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ARTICLE I.

DENOMINATIONAL EDUCATION.

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The connexion of the Church of God, with the general education of the people, is a subject in regard to which more is said, and felt, than thought. It is a subject at all times, and every where, of immense importance; and no where, and at no time, more so than at present in this country. Perhaps it may not be useless, to attempt an examination of the question, as one of principle, and to make an effort, candidly and thoroughly, to estimate the grounds upon which its determination ought to rest. It is certainly a very serious thing for the Church as a body, or any Denomination, in particular—either to omit a high duty—or to intrude violently into matters belonging to other authorities not less divinely instituted than itself. And it is therefore not without its value to recall public attention, from exhortations and emotions, delivered and excited upon this subject, as if it were one settled past doubt, in a particular way, to a serious revision of the original grounds of decision in the case, and a fair estimate of the great principles which must control it—or if they are neglected, must ultimately defeat all our attempts to control them.

There are several aspects in which our duties are obliged to be considered. if we would arrive at clear views in relation to them. We are under obligations to do many things, and to abstain from doing many things, considered merely as separate and individual beings; beings created,

each, as a power in the universe,—an activity, a personality, and in these respects, in the image of God, as remarkably as in any other: and all the issues of the eternal world will fall upon us, as do most of the great things of this present life, in this precise aspect of our being. Then we are bound together as parents and children, husbands and wives, masters and servants, guardians and wards, constituting the first and primary aggregation of individual persons—over whom rules, with divine sanction, the appointed head; and to this little state, sacred and complete, are committed countless duties, upon the right discharge of which are staked boundless results. Above this, in the weight of its power and the wideness of its reign, is that universal brotherhood, which we call the State: meaning thereby, not the government, or authority at any time existing, nor the particular form, as free or despotical,—but the great commonwealth itself: an institute of God, for the general and boundless developement of man—for his security, for his advancement, for his use and power, in all things temporal, which are beyond the sphere of his primary commonwealth—his own fireside. Neither above, nor beneath, nor to the exclusion, nor as embracing all three of these preceding conditions of being—but co-ordinately by the side of them, and for a new purpose, gathering some from all—stands the Church of the living God; not of the world, but in it—a peculiar state erected by God for special ends, all terminating in another and a higher state of being; taking no direct cognizance of any thing that is not spiritual—and taking cognizance of things, partly spiritual and partly not, only so far as they are spiritual. These are all the conditions of man, as he exists here below. He is an individual, he is a member of a family, he is a citizen, he is immortal. Whatever he can do, or ought to do, he can and ought to do, as a personality, as a member of a family, as part of the State, or as one of the household of God. In like manner, the family, the State, the Church, can do and must do, all that is capable of being done, all that is proper to be done, by any force or combination of forces, in this life, superior to the force of individual man; these being the only combinations of the force of individuals, recognized by God in this world—the only aggregate powers he has ordained—and

these so ordained as to exhaust completely, the susceptibilities and powers of man, when united with his fellows, and to comprehend absolutely, all his duties and obligations, that are not purely individual.

It is not uncommon, in our day, to hear it asserted with great emphasis: that the Church of God—nay that every particular fragment, into which, for our sins, God has allowed his Church to be broken,—is under the clearest obligations to take upon itself, and that in the widest sense, the entire education of the children of its members,—to the total exclusion of the civil power; that this duty is a strictly religious duty; and that to neglect it, is to fail grossly in duty, and incur great and lasting injuries. If this be so, then it is equally clear that the civil power is under no obligation to provide for the education of its children generally, for otherwise the Church could not be bound to interfere with the State, much less to exclude it. God is not the author of confusion. The duties of the State are civil, not sacred; the duties of the Church are sacred, not civil. To exclude the State from the control of general education, and to exempt it from the duty of providing the means thereof, it must be shown that education is of the nature of religious things, and that the duty of superintending it, is in its nature spiritual. Is not a man bound to educate himself, as an individual person? Is not every family bound to educate each other, and the head of the family peculiarly bound to educate the members? If so, are these obligations which arise out of our individual personality, and out of our family relations, in any degree at all; or do they spring solely, or chiefly, out of our obligations as members of Christ? Is a christian more bound,—or is he chiefly bound,—or is he exclusively bound; they are three degrees of the same proposition—to acquire and to impart knowledge, which has nothing to do with religion, but much to do with temporal success, and temporal usefulness; all the positive sciences for example,—simply or mainly, as a christian, and because he is christian? or is he bound, chiefly or at all, to do so, from any considerations drawn from his individual position, or his relations to his family or his country? These are considerations, and there are many more like them, that require to be deeply pondered, before we arrive at the sweeping gene-

ralities, which assume and assert that Denominational Education is the only safe and true conclusion of this "high argument."

Let us turn our attention to the obligations of the government to its people ; or in other and larger terms, the obligations of the community to itself. Considered in its broad light, the commonwealth is manifestly bound to provide for its own security, for its own progress, for its own perpetuity, for its own highest possible developement. It is, naturally, the very end of its existence, to do these things : it is, philosophically, the very mode of its existence, to be occupied in doing them ; it is, morally, the very ground of the divine sanction for its existence, that it shall do them. Of the things that tend to promote these objects, some are of that kind that falls more immediately under the sphere of individual effort, and these, the commonwealth will best use and promote, by leaving them to individual control : some fall more immediately under domestic superintendence, and these may be left, most properly, there ; some are in their nature chiefly or wholly religious—the former may be, the latter must be, left to the conscience—as being out of the reach of the State ; but such as fall under neither of these catagories, must, in the nature of the cause, and by the severe logic springing out of the very conditions of the existence of the commonwealth, fall under its direction, and be found in the immediate sphere of its duties. Is the education of mankind, one of these ? Is it a matter purely or chiefly appertaining to the Church—or if the other statement be thought more candid, purely or chiefly falling out of the proper duties of the State, that men should be taught to read and write, and be furnished with the means of education, and be encouraged to use them ? Can any community, as such, safely, justifiably, omit to provide for the universal education of the people ? Can it—we were going to say, be *guilty* of this omission ? the very phrase, and every phrase that fully expresses the idea, showing the instinctive judgment of most unprejudiced and enlightened minds ; that such an omission is really criminal—that is, that the performance of the opposite, is instinctively judged to be a duty. But if this be so, then it is not possible, that it is the duty of the Church, of the family, or of individuals, to proceed upon an hypothesis, that excludes the State from the right to perform one of its high and

manifest duties, or upon a different hypothesis, which assumes that the State has no such duty. It seems to us, it can be clearly shown, that this duty on the part of the State is manifest and transcendent, and that those common and instinctive judgments, to which we have alluded, are just and irrefragable; and, this being shown, the duties of all others, must necessarily take their complexion from this established fact; unless it can be shown that some or all others, are equally bound to provide for universal education, to the exclusion of the State, upon principles and proofs so clear and exalted, as to crush all countervailing claims and obligations; or unless it can be shown that it is nobody's duty to make such provision.

Education is an affair purely civil, purely temporal. It cannot be shown that the processes of acquiring the art of reading and writing, have any thing more to do with the spiritual operations of our being, than the processes of acquiring any other arts; for these are merely arts—arts by means of one of which, when acquired, we may ourselves proceed indefinitely in the acquisition of knowledge, and by means of the other of which we may act indefinitely in communicating knowledge. Nor can it be shown, that the processes by which any one part of knowledge, not purely moral, is acquired, is any more religious, or has any more relation to religion, than any other part of knowledge; so that every means by which any mortal acquires any knowledge, is as much liable, as the District school, to be engulfed by the Church; as indeed all have been in past ages. Nor can it be shown, that a company of boys at school, is more liable to spiritual injury, than a company of boys at a tannery or a carpenter's shop; nor that unsanctified study, as they express it, more demands, upon principle, the supervision of the Church, than unsanctified play, or unsanctified work. Nor can it be shown, that all the learning under heaven, or any part of it, except only that obtained by sitting down at the feet of the Saviour of sinners, has the least direct religious tendency whatever, or any power to make us, in God's sight, any better or any worse; the very highest attainments having nothing more to do with our spiritual condition, than the very lowest. Not only can none of these things be shown, but the very opposites of every one of them, can be clear-

ly and plainly established. If therefore there be any one thing, for which the State might venture to provide, without the remotest possibility of intruding into the province of the Church, it would seem that a provision for the universal education of the people, might be the thing.

If it is alleged that the moral influence of those who impart instruction is so great that the Church cannot safely trust the selection of them out of her own hands; then the obvious reply is, that this puts an end to society itself, and makes the Church the only power that can exist; since all that is necessary is, for any officer, or any power, to be capable of moral effects, or influences, in order to put it under the dominion of the Church. The moral influence of judges, governors, presidents, nay even sheriffs, coronors, and constables, is as real, and may be far more extensive, than that of school-masters. The moral influence of wealth, manners, tastes, is immense; that of domestic habits—nay even personal habits, often decisive. For this reason, shall the Church session sit in judgment, upon all possible conditions, all possible relations, all possible interests, that are capable of being perverted to moral evil? If not, upon what principle shall they appoint the school-master? Is he a Church officer? Are his functions ecclesiastical? The true security lies, not in putting the school under the power of the Church session, nor the appointment of the school master in that body, any more than the remedy for bad government lies in putting the Synod over the Legislature, and giving to that venerable body the appointment of Judges; but it lies in the universal diffusion of religious truth and influence, by other means, ordained of God—whereby school masters, as well as Judges and Legislators, shall become what it is fit they should be. And in the mean time, and in all possible times and circumstances, the pulpit and the fireside, the minister and the parent—not the school room and the school master, are the true and the authorised moral instructors of mankind; and in the mean time, and in all times, we must, as far as possible, avoid and discountenance bad school masters—just as we should avoid and discountenance, in all things, evil specimens of things in their own nature good.

Let it never be forgotten, when this view of the subject

is before the mind, that even the moral aspect of this question, to say nothing of its more legitimate bearings, has not proved wholly satisfactory when it has been most completely under the dominion of the Church. Has the Church—has any part of the Church, perfectly secured the object aimed at, by the most complete control of Schools and Colleges? Of what advantage to religion, has been the control of the Papal, or any other corrupt sect in past ages? Or rather, what a blessing would it not have been if no such control had existed! What has been the influence of the peculiar relations of the English universities, to the Church of England, upon the spirituality and orthodoxy of that Church? Even in Scotland, of what avail has it been, that school masters were obliged to be members of the established Church—when heretics and formalists ruled for generations the Church itself? In our own country, memorable examples are not wanting to prove that we have achieved very little in the way of giving to education a safe moral direction, when we have placed it most completely under ecclesiastical control. No delusion is more complete than that which seems to lie at the base of the present movement for Denominational control of schools and colleges, that a real security for religion is gained when the Church has a potential voice over the institutions of learning, and a profession of religion is made a fundamental condition of office in them. The real security, so far as any is needed or can be derived from the relations of education to religion, must be sought, as we have before intimated, in other quarters. If the Church cannot protect the purity of religion, without the control of education, she cannot do it by means of that control; and if she is not in a condition to do it, and that effectually, without the help of the schools, nay, we will add, in defiance of their opposition, if that were presumable, in a pure and efficient state of the Church—then her condition would be already such, that, if she controlled education, she would be at least likely to use it as a means of increasing the general deadness, formality or heresy, as in reviving the true knowing of God. This is, indubitably, the sum of the lessons which the past has taught.

We are far from saying, far from believing, that religion

is no part of education. It is the very best and greatest part of it. What we say is, that the Church has not and should not have the control of all things of which religion is the best and greatest part,—for then she would engulph the control of all things; and of most of them upon clearer grounds than general education. She should have the control of things strictly religious, and of none others; for her Master has given her this control, and no other; and right reason, as well as divine truth, limit her to this sphere as the one of her true and real power. Religion is an interest of the State; though the State, as such, is not part of the Church, still the commonwealth is ordained of God, and is as really a divine institute as the Church itself. Its office bearers are, in their place, for their appointed ends, servants of God; it may be, oftentimes, very wicked ones,—like too many in the sanctuary; but none the less really executing a divine authority on that account. It is part of their office to recognise God, and to obey him; and they omit it at their proper peril. But it is not—and this is the exact point—the duty of the Church to take away their office if they abuse it; to hinder them in any part of their vocation, or even to call them to account, except just so far as that account is purely personal to such as are members of her communion, and rests upon grounds absolutely personal.

Religion, as a distinct and most important part of knowledge; revealed religion, as the received religion of our country, so far from being excluded from general education, should be made a prominent part of it—from the primary school to the university. Divine revelation may be said to contain a distinct and authoritative republication of natural religion, and a new and further communication of the knowledge of God, and of spiritual things, such as without it, could never have been known. It is the voice of God, speaking with clearness and authority on the whole subject of man's origin, duty, destiny and hopes: the voice of Him, who ordained both the State and the Church. Most clearly, then, in a land professing to be, even nominally, Christian, this book should have a prominent place in every part of education. That it has been excluded from any system of general education, in this country, is to be attributed, mainly, if not entirely, to

two causes: first, that the Christian public has been faithless to its high obligations, and secondly, that schemes of denominational education, have withdrawn the attention of so large a portion of the Christian public from all proper regard to what was going on in systems and institutions, for which they felt but little interest or responsibility. There is no reason to doubt that the religious portion of the people, in every part of the United States, have it completely in their power, through the ordinary channels of influence accessible to them, to secure a result that ought to be perfectly satisfactory to them on this subject. In Maryland, ten years ago, by a simultaneous movement, the word of God was introduced as a reading book, first into the public schools of the city of Baltimore, and afterwards into far the greater part of the public and private schools of the State. Those who insist on going beyond this, and who require, as a part of public education, that the peculiarities of their particular sect, shall be publicly taught to all the pupils, in all the schools, manifestly require what they would not themselves be willing to concede to others, and which it is therefore absurd for them to expect that others will concede to them. For such there is no alternative but a sectarian school, and the result of the principle would be, if they could enforce it, a sectarian commonwealth as exclusive and as narrow as their sectarian school—as feeble in itself, and as liable to convulsion and decay. The narrowest of all sects, by the law of their being, are those most exposed to perpetual schism; and examples are not wanting of considerable communities, reduced to utter disorganization and dispersion, by this madness of sect—the most rabid of all madness. But all who are content to allow God to speak for himself in our schools, to the hearts and minds of our children—reserving for the fireside, the Sabbath schools, the pulpit, and the press, comment, elucidation, and thorough systematic instruction, may meet on a ground common to all, and satisfactory assuredly to most; which frees our systems of general education from the apprehension of a tendency to infidelity, which it has been diligently sought to instil into the public mind. At any rate all our arguments are for the power and duty of the State, to establish such a system as should be,—not such a system as should not

be. And it is for others to show that popular education, under the care of the State, is necessarily of irreligious tendency, before the State is robbed on that plea of a power most clear and beneficent; and to show further that popular education, under the care of the sects, is necessarily free from all similar and all equal danger, before those sects are invested with a power which does not necessarily, if at all, reside in them; and which, we must say, all past experience warns us to be cautious how we commit to their hands, while all careful consideration of the nature of things, and all large views of human progress, teach us they are not competent to wield.

Let us not be understood as intimating that the Church has no interest in the cause of general education, and no means of promoting it. Far otherwise. The Church has the utmost interest in the existence of sound and wholesome laws, and in their prompt and faithful execution, and vast influence in promoting both; but she has and should have no power, either to make or execute the laws. So as to many subjects, and amongst the rest, the one under discussion. She has the highest interest in the widest and most thorough cultivation of all mankind, and she has an immense power to promote it; it does not, therefore, follow that she should possess the power to control it, along with, much less to the exclusion of, the commonwealth; least of all, that she possesses this power and right, by a fragmentary investiture of it, in all the broken sects which disgrace her history. Very much beyond this may be said with perfect truth, when we assert, that it is the spirit of the new man, the spirit of true religion, which lies far down in the bosom of all that great movement for the temporal regeneration of mankind, which so remarkably distinguishes these latter ages. The great John Calvin is the veritable founder of the scheme of general, but let it also be carefully noted of *national*, not *denominational* education; and the baptismal vow required, in this country, of Presbyterian parents, that they will teach their children *to read* the word of God, has made an absolutely illiterate Presbyterian an almost unheard of thing—in the midst of the masses of popular ignorance, which everywhere deface our country; but this she has accomplished by an influence, not a power,

and through individual, not ecclesiastical effort. High, beneficent, transcendent, is her capacity—to advance this and every other righteous and glorious cause, but that capacity lies not in disturbing, but in holding sacred, the harmony of all things, which her master has ordained; in respecting, not obliterating, the great boundaries which define the powers and duties of man in his various positions,—boundaries, which none have a higher interest, or are under a more exalted obligation than herself, to preserve inviolate; and which it is one object of her mission to illustrate and enforce.

From this point, then, we may take a new departure. It has been shown, as we think, that the subject matter appertains strictly to the commonwealth; and even if omitted by it, rather to domestic, or even to individual than to ecclesiastical control. If the State will not do it, let it be the neighbourhood rather than the congregation. If the neighbourhood will not, let the minister do it—not as Pastor but as man. For, manifestly, the matter is not ecclesiastical; and if for reason of its incidental moral bearings, it may be made so,—so may any thing—every thing else. So also, it has been shown that the danger of evil, in the absence of ecclesiastical control, is purely imaginary, if the Church will faithfully execute its proper mission; and that when any danger really does exist, irregular intervention, nay, even exclusive control by the Church, has never and can never prevent it. And to sum up all, that there is no sort of necessity that the Church should undertake what can be otherwise better done,—seeing that her ability, to promote the very end in view, is really greater, if she will use it aright, than if she undertook to do the thing herself. Let the denominations then assume their true position—let them not call the State infidel because the laws do not teach the creed, nor the schools inculcate their peculiar dogmas; but content with the recognition of our common Christianity, admit the word of God to be sufficient for the schools, as the teacher of that part of public education which relates to religion; and unite in a common and glorious effort to advance the great interests of knowledge, and enlarge the deep foundations of freedom.

But it is not enough, perhaps, to infer the duty of the State, from its clear right to act in such a case. Its duty to provide for the general education of the people is, upon other grounds, extremely clear. The subject matter being once shown to appertain to the commonwealth, the transcendent importance of the thing itself places it among the highest concerns of the State. The value of education, in itself considered, is beyond all estimation. As a mere possession, irrespective of all things but its intrinsic excellence—the love of knowledge and the means of pursuing and imparting it, which are but the elements of education, can only be degraded by comparison with earthly treasures. Estimate, if you can, the value of education as an instrument by which other attainments may be made, and other enjoyments secured, and other victories won: its value as a training, by means of which we are fitted for higher efforts and severer labors, under capacities continually expanding in the pursuit of objects more and more exalted: its value as a distinction, the most pure and singular that is confined to this poor earth: its value as a security, and the greatest temporal security, against vice, and want, and degrading sin: its value as a solace, and the most precious earthly solace, under sorrow and disappointment and corroding care: its value as a trust to be used for the benefit of those around us—for the State itself, and for posterity: and, above all, its value as a developement of the precious stores which God's munificence has hid away in the deep secret chambers of the soul, bringing to open day his glorious handiwork, which else had lain buried in darkness forever! Oh! may not the State—*shall* not the State draw forth and cherish and hang like a diadem around her venerated brows, jewels so precious? Has the State no duty to perform except to our dying bodies, our perishing estates, our mad passions? Is nothing due to our purer and better part—to that lofty intelligence, which, though not wholly, yet more than the body, more than the soul, escaped the curse and ruin of the fall? Yea verily, we owe it to ourselves—all owe it to each—and what is that but the State owing it to every member of it—to rescue the general intellect from darkness, and to provide, to the utmost extent of its

capacity, that all may know whatever may be known — that all may be and do whatever knowledge can secure of good.

The magnitude of the work of educating the community, places it wholly beyond the reach of individual means and voluntary efforts. Even the humblest system of common school education, in which nothing but the bare tuition is estimated, and no supervision but that which might be required to keep the system in motion is contemplated — would, if it extended over one State of medium size, and proposed even to assist the poor, much less to instruct all the pupils by means of a common fund, be found, in all respects, beyond the power of private means and purely moral influences. To instruct 100,000 children in the rudiments of knowledge, six months every year, would require in the middle States, for tuition alone, from five hundred to eight hundred thousand dollars every year, and would demand about three thousand teachers. There are in the United States, at present, six or seven millions of children and youth, of suitable ages to be at school, and the number is increasing with great rapidity. Now it is a very simple thing and easily done, for a Church Court to pass orders recommending the establishment of good schools in all the congregations, and good Academies in all the Presbyteries, and good Colleges in all the Synods; and it is not very difficult to draw up and publish paper schemes, in which the work is done — and it is not impossible to get agents to pervade the Churches and solicit and collect considerable funds: and it may, with more difficulty, be achieved, that a few active, enlightened and philanthropic persons, in various localities, will go earnestly to work, to do something, and a good deal may be done; but whatever is done, we undertake to say, is done in most instances by the individual activity and wisdom of particular persons, and that the denominational control and power lay chiefly, if not wholly, in counsel and encouragement — not in creating or sustaining. But after all that can be done has been done by all the denominations, in this manner, does any one really imagine that a serious approach is made towards educating six or seven millions of persons — that the two hun-

dred thousand teachers who must be had, have been called into existence and designated to their particular fields of labor—that the edifices have been erected necessary to accommodate these vast armies of youth—that the means have been provided to procure libraries and other aids for the instruction of such multitudes—that the perpetuation and expansion of the system have been adequately secured—that any organization, deserving the name of *system*, has been effected, or that any adequate control, superintendence or direction has been provided? It is, as it appears to us, utterly absurd to make any such pretension. Education is so great a necessity and so great an attainment that many individuals and neighborhoods will have schools where it is possible to establish them by the means at their disposal; and the people of God see such clear and controlling reasons for promoting sound and extensive learning, that they will, by one means and another, provide colleges for the education of their youth, especially those who expect to preach the Gospel: and the power of the principle of association is so vast, that private means, under its operation, and stimulated by moral influences, may accomplish immense results—and, by the intervention of boards of trustees, charters, and other helps from the State, great efficiency and duration may be secured—not, however, without great risk. But what does all this amount to when we come to argue the great principles involved, and to contemplate the boundless and endless work of educating all mankind, through all ages, in all knowledge? Nothing short of the whole resources of commonwealths, laid under such contribution as the whole power of commonwealths alone can enforce, and directed with a unity and comprehensiveness which absolutely demand the presence and authority of the State—is adequate to the result professed to be desired. If we admit that general education is in any sense so important or desirable that any duty arises any where to make any attempt to secure it, that admission necessarily draws after it the consequence that this duty devolves on the commonwealth, not only because the whole case is exactly analogous to all other cases in which similar duties rest on the State, but because it is utterly beyond the power,

and absolutely heterogeneous to the nature and action of every other person, natural, artificial, political, or spiritual, that exists amongst men.

We do not hesitate to say, that a new proof of the existence of this obligation on the part of the State, is to be found in the very tendency of denominational and other insufficient efforts, to perform partially and amiss the great work, which the human race is so deeply interested in having performed fully and aright. If every denomination were to carry out at large, a denominational scheme covering the whole sect, and embracing the whole round of knowledge, which they might see fit to incalculute, the result would be better indeed than universal ignorance—but worse, in our judgment, than might have been achieved by the spontaneous action of mankind, to the exclusion both of the State and the denominations. In this country a very large part of the population would be excluded after all the denominations had counted up their hosts. Is no provision to be made for them?—or are they to be reduced to elect between ignorance and sectarianism?—or is the State to set up a separate scheme for them, or allow them to do it for themselves? which two latter things, as the remnant is no sect, and as the State has no business with education, might be excluded from the possibilities of the case. The sects, in every part of the Union, are mingled by residence amongst each other, in such a manner that when their schemes are carried out, we shall have school against School, Academy against Academy, and College against College—in the rich and populous regions; and then wide tracts of country sparsely peopled by the poor, left destitute. Let it be remembered also, that some of the sects are, according to the judgment of others—and certainly according to our own, wholly unfit to be trusted with the education of the people, an unfitness doubly manifest if the connexion between education and religion, which is really the only pretext for denominational education that has the least force, be brought into the account. In the midst of such a condition of things, the State has other considerations, if possible, still more important, to be weighed before she can consent to allow such miseries to afflict the community, through her neglect. Is it nothing to her, is it nothing to us all, that the whole community, from tenderest infancy to mature

age, should be trained up in the narrow and bitter spirit of sect? Has the State no interest in presenting herself to her children, as their common parent, and filling their young minds with sentiments of gratitude and reverence towards her, and binding their affections to each other, as brothers whose great strife is to be, who shall best serve and most love her? They have carelessly read the history of the past, who are not aware that the most serious difficulties in the conduct of human affairs, may spring from any heterogeneousness in the composition of society, from radical differences in religious opinions, or through alienations upon religious topics, as fruitfully as from any other source. Is it the interest of the commonwealth that her people should be so trained as to promote in the very highest degree, the activity of every heterogeneous particle in her composition? If so, let her stand still, till the zeal of sect shall have done its work, with such an educational movement as that our age witnesses. In fine, what can denominations, comparatively small, thoroughly disunited, liable to constant change, actuated by considerations of their own particular interests, and altogether embracing only a part of the whole community, accomplish, of good or great, by separate action in such a field as this, compared with what may be accomplished, by the united, vigorous, consistent, sustained power of the State itself? Were it not better to prevent so great a cause, from being so signally abused? And is not the certainty of such a result, in the absence of all intervention by the State, a sufficient call to her, to enter earnestly upon it herself?

This great duty of the commonwealth, clear in itself, and of universal obligation—becomes more palpable and more stringent when it falls upon States peculiarly organized, or upon States placed in particular circumstances. The progress of society creates new obligations, and gives higher sanctions to those already existing. The development of civilization places in new and conspicuous lights the value of knowledge, which is at once its deepest cause and its noblest offspring. If freedom is to be the heritage of man, knowledge must be so too. Free institutions, to become universal, must bear along with them universal education. If there be any exception to these statements

they are few and uncertain, and will be found to exist where a safeguard against ignorance in free governments has been sought, on the one hand, in some limitation of the Democratic element, or on the other, in a more exalted training of that part of the community that was trained at all. The lessons of experience, the meditations of philosophy, and the light from heaven, all direct us to the same career—by the same assured way. The fanaticism which despises the State, and the infidelity which contemns the Church—are both alike the product of ignorance and folly. God has established both the Church and the State. It is as clearly our duty to be loyal and enlightened citizens, as to be faithful and earnest Christians. Instead of promoting, we are sacrificing the interests of humanity, when we put at hazard great and lasting advantages, through an unwise devotion to interests which, though real, are less conspicuous, and which may be better secured, so far as it is right to secure them, in some other form. Is it better that all men were enlightened, and the tenth part of them Presbyterians?—or is it better that all but the tenth part of men remain in ignorance, and that tenth be exclusively and intensely Presbyterian? God is not honoured by our making devotion to some dogma not in itself fundamental—the means or even the occasion of robbing millions of his creatures of costly benefits, for which they sigh in vain, and in vain stretch out to us imploring hands. Religion is not honoured, and patriotism and humanity are outraged, when, on narrow and insufficient pretexts, we snap the great bond of human brotherhood, and deride our country as unworthy of our trust, in her just and noble efforts to promote lawful objects, to which we say we are devoted. Surely, here, if any where, in free and Christian America, the State is bound and the State may be trusted to occupy this vast field of exertion; and here, if any where, every hand should help her, every voice applaud her, every heart bless her for her work.

Of all the Christian denominations, it has seemed to us most remarkable that Presbyterians should be assailed with personal and sectarian appeals to separate themselves from the body of the people in their efforts to promote the spread of knowledge. What conceivable advantage are we to

reap from such a course? What part of our past history justifies such appeals? What portion of our principles invites such attempts? Shall a people, famous from the first, for their patriotic devotion to all States they have dwelt in, by some new impulse rebel against all States in one of the most beneficent of all attempts to exercise the civil power? Shall a people, renowned for its steadfast love of knowledge, and its great exertions to promote universal education, rise up in arms against the only possible method in which, and the only existing power by which its cherished desires may all be gratified? Shall a people, more capable than any other of doing good, by acting with all—and more certain than any other of suffering harm by separating from them, shrink from the sublime vocation of directing a great, and, in its consequences, interminable movement of the human mind, and establish for itself a voluntary and fatal paralysis, by drawing tightly around its noble and free proportions the cold and frigid bonds of sect? Never—never. The Presbyterian Church loves its creed, comprehends its interests as a denomination, is faithful to its peculiar mission among the branches of Christ's people, and will execute firmly and steadily its own special objects, in its own chosen way. But the Presbyterian Church in this country is composed of free citizens of free commonwealths—and her members will accept the mission which is given to them as patriots, no less than the mission given to them as Calvinists—their vocation as Americans no less than their vocation as Presbyterians. She will be true to her noble history, her high instincts, her exalted destiny; and throughout America a more cordial and unanimous support to every fair system of general education, and to every part of every such system will be accorded to no commonwealth, by any sect, than the great body of the Presbyterian people will give to all, every where. Narrow views may be put forth in her name; they are not hers. Idle fears may be expressed on her behalf; she does not cherish them. Unworthy motives may be held out to her; they will not move her. Weak, timid or selfish counsels may appear for a time to gain her consent, but the calm, final, settled purpose, the true, earnest, cordial action she will take at last, will be in full accord with the spirit of the age.

We do not pretend to say, that education by the State, or by the Church, or by any body else, can ever make man what he ought to become. But without it, he never can approach to his full stature. It is therefore one of the highest human interests. To place it on its true foundation—to commit its management to the proper authority—to urge forward its majestic progress—are points, therefore, of general and vast importance. It has been manifest, for some years past, that great efforts were to be made to divert the Christian public from all co-operation in the support of schemes of education and institutions of learning supported by the State, and enlist them, as far as possible, in schemes and efforts purely denominational. At first, the main argument was, that the State schools and colleges were not safe, in a religious point of view; more recently, it has been largely urged that it is the peculiar duty of the Church to establish and conduct schools. It is not therefore amiss to have inquired how far the very want of alleged safety in the public schools and colleges is not the fault of the Church herself—and to have shown that the pretension now set up for ecclesiastical control over general education is utterly absurd, and without the shadow of a foundation in religion, in reason, or in our political or ecclesiastical systems. General education, by means of denominational control, if not a contradiction in terms, is a pure figment of the imagination, incapable of practical execution, and destitute of all grounds of rational support; and its logical advocacy involves the denial to the State of some of its clearest rights, and the subversion of some of its highest obligations—while it sacrifices all hope of the general education of mankind, upon the altar of sectarian bigotry and cant.

ARTICLE II.

THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSY.

This controversy occurred in the early part of the fifth century. The individuals, principally concerned in it, were Augustine on the one side, and Pelagius and Celestius on the other.

Augustine, bishop of Hippo, (now Bona, in Northern Africa,) was born at Tagaste, an obscure village in Numidia, A. D. 354. His father remained a Pagan till near the close of life, but his mother was an eminently devoted Christian. He is to be classed, therefore, with many other excellent Christians, who have owed, not their usefulness only, but their salvation, to the influence of a pious mother. Augustine's advantages of education were good, and his talents of the highest order; but his early life was one of continued debauchery and wickedness. In philosophy he was a Manichee, and by profession a teacher of rhetoric and oratory. In the exercise of his profession, after visiting several other cities, he came to Milan; and here, under the searching ministry of Ambrose, his heart was touched, and he was brought to consideration and repentance. His convictions of sin were deep, painful, I had almost said *terrible*, and abiding. He has detailed them at length in his Confessions—a work well worthy the study of the child of God, in every age. His conversion was eminently satisfactory,—very like to those which sometimes occur in our best modern revivals; old things passed away with him; all things became spiritually new; and he was prepared, at once, to renounce his flattering worldly prospects, and consecrate his cultivated and brilliant powers to the service of God in the Gospel of His Son.

Augustine was thirty-three years of age at the time of his conversion. Subsequent to this, he lived more than forty years, and was, under Christ, the great luminary of the Church. He was specially instrumental in reviving and diffusing spiritual, evangelical religion, and in restoring, in some good degree, the theology of Paul.

As to the particular doctrines of Augustine, there never

has been, nor can there be much dispute. He taught the natural and total corruption of man, connecting it with the first sin of Adam, and considering it as, somehow, propagated to the race. He taught the necessity and the efficacy of divine grace, not only to carry forward, but to *commence* the work of recovery in the depraved heart of man. There was nothing good in that heart naturally, and never could be, unless God, by His grace, interposed to excite it. Hence, predestination, with him, was not conditioned on foreseen holiness, but was a predestination *to* holiness and consequent salvation;—"predestined *to be* conformed to the image of His Son." Still, Augustine's predestination did not run into fatality, or lead him to deny the proper free agency of man. "God could so influence men," he said, "that being awakened, drawn, touched, and enlightened, *they would follow* without any resistance to the grace operating upon their will. God calls in a way which is so befitting, that the subject is drawn by Him who calls, and yet *follows with freedom*."

Augustine did not come into the belief of his system of doctrines at once. He was led along by degrees—chiefly through the study of Paul's epistles, and by the teachings and influence of the Holy Spirit—to the full discovery and adoption of them, and to an earnest inculcation and defence of them, in all his after life. For several years after his conversion, he held to the self-determining power of the will, and believed that the influences of divine grace, without which none could be saved, "were conditioned on the subjective bent of the will to holiness." A little later, his views on the subject were modified, and he represents recovering grace as conditioned on *faith*. "As man can perform nothing good before his renewal, so he can merit nothing—grace precedes all desert. Still, there is nothing arbitrary on the part of God when he gives to some, and withholds from others, that grace by which they obtain salvation; since men obtain this grace by *faith*, and faith is wholly the work of man."

It is clear, however, that a mind like that of Augustine could not long rest in views such as these. He soon came to see and to say, that "the desert of faith does not *precede* God's mercy, but *presupposes* this mercy. Faith it-

self is one of the gifts of grace," and thus he came to the conclusion—for he could come to no other—that the reason why God rescues some, rather than others, from the destruction into which all had plunged themselves, lies in the incomprehensible counsels of his own will. At the same time he insisted, that neither the justice nor the impartiality of God was at all impeached. Not his justice; since those who are lost are treated no worse than they deserve. Not his impartiality; since it is to be supposed that God has good and sufficient reasons for the dispensation of his grace, though we may not be able so much as to conjecture what these reasons are.

I have said that Augustine did not come into a belief of his system of doctrines *at once*. It ought to be added, that he was not led into them, as many have pretended, in consequence of his controversy with Pelagius. So far from this, he was led unwillingly into his controversy with Pelagius, in consequence of his holding and revering these doctrines. He learned them, as I have before remarked, in the Bible, and in his own conscious experience. He was taught them by the Holy Ghost. And it may be shown to a certainty that he came to an open profession of them, at least ten years previous to the Pelagian controversy. This controversy did not commence till about the year 412, whereas Augustine had waded through all the preliminaries in the progress of his opinions, and had become settled in his theological views, as early as the year 397.

Of the particulars of the early life of Pelagius, we know but little. He was a native of Britain, but neither the place nor date of his birth has been recorded. He never aspired to the clerical office, but was a monk and a layman to the day of his death. He visited the monasteries in different parts of the Roman empire, previous to the disclosure of his heretical opinions, and was every where esteemed, not only for his intelligence, but for the excellence of his moral character. Such is the testimony which Augustine gives of him, and it is confirmed by a variety of other evidence. Accordingly, it was with great reluctance, and under the most solemn convictions of duty, that Augustine came into conflict with him.

As to the real sentiments of Pelagius, there has been

little or no dispute. He held that the sin of Adam affected only himself. It exerted no injurious influence upon the natural state and character of his posterity. Men come into the world as innocent as Adam in Paradise ; as innocent as they would have been, if he had not sinned. They have not only no inherited sin, but no natural *prone-ness* or *tendency* to sin ; so that all the sin which there is in the world, may be traced to bad examples, to injurious moral influences, to external temptations, and not to any inherent corruption.


Pelagius also held that *perfection in this life* is no very difficult or uncommon attainment. Many persons have been perfect, and some have been *more* than perfect. They have done more than the moral law requires. This is particularly true of the more rigid and abstemious of the monks, who voluntarily subject themselves to great austerities and privations.

Pelagius had much to say, in terms, of *the grace of God*, of our need of it, and of the obligations we are under to God for it. But, by divine grace, he only understood divine instructions—outward appliances and means, and never an influence from God, exerted directly upon the heart, exciting it to the exercise and practice of holiness.

How early Pelagius came to entertain opinions such as these, it is impossible now to ascertain. It is certain that he did not divulge them till late in life, and then not openly, but with the utmost precaution. It was his custom to start *queries* concerning the doctrines of the Church, and these, not as having originated with himself, but with others.

Near the beginning of the fifth century, we find Pelagius established at Rome, where he was engaged in writing a commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. Among those, who were here converted to his views, was a distinguished young advocate, by name Celestius. Celestius was much younger than Pelagius, and much more bold and decided in the expression of his opinions. He was a native of Ireland, and ever after his acquaintance with Pelagius, was his devoted follower and friend.

When Rome was taken by the Goths, about the year 410, great numbers of the people fled into Africa : and among the rest, Pelagius and Celestius. Augustine met



them once or twice at Carthage, but nothing material passed between them. Pelagius soon retired from Africa, and travelled through Egypt into Palestine, leaving Celestius at Carthage.

It was during the stay of Celestius at Carthage, that the Pelagian controversy may be said to have commenced. Celestius wished to become a presbyter, and proposed himself as a candidate for ordination. As he labored under some suspicions, with regard to his soundness in the faith, he was brought before a Synod, and Paulinus, a deacon of the Church, at Milan, appeared as his accuser. Six heretical propositions were charged upon him, all growing out of the first and leading one, viz: that "the sin of Adam had injured only himself, and not the whole human race." The answers of Celestius were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was excluded from the fellowship of the Church.

Meanwhile Pelagius had arrived in Palestine, where the tone of feeling on these subjects was very different from that prevailing in Africa, and where some of the leading ecclesiastics were not unwilling to receive him. There was one, however, with whom he could find no favor. This was Jerome, a brother monk,—a petulant, ill-natured man, but the most distinguished biblical scholar of his age. Jerome was now residing at Bethlehem, surrounded with flatterers and scholars of both sexes, and pursuing with diligence the study of the Bible. Defective as was his character in some respects, Jerome seems to have correctly apprehended the natural state and character of man, and his need of the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit, in order to his salvation. Of course, he could not endure the theology of Pelagius, and it was through his influence, chiefly, that the latter was brought before a Synod, assembled at Jerusalem, A. D. 415.

His accuser, on this occasion, was Paul Orosius, a particular friend of Augustine, and one of the pupils of Jerome. But John, bishop of Jerusalem, was little better than a Pelagian himself. He paid no regard to the charges preferred against Pelagius, accepted his excuses, and instead of condemning him, he was inclined to treat him with peculiar honor. He allowed him, though a layman, to take a seat among his presbyters; a proceeding for

which, by some members of the Synod, he was severely censured.

The accusers of Pelagius, finding that they could accomplish nothing, proposed that the case should be referred to Innocent, bishop of Rome. This was the more reasonable, as the individual accused was of Western origin, and had long been a resident at Rome. In view of these considerations, the Synod and bishop of Jerusalem gave their consent, and the case was referred accordingly.

Little satisfied with the issue of this first trial, the opposers of Pelagius resolved upon another. A council was convened at Diospolis, under the direction of Eulogius, bishop of Cesarea, before which the heresiarch was summoned to appear. But he came forward with his old evasions. He believed not only in free will, but in the sinfulness of human character, and in the necessity of divine grace—in his sense of the term grace—in order to man's salvation. Some of the propositions which had been proved against Celestius, were brought forward ; but for these he was not at all responsible. He even consented to condemn them. His judges, or a majority of them, were satisfied—Pelagius was acquitted, and recognised as a true and faithful member of the Catholic Church.

The decisions of these two councils, were now made the most of by Pelagius and his party, in vindication of their orthodoxy. Their opponents, however, were far from being satisfied. Jerome did not hesitate to charge the Synods themselves with heresy ; while Augustine, more charitably, insisted that they did not understand Pelagius ; that they had been deceived by his subterfuges and evasions ; and that by the anathemas which they had prescribed to him, and to which he had consented, they had in reality condemned his peculiar doctrines.

As, by the decision of the first council, the matter was to come before the bishop of Rome, both parties undertook to justify themselves to him, and to prepare his mind for a favorable issue. Three letters were addressed to him, A. D. 416, by the North African Church, in which the errors of Pelagius were fully set forth ; in which he was accused of maintaining free will, in such sense as to exclude the necessity of grace, at least in the proper Christian sense of the term. In connection with the let-

ters, they also sent to Innocent one of Pelagius's books, in which they had marked several passages for special consideration.

Pelagius and Celestius sought, also, to justify themselves to the Roman bishop. Pelagius wrote him a long letter, in which he defended himself against the charge of his adversaries. At the same time, he sent a confession of faith, setting forth his orthodoxy, more especially on the points not connected with this controversy.

Innocent received these communications, and was preparing to act upon them. He seems to have been sincerely inclined to the Augustinian views. But before a formal decision could be had, he was removed by death.

He was succeeded by Zosimus, whose doctrinal predilections were very different from those of his predecessor. He favored the Pelagians: and when this came to be generally known, it was found that a strong party at Rome entertained the same opinions. It was under these favorable circumstances that Celestius himself arrived in the city. He had several interviews with Zosimus, in which he endeavored to persuade him that the matters in dispute touched no important point of doctrine; that they were questions of mere speculative controversy, relating to the propagation of sin, and the origin of souls, about which philosophers and Christians had always been allowed to differ. He insisted that himself and Pelagius held firmly to the doctrines, both of free will and grace, and that the differences of opinion, concerning the nature of divine grace, and the mode of its operation, belonged only to the schools.

These explanations were enough to satisfy the easy mind of Zosimus. Accordingly he wrote to the African bishops, charging them with having decided the matter too hastily, and giving the most unequivocal testimony to the orthodoxy of Pelagius and Celestius. Of Pelagius's letter he said: "How surprised and rejoiced were all the pious men who heard it! Scarcely could some refrain from tears, to find that one so thoroughly orthodox had been made the object of so much suspicion. There was hardly a passage in the letter where grace, or the divine assistance, was not mentioned." He sternly rebuked the African bishops for their too great zeal and officiousness in

this matter, and entreated them, in the name and authority of the Apostolic see, that they would restrain their curiosity, and submit their reason to the decisions of the Bible and of the Church.

It will be readily supposed that Augustine and his brother bishops, would not sit down very submissively under such a rebuke. They were conscious of understanding the matter better than the new made bishop of Rome; and the time had not arrived when his letters carried with them any special spiritual terrors. They returned him a respectful answer; but without waiting for his more formal decision, they immediately summoned a council at Carthage, before which all the points in the controversy were thoroughly examined, and Pelagianism was strongly condemned. In their result, the members of this council set forth the corruption of human nature, through the sin of Adam; they exposed the shifts and subterfuges of the Pelagians, in their use of the term grace; they defined grace to be an inward communication of the divine life, from which all good actions spring. In opposition to those who said, that grace only renders the performance of duty more easy, they quoted the express words of the Saviour. "Without me, ye can do nothing." It has been intimated, too, though not proved, that they interceded with the *civil powers*, to exert their authority in the case, and restore peace to the Church. At any rate, from the year 418, and onwards, there were issued several imperial edicts, couched in a style more theological than political, condemning Pelagius and his adherents.

Against such an influence, the infallible bishop of Rome could not long maintain his ground. He summoned Celestius to appear before him, and submit to another examination; but the crafty heretic, foreseeing the result, hastily left the city. Upon this, Zosimus issued a circular letter in which (in express contradiction of his former views) he pronounced the condemnation of Pelagius and Celestius. He adopted, in full, the decisions of the late council of Carthage, and declared himself, on all the contested doctrines, to accord with the views of the North African Church. By the authority of the Emperor, this letter of Zosimus was circulated through the whole Western Church, and all bishops were required to subscribe to

it. Those who refused (and there were some such) were banished from their Churches and deposed.

I have said that Celestius fled from Rome previous to the condemnation of his opinions by Zosimus. We next hear of him at Constantinople, where he was opposed by Atticus, the bishop, and where he was again condemned.

Pelagius, who had remained all this while in Palestine, complained bitterly of the treatment he had received, and by evasive answers and ambiguous statements, continued to impose on those around him. It was under these circumstances that Augustine wrote his treatise on "Original Sin and the Grace of Christ," which opened the eyes of many as to the real nature and importance of the subjects in dispute.

About the year 420, Celestius appeared again at Rome; but he was not suffered to remain. The probability is, that both he and Pelagius retired into Britain, and spent the remainder of their lives in obscurity. We hear little or nothing concerning either of them afterwards.

The Pelagian heresy, however, did not die, when its original promoters had retired from the scene. The controversy was for a time continued, by the adherents of Pelagius; and chiefly by Julian, the deposed bishop of Eclanum. He was a young man, of much spirit and self-conceit, and the more in earnest, since he had lost his office on account of his adherence to the Pelagian doctrines. He represented himself as the little David, who was to fight against the Goliath of Hippo; and his proposition was to decide the contest by single combat, while the rest of the Church should be in peace.

In reply to his boastings, Augustine asked: "Who promised you a single combat on my side? Where, when, was the promise made? Who were present? Who the arbiters? Far be it from me to assume to myself, in the general Church, what you are not ashamed to do among the Pelagians. I am one of the many, who refute your profane novelties as we can."

The most specious argument urged by Julian, was the use which had been made of the civil power, in opposition to his party. With *our* notions of religious freedom, this certainly cannot be justified; though it was quite in accordance with the spirit and customs of the fifth century.

It is no more than the Pelagians would have done, had they been in a situation to attempt it with any prospect of success.

Julian also complained that "the dregs of the people," as he was pleased to call them,—“mariners, cooks, butchers,” &c. were stirred up against his party. But the chief priests and Pharisees might have urged the same objection against the Saviour and his apostles. “Not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called.” It was the *common people* who heard Christ gladly.

Finding no encouragement in the West, Julian passed over to Constantinople and the East, hoping to ingratiate himself with Theodore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, Nestorius, and other distinguished ecclesiastics of Asia. But here again he was disappointed. Though his views harmonized, on some points, with the individuals who have been named, on others there was a direct repugnance; and that same council of Ephesus which condemned Nestorius, (A. D. 431,) condemned also the Pelagians.

From this period, pure Pelagianism passed into comparative obscurity. Little more was heard of it for a long course of years. A doctrine which repudiated the fall of man, and set aside the necessity of sanctifying grace, could gain no favor with the Church.

Still, there was a pretty large class of christians in the Western Church, who, as they could not accept the system of Pelagius on the one hand, so neither could they embrace the doctrines of Augustine on the other. They sought to compromise the matter, to split the difference, and between the two to construct a theory which should be more nearly in accordance with the truth than either. Hence the origin of what has been called semi-Pelagianism.

The principal advocate and supporter of this doctrine, in the ancient Church, was John Cassian. He was a Scythian monk, who came from the country bordering on the Black sea. After long travels in the East and the West, he settled, at length, at Marseilles, where he was the founder and abbot of a famous cloister. It is probable that his eastern education had prepared him to disrelish the doctrine of Augustine, and he early appeared in the number

of those who excepted against it. Still, he was not willing to go the whole length of Pelagianism. He recognised the universal corruption of human nature, in consequence of the first transgression, and also the necessity of grace, and of justification; but held that the bestowment of grace is conditioned on the free self-determination of the human will. And yet, strange to tell, he taught that in some cases, though not in all, grace is *prevenient*. "The question," he says, "has been much discussed, whether free will depends on grace, or grace on free will." But this question does not admit of an answer which will apply to all cases. In some instances, the first incitements to goodness are from the grace of God; in others, they are from the will of the individual, which divine grace meets, supports, and strengthens, till renovation and recovery are secured. As examples of the former class, Cassian cites Matthew the publican, and Saul of Tarsus. As instances of the latter, he mentions Zaccheus, and the thief on the cross, whose craving spirits, taking the kingdom of God by violence, anticipated the call of *prevenient* grace.

Thus taught Cassian, in the fifth century; and his doctrine found great acceptance with many of the Gallic monks and bishops. There were others, however, who clung to the entire system of Augustine, and who regarded the new explications as heretical and dangerous. Foremost among these was Prosper of Aquitaine, and Hilary, bishop of Ailes. These men addressed a letter to Augustine, who was yet alive, informing him of the recent movement among the monks, and imploring that he would again appear, in defence of assailed and perverted truth.

In answer to this request, Augustine wrote his two books, on "the Predestination of the Saints," and "the Grace of Perseverance." In these works, which are characterized by great moderation, he gives Cassian and his followers credit for all the truth which their system contains; while, at the same time, he wonders that they should represent the grace of God as in any cases, depending on human merit. He re-affirms all that he had ever said as to the sovereignty of divine grace, and unconditional election, and shows that these doctrines, though liable, like most others, to be perverted and abused, were not, for that reason, to be concealed. With the necessary explanations and precautions they ought to be held forth and preached.

These works of Augustine, however able and convincing in themselves, seem to have had but little effect upon those for whose benefit they were specially intended. The semi-Pelagians continued to teach and write as before; and Augustine forbearing to prolong the controversy, suffered it to pass over into the hands of Prosper and Hilary.

These men continued to assail the semi-Pelagians both in poetry and in prose. The poem of Prosper, entitled "*Carmen de Ingratis*," is a singular specimen of polemics in verse, and is well worthy a perusal, if not a translation. Referring to his opponents, the writer asks: "Do these men consider it a shame, that Christ will, one day, be *all in all* to the redeemed? And why should they be ashamed, in this present vale of sorrow, to be mighty *through God*, and to have in them as little as possible of their own, which is nothing but sin?"

Prosper endeavored, in various ways, to bring the authority of Rome to bear upon the semi-Pelagians, as it had before done upon the Pelagians; but for a time without any decided effect. Nothing remained, therefore, but to discuss points of difference, and to harmonize views as far as possible. A remarkable work appeared, about this time, which is commonly ascribed to Prosper, entitled "*De Vocatione Gentium*," which, while it advocates the system of Augustine, disrobes it of its more objectionable features, and exhibits it in a way not likely to give offence. This evidently produced a very considerable effect. Individuals were raised up, here and there, who adopted and advocated the same general views.

At length a Synod was held in the South of France,—the very seat and focus of the semi-Pelagian errors—in which these doctrines were formally condemned, and the system of Augustine, so far as relates to depravity and grace, was approved. This decision was re-affirmed by a subsequent council, and afterwards by Boniface II. bishop of Rome. The pontiff, in his letter, describes the followers of Cassian as "offshoots from Pelagianism, who refused to acknowledge grace as the cause of faith, and considered that to be a work of corrupted nature, which could only be a work of Christ."

I conclude this brief sketch of the Pelagian controversy, with a still briefer notice of the closing labors and trials

of the venerable Augustine. He had set apart the last years of life for revising and completing his theological works. He commenced with preparing what he called his *Retractiones*; which is no other than a critique on his own writings. Some of his followers would scarcely admit that he could be in error; but he made no such pretensions himself. He rejoiced in the confession that he had made some progress in the truth, and was not ashamed to expose, before his death, what he regarded as his earlier errors.

Augustine lived to see Northern Africa overrun, and his beloved Hippo besieged, by the ruthless Vandals. In the prospect of approaching trials and sufferings, it was his daily prayer,—either that God would deliver the city, or that he would give to his servants grace to endure whatever might be inflicted, or that he might himself be taken out of the world. In the last particular (we hope in the second) his prayer was heard. In the third month of the siege (which lasted fourteen months in all) the great Augustine was taken to his rest. He died, A. D. 429, in the 76th year of his age. And though we are far from endorsing all that Augustine wrote and taught, still, we doubt whether the man has lived, since the days of Paul, the influence of whose writings upon the religious world has been so great, so enduring, and on the whole so happy, as those of the renowned bishop of Hippo.

ARTICLE III.

A PLEA FOR DOCTRINE AS THE INSTRUMENT OF SANCTIFICATION.

That a deeply seated prejudice exists in many parts of the Church against the systematic exposition of the doctrines of the Bible, is too obvious a fact to be questioned. It probably falls within the experience of every pastor, to see the gathering frown, the averted shoulder, and the drooping head, as soon as certain doctrines are announced

as the theme for discussion. It does not excite our surprise, that the world of the ungodly should manifest this displeasure : for the same "carnal mind" which is "enmity against God," is enmity likewise against the truth of God. But that professing Christians should engage in this unholy crusade against doctrinal religion, and that even ministers of the gospel should sigh over the earnest proclamation of its truths, and accuse the faithful witnesses of "daubing with untempered mortar," is certainly a most afflictive and atrocious scandal.

Yet this strange phenomenon is not inexplicable. In the case of some, it is owing to a latent scepticism of the doctrines themselves. Having received them upon trust, an heir-loom from their fathers, they have felt neither interest nor zeal enough to carry them through the labour of a thorough and independent investigation. If it be not easy to prove the truth of these tenets, it is still more difficult to disprove : yielding therefore to the indolence of scepticism, they find it an easier, and far less responsible, disposal to class these doctrines among the *αντιλεγόμενα*—the things that are spoken against, and of course doubtful. And does not the great apostle himself exhort us not to engage in "doubtful disputations?" All publication of these disputed topics then is decided to be a wicked agitation of the Church ; and the luckless incendiary must undergo the tortures which inquisitorial hands have made ready. He may live in charity with all mankind, and his love be attested by the most abundant labours, still he is branded upon the cheek as a bigot and a sectary. He may entreat sinners even with tears, and lay his appeals scorching hot upon the conscience, and cause the hair to stand on end with his frightful warnings ; yet if he graft his appeal upon a doctrine, he is cold as an iceberg, and his eloquence is but miserable croaking.

In the case of others, this opposition to doctrinal preaching results from too timid concessions to the clamours of the ungodly. It is an old device of the adversary to drown the gospel by the sound of haut-boys and kettle-drums. That, for example, was a pretty artifice to set an ancient city by the ears, and to lead the chorus, "great is Diana of the Ephesians ;" for it effectually stopped the mouth of Paul,

and saved the labour and the uncertain issue of an argument. The devil is not less "full of all subtlety" now than he was then : and when the world which "lieth in wickedness" lifts its voice against the gospel, "some crying one thing and some another," the timid Christian, not understanding who it is that stirreth the uproar, proposes a parley : "let us speak softly to them and thus endeavour to catch them with guile." Experience ought to show that it is a crazy enterprize to outcraft the devil, and an enterprize in which the Nathaniels will most likely have the disadvantage. A doctrine, so effectually disguised as to be smuggled through the sinner's "carnal mind" without awakening opposition, will be equally ineffective, whether preached or suppressed. Nay, if we will for the most part cover the austere features of religion with a becoming cap, we may readily gain permission to make an occasional show of valour. Satan himself will consent to our showing up even the doctrine of reprobation, and that with flourish of trumpets, if it be only once in the year. He may well afford to compromise with our consciences for one sabbath, if we compromise with him for the remaining fifty-one. There are ministers of the word of whom this is but too truthful a likeness : after a careful and studied suppression of all the distinctive points in their creed, once in a while (perhaps at Synodical and Presbyterial meetings, where they are strong because strongly backed) they make a sally from some one of the five points, and then retreat hastily again into the citadel—prodigiously elated with their own valour, while all the world beside knows it only as the shameful confession of their habitual cowardice. Another form in which the same spirit of concession exhibits itself, is the craven apology which too often accompanies the truth when it is preached. The sinner cannot be told that he is a sinner and deserves to be damned, unless the message is preceded with a thousand regrets that his feelings should be hurt in the matter ; and God cannot be suffered his divine prerogative "to have mercy upon whom he will have mercy, and whom he wills to harden," until it be first covered by a blasphemous apology from the preacher. How many ministers of the word are thus systematically giving aid and comfort to the spirit of rebellion and infidelity, so rampant upon this apostate globe, is

doubtless reserved among the terrible revelations of the judgement day. But that many, through excessive fear of exciting the prejudices of men, fail to preach the offensive doctrines of the cross with a bold and manly tone, is too painfully forced upon our daily observation.

A third reason for the existence of this zeal against doctrine is a violent spirit of party and sect. This may appear strange to those who can account for the Christian's love for the truth only upon the ground of bigotry. Yet does this charge lie with more force upon the other side. Amid the clashing of denominations, not a few betray great uneasiness lest the characteristic views of their sect should drive away some to another communion, and thus the Church of their party be shorn of its proportions. With such, the question whether souls are led to Christ Jesus the Lord is wholly subordinate to this, whether they are led to *them and to their side*.

A fourth cause of this outcry against the inculcation of doctrine is found in the indolence and sluggishness of men. It requires some attention to follow an argument through, from the premises to the conclusion; and a cozy nap in the middle, leaves the hearer at fault in the inferences. But a good exhortation is like the Polypus: you may cut it off at any of the joints, what is left is sure to be alive; and what is better, the sting of an exhortation is always in the tail, just where the refreshed sleeper wakes up to enjoy it. In the days of the Owens, the Howes, and the Erskines, consideration and thought were required of the hearer, no less than of the preacher; but in this age of steam pressure and labour-saving inventions, conclusions are to be reached without the tediousness of argument, and all the passions of the human heart are to be stirred to their depths, without informing the understanding or enlightening the reason. Men can be craned up into the Church, and perhaps into heaven, through the agency of weights and pulleys, and any given amount of religious emotion be pumped up by mechanical processes, without any of the travail of thought. A preacher, if he would not be voted a bore, must hash up and spice his doctrine with all the art of a French cuisinier. Hard fate is theirs, who having, through days and nights of severe and patient thought, quarried out a noble and massive truth, must then

chip into elegant slips to suit those who can only be attracted by the small fretwork of the Christian scheme.

But a fifth reason—we charitably believe more general and more influential than any other—is found in the mistaken impression that doctrine is not necessary to sanctification; if it be not rather a hindrance to that blessed work. To the minds of such, preaching consists simply in a free and generous exhortation, or else in the statement and enforcement of some practical duty. The former of these bears so directly upon the feelings, and the latter upon the conduct, that the connexion of both with progress in holiness is open to the view. But the manner in which an abstract truth is taken up into the experience, or by what process of assimilation it goes into the character, is not so immediately apparent. These speculations seem therefore to be an idle waste of opportunity for growth in grace: and the diversion of the mind from practical to speculative subjects is thought to inflict a most serious and permanent injury. It is observed further, that Christians of opposing doctrinal creeds obtain reputé for holiness of heart, and the conclusion is drawn that one type of piety is as good as another; or that the true type is as likely to be reached by one system as another; or perhaps, best of all by no system whatever. A shrewd mind might suspect then, that after all, the old adage is not far wrong that “ignorance is the mother of devotion.” But seriously, ought it not to be considered that some difference must exist between superstition and religion? and that he who feels and acts, he cannot tell how nor why, falls rather into the former of the two categories? and that where true piety is admitted to exist, it is of some consequence into what mould it is cast? and that one type of Christian experience may be every way more valuable than another? This subject is of sufficient importance to justify the writer in an attempt to trace the influence of doctrinal truth upon practical godliness: and it can hardly be presumption to hope that from such a discussion the reader will not arise without profit.

There are five stages into which the ordinary religious progress of Christians may be divided. It is not meant that these are so perfectly distinguished from each other, that no feelings or sentiments are common to any two of

them. On the contrary, the essential elements of true piety—faith in Christ and repentance for sin—must be found in the first, in the last, and in all the intermediate stages. Indeed, each succeeding stage must include all that preceded: yet this does not forbid that it be distinguished by characteristics peculiarly its own. Thus, while at every step in his career the Christian must have the essential features of a converted man, still at different points his piety may assume a different outward expression, and these may be severally compared. Nor is it implied in the following classification, that every Christian passes through the entire series. God may deal with the soul in a way to show forth conspicuously the sovereignty of his grace. The Holy Ghost may so remarkably illumine the mind in the true nature of gospel holiness, and may so fully sanctify the soul, that the more early and laborious stages of Christian progress may seem to be overleaped, and the slow, tedious lessons of ordinary experience may appear to be superseded by His instantaneous teachings. Yet even these cases will prove no exception to the doctrine of this article; they rather afford a more complete illustration of the position that no degree of sanctification is attained, whether higher or lower, but through the influence of gospel truth upon the mind.

The first of these stages, where we ordinarily find the young convert, is marked by the predominance of the emotional in religion: the attention is almost exclusively given to the developement of the effections; and forms and exercises are made the determining evidence of one's Christian state. This is altogether natural. To one who has just been "turned from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God," the very transition from such opposite states must occasion the liveliest emotions. In proportion, too, as the previous exercises of the convinced sinner have been dark and forbidding, will the present emotions of the converted man be vivid and joyful. If the sense of God's wrath was before appalling, the mere thought of a gracious and full pardon will be now transporting. If, while the prayer was shut up in the heart, he was almost suffocated with the feeling of despair, the free and cordial intercourse, now opened with God, affords him a joy, which gives him the happiest conception of heavenly bliss.

These strong emotions and vivid frames, are thus in exact agreement with the laws of our spiritual economy. The young Christian yields himself passively to the wild delirium of delight, with which he is so happily intoxicated; and as yet, no suspicion throws its dark shadow across his path. It is not wonderful that, to him at least, these frames should be the all of religion, and that the degree of religion should be measured by the vividness of his exercises. He does not stop to inquire how far these feelings may result from a temperament naturally sanguine and ardent; nor what allowance, if any, should be made for the lower exercises of those who are, by nature, sluggish or melancholy. It has not occurred to him, that the brilliancy of one's emotions is, to some degree, dependent even upon the condition of the bodily frame, and therefore no infallible sign of the exact state of the soul. Much less has he reflected that, to one just sinking into despair, the mere notion of a pardon obtained, whether it be true in fact or not, procures relief which is, at once, the precursor of a spurious joy. The painful discovery is reserved to a later day, that a false hope may beget emotions as vivid and a joy as great, as those inspired by the hope which "maketh not ashamed." Yet, in this matter, "days will speak, and multitude of years shall teach wisdom." No long interval is required, before the novelty of these exercises wears away; and by a necessary law of our nature, these keen emotions subside into a frame of heart more equable and of a lower temperature. By the same fatal error, which made religion to consist in pleasing emotions, the young convert seeks now to reproduce them, not as at first by a believing view of Christ, but by artificial stimulants directly applied to the affections themselves. The result is inevitable: after a protracted struggle, in which he is conscious of frequent and painful alternations, all his joy finally collapses into settled gloom or despair.

This is the first lesson taught by experience, that best earthly teacher; and it prepares the way for the second step in Christian progress, which has a busy activity for its external sign. We place this stage in advance of the preceding, since it is less selfish and goes out more in sympathy with other beings and with the requirements of the divine law. The passage from the one to the other,

it is not difficult to explain. That exclusive devotion to his own happiness, which, as we have seen, resulted only in bitter disappointment, naturally suggests the hope that an opposite course will be more successful. He suddenly awakes to the truth that "no man liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself:" and as the conviction presses upon his conscience, that in a high sense every man is his "brother's keeper," he lends a quick obedience to the command, "look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others." Of course the prevailing type of his experience is now a bustling, active, out-of-doors religionism. He becomes the zealous supporter of the thousand and one operations within and without the Church for doing good; and if perchance he have wit enough to invent some new patent method of purging society of all its evils, and can cause his name to be rung over a whole continent, conceives that he has reached the culminating point of all holiness. For a time he is happy. He feels of necessity that degree of pleasure which always attends the wholesome exercise of our powers, both mental and corporeal. He is intoxicated with that peculiar enthusiasm, so easily generated in a crowd, and which is so readily communicated by sympathy. He may enjoy also that delightful exhilaration imparted by the successful issue of our own schemes without reference to their intrinsic merit. All this, however, may consist with a superficial knowledge of his own heart, with low impressions of the majesty and holiness of God, and with narrow views of the spirituality and extent of the law. How many are there in the Church of Christ, who, after a long life, are apparently not advanced beyond these two first stages of Christian progress! Either wholly absorbed in watching the changing hues of their own transient emotions, or else bustling about with a noisy and ostentatious zeal in the discharge of external duties! It is not implied that in either case, the profession of religion is wholly vain; but only that the experience is defective, and is simply preparatory to what is graciously ordained to follow. As in the first stage, the young Christian is at fault, not in having strong affections and exquisite enjoyment, but in making these the sum total of religion; so in the second stage, the ground

of impeachment is not that the Christian is active in his Redeemer's service, but that he takes no higher view of Christianity than as a mere circle of duties. But as the first step was only the antecedent to the second, so the second step prepares in turn for the third. These schemes at last stale upon the taste, or some sudden temptation throws him out of the routine of duty ; or the good spirit directly teaches him that there is an inside as well as an outside to religion. A voice of solemn warning sounds forth from the scriptures, "though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

Under this training, the Christian rises another step upon the scale, into the third stage of religious progress : which is characterized by a profound sense of the vileness of sin, and a corresponding depth of humiliation before God. Under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, he lingers no more about the porch, but passes into the interior of experimental religion. He is led through "the chambers of imagery" within his own soul, and traces the abominable and polluting idolatries portrayed upon the walls round about. He deplors the shortcomings of his best deeds, and the daring impiety of his acknowledged sins. The soil is turned up deeper and still deeper under the plough, and he bewails that depravity of nature which is the source and spring of all his actual transgressions. He finds his "heart deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked ;" and proportional with these discoveries of his own vileness, are his discoveries of God's terrible holiness. With Job he exclaims, "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee, wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." He is indeed not less active than he was before, nor less anxious that "the candle of the Lord should shine brightly upon his tabernacle," but he at the same time pours contempt upon all his former pride, and glories in nothing but the Cross of Christ, and in that "blood of sprinkling" which "purges his conscience from dead works." Religion assumes more completely to his mind its true character, that of a living principle which seeks its only real development in right actions and glowing affections. There is no more certain evidence of growth in grace than is

furnished in this growing knowledge of our own sinfulness: a knowledge which penetrates beyond the outward act into the hidden character, and which traces the deep pollution of this behind all occasional influences to its inborn corruption. The agonizing confession, "behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did by mother conceive me," places the penitent at once in right relations to God, and the passionate exclamation of Paul, "wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death!" is adopted as the spontaneous expression of his spiritual grief, and throws him also in proper dependence upon the grace and power of God. Indeed so essential an element of true holiness is this self-knowledge and consequent prostration of heart, that God not unfrequently prepares a man for eminent attainments in grace by laying the foundations of his religious character in overwhelming convictions for sin, before the first ray of hope dawns upon the soul. But ordinarily, these first convictions are only deep enough to drive the sinner from every refuge of lies, in utter helplessness, to the cross of the Redeemer. These further discoveries of the evil and extent of sin are usually reserved to this stage of Christian experience upon which we are now dwelling. Truly, it is a dark and wintry season to the believer when the great lesson he is set to learn is the plague of his own heart: but it is the season, to appropriate the striking figure of John Owen, when the sap runs down into the roots of the tree, which thereby send their fibres farther and deeper into the soil.

Yet profitable as this experience may be, it is not the most comfortable to the soul. The Christian pilgrim does not plant his feet within the land of Beulah until he ascends to the fourth and next stage, and fully recognizes the freedom of the sons of God. It is a happy discovery when the Gospel is not looked upon as a scheme of duties so much as a charter of privileges. After the long and painful search into the hidden wickedness of his own nature, it is like the opening of spring to the saint when he reads and comprehends that "where sin hath abounded, grace doth much more abound;" when he "receives not the spirit of bondage again to fear, but the spirit of adop-

tion, whereby he cries Abba, Father." He is delivered from that fear of death which brings the soul in bondage, and sounds to its depths the faithful saying, "that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, even the chief." His views of sin are none the less regretful because he now regards it only in the light of the cross. But while his heart is broken with penitence, it is at the same time melted by the contemplation of infinite love—that love which "forgives his iniquity, and remembers his sin no more." He walks in the light, because he has been turned out of himself. He takes no thought of his own sin, but he will take equal thought of his Saviour's grace. He balances this over against that; and while confessions are yet upon his lips, thanksgiving for redeeming and pardoning mercy is welling up within the heart.

There is but one other stage of the believer's progress before he shall cross the threshold of eternal glory. It is when he stands upon the Delectable Mountains, and through the glass of an abiding and infallible assurance is able to view the gates of the Celestial City. There have been many seasons in the past when he could scarcely doubt his "acceptance in the Beloved"—seasons when he has been brought into the banqueting house, and under the banner of love; when the ravished soul could exclaim, "my beloved is mine and I am his"—"his left hand is under my head, and his right hand doth embrace me." But these precious seasons have been always brief. The temptations of the adversary, the bewildering cares and seductive pleasures of this world, his own want of watchfulness, some sudden surprisal into sin, the remaining spirit of legalism which creeps anew into the heart, and nestles itself again where once it was expelled—these are among the causes which, singly or combined, so often mar or destroy his peace. But now that his views of truth are more clear, and his experience more full—now that he has learned the devices of Satan, and the treachery of his own heart—and especially, now that his Christian career covers a larger tract, and he is able to institute a safer comparison between his own exercises—his "peace flows like a river." The Holy Ghost likewise, having renewed, enlightened, purged and sanctified, now perfects

his work, by bearing a gracious witness to his own operations. Through His testimony, itself a new and special act of grace, the Christian comes to

——— "read his title clear
To mansions in the skies;"

in the enjoyment of that "love which casteth out fear," he begins to *know* in whom he has believed, and to rejoice in "full assurance of hope to the end."

These five stages, which we have so rapidly traversed, do certainly cover the usual progress of the Christian in holiness; and none will deny that at the end of this career he is left upon a far higher elevation than he occupied at its beginning. We have not aimed to survey and to map down all the varieties of religious experience. This would require, in the place of a few pages, a book as long as a life. It is sufficient for the purpose in hand to seize upon those broad features which mark out the leading divisions, without going into minute details.

The connexion of all these remarks with the design of this article will now be perceived, if the reader will carefully observe that in no case has it been possible for the Christian to ascend from the lower to the higher forms, except as the doctrines of the word of God have been brought to bear upon his mind and conscience. How shall the young convert be disenchanted of his selfishness, and be brought out of the charmed circle that he has drawn around himself? How shall he be put in sympathy with other beings, and become a man of *work* as well as of *feeling*, unless the doctrine of his allegiance to God shall be pressed upon his conscience? He may, indeed, in the indulgence of a legal spirit, work for hire, and bring his labours and charities as the price with which to purchase the favour of God. But the fountain of selfishness shall not be dried up within, nor his activity become the activity of love, nor his work the work of obedience, until he recognizes the claims of the Most High upon him. In other words, the doctrine of the divine supremacy must be drawn forth from its concealment. He must learn that as God is the first cause of all things, and comprehends the existence of all creatures within his own, so His glory must needs be their last end. He learns further, that this law of moral gravitation, which binds all crea-

tures to the eternal throne, binds also, in happy harmony, obedience to God, with the enjoyment of God—and through this established harmony, he finds his only true happiness in the very tributes which he pays to the majesty and supremacy of the Divine Being.

By this process alone, then, is the Christian lifted from the first to the second stage of his progress. While he is entranced by his joyful emotions, or while seeking, by every incantation, to reproduce the holy spell, the promised Teacher comes from above, takes this great truth of God's supremacy out of the Scriptures, and reveals it to his understanding. This, in turn, branches out into all the departments of life. All his varied relations to God as his Creator and Preserver, and again as his Redeemer and King, come to be considered. Under these, all his relations to his fellow men, as they are found in the world and in the Church—all the multiplied duties which grow from the ties of family, of kindred, of country, are unfolded. All the Christian duties which he owes to his brethren in Christ, to the Church collective, to the ungodly around him, and to the long-forgotten heathen abroad—these all spread themselves under his eye. A voice from on high speaks to him thus: "These diversified relations I make you to possess, that in fulfilling them you may serve me." These paths of life, which cross each other at a thousand points, intersecting at every angle, are paths of obedience to God.

In like manner, Gospel doctrine is the mighty lever which raises to the third stage of Christian experience. While pacing, with self-complacent zeal, the usual round of external duties, or else seeking, with dissatisfaction and fear, to make out a full tale of service, by newly-invented labours, the truth is brought home with fresh power to the soul, that "God is a Spirit," and they alone worship truly who "worship in spirit and in truth." The mind awakens to new and overpowering conceptions of the holiness of God. The Holy Ghost, who is the author of these discoveries, takes the law as the great exponent of that holiness, and with it measures the whole experience of the man. The entire life and conduct is subjected to a severe scrutiny. Every action is weighed in the balance—every motive is brought to the touch-stone—every principle,

which can become the spring of action, is analyzed—all the emotions and affections are subjected to the “Refiner’s fire.” In a word, the whole experience is fused, while the law goes through it in its detective processes, searching down into all that has ever been said, or done, or thought, or felt, or imagined, or purposed. Nor is the law the only instrument employed to increase these wholesome convictions for sin. The Holy Ghost takes the soul now from the thunderings of Sinai to the melting scene of Calvary, and shows him the holiness of God taking vengeance of sin even upon the person of the Divine Redeemer. Here is holiness—not lying in cold and stately repose upon the bosom of precepts and commandments, but stirring itself with burning activity to execute the awful penalty. Here too is law in mysterious conjunction with love—holiness shining not only with its own dreadful splendour, but tinged and mellowed with the softer radiance of mercy and compassion. It is at the foot of the Cross that the law searches most into the evil of sin. Here the believer learns how odious his transgression is, viewing it under the double light of law and of grace:—filthy sin! which puts itself both against majesty and mercy, offending equally against the honour and the heart of God! Here he feels not only *convictions* for sin, but also *penitence*. He bows before the throne of his Father with deepest humiliation, and loathes the exercises which before he applauded. This entire change in the outward type of his experience has been wrought by the doctrine of God’s infinite holiness: and the transforming discovery of this holiness was afforded by the law—that law which is “exceeding broad,” which was promulged from Sinai and “magnified” upon Calvary.

The work of conviction is, however, at this point, only half completed. The same severe analysis, which has been made of the Christian’s life and exercises, is now applied to his inward and habitual character. The law searches into the hidden recesses of his nature: the dark understanding is suddenly explored with the torch of truth, that its appalling blindness may be disclosed—the impure affections are plied with tests, showing with what natural promptness they recoil from good, and with what instinctive tenacity they cleave to evil—the treacherous

memory—the rancid imagination—every power, every passion is explored, till the humbled Christian bows again before God, and cries: “behold I am vile!” Yet these confessions are not made without an inquiry into the mystery of this deep and natural iniquity. Here again we trace the teachings of the Almighty spirit; His text-book again is that wonderful volume which He has inspired; and the scholar is carried further still into those deep doctrines which form its mysterious alphabet. The first covenant, formed in Paradise, is unrolled; the federal relation of Adam to his posterity, is revealed; his own moral connexion, with the first transgressor, is understood; the imputation of the first sin; the righteous condemnation which is consequent upon this; the sinful nature which is thereby inherited; the natural fruit which is borne in outward transgressions; all these doctrines no longer lie hid in the Bible, but come forth with power to his soul, and abase him in the dust. He may well indulge his spiritual grief, and continue to “write bitter things against himself,” when he must not only deplore his life, but also bewail his nature, confessing alike his original and his actual sin. From all this, is it not apparent that our profound and abiding convictions for sin—those convictions in which are laid the foundations of a solid and noble christian character—depend upon the revelation of Gospel truth to the understanding and heart? and can these truths be suppressed—or, if taught, be shown only under a veil—without inflicting injuries which shall be as lasting as eternity?

This connexion between the doctrines of grace and practical godliness, becomes more obvious as we continue to ascend the scale. Let us next take the Christian when he apprehends fully the liberty of the Gospel, and luxuriates in the privileges of his adoption. How shall he step from the condition which was last described into this, where darkness gives way to light, and grief to joy? Solely by the influence of divine truth upon his heart, as he is carried further into the sanctuary, and nearer to the Ark, to the mercy seat, and to the glory of God between the cherubim. While he is gloaming over the dark discoveries of inward and hereditary corruption, he is taken up by the spirit into the heavens. He discovers, in the lan-

guage of Erskine, the sacred three "sitting around the council board of redemption." The plan of salvation devised, is doubly to him the ground of hope and confidence—having its foundation in free and eternal love, and confirmed in all its provisions by the mutual pledges of the contracting parties. From the covenant itself, he turns to consider the competency of Him who is to execute it.—The trustee, into whose hands it is committed, is "Jehovah's fellow." That essential divinity renders him equal to the work; it is the full fountain from which may flow more "exceeding great and precious promises" than he is able to conceive, and abundantly qualifies Him to fulfil all possible conditions upon which these promises shall be suspended. The filial relation of this surety to the eternal Father, comes for special consideration; and the sonship of Christ is seen to be the ultimate foundation of the sonship of believers: these are adopted into the relation of sons, because He, to whom they are united, is the only begotten Son. From the qualifications of the trustee, attention is next drawn to the discharge of the trust itself. His active obedience is compared with all the precepts of the law, and is ascertained fully to agree. His death is found to be in obedience to the penalty, and thus to satisfy the claims of justice, in behalf of all for whom it was endured. His resurrection from the dead, and subsequent ascension, with His human nature, into heaven—besides being seen to be essential parts of the Christian scheme—are traced as the final seals placed upon that finished work, attesting its acceptance before the Father. The whole nature of justification is understood as resting upon imputed righteousness. It is seen that only those are justified who are, by faith, united mystically with Christ—that all such are permitted freely to share in His mediatorial reward; and that they are fully qualified for the service and enjoyment of God, by the new birth which they experience of the Holy Ghost. The life, thus begun, is seen to be continued through the indwelling of the Spirit, and by virtue of the intercession and kingly power of their great and living Head. It is comprehended further that the honor of Christ, and the consummation of His glory require the preservation of the saint in a state of grace upon earth, and his perfection in a state of glory in heaven.

This renewed nature, which is seen to be the necessary concomitant of a justified state, must also show itself in a life of obedience and of love. Good works are clearly perceived to be the fruit of faith, and the needful evidences of a sound conversion; so that the Christian is, on the one hand, not distressed by false and distorted views of their value; and is preserved, on the other hand, from that filthy antinomianism, which not only ventures to tamper with sin, but even to remove that brand of reprobation, which a God of holiness has fixed upon it.

These and other cognate doctrines afford to the believer a most refreshing view of the Gospel economy. He discovers that, in the covenant of grace, privilege is made the foundation of duty, and not duty the foundation of privilege. He regards the Gospel as the great manifestation of the grace of God, and not merely a republication of the law—a charter of blessings, and not a new code of duties. Privileges the most invaluable, and an inheritance the most abiding, are secured through the rich and sovereign grace of God; and the title to both comes through the free promises of the Gospel alone. The type of piety, now displayed, is in happy correspondence with these more enlarged and evangelical views of the Christian scheme. The yoke of legalism is broken from the neck—the spirit of bondage is lifted from the heart; the Son has made him free, and he is free. With a cheerful and confiding heart, he communes with his Heavenly Father—with a generous and growing love, he walks in the path of righteousness. His faith steady, his penitence sincere, his humility deep, his love ardent, his obedience prompt, and his peace abiding—he goes on his way “leaping and praising God.” Can any doubt that he is ripening for Heaven, when to the ardour of love is added the activity of zeal, and to the self-knowledge of the penitent, the filial reverence of a confiding Son? Shall that type of piety be disparaged, which has been steeped in the grace of the covenant, and like the rainbow of the same, spans the whole arch of Gospel truth?

The influence of these doctrines is equally felt in the last stage into which we have divided the progress of the Christian, when he attains to an unwavering assurance of his “acceptance in the beloved.” The constant contem-

plation of the covenant with all its glorious promises, gives renewed occasion for the exercise of faith; and these multiplied acts of faith strengthen more and more the presumption that he is in a gracious state. But above and beyond the strongest probability which can thus be established, he rejoices in the direct testimony of the spirit of adoption. He is made to know that the same blessed agent who first renews, then sanctifies, enlightens, comforts and seals, also shines upon his work, and witnesses to his own gracious operations. He is taught further that like all the other influences of the same "free Spirit," this is an act of sovereign grace. Not expecting it through the operation of merely natural laws, he learns to pray for it as a special gift. It becomes an object of faith, and is therefore embraced within the prayer of faith. He receives this blessing as he receives every other which is purely of grace; just as he receives the light which disperses his ignorance, or the consolation which assuages his grief. In all these cases alike, the doctrine has led to the discovery of the grace which is finally so happily incorporated into the experience of the faithful.

We have now finished the proof by which it was proposed to show the sanctifying influence of doctrinal truth upon the renewed heart. It would have been easy to put the argument into other forms. We might have reasoned *a priori* upon the very nature of truth; but this would have been attractive only to speculative minds, fond of discussions which call for the display of great metaphysical acumen. A full inquiry into the history of the Church in former ages, or a faithful comparison between the types of Christian experience which any one may see around him, would perhaps have afforded a satisfactory demonstration to others: but this mode of proof would be invidious. We have preferred the simple and experimental train of thought which has already been presented, because it is level to the comprehension of the plainest reader of this periodical. Let it be observed now that we are not content with saying doctrinal instruction is useful, and may be blessed among other agencies to the edification of saints. Much beyond this do we pitch our conclusion: it is, that in every case truth is necessary to godliness. In no instance whatever is a

single step taken in the divine life, save as the magnetic influence of truth draws the soul a degree nearer to Christ, the centre and sum of all truth. It is not implied that the doctrines of the Bible produce this result in a merely natural way, acting upon the mind only in accordance with the established and general laws which regulate it. Thousands there are who have the most admirable speculative knowledge of Christianity, who yet have never felt its saving power upon their hearts. But this is only to say that Christianity may be to some merely a philosophy—a divine philosophy, perhaps, yet only a beautiful intellectual system. The Gospel is understood as *a science*, but is not felt as *salvation*. It claims to be more than the worldly wise shall ever comprehend—it is reconciliation with God to those who are at enmity with Him—it is the way of life to souls “dead in trespasses and sins.” To the Greek who seeketh after wisdom, Christ Jesus will appear little more than another Plato, and the Gospel only another Academy; but to the renewed man Christ is known as a Saviour from sin, and these holy mysteries are needful as food for the soul. To him a living power is imparted by which the truth is taken up into his experience and becomes assimilated to the soul, even as digested food becomes assimilated to the body. The Holy Ghost is indeed the only sanctifier, and accomplishes this work by an immediate influence upon the soul—yet truth is the instrument with which he effects every transformation. As in the first creation the understanding was made the leading faculty of the soul, all the other powers being under its direction,—so this original order, which sin destroyed, is restored in the new creation. The spirit of God therefore not only acts upon the mind, without which he would not deal with man as a rational and accountable being, but his work of illumination holds precisely the same place in the order of his operations that the understanding itself holds among the faculties of man—it is his primary and leading work, introductory to the whole, and necessary to the completion of every part.

To those who should seek our advice, we would recommend the careful and systematic study of the doctrines of the Bible, as singularly conducive to a healthy and growing Christian experience. Many an humble child of God

undoubtedly is enabled to receive and feed upon the essential truth of these doctrines, who cannot put them forth to others in an abstract and logical form—yet this does not show that even he might not be aided in attaining a fuller comprehension of the doctrines by availing himself of lucid and compact expositions of them. Indeed we utter a long cherished conviction, when we say that next to the Bible, from which all that relates to God and the soul must be drawn, there are no books we would sooner recommend for an experimental and devotional use than the Calvinistic standards. We place them in the hands of children and think their office discharged when the “form of sound words” is transferred to the memory. How few think (to appropriate a child’s expression,) to “learn these things by heart!” Many a Christian will devour a whole library of books of devotion and pious biographies, trying to draw on a ready-made experience, as he would a glove, when a better manual of practical religion is almost thumbed out in the hands of his child. Let him put ninety-nine hundredths of these volumes into the fire, and thoroughly digest his Shorter Catechism, and he will come forth a stronger, brighter, happier Christian, and in sooner time, than if he had read the memoirs of all the saints and martyrs from Abel until now. The taste of the Church is so superficial that we should not wonder if the reader is smiling at this as a conceit, rather than a matured conviction, of the writer. We would only plead with him for the experiment. Let him take the doctrine which he conceives most remote from practical life, and the most hidden among the deep things of God—let him ponder over it till his mind has taken a firm and abiding grasp of it—let him trace its relations to other doctrines, and to the whole scheme with which it harmonizes—above all, let him pray over it, until it is so revealed that he feels its power over his own spirit. Let him pass on thus through the whole system of grace, not leaving one doctrine till he has obtained clear and consistent views, and has felt it as *a fact* incorporated with his own experience: and must he not come forth a strong Christian at the end? How much room has he to grow, who has not felt the living power of *all* truth upon his soul? We have met with not a few of the Lord’s people who seemed to be station-

ary and uncomfortable, simply because they had outgrown all their previous measures of knowledge, and yet could with difficulty be persuaded to abandon the past to itself. Like indolent children, they would not turn over to a clean page and press on in new discoveries, because this was difficult; but perversely turn back over the blackened leaves of the past, weary of spirit because they could find nothing refreshing and invigorating to the soul. We have burned to lay open before them the train of thought now submitted to the reader. We have desired to hurry them along with us to the great temple of truth—to throw open before them its ample doors—to conduct them from court to court, from chamber to chamber—and to usher them even into the most Holy Place, where the glory of God lies revealed, yet more concealed, under the sublime mysteries of the Christian faith. With what holy rapture would we witness the chastened freedom, and the elevated devotion with which they would bow before Him who has condescended to reveal Himself even under a veil! What a vigorous piety would be exhibited in the Church of the Redeemer, if it would feed upon such aliment as this!

If, then, doctrine occupy the place here assigned to it, it should form the staple of all preaching; and the fullness and plainness of his doctrinal instructions should be the test of every preacher's fidelity. He is sent as a witness for the truth, and the burden of his work must be the delivery of his testimony. He may inculcate most amply all the duties and charities of life, yet only as the corollaries of Christian doctrine; otherwise he degrades the Gospel into a system of mere morals. His aim is to lead souls to Christ: to do this, he must show who Christ is, what he has done, and what his offers to mankind are. This will lead the preacher through the whole circuit of Bible truth. Exhortation is good: but exhortation presupposes instruction—otherwise it is but frothy declamation. Exhortation is only the edge of the sword, of which doctrine must be the blade. Let the appeal come burning hot from the heart—let the exhortation be of keenest edge: but let it be doctrine drawn to a point, and driven in its practical bearing upon the conscience.

But fidelity in doctrinal exposition involves more than

some may imagine. The given truth must first be understood; all its metes and bounds must be known; how it acts upon other truths and is acted upon by them; its exact position in the scheme, viewed as a whole; all this must be thoroughly comprehended. A preacher may isolate it for minuter examination, as he may separate a ray of light by passing it through the prism; yet he must present it in its harmonious combination, or it will give no light to the hearer. Further, he must steep his own soul in the truth, before he can have the unction needful to preach it. He is bound to show it in its relations to Christian experience: and how can he do it if he has not felt it in his own? He who is only intellectually conversant with a given doctrine, has the more laborious and anxious part of his preparation still to make—unless he is satisfied to be a moralizer rather than a preacher. Alas! how much occasion has been given to hearers of the Gospel for the unfortunate association existing in their minds with the term “doctrinal preaching!” With some it is a mere synonyme for angry controversy, and the Ambassador of the Prince of Peace is suddenly metamorphosed into a bloody gladiator. In the minds of others, it is associated with abstract speculations, professional technicalities, and logical forms; a doctrinal preacher is one who discourses in syllogisms, and his sermon is but a demonstration upon the anatomy of the Gospel. But he alone *preaches* the doctrine who, having felt its power, knows where to place it in its proper niche, both in theological science, and in the hearts and affections of the Lord’s redeemed. Let the Church but be blessed with such a ministry, thus skillful in the word of knowledge, then shall “Zion arise and shine—beautiful upon her mountains will be the feet of them who bring good tidings, who publish peace—then shall her righteousness go forth as brightness, and her salvation as a lamp that burneth.”

ARTICLE IV.

THE LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS OF THE GREAT SEAL IN ENGLAND, *from the earliest times to the reign of King GEORGE IV*, by JOHN LORD CAMPBELL, L. L. D., F. R. S. *In 7 volumes; Philadelphia, 1848.*

If an American Chancellor's life is entirely occupied with events and circumstances alien from the objects of our Review, a Lord Chancellor of England is, as yet, a very different personage. He does not rank among the mere 'lay lords' of Parliament. He is keeper of the King's conscience, be it worth much or little, (and that of the last two Georges, respectively, might exemplify each extreme;) he is patron of crown 'livings' to an enormous amount—so that every clergyman, with a wife and twelve children, (as Lord Eldon complains,) and every one on the road to obtain either blessing, is continually thrusting himself on his purview. The eminent Judge, just alluded to, was long called 'the great Tory cabinet maker;' of course he was, in a sense, one of the greatest mitre makers of his day: as well as bishoprics, half of the 'fat things' of the English cathedrals, canonries, prebendaries, deaneries, 'full of marrow,' and only known by name to our Episcopal brethren here, were in his gift. No man of his generation, perhaps, had an equal voice in the disposal of ecclesiastical wealth, and—'the cure of souls!'

These volumes contain the only complete and accessible history of that most wonderful of all wondrous office-bearers in England—her Lord Chancellor. Like the King, he never dies: but he has had, officially, a more tenacious life than England's *King*. He has survived Dane, Saxon, Norman, Plantagenet, and Stuart in the royal dynasty; and the change of Popes, from him of Rome, to him and *her* of Westminster, in Henry VIII. and his successors: he has out lived the great rebellion (of Lord Clarendon) *i. e.* the only half written history of the commonwealth; the greater revolution of 1688; and last, not least, all the revolutionary changes (later and latest) of France, the modern mother of revolutions. This officer can count for that of

his years, almost double the number of the Apocalyptic beast, *i. e.* according to Lord Campbell, full 1240 years. We almost wonder that no English dissenting 'Miller' has discovered his connection with the 1260 days of the Church's captivity!

A large majority of those who have held this important office, have been clergymen. Until the fall of Cardinal Wolsey, or for nine centuries, this was the rule—and one Lady Chancellor graces Lord Campbell's volumes, Queen Eleanor, the wife of Henry III. The suitors in Chancery were compelled, it appears, to submit to a much more reasonable cause of delay, on her part, than Lord Eldon was wont to produce, *viz*: the birth of a Prince! Bishop Williams, in the reign of James I., is the only Protestant prelate thus distinguished. One only, in possession of the Great Seal, (Simon de Sudbury,) was ever brought to an untimely end: but within the last three centuries, six Chancellors have been impeached, *viz*: Lords Bacon, Finch, Clarendon, Somers, and Macclesfield, of whom Lord Somers only was acquitted; and although foreigners have, in remote periods, held this office, only two Scotchmen are found on the list—Lord Loughborough and Lord Erskine. 'In any speculation for abolishing or remodelling the office of Chancellor,' says our author, 'I wish Benthamites to consider whether, as it has subsisted (ever) since the foundation of the monarchy, it can safely be dispensed with or materially altered!' By the way, we were not aware of the fact, until here presented to us by Lord Campbell, (and our contemporary, the North British Review, confirms it,) that the Lord Chancellor Loughborough was an ordained ruling Elder of the established Church of Scotland—"a fashion of his day, with all gentlemen, who aspired to the barrister's gown" in North Britain.

We call attention to these volumes, and particularly to the last, containing Lord Eldon's long life, chiefly with the view of exhibiting its vivid picture of the English high Church system. Here have we it in awful length and breadth! Lord E. was, for half a century, the lauded champion of that system: after a perusal of the whole of this impartial life, (and some personal knowledge of him,) we feel bound to add—a very sincere, and certainly

the ablest political advocate of its principles; one of the last strong buttresses, if, as some wag said, he could not be called a pillar, of the English Church, for he was rarely seen within it.

He must be married, though he runs away into Scotland. (where Episcopalians are dissenters,) by his good mother, the Episcopal Church. At Blackshiels, to which he carried Miss Surtees, (the daughter of an opulent Newcastle banker,) he finds a Rev'd. J. Buchanan of the Episcopal order, and so avoids the stigma of being married, by the lay-welder of warm hearts, at Gretna Green. This marriage, in a very singular way, decided the tenor of his future life. He had, previously, been a student at Oxford, under the fostering care of his brother, William Scott, (afterwards Lord Stowell,) had entitled himself to a fellowship there, and any one of the snug Fellowship Church-livings, which might have fallen vacant—but this College privilege requiring a man to be a bachelor, when presented, our embryo Chancellor was compelled to have resort to the bar! Mr. Wilberforce records a reminiscence of this by George III. When Lord Eldon was first presented at Court, as Chancellor, his Majesty desired him to give his remembrances to Lady Eldon. The new lord 'was not aware that she had the honor of being known' to the King. 'Yes, yes,' said he, 'I know how much I owe to Lady Eldon. I know that you would have made yourself a country curate, and that she has made you my Lord Chancellor.'

It is quite clear that Mr. Scott fully practised his own recommendation to young lawyers, 'to live like a hermit and work like a horse.' Although his personal history is shaded with much of the darkness of intrigue, and of the sacrifices of principle to policy, he deserved well, upon the whole, of his country, and particularly of his profession.

His official *debut*, while yet uncalled to the bar, was as Vice Principal of New Hall College, Oxford, and Vice Law Professor, with a salary of £60 a year. The Principal, Sir Robert Chambers, being called to the East Indies, left him a lecture to read to the students 'immediately, and which he began,' he says, 'without previously knowing its contents. It was upon the statute respecting

'young men running away with maidens.' 'Fancy me,' he adds, 'reading, with about 140 boys and young men, all giggling at the Professor. Such a tittering audience no one ever had.' He, at this time, contracted a slight intimacy with Dr. S. Johnson. 'I had a walk in New Hall Garden, with Dr. J., Sir Robert Chambers, and another gentleman.' Sir Robert was gathering snails and throwing them over the wall into a neighbor's garden.—The doctor reproached him very roughly, asserting that it was unmannerly and unneighborly. 'Sir,' said Sir Robert, 'my neighbor is a dissenter.' 'Oh,' said the doctor, 'if so, Chambers, toss away, toss away as hard as you can.'

We now find him rising in the morning at four, taking little exercise, short and abstemious at meals, and studying late at night, with a wet towel round his head, 'to drive away drowsiness.' He read Coke upon Lyttleton, he assures us, 'once, twice, thrice, and made an abstract of the whole work.' In 1775 he finally left Oxford and took a small house in Cursitor street, London, to which he would, in later life, point his friends and say, 'There was my first perch; many a time have I run down from Cursitor street into Fleet Market to buy six penny worth of sprats for supper.' He admired the learning of Sergeant Hill, whom Dr. Campbell observes to have been 'the greatest black-letter lawyer since Sergeant Maynard, and as much celebrated for his eccentricity as his learning:—insomuch that on his wedding night, going to his chambers in the Temple, and continuing there until morning, he

'Thought on the year books, and forgot his bride!'

Mr. Scott is called to the bar in 1776, and travels for some years the Northern circuit of England. So late as 1779, after he had passed from the King's Bench Court to that of Chancery, his brother, William, writes home, 'Business is very dull with poor Jack, very dull indeed; I heartily wish it may bricken a little, or he will be heartily sick of his profession. I do all I can to keep up his spirits, but he is very gloomy.' His biographer says that it was the habit of his maturer life to over-state a little his early failures. He was certainly the bluff, prompt, seldom-disconcerted Englishman, early and late in life.—'I was counsel,' he says, 'at Durham for a highwayman

who was really guilty, but against whom no sufficient case was made out by legal evidence. I would not aid the prosecution by cross-examining the witnesses, and remaining quiet, my client was acquitted. Sitting in my lodging in the evening, a very ill-looking fellow, whose face I had seen before, but could not at the moment recollect where, for he had changed his dress, burst in and said, 'Lawyer Scott, you owe me two guineas. You were my counsellor to-day, and you did nothing for me.—I am, therefore, come to have my fee back again, and my fee I will have.' I seized the poker and said, 'Sirrah, although you escaped to-day, when you deserved to be hanged, you shall be hanged to-morrow for attempting to rob me, unless you instantly depart ;' and his clerk coming in the fellow walked off.

His fortune was made by the case of *Ackroyd vs. Smithson*, which he thus narrated to his relation, Mr. Farrer, three weeks before his death:

"You must know that the testator in that cause had directed his real estates to be sold—and after paying his debts, and funeral and testamentary expenses, the residue of the money to be divided into 15 parts—which he gave to 15 persons whom he named in the will. One of those persons died in the testator's lifetime. A bill was filed by the next of kin, claiming, among other things, the lapsed share. A brief was given me to consent for the heir at law upon the hearing of the case. I had nothing then to do but to pore over this brief. I went through all the cases in the books, and satisfied myself that the lapsed share was to be considered as real estate, and belonged to my client (the heir at law). The cause came on at the Rolls, before Sir Thos. Sewell. I told the Solicitor, who sent me the brief, that I should consent for the heir at law, so far as regarded the due execution of the will, but that I must support the title of the heir to the one-fifteenth which had lapsed. Accordingly I did argue it, and went through all the authorities. When Sir Thomas Sewell went out of Court he asked the Register who that young man was? The Register told him it was Mr. Scott. 'He has argued very well,' said Sir Thomas Sewell, 'but I cannot agree with him.' He decreed against my client.

There was an appeal before Lord Thurlow—who took three days to consider—and then delivered his judgment in accordance with my speech, and that is in print, and has decided all similar questions ever since. As I left the Hall, a respectable

solicitor, of the name of Forster, came up and touched me on the shoulder, and said, 'Young man, your bread and butter is cut for life.' But the story of *Ackroyd vs. Smithson* does not end there. In the Chancellor's Court of Lancaster, where Dunning (Lord Ashburton) was Chancellor, a brief was given me in a cause, in which the interest of my client would oblige me to support, by argument, the reverse of that which had been decided by the decree in *Ackroyd vs. Smithson*. When I had stated to the Court the point I was going to argue, Dunning said, 'Sit down, young man.' As I did not immediately comply, he repeated, 'Sit down, sir!—I won't hear you!' I then sat down. Dunning said, 'I believe your name is Scott, sir.' I said it was; upon which Dunning went on, 'Mr. Scott, did you not argue that case of *Ackroyd vs. Smithson*?' and I said that I did argue it. Dunning then said, 'Mr. Scott, I have read your argument in that case of *Ackroyd vs. Smithson*, and I defy you or any man in England to answer it. I won't hear you.'"

The year 1781 saw him fully established in business, 'and an uninterrupted tide of success' flowed in upon him for the rest of his life. He would sometimes attribute that success to another remarkable incident—his employment before the Clithroe Election Committee of the House of Commons.

"Mr. (afterwards Lord) Curzon and four or five gentlemen came to my door and woke me, and when I inquired what they wanted, they stated that the Clithroe Election was to come on that morning at 10 o'clock before a committee of the House of Commons; that Mr. Cooper had written to say he was detained at Oxford by illness, and could not arrive to lead the case, and that Mr. Hardinge, the next counsel, refused to do so, because he was not prepared. 'Well, gentlemen,' said I, 'what do you expect me to do, that you are here?' They answered they did not know what to expect or to do, for the cause must come on at 10 o'clock and they were totally unprepared, and had been recommended to me as a young and promising counsel. I answered, "I will tell you what I can do: I can undertake to make a dry statement of facts, if that will content you, gentlemen; but more I cannot do, for I have no time to make myself acquainted with the law.' They said that must do: so I begged they would go down stairs and let me get up as fast as I could. Well, I did state the facts, and the cause went on for fifteen days. It found me poor enough; but I began to be rich before it was done. They left me fifty guineas at the beginning; then there were ten

guineas every day and five guineas every evening for a consultation—more money than I could count.”

After his speech upon this business, Sir James (afterwards Lord Mansfield,) came up to him in Westminster Hall, said he had heard he was going to leave town, and dissuaded him from it, as did also a lawyer of the name of Wilson. He in fact had written to engage a house at Newcastle, meaning to settle there as a local barrister. ‘However,’ he says, ‘I did remain in London, and lived to make Mansfield Chief Justice of the Common Pleas and Wilson a puisne Judge.’

The stories of this part of his life constituted the staple of Lord Eldon’s conversation ever afterwards. We have room only for this curious one, on the turning point of another lawyer’s fate :

“Jack Lee, though a Yorkshire man, had attended the York Assizes several years, without a brief. One day, after dinner, he said, ‘I find a prophet has no honor in his own country, and as I have never yet received a single guinea at this place, I will shake the dust off my feet—leave it this very night, and never be seen in this room again.’ Davenport and Wedderburn thereupon drew up a brief, entitled, ‘*Rex vs. Inhabitants of Hum-Town*,’ and which in due form gave instructions in a prosecution for not repairing a road within the parish, leading from Goose Green to Crackskull Common. This they sent to Lee’s lodgings, with a guinea as the fee. In the evening the barristers assembled as usual in the circuit room, to sup and play at cards, and the discontented Yorkshire man appearing among them, Wedderburn said, ‘Bless me, Lee, I thought you were gone.’ ‘Well,’ said Jack, ‘it is very extraordinary : I was just going, I was shaking the dust of this place off my feet, as an abominable place that I never would see again, when lo ! and behold, a brief is brought to me, and I must stay.’ ‘Well,’ said Davenport, ‘in what cause may it be ?’ Lee answered, ‘In the *King vs. Humtown*.’ ‘Oh, dear,’ cried Davenport, ‘they brought me a brief of that case, with a bad guinea, and I would not take it—I dare say they have given you the bad guinea.’ ‘I have it in my pocket ; here it is,’ said Lee. Davenport, looking at it, said, ‘Yes, the very same guinea,’ and put it in his pocket. They then told him the joke they had practiced upon him, that they might not lose the pleasure of his company. He never forgave this joke, though it kept him at York, where in a few years he led every case.”

Scott's political career begins with his being made, in 1788, Solicitor General. Before we enter on this, we must extract a note of this work from his book of fees. It will make many legal mouths thirsty, on both sides of the Atlantic. These then are his exact 'gains' from 13 years at the bar :

	£.	s.	d.
1786,-----	6833	7	6
1787,-----	7600	7	
1788,-----	8419	14	
1789,-----	9559	10	
1790,-----	9684	15	
1791,-----	10213	13	6
1792,-----	9080	9	
1793,-----	10330	1	4
1794,-----	11592		
1795,-----	11149	15	4
1796,-----	12140	15	8
1797,-----	10861	5	6
1798,-----	10557	17	

Lord Thurlow, at this critical period of George III.'s life, was at the head of the opposition, who (strangely enough to our ears,) were known as 'the King's friends:' that is, they knowing secretly His Majesty's opposition to the India Bill of his Ministers, were waiting for the good things that would be distributable on their fall. Sir John Scott and Mr. Erskine both spoke and both failed 'egregiously' in the debate on that bill. He never, it seems, was a good debater. He spoke, however, so ably on the Westminster Election Bill of that period, that Mr. Fox eulogized him as entering into the case 'with a soundness of argument and a depth and a closeness of reasoning that perhaps has scarcely been equalled.' On another occasion he drew forth the honorable enmity and fine sarcasm of Sir Philip Francis, the reputed author of Junius's Letters.

A great crisis arrived in these first years of Lord Eldon's political life—the first derangement of the king's mind. The Prince of Wales was unpopular; the case of a king's insanity new; and the Solicitor General ably supported Mr. Pitt's bold expedient for Parliament to seize the entire reins of government. He justified the continued use of the Great Seal in the king's name, because, in the eye of

the law, 'his political capacity remained entire, and because Courts of Justice shall sit and administer the law in his name.' So the Great Seal was about to be set to a commission for opening the Parliament in the king's name, and to an Act declaring *him* incompetent to hold the reins of authority! While these matters were pending the king recovered, but the arguments for and against this mode of procedure were renewed not many years after, and became the foundation of the actual passage of such bills on the final aberration of the royal mind. When introduced to His Majesty on his recovery, (in 1788,) our rising statesman was graciously addressed—'I have no other business with you, Sir John Scott, than to thank you for the affectionate fidelity with which you adhered to me, when so many deserted me in my malady.'

In four years after this, we find him Attorney General. A circumstance occurred in the interim, which exhibits him as acting at once an honorable and politic part. His friend, Lord Thurlow, had quarrelled with Mr. Pitt, of which the latter gave Sir John Scott the first tidings. 'Nothing is left for me,' said he, 'but to resign. I cannot act in political hostility to Lord Thurlow—nor join any party against you.' The minister urged him to remain in office, and not prevailing begged him to consult Thurlow, who most nobly and prophetically says: 'Scott, if there be anything which could make me regret what has taken place, (and I do not repent it,) it would be that you should do so foolish a thing. I did not think that the King would have parted with me so easily. As to that other man, he has done to me just what I would have done to him, if I could. It is very possible that Mr. Pitt, from party and political motives, at this moment, may overlook your pretensions; but sooner or later you must hold the Great Seal—I know no man but yourself qualified for its duties.'

His Attorney-Generalship is marked with many 'Un-English' ex-officio prosecutions; and by the State trials of Hardy, Tooke, and Thelwall, which were ushered in by an opening speech of nine hours! Every night going home he was hissed at and hooted; on one occasion he was protected from violence entirely by the interposition of Mr. Erskine, the counsel of the prisoners, on another

escorted by a mysterious, tall man, who told him 'that he had done an act of great kindness to his father.' Erskine, he says, submitted to be drawn home by the people, in the place of horses, until they kept the latter for their own use. Tooke, with his life at stake, was witty throughout. The Attorney General had spoken pathetically of his sole endeavor to leave to his family, as an inheritance, an example of public probity; and the Solicitor General, Milford, wept in sympathy. Some one saying, 'Look at M——, what on earth is *he* crying for?'—H. Tooke exclaimed, 'At the thought of the little inheritance that poor Scott is likely to leave his children.' On the verdict, not guilty, being pronounced, Tooke said, 'if he should again have the misfortune to be indicted for high treason, he would immediately plead guilty, as he considered hanging and beheading preferable to hearing the long speeches of Sir John Scott.'

Mr. Wilberforce thus sums up the character of Scott at this period. 'Sir John Scott used to be a great deal at my house. I saw much of him there, and it is no more than his due to say, that when he was Solicitor and Attorney General under Pitt, he never favored and flattered as some did, but always assumed the tone and station of a man who was conscious he must show that he respects himself, if he wishes to be respected by others.'

In 1799 he is Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas—and Lord Eldon! 'The King likewise made it a condition that I should promise not to refuse the Great Seal, when he might call upon me to accept it—and this condition I thought I was bound to consent to!' Who would have thought it a very onerous condition, with \$100,000 a year, at least, attached? 'All accounts admit him to have been an admirable common-law Judge,' says Lord Campbell. This indeed was the station which he appears to have filled with the most entire credit and success of any. He wrote his first letter, on receiving the honor of the peerage, to his aged mother. 'I feel,' says he, 'that, under the blessing of Divine Providence, I owe this—I hope I may say I owe this—to a life spent in conformity to those principles of virtue, which the kindness of my father and mother early inculcated, and which the affectionate attachment of my brother, William, improved in me.'

George III. parted with Mr. Pitt as an advocate of the Roman Catholic claims. These were urged on the double ground of toleration, or essential justice, and the particular pledges of the Minister to the Irish Catholics, on effecting the union of Great Britain and Ireland. The King was inflexible; and Mr. Pitt was obliged to give way to the more ultra-Protestant, Mr. Addington. At this juncture (1801) Lord Eldon received the Great Seal.

That he soon became the favorite Chancellor of George III. is placed in these volumes beyond a doubt: his lordship would state that the King, on placing the Seals in his hands, contrived to take them from within his buttoned coat, and said 'I give them to you from my heart.'—Very soon, however, is the new Chancellor in a dilemma. For two months of the spring of this year, his Majesty was so decidedly insane that Lord Eldon would not have received the signature of any private person, so situated, to important papers: yet this conscientious and highest dignitary of the law, constantly obtained the Royal Sign-manual, and as constantly affixed the Great Seal of the King to Acts of Parliament, and other State papers. 'It is absolutely necessary to have resort to *artificial prudence*,' says one Dr. Willis; 'he must not be suffered to go to Weymouth for fear of exposing himself,' says another; 'my apprehensions predominate,' writes the Premier; 'the King must be confined again,' observes the Duke of Clarence; the Queen and Princesses are 'all uneasiness,' and the King himself afterwards told Lord Eldon that one of the keepers, at this period, 'knocked him down.' It is difficult to arrive at the true *morale* of some questions here involved. Lord Campbell thinks that 'when there was a moral certainty that his Majesty, if in a sound state of mind, *would have* approved of what was done publicly in his name, and when the most serious inconvenience, to the public service, would have arisen from suspending the Royal functions—that the Chancellor was justified in this bold assumption of power. It is quite clear that the King afterwards approved of his Chancellor's conduct; but if ever man, for right or wrong purposes, entirely usurped the sovereign power of a country, surely this was de-facto usurpation. It was no Royal

assent or consent that was taken ; Majesty was reduced to something lower than even a jest in the case.

Passing over, as the limits of this article compel us, the peace with France now effected, and the general circumstances which led to the restoration of Mr. Pitt to power, it is painful to find Lord Eldon, during another attack of the King's complaint, (in 1804,) actually negotiating the change of a ministry. That is, at this juncture, he opens an intrigue with Mr. Pitt for the overthrow of Mr. Addington, his (the Chancellor's) own coadjutor. 'The ministry was settled,' says our biographer, 'the King evidently being in a state of mind in which, as a private man, he would not have been suffered to sign an ordinary contract.' On the other hand proof is supplied that, before this negociation closes, his Majesty discovers remarkable astuteness and sensitiveness of mind : he received the new Minister unwillingly ; would not, on any account, receive Mr. Fox ; and is firm in insisting it must be well understood, that the claims of the Catholics shall be agitated no more.

We should now willingly exhibit some of the honorable efforts of Lord Eldon to heal the breaches in the Royal Family ; no conduct could be more dignified than portions of that of the Chancellor in his intercourse with the Prince : he finally settles the transfer of the education of the Princess Charlotte, from both her parents to the King. Mr. Pitt died 23d January, 1805. Lord Eldon being, at that time, deeply affected by the loss of his eldest son, just married ; and to whom Lord Campbell says that 'Pope's lines on Lord Harcourt's son were strictly applicable—

Who ne'er knew joy but friendship might divide,
Or gave his father grief—but when he died.'

His lordship, therefore, allows the Tory administration to be quietly dissolved, and on 3d February takes his 'farewell' of the Chancery bench—for not quite a year. Sliding during this period, into opposition, he is soon again deep in the intrigues of Court ; becomes the patron, in effect, of the Princess of Wales, during a delicate investigation of her conduct ; and the co-adjutor of Mr. Perceval, in the authorship of 'The Book'—so long mysterious in its origin and objects. But suddenly the whig Ministers made their own breach in the citadel of power, in an obnoxious

Roman Catholic bill; the King is roused by the Duke of Cumberland, and the Ministry falls. 'I have awakened with the Great Seal in my hand, to my utter astonishment,' writes Lord Eldon—and the Seals he retains to the death of George III. in fact, (though they were then formally resigned,) to May 1827, or the next twenty years. No period of British history is more enriched with interesting events of every kind. The nation is reduced by the bold malignity of Napoleon, and his Milan decrees, to the lowest pitch of political and mercantile depression; it is elevated, in a short time, into successful alliance with all the great European powers, and achieves, with their aid, the downfall of the French empire: the English Royal Family is now prostrated by disease; now diminished by the death of some of its most distinguished members; now convulsed and disgraced by the internal enmity and open profligacy of those at its head. Our busy and adroit Chancellor threads his way steadily through all these changes, and is about the most stable and unchanged of any of the depositaries of power. We can only notice his more remarkable movements.

Frequently attacked with regard to his conduct during the King's insanity, it is fair to exhibit some points of the defence he makes: the position of all parties was a novel one: his exculpation of himself is as original. In reply to Earl Grey, he says: 'It does not follow because the physicians all concurred in the acts then done, that I am guilty of any inconsistency in saying now, that whatever might be the report of the King's physicians, I would not consent on that mere report to dethrone his Majesty, while I myself, in my judgement and conscience, believed the King adequate to the discharge of the Royal functions. I must be permitted to state, that the great man who was then at the head of the administration, Mr. Pitt, afterwards expressed some surprise, when he found that it had been my fixed resolution never to see his Majesty, at any time, when he could be considered under the control of others, or in the presence of any persons who might be considered as exercising any control over him. My interviews with his Majesty, at that time, were always in the absence of such persons, and it was my firm conviction that I was warranted in the course that was then

adopted. I knew the dangers of this proceeding, but I knew my duty too, and had determined to see my sovereign, and judge of his complaint, when he was as free from restraint as any of his subjects, whom it has been my painful duty to examine under similar circumstances. This was very hazardous to myself; but I did my duty without fear of being deterred by the consequences. His Majesty, on the 9th of March, understood the duty which I had to perform better than I did myself; this I believe I can prove. If I did act wrong it was with the best intentions, and those will acquit me in the sight of God, if not in the opinion of my country.

At this time (1810,) 54 peers entered a bitter protest against his being appointed one of the queen's council, to whom the custody of the king was committed. Long, however, were the sweets of much more important offices to be enjoyed by him. The prince regent, professedly, at first, to provide for the king's possible recovery, retained the Tory ministers: to their own surprize, that of the Whigs, and all the country, he even continues them after all restrictions upon his office are removed; abandons all his old friends; and adopts the Tory policy entire. The Chancellor is now addressed by him as 'my dear friend;' while he congratulates himself on finding his young master 'right' and even 'a stout fellow' upon all the great points of Church and State policy;—'looking out very sincerely for those who are able and willing to support Church and State in the old fashion.' Yet there was no man in England (as the prince frankly at this time told him,) whom at one time he more hated—than Lord Eldon.

Amidst a considerable conflict of juridical opinions, the Chancellor decided the legal position of Napoleon, when brought to England. It was not 'a case provided for by Grotius or Vattel—but so clearly within the law of self-preservation, that this would justify the keeping him under restraint in a distant region; where he should be treated with all indulgence compatible with the peace of the world.'

Lord Eldon, we regret to state, was, at the period of his country's greatest depression, the advocate of all the harsh measures for restraining the people—the enemy throughout life of reform. It was an honest dread of those who

License mean when they cry 'Liberty,' we do not doubt; but not less was it the mask of a narrow and unbelieving mind, as to the best interest and hopes of society. His faith was much too great in human law—proportionably small in the gospel. He resisted all enquiry into the number of ex-officio informations filed by the Attorney General; all attempts to diminish the shocking number of offences punishable at that time with death; all reform with the House of Commons; but over and above all, every concession to the Catholics, and every reform in his own Court of Chancery. With regard to the last, he reluctantly agreed to refer the subject to a select committee of the Lords and Commons. In moving this committee in the House of Commons, Sir Samuel Romilly, an unexceptionable witness, testified—the motion was not meant to convey any censure, direct or indirect, on the Chancellor. 'A man more eminently qualified in point of learning and talents for all parts of his profession, he knew not, and he most firmly believed that he never had his equal in point of anxiety to do justice to the suitors of the Court.' Lord Eldon did finally himself bring in a bill for the appointment of a new officer of the Court, the Vice Chancellor; 'the only instance' says his severe biographer, 'of his doing any thing for the improvement of our institutions.'

With regard to the question of Catholic Emancipation he writes thus to a private friend at the period of the Regency.

"(The Prince Regent) governed by a feeling, that if his father should recover, he would never forgive himself if he suffered him to awake to a scene in which the father should see his servants discarded by his son. The same sentiment appears to me to have governed him with respect to the Catholic question; with regard to which I believe that after his father's death he will act with a due regard to the established religion. But with the possibility before him, though the utter improbability, of his father's recovery, I believe the world would not induce him, as far as he is concerned, to countenance any measure that would shock his father's feeling; if contrary to all expectation he should recover. With such determinations on his part, with reference to his father, daily and constantly proved to be most sincerely adopted by him, in his intercourse with me, how could I possibly refuse to consent to what his entreaty pressed upon me, to remain in the service of a son so conducting himself towards the father,

to whom I owe so much, or how could I break up an administration which must be succeeded by another that would overturn all that I think right?"

At the same time he says to his brother, 'Some of the Dissenters are writing against the Papishers, and publishing dissuasions from making cause with them. The London clergy petition, and some few, very few, addresses come from different parts in favor of *the poor old Church!*' When lord Wellesley made a noble speech in favor of the Irish Catholics in 1812, the Chancellor said, 'There is no wish nearer my heart than to be convinced I am wrong, in which case I will without hesitation vote for the motion of the noble Marquis. But it shocks me very much to see the descendant of a Somers and a Hardwicke act in opposition to the principles of their ancestors. If the present motion be carried the noble Marquis and I may shake hands; but as I hope for God's mercy, I do not think I shall be living under the same constitution as hitherto.' On a subsequent occasion he contended 'it was perfectly just to have a religious test of a political creed,' and 'entreated the House not to commit the crime against posterity, of transmitting to them in an impaired and insecure state the civil and religious liberties of England.'

Of the royal family he is eventually the most venerable, and always one of the sincerest of friends. He negotiates the project of a marriage between the princess Charlotte and the prince of Orange; when the spirited young lady quitted, in consequence, her governor the bishop of Salisbury's house for her mother's, the Chancellor is commissioned to fetch her to Carlton House; he is present at her more propitious union with prince Leopold, of Saxe Coburg; the present king of Belgium; as also at the marriages of the dukes of Cambridge and Kent—living to see upon the throne the only child of the latter, her majesty Queen Victoria.

Respecting the great royal difficulty, the trial of queen Caroline before the House of Lords, we have no space for particulars. Lords Liverpool and Eldon, as well as his impartial biographer Lord Campbell, (and we may add here, Mr. Wilberforce) believed her guilty. We have some faith in the personal sincerity of each of these parties—but the people of England were ill-understood by their

rulers. They applied an even-handed and common sense justice to the case; and determined that no right of punishing her infidelity (could it be proved) remained with her profligate husband. Lord Campbell eulogises the Chancellor's conduct throughout the trial, as marked alike by dignity and affability, impartiality and firmness.

The death of lord Liverpool, in 1827, wrecked finally the High Church and Tory party, of which he was the head. Two years after the 'fatal bill' of Catholic Emancipation passed. We must exhibit the last struggle of the ex-Chancellor with the unhappy George IV. against it. 'He was determined,' says lord Campbell, 'to act upon the doctrine he had promulgated, that the king, if he personally disapproved of the bill, ought to dissent to it, although it had passed both Houses.' Accordingly he had two audiences of George IV. The king's conduct was almost ludicrously weak. 'He complained that he had never seen the bills—that the condition of Ireland had not been taken into consideration—that the Association Bill had been passed through both Houses before he had seen it—that it was a very inefficient measure, compared to those which he had himself, in vain, recommended—that the other proposed measures gave him the greatest possible pain and uneasiness—that he was in the state of a person with a pistol presented to his breast—that he had nothing to fall back upon—that his ministers had threatened (I think he said twice at the time of my seeing him,) to resign if the measures were not proceeded in, and that he had said to them 'go on,' when he knew not how to relieve himself from the state in which he was placed; and that in one of those meetings when resignation was threatened, he was urged to the sort of consent he gave, by what passed in the interview—till the interview and the talk had brought him into such a state that he hardly knew what he was about, when he, after several hours, said, 'go on.' He then repeatedly expressed himself as in a state of the greatest misery, saying, 'what can I do? I have nothing to fall back upon:' musing for some time, and then again repeating the same expressions.'

Of Lord Eldon's peremptory exclusion of the Catholics and Protestant Dissenters from power—both, it seems but fair to say, were matters of *principle*. He loved place and

power for himself—but high-churchism still more. He is the most remarkable instance, that could be adduced of Protestant high churchism, separate from all pretensions to personal piety:—allied indeed with the sheerest ignorance of what is vital religion. Let us analyze this heterogeneous moral mixture. It never can be (thanks to a kind Providence) an American admixture of character: it never more will be an English admixture. But how do we account for it? 1. It was the *easiest* view of religion, which this busy, scheming, worldly dignitary of the State could take. It required little or no thought about the nature of religion. It was presented to his eyes on opening them. He had but to uphold things as they were. 2. It was his party's and his sovereign's religion; the religion, to his surprise and joy, of *two* of his sovereigns. Lord Eldon prided himself on having 'never ratted:' in the good old name of 'Tory,' which he preferred to that of 'Conservative.' He was the personal and confidential friend of George III., himself of narrow mind but considerable honesty, and still more considerable inflexibility of purpose. When George IV. continued the Tories in power, nothing so delighted the Chancellor as to find that he had silently come over to the Tory prejudices on this very question of the position and claims of the Church: and when the king *did* rat back again to the liberal views of the Whigs, the ex-Chancellor manifestly despises him. 3. There were perplexing arguments on both sides of the question of concession to the Catholics. Lord Eldon was not a great reader of any thing beside his law books. But English History had on its face abundant facts and marks of the evils of Catholic ascendancy; and it is but truth to affirm that it was *this* he feared—not as touching religion itself, but as dangerous to the commonwealth and state of England. For ourselves, we confess, we learn much from this volume, both of the evils and utter spiritual ignorance of such high churchism as that of this great Judge, as well as of the *real dangers* to society of Catholic high churchism in particular, in regard to which we are 'almost one' with this, (so called) ultra Protestant.

In a fair summary of his character we shall find lord Eldon the most conspicuous of the moral and political paradoxes of his time—a most amiable bigot; a profane high

churchman ; a profoundly learned but dilatory and impracticable Chancellor ; a great judge but a small minded man.

We must enrich our pages with a further extract from this volume ; happily illustrating the singular compassion of our Heavenly Father to great and small wanderers from the truth. The bishop of Exeter had called on the Chancellor in his latest months of life. He is not considered, we believe, 'Evangelical' in his religious views—but he afterwards sends lord Eldon the following 'beautiful letter, which may be perused' as this work truly says, 'with advantage by persons of all ages and all conditions of life, whether in health or in sickness.'

"MY DEAR LORD :

"I take blame to myself for having, as I fear, obtruded on you some important matters of consideration at a time when you were not prepared to admit them ; or in a manner which may have been deemed too earnest and importunate. That you pardon the intrusion, I have no doubt ; and that you ascribe what may have been ill-timed, or ill-considered, to the true cause—an anxious wish to lead a highly gifted mind like yours to those thoughts which alone can satisfy it.

"Before I leave this place, instead of again trespassing on you in person, I have resolved to commit to paper a few considerations which your own powerful mind will know how to improve, and which I humbly pray the Holy Spirit of God to impress, so far as they accord with His truth, on the hearts of both of us. I contemplate in you, my dear lord, an object of no ordinary interest. I see a man full of years, and honors, richly earned (ay, were they tenfold greater than they are,) by a life which, protracted long beyond the ordinary age of man, has been employed, during all the period of service, in promoting, strengthening, and securing the best and most sacred interests of your country. I see in you the faithful, zealous, and most able advocate of the connection of true religion with the constitution and government of England. I see in you one, who has largely benefitted the generation of which you have been among the most distinguished ornaments. Seeing and feeling this, I am sure you will pardon me, if I exhibit a little, even of undue, eagerness to perform to you the only service, which I can hope to render—that of exciting such a mind to those reflections, by which, after serving others, it can now do the best and surest service to itself. In truth, those reflections are few and brief, but most pregnant. In short, my dear lord, I will seek most earn-

estly to guard you against the danger which arises from the very qualities which we most admire in you, and from the actions for which we are most grateful to you. That danger is, lest you contemplate these matters with too much satisfaction—lest you rest upon them as the grounds of your hope of final acceptance with God. Oh! my dear lord, the best of the sons of men must be content, or rather must be most anxious, to look out of themselves and above themselves, for any sure hope, I will not say of justification, but of mercy. Consider the infinite holiness and purity of God, and then say whether any man was ever fit to appear at His tribunal. Consider the demands of His law, extending to the most sacred thoughts, and wishes, and imaginations of the heart, and then say, whether you, or any one, can stand before Him in your own strength, when He cometh to judgment. No: it is as sinners, as grievous sinners, we shall, we must appear; and the only plea which will be admitted for us is the righteousness and the merits of our crucified Redeemer. If we place any reliance on our own poor doings or fancied virtues, those very virtues will be our snares, our downfall. Above all things, therefore, it is our duty, and pre-eminently the duty of the purest and best amongst us, to cast off all confidence in ourselves, and thankfully to embrace Christ's most precious offer on the terms on which he offers it; He will be our Saviour only if we know, and feel, and humbly acknowledge, that we need His salvation. He will be more and more our Saviour in proportion as we more and more love and rely upon Him. But surely the more we feel and deplore our own sinfulness, the more earnest will be our love, the firmer our reliance on Him who alone is mighty to save. Therefore it is, that in preparing ourselves to appear before Him, the less we think of what we may fondly deem our good deeds and good qualities, and the more rigidly we scrutinize our hearts, and detect and deplore our manifold sinfulness, the fitter shall we be, because the more deeply sensible of the absolute necessity and of the incalculable value of His blessed undertaking and suffering for us. One word only more—of ourselves we cannot come to this due sense of our own worthlessness; and the devil is always ready to tempt our weak hearts with the bait which is most taking to many amongst us—confidence in ourselves. It is the Holy Spirit who alone can give us that only knowledge which will be useful to us at the last—the knowledge of our own hearts, of their weakness, their wickedness—and of the way of God's salvation, pardon of the faithful and confiding penitent for His dear Son's sake. Oh! my dear lord, may you and I be found amongst the truly penitent; and then

we shall have our perfect consummation and bliss amongst the truly blessed:

"I am, my dear lord,
with true veneration and regard
your lordship's most faithful servant,
and affectionate brother in Christ.

H. EXETER."

"*The Earl of Eldon.*"

ARTICLE V.

THE MEXICAN WAR REVIEWED ON CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLES.

When the views of a theologian by profession are presented on a question such as that to which these pages relate, the doubt may well be suggested whether they ought, at any time, to treat questions of human strife, detached from their relation to the life-principle of peace, and apart from their place (one of opposition) in the map of its bearings on human destiny. Certainly, it is only by the light of that principle that we are enabled to exhibit the actual magnitude of such subjects, and to assign their due importance, relatively to the comprehensive interests of the world. Both the scriptural and the political argument against war in general, appear to have been so fully presented by other writers, that little scope has been left unoccupied in either department. The present writer will however attempt the application of such new principles as may occur to him in the course of this review.

In approaching the questions that grow out of the late war with Mexico, the following general heads are proposed to be treated of:—

- I. The origin of the war.
- II. The moral aspect of circumstances in the progress and conduct of it.

I. *The Origin of the war* is the question that first presents itself.

1. It is not to our purpose to review all that has been advanced in controversy on this point. This would amount substantially to a repetition, in another form, of the de-

bates upon it in Congress. Not that such a course would be otherwise than proper, did it promise much avail to the result at which we aim. More is likely to ensue from the omission, as far as possible, of such details as have but enlarged the field of argumentation, without greatly facilitating the settlement of the question. We believe we shall succeed too well in showing, that our national course *under such circumstances as are affirmed in our President's annual message to Congress in December, 1846*, was morally and politically exceptionable. It is granted (and is little doubted by the present writer,) that those of our citizens officially concerned, either in the circumstances leading to the war, or in its operations, may be acquitted of peculiar personal blame in their contribution to the national error. Nor can it be doubted that the state of public principle—one of indifference it seems to have been—as to the moral evil of war, could and did alone permit *this* war to take place, by whatever party it was commenced, and to whatever degree the sense of the nation may have been opposed to its occurrence.

In the present argument, circumstances ordinarily of an estimate which we, as moralists, cannot accord to them—such as, the rights comprised in “military possession”—are necessarily introduced correspondingly to such estimate; as it enters into the present design to argue from the ordinary worldly acceptance of the circumstances at issue, to the conclusion that the war was unnecessary and morally inexpedient, whatever may be elicited on behalf of its justice.

2. On the part of the United States, the question was one of boundary simply, after Texas had been annexed to this country. On the part of Mexico, it was whether Texas should become annexed to the United States—toward which event she took an offensive position.

Texas is that part of this continent, which, after being in dispute between the United States and Spain, was ceded to the latter in the year 1819—extending, in the previously asserted claim of this country, westward from the Sabine to the Rio Grande. When certain of the Spanish colonies made themselves independent of Spain, the territories of Texas and Cohahuila united in forming one independent State. “The State constitution which they adopted, and

which was approved by the Mexican confederation, asserted that they were 'free and independent of the other Mexican United States, and of every other power and dominion whatever.' Such was the position of this State in the federal relation of the Mexican States. When that federal relation was dissolved, Texas and Cohahuila were, morally and politically, more than ever independent of the Mexican States, and of every other power and dominion whatever. In a comparative moral aspect, she was more independent of Mexico than of Spain; for she was disunited from Mexico, before the independence of the latter was acknowledged by Spain. The ground on which Mexico assumed that Texas was not independent of her, namely, her recognition withheld, if of any force, would show that Texas was independent of every country except *Spain*, at the time the former claimed her perfect independence.* Mexico then could with propriety claim Texas only as a cession from Spain; and that only as *implied* by the delivery to Mexico, and not to Texas, of those recognitions which were designed for Texas and other States, as well as Mexico. So that the single point to which the Mexican argument may be reduced, is, whether Spain so possessed Texas at that period, that she could present it to Mexico. Presuming that she did not, the annexation of Texas to this country required no consultation on the part of either Texas or the United States, with any foreign power. Moreover, Texas had been acknowledged by the world as an independent nation, even as Mexico had been during the same generation. Mexico having for many years abandoned Texas, as beyond her power to reconquer and as being in every respect independent of her, except that she had not, in words, abandoned the assertion of her claim, consented at length to yield that recognition, provided the subsequent national course of Texas—a part, at least of her future career—would be governed by antecedent restrictions from Mexico; which was the substance of the condition that she should not annex herself to the United States. The question evidently was not one that regarded property, but the balance of power. Mexico having objections, that were encouraged

* March 1836. Spain acknowledged the independence of the Mexican colonies at a subsequent date in that year.

by foreign governments, to the extension of the territory of the United States in that direction. But as argument on that foundation could be of no avail, her only prospect of an effective protest, as having herein the *sympathy* of great powers pledged to her, was in taking the position that Texas belonged to her until she should acknowledge its independence on her own optional conditions. Texas, being independent alike of any inherent or external force in the prohibition, accomplished the annexation. Mexico in consequence—we will not say, with some, “declared war,” but—addressed warlike expressions to the government of the United States, and rather threatened than assumed a warlike attitude. This was in effect all her conduct; though it may be admitted that the form of it was such as, in the code of the world, has usually been held to be provocative of war. In this country the national honor was not felt to require war as a consequence: nor did war ensue thereupon.

3. Looking further back in the order of time, there had been during several years a series of complaints on the part of the United States against Mexico, for wrongs committed on citizens of the former.* The claims founded on them, and the acknowledgment of those claims by Mexico, were resolved into a stipulated debt from the Mexican government. The non-compliance of the latter with its engagement, left the wrongs as they previously stood.†

* They are thus summed up in a passage from a communication from Mr. Forsyth, the then American Secretary of State, dated May 27th 1837, addressed to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs:—“Treasure, belonging to the citizens of the United States, has been seized by Mexican officers, in its transit from the capital to the coast. Vessels of the United States have been captured, detained, and condemned, upon the most frivolous pretexts. Duties have been exacted from others, notoriously against law, or without law. Others have been employed, and in some instances ruined, in the Mexican service, without compensation to the owners. Citizens of the United States have been imprisoned for long periods of time, without being informed of the offences with which they were charged. Others have been murdered and robbed by Mexican officers, on the high seas, without any attempt to bring the guilty to justice.”

† There is wanting that analogy which has been alleged, between the claims of our government on Mexico, and those of individuals upon our non-paying States. The defection of these has involved no international question; partly because it is as one affecting their own citizens, it being but incidentally that foreigners participate in the effect; and partly, because our States, *separately*, are to foreign powers as mere companies. It should be further observed, that the debt of Mexico was not for money funded, but for

War however was not the result, even of a second violation of the terms by Mexico, or of her protracted indecision whether she would or would not accede to the proposed terms of a third convention relative to the subject. Nor does it appear that war was really contemplated by any party in connexion with those circumstances.

4. Subsequently to the matters of international controversy abovementioned, arose the Texan question previously stated. Both departments of controversy were associated in the object of a special mission offered by the government of the United States to that of Mexico, some time after intercourse between them had been suspended. The circumstances attending that suspension had been these. On the passage of a resolution by the Congress of this country in favor of the annexation of Texas, the Mexican Minister, resident in Washington, departed, after expressing to the Secretary of State the unfriendly terms which he held to exist between his government and that of the United States, by the fault of the latter. At the time of his preparation for departure, the Secretary of State, in reply to his inimical communication,* assured him that the "most strenuous efforts should be devoted to the amicable adjustment of every cause of complaint between the two governments, and to the cultivation of the kindest and most friendly relations between the sister republics."

"Notwithstanding Mexico had abruptly terminated all diplomatic intercourse with the United States," the President embraced what appeared to him to be "the earliest favorable opportunity 'to ascertain from the Mexican government whether it would receive an envoy from the United States, entrusted with full powers to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two governments.'" "The consul of the United States, at the city of Mexico,

personal injuries. If therefore the indemnity was unpaid, the injuries were unredressed.

* The Mexican Minister at Washington addressed a note to the Secretary of State, bearing date of the sixth of March 1845, protesting against the resolution referred to as "an act of aggression the most unjust that can be found recorded in the annals of modern history; namely that of despoiling a friendly nation, like Mexico, of a considerable portion of her territory;" and as an act "whereby the province of Texas, an integral portion of the Mexican territory, is agreed and admitted into the American Union." And he announced that, as a consequence, his mission to the United States had terminated, and demanded his passports, which were granted."—[*Pres. Mess.*

was therefore instructed by the Secretary of State, on the fifteenth of September, 1845, to make the inquiry of the Mexican government. The inquiry was made, and on the fifteenth of October, 1845, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Mexican government, in a note addressed to our Consul, gave a favorable response, requesting, at the same time, that our naval force might be withdrawn from Vera Cruz, while negotiations should be pending. Upon the receipt of this note, that force was promptly withdrawn from Vera Cruz. A Minister was immediately appointed, and departed to Mexico." "To my surprise and regret, (continues the President,) "the Mexican government, though solemnly pledged to do so upon the arrival of our Minister in Mexico, refused to receive and accredit him. When he reached Vera Cruz, on the thirtieth of November, 1845, he found that the aspect of affairs had undergone an unhappy change. The government of General Herrera, who was at that time president of the republic, was tottering to its fall. General Paredes, a military leader, had manifested his determination to overthrow the government of Herrera by a military revolution; and one of the principal means which he employed to effect his purpose, and render the government of Herrera odious to the army and people of Mexico, was by loudly condemning its determination to receive a Minister from the United States, alleging that it was the intention of Herrera, by a treaty with the United States, to dismember the territory of Mexico, by ceding away the department of Texas. The government of Herrera is believed to have been well disposed to a pacific adjustment of existing difficulties; but, probably alarmed for its own security, and in order to ward off the danger of the revolution led by Paredes, violated its solemn agreement, and refused to receive or accredit our Minister; and this, although informed that he had been invested with full power to adjust all questions in dispute between the two governments. Among the frivolous pretexts for this refusal, the principal one was, that our Minister had not gone upon a special mission, confined to the question of Texas alone, leaving all the outrages upon our flag and our citizens unredressed. The Mexican government well knew that both our national honor and the protection due to our citizens imperatively requir-

ed that the two questions of boundary and indemnity should be treated of together, as naturally and inseparably blended; and they ought to have seen that this course was best calculated to enable the United States to extend to them the most liberal justice. On the thirtieth of December, 1845, General Herrera resigned the presidency, and yielded up the government to General Paredes. Although the prospect of a pacific adjustment with the new government was unpromising, from the known hostility of its head to the United States, yet, determined that nothing should be left undone on our part to restore friendly relations between the two countries, our Minister was instructed to present his credentials to the new government and ask to be accredited by it in the diplomatic character in which he had been commissioned. These instructions he executed by his note of the first of March, 1846, addressed to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs; but his request was insultingly refused by that Minister, in his answer of the twelfth of the same month. No alternative remained for our Minister but to demand his passports, and return to the United States.”*

There can be little question that it would have been greatly to the advantage of Mexico “that the two questions of boundary and indemnity should be treated of together.” She would probably have been released from the claims of the United States upon her for indemnity, on her restoring the hand of friendship and withdrawing from her attitude on the Texan question. This may be almost inferred from the president’s remark—“they ought to have seen that this course was best calculated to enable the United States to extend to them the most liberal justice.” But setting aside the duty of endeavoring to conciliate Mexico, the government might without impropriety have confined its communication to the old question of indemnity, and omitted all notice of Texas for the present, since it was not to obtain the recognition of that country as independent, that mention of it was made in connexion with the mission. The boundary question had not yet indispensably come up, and might have been adjourned, but for a two-fold consideration in the mind of our govern-

* President’s Message.

ment; namely, that Mexico being sore on the subject of the Texan annexation, was not in a disposition to satisfy our previous grievances; and that the combination of the two would suggest to Mexico a mode of obtaining reparation for the assumed wrong. The course *thus far* of our government, cannot, in our humble judgment, be surpassed for its moderation and good policy. With reference to Mr. Slidell's pressing his reception on the Mexican government, it may be remarked;—first, that Herrera's government could have gained nothing by Mr. Slidell's adoption of its suggestion (had it been in his power to do so,) to circumscribe his official character and the object of his mission, to that of a Commissioner on the Texan question; inasmuch as this question, was the rock by means of which Herrera's government had been already doomed to a speedy downfall; and secondly, that our government would have gained nothing subsequently from Paredes by offering him the compromise that had been required by Herrera as the condition of Mr. Slidell's reception. The policy however of this government in presenting the subject *at all* to the government of Paredes, appears questionable, considering the "unpromising light," in which "the prospect of a pacific adjustment with the new government," appeared, "from the known hostility of its head to the United States." It would apparently have been more conducive to the interests of peace, had no intercourse been proposed to the then government of Mexico. A brief delay was not unlikely to usher into that nation councils more auspicious to a settlement of the matters at issue. And even if not, it had been better that our government had observed a continued, if not conclusive, silence on its claims to indemnity from a nation comparatively bankrupt, and not opened communication with Mexico on this or any other subject, until a question of boundary should be unavoidably raised. In the mean time, it might have exercised territorial administration between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, confining it for a period to the extent to which it had been been enforced by Texas. There is reason for supposing that, before the lapse of such a space of time as would exhaust the patience of our government, the question of boundary would have presented itself in the due course of events, as arising from the natural state of

things on the frontier. As for any supposed liability to disadvantage in not taking early possession of such frontier, we are perhaps justified in presuming that the passage of our vessels upon the Rio Grande, while it could not have been prevented by the Mexicans, would have sufficiently expressed our territorial claims, and contributed much to a virtual settlement of them.

5. It is in the order of argument that we now address some observations to the question of the boundary line between Texas and Mexico, in that region where it was an occasion of strife.

It is manifest that the limits of Texas, if ever distinct, could not be justly affected by the abolition of federal relations between her and other States; and therefore the judgment is erroneous that Texas had a right only to as much territory as she had held military possession of; for this is a false test of right, and one which those who apply it to the case of Texas do not acknowledge in other cases.

Again, it has been already stated that Texas and Cohahuila composed one State. Then it was only with the permission of the Government they had in common, that any portion of the State they composed could separate from the remainder—unless by a revolution in this State altogether distinct from such as might affect the whole State in its relation to the other Mexican States. Thus only could Texas and Cohahuila become separate and independent of each other. If, before their separation, there was strife between them as to union with the other States after the manner newly proposed, and if Cohahuila held Texas with her power as still a part of herself, then whether she united herself with the other States or not, she might with truth and propriety inform the world that her boundary extended eastward to the Sabine. If, on the other hand, Texas held Cohahuila in the manner conversely supposed, her boundary would extend much further westward than the Rio Grande. In that case, a Mexican occupation of Cohahuila by force would not, by itself, deprive Texas of her right to that territory. And if, simultaneously with such an occupation of Cohahuila, Texas became annexed to the United States, then the position of Cohahuila relatively to Texas would have been

conditionally this:—if she was not endeavoring or willing to effect her separation from Texas, it would have been analogous to that of New Mexico, if, at the time that province was held by the forces of the United States, and before it was ceded to the latter, Mexico had been voluntarily annexed to some other country. Texas and Cohahuila however did not question the independence of one another, when an opposition of their respective tendencies indicated that the time for its accomplishment had arrived. Cohahuila* yielded itself to Mexico; and if the people of that province have since pretended any claim to Texas, it has been only after the manner of, and in combination with, the other newly constituted provinces of Mexico.

Where then was the boundary line between Texas and Cohahuila after the separation between them? Either they had not time to bestow on the subject, or they deemed a constructive boundary sufficient; most probably the former circumstance led to the latter conclusion as at least a temporary one. They may have assumed either a demarcation established during the period of their union, or (if there were none such) one existing previously to that event. Of the former description there does not appear to have been any; so that our only resource is in one of the latter. And as this is equally the alternative left in the case of the other provinces on the Rio Grande opposite to Texas, antecedently to the confederation, the boundary question as to Cohahuila becomes blended with those as to the other provinces, New Leon and Tamaulipas—resolving them into one point, namely, the boundary between Texas and Mexico previously to their separation from Spain. The treaty between Spain and the United States in the year 1819—by which all the claims of the United States (just or unjust) from the Sabine to the Rio Grande were ceded to Spain—so far from throwing light over any past boundary, rather indicates that there was none *previously*, and tends to bury it if there was any. Had there been any distinct one, it would have greatly aided the solution

* Cohahuila was invaded by Mexico, and her senators imprisoned; but this was because they did not so far yield to the Dictatorship as to surrender all their arms, which every State was required to do. But they declined joining the Texan resistance to further dependence on Mexico.

of the point before us, provided no new one was subsequently established — and we know of none.* We do not say that there have been no definite statements made as to a boundary. There have been such at different times, proceeding from statesmen, geographers and travellers, but too conflicting to be profitably adduced on this occasion. Few if any geographical-historical questions have been so tantalizing as the present one, from its fertility of circumstances suggestive of inference, which alternate the balance of apparent right between the two sides, and from the deficiency of conclusive force on either of them. It is remarkable that local history of this importance should be wanting to so recent a period, and that its materials should be so conflicting.† A boundary question between obscure and hardly accessible villages, that have almost ceased to exist, could present scarcely greater obstacles to an arbitrator. It was a question in which arbitration could not well have pronounced a decision, if it were a condition that a river should be the line; although, if otherwise, there might have been less difficulty in such a mode of adjustment. It might have assigned to Mexico the settlements immediately on the east bank of the Rio Grande, and to Texas the remainder of the country west of the Nueces — a boundary which would have been manifestly inconvenient, and leading ultimately to endless disagreement among the borderers. It was a question then which could be properly settled only by an amicable arrangement, and an accommodating disposition between the parties concerned. It was not unreasonable in Texas to claim, on her separation from Mexico, a boundary which nature and history alike beheld with much favour; still less so in the United States to regard it in the light in which Texas had presented it, when Mexico refused to communicate to this Government even so much as a contradiction of the Texan representation, after being invited to an interchange of sentiments.

A question here arises, in what light should the settlements of Mexicans on the east side of the Rio Grande,

* "The detail of her (Mexico's) colonial history is buried in Spanish archives."

Meyer.

† This very mystery throws a classical halo around this and other points in the present subject, to one who has diligently investigated them.

opposite to New Leon and Tamaulipas, be regarded? Borders of countries are liable to indiscriminate settlement without necessarily affecting the citizenship of the settlers, or the boundary between the countries to which they are respectively subject. Nor is the accident of their being all citizens or subjects of the same country in itself sufficient to change the nationality of the soil. Mexican officers were indeed stationed there, in the exercise of jurisdiction. It was natural for the settlers in question, though in former times subject most probably to the Spanish governors of *Texas*, to look to the opposite side of the river for jurisdiction, now that the banks they occupied were apparently, at least for a time, beyond the notice of Texas, owing to the difficult occupation of her government at a great distance from the scene, as rendered necessary by recent events. Of these circumstances the Mexican authorities would be likely to take advantage, inasmuch as they were at hostilities with Texas, supposing that under other circumstances they would not have done so. We venture to express the humble opinion that the rights of Texas were not neutralized, though somewhat prejudiced, by neglect of *surveillance*, or by continued silence in her foreign* department. In like manner, the claims of Mexico were in *no greater* degree compromised during the period that Texas extended her jurisdiction westward of the Nueces, or when the forces of the United States occupied the west bank of that river.

It is of the highest importance to the argument, that Mexico claimed the country *west* of the Nueces on no other ground than she claimed that on the *east* side of the same river. She appears to have deemed it a compromise of her claim to Texas to argue the question of its extent in any direction save that towards the *Sabine*. We are not aware of any regard paid to the question of the west side of the Nueces, until Paredes, in his procla-

* She was not silent at home on the subject:—"During a period of more than nine years which intervened between the adoption of her Constitution and her annexation as one of the States of our Union, Texas asserted and exercised many acts of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants west of the Nueces. She organized and defined the limits of counties extending to the Rio Grande. She established courts of justice, and extended her judicial system over the territory," &c. (Pres. Message.) She had not *practically* extended it to the Rio Grande.

mation dated the 23d of April, immediately before the war, or, according to himself, after the war had commenced, remarks — "Hostilities have been commenced by the United States of North America, beginning new conquests upon the frontier territories of the departments of Tamaulipas and New Leon." The first occasion on which the west bank of the Nueces is mentioned by any Mexican authority, as a claim (so understood by some) independently of the comprehensive claim to Texas, is in the requisition made by the Mexican general, Ampudia, (Matamoras, April 12th, 1846,) to General Taylor, that he would "retire to the other bank of the river while our governments are regulating the pending question in relation to Texas." But there appears to be little frankness in this communication, inasmuch as General Ampudia must have been as well informed as General Taylor that (according to the reply of the latter of the same date,) "an envoy despatched to Mexico . . . had not been received by the actual Mexican Government, if indeed he had not received his passports and left the republic."

Further, the consent of Texas to the Nueces as a boundary to the once projected State, that was to have been the result of revolutionizing a small portion of Mexico, and to have been named "Rio Grande," does not involve, as it has been suggested, an incongruity with her claim to territory beyond it; for it was likely enough that, in her desire for the formation of a new State between herself and Mexico, she would contribute to that object a region which she could well spare to a friendly, and still more convenient, neighbour.

By the treaty of Santa Anna with Texas, while he was a prisoner of war, it has been contended that the boundary was adequately settled, it being therein agreed that it should be the Rio Grande. If, on the value of a treaty, of which differing estimates have been entertained by public men, that of an individual unlettered in the law of nations be worthy of any attention, we submit the following one, and without at all aiming at a middle or compromising view. Considering the constitutional independence of Texas, which rendered an invasion of it by Mexico quite different in principle from an invasion (say) of Ireland by England, in case there was set up in the latter country a

new form of government, to which the former would not submit—and considering that the war between Texas and Mexico consisted in a resistance by the former to an enterprise of Santa Anna for the purpose of subjecting her to his usurped dictatorship, she was entitled to the full benefit of his disclaimer of such pretension for the future, by whatever means she compelled it. It was a simple question of *force* on the part of Santa Anna; and it was by arms that Texas compelled the discontinuance of that force. By his treaty with her, proposed by himself, the independence of Texas was established, at least as far as the *military dictatorship* of Mexico was concerned in it; and his personal authority seems to be as plenary with reference to this matter, as his pretended one to overthrow the constitution of Texas, or to compel its subjection to a country, its confederation with which had been made to cease (and that by his act). Texas had both him and his army in her power;* and these availed themselves of the advantages conceded to them by this treaty. Santa Anna was acting, not as a minister of the Mexican nation, but as its military conqueror, with reference to the setting up of a new government in every State. He and those who succeeded to his position were bound by this treaty—one by which the very party that had set up the new order of things (Santa Anna and his forces) obtained their liberty. The treaty then is valid so far as it had respect to the freedom of Texas from future molestation—it being virtually a trial of right by force, in which she succeeded. But the question of boundary was not one that he could treat of, except *in cathedra*, or as accredited elsewhere; it being independent of the continuance or cessation of the federal relations. So that Texas could not with propriety claim the settlement of the boundary as by conquest. The objection that Santa Anna was in duress is valid as regards this last particular. It is not of equal force in both particulars, because in the former Texas demanded merely a desistance from violence—in the latter, a cession of that

* It appears singular that Texas did not liberate Cohahuila, and go to the assistance of Zacatecas. The revolt of Zacatecas belongs more to the romance of history, though less to world-history, than that of Texas.

which was not indisputably her territory. We are not brought by this section of the survey at all nearer to certainty as to a boundary line.*

In fine, the question of the western boundary of Texas, we may as well dismiss, as one that judgment cannot grasp. Nor is it indispensable to the moral argument on the war, as will duly appear. Indeed, as the parties who have approved of the war, have in general made up their minds that the Rio Grande was the true boundary previously to it, there appears to be little advantage gained by arguing the war question on any other assumption than that such was the boundary. Our argument is, in part, that, assuming such to have been the proper boundary, the war was nevertheless unjustifiable, and that, too, on other grounds than that of an exclusive Christian principle.

It is as well to remark, that whenever the Rio Grande has been here mentioned, with reference to the boundary of Texas, it is only within a limited latitude, and not to the full extent of the river course. New Mexico extends eastward of this river. "Santa Fé de Nuevo Mexico," which is east of it, is mentioned in the fifth article of the Mexican federation, as a separate "territory," after Texas and Cohahuila are included in one "State."† Texas, however, laid claim to that part of New Mexico, in defining her *revolutionary* boundary, as it has been termed. It is incorrectly so termed; for Texas was not revolutionized, but declined participation in that revolution which was introduced into the other States, and thus became affected in little other than an *extraneous* manner. In defining her boundary, so as to include New Mexico, it was implied that it became an object to her after hostilities had taken place between herself and Mexico.

* Santa Anna seems to have regarded the Rio Grande as the boundary line; though, if he did, that is no proof that it was so. The following language occurs in a proclamation of General Wall, issued by his order, dated June 20th, 1844 (as quoted by Mr. Rusk in Congress)—"Every individual who shall be found at the distance of one league from the left bank of the Rio Bravo, will be regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his country; and, after summary military trial, shall be punished as such." By *that part of the national territory* is meant *Texas*.

† Appendix to Congressional Globe, 29th Congress, 2d session, p. 385.

But it does not appear that she would have contested it with a nation at peace with her. How far up the east bank of the Rio Grande (allowing that river to be the western boundary) the territories of Texas extended, in other words, the northern boundary line of Texas, is not material to the question in which we are engaged, even were this line particularly distinct.

6. When the government of Mexico refused communication with that of the United States, on the application of the latter, through an express envoy, the government of the United States could but act on the best information it could obtain, with reference to the boundary of this country, at the frontier of Mexico. It was therefore *politically* warranted in stationing troops anywhere within the boundary line represented by Texas as her's, previously to the act of annexation; though it would not be morally warranted in making no discrimination between the historical line (wherever ascertainable) and the revolutionary one. Nor, in fact, was this government indiscriminate, as regarded New Mexico, the possession of which was not attempted. All the arrangements, however, should have been so made as to avoid, rather than evince a readiness for, the issue. The Americans were in quiet possession of the region west of the Nueces, with very little exception, whilst Gen. Taylor's force remained at Corpus Christi, near that river. "To repel any invasion of the Texan territory which might be attempted by the Mexican forces, it was deemed sufficient, in the spring of 1845, that our squadron had been ordered to the gulf, and our army to take a position between the Nueces and the Del Norte (or Rio Grande)." * It was in pursuance of this order that General Taylor took the position above mentioned. No Mexican forces had then crossed the Rio Grande; all was quiet as long as General Taylor remained near the Nueces. What then were the augmented necessities of the case which, in the following spring, impelled the advance of our army to the banks of the Rio Grande? There had been indeed a change of government—Herrera deposed—Paredes in power. "The partisans of Paredes (as our minister in the despatch referred to states,) breathed

* President's Message.

the fiercest hostility against the United States." The reconquest of Texas and war with the United States were openly threatened. These were the circumstances existing, when it was deemed proper to order the army under the command of General Taylor to advance to the western frontier of Texas, and occupy a position on or near the Rio Grande.* If these were all the circumstances that created the propriety of marching the troops from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande, in what remarkable particular did this propriety outweigh that which required the army to remain at the former station?—"the threatened invasion from Mexico?" There had been such menaces from Mexico for several years before our army entered Texas. If Mexico was until then unequal to the fulfilment of her menaces, or abstained from attempt to carry them into effect, what probability was there of her so doing, when our army was there? What effect had yet been consequent on the circular of Condé, the Mexican Minister of War, as far back as in July, 1845, announcing to various authorities that war was declared against the United States, and enunciating the vocabulary of military preparation? It has resulted as was apparently taken for granted that it would, there being at the time little curiosity as to what "might in that noise reside!"† The attitude of Mexico was subsequently scarcely more threatening than aforesaid. And without assuming it to have been the effect exclusively of our advanced position, experience has proved that collision—sanguinary collision—took place very soon afterwards; while there is far from being ground, as suggested by previous experience, for the expectation of such collision, had our army retained its position at Corpus Christi. It has been indeed stated, and we have no contradiction of it, that General Arista, commanding on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, proposed to General Taylor that they should retain their relative positions, to avoid collision.‡ In fact, the object of the Mexican army crossing the Rio Grande does not appear to have been so much for the purpose of contesting a question of boundary—which would have been

* President's Message.

† Milton.

‡ Mr. Harper's Speech—Congr. Globe, Appendix, p. 203.

rather a refinement scarcely worth its while, considering the domestic circumstances of the nation, as for that of protecting her citizens on the east bank, who were regarded, though without sufficient reason, as molested by the approach of an American army—a motive anything but discreditable to Mexico. In so doing, however, she invaded a soil which this Government had been forced to regard as an appendage of the United States, by the refusal of Mexico to enter into any communication on the question whether it was a part of *Texas*. Nor should it be denied that the pointing of our guns opposite Metamoras* was not unlike a threatening demonstration to the Mexican forces: for, notwithstanding that the latter had set this example, they seem to have regarded it as originally the intention of the American general, without reference to what was done on the Mexican side. Had Gen. Taylor not shown his batteries in response to the measures on the Mexican side, it is highly probable that they would not have fired on his fort. But these active war-like preparations being accompanied by an exhibition to the Mexicans of the very small force at the fort, presented attractions scarcely resistible to a foe that had received authority to “attack by every means which war permits,” and “to

* As a great deal has been made of this circumstance, to the prejudice of the Government, it is proper to mention General Taylor's account of it. In his letter of March 29th, 1846, to the Adjutant General, he says:—“Our approach seems to have created much excitement in Metamoras; and a great deal of activity has been displayed since our arrival, in the preparation of batteries. The left bank is now under the reconnoissance of our engineer officers, and I shall lose no time in strengthening our position by such defensive works as may be necessary, employing for that purpose a portion of the heavy guns brought round by sea. The attitude of the Mexicans is so far decidedly hostile. An interview has been held, by my direction, with the military authorities of Metamoras, but with no satisfactory result.”

On the 6th of April, he thus wrote:—“The Mexicans still retain a hostile attitude, and have thrown up some works, evidently designed to prevent us from crossing the river. . . . On our side, a battery for four eighteen-pounders will be completed, and the guns placed in battery to-day. These guns bear directly upon the public square of Metamoras, and within good range for demolishing the town. Their object cannot be mistaken, *and will, I think, effectually restrain him from any enterprise upon our side of the river.* A bastioned field fort, for a garrison of 500 men, has been laid out by engineers in rear of the battery, and will be commenced immediately.”

It is manifest, from some of the above expressions, that it was not intended to provoke the Mexicans to commence hostilities.

destroy wherever they might find" our army.* We say they received *authority* — for we can hardly regard as *orders* what were sounded for popular effect, and which the Mexican commanders do not appear to have held as obligatory. Nor do we believe that until they *saw* our army, the Mexicans believed themselves to be actually at war, *more than they had been for a long while*. This is evinced by the whole of their proceedings. They were then insulted by the smallness of the apparently challenging force—little more than 3,000 men (and these divided in order to maintain two positions); and they were attracted by the opportunity of capturing a hated adversary. But if, at the time of their crossing the river, it had been intended as a step merely collateral with our own movement, for the purpose of a joint possession until a further attempt at a settlement should be made by the two governments, however singular if not unprecedented would have been the relative position of the two armies, it is more than probable that no blow would have been struck by our own.† The Mexicans, however, announced a far different intention, and aggressively pursued it, making the first positive demonstration of—or placing beyond question the existence of—that state of war, which may be considered as having been simultaneously entered into. Such was the origin and commencement of the Mexican war—a war which, tested by the principles which have ordinarily governed what is called the civilized world in its international relations, was and will be pronounced (we have no doubt) by posterity to have been, on the part of the United States, one of the most *just* wars that have blotted with gore the history of man—a war that might nevertheless have been avoided by the United States, had they been so disposed, probably without diminution of an inch of territory, certainly without detriment to their soil or their people, or

* Letter from the Mexican Minister of War to the Mexican general near the Rio Grande, quoted in the President's Message.

† Orders had indeed been given by this Government (August 25th, 1845,) that the crossing of the river should be regarded as hostile; but considering the associations which led to such order, the above speculation is not excluded by it. Besides, Mr. Secretary Marcy's order of July 8th, 1845, is expressly, that Mexican troops, if any were found to be already on our side of the Rio Grande, should not be molested unless an actual state of war should exist.

even what is called their honour—a war, consequently, which no degree of political justice (in the ordinary sense of the expression,) could morally justify.

Before taking leave of the question of the origin of the war, an observation or two shall be submitted, on certain principles of policy, by which the Government and the public spirit of this country was in great measure influenced antecedently to the rupture with the sister republic.

1. Allusion has been made to the great moderation which characterized this Government in its advances to that of Mexico. This, instead of diminishing, (as maintained by the President,) rather augmented the duty of a continued abstinence from the semblance of any different course; for what harm resulted from the extent to which moderation *was* carried?—To give vent to her feelings in expressions of disdain, menace, triumph, declaration of war, and of whatsoever else had long been conventionally, as it were, a privilege of Mexico. It was a very material element of gratification to her—a field for the play of exuberant impulse. What if she evinced a more than ordinary passion in her sport, and bounded, full of life and fire, on the banks of the Rio Grande—feigning, now encounter, now retreat! If these movements on her own side of the river were to be regarded with suspicion by ourselves, excusable might be the suspicions of a Mexican force, at the movements, on disputed soil, of an army representing a matter-of-fact people. Again, it should be borne in mind that, previously to the war, Mexico was not alone in the opinion that she had been injured. The press of the greatest nations had done much to flatter that impression. The diplomacy of those nations had still greater effect, interested as they were in the independence of Texas. We repeat, then, that over and above the duty of our government to exercise very tender moderation towards Mexico, as it certainly did for a while, the very consideration of its having so done, in virtue of that point of Christian civilization at which we profess to have arrived, laid it under the greater obligation towards her, as a neighbor, to persevere in the same policy. Any wanton misconstruction of it would be removed, sooner or later—and what if a generation passed away in the interval? Not all the advantage, in the form manifested hitherto, that Mexico could have taken of our

deportment in that period, or even in any space of time, (considering that the interruption of relations gave her little opportunity,) was worth a single citizen, or would justify the sacrifice of one. Our "strength was to sit still;" and so long as we were so doing, Mexico *did* us no harm, whatever she might have in store.

2. Again, it has been the policy approved by many as being that of the administration, though not represented as such by authority, that it was important for a threatening foe to be made aware that delay in entering upon war when necessary, would not present itself as an impediment growing out of our constitution, as imagined by some, at all events by the Mexican government. And although this is not submitted as any part of the policy that should contribute to a war, yet it is confidently held up as a justification of the government, in not consulting with Congress before marching the forces to the Rio Grande. The executive commission does not appear to have been transcended in any way. But, to order the army as the President did, in his capacity of Commander-in-chief, to the seat of impending strife, at a time when the irritation of Mexico was at its height, without consultation with Congress *then in session*, seems to have implied either an opinion of the unconcern of every one, who was not a member of the administration, in the movements of the army and in the consequences of such, or else an apprehension that his plans would not be concurred in by the representatives of the people. It is not herein meant that he should have submitted to Congress a question of the boundary of Texas to be assumed, as that matter was not necessarily in point; at least just then, but a question as to the most expedient course under the circumstances newly presented to his notice as of increased warlike aspect. Delay would not necessarily result from so doing, in case of invasion; inasmuch as whatever the executive may do without consulting Congress, it may do (it is presumed) without awaiting its decision, if too tardy for the emergency. Further, since an inference in favor of the impulse under consideration, has been drawn from an impression on the part of the Mexican government, that by the Constitution of the United States, the President alone had not power to take requisite measures for the defence of the country, and

that the Congress and people of the United States would not sustain the President in the warlike purpose attributed to him; on the other hand, it is not an ill-founded presumption that the Mexican government, felt secured by the supposed trammels of our government, against the occurrence of any collision before our army marched to the Rio Grande; and that, all its official declarations notwithstanding, the government and people of Mexico had not more prospect of a military encounter than did the people of the United States, until the first blood had been spilt.

3. Again, it appears to have been a paramount principle in the mind of our President, to associate a scheme in Mexico for the establishment of a monarchy there, with the necessity for resistance to it by the United States. Paredes was supposed to entertain the project. If there were a prospect of his success, then, it is to be inferred from the President's intimation, that warlike preparations would be necessary. Whether this necessity would be created by the simple fact of a monarchy being established in Mexico, or by the selection of a European prince, is not clearly discriminated in the form of intimation adopted by him. But he appears to assume that an election to the contemplated throne of Mexico must be made from European candidates. On the other hand, an exercise by Mexico of her right to choose her own form of government, does not appear to involve the necessity of her acceptance or even toleration of European intervention. The idea of any other opposition to her free choice than is implied by the exercise of influence, tends greatly to the injury of the republican character. Inasmuch as the question was not connected with the recent collision with Mexico, save through the mention of it by the President as adding justification to his policy, we have to do with it only so far as it is associated with the danger of entertaining the principle of intervention with the domestic affairs of another nation, at a period when we are in controversy with her on international points; so liable is this superfluous prepossession to affect the natural course of the independent questions.

4. Another ascendant impulse avowed, not by the government, but by the party encouraging the war, was the importance to our interests that we should use the occa-

sion presented by the offences of Mexico, to present evidences of our warlike capacities to the rest of the world, in which (it is said) there has long been an assumption of our very limited capacities of that nature, through our independence of standing armies. Evidences of national power have indeed been furnished in the aptitude for military discipline evinced by the modest novices sent to the field of action against multiplied hosts, and in the readiness which answered the summons for volunteer forces to any requisite number. In addition to which it may be remarked that the Northern line of our country was not in requisition for its masses, which had not, on this occasion of Southern warfare, those calls of interest which would have roused them had it been a Northern blast that sounded.* This difference in circumstances between the two atmospheres of warfare, is worthy of consideration from those who have cast on our government the imputation of adopting a different policy respecting Oregon from that respecting Texas. The truth is, that advances were made to Mexico which were never made to Great Britain. Towards the latter nation, a deportment of a far different character was called in question on both sides of the ocean. The only semblance of analogy between the two cases, antecedently to the final issues of conduct in each of them respectively, consists in this;—our government had transactions with each, of a nature which partly for euphony, and partly in deference to the quality of the “high contracting parties,” is called *diplomacy*. Mexico living in an

* Mr. Polk remarked in his last annual message, that the nation could at any time command “two millions such as fought the battles in Mexico.” General Taylor has been reported to have said in one of his speeches—“we are a nation of soldiery!”—Both meant, no doubt, merely the contrast to the state of things implied by the following speech:—“I would demand and question, if I should not displease, how many knights be there now in England, that have the use and exercise of a knight? that is, to wit, that he knoweth his horse, and his horse him; that is to say, he being ready at a point to have all things that belongeth to a knight, an horse that is according and broken after his hand, his armour and harness mete and so forth, et cetera. I suppose, and a due search should be made, there be many founden that lack.” This passage is from “The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry, or Knyghthode, translated out of Frensshe into Englisshe, by me William Caxton”—one of Hartshorne’s “Book Rarities of the University of Cambridge,”—“supposed to have been printed in 1484”—“one of the most interesting and rare volumes from Caxton’s press.” It is in the Pepysian Library of Magdalene College, Cambridge.

ideal* world—her policy being in character with it—knew not how to entertain the proposition made to her. What place could it obtain in the romance of Mexican history?—and how could it be apprehended by the strings of the Southern lyre?—England has acted in *her* national spirit, which on the other hand was towards a practical end. She ascertained that her interest required no more than had been previously proposed to her, but which she had then declined—while the American government preferred its claim to a higher latitude merely to draw from *her* the proposition of that which she had formerly refused, since *this* government could not (as appeared to itself,) again propose it. Now the circumstances attendant on the settlement of this very question, while so far from involving this nation in any just charge of partiality or infirmity of deportment, is itself proof enough of the absence of any necessity for military demonstration to the world for its recognition of our national weight and power. Those who contend for the need of such demonstrations, are inconsistent with the tone of triumph, in some of them at least, at the Oregon settlement—attributing, as some did, the final course of England to a sense of her interest in avoiding a collision with this country. A sense of interest on her part might have been estimated with sufficient correctness without military associations. Moreover, the objects of our government were obtained without the least military preparation—and, that, when expressions publicly used by the President had created an apparently greater necessity for such preparation than appeared under other circumstances. Could we, then, by any amount of military demonstration, have procured more of due respect than was shown by England while we were quite unarmed, and unguarded in every way, even in *words*?—An indication not very remote as to time, of the respect in which this country is held, and of its weight abroad, is the effect of a protest by General Cass, on his own personal responsibility, against the ratification of the Quintuple treaty; by allowing which it was

* This term is here used in its vulgar sense.

considered that the position taken by this country, as to the right of other powers to search its vessels, would have been compromised. We should like to be informed what government, besides that of Mexico, has treated this country with disrespect since the war of 1812—such as to render expedient new proofs occasionally of our national capacities as indicated by military exploits? Even now, which is the most obvious of the results from the recent war, the better establishment of the prowess of this nation, or the diminished estimate of that manifested by Mexico? However justice to both nations may assert the former, there appears to have been a much stronger impression of the latter in the world. Mexico has received far more justice to her valour—less energetic, less directed though it was—from her foe than from other nations, which, mortified at her unequal competition, have withheld the sympathy they promised.

We hope to have shown that, whatever pretence nations may put forth as to the expediency of display in military adventure to command respect, it appears in the light of singular absurdity as coming from *this* nation.

We have now animadverted on those features in the recent public spirit of this country, and in that of its government, which could not but be deemed as of appropriate notice, in connexion with the circumstances that originated the war.

II. We proceed to remark on some of the circumstances most striking in a *moral* aspect in the *progress* and *conduct* of the war.

1. As soon as practicable after information of the first collision between the forces of the United States and those of Mexico, the Congress of the former declared the country to be in a state of war. This was true in a literal sense. But when the enemy had retired beyond the Rio Grande, which he did after the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, the war might have been desisted from with greater honour to the United States, both in their own estimation, and in that of other nations, than characterized their use of the occasion to invade the country of their vanquished foe. It is hardly credible that Mexico would have attempted another invasion; for, how-

ever ready again and again for renewed combat, it was thenceforth defensively against invaders. At all events, such a result should have been awaited. Conceding that there were some reasonable objections to this course, while diplomacy continued silent between the two countries, yet as the policy of our government was to present repeated propositions to that of Mexico, it was manifestly to the prejudice of this policy that our army was permitted to advance into the Mexican territory. Not only was the exasperation of the enemy increased, and his affectation of national honour more provoked, but his sense of interest and self-preservation were not likely to receive the impression we would fain produce, if, at the same time, we were feeding his hopes of retaliation by the very fact of our advance into his country, besides that of the comparative smallness of our invading force. Not until the capital of Mexico had fallen, was the enemy's hope, till then constant as a vestal lamp, extinguished. His sense of honour could all along afford any loss, if only by and by he might gain some advantage, at whatever sacrifice to himself; and he could not allow himself to doubt that, sooner or later, such would accrue to his patience for revenge. Nor is it improbable that he indulged in visions of intervention from those great powers, which having acknowledged the independence of Texas, were interested in the proviso of Mexico, that she should not annex herself to any other power. It has been credited to the government by its opponents, that the unpacific results to its proffer of the olive-branch while our army was on the soil of Mexico, were in accordance with its aim—a judgment we are afraid to pass!—In our advance towards *conquest*, no great difference would have been made by some delay in crossing the Rio Grande, (say, till the next rejection of pacific terms). In our advance towards *peace*, by remaining altogether on our own side of the river, we would probably have gained materially. In our advance towards *either*, we had lost nothing ultimately by even resuming our old 'position at Corpus Christi.'

That there was little anticipated expediency in hastening the pursuit of advantages, appears to have been admitted by the previous deficiency of military preparation. Witness the state of General Taylor's forces antecedently

to the actions of the eighth and ninth of May.* When intercourse was temporarily cut off between the general and the little garrison of Point Isabel, there were but a few hundred in the latter place. An overwhelming body of Mexicans threatened it; other large detachments of the enemy were being landed. In the fort (opposite to Metamorast) where General Taylor was, there were little provisions remaining. And as Point Isabel was the main depot, containing almost all the provisions and ammunition of his army, it was indispensable that the general should effect a junction with that point. But before he could be apprized of its situation, the only means on which the two points could depend for intercommunication, consisted in the mission of Captain Walker and a few men, who almost "against hope," arrived in safety at the general's camp. General Taylor had then to adventure the perilous enterprise of advancing to Point Isabel with a small force (his main one) divided into three small sections. He arrived after two days' march without opposition. But he had necessarily left the little garrison of the fort greatly exposed, and with little means of defence. The Mexicans on the opposite bank, at Metamoras, availed themselves of his departure with the main force, by making exertions to destroy the fort; while it had also to defend itself for a hundred hours against assault from surrounding forces, during which time they lost their commander, major Brown. It was therefore a point of importance to the general, when some days had elapsed, to obtain information of the condition and prospects of the fort. For the attainment of this object he was dependent on such good fortune as might attend the exposure of a hundred men under captain May, in opening the communication. There was much to sicken even the stout hearts of those who, in the interval that followed, awaited their return. May, with his band, escaped observation from the enemy. On arriving within a few miles of the fort, he halted, as directed, and sent to the fort a party under captain Walker; who not returning as expected, the party concluding that he had been captured,

* The whole army on the frontier consisted of about 3500 men; and all the land forces of the United States little more than 7000.

† This fort was afterwards named Fort Brown by General Taylor, in memory of the commander of the little garrison, who was killed.

returned without him to Point Isabel, bearing thither no information whatever from the fort, and encountering superior forces on their way. Walker however appeared unexpectedly, with a favorable report from major Brown, who had not then fallen. We are not engaged in writing a narrative of the events that occurred during the war: but these circumstances are referred to as indicative of the adoption of slender means of defence at a time when the government was anticipating the menaced invasion. Nor can the alarm be forgotten which pervaded the United States, at the situation of General Taylor, after the war had commenced. These limited preparations under such expectations, show little idea of accomplishing more than a defensive object. The order from the government to cross the river, if necessary, ill accorded with such little preparation. It could not have been executed without the previous successes which were marvellously gained under all the circumstances—for it was before the arrival of the reinforcements, which were sent for no other object than that of relieving the General from the predicament in which he was placed between Point Isabel and the fort. On the ground, then, even of the defensive attitude of the government, we cannot but suspect our protest to be morally sustained against shifting the scene of war to the opposite banks of the Rio Grande*—a result which, as we contend, was needless to the conqueror, and far otherwise than consistent with the renewed offer of the olive-branch. Alas! how heedless was it of the peace, the blood, the lives, the varied and incalculable interests of many thousands of human beings!

2. After many battles won, and territories gained by the United States, it was found that the Mexicans were not the more disposed to—what? *seek* for peace?—*grant* it to the United States?—for our armies truly carried the olive-branch wherever they went, although they were on the enemy's *undisputed* soil. The question was then mooted in this country, as to a settlement of the question of boundary in a new and peculiar way. It was proposed that we should abstain from further progress in the enemy's country, partly on principle, partly to spare ourselves

* The previous order to pursue the enemy across the river, if attacked by him, does not imply the perseverance of war on the other side.

further labour and expense, and that we should remunerate ourselves for that already incurred, by proceeding to reckon at once without our host—to draw a line separating such Mexican territory as we had taken from such as we had not taken, substituting that line for the Rio Grande as a boundary. It is but justice to both parties—that in favour of the war, and that opposed to it—to report that this proposed measure was not peculiar to either of them. Nor was it proposed in any spirit but that of a sincere desire to end the war, a termination of which appeared to be, for the present, accessible in no other way. Leaving the question of the practicability of this course to professed statesmen, who indeed disposed of it, our stricture upon it is applied to its moral merit. It really seems that, without the consent of Mexico, we had no justification in adopting any line of boundary beyond the Rio Grande; and that from the time we crossed that river, our duty to return to our own side of it was unvarying during the whole of our progress, and uncompromised by any circumstances attending that progress—least of all by our too great pride to return in consequence of the construction to which it might have been liable. Yet, the further we had advanced, and the more prowess we had manifested, so much the more real independence and sense of honour would have been our proved qualities had we then retired. Not doing so, however, we had not a better right to define with pickets a boundary any where between the Rio Grande and the capital of Mexico, than to define on paper one between that city and the frontier most remote from our possessions. The fact is, that, so long as we adhered to the purpose of remaining on the Mexican side of the Rio Grande, there could be no stopping point, until an adjustment of the difficulties between the contending nations should be effected by a treaty. The capture of the city of Mexico removed the necessity for the continued advance of the army, as the proceedings of the Mexican nation, consequent on such an event, would be indicative of its final purpose whether or not to come to any terms with us. The occasion was very properly used by the commanding general, representing the American government. The Mexicans were indulged with the tardiness natural to them, which they evinced

to a degree hardly compatible with a desire that the military possession of their country by the enemy should cease.

The treaty by which the war was brought to a close was such as, on the whole, might have been fairly expected. If it be an admissible principle that war may with propriety be waged against another power by which we have been aggrieved, in order to obtain redress, then a treaty which deprived Mexico of nearly all the territories we had occupied, but which awarded to her a sum of money as a balance arithmetically due to her, is not exceptionable as to these particulars. Among the articles are some* borrowed from the treaty of 1785, between this country and Prussia, and originated by Franklin, who signed the treaty while resident Minister in France. They provide for the settlement of future international differences by arbitration, and for the mitigation of the severities of warfare, should it occur between the parties treating. These provisions, without precedent at the period of the former treaty, were highly honorable to the nation by whose accredited negotiator they were offered, and to international law, to which they imparted a more chastened spirit. The repetition of such principles in the latter treaty were more than apposite. And, considering the position previously taken by Mr. Polk in the Oregon dispute, against recourse to arbitration as an expedient for the settlement of difficulties, his consent to this insertion is the more creditable to him, inasmuch as both his prejudice and his sense of committal gave way to a consideration of humanity with reference to an unseen future. It ought not, however, to be overlooked that the spirit which entered into the treaty with Prussia was in advance of that which treated with Mexico, inasmuch as *not all* the generous provisions comprised in the former were adopted in the latter†. That "contained his (Franklin's) philanthro-

* See the 21st and 22nd articles of the Mexican treaty.

† In Lyman's "Diplomacy of the United States," it is remarked of these provisions, that "it does not appear that they have been of any practical utility to the world." Possibly, this consideration suggested the omission of them in the late treaty. But while the world is advancing, its past deficiencies should not be assumed as an earnest of its future conduct. The sooner we can say "old things are passed away," the better.—The treaty with Mexico has been represented as having been produced in the Ameri-

pic article against *privateering*, and in favour of the *freedom of trade*, and of the protection of private property *in time of war*. The king of Prussia made no objection to this article. On the contrary, his ambassador, the Baron de Thulemsier, who signed the treaty, felicitated the commissioners on its being introduced." The 'twenty-third article is directed,' said he, 'by the purest zeal in favour of humanity. Nothing can be more just than your reflections on the noble disinterestedness of the United States of America. It is to be desired, that these sublime sentiments may be adopted by all the maritime powers without exception. The calamities of war will be much softened; and hostilities often provoked by cupidity and the inordinate love of gain, will be of more rare occurrence.'" Free ships were likewise to make free goods,* and contraband merchandize was exempted from confiscation. He (Franklin) fondly hoped that these benevolent principles would be wrought into the law of nations; but the example has not been followed.† The remaining provisions of the treaty with Mexico were adapted to the accommodation of the two nations, and principally Mexico, as regarded the protection of society on the frontier. On the part of both sides it was a very liberal treaty. At the same time, though abounding in humane provisions, it was less so than Franklin—and he not a mere theorist, but a practical man—would have rendered it.

3. Not the least important feature in the conduct of the administration with reference to the war, is the recommendation to Congress to authorize by legislation the issue

can Senate, in the hand-writing of the British Agent in Mexico. Whoever made the extracts from the Prussian treaty by authority, is the party to be blamed for the omission of those creditable parts alluded to, unless he was expressly desired to omit them.

* This particular had been originated and adopted by the Northern powers.

† Jared Sparks' Life of Franklin—1844. To the above extract the following *note* is added:—"Washington spoke of this treaty in terms of high commendation. In a letter to the Count Rochambeau, he said:—"The treaty of amity, which has lately taken place between the king of Prussia and the United States, marks a new era in negotiation. It is the most liberal treaty which has ever been entered into between independent powers. It is perfectly original in many of its articles; and should its principles be considered hereafter as the basis of connection between nations, it will operate more fully to produce a general pacification, than any measure hitherto attempted amongst mankind.—*July 31st 1786.*"

of *letters of marque*.* Conceding the propriety of all other modes of warfare prevalent among civilized nations, there is not a single admissible argument in favour of a legalized molestation of private property on the high seas, the thoroughfare of nations: singular it is that the nineteenth century (the first half of it we should say—for there is hope of the remainder) should either have so little apprehension of its own advancement as to tolerate such a system, or, while tolerating it, cherish the delusion of its present assumed position in civilization!† The more remarkable is this, in that the powers by which alone it can be sustained or put down, are those Anglo-Saxon nations which are preeminently commissioned to the diffusion of humanity, and in which the earth's fairest prospects are, to all present appearances, bound up. Are these nations awaiting an example from some of less pretensions?‡ Would that Mexico had set the example when the recent hostilities broke out! she had little to sacrifice to the principle. Nor even after the course adopted by her government, in the offer of commissions to privateers from Spanish colonies—effects from which incipient course were all contravened by the relations existing between Spain and this country—would it have been too late to have done so in reply to the contemplations of our government. She may yet do so. And as expectation is not always prepared for the approaching developement or revival of a dormant principle, let us not, in our vanity, exclude all idea of being hailed from quarters whence we little expect it, equally to our shame and to our benefit. Eminent will be the nation, in the eyes of the contemporary world and of posterity, which shall first proclaim the lesson that the privateering system, however legalized, is an outrage on civilization, even though adopted as a retaliatory course. Pi-

* Congress did not act on this part of the President's Message.

† The subject was to have been discussed at the Panama Convention, in 1826, had it been well attended.

‡ It should be mentioned that, in the framing of the first definitive treaty between Great Britain and the United States, in 1783, "the American Commissioners drew up a series of new articles, chiefly relating to commerce, which they were willing should be inserted, and which embraced Dr. Franklin's philanthropic scheme for protecting private property in time of war, and for suppressing the practice of privateering. None of them were accepted." *Spark's Life of Franklin*.

racy it is ; *declared* piracy is all that it ought to be. And so to have declared it, when the inestimable opportunity for so doing was presented at the commencement of the Mexican war, would have exalted our government, our Congress, and our nation. Nor would such a stand have involved this country in the risk of any sacrifice worth naming, for, to use the expressions of the President,—“It is true that there are but few if any commercial vessels of Mexico upon the high seas ; and it is therefore not probable that many American privateers would be fitted out, in case a law should pass, authorizing* this mode of warfare.” If it be the duty of our fleets to check violence on the high seas as a marine police, their proper duty cannot but include the protection *equally of Mexican commerce as of our own*, notwithstanding the hostilities existing between the two nations. One may be excused for expressing so much surprise that, in the provisions of the recent treaty for mitigating the inhumanity of future wars, the golden opportunity was not used to procure the abolition of privateering, by the two nations in common, when the reference made to Franklin’s treaty could hardly have failed to suggest it.

4. There is a circumstance in the conduct of the administration, while carrying on the war, that calls for separate notice in this series of remarks. The terms of the capitulation of Monterey, while they were generous to the enemy, in so far as concessions were made to his feelings, were likewise, so far as the armistice was concerned, far from adverse to the interests of our army, whose sufferings needed alleviation by repose—comparatively such. And what did this respite amount to, as proposed ?—merely to a cessation from hostilities until a day little later than that at which an injunction to renew hostilities could arrive. The circumstance that such an order was sent, when it could little effect results, has brought much censure on the government, as being expressive of a dissatisfaction little called for. The mandate for the cessation of the armistice, when so little was to be gained by interrupting it, does however admit of this liberal construction—that it was

* As the *other* modes of warfare are not considered to require special legislation, to authorize them, why should *this* require it, unless it be, that this is even more unnatural than all others ?

deemed expedient to avoid confirming any impression in the Mexican mind, that the resources of this government were in a state to need any intermission of the contest. Still it appears to have escaped the reflection of the government, how ill a moral effect may be produced on the general proceedings of the commander, if he is led, by such a course as was their's in this particular, to anticipate the refusal of sanction to other measures of like character, on occasions when humanity may be even less able to dispense with them.

5. In the military conduct of the war, we may with feelings of gratulation ascribe to the commanding Generals of the American forces, at least as great examples of both unavenging and active humanity as the annals of war can present. Their deportment has maintained a congruity with that part of their vocation which consisted in representing a humane country, entitled to expect in her sons when abroad the best illustration of this characteristic. The magnanimous sacrifices made by General Taylor of advantages to the enemy, at Buena Vista* at the risk both of loss to his own army, and of compromise to his prospect of victory, merely to honor a white flag from a "*notus Ulysses*," when, under the circumstances of the two armies, it could hardly wear a pacific expression, seem almost to transcend a just claim to approbation—exposing, as it did, his own army (which seemed thrice to have lost the battle before it was won) to the perfidy and wantonness of that tried individual. But great was the *self-sacrifice* to which it also tended.†

* Santa Anna sent a white flag at a period of the action at which his army was placed to manifest disadvantage from the American fire, but was yet far from being defeated. His real object was presumed by every one, before it could be proved, to be merely that of gaining time to remedy the disadvantage. He is reported to have even re-commenced his fire before the parley had ceased. It is to be hoped that this is an improvement (if there can be any) on his breach of faith. Another object gained by this white flag, was the certainty of General Taylor's position, a fire being immediately opened upon his person.

† The following handsome testimony, published in some of the public journals, is from a young sergeant:—"I have seen cruelty and inhumanity on the part of subordinate officers to their men—inhuman punishments inflicted for slight offences, *but never in the presence of General Taylor*—who was always a kind father and protector to the poor soldier, and whom every honest soldier in the army loved. No man of honor who ever served under him will charge him with cruelty, either to his own troops or to the enemy.

The chivalry of Scott conceded, after every battle, to prisoners who had made themselves conspicuous for military qualities, *liberty without parole*, in consideration of the degree to which they evinced those very qualities which rendered them formidable. It was *his* wise moderation and heroic independence, that for a while denied to himself and to his elated army, the scarcely resistible enjoyment of a triumphant entry into the city of the Montezumas, in order to spare the feelings of a prostrate foe, by yielding to him—thanklessly as it issued—the opportunity of an honorable peace without the walls. He declared, moreover, that the great triumph he sought was a peace, as honorable to Mexico as to his own country.*

Various circumstances of exception to the discipline maintained by the two Generals mentioned, have been pointed at, but invariably with a captious spirit. There is indeed one of these worthy of notice—namely the refusal of Gen. Scott to comply with the request of the foreign Consuls in Vera Cruz, that he would grant a respite from the siege till the women and children could leave the city. But those who have made this a peculiar charge against his fair name, have lost sight of the circumstance that before the commencement of the siege he had particularly advised

After the capture of Matamoras, instead of using one of the houses in the city as his quarters, he gave them all up to the sick, wounded, and suffering soldiers, and slept in his tent on a bed that was not more than four inches above the mud and water that surrounded it." * * * "He never turned away from a suffering soldier without doing all that he could to relieve and cheer him. On the march to Seralvo," continued the youth, "my strength gave out, and if it had not been for Gen. Taylor, I might have been left upon the road to die or be murdered. But he saw me, and knew from my looks that I was exhausted. He took me up and sat me on his own mule, and I rode with him in that way for several days."

"At one time we were almost out of provisions. We had nothing to eat but musty biscuit and magotty pork. An officer went to General Taylor, and complained that he could not eat such food. 'Well, sir,' said the General, 'come and take your dinner with me.'"

"The invitation was gladly accepted, and the officer, anticipating a first rate dinner, dressed himself up, and went to the quarters of the General; but instead of finding a regular dinner table, filled with delicacies, he saw the General sitting before a fire, toasting a piece of the same pork on a stick, and that, with some musty biscuit and a little bean soup, made the dinner for himself and the disappointed officer, who expected to dine on roast beef and plum pudding. That gentleman didn't eat any more dinners with General Taylor."

* The author is indebted to Mr. Gardiner, the Spanish Secretary of General Scott, for information of this circumstance.

the removal of the parties in question. His subsequent refusal was founded on circumstances which led him to suspect the motives for the application.* It does seem indeed that, to one who could not have distrusted his prospect of success, the space of half a day, if even that space was indispensable for the object in view, would have made but little difference, whatever advantage of a different kind could have been taken by the enemy. But it cannot be made to appear, that the General was less considerate of the situation of women and children, than the most humane besiegers of cities, revolting as is a *system* from which events of this nature do, and (as it appears) must have birth.

The conduct of the American forces in general was chequered with good and evil, as will hereafter be shown. It is hard to determine which should be *expected* to predominate. On one hand, it would seem that, in an army from a civilized country, savage conduct would be the probable exception. Yet, on the other, in a band trained to the most effective means of violence and blood-shedding, it really does seem rather exacting on human nature, thus inflamed and thus exposed, to expect from it other than the reverse. According to General Scott, indeed, there were but "few bad men in this army" against whom "the

* "I enclose a copy of a memorial received last night, signed by the consuls of Great Britain, France, Spain, and Prussia, within Vera Cruz, asking me to grant a truce to enable the neutrals, together with Mexican women and children, to withdraw from the scene of havoc about them. I shall reply, the moment that an opportunity may be taken, to say—First, That a truce can only be granted on the application of Governor Morales, with a view to surrender; second, That in sending safeguards to the different consuls, beginning as far back as the 13th instant, I distinctly admonished them, particularly the French and Spanish consuls—and, of course, through the two, the other consuls—of the dangers that have followed; third, That although, at that date, I had already refused to allow any person whatsoever to pass the line of investment either way, yet the blockade had been left open to the consuls and other neutrals to pass out to their respective ships of war up to the 22d instant; and, fourth, I shall enclose to the memorialists a copy of my summons to the governor, to show that I had fully considered the impending hardships and distresses of the place, including those of women and children, before one gun had been fired in that direction. The intercourse between the neutral ships-of-war and the city was stopped at the last-mentioned date by Commodore Perry, with my concurrence, which I placed on the ground that that intercourse could not fail to give to the enemy *moral aid and comfort*." *Extract from Gen. Scott's despatch to the Secretary of War.*

safeguard of martial law" was required.* The Commander-in-chief is perhaps the individual least likely to be informed of the number of misdeeds perpetrated by his army. Tales told in school or in camp, though exceeding in number those ever told out of the same, do nevertheless come far short of what might with truth be told. But besides this, a general must be, from necessity, a special pleader for his forces. They are his limbs: and if, in the instance of every capitally offending one, he should "cut it off and cast it from him," he might soon be left desolate in a strange land. Or, supposing the guilty men of his army to be under sentence, according to the magnitude of their respective offences, and supposing all the remainder appointed to carry it into effect, it might be matter of speculation to-night which half of the army would be strong enough to hang or flog the other half on the morrow. We mean to say that the idea of a just infliction of punishment in an army appears to be an absurdity. An army is committed to its general to take care of—not to diminish or enfeeble it. It is not the end of discipline to produce such results. Could any government, determined on the invasion of a country, accomplish its object as well by sending thither a mob without discipline?—would it be at the trouble and expense of subjecting to discipline those who composed it, if the purpose of it was merely the regulation of their moral deportment? We trow not. They would merely receive a commission to go and do all the mischief they could on the hostile soil. Discipline, then, is merely to qualify the armed band for its avocation. That our forces fulfilled not only their vocation, but its collateral temptations presented to every passion, there is too much proof, little as is told out of camp. They have proved that war at this advanced period of the present century is like war at any period in the preceding one; and have rendered the inference too obvious that, whatever diminution of inhumanity has been effected in the modes and circumstances of warfare during recent centuries, yet that the system is scarcely susceptible of further improvement in those respects; and that until war is abolished, society in the land invaded

* General Scott's proclamation of April 11th, 1847.

will never be secure from, but will rather have assurance of, excesses such as those which pervaded the Mexican war—excesses which appear as properties inseparable from the current of war. Some illustrations of the life led by our *soldiery* (and is this designation often employed in a favorable sense?) will be presented when we hereafter proceed to consider the evils of the war. Justice requires it to be noticed at this point, that general report, and consequently public opinion, has discriminated between the conduct of the *regular* forces and that of the *volunteers*, in a manner most unfavourable to the latter.

6. As regards the Mexican deportment during the war, little allusion can be made to that of their commanding generals on the present occasion, there having been too slight a representation of it on which to found observation of any extent. To this may be added the little competency there can be to judge of the circumstances in which they were placed, and the difficulty of feeling as they did in their own country invaded. The deportment of Santa Anna with reference to the white flag sent by him to Gen. Taylor, (which has been alluded to,) is, as far as we can speak with confidence, an exception to the usual bearing of those in high command during this war, as well as to the general character of modern warfare. So likewise was his last step before abandoning the city of Mexico—setting at liberty and arming all the prisoners and convicts in that city, expressly that they might assail the Americans after the surrender, and pay no respect to the terms of capitulation. The reviewer, as well as the historian of this war, cannot hasten too soon, for his own gratification, and that of his reader, to scenes in this drama, of which the women of Mexico were the heroines.

“The angels of Buena Vista” were not long without a minstrel to tell their deeds, though in “a strange and northern tongue.” The following brief but pregnant passage contains the story that “opened his saying upon the harp:”—“A letter from Mexico states, that at the terrible fight of Buena Vista, Mexican women were seen hovering near the field of death, for the purpose of giving aid and

* Psalm xlix. verse 4.

succor to the wounded. One poor woman was surrounded by the maimed and suffering of both armies, ministering to the wants of Americans as well as Mexicans, with impartial tenderness."*

Again, according to a writer in the *New Orleans Delta* — "During the siege of Monterey, there were constant and affecting evidences of the kindness of the Mexican women afforded to the soldiers of the American army, regulars and volunteers. When our men and officers were passing through the streets of the city, during the most exciting intervals of the battle, they would run out of their houses with baskets filled with bread and cakes, and distribute the contents among the officers and soldiers, without the reception of fee or reward for their kindness. And it can be easily imagined that these were highly acceptable donations, inasmuch as many of us at the time were very much reduced in our stock of provisions. There were also many of us during the siege, and after we had entered the city, in different yards in the place, where we fired from the tops of the houses upon the Mexican troops, stationed in the public squares or plazas. Here too our toils and lassitudes were greatly soothed by the tender assiduities of the Mexican females. There were some of them still remaining in the houses which backed upon these yards, who cheerfully tendered their services to cook for us, receiving a small amount of compensation from those who had money, and to those who were destitute of means, handing food without any reward whatever. The humanity of the Mexican women was also brightly manifested during the most intense heat of the action, in causing the wounded among the American soldiers to be removed out of the streets, where they lay weltering in their blood, into their own houses, where they carefully and tenderly dressed their wounds, and provided them with food and drink. They also evinced the most ardent devotion to such of the wounded soldiers on the American side as were taken prisoners by the Mexicans, and sent to their hospitals. They dressed their wounds, washed their clothes, and brought them fruit of different kinds, without any charge for their pains."

* See Whittier's verses on "The Angels of Buena Vista."

Nor does this romance of the sex end before life has been sacrificed :

"Where I was stationed," says one writing from Monterey, after its capture, to the Louisville Courier, "with our left wing in one of the forts, on the evening of the 21st, I saw a Mexican woman busily engaged in carrying bread and water to the wounded men of both armies. I saw the ministering angel raise the head of a wounded man, give him water and food, and then carefully bind up his ghastly wound with a handkerchief from her own head. After having exhausted her supplies, she went back to her house to get more bread and water for others. As she was returning on her mission of mercy, to comfort other wounded persons, I heard the report of a gun, and saw the poor innocent creature fall dead ! I think it was an accidental shot that struck her. I would not be willing to think otherwise. It made me sick at heart, and turning from the scene, I involuntarily raised my eyes towards heaven, and thought, great God ! and *is this war* ? Passing the spot the next day, I saw her body still lying there, with the bread by her side, and the broken gourd, with a few drops of water still in it—emblems of her errand. We buried her ; and while we were digging her grave, cannon balls flew around us like hail " *

Of the lower classes of Mexican women, hear an observer :

* It may be an interesting inquiry to the student of human nature, in what respect and to what extent this was characteristic of *Mexican* women in particular. Would it be characteristic of those in a northern latitude to hesitate so to act ? They would no doubt have been ready and willing, had it occurred to them. But their imagination is less suggestive to their resolution. In the days of Chivalry there appear to have been two constituting elements of the *quality* of chivalry : *courage* was one—the other consisted in the *manner* of performing an action. Now it need hardly be doubted that woman elsewhere, perhaps anywhere, would have been possessed of the requisite courage to act as woman did at Monterey, Buena Vista, and elsewhere in Mexico. Nor is it derogating from the women of Mexico to ascribe to their sex, generically, that with regard to which it was so nobly represented on those occasions. Among the natives of northern latitudes, the question as to a course of proceeding is usually one of either duty or expediency, while among Southerners it is rather one of either aspect or association. The idea of so acting in the scenes above mentioned, and the instant judgment that such was the suitable time for self exposure, (not excluding sense of *duty*, but at the same time not so exclusively implying it as elsewhere,) was a feature of *manners*, in which may be observed the influence of climate and the transmission of character from the land of Isabella, not without engraftment from the generous Saracen.

The effect of climate and of the luxuriant aspect of nature in contributing to educe the phases of character in question, can hardly be doubted. Alison has remarked, in substance, that until the history of the British in *India* shall

"I felt much interested in the numerous camp women, those devoted creatures who follow them through good and evil; and it grieved me to see them, worn down with fatigue, moving at a snail's pace, their heavy burdens almost weighing them to the earth. These women, like the Indians, are the slaves of men—a slavery they submit to under the all-powerful influence of affection. In addition to their bedding and wearing apparel, they pack upon their backs the food and the utensils to cook it in; and, worn out as they are by the toils of the day, whilst their husband or lover sleeps, they prepare his repast."

Of the Mexican forces generally, it is matter of deep regret that no report of any other conspicuous moral feature has reached us from the late seat of war, than this—that they rarely scrupled to maim and slay those who lay in their way, on the field, wounded.* It was in this manner that Colonel Clay, son of the eminent leader of opposition to this very war, was slain at Buena Vista.

Thus much has it appeared apposite to remark on the moral features that were most striking in the conduct and progress of the war.

The triumphs of genius and science in the prosecution of the war, are subjects scarcely appropriate to the purpose of this review. Apart from the little wisdom to be

be worthily written, the British character, as illustrated by romantic and disinterested exploit, will never be duly estimated. So far as this remark includes any allusion to valour, it can scarcely contemplate variations in the degree of it displayed in different climes. The writer has in view peculiar *æsthetic* advantages in the style and mode of its exhibition, to which the scenery and climate must have influentially contributed. They do not appear to have been indebted for impulse to any admirable qualities in the foe. To the latter these remarks do not apply: for to climate and scene cannot, of course, be attributed more than a tendency to impart impulse to the manifestation, and *form* of manifestation, of an *already existing* spirit, native or transplanted.

It may be observed of the people in the southern States of this Union, that they are as mediate in character as in climate, and participate in northern and southern attributes, though possessing them in a less degree than their extreme neighbours respectively. They are more northern in their tendencies than the races in corresponding latitudes, which is owing to their English origin.

* The Mexicans have not been singular in this respect among modern nations; though discarded in theory from modern warfare, it has been often practised—for example, by the Russians in the Polish war, and by the French at Waterloo. A British officer, Capt. Ommancy, (a personal friend of the present writer,) when lying on the ground dangerously wounded by a musket ball, was pierced four times by lancers. He survived for eighteen years, during which period the ball was never extracted.

associated with judgments other than professional on military operations, we take leave to observe, that whatever greatness, intellectual or physical, may be proved by military deeds to have been attained by the faculties of man—and marvellous unquestionably has been the greatness thus proved, even in the recent war—it is less a matter of congratulation to human nature than any other form of prowess. Yet who can withhold admiration at Taylor's ever-readiness to engage against whatever odds, and with whatever materials, and his effectual *coups de main*—and that attainment in military science with which Scott predestines (if one may so speak) his results, as if their occurrence was of mathematical necessity.

An ascription of a different kind may be claimed for the generals of Mexico. The productions of their pen, professional and diplomatic, afford a most classical treat. To wield "the set phrase of speech,"

"And uncouth politics to measures mould,"*

are among their refined accomplishments, and often marked with an artistic excellence of the highest order.†

The reader need not be surprised at the brevity of the observations that have been herein presented on military features in the war. But is it not remarkable how much almost every man has to say, and with confidence, respecting merit in the conduct of war, or of a battle that is of universal interest, such as Waterloo—however confessedly unable to venture an opinion upon a game of chess? It is to all appearance assumed that common sense and ordinary information are alone adequate to bear on military questions. How many give utterance to their sentiments under this previous impression! But besides an utter inutility accruing to the interests of truth in military history, from conversations on naval and military affairs, among other than military or naval men, it should be considered what moral injury to the human feelings is derived from the earnestness and the general prevalence of such conversations, considering the degree to which national rivalry

* A line from "All the Talents"—a satirical poem, published in 1807, and attributed to Canning, but not published among his poetical works.

† It is due to truth to repeat the information received since writing the above, from the best source, that these documents are generally prepared by parties holding a military *rank* merely.

and ambition are nourished by them, and the shade into which those impulses invariably throw the evils of war. Nor is that all; for where those feelings are not excited by them, the same blinding and blunting effects are cast over the sense and sensibility by stimulated conceptions, and images too chastened, of warlike deeds. A truthful apprehension of the nature and character of war is impeded by the many factitious associations that gather around the idea of the military profession, and the augmentation of force accruing to those associations from uninterrupted tradition.

To this review of the origin and conduct of the Mexican war, it was our design to have added a chapter on the evils resulting from it. But, independently of its inconvenient length, the evils to be treated of are of the same nature as those by which every war is, and must be, more or less characterized. Illustrations of them are presented in various publications—among which the reader is particularly referred to the "Peace Manual," and the "Book of Peace," both published by the American Peace Society, (the former being gratuitously distributed.) Much of the suffering and other evil occasioned by the war with Mexico is specifically exposed in the Peace Advocate.*

The manifold evils in question may be thus classified :

1. Sufferings of the soldiers, irrespectively of those necessary to the battle-field.
2. Sufferings from wounds and mutilations, not only of soldiers, but of peaceable citizens, of all ages, and of both sexes, during sieges.
3. Vindictive bloodshed on the field of battle, irrespectively of the contest for victory, and on other occasions.
4. Wanton injuries to women.
5. Military habits of rapine and plunder.
6. Domestic afflictions.
7. The more than servile humiliation of the private soldier, and his constant exposure to arbitrary ill-usage.
8. The destruction of life, or of the capacity for the enjoyment of life.

* This is a periodical, edited by the Rev. George Beckwith, Secretary of the American Peace Society, and published every second month at the office of the Society, 21 Cornhill, Boston. The subscription is \$1 00 for two years.

9. The waste of national wealth.

10. The effect of war on the interests of morality and religion in the contending nations.

Notwithstanding all this "vast variety of woe," it has been an unquestionable result of the recent war, that that cause, in the triumph of which civilization was most interested, has triumphed; the proofs of which it is not necessary to enter upon.

It has indeed been contended, as for a principle historically established, that wars have been indispensable to the advancement of civilization; decisive victories invariably (as maintained) establishing the ascendancy of better principles.* That the wars carried on in the circle of civilization have most commonly been so available, we need not question. But that there is on that account any necessity for wars, whether in the form of a compulsory instrument, or of an appointed condition, we feel bound to deny on behalf of God's pledges to suffering humanity.

Besides, what advancement in ideas appear in those tribes which are ordinarily in a state of war? If wars have advanced the world, it is only inasmuch as they have been overruled to that end by Him who "bears up the pillars" of human society, lest it should be "dissolved"† thus making "the wrath of man" to "praise" him, while "the remainder of wrath he restrains."‡ A portion of mankind is predestined to advance in civilization, whether there be wars or not, however these may retard its progress, if left to their *natural* operation. Wars, like other evils, may be commissioned with impulses favourable to certain ends. But it is, on the whole, in spite of them, that a part of the human family advances to its destined moral attainment.

And now a word or two on the subject of *just* wars:—The justice of a declaration of war cannot justify the horrible consequences, physical and moral, which are *foreknown* to be attendant on a state of war. The abstract justice of a course of conduct renders it moral *so far*. But the *law of love* has a say in every question of morality. "The moral law transfigured by love,"|| is Schiller's defi-

* See Victor Cousin—"Introd. a l'histoire de la Philosophie." l. x.—a most interesting chapter.

† Ps. lxxv. 3. ‡ Ps. lxxvi. 10.

|| "The moral imperative, transfigured by love," is (according to the trans-

nition of Christianity, little as he recognized the Christian scheme for man's renovation. If then *justice* be transfigured by charity, revenge and retaliation find no place; and if, in cases where punishment is necessary, it be not so transfigured, he who, from whatever sense of justice, inflicted it, or contributes to the infliction of it, is, morally, his own executioner to that extent. And further, "hatred is a prolonged suicide"—a maxim constructed by the same philosopher-poet*—one that is of not less appropriate application to instances of animosity between communities, than to instances between individuals.

Again, in whatever sense of right wars may originate, there is ever danger of injustice in undertaking them. Such enterprises are not subject to the judgment of any disinterested Court, but, when least unjust, are prompted almost invariably by a spirit of retaliation in the party declaring war. The absence of self-conviction with regard to the injustice of a war, does not abate responsibility for it. Moreover, not only is humanity compromised by the most just war, but such a war provides, as undeniably as any other, for the exercise of inhumanity and of every bad passion. And, by the laws of Divine Providence, criminality never escapes retribution in some form, unless arrested by moral repentance. Thus, communities, and particularly nations, have less prospect of escaping retribution, owing to the less likelihood of their repentance. For to bring a nation to repentance, even for a solitary national sin, is a work not unlike that of converting a world. And it is probable that no nation ever repented of its wars, and the bloodshed resulting from them, unless on account of ill success, or want of compensation for the sacrifice incurred in them. Nor, in those cases in which the public sentiment of a period has condemned the wars carried on and the conquests achieved in a former period, is it at all usual for atonement to be rendered to the injured nation, if there ever was a case in which it was thought of.

It may be justly complained that the conduct of our government towards Mexico has not been such as does jus-

lator, Mr. Weiss) the literal equivalent to Schiller's expression. See the introduction to his translation of Schiller's "*Æsthetic Letters, Essays, and Philosophical Letters.*"

* Philos. Let.—On Love.

tice to the character of our people. That is to say, the people having herein contradicted their social character, the government has preferred to adopt and represent this impulsive contradiction, rather than the more ordinary deportment which characterizes our people. There is not a land in which the members of society are more liberal than in this with reference to the concession of private rights and privileges; though different sections of the country may differently strike observation as respects this feature. There is no country in which social misunderstandings are more easy of removal, through the accessible disposition of the people, and their ill-satisfaction to allow, longer than can be avoided, the existence of mortified feeling in a neighbour, from conduct by which the latter may have been even slighted—and whatever difference there may be in the position and quality of the parties.—If, for the governments of the United States and Mexico, we substitute the idea of two individuals analogously circumstanced, the course pursued by one of the parties, namely, the American, might be expected to be this:—a dissension having arisen on a matter which none could settle for the parties but themselves, the weaker party having a morbid sense of injury, and refusing not only a restoration of the good terms previously existing, but even the intercourse requested by the stronger party for the settlement of the difficulty—the latter, if acting in accordance with the prevailing sentiments of society in this country, would simply clear himself with reference to the premises, and intimate that the continuance of the misunderstanding was not his fault, and would avoid occasion for collision; though it need not follow that he would abandon his position, or his right, or his possession, (if he held it.) We are not, it is true, supposing any extreme case; the matter before us does not appear to require it. Such however is the form which the principle of self-respect is most usually expected to assume in this country. That principle has, in every community, some regular forms of self-exhibition, but varying as much as the regions of the earth in climate and productions. The varieties of our own climate, while symbolical of the variations of disposition in the people, are not, in *this particular*, met by an *equal* variation in the national habit of thought. There are in-

deed among us two somewhat dissonant manifestations of the principle now before us, the discriminating line between which corresponds with the broadest one of latitude in the Union, distinguishing, as it does, the idea of the North from that of the South. The *ideal* of the former is the course most consistent with *morality*; that of the latter is the course which presents the best aspect as to *manners*.* Both descriptions would concur in the course which we have assigned to the party representing this country, in relation to its sensitive neighbour. We have nothing to do with exceptions, however numerous, to the deportment which has the ascendant approval. Testing the controversy between the two nations by the assumed analogy—as we cannot illustrate the case by the supposition of a *land* dispute between individuals, that being one that *law* provides for, and it is otherwise with our present hypothesis—there is no difficulty in marking out the course of conduct towards Mexico which would have most correctly represented the manners and sentiments prevalent throughout this country. The national duty therefore at the period of the crisis, viewed in the light of the foregoing test, was opposed to the movement beyond the station at Corpus Christi. At the same time it might with propriety have been not only notified to Mexico what boundary we claimed, but further intimated that, for whatever length of time our arms might lie peaceably on that spot, our claim would not be thereby abridged. Had an appeal been made to the deliberation of our people, on the question between this course and that which was pursued, their instincts and habits of thought would most probably have suppressed those casual impulses which might cause a hesitation with regard to the former. We have not yet supposed any extreme case. Such a one could only have occurred, in the event of Mexico endeavouring to drive our army beyond the Nueces, or to prevent the legitimate effects of our jurisdiction in the territories we were actually occupying. We cannot include among *these* effects the put-

* It is not assumed that the standard of either is the best. But such are the ideas which enter into and characterize the life of each respectively. Similar discriminations appear in some "Philosophical Letters on North and South," addressed to Mr. G. P. Marsh, by "a Northern man with Southern citizenship."

ting down of the Mexican custom-house at Brazos Santiago, the suddenness of which *notice to quit* was itself inconsistent with the idea of *preserving the peace*, which if not a definition of *jurisdiction*, is at least its primary end. What ought to have been our deportment in the event of what we have admitted as an extreme case, is subject to the rule of conduct implied by a prohibition of war, offensive or defensive. And an observance of this principle involves neither the retreat nor the unresisting surrender of the army of Corpus Christi, but the non-existence of such a band there. And if called upon to show the practical application of the theory, in case a Mexican army invaded that part of the country, we have only to reply—first, that, if there was unlikelihood of it while we had so small a force there, that unlikelihood is increased in the supposed absence of all our forces;—and secondly, the *trial* of the pacific principle in its unqualified extent is all that we ask, and the least that we accept, in order to sustain the theory. If in some suitable case, such as the recent one between this country and Mexico, the two parties would each offer to concede the point to the other, or if one of the parties, less deficient in generosity than the other, were so to act, it might introduce a new epoch in international manners, and relieve politicians of that nice responsibility and difficulty from which they at present suffer whenever the national “honour” is the only material consideration. Whatever difficulty there might be in the way of introducing this policy in cases where the territory in dispute is of value (in which event arbitration is the most apposite course) it would say little for the “honour” of human nature, if the same difficulties were permitted to have place in cases where, not the territory, but national honour, or little besides that, is involved. It is not presumed that the people of the United States would, in the present state of human sentiments, be prepared for such a mode of concession, if only proposed while a matter is in controversy, and especially if proposed to be made to a stronger power than Mexico; in which cases they would consider the motive liable to questionable construction by the opposite party and by the world. But had the President proposed it to the country as related to a consideration of the mortified state of Mexican feeling, and accom-

panied with the understanding that the concession was to be conditional on the return of Mexico to an amicable deportment towards this country, and that, until then, any attempt by her to exercise jurisdiction in the territory proposed to be conceded would be resisted by this nation, there is little doubt that the country would have assented. Texas would probably have been inclined to object, in her temptation to exult over Mexico; but in her gratitude for the act of annexation, she would scarcely have opposed the general sense of the American nation, had it been expressed as we have contemplated. But independently of the view that might be taken by Texas, although our government considered it as binding on the national course, yet since the boundary of Texas was unsettled, and was not an implied condition of annexation, it was not incumbent on the government to treat the matter as one of Texan interest.* There is, it is acknowledged, a *literal* incongruity between the circumstances of the Mexican question, as it actually was, and the form assumed for it in the above argument. That is, we have treated it as an implied question of boundary between ourselves and Mexico on the *west* side of Texas; whereas Mexico claiming to the Sabine, that is, the whole of Texas, would treat upon no question as to the western frontier of Texas. But had the government of this country acted in the mode we have imagined, it can hardly be surmised that Mexico would have persisted in the untenable attitude of a threatening re-conqueror of Texas, now united with this country, after being forced to abandon that State while it was isolated and single-handed. Besides, on the holding out of such an amicable arrangement by this country, the sentiment and influence of all nations would have been added to the scale in which would have been thus laid the interests of peace—nor confined to locality, inasmuch as the contemplated event would have obtained the force of precedent. And although the nations are yet far behind the point they claim to have attained in humanity, yet it would be doing them injustice to doubt that they would have made the best use in their power of so favorable an opportunity

* If so, then any frontier State in the Union might consider the Federal compact violated, when a new boundary is run, as between Maine and Canada.

for the improvement of the epoch, if not the constitution of a new one.

In conclusion, it may be remarked, that the war, which we have been engaged in reviewing, was, previously to a discovery of the gold region, calculated to strike the future historian as involving little more than a continental importance. A *world-historical* character now belongs to it; particularly if, as appears in the highest degree probable, the discovery of the gold region is a material event in the scheme of Divine Providence for the renovation of the East—inclusive of the restoration of the Jews to their own land.—Through the geographical circumstance in question, civilization and the gospel will be diffused over the Western side of this continent; and increasing intercourse with the Asiatic nations will bring these in a vast degree under those influences. If this were all that is in prospect, the era in which the first impulse has been given to such destinies, is of the greatest magnitude that history can ascribe to it. Such is the *indirect* contribution to apparent prospects, by the solitary event under notice. And this very bearing suggests, with no slight force, the *direct* manner in which the event may subserve the purposes of the Most High. Doubtless he has laid that golden region under tribute from the beginning, either to send forth the ships—the ships charged to bring his people to the haven where they would be, or to be an Ophir to Jerusalem restored, if it was not the Ophir of King Solomon's day. Not a little remarkable is it, that this region has been veiled from the eye of avarice, until the period when it would be tributary to the divine counsels, and morally useful to the world. Could the vain searchers for El Dorado in former times, have foreseen the result and its *rationale*, they had been gross indeed, had they not acquiesced in this economy, and “vindicated the ways of God to men.”

To carry speculation on the result somewhat further;—That England will be possessor of the present Asiatic and principal African dependencies of Turkey—an event natural in respect to her Eastern interests, and in view of her moral influence in those regions—may be confidently anticipated. Indeed, as we have elsewhere remarked, she “is expected in the East.” Under such circumstances, should they occur, the whole of Asia (excepting Tartary)

will be under the influences of the Anglo-Saxon, to an extent scarcely admitting of limitation. The wall of obdurate exclusiveness by which China has not only shut out whatever is not assimilated to herself, but concealed what it *may* be the interest of humanity to discover, and the intention of prophecies to declare, will be then shattered to its foundation by the moral influences both from the East and from the West. To which ever sea she turns, even now, the Anglo-Saxon is her nearest neighbour. The ships that bear exotic wealth to her, and are messengers to the ends of the earth, are *his*. From no other tutor will she derive her new civilization, if she is to have one. By no other powers will she be politically influenced, than the two branches of this chosen race. May God grant that, aside from their prospective co-operation for the realization of His written will, the peculiarity of their position may not engender opposite ends, jealousy and strife.

ARTICLE VI.

THE UNITY OF THE RACE.

1. *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind.* By JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, M. D., F. R. S., M. R. I. A., Corresponding Member of the National Institute of France, Honorary Fellow of King's and Queen's College of Physicians in Ireland, Member of the Royal Academy of Medicine of Paris. 3d Edition. London: 1836—47. Five vols. 8vo.
2. *Lectures on Comparative Anatomy, Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of Man.* By WILLIAM LAWRENCE, F. R. S. London: 1823.
3. *Crania Americana; or a comparative view of the skulls of various aboriginal nations of North and South America: to which is prefixed an Essay on the varieties of the Human Species.* By SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, M. D., Member of the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia; of the Am. Phil. Soc., &c. &c. Philadelphia and London: 1839.

4. *Crania Egyptiaca ; or Observations on Egyptian Ethnography—derived from Anatomy, History, and the Monuments.* By SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, M. D. Philadelphia and London: 1844.

“When I consider the heavens the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained ; what is man that thou art mindful of him, and the son of man that thou visitest him ?” Bearing but an infinitesimal proportion to the mass of the entire creation, and at his first existence on the earth, the feeblest, most dependent, and defenceless of God’s creatures, he at length, notwithstanding, comes to exercise dominion over all the works of the Creator ; all things are put, by the divine arrangement, under his feet ; all sheep and oxen, the beasts of the field, the fowl of the air, the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the sea. He subjugates the ferocious beasts of the forest, erects his works, his monuments of pride, and engines of art ; by his commerce he binds divided continents together, by his science he measures the stars, by his research and combinations he uses the untamable elements of nature as his playthings to amuse him, his agents in scientific pursuits, or his obedient servants to bear his messages around the globe in an instant of time, or to accomplish for him the practical objects of life. When we see, in revelation, God’s care of him, the angelic ministries that wait around him, the provisions made to enlighten and save him, and the immortal life to which his present state introduces him, he is invested with a dignity which outweighs that of the material systems, or the innumerable beings beneath him. Wherever he is found, however down-trodden and degraded by outward oppression, or sunk by the proclivity of his own nature, the most interesting object to man is his fellow-man.

And yet how various is the form, complexion, and condition in which he appears :

“If a person unaware of the existence of these diversities, after surveying some brilliant ceremony or court-pageant in one of the splendid cities of Europe, were suddenly carried to a hamlet in Negroland, at an hour when the sable tribes recreate themselves with dancing and barbarous music, or if he were trans-

ported to the saline plains, over which bald and tawny Mongolians roam, differing but little in hue from the yellow soil of their steppes, brightened by the saffron flowers of the iris and tulip; if he were placed near the solitary dens of the Bushmen, where the lean and hungry savage crouches in silence, like a beast of prey, watching with fixed eyes the birds which enter his pit-fall, or the insects and reptiles which chance may bring within his grasp; if he were carried into the midst of an Australian forest, where the squalid companions of kangaroos may be seen crawling in procession in imitation of quadrupeds, would the spectator of such phenomena imagine the different groups which he had surveyed, to be the offspring of one family? and if he were led to adopt that opinion, how would he attempt to account for the striking diversities in their aspect and manner of existence?"

—*Prichard, Vol. I, p. 1, 2.*

The difficulty is increased as a narrow view is taken of the diversity between the races of Africa and those of Europe in colour, between the crisp and woolly hair of the negro and the flowing, silky locks of the Esquimaux, the broad face of the Kalmuk, the pot-belly of the Samoiedes, the hump and other deformities of the Bushman, the hairy bodies and apish countenances of the Mallicolese, and the beautifully chiselled features of the Greek, and the fine proportions and fair complexion of the Caucasian. The multiplicity of jarring tongues, too, constitute another difficult problem to solve, which has tasked the ingenuity of the most learned and philosophic men. As far back as we can trace the nations in authentic history, in their separate existence, we find evidence of a diversity of tongues. How are we to account for these differences of complexion, form and language, on the supposition of the common origin of the various races of men?

The subject has occupied the attention of men in different ages, nor has it in any degree ceased to be a matter of interested enquiry.

Those of the ancients who did not believe the human race to be propagated by eternal generations successively produced, imagined that each portion of the world had its "autochthones" or indigenous inhabitants, adapted in their constitution to its own peculiar climate. The supposition suits the diversities of race and language, and if it could be allowed, would save us the trouble of accounting for the peopling of those distant and insular portions of our

globe in which men are found in an extremely rude and barbarous state, often wholly unacquainted with the art of navigation, without any knowledge or tradition of any other human beings than themselves, and destitute of those arts which, if they had ever possessed them in any former generation, it would seem impossible that they should have lost.

This theory, which was adorned with the genius of Lucretius, was equally advocated by the Epicureans and Stoics. They believed man to have sprung, with the animals and plants, from the virgin soil of the new formed earth, which at first was peculiarly genial and prolific. Myriads of wombs arose like mole-hills over the surface of the earth, in which he was produced, and were afterwards transformed into glandular and milky breasts for his nourishment in his infantile years. Linnæus, Buffon, Helvetius, Monboddo, Virey and Lamarck have believed that men were derived from the race of monkeys, and that in the chimpanze and orang we have the intermediate step between the lowest specimens of humanity and the highest of the brute creation. And both Dr. Darwin and the more recent author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*," regard man as having originated from minute germinal vesicles, according to the latter, started into existence "by a chemico-electric operation." He belonged to the aquatic order at first, in the process of ages developed gills and assumed an oyster-like form, after other ages became a reptile, still advancing in the process of developement he becomes an animal of higher type, at length he assumes the form of a monkey, and then after a long time that of man. It has sometimes been pretended that men have been discovered in the intermediate stages of transformation from the inferior tribes, but the cases alleged have either been gathered from the wild tales of ignorant mariners, a class of men proverbial for exaggeration, or have been idiots, or insane persons escaped from the hands of their keepers. In one instance the wild specimen caught in the woods of Campagne, which was exhibited under the name *la belle sauvage*, the painting of which has long been the sign-board of the Bell Savage Inn in London, proved to be a young negress who escaped from the wreck of a slave ship on the coast of France, and who was care-

fully taught the French language by the family into whose hands she fell.*

Other theories have been proposed to account for the diversities of race, and to meet the remaining difficulties. By some it has been conjectured that many different pairs of men were brought into existence by the Creator, from whom the varieties in the human family have been transmitted, and that these varieties could not have been produced by climate and manner of life. One of the most singular theories was that of Isaac Peyrere, librarian to the prince of Conde, who in his book styled "*Pre-adamitae*," published in 1655, brought forth the theory of the Preadamites, maintaining that Adam and Eve were the progenitors of the Jews, that their creation is described in the second chapter of Genesis, but that there was a race before them whose creation is spoken of in Gen. i. 26—30, as occurring on the same day that the beasts were made, and these were the progenitors of the heathen world. He also found his Preadamites in Romans v. 12—14, and contended that it must have been they of whom Cain stood in dread when he went forth from his father's family; that it was one of the daughters of this race he married, when he went out into the land of Nod, where he built a city, and called it Enoch, after the name of his son.

We need not stop to say, that the account of the creation of man in the second of Genesis is but an amplification of that in the first, and that in the 130 years in which the first pair lived together before the birth of Seth, a numerous family must have grown up around them; that it is implied in the sacred narrative, that there was other progeny from the first pair than those whose names are expressly mentioned, and that there are many reasons for believing that those natural powers which we find man and other creatures endowed with now, were in the primeval period greatly quickened in their action.

Dr. Prichard, in the commencement of his book, remarks, "that those who hold with entire conviction the divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, are yet accustomed to receive different portions of their contents, if not with different degrees of assent, yet with an assent modified by

* Good's Book of Nature.

different considerations." "On such matters as transcend the scope of human faculties, the Holy Scriptures are the sole "*principium cognoscendi*" and the only appeal is to them." But the most sincere believers in revelation do not give the same species of assent to those parts of the sacred writings which relate to subjects open to the ordinary methods of investigation; such as matters of fact and historical testimony." While we agree with him that such "portions of Scripture have ever been regarded as admitting and even challenging the most unwearied and severe scrutiny," we are not conscious of receiving them with a less confident faith, then we do those which relate to matters of pure revelation. We expect the volume of nature, written as it is by the same immutable God, to be harmonious in its teachings with the volume of inspiration, and are assured that philosophy and science truly, so called, cannot be inconsistent with the written word.

It certainly is the teaching of the Bible, that all men are from one original stock, He hath made of one blood all nations of men. By one man sin entered into the world and death by sin, and so death hath passed upon all men, for that all have sinned. Adam is represented as the root and federal head of the human race. And the doctrine of original sin, transmitted by ordinary generation to every member of the race from the first man, and the plan of salvation through the second Adam, alike imply the identity and common origin of men.

Dr. Prichard has collected the scattered rays of light shed on this subject from the various departments of human knowledge, and with an impartiality and thoroughness which are worthy of all praise. All future writers on this topic must be largely indebted to his volumes for the materials, which his industry and learning have brought together; and these materials we must take the liberty of freely using in the present expression of our opinions.

The first line of investigation which presents itself to the mind is, as to the order of nature in the entire world of organized beings; whether it has been the order "to produce one stock in each species" from which the whole of that species have been derived, "or to call the same species into existence by several distinct origins, and to dif-

fuse it generally without propagation from any central point."

On this head, in reference to the vegetable world, there are three conjectures: That all species of plants had their primary seat in one particular region, from which they have spread into the countries where they are now found: That every species originated from one central spot, but that the primary habitations of different species were in different parts of the globe: Or thirdly, that plants of every kind are brought into existence wherever all the conditions are favorable to their developement. The first of these hypotheses was defended by Linnaeus, and the last by Rudolphi. Dr. Prichard, though he rejects the form in which Linnaeus presented his theory, has come to the conclusion "that each tribe of plants, and especially of the more perfect plants, had on the earth one original habitation, from which it has been dispersed according to the capabilities afforded by its structure, and the aid of external agencies."

The means by which plants have been dispersed are easily seen. One manifest method is the agency of men. The *erigeron canadense* introduced into gardens near Paris from North America, in the course of a century was spread over all France, Italy, Sicily, Belgium, Germany, and the South of England. There has been a similar diffusion of the Jamestown weed in this country, and of many other plants of greater service to man. Another is the agency of animals; another aerial currents, which bear the lighter seeds to surprising distances;* another still, the element of water, either of running streams or the currents of the ocean.†

In some measure, as might be expected, it is found that in continents which approach each other the vegetation is similar on both in the parts where they approach, but different, though analagous, in those portions where they

* "Each [seminal particle] as it floats along the ever moving breeze, selects, as it were, its own suited bed of nutrition, and there unfolds its effervescence, and produces its successor." Turner's *Sac. Hist. of the World*, I. 165.

† A Cocoa nut (its rough outer coat protecting the germ and rendering it impervious to the salt water,) borne by the current from another island upon a coral reef, vegetates and propagates its species, covering the island newly forming, and fitting it to become the abode of man.

recede to a wide distance. Generally the flora of islands near the continents consist in great part of species found on the nearest main lands. In islands separated from all other parts of the world by wide expanses of water, the plants are few and very peculiar.

The same facts are true in relation to the inferior animals. In the extreme north, where the two great continents approximate, many species of animals are common to both: "in parallell climates analogous tribe replace each other, sometimes the same genus is found in two separate continents; but the species which are natives of one region are not identical with corresponding races in the opposite hemisphere." It is also true that animals on islands near to continents, are of the same stock with those on the main land, and that small islands remote from continents are generally destitute of land quadrupeds, except such as appear to have been conveyed by man, or by accidental means.

"There appears to have resulted," says Dr. Prichard, "from the foregoing inquiry, sufficient evidence to establish one out of the three hypothetical statements which were expressed at the commencement of this investigation, and to show that the other two are irreconcilable with the phenomena of Nature.

1. The hypothesis of Linnæus, that all races of plants and animals originated in one common centre, or in one limited tract, involves difficulties, which in the present state of our knowledge amount to physical impossibilities. It is contradicted by the uniform tenour of facts, both in botany and zoology.

2. The second hypothesis, which supposes the same species to have arisen from many different origins, or to have been at the period of their first existence generally diffused over separated countries, is also irreconcilable with facts. It does not appear that Nature has everywhere called organized beings into existence, where the physical conditions requisite for their life and growth were to be found.

3. The inference to be collected from the facts at present known, seems to be as follows:—the various tribes of organized beings were originally placed by the Creator in certain regions, for which they are by their nature peculiarly adapted. Each species had only one beginning in a single stock; probably a single pair, as Linnæus supposed, was first called into being in some particular spot, and the progeny left to disperse them-

selves to as great a distance from the original centre of their existence, as the locomotive powers bestowed on them, or their capability of bearing changes of climate, and other physical agencies, may have enabled them to wander.

The bearing of this general conclusion on the inquiries hereafter to be pursued is sufficiently obvious. We have now to investigate the question whether all the races of men are of one species in the zoological sense, or of several distinct species. If it should be found that there is only one human species in existence, the universal analogy of the organized world would lead us to the conclusion that there is only one human race, or that all mankind are descended from one stock. It is the more improbable that a plurality of races exist in one species with reference to man than with regard to any inferior tribe, as the locomotive powers of mankind, aided by the resources of human sagacity, are greater than those of brute animals."

Before proceeding further in his work Dr. Prichard defines the more important terms used in treating of this subject. *Species* he defines to be "a race of animals or of plants marked by any peculiar character which has always been constant and undeviating." "Two races are considered as specifically different if they are distinguished from each other by some characteristic which the one cannot be supposed to have acquired, or the other to have lost through any known operation of physical causes." The same meaning was originally attached to the word *genus* γένος, which is now appropriated to species. While *species* is now applied to those individuals resembling each other, which, in accordance with the settled laws of nature, have descended from one common stock, the word *genus* is spoken of an assemblage of tribes arranged together on the principle of general resemblance, but not proceeding according to the laws of propagation from the same original stock. *Varieties* are modifications produced in the species of animals or plants, by the agency of various causes; they are produced within the limits of a particular stock, and have not existed from its first origin. *Permanent varieties* are such as, having once taken place, are propagated in perpetuity. The term *race* is often used in the sense of species, but it is properly a more general and indefinite term, signifying a succession of individuals proceeding from one common stock, without defining whether they are to be viewed as a distinct species, or whe-

ther they are mere varieties included in one and the same species,

The particular species have generally the same limit as to the duration of life, agree in the laws of reproduction:—among mammifers, as to the number of their progeny, the period of utero-gestation, the times and frequency of breeding; they are in general subject to the same diseases, have the same psychical powers, and a striking uniformity in their habits and instincts. Yet within the limits of these species there are diversities of inward temperament and constitution, and of outward appearance, as in the covering of the skin, whether hairy or woolly, the presence or absence of horns in the case of quadrupeds, the colour or complexion, and the number of fingers or toes, &c.

Now when we compare the several varieties in the human race with each other in all these particulars, it is plain that they are governed throughout by the same laws. As to the duration of life, there is no considerable difference between the European and the Negro. What difference there is would seem to indicate a greater longevity to the African race in those climates in which they and the Europeans reside side by side. In Guadaloupe from 1811 to 1824 the deaths among the whites were one in 22, among free men of colour 1 in 35. And the census of the United States for 1840 informs us that while there were but 741 whites over 100 years of age in a population of 14,189,108 there were 647 free coloured persons over 100 in a population of 386,245 and 1338 slaves over 100 in a population of 2,487,566. Or 1 centenarian among 17,925 whites. 1 among 598 free coloured persons and 1 to 1859 slaves.* The contrast between the African and indeed the whole race of man, and the family of Simiae and Orangs, is remarkable. The full period of their existence does not extend to beyond 30 years at the utmost.

As it respects the natural and vital functions of the several races of men there is a great uniformity.

The age at which females become marriageable

* We cannot vouch for the perfect accuracy of these statistics, for besides the imperfection of memory, there is a great tendency to exaggeration on this point among aged negroes.

In England, is from	13 to 14 years,	Among the Bushmen of Africa	11
" Italy at	12	" Eboes	8 or 9
" Minorca "	11	Northern Indians of America	18
" Smyrna "	11	" of the Rocky Mountains	14
" Persia "	10	Algonquins	14
" Arabia "	10	Potowatomies	14
" Jamaica "	11	Dacotahs	16
		Chili	11 " 12
		California	11 " 12

In this respect then, and in the period of gestation there is no material difference in the races of men. In this country where the negro and the white races live side by side, no difference in these things is known to obtain. Were they of different species, this would not be the case. Uniformity therefore, of physical developement and of the vital functions, is evidence that they have one common nature, and a strong presumptive argument that they proceeded from one common stock.

The Pathology of the human races affords additional proof of a unity of species. There are indeed a few diseases, which, originating in one tribe of animals, may be communicated to another. Hydrophobia originating in the dog, is communicated to other animals and to man. The vaccine disease is communicated from the cow to man, and may be transferred to the sheep, the ass, the dog and the goat. Yet are there diseases peculiar to each species of animals that cannot be transferred to others. The lower animals have been inoculated with virus taken from the human subject without any effect being produced. Measles, scarlatina, whooping-cough, &c. never pass from man to the brute. Yet are they transmitted with equal ease from one race of men to another. The diseases which prevail on our plantations prevail among ourselves, and the negro takes from the white those contagious diseases, to which he is subject. It is true there are some endemic diseases, which, originating probably in local influences, produce in a long series of years, a morbid predisposition in particular races. Such are the plica polonica affecting the Sarmatian race, the elephantiasis of Barbadoes, the goitre of Switzerland. Some of these diseases seems to be confined to one race, others, after a length of time, gradually become endemic in other races; but as they originally proceeded from local influences which have modified the original constitution, they cannot be regarded

as any proof of a different origin of these races, but the whole history of human diseases establishes the fact that all men are possessors of one common nature, the different susceptibility to particular diseases in different races, having its parallel in the children often of one and the same family.

The *phenomena of hybrids* too confirm the distinctness of species, and go far to prove the unity of the human race. Only those species of animals which are very nearly allied to each other can be brought into that close union which will produce offspring. The offspring of such unions is usually sterile. It has been ordinarily supposed that they are utterly incapable of procreation. And the celebrated John Hunter has justly observed that the true distinction of species must in the last result be gathered from their incapacity of propagating with each other, and producing offspring capable of self perpetuation. The mule in this country, so far as we know, is incapable of procreation, but in Spain, Italy, and New Holland, examples have occurred of their breeding. But it has always been by a reunion with the original stock. Among themselves the hybrids of mammals and except in a few instances, of birds also, have never been known to propagate their kind. It seems to some little extent to be otherwise with plants, though the cases of fertile hybrids here referred to are mostly doubtful. Hybrids among plants are produced by artificial impregnation, and as among animals their production almost always requires the hand of man. In the natural state of the vegetable tribes, the number of hybrid plants yet discovered amounts to about 40, most of which, if not all, are absolutely sterile. It is to this fact that the preservation of species is to be ascribed. How often is it the case that the pollen is wafted by the wind or borne by industrious insects to the stigmas of plants of a different species. Were it not the case that they reject this, and imbibe the anther-dust of their own species, all species and orders would long ago have been thrown into utter confusion, and a bald uniformity have come to exist in the vegetable world. Among animals mules have never been found in a wild state. Both mule plants and animals are sterile, except where a union is

formed with one of the parent stock, and these connections are themselves very rarely fruitful.*

Now the phenomena of hybrids tends strongly to show the absolute unity of all the races of men. They are all included as varieties under one and the same species. As in the case of the inferior animals, so far are mixed breeds from being incapable of continuing their kind, they are remarkably prolific. This is exemplified in the Griquas, a mixed race between the Dutch colonists and the aboriginal inhabitants of S. Africa, in the Falattahs of middle Africa, in the various intermediate races of S. America, which are said to be more prolific, hardy, and energetic, than either of the races from which they sprung. It is exemplified too in the mulattoes of this country, at least as far as respects their ability to fulfil the command to be fruitful, multiply, and replenish the earth.

It has indeed been contended that the mulattoes are more feeble and liable to disease than either of the pure races from which they have originated, and that if left to themselves they would become extinct. The fact as to a less degree of strength, and greater liability to disease may be as has been stated. And it is as easy to understand why the intermediate variety should have less strength and firmness of constitution than the original stock, as it is to understand why they should surpass them. A feebler race may also be as permanent as a stronger. A Bedouin tribe may be as permanent though feebler in physical force, as the more strong and vigorous races of Europe, and

* Dr. Morton in his paper on hybrids in Silliman's Journal Vol. III. new series, has adduced many facts and seeming facts to the contrary, and entirely rejects this argument for the unity of the human species. We use the argument not as the sole argument, but as a real one, and, as we regard it, of no little weight in cumulative proof. The numerous cases alleged of fertility in hybrids in part rest on theories which require to be themselves established. The remark of De Candolle still remains unimpugned, that "all such intermediate breeds tend incessantly to extinction by the difficulties which are opposed to their reproduction. This explains the rarity of their appearance, and reconciles the permanence which is observed among the distinct species of nature, with the real existence, often, however, exaggerated, of hybrid or temporary tribes, which are thus reduced to the class of monstrous productions." Among the myriad instances of reproduction in animated nature every moment occurring, how exceedingly few in number are the hybrids brought into being! They are probably not more numerous than those monstrous births which occur within the limits of the existing species.

as a distinct community of men may outlive them. They have continued from Abraham till the present day, and are likely to transmit their name and peculiarities to the latest time. As the progeny of the different races of men are prolific often beyond the original races, while the hybrids which arise between different species are sterile with but rare exceptions, we are brought to the conclusion that the several races of men are but varieties of one and the same species.

We next consider what Dr. Prichard terms the *Psychical* character of the various races of men.

But first it is necessary to say that there is scarcely any thing which so clearly distinguishes one species from another as those intellectual endowments, or quasi intellectual endowments, by which the Creator has distinguished them one from another. The dog who attaches himself to man, though greatly resembling the wolf in external form and inward structure, is wholly different from it in this, and the gregarious wolf is equally removed from the solitary fox. The inert and unresisting sheep differs from the agile, roaming goat; the young of the one helpless and defenceless, that of the other seeking from its earliest existence the craggy cliffs of the mountains. What more unlike than the industrious, judging, persevering, constructing beaver, and the indolent sloth? Among the fishes of the sea, the birds of the air and the beasts of the earth, each species has its dispositions and habits entirely different from those of every other species.

There are some resemblances in affection for their young, and in their control and discipline, between the monkey tribes and man. The chimpanzees, according to Cuvier, live in troops, construct themselves huts of leaves, arm themselves with sticks and stones, and employ these weapons to drive man and elephants from their dwellings. They assume often an erect attitude, as do also the orang and the ape. A female of the *simia entellus* has been seen when mortally wounded to collect her strength in a dying effort to remove her young to a place of safety. But in all these respects these animals are surpassed by others having no outward resemblance to man. The bird, the beaver, the bee and the ant excel them in powers of construction; the bear, the whale, the grampus, the

walrus, and many species of birds, excel them in connubial and maternal affections ; and the erect attitude which they are with difficulty taught to assume is one of constraint, the orang and chimpanze resting in these cases on the outside of the foot, and showing by their whole habits that they were made to support themselves on their four limbs, and to climb from tree to tree rather than to walk over the face of the earth. In the possession of speech, in the use of fire, the cooking of food, and the manufacture of clothing to protect themselves from the changes of season and climate, which of these animals resembles in any degree the human race ?

But there is a class of emotions and actions in which man differs wholly from them, and in which all varieties of the human family agree. We allude to their manifest and universal belief in a state of existence after death, and in the power exercised over them by invisible and spiritual agents. Witness, in proof, the various rites performed over the remains of the dead—of cremation, sepulture, embalming; the funeral pomps, the tumuli of forgotten races, the morais and the catacombs, the pyramids of Egypt and Anahuac, the sepulchral monuments and mausolea of various nations; the prayers, litanies, requiems for the dead ; the churches, temples, mosques and pagodas where worship is rendered to superior beings, or the dread Supreme ; the sacerdotal orders who intervene as his appointed ministers and their chosen intercessors between God and man; the various rites of religious worship, of sacrifice, penance, and painful pilgrimage ; and behold the convincing proof that man is immeasurably above the nearest of the tribes below him, and that all men, from the most civilized to the most barbarous, are possessors of one common nature, feel themselves under one and the same condemnation, responsible alike to some superior power, and anxious alike, though not in the same degree, to propitiate the objects of their adoration or fear.

These differences between man and the brute, which mark all men as of one and the same species, are found to obtain among the most degraded families of man. The Bushmen of S. Africa whom M. Bory de St. Vincent represents as differing most from the Japhetic man and as the transition link between the genus homo and the gen-

era of oranges, chimpanzes, and gibbons, as so brutish, lazy, and stupid, that they are not even fit to be made slaves of; who are always smeared with fat or sprinkled with their own urine; who make to themselves ornaments of the dried entrails of animals which they wear as bracelets and fillets; whose pomatum is a mixture of grease and earth; who are clad in undressed skins of beasts; who feed upon wild roots, or on the unwashed entrails and paunches of animals; passing their lives in sleep, or squat on the ground smoking the everlasting pipe, to light which appears to be almost the only use they have for fire; isolated, taciturn, fugitive, without houses or huts, living in dens and caves of the earth, hardly supporting their comfortless existence in their more active moments by a toilsome search for the eggs of ants, and by devouring lizards, snakes and loathsome insects; these men certainly are the lowest on the scale of human existence. Yet among these very men, the gospel has produced the most surprising results. "The missionaries very naturally expected that it would require a long and laborious course of culture and tuition before such pupils could be expected even to apprehend the doctrines of Christianity. This however was not the case. The light and power of the gospel at an early period of the mission, accompanied the proclamation of its glad tidings, and a number of these barbarous people, when they heard the word of life, believed. And here a Christian church arose, extensive gardens were laid out, and these cultivated with the Bushmen's own hands."* The habits of these people who gathered around the settlements of the missionaries were entirely changed. Some of them, says Dr. Philip, in a short time "acquired very rational ideas of the Christian religion." "It was delightful to hear the children sing the praises of Jehovah, and to witness the progress they had made in spelling and reading." "The same gospel," says Moffat, of the Bechuanas, "which had taught them that they were spiritually miserable, blind and naked, discovered to them also that they needed reform externally, and thus prepared them to adopt those modes of comfort, cleanliness and convenience which they had been accustomed

*Moffat's Southern Africa, p. 51.

to view only as the peculiarities of a strange people." "Our congregation now became a variegated mass including all descriptions, from the lubricated wild man of the desert, to the clean, comfortable well dressed believer." The conversion of the formidable Africaner, chief of the Namaqua Hottentots, is too well known to be repeated. From being a man of blood, and of the most savage appetites, he became a meek, intelligent, and lowly disciple of Christ, a wonder as he had been an object of terror to all who lived in Southern Africa.

But even in their pagan state the lowest tribes of men show that they belong to the same species with those who are deemed the highest. The Greenlanders believe in a future state, in the existence of spirits good and evil, and in Tongarsuk their chief, dwelling in his happy subterranean mansion. They too have bowed before the doctrine of the Cross, and at New Hernhut, Lichtenfels, Lictonian, and Fredericksthal, are found gathered into Christian villages, and enjoying, as far as their inhospitable clime will allow, the blessings of civilized life.

The Negro races who live beneath the equator are not without their religious notions. "They believe" says the missionary J. L. Wilson*, "in one supreme being," they "practice image worship or the worship of ancestry," "they worship reptiles, at Dix Cove the crocodile; at Whydah and Popo, [the serpent; at Benin, the guana; at Calabar, the shark." "Their belief in a future existence is common if not universal, and it is not a little affecting sometimes, to see multitudes of this simple hearted people clustering around the dying couch of one of their fellow men, to transmit messages of filial or fraternal regard to the spirits of their deceased friends. They also believe in a plurality of evil spirits, the more prevalent belief respecting whom is that they are spirits of dead men, especially of those who were most famous for their wickedness while living, in the worship of whom the inhabitants of Africa are generally united." Their sacrifices and fetishes or charms, their prayers and oblations, their funeral rites, their annual harvest feast, their order of priests, their omens and auguries, their belief in the transmigration of

* Southern Pres. Review, Sept. 1848.

souls, and their pilgrimages to sacred places, all show that they have religious sensibilities which are possessed in common by the whole family of man. The negroes who are around us here, whom the wickedness and cupidity of the white man has brought from their distant home, and who were old enough to remember the scenes of their youth, all testify that their people were worshippers of a supreme being. Many of them in this country and in the West Indies have embraced the Christian religion in sincerity; and few of us are there, who do not sit at the same communion table, as we celebrate the supper of the Lord, with the natives of Senegal, Gambia, and Guinea. These tribes in their own land were not a wholly uncivilized people. "They have permanent habitations, herds of domestic animals, and depend for subsistence upon agriculture." "The Mandingoes are said to be active and shrewd merchants, laborious and industrious agriculturists, breeding a good stock of cattle, oxen, sheep, and goats." In the northern parts of Central Africa south of the desert of Sahara, the Sahara-belama, the great dry ocean of Africa, the followers of Islam have introduced the Mohammedan religion, and to some extent the habits of civilized life. Ethiopian pilgrims from Central Africa are found on the Hadj routes pressing on to pay their devotions at the shrine of the prophet at Mecca. Among these negroes are extensive cities. The Foulahs have the art of working iron and silver, work skilfully with wood and leather, manufacture cloth, have clean and commodious dwellings, and have mosques and schools existing among them. We have lying before us vocabularies of words we have ourselves obtained from the lips of negroes of different tribes now in slavery amongst us, which accord with those found in the books of travellers, and in the pages of Prichard. And we have one or two specimens of Arabic, written by aged servants in this country, one of whom writes in a beautiful hand for one so old and long removed from his own land, and reads the sacred scriptures in the Arabic language with great fluency and much evident enjoyment and appreciation of their contents.

Much has been written in depreciation of the African character and intellect. It certainly has not shone forth as yet with any brilliancy. But as Dr. Prichard well re-

marks, it would be no difficult matter to discover particular men, and even entire families among the European races, who are intellectually weaker than any reasonable person could pretend the generality of Africans to be. According to the testimony of a beloved missionary, well known to many readers of these pages, who with self sacrificing zeal has spent the last fifteen years of his life on the coast of Africa, the African children assembled in the mission schools exhibit as much aptitude as white children of the same age; and the same brother speaks of Toko, at the Gaboon River, as one of the most intelligent men he has met with in any country, (except that he is destitute of learning, technically so called,) keen in all matters of business and trade, which he transacts to a considerable extent, extensively acquainted with the natural history of his own country, agreeable and instructive in conversation, having his memory stored with a vast number of legendary and romantic tales, such as the Africans in their social circles are fond of repeating to each other. Many a trader, visiting the coast of Africa for the first time, has found the natives too keen for him, and has been obliged to make an unprofitable voyage.

Travellers in South Africa have also been surprised at the evidences of vigour and acuteness of understanding displayed by the Amazuluh, Amakosah, Bechuana and other Kafir nations. Kolben declares that he has known many of them that were tolerable masters of the Dutch, French and Portuguese languages, and one in particular who learned English and Portuguese in a short time. Cloos, a Hottentot in the employ of Van der Stehl, governor at Cape Town, carried on a large trade in cattle, and executed his commission with signal success.

Now if these various evidences of capacity and intelligence, and, above all, these sentiments of religion found in these men who, by common consent, are on the lowest verge of human intelligence, do not, when compared with the European races, mark them all as belonging to one and the same species, we are at a loss what arguments to adduce to meet so determined a skepticism.

Above all, at what an infinite remove does it place them from those forms of the brute creation from which they have been thought to spring! Who would think of edu-

cating the orang and chimpanze in human learning, of teaching Portuguese, Dutch, French and English to a class of baboons, or of gathering a company of chattering monkeys and leering gibbering apes into a Mohammedan mosque or a Christian church, and discoursing to them on the themes of moral obligation and their eternal destinies?

But we proceed to speak of those great difficulties which have been supposed to stand in the way of the hypothesis of the unity of the human race. One of the most striking diversities observable in men, and which meets the eye at first, is in their complexion. But the colour of the hair and of the eye vary with that of the skin. Persons of a fair skin have usually light or red hair, and blue eyes. Owing to the transparency of the skin, which transmits the sanguine tint of the blood, they have a ruddy complexion. Black haired persons have sometimes skins as white, but not so fair and transparent; on exposure to the sun their complexion becomes brown or yellow, while that of the sanguine becomes inflamed and blistered. The complexion of these persons is very fair only when protected from the solar rays. The women of Syria and Barbary are often very white, as they live within doors and do not permit themselves to be exposed. In this country black haired women are called brunettes, from the brown tint their skin has on exposure to the solar light.

White haired or light flaxen haired persons very rarely have black eyes. Their eye is light blue, or, from the absence of the pigment in the choroid membrane, assumes a red colour, from the blood appearing through the transparent coats. Dr. Prichard, therefore, from whose accurate description we have drawn, has distinguished the complexions of the human family into the three following varieties: 1. The Melanocomous, Melanous, or black haired variety. This embraces the majority of the human family, and may be looked upon, Dr. Prichard thinks, as the original complexion of the species. The hair is black, and varies from the long, lank hair of the Americans, to the fine crisp hair of the negro. The skin, too, varies in hue, from the snow white of those of the more northern races who are secluded from the sun, through every shade

of duskiness to the deep black of some African nations. The dusky hue is combined in some nations with red, in others with yellow. In the one case it forms the copper colour of many natives of Africa and America—in the other, the various shades of olive, from the light olive of the northern Hindoos to the deep olive and almost black of the Malabars and some other nations of India.

2. The Xanthous variety, embracing all individuals who have light brown, auburn, yellow, or red hair, accompanied with a fair complexion, which on exposure to the sun becomes more or less red. The pigment of the eye is of a light colour, mostly a light grey or azure blue, but sometimes has various shades of yellow or brown, and occasionally a green yellow tint. It prevails the most in the temperately cold regions of Europe and Asia, and not unusually is found in high, mountainous tracts, while the neighbouring low grounds are occupied with the melanous variety.

3. The Leucous variety. This embraces the *Albinos*, the distinguishing character of whom is the red hue of the choroid, the hair white or cream colour, and of a very soft and flaxy texture, and sometimes silky, the skin very fair, and blistering on exposure to the sun. These albinos are most frequent among the dark colored races and in hot climates, but arise also in the Xanthous variety and in the temperate zone.

Albinos are found among the copper-coloured Indians of America. On the Isthmus of Darien there are said to be one among every two or three hundred. Their skin is a milk-white, the eyebrows of the same colour, their hair also; their eyes are weak, and cannot bear the strong light of the sun. The same were seen by Captain Cook on the island of Otaheite. They are met with in Java, Hindostan, and are quite frequent among the negro races of Africa. The negroes brought from the Gold Coast to Martinico, St. Domingo, and Guadaloupe are said to have one among 6 or 7 of their children, of this variety. In some instances the Albinos have some degree of ruddiness in their skin, the eye is blueish, and they approach nearer to the Xanthous variety. Albinos when arising among the Xanthous variety are usually sufficiently marked and peculiar, but sometimes approach the general characteristics of this variety.

The colour of the eye, the hair, and the skin, seems to depend upon the same general laws of the constitution. In the eye the pigment, when it exists, is secreted in the choroid, in the hair it seems to be diffused through the medullary substance which fills the external bony cylinder. It is perhaps secreted chiefly in the bulbs at the root of the hair. As to the skin, it is well known that the outer covering is nearly of the same white colour in all men.

The colour of the negro is owing to a substance lying immediately below the outer cuticle and above the true skin. It is a kind of mucous net work, containing a slimy unctuous substance which, showing through the transparent scarf-skin, gives the impression of colour.

Now the colour of the eyes, of the hair, and the skin are not in all cases permanent. The eyes and hair of very young children often grow darker as they advance in age. The Albino child in some instances has had the eye change from a red to a brown colour. The hair has been known to change, in less than eight days, and to become white from grief in a single night. The skin of many fair persons becomes freckled on exposure to the sun, and frequently tawny, and sometimes black coloured patches form and spread on white persons. Females in a state of pregnancy often exhibit these changes, the skin becoming brown, and in some cases, on portions of the body, entirely black. Cases have also been known in which negroes have lost their peculiar colour, the pigment of the skin being absorbed. Klinkosh speaks of a negro who became yellow; and we have known of at least one case where the colour of a mulatto man has been absorbed, and he now exhibits, except in his face, the fair skin of the xanthous variety of the white man. His face is peculiarly marked, and in many spots the yellow pigment has disappeared, leaving the other portion of his face yellow or of a dusky hue. And it has often been remarked that the negro complexion, in cases where there is no mixture of blood, becomes lighter in this country in the second and third generation.

The different varieties too spring up within the bounds of each other. The Jews are as pure a race as can be found on earth, having kept themselves from all foreign admixtures. They belong to the melanous variety, as they

generally have black hair. But there are many Jews from Germany and Belgium, with light hair and beards, and blue eyes. Those of this nation who have been settled for centuries in Cochin and Malabar, are so black as not to be distinguished from the other inhabitants. There is, on the contrary another colony in Cochin, who have settled there more recently, who are called the white Jews, they having not remained in that climate sufficiently long to have their complexion changed. The Laplanders are dark, while the Finns and other allied tribes are xanthous. The xanthous variety frequently arises among the negroes, both in Africa and elsewhere. Their complexion is ruddy, their eyes blue or hazel. The light hue of the European may be found in Africa. Mr. Hodgson represents the tribe of Mozabbi on the lofty table land of Mt. Aurasius in northern Africa, as fair and ruddy, with yellow hair, while the Kabyles are brown and nearly black, and the Tuarek of Sahara are many of them, black, while others are copper coloured. The tribes of Ackmar and of Nouba, in Sennaar are of the xanthous variety, and differ from the African, having thinner lips and less prominent cheek bones. And in the high lands of Abyssinia the Edjow Galla are of a light brown complexion; except those who live in the low lands, who are black, the Sumali and the Suakini have soft hair, regular features and light complexion. The xanthous variety was found among the ancient Egyptians, and it still arises among the Mandingoes, the Congos of central, and the Kaffirs of south Africa, in the Marquesas, and the island of Otaheite.

On the other hand, the melanous variety arises, where the xanthous has prevailed. The Germans of the time of Tacitus were a yellow haired race, and had blue eyes, but this is not their most usual complexion now. And the dark haired races are perpetually exhibiting changes from a lighter to a darker hue. The Arabs near Muscat are of a sickly yellow, those near Mecca of a yellowish brown, those in the low countries bordering on the Nile nearly jet black. Mr. Buckingham informs us that the Arabs near the Jordan, where the climate is intensely hot, have dark skins, flat features and coarse hair; and in the Hauran beyond, he found a family with negro features, a jet black complexion and crisped hair, of whose genuine Arab

descent he could have no doubt. And Rozet says, that in Algiers, there are many Arabs as black as negroes, and yet preserving all the characteristics of the Arab race.

The general complexion of the Hindoos, says the missionary Ward, is a dark brown, but some are comparatively fair and others quite black. Bishop Heber was unprepared to find natives of India as black as African negroes. He says, "the great difference in the colour of the natives struck me much. Of the crowd by whom we were surrounded, some were as black as negroes, others merely copper coloured, and others little darker than the Tunisines whom I have seen at Liverpool." This surprise we also experienced when the missionary Rev. J. C. Rankin told us that perhaps one in six of the natives of Hindostan were as black as the full blooded African at that moment waiting at our table. The distinction of caste forbids this variety of colour from arising through mixture of races. Yet though the Brahmin is of lighter hue, and the Pariah, or lower class, very dark or quite black, a black Brahmin and white Pariah are sometimes seen. The portrait of Ramohun Roy prefixed to Dr. Prichard's 3rd vol. shows a darker complexion than that of many Africans, and curly hair. On the contrary Hindoos in the high Himalayan countries are frequently of the xanthous variety.

The American variety, the red man of Gmelin, is of an obscure orange, rusty iron, or copper colour, the eyes dark and deeply seated, and the hair black, strait or lank, and thick. Yet some N. American Indians are as fair as many Europeans, others brown or yellow, and others approach the negro tint. The Indians of N. Eastern Oregon are of a fair and sometimes ruddy complexion, of Northern Oregon a dingy copper, while in Southern Oregon or California they are dark, and some tribes wholly black.*

* The Mandan Indians exhibit various shades of complexion. Many are as light as half breeds; and among the women the skin is often almost white, with the most pleasing symmetry and proportion of features; with hazel, grey, or blue eyes. The diversity in the colour of the hair is equally great, every shade being seen which appears among the whites except red. There are some with hair that is white or a bright silvery grey. Their traditions afford no evidence of their having had any knowledge of white men before the visit of Lewis and Clarke in the winter of 1804-5.—*Catlin's N. Am. Indians*, Vol. I. Letter 13.

If we examine into the causes of this diversity of complexion, we shall find two, which operating in some way, not always plain, upon the animal organization, produce these varieties. One of these is climate. If we will dismiss the ordinary division of the earth into the four quarters of the globe, and unite the northern and southern continents into one view, as did Eratosthenes of old, we shall have for the western division of the old world embracing Europe and Africa a country stretching from Nova Zembla to the cape of Good Hope through 113 degrees of latitude, 80° of which are north of the equator, and 33° south of it. Beginning in the northern part of this country and dividing it into 8 zones, we find, in the most northern of these divisions, the Swedes and Norwegians, a tall, white haired race with light grey eyes.

2. The next, embracing the northern part of Germany, England, Denmark, and Finland exhibits the xanthous variety. The Danes have always been known as a race of florid complexion, blue eyes and yellow hair. The Hollanders were known in ancient times as the "Auricomi Batavi."

3. In the next zone towards the south, the prevailing colour of the hair in the latitude of France is chesnut-brown, of the eyes the same, and to this the complexion sustains a certain relation.

4. Advancing southward in the countries surrounding the Mediterranean as far as the chain of Mt. Atlas, among the Spaniards, Italians, Greeks, the islanders of the Mediterranean, and the Moors of N. Africa, we find black hair, dark eyes, and a brownish white, or a brunette complexion. This is the predominant complexion, and hardly one in a hundred is of any other.

5. South of the Atlas, the native races are of a light or a dusky brown approximating to the black.

6. At the tropic of Cancer, in the latitude of Senegal the colour is almost universally black, except in the more elevated regions until we pass the tropic of Capricorn south of the equator.

7. Beyond this point and in Caffraria, the copper or red complexion predominates.

8. Towards the cape are the tawny Hottentots. Were there habitable land for 40° further, or beyond the antar-

tic circle we might find the hue again approaching that of northern Europe.

The same analogy might be carried out less perfectly in Asia, including N. Holland, and in N. and S. America, although Humboldt contends that there is a uniformity of tint in the American tribes throughout the whole length of the two continents.

Elevation produces the same effect as proximity to the polar regions. This is illustrated in botanical geography. As we ascend from the vallies to the tops of mountains we find vegetation changing, as you do in passing over the earth's surface from the equatorial regions to higher latitudes. The Swiss in the mountains above Lombardy have sandy or brown hair, the Milanese in the plains below have black hair and eyes, and oriental features. In the Basque country of dark complexioned Spain, in the more mountainous regions, we meet with fair complexions, blue eyes, and auburn or flaxen hair. In the region of Mt. Atlas the Berbers of the plains are of brown complexion, while the inhabitants of Mt. Aurasius have yellow or red hair, blue eyes, and a fair and ruddy complexion. The Foulas of the high regions of Senegambia are of light copper colour, the people of the low country on every side are negroes; and in eastern Africa, in nearly the same latitude, on the high plains of Kaffa, the inhabitants are described as fairer than those of southern Europe. The Galla and Abyssinians in the elevated portions of that country are fairer than the natives of the low lands, many of whom are nearly as black as the negroes.

A similar effect is produced by climate upon the lower animals, and upon the vegetable world. The birds, beasts, flowers and fishes of the equatorial regions, are brighter and deeper tintured in their spots, their feathers, and their scales, than in other regions of the world, and as we approach the poles every thing has a tendency to whiten. Bears, foxes, hares, falcons, crows, and blackbirds, conform to the general livery of the snowy regions.

The fowls in Guinea and the dogs also, are as black as the inhabitants; and the sheep would not be recognised as such, but for their bleating. Instead of wool they are covered with hair like a dog. The "world seems inverted, for the sheep are hairy and the men woolly." Around

Angora, so celebrated for its manufactures of hosiery and shawls, sheep, goats, rabbits and cats are covered with a long silken hair; and "hogs and dogs" according to Bishop Heber, "carried into the hills from India, are soon covered with wool like the shawl goats of that climate." The ears of European dogs when carried to the gold coast, become stiff and long like those of the fox, to whose colour they also incline; and their bark turns into a howl or yelp like that of the native breed.

The other main cause of variety of colour may be in the food. Animals fed on madder-root have their bones stained of a red colour, and it is said that the Chinese by a similar process change the hair of men to a darker hue. Oily food has a tendency to increase the biliary secretions and produce a sallow or oily shade.

Still another cause of change may be found in advancing civilization or the reverse. The people of Nigritia as soon as they escape from their degradation, and rise to a superior elevation in intellectual and moral worth, slough off the most extreme deformities of the negro. In proof of this, witness the Ashantis, the Sulima, and Dahomans of the coast of Guinea, and the fine races of Guber, Hausa, and the Jolofs, their near neighbours on the north.

There are an abundance of facts to sustain the common belief that a simple mode of life, abundant and nutritious food, and a salubrious atmosphere, give to men, and indeed to all organized existence, large and graceful forms; while, on the other hand, hot and insalubrious climes, inferior food, and sensual habits, produce opposite changes equally great.

We have abundant proofs of this operating among ourselves. In the low country of these southern States, white families, living constantly in the swamps and rice lands, gradually lose their fine complexions and their robust appearance; the roseate tint disappears from their cheek, their skin becomes colourless or tawny, their hair even in some instances changing to a dirty yellow, or flavous cream colour. The effect must be produced by the heat and miasmatic atmosphere generated in those low and marshy regions. In an entirely opposite country in the same latitudes, the middle or sand-hill region, a region universally healthy but barren, a similar effect is produced by the

miserable food and indolent life of the inhabitants. The poor and miserable tallow-faced, or tawny inhabitants, though of pure Anglo-Saxon origin, show, in an equal degree, the modifying influence of inferior and scanty food upon the human face divine. Even the children of such parents, from their earliest days, still more than the parents themselves, show all these effects. Indeed, in many parts of these southern regions, one accustomed only to the fresh and rosy complexion of the northern portions of our land, will be struck with the manifest change in the pure Anglo-Saxon race, which a residence of two or three generations under a southern sun has made, even where there has been abundance of the necessities and luxuries even of life.

The argument, then, for a diversity of species in the human family, from the colour of the skin, eyes, and hair, is manifestly unavailing. To the inferior animals no one thinks of applying it as a distinctive mark of species. A black, white, red, or spotted colour in the horse or cow, the varieties of bay, sorrel, chestnut or gray in the one, or brindled and mottled in the other, are hardly regarded as indicating varieties in the same species.

A far more important difference obtains in the races of men in reference to form and structure. The heads of different nations are differently formed. And Prof. Camper first suggested a method by which the crania of different races of men and species of animals might be compared. This is the facial angle included between a line drawn from the *meatus auditorius*, or entrance of the ear, to the base of the nose, and another line touching the more prominent part of the upper jaw, and resting upon the most prominent part of the forehead. This angle, when the head is viewed in profile, differs in the various animals up to man, and in the different races of men up to the most intellectual, beautiful and perfect. In the bird it is the least, in the ape tribe, one species has a facial angle of 42° , in the one most approaching man the facial angle is 50° , in the negro and Kalmuc it is 70° , in the European 80° , in the profile of the Greek statues of Jupiter it is 95° or 100° .

Dr. Prichard objects to the method of Camper, that it does not indicate, as he supposed, the sagacity and intel-

lect of men. In the first place, it is not certain that the quantity of brain either positively or relatively indicates the measure of intellectual power. Many of the lower animals, especially insects, which have no cerebral lobes, as the bee and ant, manifest instincts having a wonderful resemblance to intellect in man. And in the second place the quantity of brain is not determined by the facial angle, for the greater prominence of the bones of the upper jaw will give a more acute angle in one individual who has precisely the same quantity of brains, than in another whose facial angle is more obtuse. And Blumenbach has objected that the facial angle is precisely the same often in skulls which, in other proportions, are wholly different. The skull of a Congo negro in his possession, and one of a Pole from Lithuania, were nearly equal in their facial angle, but the narrow, compressed head of the negro was exceedingly different from the square head of the Sarmatian. He adopted a different method of determining the distinctive differences in the configuration of the head. He viewed it from behind and above, adopting what he called the *vertical* method. Viewing the skulls of different nations in this way, he divided the human race into three families and two intermediate ones, the Caucasian, the Mongolian, and the Ethiopic — between the Caucasian and the Ethiopic is the Malay, and between the Caucasian and the Mongul, the American variety. In the Caucasian skull the form is symmetrical, the zygomatic arches are hardly perceptible from the point of view taken, and the cheek and jaw-bones are covered by the overhanging forehead. The negro skull is greatly flattened laterally, the zygomatic arches protrude greatly, and the whole lower part of the face projects so much that the upper jaw, the teeth and cheek bones, are visible from above. The Mongolian skull has an exceeding breadth in front, the zygomatic arches are exceedingly prominent, the forehead depressed, and the upper jaw visible from above. But Dr. Prichard, in determining the varieties of the bony structure of the head, views the base of the skull, though not to the neglect of other examinations and measurements. He also distinguishes three varieties in the skull: 1. The symmetrical or *oval* form. This is known by the expanded forehead, the symmetrical proportions of the zygo-

tic arches and the maxillary bones, giving to the contour of the face an oval shape. The upper jaw-bone is not projecting, but rounded and adapted to the general figure of the head, which gives a perpendicular position to the front teeth, so that they do not project. 2. The narrow and elongated skull of the negro of the Gold Coast. The temporal muscles rising very high in the parietal bones, and being very powerful, have compressed and elongated the head. The cheek bones project forward, the upper jaw also projects forward, carrying forward the alveolar process and the teeth, and diminishing thus the facial angle of Camper. 3. The broad and square-faced skull of the Turanian race. The Monguls afford a specimen of this variety—the Esquimaux an exaggerated one. In this the most noticeable feature is the outward projection of the zygomas. If a line be drawn from one to the other of these as a base, it will form with the apex of the forehead nearly a triangle. The orbits are large and deep, the upper part of the face flat, the nasal bones nearly on the same plane with the cheek bones. This variety Dr. Prichard calls the *pyramidal*, while to the second variety he gives the name the *prognathous*.

Regarding men as distinguishable into classes according to their structure, Dr. Prichard enumerates seven varieties of men. 1. The Iranian, who in the form of their skull and other physical characters, resemble the Europeans, though some nations in Asia and some in Africa are included in this variety. This division of the human family embraces Europe, North Africa, and Asia south of the Caucasus and the Himalaya mountains, and from the Ganges to the Mediterranean and the Red sea. Of these the Greeks, and the Persians as exhibited in the sculptures of Persepolis, form the most perfect models. The term Caucasian is avoided as a name of this class, as it would seem to indicate what is not true in fact, that these people, and these alone of the families of men, originated in the region of Mt. Caucasus. 2. The Turanian nations, as the Kalmucks, the Mongols, and the Chinese. This class embraces all nations of northern and eastern Asia, beyond the Ganges. With this also are reckoned the Esquimaux of N. America who have the same general appearance, and the Lappes of northern Europe. 3. The

native American nations, the Esquimaux excepted. 4. The Hottentot or Bushman race. 5. The Negroes. 6. The Papuans or woolly haired nations of Polynesia. 7. The Alfourou and Australian races.

The Iranian variety embraces the Caucasian family proper, the Germanic family, the Celtic, the Arabian, the Libyan, the Nilotic, and the Hindostanee families of nations.* These families of nations have the large oval skull with its anterior portion full and elevated, the nasal bones arched, the chin full, the teeth vertical, the face small but with regular features. Of these families the Jews included in the Arabian family, have a more receding forehead, an elongated face, and large aquiline nose. That the Nilotic family belong to this Iranian race, is now rendered certain by the valuable work of Dr. Morton, *Crania Egyptiaca*, in which are depicted one hundred and thirty-seven skulls, and mummified heads, from the pyramids and catacombs of Egypt. Of these, he informs us that eight tenths are of the unmixed Caucasian race, the structure of the bones as thin and delicate as the European; on thirty-six heads the hair is preserved, and is as fine as that of the fairest European nations at the present day; the nose straight or slightly aquiline as in the Hindoo, or more prominent as in the Pelasgic, or long, salient, and aquiline, as in the Arabian, and, more especially, in the Hebrew stock. The meatus auditorius presented no variation from the usual position. The Turanian variety has the pyramidal skull, the nose broad and short, the eyes small, black, obliquely placed, the forehead low, the skin sallow or olive, the hair long, black, straight, the beard thin. It embraces the Mongul Tartar family, the Turkish, the Chinese, the Indo-Chinese, the Polar family, including the Laplanders, Finns, Samoiedes, Ostiaks, and others in Asia, and the Esquimaux in America.

The American variety is fully exhibited in the splendid work of Dr. Morton, of Philadelphia, on the Aboriginal races of North and South America. He divides the races into two, the American and the Toltechan families. "They are marked by a red or brown complexion, long, black,

* See Morton's *Crania Americana*, p. 5. He follows Blemanbach's distribution of the races of men.

lank hair, and, a deficient beard. Their eyes are black and deep set, the brow low, their cheek bones high, the nose large and acquiline, the mouth large, and the lips turned and compressed. The skull is small, wide between the parietal protuberances, prominent at the vertex and flat on the occiput. The Toltecans are the race whose works are found from the river Gila in California, to the southern border of Peru, among which are pyramids, temples, grottoes, basilisks, and arabesques, with their roads, aqueducts, and fortifications. Dr. Morton thinks the American race differs from all others, even the Mongolians, i. e. the Turanian of Prichard. But Dr. Prichard supposes the Aboriginal Americans to exhibit the broad pyramidal skull of the Turanian race. The cheek bones are prominent but not quite so angular, the nose more so and acquiline, the complexion, hair, and defective beard assimilate them to the Turanian family of nations.

The Hottentot and Bushman race have broad and square heads, like the Kalmucks and other Turanians. The face is flat, especially between the cheek bones, the eyes of a deep chestnut colour, long, narrow, distant from each other like the Chinese, but possessing great powers of vision. Their habits are like those of the Kalmucks, they are nomadic tribes wandering over arid steppes covered with but a scanty herbage. The principal difference is in the texture of the hair, which though scanty in the Hottentot, is still woolly, but differing in its quantity from the thick wool of the negroes of middle Africa.

The negro skull is of the prognathous type, the narrowest and most elongated of human skulls, excepting those which have been subjected to artificial pressure, such as those of Titiaca in Peru,* and much has been said of its great resemblance to the cranium of the chimpanze and orang otang. But all the measurements of Camper, Tyson, and others, were of young specimens of these animals.

* Dr. Morton however supposes that the skull of the ancient Peruvians was elongated naturally, and the elongation only increased by compression, to heighten what was supposed to be a beauty. See *Crania Americana*, p. 98, and plate iv. where is delineated a Peruvian skull, as Dr. M. supposes, in its unaltered form. The retreating forehead and prognathous face, would argue an affinity with the negroes were it not that the hair is uniformly lank and long like that of the other American tribes.

Their brain is fully developed at an early period unlike the human brain which is comparatively slow in development; and before the jaws are fully enlarged by complete dentition, and the zygomatic arches fully extended, these measurements were taken. In these cases the cranium was relatively more protuberant, and the facial angle greater than in the adult skull. In this, the cranium shews itself as a small rounded case wholly posterior to, and not above and over the face, the zygoma is in the middle and not in the anterior region of the head, and the foramen magnum is in the middle of the posterior third, and not in the middle of the base of the skull as in man.

The skull of the negro is in general thicker, denser, and heavier than that of the most of men; but the great distinguishing difference is its narrowness, and the prominence of the alveolar processes of the upper jaw, causing, in this way, the retreating forehead. The Kaffir has a higher forehead, and less prominent jaws, but, on the whole, approaches to the prognathous type. It is obvious that the form of the skulls has little to do with the quantity of brain, provided where it is flattened or depressed in one direction it is extended in another, and Tiedeman has ascertained by comparing, by an accurate process, the capacity of the skulls of different nations, that the cavity of the negro skull, and of course the quantity of brain which fills this cavity is in no degree smaller than in European and other human races.

The Papuas or Oceanic negroes, inhabit New Guinea and other islands of the Indian Archipelago, and are found also in many islands of the Pacific. Their head resembles that of the negro, being of the prognathous type, their skin is of the deepest black, their hair short, woolly, and more compact on their head than in any other people, their eye is of a greenish brownish tint, their nose flat, mouth wide with thick lips. The Papuas proper, living on that island, are a mixed race, between the Malays and the Oceanic negroes. Their name in the language of the Malays signifies "frizzled head," they were called by Dampier "the mop-headed Papuas." They comb out these locks to their full extent on every side, which gives their head an enormous apparent size, being, it is said, three feet in diameter. The Australian skull exhibits a deep sinus between

the nose and the forehead, and the frontal ridges greatly overhang the eyes. It is of the extreme prognathous type with retreating low forehead. Their hair is longer than that of the negro, coarse and frizzled, or soft and straight as in the white man. Their colour black, or dark brown, though some of the women are as light as mulattoes. The Alfours are of the same general type, and repulsive in the extreme in their whole appearance.

It will be remembered that the black complexion and the other distinguishing features of the Guinea negro do not always go together, that there are many nations of Africa extremely dark, whose skull approaches the oval form, whose lips are thin, their forehead and nose prominent, and who are finely formed. Such are the Berbers of Mt. Atlas, the Tuaryk of the desert of Sahara, the Tibbos of Borneo, the Fulahs, and Jolofs of Senegambia, a portion of the Ashantis, the race of Gubah and Hausa of Sudan, some tribes in Congo, and the blackest of the Kafirs in South Africa. There are others having the same features and colour whose hair is not woolly, as the Bishari, Danakil, Hazorta, and the darkest of the Abyssinians. Others still, have the negro type and complexion in every respect, while their hair flows in ringlets. The colour of the complexion and form of the skull do not therefore seem necessarily connected.

It has been supposed that national varieties exist in the form of the pelvis, and that these bear a relation to the shape of the skeleton and form of the skull. Drs. Vrolik, of Amsterdam, and Weber, at Bonn, have devoted their attention to these comparisons, and the latter, more especially, has distinguished four forms of the pelvis: 1. The oval. 2. The round. 3. The square. 4. The oblong or cuneiform. Prof. Weber has found examples of each of these forms in every one of the principal varieties of the human race; but gives it as his opinion that the most frequent form among Europeans is the oval form, among the American nations the round, the square among the Mongolians, and the oblong among the African races. To their forms he supposes the crania of these several varieties of man in general correspond. But we doubt not, if as much attention were bestowed upon the examination, and mensuration of the pelves of the inferior animals of

one and the same species, equal and greater variation, would be found in them.

These varieties of form in man are more important perhaps than the outward varieties of colour, and in themselves more strongly argue a different and independent origin of the several races of men. But it has often been remarked that there are stranger varieties arising among men than those which mark the differences of race, and that these are propagated for a length of years from father to son.

"Native or congenital peculiarities of form, like those of colour," says Lawrence, "are transmitted by generation. Hence we see a general similitude in persons of the same blood, and can distinguish one brother by his resemblance to another, or know a son by his likeness to the father or mother, or even to the grandfather or grandmother. All the individuals of some families are characterised by particular lines of countenance; and we frequently observe a peculiar feature continued in a family for many generations. The thick lip introduced into the imperial house of Austria, by the marriage of the Emperor Maximilian with Mary of Burgundy, is visible in their descendants to this day, after a lapse of three centuries. Haller observes that his own family had been distinguished by tallness of stature for three generations, without excepting one out of numerous grandsons descended from one grandfather.

Individuals are occasionally produced with supernumerary members on the hands or feet, or on both; and from these, whether males or females, the organic peculiarity frequently passes to their children. This does not constantly happen, because they intermarry with persons of the ordinary form; but if the six-fingered and six-toed could be matched together, and the breed could be preserved pure by excluding all who had not these additional members, there is no doubt that a permanent race might be formed constantly possessing this number of fingers and toes.

Pliny has mentioned examples of six fingered persons among the Romans: such individuals received the additional name of *sedigitus* or *sedigita*. C. Horatius had two daughters with this peculiarity. Reaumur speaks of a family in which a similar structure existed for three generations being transmitted both in the male and female lines. Mr. Carlisle has recorded the particulars of a family, in which he traced supernumerary toes and fingers for four generations. They were introduced by a female, who had six fingers on each hand, and six toes on each

foot. From her marriage with a man naturally formed were produced ten children with a supernumerary member on each limb; and an eleventh, in which the peculiarity existed in both feet and one hand; the other hand being naturally formed. The latter married a man of the ordinary formation; they had four children, of which three had one or two limbs natural, and the rest with the supernumerary parts, while the fourth had six fingers on each hand, and as many toes on each foot. The latter married a woman naturally formed, and had issue by her eight children, four with the usual structure, and the same number with supernumerary fingers or toes. Two of them were twins, of which one was naturally formed, the other six-fingered and six-toed.

Another remarkable example of the occurrence of a singular organic peculiarity, and of its hereditary transmission, is afforded by the English family of porcupine men, who have derived that name from the greater part of the body being covered by hard dark-coloured excrescences of a horny nature. The whole surface, excepting the head and face, the palms and soles, is occupied by this unnatural kind of integument. The first account of this family is found in the *Philosophical Transactions*, No. 424; and consists of the description of a boy, named Edward Lambert, fourteen years old, born in Suffolk, and exhibited to the Royal Society in 1731, by Mr. Machin, one of the secretaries. "It was not easy to think of any sort of skin or natural integument, that exactly resembled it. Some compared it to the bark of a tree; others thought it looked like seal-skin; others like the skin of an elephant, or the skin about the legs of the rhinoceros; and some took it to be like a great wart, or number of warts uniting and overspreading the whole body. The bristly parts, which were chiefly about the belly and flanks, looked and rustled like the bristles or quills of a hedgehog, shorn off within an inch of the skin." These productions were hard, callous and insensible—other children of the same parents were naturally formed.

In a subsequent account presented to the Society twenty-four years afterwards, by Mr. H. Baker, and illustrated with a figure of the hands, this man is said to continue in the same state. He was a good-looking person, and enjoyed good health: every thing connected with his excretions was natural; and he derived no inconvenience from the state of his skin, except that it would crack and bleed after very hard work. He had now been shewn in London under the name of the Porcupine Man. "The covering," says Mr. Baker, "seemed most nearly to resemble an innumerable company of warts of a dark brown colour, and a cyl-

indrical figure, rising to a like height (an inch, at their full size,) and growing as close as possible to one another, but so stiff and and elastic, that when the hand is drawn over them they make a rustling noise."

They are shed annually, in the autumn or winter, and succeeded by a fresh growth, which at first are of a paler brown. "He has had the small pox, and been twice salivated, in hopes of getting rid of this disagreeable covering; during which disorders the warts came off, and his skin appeared white and smooth, like that of other people; but on his recovery it soon became as it was before. His health at other times has been very good during his whole life." "He has had six children, all with the same rugged covering as himself; the first appearance whereof in them, as well as in him, came on in about nine weeks after the birth. Only one of them is living, a very pretty boy, eight years of age, whom I saw examined with his father, and who is exactly in the same condition."

Two brothers, John Lambert, aged 22, and Richard, aged 14, who must have been grandsons of the original porcupine man, Edward Lambert, were shewn in Germany, and had the cutaneous incrustation already described.

Let us suppose that the porcupine family had been exiled from human society, and been obliged to take up their abode in some solitary spot or desert island. By matching with each other, a race would have been produced, more widely different from us in external appearance than the Negro. If they had been discovered at some remote period, our philosophers would have explained to us how the soil, air, or climate had produced so strange an organization; or would have demonstrated that they must have sprung from an originally different race: for who would acknowledge such bristly beings for brothers?

The giants collected by Frederic William I. for his regiment of guards produced a very tall race in the town where they were quartered: in the language of Dr. Johnson, they "propagated procerity."

This resemblance of offspring to parents, in native peculiarities of structure, prevails so extensively, that those minute, and in many cases imperceptible differences of organization or vital properties, which render men disposed to particular diseases, are conveyed from father to son for age after age. This is matter of common notoriety with respect to scrofula, consumption, gout, rheumatism, insanity and other affections of the head. There is more doubt in some other cases, as hare-lip, squinting, club foot, hernia, aneurism, cataract, fatuity, &c.; of which, however, there are many well-authenticated examples." There is an

hereditary blindness in a family in North America which has always affected some individuals for the last hundred years."—*Lawrence's Lectt. p. 438. et seq.*

"In a family at Iver, the individuals for nine generations had perfect thumbs, but instead of fingers had only the first phalanx of each, and the first and second joint of the ring finger of the left hand, these rudiments of fingers having no nails. This is said to be the description of the whole family, as it had been with slight variations that of nine numerous generations."—*Prichard I. 245.*

The same perpetuation of casual varieties is seen in the lower animals. The first ancestor of the Otter variety of sheep in New England, was a male lamb, produced by an ewe of the common description. This lamb was of singular structure, having a large body and short legs the fore legs being crooked. The variety has been perpetuated, and is valued from its inability to jump over fences. The Durham breed of cattle was artificially produced upon the basis of the small Highland breed, and the varieties of the dog and horse are best accounted for from the same cause.

Varieties are thus occurring daily in the human form and proportions, even without the influence of difference of climate, and manner of life. When these are superadded, we may expect to find the natives of different countries differing from each other more than the natives of one and the same country do among themselves. Even the same races when diffused through different and remote countries vary from their original type. The Arabs who have emigrated to Africa 11 or 12 hundred years ago, have become larger, stouter, more regular in their features, and of a different complexion from the original stock. Some have become entirely black, while they retain much of their original type. The Jew living in countries where the races are of a different hue, becomes, in some measure, assimilated to them. In England they are of a light brunette; in Germany xanthous, in Portugal very dark, in Cochin China and Malabar black. Transplanted negroes, long resident in temperate climes, seem to be slowly approximating in hue and form, even when there is no intermixture, to the races among whom they reside. And if the same is not true of the European and Asiatic varieties, dwelling in inter-tropical Africa, it may well be ascribed to the fact that they

have not conformed to the manners and habits of this degraded people. Where the Caucasian race has been compelled by necessity to adopt the habits of the inferior tribes of men, they too have degenerated. "There are," says the *Dublin University Magazine*, and the *Edinburg Review*, "certain districts in Leitrim, Sligo, and Mayo, chiefly inhabited by the descendants of the native Irish, driven by the British from Armagh and the south of Down, about two centuries ago. These people whose ancestors were well-grown, able-bodied, and comely, are now reduced to an average station of five feet two inches, are pot-bellied, bow-legged and abortively featured; and are especially remarkable for open projecting mouths, with prominent teeth and exposed gums, their advanced cheek bones and depressed noses bearing barbarism on their very front. Within so short a time they seem to have acquired a prognathous type of skull; like the natives of Australia;—thus giving such an example of deterioration from known causes, as almost compensates, by its value to future ages, for the suffering and debasement which past generations have endured in perfecting this appalling lesson. It is marvellous how close is the physical resemblance between the lowest class of the Irish population and the natives of Australia as depicted in the voyage of the "*Astrolabe*." Although the ancestral types of the two were in all probability very different, the changes induced by deficiency of food and social degradation, have tended in a remarkable manner to bring about the same results.*

The races of inferior animals present more striking instances of variation. It is with justice believed that all varieties of swine descend from the wild boar. Yet those carried to America by the Spaniards have varied from the original stock. Those taken to Cubagua became a race with toes half a span long, and those of Cuba twice the size of their progenitors. In Norway they are remarkable for length of bone in the hind leg. Large breeds of them with solid hoofs are found in Hungary and Sweden. In some the hoof is divided into five clefts. In China they have large bellies and short legs, at Cape Verd

* *Dublin University Magazine* xlviii, p. 658. *Edin. Review*, Oct. 1848, and Prichard II. 349.

large curved tusks, in Guinea long ears couched upon the back. And Blumenbach remarks that the whole difference between the cranium of the negro and that of the European is not greater than that between the wild boar and the domestic swine.

Having dwelt as long as our limits will allow upon the positive proofs of the identity of the human race, it remains that we should attempt to answer certain objections which have arisen in the minds of all who have thoughtfully considered the facts that have been adduced.

It has been denied that climate, food, and mode of life, have any effect in producing the varieties of complexion, of hair, and conformation, which are observable in the family of man. It is contended that whatever effects these produce, are limited to the individuals exposed to their influence, and are not in any way transmitted from them to their near or their remote descendants. That in precisely the same latitudes and circumstances men live of wholly different complexions, whereas if these external causes have any effect, their influence ought to be uniform upon all. It has been alleged, that there has been a permanence of all alleged to be wholly unaccountable that beneath the equator, in S. America and the islands of the Pacific, comparatively light coloured races should be found, and dark ones at the distance of 20° , 30° or 50° from it. And finally, it the characteristic features, hair, and complexion of men from the remotest times to which these matters can be traced. The characteristic differences of complexion are found exhibited, for example, on the sculptured monuments of Egypt, and the plates Dr. Morton has given of the heads taken from mummy pits of that country, exhibit the characteristic form, features, and hair of the Ethiopian, Jewish, and Pelasgic varieties, which were the same they now are 2200 years ago.

These, it must be admitted, are formidable difficulties in the way of our hypothesis, and have induced many to deny the unity of the race, which they have done sometimes, with no little contempt expressed for those who are so weak, ignorant, prejudiced, or superstitious, as to believe in so great an absurdity. Some, with a more becoming reverence for the scriptures, have met the difficulty by referring it to the direct intervention of the Almighty, who

in his benevolence, immediately after the flood, adapted the race, by an extraordinary intervention, to the situations they were to occupy, originating thus, at that time, the principal diversities which now exist.* Dr. Murray has spoken of the coincidence, that both Cuvier and Prichard have made but three principal typical varieties of man, and that there were just three branches of the family of Noah; Japhet, Shem and Ham.†

For our own part, it has seemed to us, that while the theory of the common origin of the race from one pair, demands our assent, because it is taught in the divine word, it also is most accordant with all the facts of history, and with the physical phenomena our race exhibits. If we suppose typical forms for every variety of man, existing from the first, there will have to be many originals of the race, both for all the variations of craniological developement, and all the variations of stature, or of the osteological form; for the various shades of colour, and the different texture and quality of the hair and beard. There will be scarcely any end to these original types. There must be one for every variety of the race. But we do know that varieties accidental to us, are produced and may be perpetuated, and if one, why not all. If new breeds of animals come into existence by the interference of man, why may not, in an early age of the world, new varieties of our own kind have been originated, and under favorable circumstances been perpetuated. And why may we not suppose, that in the early period after the flood, when men were first anew spread over a world, which under the deluge underwent great changes, there was a more speedy change effected by natural or providential causes, than perhaps is occurring now. When the difficulties of chronology shall at length be adjusted, we shall find a sufficient time to have elapsed between the flood and the building of the pyramids, for these changes to have occurred. Having once occurred they seem to have had a good degree of indelibility imposed upon them. Not merely climate, food, outward natural causes, but this inward unknown tendency to produce variations from the common

* See Morton's *Crania Americana*, p. 3.

† *Encyclopedia of Geography*, by Hugh Murray, F. R. S. E. I. p. 263.

type, we suppose to have concurred in their production. The comparative isolation of these varieties thus produced, from other portions of the race, in the dispersion of the family of man, may have tended to their perpetuation and to the stamp of permanency they now exhibit. It is not necessary to suppose that they are now found in all cases in the locations where they originated. Man is a migratory animal. War, commerce, famine, adventure, or pleasure carry him away from his ancient haunts, and place him in other circumstances than those in which his predecessors lived. That these changes of clime and manner of life do in some cases effect physical changes in him we think is clear. But that his distinctive traits do to a great extent resist them, when these are once fixed, is also perhaps equally plain. It is difficult not to believe that the hard life and cold climate of Lapland have affected the physical system of its inhabitants, and that the abundance and intelligence of England have shown themselves in the physical developement of the more prosperous of her people. As to the great and distinguishing characteristics of the human races, Mr. Lyell's remarks, in his *Geology*, respecting the lower animals, seem to us founded in truth and applicable here, "that a short period of time is generally sufficient to effect nearly the whole change which the alteration of external circumstances can bring about in the habits of a species," that "the alteration in form and organization is often rapid during a short period, but when the circumstances are made to vary further, all modification ceases," "indefinite divergence either in the way of improvement or deterioration being prevented."

We have now seen that though the races of mankind are distinguishable by different types, these races are not so distinct that individuals of each do not approximate or fully reach the type of the others; that these types do not vary from each other more than the forms of the lower animals vary within the limits of one and the same species; that those of the same type differ often in colour of the skin, eyes, and hair, while those of the same colour differ in their primitive type; that accidental varieties arising within the limits of a species can be propagated from generation to generation; that climate, food, manner of life, culture of mind, co-operating with unknown and se-

cret causes of change in the animal economy itself, produce change of complexion, and conformation; that all the varieties of man are fruitful *inter se*, and can perpetuate themselves without known limit, an argument that they are not hybrids between distinct species but varieties in one and the same species; that they agree together in all their animal economy, as e. g. in the duration of life, their period of gestation, and the diseases which assail them, which animals of different species do not; that they agree in their psychical characteristics which place them infinitely above the brutes; (while in the analogical traits found in the brutes, different dispositions are developed in different species;) that the analogy of both the vegetable and animal world shews that the several species have been diffused from their own centres; where the evidence of alliance between members of the human family has historically failed, evidence from similarity of conformation, or complexion has been found; where both have been wanting, psychical or pathological has been afforded; and did our limits allow us to enter upon the wide field of the analogy and derivation of languages, a topic we must defer for a future occasion, a new and valuable source of evidence would be available, to show the affiliation of all the families of men, and their common descent. The conclusion to which we are brought, by what we fear will be to our readers a tedious deduction from facts, is what Adam in the beginning in some measure prophetically announced, that Eve, "is the mother of all living," and that God hath made of one blood, race, and lineage, all the families of men that dwell upon the earth; that they therefore are our brethren, and, descending from one and the same federal head, are under the same condemnation, from which they are to be delivered by the same economy of redemption. To the Christian man, national distinctions disappear, in some measure when he looks upon them as originated by diversity of race, and still more when he looks upon them in the light of revelation and the plan of mercy, in which there is neither Greek, nor Jew, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.

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ARTICLE I.

ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

An Essay on some of the means by which the evil of war may be prevented, may be a not inappropriate supplement to the preceding review.* The following enumeration of means contributive to that end, may perhaps cover the whole ground :

1. A diffusion of the moral power of Christianity.
2. A direction of the special attention of society to the effects of war, and to the principles of peace.
3. Peace Societies and Conventions.
4. A Congress of nations.
5. Arbitration—both as an habitual resort, and as the subject of special treaties.
6. The disarmament of nations.
7. Unfettered commerce.

It is only to a few of these that we at present address remark ; after which the subject of *civil* war shall receive attention.

I. On the subject of Peace Societies, it is but necessary to exhibit their efficiency. Hear the plea of the American Peace Society, in the following extracts from one of its publications :†

* See the Mexican War Reviewed, in the July No.

† A tract entitled, " Shall I give to the cause of Peace ?"

"The general tone of feeling on this subject in the East and North, was once as bad as it now is at the West; and the change of public opinion which has actually abolished militia drills in some of the New England States, and in all reduced it well nigh to a nullity, may be traced mainly to the efforts made by the friends of peace *at a very small expense*. During its first ten years here, this cause received less than \$500 a year, for the next ten years little more than \$1,000 a year, and from its origin in 1815 to the present hour, hardly \$50,000 in all. With an addition of \$10,000 a year for the last ten years, or \$5,000 a year for twenty years past, we might have diffused over the rising West, over the whole country, such pacific sentiments as would, under God, have saved us not only from this crusade against Mexico, but from danger of war with any other nation.

"Now, in what way could five or ten thousand dollars a year, \$100,000 in all, have been spent to better purpose? We disparage no form of charity to the poor or the suffering, no enterprise of Christian benevolence at home or abroad; but tell us where such a sum *has* done, or is likely to do, a tenth part of the good that would have been secured by the prevention of this single war. The cause of foreign missions is supported at an annual cost to Christendom of some \$2,500,000; but can all the missionaries now among the heathen do good enough in one year, or twenty years, to counterbalance the manifold evils of this war? Nine or ten millions are annually expended in our country to support public worship; and how many years must all our ministers and churches, of every name, with their varied instrumentalities, labor to repair in full the injury done by this brief, distant war, to the spiritual interests of our own people alone? Nor, besides the boundless sweep of its social, political and moral evils, is even its waste of property, though the least of all its calamities, to be entirely overlooked, especially in an argument touching money. War generally wastes twice as much as it costs; but hardly any body expects this war, even if stopped in a month, to cost ourselves alone less than \$150,000,000 in the end, one-third of which must come from professed Christians, the church-members of our land. Here is the economy that refused aid to the cause of peace;—rather than give five or ten thousand dollars a year to prevent all wars, we sacrifice in a single war of two years twenty thousand times that sum, and one-third of it all from the pockets of the church. * * * *

"Prevention is our grand aim, also our only hope; and with adequate means, we cannot doubt the possibility or the moral certainty of saving our country henceforth from all war. Had this

cause received for the first ten years here ten thousand dollars a year instead of four or five hundred, and for the last twenty years thirty thousand a year in place of two or three, it might by this time have so far christianized public sentiment through the nation, as well nigh to insure us against war through all coming time. * * * * *

"In 1837-8 we were in most imminent danger of a war with Mexico; and Ex-President Adams, in a published letter, expressly attributed our escape to the timely and efficient efforts made by peace societies. We were exposed in the course of a few years to war with England in three instances,—the Canadian troubles, the North-eastern boundary, and the Oregon dispute; and, had public opinion in the two countries been what it was fifty or even thirty years before, no skill of diplomacy could have prevented a conflict. The general peace of Europe, after twenty-two years of war that are supposed to have sacrificed eight or ten million lives and some forty thousand million dollars in all, has been preserved nearly thirty-three years, ever since, and only since, the commencement of efforts in this cause. True, other influences have, as in all kindred enterprises, conspired in producing these results; but they are as fairly attributable under God to the cause of peace as the spread of Christianity is to the missionary cause, or the triumphs of temperance to that cause. No enterprise, to our knowledge, has ever accomplished more, if as much, with so small an amount of means; for all Christendom has thus far given it not more than \$150,000, an average of only four or five thousand dollars a year."

Though it is a sudden transition from the sphere of figures, somewhat into that of romance, we cannot refrain from presenting the idea, that a body of peacemakers from different countries, and especially from the two recently at war on this continent, might with some effect have stood in the breach, at the commencement of the war. At the peril of their lives, if necessary (though the adventure would probably not have involved great peril) they might have shewn what it is to be soldiers of peace, whose business it is to die, if required as a testimony, equally as the soldiers of any other cause. Had this been fanaticism, then, for once, there had been good in fanaticism.

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cret causes of change in the animal economy itself, produce change of complexion, and conformation; that all the varieties of man are fruitful *inter se*, and can perpetuate themselves without known limit, an argument that they are not hybrids between distinct species but varieties in one and the same species; that they agree together in all their animal economy, as e. g. in the duration of life, their period of gestation, and the diseases which assail them, which animals of different species do not; that they agree in their psychical characteristics which place them infinitely above the brutes; (while in the analogical traits found in the brutes, different dispositions are developed in different species;) that the analogy of both the vegetable and animal world shews that the several species have been diffused from their own centres; where the evidence of alliance between members of the human family has historically failed, evidence from similarity of conformation, or complexion has been found; where both have been wanting, psychical or pathological has been afforded; and did our limits allow us to enter upon the wide field of the analogy and derivation of languages, a topic we must defer for a future occasion, a new and valuable source of evidence would be available, to show the affiliation of all the families of men, and their common descent. The conclusion to which we are brought, by what we fear will be to our readers a tedious deduction from facts, is what Adam in the beginning in some measure prophetically announced, that Eve, "is the mother of all living," and that God hath made of one blood, race, and lineage, all the families of men that dwell upon the earth; that they therefore are our brethren, and, descending from one and the same federal head, are under the same condemnation, from which they are to be delivered by the same economy of redemption. To the Christian man, national distinctions disappear, in some measure when he looks upon them as originated by diversity of race, and still more when he looks upon them in the light of revelation and the plan of mercy, in which there is neither Greek, nor Jew, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free.

SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER II.

OCTOBER, 1849.

ARTICLE I.

ON THE MEANS OF PREVENTING WAR.

An Essay on some of the means by which the evil of war may be prevented, may be a not inappropriate supplement to the preceding review.* The following enumeration of means contributive to that end, may perhaps cover the whole ground :

1. A diffusion of the moral power of Christianity.
2. A direction of the special attention of society to the effects of war, and to the principles of peace.
3. Peace Societies and Conventions.
4. A Congress of nations.
5. Arbitration—both as an habitual resort, and as the subject of special treaties.
6. The disarmament of nations.
7. Unfettered commerce.

It is only to a few of these that we at present address remark ; after which the subject of *civil* war shall receive attention.

I. On the subject of Peace Societies, it is but necessary to exhibit their efficiency. Hear the plea of the American Peace Society, in the following extracts from one of its publications :†

* See the Mexican War Reviewed, in the July No.

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never have been lost on mankind, particularly the nations through whose encounter they were rendered martyrs. Imagine these nations to behold a deputed number of their own citizens and their foes united, prostrated by the deadly weapons they themselves had sent to that very field—slain while taking sweet counsel together, and “in their death not divided”* illustrating the unity that should have prevailed, at any sacrifice, between their respective nations! It would have been found that those who had thus fallen in the midst of the battle, were mighty beyond those who had carried arms thither. Their blood, like that of other martyrs, would have watered the seed sown by them. Their testimony would have been borne over the hills, and planted on the heights, more swiftly than the standards of the most rapid conqueror. The demands of the case, however, imply no such sacrifice. Their mission could scarcely be a failure, even if, like other sons of light, of not a more sublime distinction,

“From each band with speed retired,
Where erst was thickest fight, the angelic throng,
And left large field, unsafe within the wind
Of such commotion.”†

But hope as to the result of such an adventure is not circumscribed within this alternative. Why might not the parties succeed in preventing the fray, and yet live? It were no new thing for whole tribes to change their minds in a day. How speedy was the reception of Christianity by some nations in Europe. Why then may there not be hope, that nations professing to be *already christianized*, should be converted rapidly from mutual slaughter! The day may yet arrive, when opposed armies may adopt a new method of “conquering a peace,” and, rejecting the sword, be baptized into reconciliation at the waters of strife. Imagine how such an event would shed over the scene associations, transcending in romance and in gladness any that have immortalized the banks of the Rio Grande!

But here is a scheme more accordant with the present spirit of the age:—We hear annually of world-conventions held with reference to objects to which their counsels

* 2 Sam. i. 23.

† Paradise Lost, B. vi.

are little available, and in countries where there is not the greatest need of them. But a peace-convention for the benefit of this whole continent, appears to have been left for another age. Still less thought has there been of pitching its tents at Corpus Christi, rendering that spot more than nominally an ark for the peace-bearing dove. While, for a considerable period, there has been an alienation of feeling between this country and Mexico, no efforts have been made for communication with society in Mexico on the subject of peace principles, though such might have been made with happy results.

Societies of the nature we are considering ought not to lose sight of the evil of *civil* war, as one that claims their laborious attention. In their proper place in this article, sentiments shall be offered on the means by which it may, to a great extent, if not altogether, be avoided. At present we humbly suggest that a mode in which the advocates of peace may greatly promote the interests of the principle, is, by the diffusion of such knowledge among the dispensers of civil government throughout the world, as will correct the views too common among them, as to the manner of preventing the outburst of popular passion. In this aspect of the duty alluded to, it renders indispensable an attention to the science of free government. This circumstance presents to collateral notice, the danger to which the interests of this cause will be liable, if its connection with the pursuit of that science be not perfectly detached from all other ends than the interests of this particular cause. If that independence be not carefully maintained, the advocacy of this cause will be liable to abuse, as a channel for instilling theories adverse to the systems of government prevailing in various countries. It is not to be expected that organizations committing such invasion, foreign to their object, would receive that confidence abroad which is essential to their usefulness. Policy is indeed far from requiring in this connection reserve as to political predelictions; nor could there be an observance of such reserve consistently with the prosecution of the objects in view. Such a policy would dissociate the knowledge of good government from the sphere of usefulness, the importance of its connection with which is the point now maintained. The duty of the peace bearers with re-

ference to civil war is two-fold—on one hand to impress the popular mind with motives for abstaining from active resistance, to whatever degree right may be their's—on the other hand, to enlighten governments on the adaptation of constitutions, or of administration, to the character and wants of their respective people. Were the cause of peace as well supported as some others, the society for its promotion might have ambassadors resident or visitant in every metropolis throughout the world—selected too from the ablest public characters, with a provision adequate to the situation assigned them, and to the influence sought. Although such arrangements, if made with reference to countries of which the governments have not had previous acquaintance with the movements of the society, would be very likely to excite suspicion of untoward motives, this would not be the case, if, during the whole period *antecedent* to such arrangements, information of all the proceedings of the society are regularly forwarded to all accessible governments, whether designated as civilized or as barbarian. There can be little doubt that the sound moral system maintained by such representatives (divested of all political intrigue, or expression of party-sympathy—which would be a disqualification from such office) their knowledge of human nature in a state of political freedom or of narrow restraint, their philanthropy and feelings of universal citizenship, would procure such a degree of confidence, as would invest them, to a very considerable extent, with the attributes and privileges of universal councillors, upon national interests. It should be observed, that already some of the greatest politicians in the world are in the interest of the cause.

II. By a Congress of nations, it has been often proposed to remove the assumed necessity for wars. Without a diffused inculcation of the principles of peace, there would be little security for an obedience to the decrees of such a body; though unquestionably it would by itself diminish materially the motives and temptations to engage in war.

The only council of nations now existing, that fulfils in any degree the objects of such a Congress as is contemplated, consists of *the five powers*; and this has rather the functions of an oligarchy, created by a necessity that may have been real, or apparent, or assumed—constituted by

self-election, excluding other nations from participation, while it exercises a degree of international jurisdiction over them. Nature and special providence have made this council—if it will but apprehend its proper destiny—a suitable *nucleus* for the constitution of a Congress of nations, over an *acquiescent* area of jurisdiction. It is to be regretted that such an end was not sought anterior to the last French revolution. Had such a plan been entertained and carried into effect, there might have been now a restrictive moral force over the European nations, which, as times are, does not exist. It is not while a continent is shaken, and nations in explosion, and the atmosphere war, or rumour of war, that a permanent association of the character we plead for can be formed. When the present convulsion has subsided, the favorable opportunity will be again presented. International legislation, based on the equality of nations, being once commenced, its universal prevalence, with little exception, may be confidently hoped for. "If (says Kant,) we may indulge the anticipation, or even conception, of the established supremacy of a universally recognized law, though its perfect realization be attainable only by indefinite approximations, then the idea of perpetual peace, which shall supersede what have heretofore been called treaties of peace, but which are rather terminations of hostilities, is not chimerical, but a problem of which time promises the solution, within a period to be lessened no doubt according to the progress of the human mind."*

The subject of a Congress among the nations for the solution of their mutual difficulties has received considerable attention from individuals; likewise the requisite mode of electing, organizing, and investing such a body. It is probable that little more can be added to the suggestions already published, until an experimental application of these has been undertaken. That alone can determine the character of the theories proposed. There is enough suggested, so far as the administration of justice to nations is in point; and on other points, there is sufficient light for a *beginning*. How to enforce the decisions of such a Court—or rather how to discourage effectually a non-com-

* Kant—On perpetual peace.

pliance with them, is a department of the subject, which demands all the ability that can be brought to bear upon it; the successful exertion of which to a practical end, would most probably command all the recompense that is ever yielded to moral or political discoveries. On the supposition, for example, that the discontinuance of commerce with a refractory power, were a measure proposed to the other powers in the Congress, it were well that there should be antecedent estimates of the distresses to which individuals, or companies, or classes, would be liable in consequence of such a resolution, and the mode in which compensative channels may be opened to their enterprise, permanently or temporarily. Nor should there be an oversight of the question as to the virtual incentives to hostility obtaining through such discontinuance of commercial relations; though there would be some security against that evil, besides a hope for reclaiming the disaffected power, in the continued recognition of its privilege of representation in the Congress. These points are named as of that kind which should especially occupy those who are qualified for the investigation.

III. *Unfettered commerce* is among the most important of the peace-bearing schemes ever devised. That extensive commercial intercourse among nations is favorable to the maintenance of pacific relations, is but a truism. But that the less restricted is such intercourse, the more cemented and the less liable to violation are those relations, although it is not more questionable, yet the principle has been hardly yet (practically) invested with the recognized character of a maxim.

Sundry questions are now before the world occupying the attention of statesmen; to whom belongs the exposition of them to the popular tribunal. And on the determination of them depend, not indeed the destinies of the world, but the acceleration of such as are becoming more and more manifest. One is whether the nations ought not to be mutually dependant, rather than seek to be independent of each other. Another is whether, supposing there be sacrifices incurred by a nation, not ruinous to its essential interests, in unrestricted or but lightly burdened commerce, it is or is not preferable to incur them, with a view, partly to the greater insurance of amicable relations

with other countries, by strengthening that bond which is called *interest*—and partly to the impulse which such example communicates to other parts of the world, which are in greater need of such relations for their advancement in humanity. Another question is whether, generally speaking, a nation does really incur internal sacrifices, in the long run, by the removal of restrictions to commerce, even if its liberality be not reciprocated. It is not within our province or ability to expound these most important questions, although not without a creed respecting them, and a deep interest in them. Besides, remarks on the present topic, can, with propriety, be little other than general on the present occasion.*

With reference to commercial relations generally, and to the analogous departments of activity, to which confidence and credit are as life-blood, it might seem superfluous to enunciate the self-evident principle, that credit should be sustained as unimpaired as unavoidable misfortune will permit. But the motive for its repetition, at present, is rather to impress upon those who maintain in theory the most liberal views of international relation the high place it ought to have in their reflections, and among the objects of their intent self-application. The scrupulous maintenance of national credit abroad, in every department of business, does not admit of being passed by, when the ethical aspect of free commerce is before the

* Bastiat's work, on Protective Policy, translated by Mrs. M'Cord, with an introduction by Professor Lieber, should be read by every one. The following remarks of Lord Palmerston are very forcible:—"Why is the earth, on which we live, divided into zones and climates? Why, I ask, do different countries yield different productions, to people experiencing similar wants? Why are they intersected with mighty rivers, the natural high-ways of nations? Why are lands, the most distant from each other, brought almost into contact by the very ocean which seems to divide them? Why, sir, it is that man may be dependent upon man. It is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the extension and diffusion of knowledge—by the interchange of mutual benefits, engendering mutual kind feelings—multiplying and confirming friendly relations. It is that commerce may freely go forth, leading civilization with one hand, and peace with the other, to render mankind happier, wiser, better. Sir, this is the dispensation of providence—this is the decree of that power which created and disposes the universe; but, in the face of it, with arrogant, presumptuous folly, the dealers in restrictive duties, fly—fettering the inborn energies of man, and setting up their miserable legislation instead of the great standing laws of nature." (Speech in the British House of Commons, on the Corn Laws, Feb. 16th, 1842.)

attention. And it is important that that aspect be kept before the public mind universally ; inasmuch as every man, though not engaged in commerce as an avocation, or in agencies having affinity with it, may bear more or less, by his intersecting influences, on national or local character, with reference to those very particulars. In the transactions between governments and private persons, the principle of *repudiation* has found place, analagously as in those between individuals. And there can be no doubt that the peace of nations is, at all times, endangered, nor always in an indirect manner, by national or (what is not badly termed) *sectional* violation of faith ; besides the indirect manner in which its stability must be affected by the diminished negotiations and interests that have previously insured it.

To the greatest facilities of commercial intercourse, should be added international encouragements to a social mingling of the people of different nations ; also, *corporate* intercourse between particular classes in one country, and the corresponding classes in other countries.— Among the advantages accruing from such an approximation of nations, is the knowledge they thus acquire of one another's civilization, and of its *rationale*. This is very effectual towards the expulsion of national prejudice. He is but a child who passes judgment on nations, without an apprehension of characteristics as otherwise modified than in his own country ; and these are ill discriminated, without a capacity for referring them to other standards than his native one, supposing him to have grasped any other. It is not an unfrequent speculation, that increased intercourse between countries tends to lessen prejudice, either by making apparent a less difference in their habits, and in the mould of their sentiments, than as previously believed, or by assimilating them in a greater or less degree. The diminution of prejudice is a natural, perhaps usual effect, but not through an altered impression, which is presumed with as little reason to be a general consequence of the intercourse, as to be a means of producing the favorable result.* Whether the differ-

* Nothing can be more certain, than that the circumstance of the English language being common to Great Britain and to this country, is a cause of ill impression, in common, to people in both countries, particularly the for-

ences of the nature in question, be proved by the intercourse, to be more or less agreeable with prepossession, is not so much to the point, as an intelligence with regard to the principle of difference, or the circumstances on which the difference is based, and the elementary influences, (so far as they are not immoral,) out of which a spirit of society, other than we are accustomed to, has been formed. When read by these lights, many circumstances, inapposite to uninformed prejudice, obtain license in the court of reason, if not in that of taste. The quality of an elementary law, or organic influence, in the society of a particular region, is of course disputable. But only in relation to such laws or influences, can that society be properly estimated, or even understood.

The drift of the foregoing observations must be obvious: and it is hoped that, in their suggestive character, they are not inapplicable to use, for the promotion of good will amongst mankind.

IV. *Civil War* has been alluded to in a former part of this article, as creating a separate department of duty, the qualifications for which were suggested as worthy of special consideration. We propose to renew allusion to it, with a view to a presentment of certain radical causes of civil war.

Whatever be the form of government and society, supposing it to be once adapted to the happiness of a people, it is the duty of those who form the privileged orders, (if there be any such,) to regard their position as being not so much a *privilege*, as a vocation for certain ends.—When, therefore, with the progress of time, the popular intelligence has advanced, and the spirit of the age correspondingly altered, it becomes those whose position or vocation has been defined by a different state of things,

mer. For where a person finds his own language spoken, he is disappointed at the absence of uniformity, in all other respects, with his own native habits and customs. Had these two countries a different vernacular, then greater differences than there are would be looked for. Further, it is both an advantage and a disadvantage to the English language, that its spirit is intolerant of variation from a prevailing mode of speaking it. The advantage is, its greater tendency to universality in a *single dialect*. The disadvantage consists in a narrowness of sentiment, occasioned by it, which does ill justice to literary or conversational merit, when featured with variation produced by foreign birth or remote scenes.

not to be loth to yield that pre-eminence, to the extent which accords with the public spirit. It commonly happens that, when measures of reform are proposed, with a view to effect a wider distribution of privileges, or to graduate them more liberally, or to render less unequal the enjoyment of natural rights, by removing or diminishing the *causes* of excess in the inequality, the privileged orders immediately raise the cry of interference with hereditary rights. Yet these rights were not designed by Supreme Providence for their enjoyment in any other sense than every one who fulfils his duty in his proper place, can likewise realize. In what other legitimate mode can they enjoy their position? Is it in the augmented means of self-indulgence? Powers beyond those possessed by ordinary mortals, were not originally, and never legitimately—that is, consistently with natural right and moral propriety, conceded for any *such* purpose. It is simply for a useful end that any peculiar political order is created by society; and it is consequently revocable by society, whether on a conviction that it has answered its end, or that it has failed to do so. It is too commonly argued that historical proof of advantage from a certain form of constitution, or from sundry circumstances, is reason for their perpetual continuance. As well might it be argued, that the best school for the young is still the most appropriate when maturity has been attained, as that a people should not have a free constitution when qualified for the enjoyment of one. The *ideal* state of humanity, which will never be quite attained in the present dispensation of things, is one in which the most perfect self-government alone prevails; though this can never dispense with the need of delegated powers, to concentrate the popular voice, in that form which is called “government.” And this requires more or less force, according as the masses are less or more capable of taking care of themselves. In a country far advanced in civilization, there is little fear of the masses erring much in their estimate of good government, if their views are truly represented. Look at France—what is the state of public spirit throughout that country, notwithstanding the extent of insubordination? It has had a most marked expression in favor of law and order. Too many among us do the French people an in-

justice, by overlooking how sorely tried their energies have been, in resisting the tempestuous element that has threatened to submerge all the interests of man in a common burial. These severe trials, the lot of that people in the first stages of their experiment in self-government, should enlist the sympathies of mankind in a greater degree, than if there had been no volcanic elements in their political sphere, boiling evermore in an impenetrable deep. The conduct of the French *nation* is entitled to no small praise. The circumstance that so small a portion of society has produced so much turmoil, with comparative impunity, has grown out of the moderation and unavenging spirit of the people at large. Had such occurrences taken place in the United States, it is more than probable that the people would, in a mass, have risen against the insurgent community, and, as the condition of their deliverance from molestation, would have required their departure, within a given time, to some distant corner of the land, where they might have governed themselves in any way they pleased—as Mormons or as Communists—so long as they ceased to disturb the peace of the nation.—It was indeed intimated, in some of the foregoing expressions, that the depth of the disorder, in French society, is not to be probed. This unhappy circumstance renders the condition of that people, striving with a mighty effort, to fulfil their duty in the scale of nations—one that ought to be peculiarly interesting to the philanthropist, or even to those censors of mankind, whose impatience is not entirely devoid of forbearance. The state of France, at this period, is of the most vital importance, in the eyes of all who are concerned for the peace of mankind. Her internal condition requires all the attention which the statesmen and philanthropists of the world can devote to it.* It would be well if a Legislature, which volunteers

* "The Federalist," a collection of the ablest political papers ever written, should, at this time, be recommended to the study of incipient republicans. Lamartine has misapprehended the design of the *Senate*, in the constitution of the United States. In a recent speech, on the question of a second branch of the Legislature for France, he has referred to the mode of constituting our Senate, as if this were indicative of a solitary and exclusive idea in its original institution, namely: the representation of the *federal* relation. But the fact that every separate State, in the Union, has taken the precaution to divide its Legislature into two branches, of which the Senate is elec-

so much aid to the christian religion, as does that of France, would cease to exclude, as it does, consistent christians from its own body, by requiring attendance on the Sabbath, which appears to be their great day for public business, when the times are unpropitious to a devotion of it to pleasure. "The Sabbath is the sheet-anchor of religion and good morals. All experience proves it so; for France tried to do without it, and plunged at once into atheism, anarchy, and a sea of vices and crimes. It is the nurse and guardian of intelligence, and piety, and virtue, and good order, and general prosperity. It is the hinge of God's moral government over our world, and the main-spring or pivot of all the instrumentalities employed or appointed for the salvation of mankind." A nation that can dispense with the christian Sabbath, may be presumed to have made up its mind that God's moral government of the world, including of course the blessing of peace, both domestic and international, can be likewise dispensed with.†

ted for a much longer period than the Assembly, is no slight exposition of the primary intention of the *national* Senate. The adoption of this element in the constitutions of the separate States, and in their federal constitution, appears to have been founded on a conviction that the history of popular views, for a space varying from one to three or four years, is often a very different thing from a history of such views, in the same region, for six or eight years. The mode of election for the national Senate, so as to render it federal in its representation, was a grand conception. But that such was not the germ of the institution, will further appear from the following extract from the Federalist, No. 62, by Mr. Madison:—"Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention, is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended, by the double advantage, of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government, as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems." Had the adopted mode of constituting this branch, been otherwise than "congenial with the public opinion," undoubtedly some other of "the various modes which might have been devised," would have been adopted. So that the *institution* of the Senate was not for a federal end, although its *constitution* is made to answer that end. Moreover, the President of the Senate represents no particular State, being appointed by the people.

† Prizes have been awarded, in England, to Essays on the Sabbath, by working men. Why do not the religious societies, in *France*, make a similar call in a land where it is so much needed? As, however, statistical knowledge, on the subject, is probably small there, it might be expedient to circulate first translations of the English Essays, to familiarize some of the corresponding classes, in France, with the bearings of the subject.

Let us now turn towards England. The English are a people qualified for self-government, which, to a great extent, they already enjoy. They have always had a greater participation than other monarchists in impelling the wheels of government. This, of late years, they have done much more than ever. It has been the wise policy of the government, notwithstanding resistance from a portion of the privileged orders, to do comparative justice to the increasing claims of the people, as regards the extension of constitutional privilege, and a more comprehensive admission to the suffrage. It is in this manner that the order of things is preserved; the only occurring changes being such as harmony requires, though not to the extent required. Concessions have not usually been made when first needed, nor until they have become absolutely indispensable. But the statesmen of England have learnt to apprehend the period when such is the case. Consequently, were England to be threatened with such storms as those to which France is subject, the civilized world may exult in a belief that they would be weathered—and in a way which, to republicans in *this* country, would not appear marvellous. If the popular form of government were ever to become general, its establishment in England would be, probably, without the least bloodshed, when the hour for it might arrive. When self-government is the tendency of a people, a prematurity, in its arrival, is occasioned only by neglect to prepare them for it. The change from a monarchy to a republic, is more simple than is made to appear through the war-notes that have so often ushered the transition. One definition of the change may be this—that the executive ceases to be the head of an aristocracy, and becomes the head of the people. Nor is it so much a change, in the form of government, as in the distribution of the privilege and responsibility of government. So that a government, of which the form is monarchical, may be, essentially, more republican than one of republican name.

We have intimated how unusual it has been for privileged orders to make concessions to the people, till compulsory necessity interposes. But is it right to wait for such a crisis? It is the duty of monarchs and aristocrats to “stand upon their watch, and set them upon the tow-

er, and watch to see"—not what is for their individual or corporate interest, (so regarded,) as being conservative of their monopolized privilege; but *the improvement of the people*, which it is their *mission* to further, and that, with a view to the fitness of the latter for the revocation to the general mass of that which they themselves are holding in trust for that mass. The more absolute the discretion they consider themselves to be armed with, the greater their political and moral obligation to think as for the people, and not as for themselves and their order. If they continue blind to the truth that privilege is a *commission*, they will find themselves, sooner or later, behind their age, and be no longer able to lead it. Were it matter of experience, that the orders of men in question, evinced a consciousness that such is their mission and vocation, there would be unfailing general confidence in them; and if impatience were manifested, it would be of a different kind from that by which society is alarmed.—It would be the popular aspiration of self-adaptation for the enjoyment of the privileges and the exercise of the responsibilities that await them. If there be a distrust of the popular tendency, there may be a no less counter-distrust of the professions of the privileged orders, to be engaged in seeking the national welfare *in their own*.—They must not, like the Jewish Priesthood, consider their rights invaded, because the continuance of their office, which was for the nurture of a nation, until its mind has attained a certain growth, is made a question of. Did they act on correct views of their destiny, the people would rarely fail "to esteem them very highly in love for their works sake, and to be *at peace among themselves*."* It would be injustice to the aristocracy of Great Britain (we exclude that of Ireland from this remark,) to deny their fulfilment, to a grand extent, of the ends for which they have been instituted. After their resignation, in due time, (if such is the appointment by providence,) of the arena which they have historically ennobled, there will be, probably, no *class* of men to whose career history will pay a more grateful tribute. They do not yet, indeed, appear to be impressed with the conditions and limits of

* 1 Thess. v. 13.

their destiny. But the theory of their appointed end, which we have ventured to propound, is an *ideal* of duty, which it must be admitted that human contemplation ordinarily refuses to embrace, and the consequence to privileged orders, by the laws both of nature and of special providence, is repeated alarm from the suppressed, but threatening spirit of mankind, until the final issue, which is thus rendered too commonly an explosion. And yet the popular spirit, now become the world-tendency, only requires, in practice, the substance of the above maxims as its counterpart, in countries where inequality of political privilege obtains. On the confluence or opposition of these impulses, it must depend whether the discontinuance of privileged orders will be an acquiescent absorption of them into that body of mankind, which they have contributed to prepare for these solutions of natural and providential dispensation—or whether it shall be the result only of national convulsions; their failure to anticipate which indicates either the immaturity or dotage of their institution. The fulfilment, by any order of men, in times past, of a purpose gradually expiring, is no argument for its perpetuation. To maintain that whatever is venerable with the hoar of centuries, ought never to be brought to a close in the world, is equivalent to denying the decree of cessation, or of change in the form of existence, to all organizations, even to contending against the dispensation of “a new heaven, and a new earth.”

Among the points comprehended in the general question of internal national peace, is an exaggerated inequality in the distribution of land in some countries. Imagine but two families in a region, typical of the two great divisions of rich and poor, and that which has first occupied claiming the whole, assigning to the other a cave or a cellar, to the limits of which it dutifully submits. Can the increase of this family be bounded by such an allotment? How is it then with what is called an over-populated country, but which only means that there is a part of the population confined to a spot which can scarcely contain it? Does not the nature of things require that the existing principles of allotment shall sooner or later undergo a change? “The earth is the Lord’s, and the fulness thereof.” If the original man was to “multiply, and re

plenish" it, his progeny was, like himself, to have it for a residence, and each individual to have a share in its dominion, though "in the sweat of his face he should eat bread." If there be a portion of mankind for whom there is not space sufficient to enable them by the sweat of their face to eat bread, in their own land, legislation is demanded; not indeed for the spoliation of any party, but either to withdraw the obnoxious legalized principle of agricultural distribution, or, if it be prevalent without legislative enforcement, to provide against its continuance; unless the government can *immediately* convey the destitute to another soil where the sources of comfort and happiness are open to honest industry; that is, *supposing* it justifiable to present that alternative, if a remedy to the domestic evil is otherwise impracticable. No social evil is more liable than this to ultimate retribution, though in a longer run than in the case of others. And it is certain that, but for the ill provision of a vast portion of the human race, wars, both foreign and civil, and rumours of their approach, would find less encouragement on the earth—owing to a diminution of the suggested expediency for them, and of provocation or other incentive to them—owing also to the enhancement of every impulse to their avoidance, as contained in the homestead and its associations, in an increased estimate of life, time, property, and every appendage to which the idea of sacrifice can be attached.

Some notice should be taken of the form which, in confederated republics such as the United States, provocation to civil war would be most likely to assume. These States maintaining, as to their internal economy, a perfect independence of each other, it is essential to general security that no intrusion be menaced on the prerogative of any. A truism as this is abstractedly, it is nevertheless one of those political rudiments that we do well to put one another in mind of. The observance or otherwise of this constitutional tie—and the more independent internally we regard each other, the closer the bond—will be of incalculable effect on the repute of our federal system throughout the world, inasmuch as there is an exhibition hereby of the unlimited extent to which nations may be united by such a tie, without endangering the security of their internal institutions, through that difference in their modes

of thought, which is created by variety in climate, and historical or other associations. Their reciprocal independence should be such as to prevent all liability to collision, respecting local institutions and locally affected interests. They should be, in this respect, as a cluster of trees, which, though combining to produce a shade, do nevertheless, "shun each other's shade,"* when agitated, and thus avoid that entanglement and confusion which might result in disaster to them all. It is only thus that they can grow together, enjoy the same sunshine, and resist the same storms.† If a comprehensive republic, constituted on such a basis, and governed consistently with it, should not endure for ages, it would be because it is too good a system to last long, in a world which has evinced so much predilection for discord and usurpation—too great a blessing for man's perversity to allow it a long residence on the earth.

As to cases of oppression, in which the parties governed feel it a duty to make resistance, the views of an anonymous female writer are very appropriate and forcible:—"The event of a battle is always doubtful; but the opposition of steady persevering non-compliance, no victory can subdue. No man can be literally compelled to obey the commands of another. Would any ruler attempt to invade the liberties of a nation, when he was perfectly assured that all his efforts would be unavailing in producing obedience to his decree, and that, after baffling the last resources of tyranny, resolution would remain as immovable as at the beginning of the contest? It would be like attempting with a knife to cut against the solid rock. Physical resistance is the clash of opposing lances in the tilt yard, where it is an even chance which shall first shiver the other to pieces. Hampden did more for the liberties of his country, when he stedfastly refused to submit to the illegal imposition of twenty shillings, than when he

* Pope.

† This illustration may be profitably amplified. Corruption in a limb of the constitution of one, must be left by the others to be cast off by its own internally prevailing life. The others are not likely to better it by an entangling interference to wrench off the morbid appendage or objectionable feature; in doing which, they may destroy their neighbor and mar themselves.

took up arms in defence of those liberties. And if all Englishmen had been like Hampden, there would have been no Charles to tyrannize, no Cromwell to usurp.*

The observations submitted as above, on some of the means by which civil wars may be prevented, will render more apparent to the friends of peace, the importance of attention to the modes in which liberal principles of government may be recommended with effect, in cases where public security is involved in such questions.

Assuming that the prevailing sentiment of a nation is opposed to war, unless there be a necessity for engaging in it—which is the ground professed to be taken by all the civilized world—is it not clear that the compulsion of *honour* is neutralized by resigning the protection of that honour to a court of nations?† Is not even a prejudicial arbitration more than compensated by the avoidance of those manifold evils, for which the strongest sense of right in a dispute cannot atone to a correct moral sentiment, or to those whose lives or comfort for life, or whose interests and feelings are sacrificed. If these points be conceded, how can any nation hesitate to aim its mightiest moral efforts at procuring the concurrence of other nations, in a scheme by which national complaints may be redressed, and the motives for war superseded, if not extinguished? Independently of the result of such efforts, should a nation fail of success in her appeal to others, would that be a reasonable ground of discouragement from the pursuit of the same end by a solitary renunciation of war? What a glorious example would be the public renunciation of the principle and practice of war, by any nation of character! Who could impugn her honour, in the spirit of the present age, when only an example is required—one, involving not so much forbearance, as moral courage? There is no slight analogy between the hesitation of a nation to risk its repute for warlike courage, and that *formerly* of an individual to face the frown of a society in which the prin-

* From a Peace tract.

† Even the private duellist does not consider his honour to be quite safe in his own hands. He commits it to another party, in plenary confidence. Nor is the position of this party so analagous to that of an advocate, as to that of an arbitrator.

ciples of false honour prevailed. Of the latter kind every instance of moral triumph, publicly exhibited, has aided in raising a battlement for the protection of public virtue. And why may not the example of a nation, particularly one that can shew her scars, be of like moral effect in the community of nations? What nation of any character would assail her? It might be doubted if a nation of *no* character would do so, inasmuch as all value a repute for morality when it has the name of *chivalry*—to which repute such a movement would be fatal, as in a case of aggression on an individual the reverse of combative. Further, as the prevalent idea of the expediency of increasing territorial possessions and other sources of power, would have less scope for its entertainment, if war were renounced, so every nation would be more content with its possessions. Nor would the ebullitions of jealousy be so much intruded, when one State becomes annexed to another for participation in the advantages of a better government afforded by the latter: the motives for confederation would incur less suspicion; federal relations would be established with less hesitation at home and objection abroad, when mutually beneficial: and there would be less obstruction to the formation of separate States out of large territories, where the inhabitants prefer being independent of the government to which they have been subject. If such prospects be *Utopian*, it can only be so in case mankind at large are incapable of any considerable moral elevation.

In as far as special appeal is invited by the occasion, we have more to say of course to our own United States. The idea of "manifest destiny," which many as seriously check as others encourage, we adopt with as much enthusiasm as any—actively as to our national duty to advance the good of mankind at large—passively as to our acquisitions, which depend honorably as much on the will of others, independent of us, as on our own. This nation has but to let events take their course; and if she fulfils the claims of universal humanity upon her, without imposing self-aggrandizing movements on herself, her shadow will be sought after. If she predicts the destiny of other lands to be her possession, why precipitate the

event? "He that believeth shall not make haste."* Again, whatever nations we anticipate as our own, the more we do for their advancement, the more plastic to our influence are they rendered. And it might well operate as a motive to national effort for the universal benefaction of the human race, that we know not how much of it is one day to be our's; for it is important to our interest, that such accessions should be in the most improved condition that can be attained by them in the interval.

Let our policy be that of accomplishing our mission in the cause of human melioration; and if, after proof of this, new States are given to us, they are our reward. But we prejudice results by anticipating the providence that would have invested them with a voluntary character. Whatever ambition may be able to effect out of due course, it will hasten no acquisition that is to be real and permanent enjoyment. The supposition of it is at all events unhistorical. In all our acquisitions, the character of the circumstances through which they have come into our possession should be heedfully scrutinized. If it be matter of necessity that they shall fall to us, as it were in spite of ourselves, we cannot do better than insist, so far as we can, on the mould which the circumstances of our possession shall exhibit—their moral characteristics at least, over which we have some control. No disadvantages need then be apprehended from the enlargement of dominion. There will be little danger of unwieldiness, when the appendages are acquiescent, like naturally developed members, and not like fragments pieced on with a cement of gore, ever subject to the necessity of renewal.

In awaiting with dignified patience the developement of the grand destinies that seem to await our nation, if not prematurely interfered with, it is incumbent on the people, and not less essential to their happiness, to be guarded against the temptations held out to the inferior side of their national character, which, in every nation, is with difficulty counterbalanced by the better side of it—

* Is. xxviii, 16.—There is a reported expression of Rothschild, when asked why a portion of the wealth of his tribe was not appropriated to the purchase of Palestine. "Why purchase, (said he) that which is given to us to possess in due time?"

lest it be drawn out to the fulfilment of much more than they would wish to see on historical record. To wound one neighbour, and to minister balm to another, to bless one and hurt another—whether in public or in private life, in national or individual conduct—spoils the good, and atones not for the evil. Even the nation that does the most for civilization, should look to it, lest she be found to have the most blood-guiltiness in her trail.

The matter of the foregoing observations, though addressed especially to the United States, would be, it is trusted, not an unsuitable offering to the people of every nation under heaven, to whom it were more acceptably presented. Our desires should be far from circumscribed to the glories of the career of our own country. We should desire to see all nations in the enjoyment of the same triumphs, by enlisting in the same cause, which is indeed their calling—*the pacific melioration of mankind, at whatever cost.*

Some of the principles here maintained, shall be briefly applied in a single, and we know not how remote, reference. “England is expected in the East.”* Let her go, wherever invited. Or, if determined to go at *all* events, let her leave sword and spear,† taking with her the ploughshare and the pruning hook, in which she excels even more than in the other weapons. And if that will not secure at least an equal welcome from the natives, it will be evidence sufficient, that she has misapprehended either the field of her mission, or the period for its undertaking. Where it is written—“There go the ships,” &c., it is added “These wait all upon THEE.” And one might as reasonably burden the sacred song with the contemplation of fetters for a slave coast,‡ as with that of weapons

* Warburton—*The Crescent and the Cross*. See also, in Coleridge’s *Friend*, a letter from an American officer.

† We were not a little surprised and disappointed, that Mr. Tupper, in his proposed national anthem for Liberia, should have used such expressions as,

“Come with the trumpet, the sword and the spear,
“For love of liberty brought us here.”

‡ The correspondence of Mr. Wise, the American Minister at Rio, with the British government, concerns every Englishman and American; as it exposes the extent to which American vessels, with British cargoes, are sent on expeditions to barter for slaves.

for destruction. On England's next return, in triumph, from the scenes alluded to, it is devoutly to be wished, that none of her spoils would bear, as formerly, the inscription—"Captured by the British army in Egypt."*

In connection with this reference, it might be inquired of France, whether *her* prospects of being made at home in the East, have been advanced by the nature of the arms she sent across the Mediterranean—*conceding* the propriety of the mission, and the appropriate period for the enterprise. Has she not raised a barrier of steel to her own progress? Does any one doubt that William Penn would have made his way thither, in less time and with less sacrifice, than it will cost *her*, should the least success attend her?

To return to this country—the associations with its apparent destiny—possessed as it is by a branch of the Anglo-Saxon race, are such as to render important an allusion to circumstances that might threaten its progress with a drag. Notwithstanding the vast accessions to its

* This is all the history that is appended to that celebrated *antique*, the Rosetta Stone, in the British museum. From the circumstance that the presents there deposited, are commonly acknowledged, one might, in the absence of better information, suppose that this had not been presented, as it was by the Turkish government, but had been, without scruple, taken from the land of an ally, after being captured from the foe of the latter. It is mentioned, however, in Bonomi and Arnudell's *Gal. Antiq. Brit. Mus.* that "by the fortune of war, and the presentation of the Turks (it) came into the possession of the British government." Also, Long (*Egypt. Antiq.*) refers the British claim to Article 16 of the Convention of Alexandria.—The extent to which *morale* is here involved, is simply this—that the military aspect of the transaction, is considered as solely entitled to consideration, to the exclusion of the legitimate mode in which the treasure was acquired, and the courtesy of the former proprietors as if this was mere form, and as if, in the *vi et armis*, all was contained that could be presumed to interest the reader. Previously to the information imparted by the above named authors, the satisfaction of the present writer, as to the unexceptionable character of the circumstances of possession in question, could only consist of an *inference* from the scrupulous deportment of the British government, with reference to points of this kind, of which the investigation by the committee on the Elgin Marbles, is a strong proof. The circumstance which is the subject of this note, though a small matter in itself, is in keeping with that disposition in the English, often noticed by foreigners, as striking at first sight, and in little congruity with their great pre-eminence in the arts of peace—to give the greatest prominence to naval and military distinction, as proved by the comparatively fewer memorials "erected at the public expense" to those who have advanced their country in other departments.

population from other countries, the Anglo-Saxon is far more than the merely prevailing element among those of which the nation is composed; for it assimilates and nationalizes the others. Considering the high calling of the race, the admixture of others with it, to the present extent, on this continent, is not unlike an election of them by providential favor to engraftment with it. An abuse of this privilege is occasionally threatened by portions of the grafted population having designs extraneous to the country and its interests, and at variance with its historical spirit. If it be not in the power of the rest to deter them from intervention with the political difficulties in their native land, which they are presumed by their present citizenship to have resigned a personal connection with, it is at all events not the interest, any more than it is consistent with the political and moral principles of the rest, to be drawn in any degree into a compromise of their national stand-point and their whole foreign policy, for the gratification of that party. This allusion is obviously to the efforts occasionally made for interesting the people of this country in the affairs of Ireland, to a far greater degree than they were ever invited to interest themselves in those of France. Yet the French element, in our population, is unquestionably more involved in our commercial and other international ties. It is, perhaps, the less participation of the Irish class in those interests, that renders their proceedings thus independent of the consideration of them. It is natural for a man to sympathize with his native land, particularly if he is well acquainted with the history of its trials.* But it is no indication of his regard for the land he has adopted, if

* Aside from the merits of the controversy, between Ireland and England, the great difference in temperament between the people of the two nations—exceeding as it does even the difference that might have been looked for had they been distant in geographical latitude—would sufficiently account for the incessant broils they have, while subject to the same legislation; even as individuals that vary greatly in that respect, rarely comprehend each other's impulses, or do one another justice, and cannot be reconciled to the same social restrictions. The establishment of their separate sovereignty, but in federal union, is all that can keep them in domestic peace. Thus related, it would matter little how their modes of thought differed, so long as they would let one another alone. Such an order of things does not interfere with the question as to the character of the federal executive office, whether it be monarchical or otherwise.

he proposes a compromise of its interests and principles to the passions he has brought with him, though they may be enlisted in a good cause. Even another and very different description of persons, the advocates of universal peace, would not be warranted in the promotion of that cause, did it tend to throw back, in their own country, the interests of humanity. Inasmuch as the Irish question has put forth claims to American *sympathy*, it is but just to raise a collateral question of *reason*, that nullifies its pretensions. It ought not to be lost sight of, that there is admixed with this question the idea of an *anti-Saxon* movement. The drift of this allusion is not to the circumstance of an Anglo-Saxon country, (England,) being the object of this movement, as if such a circumstance should affect the bearing of a just and unobtrusive sympathy; far from it. But where the sympathy is called upon to assume a different character, to subject itself to indefinite demand upon its activity, it is no appeal to prejudice, although a caution against dangerous prepossession, to suggest the tendencies, immediate or remote, of the sympathy invoked. The tendency of the whole scheme of excitement, is to animate the impulses of one-half of the Anglo-Saxon race, now in the world, into a not inactive interest in the domestic insecurity of the other. But the prospects of the entire race, and of the world likewise, can ill afford that loss in progress, which may result from any abatement of the energies of either branch; and if those of the one are of diminished power or compass, through the opposition of forces impelled by the other, those of the latter are ill spent, to say the very least. It is not, indeed, in any *combination*, but in the observance of the most perfect political independence of one another, that the mission of the two branches of this race will be best fulfilled. But that very independence is molested and tampered with, if the parties who are forming projects of intrusion upon the internal peace of the one, have a disproportionate share of moral influence conceded to them in the other. The naturalized parties alluded to, are of course unaware how prejudicial are the movements under objection, to their own national interests as *Americans*, which is all that they have any right to call themselves.

A word or two may be added on the advantage, negative as it is, of the invidious considerations which have attended the intercourse of England and the United States—circumstances not immaterial in qualifying the good understanding between these two nations. Whether we may or may not assume that they have outgrown the likelihood of war with one another, or that the repugnance of national sentiment, in both countries, to such an event, is a more than ordinary security against its occurrence; the usefulness of their mutual petty feelings to the interests of the world, consists in the prevention of certain *enteintes* which might otherwise be anticipated from their affinity. A comparison of this observation, with some that have gone before, if superficially regarded, may seem to create a paradox. Its reference is rather to the prematurity of such *enteintes*—that is, their existence, before the tone of international morality shall have become such as to preclude the idea of their combination to molest the independence of other nations. However they might pride themselves on their aversion to war, and however influenced by a sincere desire to undertake a joint mission to advance the civilization of the world in the most pacific modes, it is too probable that self-gratification would be the predominant impulse. At all events it is a mission with which they can hardly be yet entrusted. Until their governments shall abandon, on principle, the prevailing doctrines on the subject of war, they will be scarcely fit, either of them, for the enjoyment of power, the double of that which already each of them possesses. There is no doubt as to their extending civilization, under such circumstances, with a vastly augmented influence. But whether they would undertake it in any other mode than that which has been hitherto usual among nations, may well be questioned. There can be no danger of misapprehension of the allusion to circumstances invidious in their nature; inasmuch as the remark contains nothing commendatory or congratulatory as touching those circumstances, but simply an explanation of their providential use. There is, indeed, an obvious limit to the utility, or even harmlessness, of an invidious countenance, in either nation, towards the other. There

has been much complaint, in this country, of English travellers traducing it—a practice which cannot gain upon the better feelings of any people. True it is that various States, in the Union, do sometimes speak as prejudicially of *one another* as foreigners ever speak of the entire country; for differences in *latitude* affect the modifications of taste in a much greater degree than those of *longitude*—other circumstances being equal. But variance in tastes, and even jealousies, between different sections of the same country, are not intolerable evils, so long as there is room for them on the same platform.—But a national practice of disparaging another country, is very unfavorable to pacific prospects, however indirect and remote may be the effects from it. Those who conduct the press of a country, since they are always regarded, in other countries, as representing its spirit, should never fail to bear this in mind, characterized, as the press too often is, with a reckless impolicy.*

There would be more security for a cloudless prospect, had England no possessions on this side of the Atlantic. These, all together, are not now worth, to her, the cost of a war (if ever there should be one) to protect them, even were the greatest success to attend her arms. The northern colonies have outgrown their state of pupilage, and can only, in a state of independence, make those returns to the mother country, on account of which their existence is of any consideration to her. As regards the British West Indies, the career of the Anglo-Saxon, *on his own account*, is there manifestly closed. A new crisis in the history of his mission to the African might be hastened, and appears to be the only substitute for the stagnation that now fills every department of life in those

* There was an occasion, about the year 1842, on which the British and French nations were much incensed against each other. Sir Robert Peel, then prime Minister, remarked in Parliament, on the grand moral spectacle, then presented to the world, in which, while the press in both countries was doing its best to precipitate war, the two illustrious chieftains, then contemporaries in political ascendancy, as formerly they had been in military command, (Wellington and Soult,) were using their utmost efforts, each to conciliate the opposite country, and to pacify his own. The observations (which it would have been preferable to quote literally, were they accessible to more than imperfect recollection,) were circulated in several French and American journals.

colonies.* Their independence, or *quasi* independence, under the administration of a Colonization or African society, on one or both sides of the Atlantic, might be guarantied by all nations. Their special protection might be provided for by treaty, including provisions expressly intended for observance in time of war. In the devotion of those scenes to a philanthropic experiment, there would be no scope for international jealousy; at the same time, it is their legitimate destiny. It will be a day of the highest interest to humanity, and the commencement of an important era, in the reign of providence, when the last remains of possibly attractive grounds for collision are removed, between powers whose associate mission is so strongly apparent.

Nor has yet been mentioned that which may be surmised as to the effect of temptations or provocations offered to the weak side of the American character.—Should there be ever again a collision between this nation and one which, in power, may compare with it, let the world, and still more, let ourselves, be prepared for the dire consequences! It is to be apprehended that such a martial spirit would take hold of our people, as would be long before it could subside. An immense portion of our population, conscious of the facilities for their adaptation, on very short summons, to the most arduous enterprises, would (we dread the thought!) sacrifice probably every consideration to that of military glory. The profession of arms can too easily become every man's profession here, to allow a hope of the early termination of a war, in which the utmost strength and spirit of the nation were drawn out. With anything rather than "flattering unction," should we feel imbued, at the contemplation of such a state of things! Besides that a military republic ever ends in despotism—how vitally, if not fatally, would all the arts of peace, the cultivation of every virtue, the sources of domestic and social enjoyment, and every other blessing, be then affected, even in the soil where they have taken root deeply, and which is the home of every element of happiness!

* The present proprietary class, who are ready to abandon at least the island of Jamaica, would be as glad to receive, as they would be (and are even now) entitled to, compensation on yielding up their *lands*.

And now a word to Mexico. Let her sons "talk no more so exceeding proudly,"* as to military pretensions; but let them, influenced by generous woman, and by sunny climes, aspire to become the *Troubadours* of peace. This is the only chance now remaining to them for national distinction. To the women of Mexico, there remains but this step to crown the character that awaits them in history, namely, to cherish this association, and to foster it in their countrymen. An exertion of such influence would be the best commentary on woman's mission, that the world has seen—always excepting that presented by the "company of women,"† who followed to his cross the Prince of Peace. If in your sphere, women of Mexico, you are "to time, as stars to night,"‡ your course is determined on, and the decree is gone forth, that your mission shall not fail!

In conclusion;—We have set before mankind no Utopian prospects as the promised reward for abjuring war—none other than they can substantiate, if they will but commence the project of attaining them. Our ardent hope is that a republic will be the first to adopt measures avowedly for that end, and thus evince to the world how a self-governing people can anticipate others in the race of civilization. But rather than that it should be delayed, let the glory of so doing, be yielded to the most absolute sovereign. Sooner, indeed, than behold this movement retarded, lest civilization should lose the credit of it, gladly should we receive the lesson from the most unenlightened tribe that a missionary ray ever penetrated.¶ There

* 1 Sam. i. 3. † Luke, xxiii. 27. ‡ Pollok.

¶ The Rev. James Long, Missionary of the Church of England in Calcutta, bears this testimony;—"I have seen the benefits conferred by the Peace Society, both at home and abroad; and I regard it as eminently calculated to promote the glory of God, and the good of men. I rejoice to have an opportunity of co-operating, as a clergyman of the English Church, in the designs of so noble and excellent a Society. I have labored among the Hindoos for eight years, a large number of whom have renounced idolatry, and are fully acquainted with English literature; but *their greatest objection to the reception of Christianity is the warlike spirit manifested by those who profess it.* They read the history of England, and then tell us, "You say that Jesus Christ taught his disciples to love their enemies; but we find that you English Christians have been engaged for hundreds of years in killing the French, and other nations! Your history abounds with scenes of blood, which are approved of by your best and even your religious writers, while your clergy offer thanks to God, as if he were a God of blood, like our Kale, when you

is hope for the world, both civilized and barbarian. Notwithstanding the backwardness of each, an estimate of universal peace is abroad, adequate to encourage a very great confidence in the effect of a *single national example* of the nature we plead for—the abjuration of war. Gratefully, as we believe, would the tidings of such an event fall on the ear of a vast portion of mankind, in all lands. Whether we set or follow the example, the advantage to our representatives, everywhere, commercial, political and religious, when able to tell it abroad that no wars are waged by their countrymen, would surpass the most glowing descriptions of national success in any past enterprises; and the moral effect would be but feebly symbolized by the transmutation of steel into gold. Glorious things await such a nation in the prospective history of the human race. If internal peace is maintained by her consistently with her external banner, both the wise and the rich of the earth will, in greater and greater numbers, “bring their glory and honour into her.”* Her converse with other nations will disperse the flowers of goodwill “beside all waters”†—a circling tie more soft, yet not less strong, than that “golden chain” in which “generous commerce binds the nations.”‡ The picturesque distributions of society by Providence, have certainly no less claim than the disposition of the natural world, to be accounted as the pattern of a more excellent economy. For eminence in eternal fame will be the endless reflection of moral light from the associated past and present. And as the works of individuals accompany them from the present stage of being, yea, have recorded themselves forever, it cannot be otherwise with nations. Their past is inextinguishable. A memorial is engraven forever of the part which they have had in the elevation or depression of the human race. “Rahab and Babylon, Philistia, and Tyre;

gain a battle.” They say, moreover, that since England put her foot in India, a century ago, there has been nothing but war; and I am sorry to say I cannot contradict them. This objection to the reception of Christianity is the most difficult to answer of any I have to deal with. I have for twelve years been advocating the principles of this Society; and as long as I have breath and strength, I will continue to advocate them.”

* Rev. xxii, 24.

† Isaiah, xxxii, 20,

‡ “———Generous commerce binds

The round of nations in her golden chain.”—*Thompson.*

with Ethiopia"—are *they* not to be "made mention of?" Let us not doubt, then, of this sequel to our country's history, whether to its glory or to its shame. Nor let us cease to contemplate that a nation which will cultivate in itself a type of the City of Peace, it will be a future delight to call our own in the days of a renovated world; for it will be commemorated that "this and that man was born in her!"*

Samuel C. Pharr ARTICLE II.

"CHRISTIAN PRINCIPLE IN RELATION TO MENTAL CULTURE." *A discourse to the graduating class of Wesleyan University, (Conn.) July, 1848. By the Rev. STEPHEN OLIN, D. D.*

The above discourse has been recently published in the form of a volume, and as we believe the truths which it enforces to be of the highest importance to students of theology and ministers of the Gospel, we would call the attention of the reader to the subject of which it treats. We are truly gratified to be able to state that a production of this stamp, and on this subject, has emanated from such a source: 1st. because it is a virtual acknowledgment, on the part of a denomination that did not formerly set a very high value on education, of the importance of giving to candidates for the ministry all the advantages of a full course of literary and theological instruction; 2d. because it is evident that the author himself has been governed by the principles which he recommends, and for this reason he is capable of delineating their legitimate influence on the mental powers. We would fain hope that the full force of the truths which are illustrated and enforced in this little volume, is appreciated and felt by all students whose minds have been enlightened with divine wisdom. At the same time, however, it is to be feared that, like all truths of a moral nature, they are

* Ps. lxxxvii, 5.

questioned by many who have never thoroughly investigated them. Even pious and devout students may forget that "Christian is the highest style of man," and may be tempted, like Nehemiah, to desist from the work in which they are engaged, or to prosecute it from unworthy and unscriptural motives. Possessing, as we do, the power of comparing modern and ancient literature, we cannot fail to discover the exalted and superior character of the incentives and motives which the christian religion has furnished for the cultivation and refinement of the human intellect. Whoever stands on the peak of a lofty mountain, should not look merely at the gold which the morning sun showers on the earth or pours at his feet, but he should also, sometimes, look into the deep valley where the shadows still rest, that he may realize that the sun is indeed a sun. It is right for the philosopher of this century to cast a retrospective glance at the exploded dogmas of a less liberal age, that he may duly appreciate the rapid advancement of the science to which he has devoted the health and vigor of his mind. He will soon perceive that philosophy, modified and improved by the genius and untiring labors of Bacon, has risen from a region of inferior grade to a state of comparative perfection. It is proper for the fearless mariner to recur to the time when vessels were compelled to coast along the shore, and when a voyage of three hundred miles, across a lake, was sufficient to astonish the gods themselves. Not till then will he be sensible, in a proper degree, of the important uses of the compass—the sailor's guide and friend. The needle, ever faithful to the pole, will correctly indicate the direction in which the vessel is sailing, though the sun were totally eclipsed, or the heavens clothed in the sable garments of night. It is important and salutary for the divine, from the kingdom of light, to cast forth a glance over the dark stage where men have played their part in lonely gloom, without a Saviour, without a God. In this way he is speedily convinced that man, in his fallen state, is a complication of intellectual and moral ailments that are at war with one another, and with God. Sin has disturbed and confounded the harmony that once existed; it has, to such an extent, deranged man's intellectual and moral system, that he has lost sight of the great end of

his existence, and remaining as he is, is unhappy, lives to no good purpose, and dies in despair. In like manner, it may be proper and useful for the student of literature to take a brief survey of its earlier ages, that he may realize the superior advantages which we enjoy for the cultivation of the mind ; and that he may also deduce from the comparison, our corresponding obligations to advance the cause of education, and raise the standard of its excellence. We are aware of the censure which we would incur by speaking in disparaging terms of the merits of ancient authors, and by saying that their literature was, in the least degree, defective. The fond admirers of sweet and elegant Homer, the Asiatic eloquence of Cicero, the wit of Horace, and the sarcasm of Juvenal, however they may differ in other respects, would cheerfully unite in administering a severe rebuke for any attempt to undervalue such finished specimens of taste, and so perfect models of style. But as we do not intend to detract from the merit of ancient genius, we shall expect the indulgence of its advocates, whilst, after a few desultory remarks, we shall endeavor to prove that ancient uninspired literature is destitute of an element—the absence of which is an essential defect,—a well founded assurance of immortality, and an abiding sense of moral accountability.

In examining the human constitution, we may discover, in a short time, that wicked men are under the control of wild and extravagant passions. The fountain of action is depraved ; the motives are impure. Although many are endowed with amiable and lovely dispositions, have acquired attractive and fascinating manners, and have embellished their minds with whatever is useful and admired, so that they are as eminently qualified as the Lady of the Lake to be the “leading stars of every eye ;” they are still governed by emotions and feelings which need only to be awakened and developed to illustrate their evil nature, and their pernicious tendency.—These passions of our nature are like the restless fires of a volcano, and will occasionally give indications of a commotion within. The cup of our felicity, composed of as delicate and sensitive materials as the fabled glass of antiquity, will as readily detect any uncongenial ingredients, and as soon as they are discovered, will as surely

break into a thousand fragments. So long as the intellect is controlled by evil influences, it must necessarily be unfit for making rapid advances in knowledge. But where the religious element has been introduced—where the influence of the Bible has been acknowledged and felt, and especially where it has taken a deep and permanent hold on the powers of the soul, its restless desires are subdued into harmony and peace; and the mind, released from the fetters of passion, will ascend on a pinion bolder than that of the eagle, and as it soars towards the pinnacle of the temple of truth, will perceive at one and the same glance the comparative insignificance of external enjoyments, and the paramount importance of adorning the soul with the jewels of wisdom and knowledge. The raging waters have been pressed with the Saviour's feet, and gently stilled into peace. Thus tranquillized and calmed, the intellect is more capable of acquiring a knowledge of those duties and studies to which it may be directed. But there is yet another advantage. Deeply impressed with a sense of the brevity of life, we improve with diligence the golden opportunities that we enjoy, and the shining hours of our limited existence on earth. In regard to the value of time, we cherish the sentiment which glowed in the breast of the Roman conqueror, when he exclaimed, in useless regret, "I have lost a day." No longer do we throw away the golden sands of the hour-glass of life. We esteem time as the most precious of all temporal gifts.

"Time the supreme,—time is eternity;
Pregnant with all eternity can give;
Pregnant with all that makes archangels smile.
Who murders time crushes in the birth
A power ethereal, only not adored."

Whoever sets so high a value on time will be stimulated, of course, to the cultivation of his intellectual as well as moral powers. The precious and rapidly passing hours that were literally wasted by a Pope and a Byron, in excesses of different kinds, were redeemed with unremitting assiduity by a White and a Doddridge. Whilst the former were willing slaves of despotic passions, and desired to live that they might continually indulge them, the latter, being delivered from such a yoke of tyranny, and

realizing the shortness of the time allotted to their exertions, successfully employed it in the cultivation of their minds, and in ameliorating the condition of their fellow-men. The thought that, for every inch of life, we will be called to account in the day of judgment, is an additional incentive, of great weight, to the improvement of our talents and privileges. In short, wherever a sense of moral accountability has been deeply felt, the inducements to mental exertion have been proportionally augmented.

We are now prepared to enter on the proof, that this salutary impression has never been produced on the minds of men, by the writings of uninspired antiquity. In no heathen work, however finished the style and splendid the diction, will you find the truth proclaimed with an authority which cannot be impeached, that after we shall "have shaffled off this mortal coil" there will be a state of endless existence, where rewards will be bestowed, and punishments inflicted. If no such doctrine can be discovered in the works of the most learned heathen, which treat of the subject, it is but fair and logical to infer that they knew nothing of it. It will not be denied that they had some ideas respecting a future state; but these were so vague and indefinite, that they exerted no influence on their character and life. That they were in great darkness on this subject, can be proved from their own confessions. Many ingenious theories were formed and propagated among them, but the most plausible and consistent entirely failed of affording to anxious minds that degree of satisfaction and assurance which they demanded. Speaking of the distribution of rewards and punishments, the learned Plato very candidly remarks: "to determine any thing certain, with regard to this matter, in the midst of so many doubts and speculations, is the work of God only." In his *Phædo*, one of the speakers says to Socrates, concerning the immortality of the soul, "I am of the same opinion with you, that, in this life, it is either absolutely impossible or extremely difficult to arrive at a clear knowledge of this matter." After Socrates had taken the fatal hemlock, he delivered to his disciples an affecting farewell discourse, which he closes in the following remarkable language: "I am now going out of the world, and you are to continue in it, but which

of us has the better part is a secret to every one but to God."* Cicero has ever been regarded as one of the most eminent philosophers who argued for the immortality of the soul, and even he, having enumerated several opinions, expresses his anxious doubts by saying, "which of these is true is known only to God, and which is the most probable is a very hard question."† It was with good reason, then, that Seneca declared that immortality was rather hoped than proved by these great men. Neither were the ancient poets more clear and definitive in their views, on this subject, than those whose names have just been recited. Catullus complains that though the sun and moon and stars may set and afterwards rise, and move with silent grandeur in the "*primum mobile*" of the heavens, yet the grave will be the final resting place of our spirits, and perpetual darkness will veil our eyes :

*Soles occidere et redire possunt;
Nobis, quum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.*

Another poet appears to envy the plants and flowers their renewed existence :

"Alas! the tender herbs and flowery tribes,
Tho' crushed by winter's unrelenting hand,
Revive and rise when vernal sephyr's call.
But we, the brave, the mighty and the wise,
Bloom, flourish, fade and fall, and then succeeds
A long, long, silent, dark, oblivious sleep;
A sleep which no propitious power dispels,
Nor change of seasons, nor revolving years."‡

We might easily enlarge the number of quotations on this subject, but we hope that these we have cited will be abundantly sufficient to show that the light of nature alone can never *assure* any one of immortality beyond the tomb. Neither can it assure us that we are accountable beings.

In consequence of their uncertainty in regard to these points, we need not be surprised at learning that ancient philosophers and poets cultivated their minds for the sake of gratifying their taste, and acquiring the applause, and some claims to the munificence, of the rich and the noble.

* Dick's Theology, vol. 1, p. 28, et seq. † Cicero Tusc. Quæst. Lib. 1.

‡ Moschus, Epitaph Bion.

As soon as the love of letters declined, or Mæcenæus frowned, these parasitical poets lost their highest incentives to the improvement of their minds. They were not favored with an assurance of immortality and moral accountability, and were, therefore, destitute of the greatest stimulus to mental exertion. They knew nothing of the great law of responsibility which furnishes a motive of great and ever living efficacy—and we might safely say, the most powerful of all motives to intellectual improvement. Had they possessed a tithe of the knowledge of these subjects which God hath revealed to us, their celebrated works—well worthy of imitation and reverence in many respects—would have exerted a more healthful influence over the nations, and would have preserved their own governments from gradual decline and final ruin.—If the Athenians had been fully aware of what we now regard as a common doctrine, they would have spent their time more profitably than in hearing or telling some new thing; and had Roman orators and statesmen been governed by the dictates of conscience, enlightened by the word of God, they would never have sacrificed their lives and their country on the altar of unhallowed ambition. The famous authors, whose works are now admired by every man of literary taste, would have studied and written *from principle*. The applause of the learned, and the splendid presents of the rich, would not have been their chief objects.

We can never be too grateful for the blessed Gospel which “has brought life and immortality to light.” In this book we are informed, by him “who cannot lie,” that our souls are immortal—that they are rapidly hasting to heaven or to hell,—that, on a certain day, we shall “all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, and receive according to deeds done in the body.” These weighty truths have found a lodgment in the minds of our most intelligent, enterprising and industrious citizens. The legitimate effects can soon be told. We are in the midst of a wonderful and a wonder working age. Books can be had without number, and almost without price. The press groans under a heavy load of literary wealth.—And not only so, but in other departments of labor we discover the same spirit of enterprise and improvement.

An element which we once beheld without interest is now applied to propel a train of cars. The electric fluid which once served only to amuse us with its beautiful coruscations, or to appal us by its desolating crash, has now submitted to the puissance of mind, and carries commercial news of the greatest importance, as well as the high behests of legislative halls.

A casual reference to Italy, Spain and other countries, in which the Gospel has not obtained free circulation, will be sufficient to convince every unbiassed mind, that it is to the Bible we are indebted for our free institutions, our civil and religious privileges, and all our opportunities of developing and improving our intellectual powers. It is the Bible that has given them to us, and we trust in the principles and spirit of the Bible to preserve them for us, and transmit them unimpaired to the latest posterity. Unless the star of Bethlehem rule the ascendant, we cannot be long either a free or an improving people.

Since God has condescended to reveal, in a clear and authoritative manner, those doctrines and truths of which the most cultivated intellect in the heathen world was grossly ignorant, we should carefully inform our minds concerning them, and permit them to exert a due influence on our character and conduct. Believing the assertions of divine revelation, we should be governed and controlled by them. We should permit invisible things to exert the same influence over our thoughts and words and actions, as if they were immediately before our natural eyes. Every addition to our stock of knowledge brings with it an obligation to improve it to the best advantage. Every new truth, revealed from heaven, should be permitted to play its part in the formation of character, and in developing our energies, and in directing our exertions for the promotion of the divine glory. If this were more frequently the case, we should see more examples of the power of Christian principle in relation to mental improvement. The student would realize his solemn and responsible position, the shortness of life, and his accountability to a high and impartial tribunal, from which no appeal can lie. On this subject the remarks of Dr. Olin are very judicious and forcible, and we think they will amply repay the reader for the time he may spend in perusing them :

"The student occupies a high and holy trust. By diligence and fidelity in his work, he augments forever his own powers of happiness and usefulness. He augments the means of happiness entrusted to him for human society. He augments his own capacity for knowing, enjoying and honoring God. Shall it be thought a slight offence to prove false to such strong obligations? Shall the man who perverts influence, or squanders wealth, or violates a public trust, be deemed culpable; and is he innocent who robs himself and society and God, of talents put into his hands not to be buried or wasted, but to be improved to the utmost? Surely if God will judge the world in righteousness, and with a rigorous impartiality demand His own, with usury, from every one, the inquisition will press hard upon those who are accused of wasting the most precious of their Lord's goods—the immortal mind—made to appreciate his character and promote his glory. Upon every student rests this fearful responsibility; and every Christian student will recognize and respect it with a degree of solemn earnestness proportioned to his intelligence and piety. He will feel that he is not his own—that his talents and opportunities are only his to improve and employ conscientiously, and to account for in the last day. Under such convictions he can neither idle nor trifle. He will find in them a sleepless, faithful monitor to rebuke away indolence and apathy; to whisper hope and heroism into his fainting spirit; to prescribe temperance in all things; to endow his hours with such a sanctity that it would be sacrilege to waste them; to give law to his resting, his rising, and his recreation; to invoke his profounder respect for statutes and usages established for the maintenance of needful order, and for the protection against all intrusion on time consecrated to study. Such is the natural and actual influence, so far as conscience has fair play, which religion exerts over intellectual improvement."

It would be a source of unfeigned pleasure to all Christians, to believe that these principles are reduced into practice by our young men in colleges and seminaries, and also by ministers of the Gospel. But we are forced, by observation, to agree with the author, when he says that "not a few nominally Christian students are neither industrious nor law abiding; and many cease to be students as soon as they are fairly launched on the voyage of life. They are at the zenith of their greatness at thirty or thirty-five. A modicum of professional lore, a poor pittance of theology, a petty curriculum of pulpit preparation, is all they ever add to the measure of attainments

with which they enter on active life." A remedy for this defect is certainly to be desired, and Dr. Olin has ventured to prescribe one :

"So far as these strictures are applicable to Christian scholars, the evil ought to find its cure in their conscientiousness, and their zeal to obtain the highest qualifications for usefulness. To these moral influences we are indebted for a majority of the examples of literary industry and excellence that still exist among us. A considerable number of clergymen, especially, retain their habits of careful study and mental activity to advanced age. It must be confessed, however, that as a class they are far from guiltless of the short comings on which we have ventured to comment."

These last remarks are well adapted to excite ministers of the Gospel to greater diligence and zeal in their high and holy work. This is an age in which superior qualifications are required. The increasing intelligence of our citizens, and the prevalence of errors, demand a corresponding degree of learning and aptness to expose the fallacies and effects of heresy. The admitted fact that we are entirely dependent on the Holy Spirit for success in labor, does not, in the least, supersede the necessity of diligence and perseverance in the use of means. —The man of God should be "thoroughly furnished" in head as well as in heart. —The motives of the holy religion, which he recommends to others, are sufficiently strong to incite *him* to more abundant labors, more self-denial, and more intense study of the Bible.

Moreover, if the Bible presents such strong and effective inducements to intellectual exertion, its truths should be taught to the children of the church. Parochial schools should be universally established, and strongly encouraged ; in which the youthful mind would be trained, at the forming period of life, under the influence of these lofty, pure and holy motives. And when our blessed Lord shall take them into the arms of His love, and breathe on them His Spirit, and consecrate them to His own work, they will be properly qualified to lead the way and allure the impenitent to brighter worlds. And when their work shall have been accomplished, and their bodies committed to the silence of the grave, a still greater number will succeed and be baptized for the dead, who, in

like manner, will sing the praises and publish the Gospel of the Redeemer.

ARTICLE III.

CHURCH AND STATE.

Alliance between Church and State. By WILLIAM WARBURTON, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester.

Lectures on the Establishment and Extension of National Churches. By THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D. L. L. D.

The State in its relations with the Church. By W. E. GLADSTONE, ESQ.

The Principles of Church Reform; The State and the Church; with other Essays. By THOMAS ARNOLD, D. D.

Essay on the Union of Church and State. By BAPTIST W. NOEL, M. A.

The subject discussed in these works is not one in which the people of this country are immediately and practically interested. The entire separation of the Church from the State was one of the most sublime, as it has proved one of the most successful, experiments of the American Revolution. And though among the problems in political science which have been solved by our national career, this perhaps has received the least consideration from statesmen, both at home and abroad; yet surely no other has worked out larger results, or been conducted to a more favorable issue. It may be doubted whether any question of a political, social or religious nature can be raised, upon which, as a people, we are more perfectly agreed than this. Amidst all the clashings of party politics, and all the jarrings of denominational strife, there is not probably one sincere Protestant among the twenty millions of our population, whether native-born or naturalized, who would consent to the establishment of a National Church.

We have spoken of the divorce between Church and State as an experiment : it is interesting to observe the necessity under which it was attempted, and which was itself no inconsiderable pledge of success. The statesmen of 1776 were no visionary constitution-mongers, like those who are now attempting to fit capricious France to a political costume ; nor were they restless radicals, pulling down existing institutions to make room for model governments of their own invention. The republican form of government which they adopted was fully as much a necessity with them as a choice. The controversy with England was not begun for republicanism, though it ended in it : monarchy was not so much repudiated as liberty was sought. It is highly probable that if any branch of the royal family had resided in this country, and had sympathized with the passionate struggle of a young nation to be both great and free, the conservative spirit of our forefathers would have led to the establishment of monarchy upon these republican shores. But Providence had ordained that a palpable advance should be made, at this time, in the progress of mankind to liberty. There was no titled class, having the prestige of nobility and rank, from which a monarch could be chosen ; and the statesmen of this period dwelt too much in the light of past history not to know the impossibility of lifting a single family from the uniform level of society to permanent presidency over the rest. They were too well skilled in political science not to be aware that the wide interval between the commonalty and the throne must be filled with an intermediate class, who should render the ascent less abrupt and precipitous. In all countries, a dignified and time-honored aristocracy must be found underlying and supporting every throne. All these conditions of monarchy failing, our forefathers showed their practical wisdom in striking the golden mean between the radicalism which invades and overturns only for the sake of remodelling, and that fatal conservatism which, in its blind attachment to inheritance and prescription, resists the progress which it should aim to guide. They did not change the whole political fabric "from turret to foundation-stone ;" but only so far as the pressure of events imperiously called for. As the people were *de facto* sovereign, their sovereignty was acknowledged ; and

yet the country was saved from the savage rule of unlicensed democracy by the establishment of a great confederated republic, with its written constitution, and all those checks and balances which can be furnished in two deliberative chambers, the presidential veto, and State sovereignty.

Precisely by the same necessity which caused monarchy, with its hereditary nobility, to resign to primitive republicanism, did the established Church likewise disappear. Bishop Warburton, among his other splendid fictions of original compacts and treaties of alliance, imagines the State coolly to choose between existing religions (though he maintains that policy should always dictate the selection of the largest); we nevertheless take leave to say that this prudential balancing of conflicting claims never has been, and never shall be, realized. Before a Church can be established by law, it must embrace the overwhelming majority of the population—it must be interwoven with their most pleasing associations—it must enjoy the prestige of a long antiquity. At the period of the revolution, no one Church possessed any of these requisites. Dissent had previously won its way in those countries from which our population was mainly supplied; and the Churches which had sprung up and grown under the very frown of existing establishments, were transplanted here side by side. There was clearly the same impossibility, under the circumstances, that any one of these should take such precedence of the rest as to be established by law, as that a single family should achieve and entail a perpetual dictatorship. There was no alternative but to throw off all alike from any connexion with the State; that no longer sucking the breasts of kings they should live and grow by their own inherent vitality. The wisdom of our ancestors consisted in seeing at a glance the peculiarity of their position—in waiving instantly all prejudices arising from education and habit—in seizing upon the true idea which alone could be realized—and in boldly cutting off what no conservatism could retain. The question of an established Church, like that of a monarchical government, was decided by them not upon abstract principles, however these may now be adduced to justify their decision; but for political reasons, which nevertheless impelled them in the right direction.

But while the controversy upon Church establishments is no longer one which touches our fortunes as a people, there are yet two reasons which invest it with a permanent interest to us. The first is, that it is so closely interwoven with all the questions of European politics; and at no period more than the present prominently engaging the attention of statesmen. The late secession of the Free Church from the establishment of Scotland, under the guidance, to a very great extent, of one who not ten years before was known as the special defender of this policy—and the more recent secession of individuals from the English establishment, as of Mr. Noel and Mr. Shore, together with the treatment they have received from Bishops and Bishop's Courts—are events not easily hidden from the eyes of men. And when, as in England and in Scotland, the dissenters of all classes perhaps outnumber the established, the question cannot always slumber in the recesses of men's thoughts, but will be raised with a view to be answered, how long a union so distasteful shall be perpetuated. It is impossible, therefore, without some knowledge of this subject, to understand the politics of Europe generally, and of the British empire in particular: and to gain this knowledge we must enter somewhat into the opinions and feelings of those who are attached to the policy we have so long discarded. The second reason is, that some topics involved in this controversy we do not ourselves understand as fully as may be necessary. As champions of the voluntary principle, having faith in it to reduce it into practice, it becomes us, for our own credit and for the good of mankind, to guard against dangers which tend to prejudice our favorite theory in the minds of others.

No one can read the above works in the order in which they are arranged, which is indeed only the order of their chronology, without observing the manifest alteration in their tone; a change which is deeply significant of the progress which dissent has made. A progress slow indeed and gradual; but which indicates at every step an immense accession of strength, and a permanency of power not likely to be subject to material fluctuations. If the bearing of an army ever afforded presage of defeat, the altered tone of these advocates clearly prefigures the

doom which they in vain strove to avert. Warburton, the first in the series, takes hold of the subject not only with the composure of a man who knows his own strength, but with the confidence of one secure of general sympathy, and scarcely repressing contempt for his foes. At that day, few serious persons comparatively objected to the establishment on religious grounds; and the battle was waged chiefly against sceptics, who fancied that by this avenue the bulwarks of Christianity could be stormed. Warburton conducts his argument, therefore, with all the clearness, skill, and power for which he is so justly famed; but blurting out occasionally his invectives against the free-thinkers, who seemed to serve for him the office of a court fool to be perpetually bantered. According to his theory, the State and the Church are originally both independent and sovereign societies; having different ends in view, and hence not clashing, although the same persons may be under the jurisdiction of both. The office of the State is to provide for the *temporal* interests of man; that of the Church, for his *eternal* interests—the care of the one is confined to the *body*; that of the other is directed to the *soul*—the one looks upon offences as *crimes*; the other takes cognizance of them as *vices* and as *sins*. He next shows that civil society labors under certain defects for the attainment of its ends; it can only restrain from open transgression, nor always from this without opening the way to crimes still more flagitious; it cannot enforce the duties of imperfect obligation; and further often inflames the appetites which it proposes to correct. Now religion, having the sanction of rewards, while civil government has only that of punishments, exactly supplies these defects; and so the Church becomes necessary, as a complement to the State. The latter, therefore, proposes to the former a union for their mutual benefit; and this amalgamation is termed ‘an alliance,’ to indicate the original sovereignty of the parties. By this alliance, the State pledges itself to endow, protect and extend the Church; and the Church, to lend her whole influence to the State. The reciprocal concessions are that the Church resigns her supremacy by constituting the civil ruler her supreme head, and by submitting her laws to the State’s approval: and the State in compensation gives

to the Church a coactive power for the reformation of manners, and secures her a seat and representation in the national council. The motives which prompt the State to offer, and the Church to accept, these conditions, are that thereby the purity and being of religion are preserved, additional reverence is bestowed upon the person of the magistrate and upon the laws of the land, the Church obtains a coercive power which does not belong of nature to her, and the State is guarded against the mischiefs arising from the original independence of the Church in relation to it. The Church thus established is protected from the assaults of every rival by test-laws, designed only for restraint, and not for punishment; and beyond which a full toleration is indulged to every sect.

This is Warburton's ideal of Church and State. Not that it is the actual process by which the union was effected; but the theory upon which it may be justified.—He is warmly censured by Gladstone, for not recognizing the State as a moral person, having a conscience, and immediately responsible to God. Especially his selection of the largest religious society, rather than the truest and best, as the ally of State, is denounced as sordid calculation. By this same writer, and afterwards by Dr. Arnold, he is also rebuked for taking too low a view of the State, in restricting its office to material and temporal ends. Yet despite these criticisms, Warburton's theory appears to us the most consistent and defensible of all that we have considered. There are, however, very grave difficulties in his scheme, which go far to vitiate it. We may admit, for example, that the State is defective in power to enforce certain duties, and that religion exactly supplies this deficiency; but it is surely a wide leap to infer from this the necessity of an established Church. If we grant the Church to be needed as the external organ, through which this influence of religion shall be exerted, will she not be equally effective in her separate sphere? From her very nature, it is hard to see how the Church shall supplement the State, save as she teaches men their duties, puts a police into every man's breast by arraigning transgressors before the tribunal of conscience, and enforces her teachings and warnings by the awful sanctions of the eternal world. But all these offices she may discharge with

equal if not with greater effect, being disestablished. If she has more power than this, after her connexion with civil government, it is not power which she brings with her, but which she receives from the State; and it seems a vicious circle, to bring the Church to remedy the State's defects, and yet in rendering this service, derive from the State her whole efficiency. If, on the other hand, the Church exerts an influence, simply as she embodies and teaches religion, the State may lose rather than gain, by selecting only one religious society as its ally; while it is the province of each to furnish its quota.

It will also strike religious minds very strangely, that this alliance is necessary in order to preserve the purity and even the being of religion in the world. Hardly less monstrous is the proposition that the State cannot effectually protect itself in any other way, from the mischiefs arising from the Church's independency. We should rather expect a dignitary of the Church to teach that her life is derived alone from her spiritual Head, and to remember the promise which that Head has given, "because I live ye shall live also." As to the maintenance of purity, history would rather teach that the Church has always lost, in this particular, just in proportion as she has become Erastian. But we are concerned, at present, only with the inconsistencies of Warburton's theory as such. If the Church exists as a society, independent of the State, it must be by a life of her own; but to make the perpetuation of this life depend upon union with a foreign body, is simply to deny that inherent life which has just been affirmed. It is a main pillar of his argument, likewise, that these sovereign and separate societies do not clash, simply because they compass different ends by different means. If so, whence arise those mischiefs which the State dreads from the separate action of the Church? Surely the legs of this theory are not equal.

What too does Bishop Warburton mean when he teaches that the State cannot offer protection to the Church, except by compact? "The State," he says, "could not justly offer this benefit, security from all exterior violence, had an alliance never been made."* If this protection be

* Alliance between Church and State, vol. 7, works.

only a protection in the monopoly of chartered privileges, it is certainly true that it will depend upon a given contract to that effect. But, then, the main thing to be proved, is whether any Church can be justly secured in the enjoyment of such benefits; and whether the State, in departing from its province, has not become an instrument of oppression to those whom the establishment may exclude. If, on the other hand, the "exterior violence" arises not from rival religions, but simply refers to wrongs which the Church may experience from society at large, surely the State cannot withhold its protection from the Church, more than from any other corporation having vested rights. This would militate against his theory, which makes it the sole business of the State proper to give security of temporal liberty and property.

We add but one item further to this running criticism upon Bishop Warburton. He makes it a main advantage accruing from the alliance, that the Church gains a coercive power for the reformation of manners. But is the Church, as a separate society, devoid of discipline and of sanctions? Has she not the right, inherent in every society, of expelling unworthy members from her fellowship? And has she not spiritual penalties with which to support her jurisdiction, graduated from this excommunication down to the mildest form of censure? As a spiritual society, ought she ever to employ any other than a spiritual discipline? And have the civil pains and disabilities, which she borrows from the State, ever strengthened her rule over the conscience, or even over the conduct of men? After all, too, there is no real reformation of manners effected by the Church, save by her doctrines and her purifying influence: in proportion as she is pure, does her influence ramify itself, by means of her members, through all the departments of society. She not only needs not, but is seriously injured by that coercive power derived from the State, for which Bishop Warburton so strenuously argues.

Dr. Chalmers drew his pen to defend Church establishments against a different class of objectors from those opposed by the preceding writer. Religious men, who loved the cause and truth of God, had come to be scandalized at the corruption and slavery of a thoroughly

Erastianized Church. Dr. Chalmers undertook to reduce the idea of an establishment to such simplicity as would seem to meet the scruples of the most conscientious.

In his view, an established Church is simply an endowed Church. Take the following language from his first lecture :

"We shall assume, then, as the basis of our definition for a religious establishment, or as the essential property by which to specify and characterize it,—a sure legal provision for the expense of its ministrations. * * * * * Wherever we have a certain legal provision for the ministrations of Christianity, there we have an establishment of Christianity in the land. It is this which forms the essence of an establishment ; and as such, must be singled out from among all the other accessories wherewith it may happen to be variegated. This idea of an establishment may or may not imply what is commonly meant by a connexion between the Church and the State. If it be the State which maintains the Church, we admit that there is such a connexion—whether this maintenance be their ancient and original gift ; or a grant renewed every year, and which may or may not be recalled by the civil government. But the truth is, the maintenance may have originated in other sources—in the bequest of individuals, or numerous private acts of liberality : in our eyes it is not less an establishment on this account, than if supported by a direct allowance from the national treasury. To realize our idea of an establishment, it is enough that there be legal security for the application of certain funds to the maintenance of Christian worship or Christian instruction in a country ; and this in whatever way these funds may have originated."

This is not the first instance in which a stupendous system of economics has been built upon a pun ; nor the first instance in which a worthless argument has escaped exposure by sheltering itself under a great name. On this subject, the term "established" has a fixed meaning, involving two ideas : that of patronage on the part of the State, and submission on the part of the Church. Dr. Chalmers, by a slight play upon words, changes at once the nomenclature, and with it the whole issue, of this controversy. The object of this clever legerdemain is very apparent : no person objects, on principle, to a certain provision being made for the support of religion, nor indeed to a special fund to endow the Church for this purpose ; although the expediency of such a measure may be ques-

tioned by many. And if this view could be taken of Church establishments, much suspicion and odium would be removed. This, then, is the establishment for which he pleads: a Church endowed by the State, but left wholly independent of the same:

“Although,” he argues, “the Church should be wholly supported by the State in things temporal, and a connexion between them be established thus far, it follows not that this connexion should proceed any further. * * * Although the Church should receive its maintenance, and all its maintenance from the civil power, it follows not that it therefore receives its theology from the same quarter. * * * The Church receives from the State the maintenance of its clergy; and the clergy, in return, give to the subjects of the State a Christian education; but they might and do reserve to themselves the whole power and privilege of determining what that education shall be. For their food and their raiment, and their sacred or even private edifices, they may be indebted to the State; but their creed, and their discipline, and their ritual, and their articles of faith, and their formularies, whether of doctrine or of devotion, may be altogether their own. * * * The Church may submit herself so far to the State as to receive this maintenance, and yet abide as spiritual, as holy and independent a Church as before.”

Even philosophers indulge in romances. Plato amuses himself with the dream of a perfect republic, and Chalmers with the dream of an unfettered establishment.—We certainly are not so ill-natured as to disturb the sportings of a playful fancy; and only complain when these pleasant fictions are passed for sober realities. An establishment of this sort never existed upon earth. But a few years' further experience—years, however, of earnest strife, on the part of the State and of the Church—taught how impracticable was the theory here so eloquently advocated. The secession of the Free Church, with Dr. Chalmers at its head, turned upon this single point, that the State exacted a *quid pro quo*; and patronage was but another name for bondage. It is but candid, however, to state that from the principles of these lectures, Dr. Chalmers never receded: and the Free Church still stands upon the right to demand of the State a complete maintenance, without the imposition of a single fetter. One of the deputation, which visited this country immediately

after the disruption, on being asked if the Free Church had abandoned the principle of an establishment, replied in playful evasion, "we have adjourned that question until the millennium." Yet, whether even in that happy state of the world, civil governments can unite with the Church without enslaving or being enslaved—and whether, in the most perfect state of society, the State should pour its treasures in the lap of the Church, without inquiry respecting the uses which it subserves—are both points, to say the least, which are more than doubtful.

Having framed the conception of a free, yet endowed Church, Dr. Chalmers proceeds to show the advantages it possesses. He is first brought into conflict with a class of political economists, who repeat in Parliament and at the hustings, the lesson they have conned from Adam Smith. Theirs has been termed the system of free trade in Christianity, which leaves in religion as in commerce the supply to be regulated by the demand. The satisfactory reply to this, we give in the following extract from the second lecture :

"It is not with man's intellectual, or his moral, as it is with his animal nature. Although it be true, that the longer he has been without food, the more hungry he is, or the greater and more urgent is his desire of food ; yet the more ignorant a man is, not the greater, but generally speaking the less, is his desire of knowledge. * * * The less a man has, whether of religion or righteousness, the less does he care for them, and the less will he seek after them. It is thus that nature does not go forth in quest of Christianity ; but Christianity must go forth in quest of nature. It is, on the one hand, the strength of the physical appetency ; and on the other hand, the languor of the spiritual, the moral, or the intellectual appetency, which makes all the difference."

We agree that Christianity must go forth into the highways and hedges—not under the direction of the State, but of the Church, to whom this special commission was given.

The third lecture is devoted to the proof of the insufficiency of the voluntary principle. Some of Mr. Noel's statistics will help us shortly to cipher out this problem. At present it is enough to remark the sophistry of the leading argument by which voluntarism is convicted of incompetency. It is that "in the shortcomings of the es-

tablishment, the voluntary principle has had an ample field for the trial of its energies." Yes, when the establishment, with its hand upon the national purse, has thrust aside all competitors, professing to occupy the whole field; and when dissenters have had the burdens of the establishment superadded to the support of their own Churches, then to be twitted with insufficiency because they have not outstripped the State and its ally together—to make voluntaryism, struggling against fearful odds, responsible for all the destitutions in the land—this is such justice as may be looked for in a partisan. But of this more anon.

The remaining lectures are occupied with showing the considerations which should influence the State in selecting one denomination for the national religion, and in detailing the advantages of a territorial establishment. We could not but think in reading the last point that Dr. Chalmers was once more drawing upon a luxuriant imagination, in his glowing picture of the facilities possessed by a parish, over a congregational minister. The former being assigned to a certain district of country, for the religious cultivation of which he is responsible, has the right to approach every family, within its limits, with the offer of the Gospel. The latter, on the contrary, has no charge beyond those who chose of their free will to place themselves under his instructions; of course, he feels himself an intruder whenever he approaches all families besides these. But if these families attend upon Church ordinances no where, what shall hinder the congregational minister from approaching them with as much freedom as the parish minister? Can there be any better warrant than the commission of Christ: "Go ye into all the world and *preach the Gospel to every creature?*" And can the commission of the State, 'go, preach throughout the parish,' be considered superior? Shall the man who approaches the irreligious around him, from love to their souls, be less acceptable, or feel himself more embarrassed, than he whose only differing claim is that he is paid for the service? If, on the other hand, these families have, in the due exercise of private judgment, chosen their own place of worship, what right has the State to commission one, and send him forth upon a proselyting errand? But Dr. Chalmers will say, that the parish

minister, being supported by the State, can preach the Gospel without cost to the poor, and thus attract them to his instructions. But this advantage, secured to one set of religious opinions, is so much injury to another; and this brings up another principle which we will not discuss in this incidental connexion. The territorial establishment is, however, important to Dr. Chalmers for another reason: it assists him in answering the question why the State should endow one Church to the exclusion of another, but little differing in doctrine. It is easy to say why Protestantism should be preferred over Popery by the State, because the differences between them are obvious. But between different branches of Protestants, those differences are slight; and why should one be preferred to all the rest? The answer is partly, that it is for the common good; the advantages of the territorial division cannot otherwise be had; and partly, if these differences are small, why do they exist, and why should they not be sacrificed by a union with that favored by the State. Truly this is modest. Honest convictions of truth are entertained: and when the complaint is that the State employs its tremendous power and wealth for their suppression, the answer is, why do you not conform?

Mr. Gladstone presents this subject from a different point of view still: he approaches it as a statesman.—And it is no small proof of the growth of dissent, that, from his seat in Parliament, Mr. Gladstone judges the State to have “given too certain signs of an inclination to dissolve its connexion” with the Church, and thus that “the mind of the former requires to be exercised on this subject” more than that of the latter. His work, written in Germanized English as it is, should be read by those who desire to see this controversy in every possible light. According to this writer, then, there are four lines of investigation, which conduct alike to the necessity of a national Church. The first is to collect the testimony of Scripture in favor of the union, whether given by precept or by examples; the second is to analyze the nature of the State, and to deduce *a priori* its duty in relation to religion; the third is, to inquire into the necessity of religion to the State, in order to its fulfilling both its higher and its lower ends; the fourth is an historical inquiry,

designed to show the universal consent of mankind to this combination of the spiritual with the civil power.—Thus the argument will be “direct, ethical, consequential and inductive:” the first being “the voice of command”—the second, “the voice of design”—the third, “the voice of penal admonition”—the fourth, “the voice of experience”—and corresponding severally to the formulars, “it is written, it is natural, it is expedient, it is customary.” This foundation is sufficiently broad; yet is not covered by the superstructure. Indeed Mr. Gladstone declines the first altogether; and the historical induction he deems to be superseded by the fact, that the opponents of an established religion do not bow to its decision. He, therefore, pursues it only so far as relates to the history of the English establishment. It is upon the second, or the ethical argument, that he concentrates his strength; and only under this does he pursue a track of thought, varying materially from those who preceded him. As the conclusion he reaches embraces one of the fundamental fallacies under which the whole argument in favor of Church establishments labors, viz: that the State is strictly a moral person, it will be interesting to follow Mr. Gladstone in his own language, as step by step he eliminates it. His starting point is “the oneness of life and action” in the universe, its “absolute and invariable dependence on a centre.” So far as the race of man is concerned, “this cardinal idea of unity, as the fundamental law of beauty and well-being,” was destroyed in the fall. Since that dismal hour, instead of one centre, there are as “many centres and rebellious systems of action,” as there are human beings. The great remedy which God proposes for this evil, is the scheme of redemption: yet, as an “intermediate expedient,” he establishes the law of association, by which they possess “a common or joint life,” reacting against the individualizing and selfish tendency introduced by sin. This common life is found in the family, in the tribe, in the nation, in the Church; and constitutes what is termed the personality of societies, so soon as it “assumes the determinate form of incorporation, and becomes subject internally to a deliberative regulating principle.” But this organization, while it checks one class of evils, introduces evils of

its own, which call for a remedy; and the corrective element is found in "collective religion." The social person, then, whose exponent always is its own recognized organ, is not only capable of religion, as the individual person is, but requires as much to be consecrated by it.

But at this point Mr. Gladstone feels constrained to pause and remove a difficulty which obstructs his further progress. Are there not other combinations among men, equally fulfilling the above definition of social personality, to wit: "incorporation and a deliberative regulating principle?" and shall these, as banks, canal companies, hospitals and the like, feel themselves capable of religion, and bound to be consecrated by it? This leads to a distinction between the degrees of personality in society. The conclusion is that only those associations admit of collective religion which are characterized by the following marks: they must be general, belonging to man as such; they must be natural, so that he is born into them; they must be permanent, so that they are parallel with his own existence; they must be moral, contemplating moral ends, requiring moral motives and restraints, and exercising moral influences. All these conditions meet in the family and the nation; between which a parallel is drawn at some length; and the ultimate conclusion is that the State is strictly a moral person, discharging moral offices, having of necessity a conscience, and only meeting its conscious responsibilities by professing a religion and "offering that worship which shall sanctify its acts."

Against this sweeping conclusion a formidable objection lifts its stern front; in this view of the matter, the State would seem to be immortal, and capable of reward and punishment in a future life; and corporations after all may have souls. Mr. Gladstone says they have; at least "they have souls as much as they have bodies, and it will hardly be said they have neither." But admitting that these "public persons are confined to the sphere of this world," their obligations are not thereby destroyed. It is further contended that States enjoy a quasi immortality in their indefinite succession though different generations: and should these pleas fail, inasmuch as retribution is more strictly and immediately enforced upon States than upon individuals, this may be substituted in lieu

of the sanctions of a future judgment. The State then stands before us a moral person, having the same obligations which press upon the individual conscience, and is bound to profess a religion. But religion is embodied and rendered visible in the Church; the State therefore fulfils this duty, like the individual, by connexion with the Church. And as Mr. Gladstone recognizes only the Church with three orders and an uninterrupted apostolic descent, he is at no loss to decide with what religious society the State should be united. In this way he readily escapes from the "sordid calculation" of Bishop Warburton in choosing simply the largest society; and is disembarassed of all those difficulties under which Dr. Chalmers labors in attempting to justify the State in the endowment of Episcopacy in England, and of Presbytery in Scotland. As the Church (we mean of course **THE** Church of Mr. Gladstone) has not only apostolic truth, but an apostolic descent in "a divinely appointed though human line," it brings to the State that permanency which is so requisite, and to which the sects can never lay claim.

We will not pursue this author further: as from this point he treads in the same path with others, presenting the stereotype argument against the sufficiency of voluntaryism to supply a country with the ordinances of religion; and the stereotype defence from the charge that the alliance corrupts and enslaves the Church. It is obvious that independent of the main issue which Mr. Gladstone creates, his theory is open to minute criticism upon several of its points. For example, his grand doctrine that social organization in the family, tribe, &c. was simply corrective of that centrifugal tendency occasioned by sin, does it not include the idea that social relations formed no part of man's original condition in his estate of holiness. How will Mr. Gladstone undertake to show that but for sin, or if men had retained their primitive integrity, they would never have existed in families and even in nations? Again, the idea that association in the State is an "intermediate expedient" preparing men for the work of redemption, the great remedy against sin, seems utterly to confound all the offices of the State and the Church together. But we forbear all special comments: the argument of Mr. Gladstone is one consistent whole, leading to

an important, though we believe, a false conclusion. We waive all criticism until we shall be able to discuss at length this great question of the personality of the State.

It is refreshing to pass from the cumbrous and foreign style of Mr. Gladstone to the elegant and classical diction of Dr. Arnold. Although presenting his views in a briefer and more fragmentary way than the other, a style clear as amber discloses without an effort his meaning. We select Dr. Arnold not merely because he is a beautiful and popular writer, whose influence is as widely diffused as that of any recent English author, but because he is the bold expounder of another principle equally fallacious with that of which Mr. Gladstone was the patron. It is that the State has for its end—not as Warburton taught, the protection of life and property—but the more general end of promoting, by all methods, the moral and intellectual improvement of men. This is his language, speaking of the State: "Our physical wants may have led to its actual origin, but its proper object is of a higher nature; it is the intellectual and moral improvement of mankind, in order to their reaching their greatest perfection, and enjoying their highest happiness."* Since the confusion existing in men's minds as to the true office and aim of the State is one main source of the endless discrepancy of opinion respecting Church establishments, we shall hereafter subject it to a special examination. At present, we wish the reader simply to observe how directly this principle led Dr. Arnold to avow the most glaring Erastianism. As the end and aim of the Church are defined by him in precisely the same terms, it follows that the two societies are identical. To employ his language:

"Thus the State, having been enlightened by the knowledge of the Church, becomes a society seeking the same end which the Church sought. And this was my meaning, when I said that in a country where the nation and government are avowedly and essentially Christian, the State or nation was virtually the Church."†

How fully Dr. Arnold deserves to be considered the special representative of a certain form of Erastianism will appear from another extract:

* Principles of Church Reform. Miscellaneous Works, p. 331.

† Fragment on the Church. Appendix II. p. 186.

When a State "chooses for itself the true religion, it declares itself Christian. But by so doing it becomes a part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church: not allied with it, which implies distinctness from it, but transformed into it. But as for the particular portion of this Church which may have existed before within the limits of the State's sovereignty,—the actual society of Christian men there subsisting—the State does not ally itself with such a society—for alliance supposes two parties equally sovereign—nor yet does it become the Church as to its outward form and organization; neither does the Church on the other hand become so lost in the State as to become, in the offensive sense of the term, secularized. The spirit of the Church is transfused into a more perfect body, and its former external organization dies away. The form is that of the State, the spirit is that of the Church; what was the kingdom of the world has become a Kingdom of Christ, a portion of the Church in the high and spiritual sense of the term; but in that sense in which 'Church' denotes the outward and social organization of Christians in any one particular place, it is no longer a Christian Church, but what is far higher and better, a Christian kingdom."*

It is well to observe at what expense this blessing of a national Church is to be enjoyed. To most of our readers it will be a sufficient refutation, better than any argument of our own, simply to know that by this union the Church ceases as a spiritual body to exist: she is transfused into the State, and the two so thoroughly interpenetrate each other, that the Church becomes a "Christian kingdom," and the State becomes a "portion of the Church."

This low view of the Church probably led to the comprehensive scheme which Dr. Arnold gravely proposes as a remedy for "the monstrous evils of sectarianism." He judges it possible to construct the articles of doctrine, the ritual of worship, and the form of government, upon such a scale, as shall comprehend nearly every class of religionists, and thus take away all occasion of dissent. For example, the different sects in England, Baptists, Methodists, Independents, Presbyterians, agree in the belief of certain fundamental truths: the existence of God and his providential care; the mission, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; the scriptures revealing God's will as a rule of faith and practice; the immutable distinction between

* Fragment on the Church. Appendix II. p. 177.

right and wrong, &c. Now a scheme of doctrine so drawn as to express these general and admitted truths, devoid of technical and controversial phrases, might embrace all classes but the Quakers, Romanists and Unitarians. In the lapse of time, by softening whatever in the national creed seems harsh to them, the best portions even of these three classes may be gained over to so Catholic an establishment. How far this writer would be willing to concede so as to win dissenting minds to a national creed will appear from an extract:

"If an Arian will join in the worship of Christ, and will call him Lord and God, there is neither wisdom nor charity in insisting that he shall explain what he means by these terms; nor in questioning the strength and sincerity of his faith in his Saviour; because he makes too great a distinction between the divinity of the Father, and that which he allows to be the attribute of the Son."*

It might not be amiss for the reader to ask himself what use a creed, or a Church either, can subserve, when a double sense may be knowingly put upon every word that is uttered.

In regard to the ritual of worship, Dr. Arnold considers absolute uniformity to be unnecessary and hurtful. Some persons are attached to a liturgy; others can endure none but extempore prayers; while others still have an ear for both. As his plan of reform is designed for England, his proposal is that once on the Sabbath the English service should be employed; but in the other parts of the day, the parish minister should be permitted a wide discretion. If dissenting ministers with their congregations shall be gained over to this comprehensive Church, he would have the ministers supported from the national treasury, aided if necessary, with the free-will offerings of the people. And the more completely to cement the religious associations of the nation, he would have the parish Church answer for all: the different tastes and convictions of different classes to be met by appointing different hours of service—so that "the same roof which had rung at one part of the day with the rich service of a regular choir, should at another resound with the simpler but not less impressive singing of a mixed congregation."

* Principles of Church Reform. Arnold's Miscellaneous Works, p. 285.

The only remaining difficulty is to organize a form of government equally enlarged. We say to 'organize,' because the idea does not seem to be entertained for a moment that the Church has a form of government prescribed by divine authority; but such a form as may "die away" when its "spirit is transfused into the more perfect body" of the State. Taking Episcopacy as the basis, Dr. Arnold's inventive genius seeks to supple it so that it shall become flexible and elastic enough to fit every sect. In order to show the necessity for Church reform in England, a singular confession is made, valuable to us as showing the delapidation into which the Church must fall by alliance with the State: "it has come to such a point of actual dissolution that it has been made a question what the government of the Church of England is."* The first improvement suggested is to admit to the functions of the ministry persons of every degree of education, and from the highest to the lowest class in society. The second improvement is to popularize the government by giving the laity a greater share in its administration. This latter end is gained by the suggestion of such details as these: the dioceses are to be made smaller, by contracting and multiplying them—leaving the Metropolitan Bishops alone the right to sit in Parliament; each Bishop is to be supported by a council, consisting both of clerical and lay members; dissenting ministers (with the exceptions, of course, of Romanists, Quakers and Socinians) are to be included in the establishment, and to be maintained by Easter offerings levied on all Church members; existing benefices are not to be disturbed, as they are vested rights; but all patronage must be simply recommendatory, the Bishop's council sitting in judgment upon the candidate's qualifications; and those who stickle for the right to choose a pastor are to be allowed its exercise. These innovations are thus summed up under heads, which we only condense: 1st, reducing the size of the dioceses; 2d, a council of clerical and lay members co-operating with the Bishop; 3d, the institutions of diocesan general assemblies; 4th, the admission of persons to the ministry destitute, in some cases, of a University education; 5th,

* Principles of Church Reform. Arnold's Miscellaneous Works, p. 287

the election of ministers, in certain cases, by the people, and the checking of patronage by granting the right of disallowing a presentee; 6th, Church officers, lay and clerical, as a substitute for district visiting societies. It is hard to characterize a scheme so nondescript as this; or to decide what principle of cohesion holds together the heterogeneous parts of a system which can be likened to nothing in heaven or earth, save Nebuchadnezzar's image. We are presented with a doctrinal creed couched in such vague generalities as to define nothing, and yet allowing a double sense in the interpretation of what little it does utter. We have a ritual, which yet settles no form of worship, but comprehending the widest diversities which taste, conscience or caprice may engender. We have finally a government, which it is impossible to class in any category known hitherto among men—a curious amalgam of Episcopacy without prelacy, of Presbytery without courts, of Independency without the brethren. The last result of all is a Church composed of members who have not a single principle in common, except it may be a fraudulent use of terms invented solely with a view to conceal differences; and a State, that endows and propagates a Christianity from which the very heart and core has been extracted—in other words, we have the nation christianized by an infidel Church.

The Essay of Mr. Noel is written upon the other side of this controversy; and he deserves to be noticed in connexion with the preceding writers, if only for the profound impression which his work has produced upon the dissenting population of England at least. Mr. Noel has every advantage from position to speak with effect on the side which he has espoused. His honorable birth, the respectability of his talents, the honesty of his character, and the purity of his life during the many years in which he has been a worthy representative of the most worthy portion of the English Church, are all passports to public confidence. He has moreover attested the sincerity of his convictions upon the subject which he discusses, by the most severe and costly sacrifice to which he could well be called. To abandon a Church he had so long cherished—to resign old associations and to form new, at a period of life when it is so difficult to transplant ourselves—to be

exposed to the sharpest criticism of those whose cause he has cast from him—these are sacrifices, which as they call for nerve to encounter, are at least evidences of honest conviction of mind. We are not aware that any one has ventured to impeach the purity of Mr. Noel's motives or the sincerity of his conclusions, in his recent secession from the English Church; and we think it will be hard for the advocates of the union to silence the battery which he has opened upon the English establishment. The work is nevertheless open to the criticism passed upon it by a writer in the *North British Review*, that it looks at the question of a National Church too exclusively in the light in which it is presented in England; and thus the reply to far the larger portion of it is, that the evils reprehended are not essential to the idea of an established religion; but only accessory to it in the particular form in which that idea has unfortunately been realized in the English Church. This however is easily explained: although there is not a single allusion to himself in the whole book, it was written evidently with a view to justify before the British public his own secession. It is divided into two parts; the first being devoted to a consideration of the *principles* of the union; and the second, to its *effects*. Under the former of these divisions, Mr. Noel undertakes to show, in opposition to Mr. Gladstone and others, that the State is incompetent, from its very constitution, to order the affairs of a spiritual Church—that the parallel is altogether false which is run between the family and the State—that all history condemns the union as disastrous in its results—that the argument is fallacious which supports the establishment from the Mosaic law—and that neither the prophecies of the Old Testament, nor the injunctions of the New, infer the necessity of a National Church. From these more general principles Mr. Noel passes to others more in detail, and which are particularly recognized in the English establishment; aiming to show that the State's supremacy, the maintenance of ministers from the national treasury, patronage and coercion, are all condemned by the word of God. Under the second great division of his work, Mr. Noel exhibits the practical workings of the system, in the evil influence exerted upon Bishops, Pastors, Curates, private members, and

upon dissenters. As for ourselves, we were most interested in the succeeding chapter; in which are described the effects produced by the union upon the number of ministers, upon their distribution, upon their maintenance, upon the doctrine they teach, upon the discipline of the Churches, the Evangelization of the country, and the like. We feel greatly indebted to this author for the collection of his facts and for the statistical form in which he presents them, so well adapted to the comparison we design to institute. We have always suspected these things to be as Mr. Noel describes; but with his aid, we shall be able to humble the arrogance of those boastful theorizers who have assumed as a necessary truth and as a historical verity, the utter insufficiency of the voluntary principle.

In relation to the amiable author himself, who, in his trying position, has been able to disclose enormous abuses without the slightest infusion of bitterness, we confess to a particular regret when it was rumored that he was about to identify himself with one of the existing bodies of dissenters in England. It seemed to us that if his mission was to overthrow a union which was simply desecrating to the Church of Christ, that mission could be more certainly accomplished by his maintaining an independent position and becoming the nucleus of an evangelical, disestablished Episcopal Church; and we anticipated a growth for this secession of Noel, Shore, and others, not inferior to that which was attained by the secession in former years of the Erskines and Fishers from the Scottish establishment. Whether Mr. Noel is a man equal to such an enterprize, it is not necessary to inquire. The perusal of his Essay has satisfied us, that he has receded as much from Episcopacy as from the Establishment; and that the honesty of his character and the sincerity of his convictions necessitate the step which otherwise would be a matter of regret.

This article, sufficiently long to bring to a close, has assumed on the anvil a different form from that at first designed. Our purpose was to have entered at once upon the discussion of the points involved in this controversy. But as, in this country at least, it has been so long considered "*res adjudicata*," and we hear so often the wonder expressed, upon what grounds it is pretended to retain and

justify the alliance of Church and State, it seemed not unfit to present the historical view given above. The careful reader will perceive that very grave questions have been sprung in the preceding review: is the State a person, capable of religion? What is the end for which civil government was instituted? Cannot the Church exert an influence upon the State, as a co-ordinate institution and independently of an alliance? Is the voluntary principle insufficient, as boldly alleged, to propagate religion in a country? Does the voice of past ages cry out for a national Church, and how is this the voice of nature? Does the Jewish Theocracy afford a precedent in favor of the connexion between State and Church? Do the Millennial prophecies set this union before us as a necessary feature of Christ's universal rule upon earth? The answer to these questions must be reserved for another article, in which they may be thoroughly discussed. In the meantime, it is hoped the synopsis already given of the views of leading writers in favor of Church establishments may not prove unacceptable nor uninteresting to the reader.

ARTICLE IV.

ETHNOGRAPHY.

Rev George Howe D.D.

1. *Mithridates, oder allgemeine Sprachenkunde, mit dem Vater Unser als Sprachprobe in bey nahe funfhundert Sprachen und Mundarten, von JOHANN CHRISTOPH ADELUNG. Mit Wichtigen Bajtragen Zweyer grossen Sprachforscher, fortgesetzt von Dr. JOHANN SEVERIN VATER, Professor, &c. 4 Banden, 8vo. Berlin, 1806—1817.*
2. *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind. by JAMES COWLES PRICHARD, M. D. F. R. S., M. R. J. A., &c. 4 vols. 8vo. London, 1836—47.*
3. *Vergleichende Grammatick des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Litthanischen, Gothischen und Deutschen; von FRANZ BOPP. 4to. Berlin, 1833.*

VOL. III.—No. 2.

4. *Introduction a L'Atlas Ethnographique du Globe, &c. dedie A. S. M. l'Empereur Alexandre, par ADRIEN BALBI, Ancient Professor de Geographie, de Phisique et de Mathematiques, &c. Tome Premier. Paris 1826. 8vo.*
5. *Philological proofs of the Original Unity and recent origin of the Human Race. Derived from a comparison of the languages of Asia, Europe, Africa, and America, being an inquiry how far the differences in the languages of the globe are referable to causes now in operation. By ARTHUR JAMES JOHNES, Esq. 8vo. London, 1846.*

The word Nation (*ἔθνος*) may be taken in three different senses, as we consider it in a political, geographic, or ethnographic relation. In the first, we use it of a people, however different their religions, languages, and degrees of civilization, who yield obedience to one and the same civil power, and form a political community separate from the rest of the world. In the second acceptation, we apply it to the inhabitants of a country defined by natural boundaries which seclude them, in a great degree, from intercourse with other parts of the earth. In the third place we may use the term, though in doing so we depart from ordinary English usage, and conform rather to that of the French language, of the inhabitants of a country speaking one and the same tongue, with its different dialects, however widely separated they may be in their habitations, their religion, their social state, their governments, and degree of civilization. The term race, or people, is the most appropriate term in our own language to express this idea. In this sense we speak of the Anglo Saxon race, the French, Spanish, Portugese, Armenian, Chinese race, races, or people, however widely they are found dispersed over the face of our globe, and however separated historically in time. The classification of nations by their languages constitutes the modern science of *Ethnography*, which is a happier word than the French *Linguistique*, or the harsher term *Glottology*, by which it has been proposed to designate this important branch of knowledge. The light which it is suited to throw upon the subject discussed in our previous pages, the Unity of the

human race, and the difficulties also which the facts it exhibits oppose to the conclusions to which we have arrived, constitute the main reasons for bringing the subject forward at the present time to the notice of our readers. The manner in which the various points embraced in the entire subject have often been discussed and held, has conflicted with the historic truth of the sacred scriptures, and their credibility as a divine revelation. The spirit of the times is unfriendly, and the discussions of the age to which we belong, are conducted, by most, independently of the light shed from the sacred scriptures; and there is in many quarters a decided willingness to believe that the old records ascribed to Moses are little better than the cosmogonies of Hesiod, Ovid, or Zoroaster.

The question how language came into existence at all, has exercised the wits of men in all ages. By some it has been supposed to be wholly the invention of man. Lucretius, the Epicurean poet and philosopher, informs us that at some early period—the time when, the deponent saith not—the woods being set on fire by lightning, or by trees grating together in a storm, human beings, who, like the rest of the universe, had been formed by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, and who had thus far lived dispersed, naked and dumb, were so enervated by the heat of the conflagration, that they were obliged to take shelter from the weather in caverns; males and females thus jumbled together by accident became known to each other; individuals knew their own offspring, which formerly they could not distinguish from the offspring of other men; their minds became softened by the blandishments of domestic life, and families were formed. After a little communication with neighbouring families they were enabled to form some artificial distinctions of right and wrong, of which before they were unconscious; that to enforce these distinctions, and for mutual defence, compacts became necessary; that to make these compacts some better signs of thought and feeling were requisite than the indistinct yells, and the gestures by which they had communicated with each other; and so speech was invented, which was as really the effect of human art as houses, wagons, or any other article manufactured to promote the convenience of man.

Diodorus Siculus also tells us, that the first men lived for some time in caves, after the manner of beasts, uttering only confused noises, instinctive cries of pleasure or pain, till necessity compelled them to associate together for mutual aid, and gradually to agree upon some audible signs of ideas by which to communicate with each other. Different communities would thus invent different languages, and inventing them would proceed on different principles.*

Rosseau and Volney also represent man as thrown as it were by chance, on a confused and savage land, abandoned by the unknown hand that produced him, and left to discover for himself the first elements of life, and to become the sole architect of his own fortunes.

Were pagans and infidels the only ones who had advocated this theory, we should regard it with less surprise; but when we find it adopted by professed believers in inspiration, it certainly argues but a slight reverence for the sacred scriptures. Yet it received the assent of Gregory Wyssen, a father of the Church in the 4th century, and of

* "The beauty of Lucretius's poetry," says Beattie, "made this system fashionable at Rome, where Horace adopted it."

Cum prorepserunt primis animalia terris,
Mutum et turpe pecus, glandem atque cubilia propter,
Unguibus et pugnīs, dein fustibus, atque ita porro
Pugnabant armis, quæ post fabricaverat usus;
Donec verba, quibus voces sensusque noterant,
Nominaque invenere; dehinc absistere bello, &c.

Lib. i. sat. 3. v. 97.

The following paraphrase has nothing of the elegance of Horace or Lucretius; but seems to have all the elegance that so ridiculous a doctrine deserves:

When men out of the earth of old
A dumb and beastly vermin crawl'd;
For acorns, first, and holes of shelter,
They tooth and nail, and helter skelter,
Fought fist to fist; then with a club
Each learn'd his brother brute to drub;
Till, more experienced grown, these cattle
Forged fit accoutrements for battle.
At last (Lucretius says, and Creech)
They set their wits to work on *sperch*:
And, that their thoughts might all have marks
To make them known, these learned clerks
Left off the trade of cracking crowns,
And manufactured verbs and nouns.

Beattie, Theory of Lang. chap. vi.

Richard Simon, priest of the oratory and author of the critical history of the Old Testament. Adam Smith also, and many of the philosophers have followed in the same train, and Dr. Murray thinks he discovers the elements of all languages in the nine monosyllables, ag, beg, dwag, cwag, lag, mag, nag, rag, swag.* We find the theory also in many of our elementary books referred to for illustration as the true theory of language, and adduced to account for many of the phenomena which language actually exhibits.

Others have maintained that the faculty of speech was made as natural to man as his reason, and that the use of language is the necessary result of the constitution conferred on him at his first creation. Language has thus resulted spontaneously, without any intervention of Deity since the first creative act which brought man into being, and without any contrivance or intervention on the part of man himself. Such was the decided opinion of the celebrated Herder, who advances it in an elaborate disquisition on the origin of language, which was crowned with the prize by the Royal Academy of Sciences at Berlin.† Such also was the opinion of Humboldt. "Speech" says he, "according to my fullest conviction, must really be considered inherent in man; since as the work of his intellect in his simple knowledge it is absolutely inexplicable. This hypothesis is not facilitated by supposing thousands and thousands of years; language could not have been invented without its type existing in man. Still it must not be considered as a gift bestowed ready formed upon man, but as something coming from himself."

A third opinion is that language is of divine origin, and was taught in some way by God to Adam. Though some, as Bochart and Stillingfleet, have maintained that Adam was possessed of higher powers and cultivation, (if we may with any propriety apply such a term to him,) and hence had a more perfect command of language than any of his posterity have manifested; others believe that only so much of language was taught to man as was necessary to accommodate his limited necessities in the infancy of his being, and that he was left to enlarge this medium

* Dugald Stuart, vol. iii. p. 70.

† Translated from the German, London, 1827.

of intercourse, as new objects met his view and new necessities were originated.

Against the first, and in favor of the last, of these theories, is the consideration that it is impossible to reason without the medium of language. There must be signs of ideas which will stand for them, as we pass from one to another, or we cannot compare two ideas together, nor perceive any relations subsisting between things. We can contemplate the individual, but cannot pass from the individual to the species without the intervention of language, or as we should more correctly say, of some sensible signs. Without language, then, man must forever have remained an infant in mind, and never could have acquired knowledge nor been capable of consecutive thought. But if language were of human invention, it was the result of much intent thought, and not the work of infancy but of culture. We could perhaps proceed no further in reasoning than the dumb beasts around us without notes, or marks, or signs of things; and there can be devised no signs so admirable as those articulate sounds of which language consists.

The human voice is so framed and adapted as to be susceptible of articulate modifications to almost any extent; and the power of forming these various modifications is possessed by all men. But it does not therefore follow that language is a human invention; nor does the possession of these powers of vocal inflection point out how it was that it was first suggested to men to employ sounds as the representatives of ideas. The infant learns to speak by imitation solely. He invents not the language he pronounces. It was in existence before him. The man who has been deaf from infancy, is also *dumb*. He never invents a vocal language, but always converses by means of signs addressed to the eye. This is not through any deficiency in the organs of speech, but because his destitution of another sense prevents his learning by imitation the vocal signs which others use. And even the mature and strong minded man, when he would acquire or invent a new language, finds it extremely difficult to attain to sounds different from those which he learned in childhood, before his habit of articulation became fixed. So far from finding it easy to originate a new language, he

finds it extremely difficult to acquire in perfection one already formed. These facts show us the fallacy of that theory which supposes language to be of human invention. Every man, as far back as history goes, obtains the power of articulate speech in childhood by imitation. We trace this process of acquisition up to the first man, and enquire how did he obtain it, and the answer must be, that it was imparted to him. We may "challenge" says Dr. Magee, "a single instance in the whole range of history, of any human creature ever using articulate sounds as the signs of ideas, unless *taught* either immediately and at once by God, or gradually by those who had been themselves instructed."

The supposition that language is not communicated *ab extra* but is the result of our constitution, the immediate product of our intellectual and material organization, is equally untenable. For if it were so, the experiment of Psammetichus was founded in reason, who shut up two infants from all intercourse with men, in order that he might learn from them the primitive language by the first sounds the children should utter. Caspar Hauser would have had a language of his own, by which he would have attempted to make known his wants. The savage would have had a language, of whom lord Monboddo gives an account, who was caught in the woods of Hanover, and is said not to have been deficient in physical strength or bodily organs.

We are therefore driven to the conclusion that language was given to men by God. Such is the testimony of the scriptures. God brought the beasts to Adam and he named them. Without some knowledge of these animals Adam could not have imposed names upon them; without the gift of speech he could not have had this knowledge. Things do not enter the mind and there reside. They make a transitory impression upon it; and these things, and the relations they have to other things, are marked by words; which words we do not ourselves originate but learn from others. The things being withdrawn, the mind cannot reason upon them or designate them without words, nor even think of them without also thinking of the words which have become their signs. So that knowledge is acquired, retained and communi-

cated by means of language. We are therefore obliged to believe that Adam came from the hands of God a full grown man, not in stature alone but in knowledge and the power of communicating it : and not to suppose the first pair, who never were infants, to have but infantile powers, comprehension, and views, and to be obliged to learn, contrive and invent by unassisted reason, as we do in passing up to manhood. The human race as existing in their first progenitors, did not start in their career of duty and trial as infants, but as adult men. Immense responsibilities were devolved upon them. The myriads of earth stood or fell with them ; and such fearful responsibilities as rested on them they were empowered by God, in their perfected reason and large discourse of mind, to appreciate, and successfully to meet. Any other supposition is alike contrary to reason and scripture. As their whole existence was miraculous, so knowledge and language were miraculously imparted to them, without having to acquire the one by experience, or the other by the gradual process of invention.

Some even among the ancient heathen reached that point in the process of their reasoning, at which they were obliged to refer language to a divine author. Socrates, in the *Cratylus* of Plato is represented as saying that "the first names were framed by the gods," that the imposition of names on things belonged to a nature superior to that of man, and could pertain to him only who had a full discernment of these natures. Hobbes too has said, God taught Adam the invention of speech. And Dr. Johnson asserts that *inspiration* would have been necessary to inform man that he had the faculty of speech, which, says he, "they could no more find out without inspiration, than the cows and hogs would think of such a faculty." Humboldt's idea is not *altogether* different from this ; though he seems to suppose that language is a product of the human mind preternaturally aroused and invigorated by the creator's power. "I am penetrated," says he, "with the conviction, that it is impossible not to perceive this divine power which the human faculties hide within them, this genius the creator of nations : above all, in the primitive state when all the ideas and the very faculties of the soul gather a more lively strength from the novelty of the

impressions made upon it : when man can perceive beforehand those combinations which he would never arrive at by the slow and progressive march of experience. This creative spirit can over-leap those limits which seem prescribed to the rest of mortals ; and if it is impossible to describe its march, its vivifying presence is no less manifest. Rather than to renounce, in explaining the origin of languages, the influence of this powerful first cause, and assign them to a uniform and mechanical progress which they make one step after another from their rude to their perfect state, I would embrace the opinion of those who refer the origin of language to an immediate revelation from God. They at least recognize this divine spark which shines over all the idioms, even the most imperfect and the least cultivated.”*

During the 930 years of Adam's life, as his family and numerous posterity were rising around him, and he in the midst of them their patriarch and instructor, there was abundant opportunity for him to communicate to them all that had been first communicated to him, and to enlarge the primeval tongue, even after the original influence which endowed him with speech was withdrawn, as new inventions, new discoveries, and new experience should require new terms.

As we now traverse the surface of the globe, we find it occupied by a vast diversity of languages and dialects, and one who has not given his mind to this kind of research is astonished at their number and characteristics. Balbi, in allusion to the vocabulary of Pallas, the collections of the Spaniard Hervas, and the Mithridates of Adelung and Vater, says :

“It is in these precious depots of ethnographic science that the astonished scholar becomes acquainted with the prodigious number of different languages, in which man has expressed his thoughts, and communicated his feelings. It is in the Mithridates, and the collections of Hervas that he learns, with surprise, what a crowd of languages, different from those of Moses, of Homer, of Virgil, of Racine, and of Dante, have the beauties and richness of verbal forms belonging to the Hebrew and Arabic, possess the boundless power of forming new words, sim-

*In Wiseman's Lect. pp. 54, 55.

ple and compound, exhibited by the Greek and German; have the force and conciseness of the Latin and English; the harmony and sweetness of the Spanish and Italian; and the precision of the French. It is in these works, too, that, contrary to his expectation, he learns the existence of grammatical subtleties heretofore unknown to grammarians, not only in the languages of the polished or half polished inhabitants of the old and new world, but also in those brutal tribes which wander in the burning deserts of the torrid zone, and in the frozen solitudes of the northern regions."*

The materials have been accumulating, for these studies, from every quarter. Vocabularies of words have been collected by travellers and navigators, and from nations of various lands, who have wandered from their own savage haunts, and reached the abodes of civilized men. The Empress, Catharine, of Russia, commenced with her own hand a vocabulary of the known languages of earth, which she employed the philosopher Pallas to complete. Champollion, Quatremen, Abel-Rémusat, St. Martin, De Sacy, Malte Brun, and Balbi, in France; Bopp, Hammer, Humboldt, Klaproth, Schlegel, the Adelungs, and Vater, in Germany; Colebrooke, Wilkins, Prichard, and Johnes, in England; Schilling and others in Russia; Munter and Rask, in Denmark; Hamaker and Van der Palm, in Holland; and Pickering, Duponceau, and Albert Galatin, in this country, have devoted themselves to these studies, with no small share of enthusiasm and success. In Paris, St. Petersburg, London and Vienna, and more lately in Boston and New York, at Calcutta, Bombay, Franguebar, Batavia, and elsewhere in the east, associations are formed for the purpose of investigating the antiquities and languages of the various tribes of men.

One of the most fruitful sources of knowledge on this point has resulted from the efforts of Christian missionaries to evangelize the world. To many a barbarous nation they have given, for the first time, a new language; they have prepared grammars, dictionaries, and other elementary works, for the easier acquisition of otherwise unknown tongues, and have translated into these languages the sacred Scriptures and other books of religion. In

* Balbi, *Introd. a l'Atlas Ethnographique*, Disc. Prel. p. xv.

this way a prodigious amount of material has been collected for the study of comparative philology.

It is true that there have been many mistakes made in the vocabularies of these new tongues, through ignorance of the language, through inaptitude and negligence on the part of those who have collected them, through the want of agreement between these and European idioms, and through imperfect methods of transcription, and a want of uniformity in expressing foreign sounds by the alphabets of civilized nations. Many examples of this are given by Balbi. If you should demand, for instance, from an Algonquin, the word for *a tree*, pointing at the same time to a particular tree, he would give you, instead of the general term, the specific name *chestnut*, or *ash*, or *oak*, as the case may be. If you ask the word for *head*, at the same time pointing to your own, he will give you the word for *your head*; if you should point to his head, the word for *my head* would be given. If you demand of a Mohegan the name for *hand*, at the same time stretching out your own hand, he will answer *knisk*, *your hand*; if you point to his own hand, he will say *nnisk*, *my hand*; if you direct his attention to the hand of a third person, he will reply *unisk*, *his hand*. It is easy to see that many mistakes must, at first, be made in acquiring a knowledge, especially, of unwritten tongues. It is recorded of one of the early missionaries, in this country, that, designing to translate the passage, "the mother of Sisera looked out at a window, and cried through the lattice," he found it difficult to obtain an Indian word answering to the word *lattice*. At length he believed himself to have succeeded. After a season, however, perceiving that his translation caused much amazement around his congregation, he learned, on inquiry, that he had made the mother of Sisera to have looked out at a window, and to have cried through an *eel-trap*. One of the missionaries in India translated the word for *dove*, that consecrated emblem, by the Sanscrit word signifying *owl*; and another, and he a *Presbyterian*, the word *baptise* by a word which almost signifies *to drown*.* These mistakes have oftentimes, and almost necessarily, occurred.

* Oriental Christian Spectator, Bombay, 1831, p. 53.

But notwithstanding this, much that is real and substantial has resulted from these enquiries.

In proportion, however, as these studies advanced, they seemed to become more and more hostile to the word of God. The vast number of dialects and tongues that were discovered, and to some extent catalogued, filled believers in revelation with an undefined apprehension. Not only were they so numerous, but apparently so distinct from each other, and so unlike, both in material and structure, that it neither seemed that they could be derived from the same stock, nor that the men who spake them could ever have constituted, in any past period of time, the same family.

The number of languages on the globe has been differently estimated by different scholars. Of necessity, this cannot be done with accuracy. Many which are mere dialects, have been denominated separate languages, and again those which in reality are separate, have been supposed to be dialects of one common tongue.

"A language," says Malte Brun, "is a collection of vocal signs, correlative to each other, derived from common roots, submitting to the same system of declensions and conjugations, governed by the same rules of syntax, and by means of which a society of men communicate their thoughts and desires."*

Adelung, in his *Mithridates*, has classified 3064 languages and dialects, living or dead, spoken still, or preserved in written records. And Balbi, in his *Ethnographic Atlas*, has been able to present to our view 860 languages, and more than 5000 dialects. He gives it as his opinion, that all the languages, living or dead, taken in the strict sense just defined, amount to at least 2000 in all. Nor can this computation appear too large, when we consider the great number of languages on the American continent already known, and recollect that a great part of the earth has yet to be explored; that Africa, in particular, may be as fruitful in jarring tongues as the continent we inhabit; that the most of those who traverse the ocean are bent on gain, and are not curious to preserve for us any vestiges of those languages with which they may have formed a partial acquaintance.

* Letter to Balbi, l' *Atlas Ethnog.* Introd. p. 3.

That these various languages all existed from the very commencement of the tribes who speak them, in the same form as now, no one can believe. New languages arise, 1. from distant migrations of the same family; 2. by the subjugation of one nation by another, and the fusion of two languages into one. This is the case with most of the languages of southern and western Europe. And yet there are instances of the co-existence, both of the language of the conquerors and the conquered. The Caribees and some other nations of South America, have one language for the men, and another for the women, whom Malte Brun supposes to be the unfortunate remains of some tribe cut off in savage warfare. 3. The imperceptible changes of manners and knowledge, as civilization advances or recedes, have their effect in varying language. 4. A language has its youth, manhood, and old age. Colonies, passing off at these different stages, and losing all connection with the mother country, would come to have dialectic or linguistic differences among themselves and the country whence they went out. 5. The passing off into a different climate and other scenes, would gradually affect the language of the migrating tribe.

It is evident, however, that, in all these cases, there will be analogies remaining in those tongues which started out from one common centre. These analogies are partly found in the words themselves, the materials out of which languages are made, and partly in the grammatical structure according to which these words are disposed, both as to arrangement and form. Whether the affinity between languages is to be sought for in the one or in the other, has been much debated. A portion of the distinguished Ethnographers deciding for one, and another portion for the other method. The latter contending that if a nation receives foreign forms or idioms of speech, it also will receive the words in which these idioms are expressed.

It was a great advance in this branch of study, when the affinities between the languages of the earth were at length intelligently seen, and when under the searching analysis of Bopp, Grimm, Adelung and others, they arranged themselves into groups or families. Of these families we shall endeavor now to give some little idea to

those of our readers who have not, for themselves, investigated this subject.

One of the most interesting of these, in every way, especially to the student of the Scriptures, is the so called Shemitish, or as Prichard prefers to term it, the Syro-Arabian family. This family has its several branches, some of which are now dead, some scarce breathing, while the youngest blooms forth in all its beauty. They have been spoken by a widely extended race, or by races of men who have exerted an astonishing influence over the modern nations of Europe by their literature, their opinions, and their religion. Among them was the first kingdom named in history, founded by Nimrod, and the equally powerful kingdom of Babylon, which succeeded it; Phoenicia, the country so celebrated for its commerce, which gave a written language to Greece and all the western world; Carthage, the ancient rival of Rome; Israel, the chosen people of God; Abyssinia, which, for a season, extended her conquests into the heart of Arabia, contending with the crescent on one side, and the barbarian hordes of Africa on the other, and which, for many centuries, held undisputed dominion of the upper countries of the Nile; Arabia, that colossal power, which overran the most beautiful parts of Asia, Africa and Europe, spreading the religion of Mahomet, cultivating science and the arts, and communicating to Christian Europe a knowledge of Geometry, of Algebra, of figures, of cotton, paper and powder, which has changed the whole method of war.*

It is the Shemitish family that has given to the world the three religions of Judaism, Christianity, and of the false prophet of Mecca; the last, though an imposture, teaching, as the former do, and in distinction from all other modifications of religion, the absolute unity of God.

"Their conceptions were more pure and sublime, their sentiment of devotion more intense, their consciousness of guilt expressed itself in more significant and more definite acts, than those of the Japetic nations, with whom mythology began." "The deity whom the Shemite patriarchs taught their posterity to worship, was that being 'whom no eye hath seen, nor can see;' at whose Almighty word the visible universe sprang into existence,

* Balbi, Atlas Ethnog.

‘when the morning stars sang together, and the sons of God shouted for joy.’”*

This family of men has been the witness of the most astonishing events which God has wrought as a testimony to man; and from them the true religion, proceeding as from its original depositaries, is to go out into all the world.

The Shemitish stock divides itself into five principal branches.

1. The *Aramean*, embracing the Syriac or western Aramean, and Chaldee or eastern Aramean. Other relics are the Samaritan, the Zabian, Palmyrene, and Nabathean dialects.
2. The *Canaanitish* branch.—This includes the Hebrew of the Old Testament, the scanty remains of the Phœnician and Carthaginian or Punic; and the later Hebrew, the Talmudic and Rabbinic, the basis of which is Hebrew, but greatly modified, mostly by the influence of the Aramean.
3. The *Median* branch.—The Pehlvi spoken in Media, is a mixed language, being, in a great degree, Shemitish in its words, although Persian in its grammatical structure. Hence, some have placed it here, while others have assigned it a different location. It was, according to Adelung, the reigning language in Persia, from 600 B. C. for a period of 900 years.
4. The *Arabic* branch, with its eldest daughter the Ethiopic, and its younger daughters, the Moorish and Maltese.
5. The *Abyssinian*, derived from the Arabic through the Ethiopic, and comprising the Amharic and Axumitic dialects.

The grand characteristic of this family of languages is the triliteral form of the roots, which in the Aramean branch, having one full vowel connected with the second letter, constitute monosyllabic words; while in Hebrew the two first letters having each a vowel, the same roots form dissyllables; and with another vowel accompanying the third letter, in the Arabic the same triliterals form trissyllables, as *k'tal*, *katal*, *katala*, *he killed*.

The Berber language, of the region of Mt. Atlas in Northern Africa, and the Haussa of Sudan, have such strong

* Prichard, vol. iv. pp. 549, 550.

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affinities with the Hebrew especially, that Prichard has classed them among the Hebraeo-African languages.* It is probable too that Cappadocia, in Asia Minor, anciently spoke a dialect of the Aramean. This family of languages, then, extended from Armenia and the Euxine on the north, around the whole eastern and southern coast of the Mediterranean as far as the pillars of Hercules; eastward it reached into Persia, being bounded thence by the Persian gulf and the Indian ocean; and southward it extended as far as the tributaries and sources of the Nile, and thence was bounded by the great desert, or perhaps rather by Nigritia and Sudan. It embraces also the religious language of all who through Africa profess the Mohammedan faith.

Another family of languages of special interest to us, as embracing our own vernacular tongue, is the *Indo-Germanic*. It embraces, in the first place, the

- Sanscrit*, with all its immediate derivations, constituting all the modern languages of Hindostan out of the Deccan.
2. The *Medo-Persic* or *Arian* branch, including the Zend, the earliest existing form of the Persic tongues, (the Pehlvi perhaps,) the Kurdish and other subordinate dialects.
3. The *Teutonic* branch, including the ancient Gothic, the German dialects, the Anglo-Saxon, the Icelandic, Swedish, Danish.
4. The *Celtic* branch, embracing the Welsh, Cornish, and Armorican; the Irish or Erse, the Gaelic or Scotch, and the Manks.
5. The *Slavonic*, comprising the Lithuanian with the ancient Prussian and Lettic, the Russian, the Polish and Bohemian, and the languages of the Slovacs of Hungary, with the Wends and Sorabians.
6. The *Graeco-Latin* branch, embracing the classic tongues of antiquity, with the modern languages derived principally from them, the Romaic or modern Greek,

* "The impulse which has been given by our countryman Mr. Wm. B. Hodgson," (of Savannah) "in his researches into the Berber language, and the Ethnographic facts which were the results of his elucidations, has extended to England, France and Germany." "The progress of Ethnology," by John Russell Bartlett, Cor. Sec. of the Am. Ethnological Society, p. 45. Dr. Prichard, with like commendation, speaks of "the excellent memoir" of Mr. Hodgson. We regret that we are not able at this time to lay our hand on this important publication.

the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and French, all of which grew out of the *Romana Rustica*, a corrupt Latin, which prevailed over the south of Europe, and was variously intermingled with the Teutonic and Celtic elements infused by the conquering hordes of the north.

As this Indo-European or Indo-Germanic family best exhibits the affinities which prevail between the various languages which are grouped together by these Ethnographic studies, a few examples will here be given.

NUMERALS.

Sanskrit.	Zend.	Persian.	Greek.	Latin.	Lithuanian	Russian.	Gothic	Old High German.	Modern German	English.	Erse.	Welsh.
1 eka	aeva	yik	έν	oīno ceno uno	wena	odin	ain	ein	ein	one an a	aen	un
2 dwi	dwa	du	δυο	duo	du	dva dvie	twa	tue	zwei	two	da do	dau dwy
3 tri	thri	seh	τρι	tri	tri	tri	thri	thri	drei	three	tri	tri
4 chatur	chatvar	chehaur	τέτταρ	quattuor quadra	keturi	chetyre	fidwor	fiuuar	vier	four	keathair	tain pedwar pedair
5 panchan	panchan	penj.	πέντε πεντε	quinque	penki	pyat	fimf	finfe	funf	five	kuig	pump
6 shash	cswas	shesh	ἑξ	sex	szeszi	shesh	saihs	sehs	sechs	six	se	chwech
7 saptan	haptan	heft	ἑπτά	septem septua	septyni	sem	sibun	sibun	sieben	seven	secht	saith
8 ashtan	astan	hesht	ὀκτώ	octo	aztuni	osm vosem	ahtan	ohito	acht	eight	ocht	wyth
9 navan	navan	nuh	εννε	novem	devyni	devyat	niun	niguni	neun	nine	noi	naw
10 dasan	dasan	deh	δέκα	decem	deszimt	desyat	taihun	tehan	zehn zehn	ten	deich	deg

English.	Sanskrit.	Zend.	Persian.	Greek.	Latin.	Old Slavonic.	Lithuanian	Teutonic.	Gothic.	Celtic.	
										Erse.	Welsh.
<i>Father</i>	pitri	paitar	pader	πατερ	pater	bat		vater		athair	
<i>Mother</i>	matri	matar	mader	μητηρ	mater	mater, moter		fader		mathair	
<i>Son</i>	sunu					syn	sunus	mutter	sunus		
<i>Daughter</i>	duhitri	dughdhar	dokhter	θυγατηρ	frater	dotcher	dukter	sohn	daughter	dear	
<i>Brother</i>	bhratri	bratar	brader	φρατρος	brat	brat		tochter	brothar	brathair	brawd
<i>Sister</i>	swasri				soror	sestra		bruder	swistar	siur	
<i>Man</i>	vira	vairya	zenne	γυνη	vir	genna	vyras	schwester	vair-s	fear	gwyr
<i>Woman</i>	jani.	gena						Old Eng. quean	guino	gean	
<i>Woman</i>	vamani				femina					fomen	
<i>Nose</i>	nasa	nao		ο-δοντ	naso	nos	nosi	nase		dend	dant
<i>Tooth</i>	danta			ποδ	dent	danti		zahn	thuntu,s		
<i>Foot</i>	pada	padha			ped		pada	fuss			
<i>Star</i>	tara	staro		α-στερ	stella			stern	stairno		seren
<i>Water</i>	uda			υδαρ	udo, unda	voda	vandu	wasser	vato		dor
<i>Door</i>	dwar		dar	θυρα	fori	dwer		thur	stand	stadam	
<i>To place</i>	stha	sta		στα	sta	sta	bu		itan	bu-mi	ysu
<i>To be</i>	bhu	bu	buden	φυ	fu	bu		bin		ith	
<i>To eat</i>	ad			εδ	ed	ed		essen			
<i>Purse</i>					crumena	carmana					
<i>Two</i>	dwa			δωω	duo	dwi		zwer			

The examples might be greatly extended, but what we have now given must suffice. We might add other evidence, to show the wide extension of each of the specific branches embraced in this family of languages, in reference to which ample materials are lying before us. Especially ample are the facts in reference to the various Celtic tribes, which have been spread out in the pages of Prichard, who has devoted special attention to their history and languages. He has traced out the settlements of the Celtic tribes in Gaul and Britain by the names of places ending in *dunum*, or *dinum*, &c. as Londinum, Lugdunum; or in *briga*, *sego*, and other terminations, which are found through Britain, Belgium, France, and Spain. All these coincidences are as striking and satisfactory, as showing an identity, at some former day, of nations now widely separated from each other, as the homely distich is, of the identity of the English and the vulgar idiom of the Frieslanders of Holland:

Butter,	bread,	and	green-cheese
Buter,	bread,	in	grien tjies,
Is	good	English	and good Friese.
Is	gud	Inglish	in gud Fries.

The *Tartar*, or *Tatar** family of languages, is another numerous group, embracing the Tungusian, the Turkish, and the Mongolian.

This family of languages occupies for its seat the central regions of high Asia, but sends out its branches over Siberia, and through northern and eastern Europe, and northern India. A tabular view might be given, did our limits allow, showing the affinities prevailing in this group of languages. From the heights of Asia there have been poured upon Europe, from immemorial time, inundations of warlike and vigorous men. The traces of the Tatar languages are found in many portions of northern and eastern Europe. The Huns who invaded Europe in the

* The ordinary orthography *Tartar* was introduced, according to Abel-Remusat, whom both Klaproth and Balbi follow, by St. Louis, King of France, who, when the arrival of the Tatars in Western Europe was apprehended, wrote to his mother in the following words: "Erigit nos, mater, cœleste solatium, quia, si perveniant ipsi, vel nos ipsos quos vocamus Tartaros ad suas tartareas sedes unde exierunt retrudemus, vel ipsi nos omnes ad cœlum adventrunt."—*Balbi*, p. 150.

4th century were the same race of men with the Magyars who invaded the eastern parts of Europe in the 8th century, and are now contending under Kossuth and Bem for their civil liberty, against the arms of Austria. It is plain from the news of their exploits which every day reach us, that their abode in Europe for ten centuries has not extinguished their love of liberty, and their indomitable courage. The affinities existing between the Tatar languages of high Asia, and the Finnish and Hungarian, are exceedingly striking.

English. Turkish. Mandschu. Magyar. Finnish.

<i>Sea</i>	dengiz	tenger	tenger	
<i>Rock</i>	gaya		koe	ku
<i>Ice</i>	szug	yuche	yeg	yeg

These affinities are widely diffused throughout European Russia, and the bon-mot of Napoleon is not without its force even in a linguistic sense, 'scrub a Russian and you will find a Tartar.'

Another very peculiar group of languages is the *Indo-Chinese* or the *Transgangetic*, embracing the languages of Thibet, of the further India, of China, Corea, and Japan. The languages spoken by these various nations, are different in vocabulary, but similar in structure.—From the time of Adelung, it has been customary to consider the dialects of the Chinese and Indo-Chinese nations as monosyllabic languages. And though Abel-Rémusat has contended that they could not, with propriety, be so termed, his reasons have failed to convince some of the most intelligent scholars. Polysyllables, except compounds, are scarcely to be found in the Chinese.—The language consists, according to Rémusat, of some 400 monosyllables alone. But these are pronounced in four or five different tones, and with each separate tone signify a different thing. So that the spoken language of China is a species of cantillation in which the several variations of sound express successive ideas. Adelung gives an example of this from the language of Tonquin. The word *ba* is pronounced in six different tones, and thus has six different meanings. It means *a lord, abandoned, something contemptible, three, present, and the concubine of a prince*. And pronounced in these six different tones suitably arranged, this one word makes the following sen-

tence: "Three lords made a present to the concubine of a prince. How contemptible that is!" Besides, each one of these words has a different meaning according to its location in a sentence. And when all these meanings come to be expressed in writing, it requires 80,000 characters to represent them. The Chinese has no particles, no connecting links, no case nor number; all the particles of relation and terminational changes are dispensed with, and the hearer is obliged to connect the ideas suggested by the several sounds, in his own mind.

The preservation of this peculiarity of the language results, in the opinion of M. M. Langles, Humboldt, Abel Rémusat and Professor Neuman, from the peculiar character of the hieroglyphic writing, adopted by the Chinese. Each word being represented by a special symbolic character was remembered in its individual sense, and instead of conjugation and declension being resorted to, to indicate the relations, these were indicated by other distinct words, or by the relative position of words to each other.

The language of Thibet is not so purely monosyllabic, and stands related to the Chinese languages on the one hand, and to the Tatar languages on the other. The Korean is allied to the Siberian languages, and is not monosyllabic. The same is true of the Japanese. The Burmese also forms a connecting link between the monosyllabic and polysyllabic languages.

We cannot pretend, within the limits of this article, to give a complete view of all the diversities of human speech. The Ethnographic groups or families we have described, cover, however, no small portion of the earth's surface. Two others, however, claim, for a moment, our attention. We have seen how widely the Shemitish, or Syro-Arabian languages, have extended over northern and north eastern Africa. The languages of middle and southern Africa remain to be considered, and then, briefly, the languages of our own continent. In reference to the first, we have but meagre vocabularies of them with which to institute a comparison. North of the Mountains of the Moon, the African dialects, both of maritime and interior Nigritia, so far as the materials we have reveal, are not, except to a limited extent, related to each other in

words, though there is said to be a striking relation in grammatical structure. The Falatahs, however, who have extended themselves over the interior countries of Nigritia, and who emanated from the high country north of the Senegal, speak nearly the same language with the Foulahs, and have diffused it widely through the various regions of their migration. The whole region further north from the Oasis of Siwa, on the eastern side of the Great Desert, to the Canary Isles on the west, including the extinct race of the Guanches, whose embalmed remains are preserved in the mummy-caves of Teneriffe, spoke dialects of the same tongue which exhibits affinities with the Biscayan or Iberian of Spain. The languages of southern Africa, from the channel of Mosambique, on the eastern coast, to Congo and the Atlantic coast, exhibit a remarkable similarity. Our missionaries at the Gaboon inform us that natives have travelled across the continent, from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, and had no difficulty in making themselves understood among the tribes through which they passed. Of one of these languages, the Mpongwe—the grammar of which, as prepared by the missionary brethren at the Gaboon river, lies before us—appears to be distinguished by its great flexibility, its softness of sound, and the exceeding copiousness of its verbal forms.

The entire African system of languages, not excluding the Coptic, seem to be distinguished by its indicating all modifications of nouns and verbs by prefixes. In this respect, there is a striking difference between them and the Indo-European languages, in which such modifications are chiefly indicated by sufformative endings.

The languages of our own American continent constitute another numerous division of the idioms spoken among men. Their number has appeared so great, and their power of combination so extensive, as to astonish the scholars of the old world. Their characteristics have been thus summed up by Mr. Duponceau.

“ 1. The American languages are rich in words and grammatical forms; and in their complicated construction the greatest order, method and regularity prevail. 2. These complicated forms, which I call *polysynthetic*, appear to exist in all those languages from Greenland to Cape Horn. 3. These forms ap-

pear to differ essentially from those of the ancient and modern languages of the old hemisphere."

The labors of Heckewelder and Zusberger, of Mr. Duponceau of Philadelphia, and Mr. Gallatin of N. York, as well as those of the missionary Eliot of former times, have done much to make these remarkable languages known to the civilized world. Their great number of words; their numerous forms of one and the same verb varied for the purpose of expressing nice shades of thought, and of including within itself, subject and object, of expressing the number of both, the animation or inanimateness of both; the power of increasing and combining words by a species of *agglutination*, as it has been termed by the baron William Von Humboldt, are wonderful, and beyond any parallel in the languages of the old world.

These numerous languages, which are so uniform in structure, resist, in a great variety of cases, the effort to group them together into Ethnographic families. Yet Balbi has included these languages in eleven families, beginning with the Chilian in the south, and ending with the Esquimaux in the north. The missionaries, employed in pious labors, had long since observed that certain languages were keys to other dialects; and in proportion as attention is directed to these tongues, it may be expected that the affinities between them will become more and more apparent.

These are the main facts which the comparative study of languages has established. And it is a study rich in fruits to the geographer, the historian, the naturalist, the linguist, and not without its uses to the divine. The languages of most nations show their derivation, and contain traces of the countries through which they have passed, and the vicissitudes which have befallen them.—When we know that in the ancient calendars of Ireland, the name of the month of February signifies *the first month of Spring*, we may learn that the ancient abode of the Celts was in a far more southern latitude than that which they now occupy. The name *Bey* by which the sovereigns of Egypt were long known, shows that that country obeys Tatar princes; it is but a softened pronunciation of the *beg* of the Tatars, a name borne by the

great Timur-beg, and by the Mandschu Emperors of China, at the present day. Most of the nations of Europe, and not a few of Africa, can thus be traced to their ancient home in central Asia, and the day may yet come when there shall be overpowering evidence of the same, in relation to the numerous tribes of America. Malte Brun has already endeavored to prove a geographical connection between the languages of Asia and America.— He conjectures that tribes of Finnish, Ostiac, Permian, and Caucasian families reached Greenland and Chili, passing along the coast of the Frozen Ocean, crossing Behring's Straits, and so reaching their distant homes; tribes from Japan and China, proceeding along the coast, advanced as far as Mexico; others, composed of Tungusians, Mandschus, and Mongols, passed along the mountain regions of both continents, to the same destination; while Malay, Javanese and African words were brought into the country by other emigrations. These things we may never know; but it is also true that the research of future enquiries may resolve these enigmas.

It is important, however, to know that as there are affinities among the languages of each group among themselves, so there are among those of entirely different groups with each other. In many cases they are so striking as to show a connection between these several groups at a remote period of time.

If it be objected that the coincidences extend to a very small proportion of the words making up these languages, this must be freely admitted; and further, that many of the coincidences may be but apparent. Yet it is also true that, in the families most nearly allied, the larger number of the words are different from each other. And yet there may be a connection between these which, by the process of change, is now lost. Who would suppose that the English word *wig* was derived from the Latin *pilus*. Yet this is claimed to be its derivation. Latin *pilus*, Spanish *pelo*, thence *pelucca*, French *perruke*, Dutch *peruic*, English *perwick*, *perwig*, *periwig*, and by contraction *wig*.

It is also difficult to conceive how languages so diverse in their plan as the monosyllabic language of China, and the polysynthetic tongues of America, could ever

have proceeded from one common centre; how men, if they had originally spoken one and the same language, could, in the construction of new tongues, have proceeded upon plans so wholly different. It has been contended that all languages were originally monosyllabic, and that the Chinese became stereotyped in that form, while the other languages went on increasing the forms of words by preformative or sufformative additions. This is not improbable, yet do we also see the opposite process of throwing off terminational endings, and coming down to a monosyllabic form. We have dropped the endings of the verbs *loven*, *haven*, and of the plurals *housen*, &c.

But we may also resort to the hypothesis that the minds of men, at the times these various groups and families arose, were rudely and violently disturbed, and that feeling the need of speech from having always enjoyed it, they set themselves at work to communicate their emotions and thoughts to each other in the way in which they felt themselves impelled. This disturbance can hardly be conceived without the intervention of a divine power; and the confusion of tongues at Babel is precisely such an intervention as allows us to conceive of a new starting point, from which language being again reconstructed, and this by communities sundered from each other by the special providence of God, should recede, for a season, by a continually widening distance from each other, unless the nations speaking them should be brought again into contact. The principal languages of the earth have had a great degree of permanence for the last ten or fifteen centuries, and the main characteristic ones of the several groups for a much longer time. They vary little except by conquest and intermixture. The older families of languages must have received their form several thousand years ago. The Celtic and Germanic languages Prichard supposed to have been formed during the 1000 years B. C. The Sanscrit, Latin, Greek, and Moeso Gothic, nearly 2000. Beyond these began the divergencies of those languages essentially distinct, as the Semitic and Indo-European stems. These speculations are perhaps beyond our depth, and we can only look at those faint probabilities where we lack so greatly the evidence of history. Most likely the Shemitish stock ascends beyond the deluge, and if its existing

members were not then in being, the common source and parent of them all then existed. We had intended to have spoken of the various attempts to explain the confusion of tongues in the land of Shinar. The views entertained by Humboldt, Klaproth, Herder, and others, on the dispersion of mankind, we designed to pass briefly in review, but the length to which our article has already reached admonishes us to close.

The books at the head of this article have furnished us with the main facts which we have spread out before our readers, though we have also drawn from other sources. Of these books we can only say that the *Mithridates* of Adelung, which was continued after his death by Vater, aided by the younger Adelung and Humboldt, is a great treasure house of knowledge on these subjects. Yet it seems to pass Moses by as if his account of the deluge and Babel were not to be regarded. The work of Balbi is also one of great research, and in its composition he was able to command the services of a numerous band of ripe scholars, who had devoted special attention to these studies. "The Books of Moses," says he, "no monument has been able to prove false; but with them on the contrary agree, in the most remarkable manner, the results obtained by the most learned philologists, and the profoundest geometricians."

The great work of Bopp is a copious and masterly exhibition of the grammatical affinities prevailing among the principal languages of the Indo-European family, bringing light from the Sanscrit to explain the forms of the Latin and Greek and the Teutonic languages of Europe. Prichard is learned and able in the linguistic portions of his work, especially in reference to the Celtic languages, to which he devoted great attention. Its chief defect is that the rays of knowledge are scattered as by a prism rather than brought to a focus.

The smaller work of Johnes is a digest of many striking coincidences between languages of Asia, Africa, Europe, and America, but has not produced that amount of conviction on our mind as the other and more important works of which we have just spoken. Each of these writings, except the last, has been a considerable time before the attention of scholars, and has been highly valued.

ARTICLE V.

Rev. J. H. Thorne well. J. D.

The Philosophy of Religion. By J. D. MORELL, A. M.
 London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.
 1849, pp. 427.

"The design of this book"* we are told in the preface, "grew out of some of the reviews, which appeared upon a former work of the author's, entitled, *An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth century.*" These reviews evinced, at least to the mind of Mr. Morell, "such a vast fluctuation of opinion," and such deplorable obscurity and confusion of ideas upon the whole subject of the connection betwixt philosophy and religion, that, in mercy to the general ignorance, and particularly in deference to a suggestion of Tholuck, he was induced "to commence a discussion," which, he evidently hoped, might have the effect of imparting intensity to the religious life, vigour to the religious literature, and consistency to the religious sentiments of his country. He is at pains to inform us,† and we devoutly thank him for the information—the book itself furnishing abundant internal evidence, which, in the absence of such a declaration, would have been decisive to the contrary—that he has not rushed "hastily and unpreparedly into the region of *theological* inquiry." "While philosophy has been the highest recreation, theology," he declares, "has ever been the serious business of my whole life. To the study of this science I gave my earliest thoughts:—under the guidance of one‡ who is recognised by all parties as standing amongst the leading theologians of our age, I pursued it through many succeeding years; and if I have found any intense pleasure, or felt any deep interest in philosophy at large, it has been derived, *mainly*, from the consciousness of its high importance, as bearing upon the vastest moral and religious interests of mankind." Trained by this fitting discipline for the task, it is, perhaps, no presumption

* p. iii.

† Preface, p. xxxii.

‡ We learn from the North British Review, that Dr. Wardlaw is the Divine referred to.

in Morell to have published a book, which professes to be not "a popular and attractive exposition" of the questions which come within its scope, but a thorough philosophical discussion, developing "from the beginning, as far as possible, in a connected and logical form," a subject, which involves the fundamental principles of human knowledge, and demands, at every step, that any thing like justice may be done to it, the subtlest analysis, the profoundest reasoning and the intensest power of reflection. These qualities Mr. Morell may possess in an eminent degree—he may even feel that the possession of them implies a vocation of God to give a new and nobler impulse to the religion of his country, and that, like all apostles, he is entitled to use great boldness of speech; still we cannot but suggest, that as modesty becomes the great, a little less pretension would have detracted nothing from the charms of his performance. The perpetual recurrence of phrases, which seem to indicate the conviction of the author, that his book is distinguished by extraordinary depth, and that he is gifted with a superior degree of mental illumination, is, to say the least of it, extremely offensive to the taste of his readers; and he will, probably, find few who are prepared to share in the supercilious contempt which he lavishes upon the prospective opponents of his system. The philosophy with which Mr. Morell is impregnated is essentially arrogant; and it is more to it than to him, that we ascribe the pretending tone of his work. The pervading consciousness of the weakness and ignorance of man—the diffidence of themselves—the profound impression of the boundlessness of nature and of the limitless range of inquiry which lies beyond the present grasp of our faculties—the humility, modesty and caution which characterize the writings of the great English masters, will, in vain, be sought among the leading philosophers of modern Germany and France. Aspiring to penetrate to the very essence of things—to know them in themselves as well as in the laws which regulate their changes and vicissitudes—they advance to the discussion of the sublimest problems, of God, the soul and the universe, with an audacity of enterprize, in which it is hard to say, whether presumption or folly is most conspicuous. They seem to think that the human faculties are competent to all things—that whatever reaches beyond

their compass is mere vacuity and emptiness—that omniscience, by the due use of their favourite organon, may become the attainment of man, as it is the prerogative of God, and that, in the very structure of the mind, the seeds are deposited from which may be developed the true system of the universe.

Within the limits of legitimate inquiry we would lay no restrictions upon freedom of thought. All truly great men are conscious of their powers; and the confidence which they have in themselves inspires the strength, intensity and enthusiasm which enable them to conceive and to execute purposes worthy of their gifts. To the timid and distrustful, their excursions may often seem bold and presumptuous—but in the most daring adventures of their genius, they are restrained, as if by an instinct, from the visionary projects and chimerical speculations, which transcend the sphere of their capacities, as the eagle, in his loftiest flights, never soars beyond the strength of his pinion. Confidence adjusted to the measure of power never degenerates into arrogance; it is the soul of courage, perseverance and heroick achievement—it supports its possessor amid discouragements and obstacles—represses the melancholy, langour and fits of despondency to which the choicest spirits are subject—gives steadiness to effort—patience to industry and sublimity to hope. But when men forget that their capacities are finite—that there are boundaries to human investigation and research—that there are questions which, from the very nature of the mind and the necessary conditions of human knowledge, never can be solved, in this sublunary state; when they are determined to make their understandings the sole and adequate standard of all truth, and presumptuously assume that the end of their line is the bottom of the ocean—this is intolerable arrogance, the very spirit of Moloch,

“Whose trust was with the Eternal to be deemed
Equal in strength; and rather than be less
Cared not to be at all.”

We can have no sympathy with the pretensions of any method, whether inductive, or reflective, which aims at a science of being in itself, and professes to unfold the nature of the Deity, the constitution of the universe and the mysteries of creation and providence. To say, as Mr.

Morell does,* that "our knowledge of *mind*, in the act of reflective consciousness, is perfectly adequate; that it reaches to the whole extent of its essence—that it comprehends the intuition of its existence as a *power* or *activity*, and likewise, the observation of all its determinations," is sheer extravagance and rant, which can be matched by nothing, but the astounding declaration of the same author, that "to talk of knowing mind beyond the direct consciousness of its spontaneous being, and all the affections it can undergo, is absurd; *there is nothing more to know*." We are not to be surprised that such a philosophy should find nothing to rebuke it in the awful and impenetrable depths of the Divine nature, that it should aspire to gaze directly upon the throne of God, and profess to give a "direct apperception" of Him,† whom no man hath seen or can see, and whose glory would be intolerable to mortal eyes. Titanick audacity is the native spirit of the system, and it is in the imperceptible influence of this spirit upon a mind otherwise generous and manly, that we find the explanation of the fact, that Mr. Morell, in the tone and temper of his performance, has departed so widely from the modesty of true science.

There is one feature of the book before us which is particularly painful, and we confess our embarrassment in finding terms to express it. Hypocrisy would precisely indicate the thing, but as that word cannot be employed without casting a serious, and we believe, an undeserved imputation upon the personal integrity of the author, we shall forbear to use it. We have no doubt that he is cordial and sincere in the zeal which he manifests for an earnest and vital religion—but what we object to is, that he should so often employ a phraseology, and employ it in such connections, as to convey the idea to indiscriminating readers, which the whole tenor of his argument proves to be false—that the earnest and vital religion, which enlists his zeal, embraces the distinctive features of the system of grace. When he speaks of christianity, in its essence, as a deep inward life in

* History of Modern Philosophy, p. 53, vol. 2. second London edition.

† Ibid, p. 52. It is refreshing to contrast with such pretensions the statements of Locke in the introduction of his celebrated Essay on the Human Understanding.

the soul, and pours contempt upon the barren forms and frigid deductions of logick, as a substitute for piety; when he contends for divine intuitions—heavenly impulses, and a lofty sympathy and communion with God—there is something in all this, so much like the language of converted men, that untutored minds are apt to be caught with the guile; and under the impression that they are still clinging to the doctrines of a living, in opposition to a formal and dead christianity, may imbibe, without suspicion, a system which saps the foundations of the whole economy of the Gospel. Mr. Morell is no friend to what is commonly denominated Evangelical religion. His divine life is not that which results from mysterious union with the Son of God, as the Head of a glorious covenant, and the Father of a heavern-born progeny. His divine intuitions are not the illuminations of that Spirit which irradiates the written word, and reveals to our hearts the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ—his communion with the Father is not the fellowship of a child, who rejoices in the assurance of its gracious adoption, and renders unceasing thanks for its marvellous deliverance, through the blood of a great Mediator, from sin, condemnation and ruin.—His religion embraces no such elements; and he ought not, in candour, to have disguised sentiments utterly at war with the common conceptions of piety, in the very dress in which these conceptions are uniformly presented. If he has introduced a new religion, he should not have decked it in the habits of the old. It is the same species of dishonesty, the same paltering in a double sense, as that to which we object in Cousin, who, in seeming to defend the inspiration of Prophets and Apostles, and to rebut the assaults of a rationalistick infidelity, really denies the possibility of any distinctive and peculiar inspiration at all, and places divine revelation upon the same platform with human discoveries. We acquit Mr. Morell of any intention to deceive. We rather suspect that he has partially imposed upon himself. We can understand his declaration,* that he “does not know that he has asserted a single result, the germs and principles of which

* Preface, p. xxxiii.

are not patent in the writings of various of the most eminent theologians of the Church of England, or of other orthodox communities," in no other way, than by supposing, that he has been so long accustomed to associate his own philosophical opinions with the characteristick phraseology of spiritual religion, that the terms have ceased to suggest any other ideas to his mind, so that he is unconscious of the change of meaning, which they have imperceptibly undergone from his habits of thought. His honesty, however, does not diminish the danger which results from the ambiguity of his language. A corrupt system, disguised in the costume of the true, is like Satan transformed into an angel of light. We should have rejoiced if Mr. Morell's religion could have been more nakedly presented. It is not the ingenuity of his arguments, nor the subtlety of his analysis—it is not the logical statement, or the logical developement of any of his principles, from which the most serious mischief is to be apprehended—it is from his fervour—his earnestness and zeal; which, in seeming to aim at a higher standard of Christian life, will enlist the sympathies of many, who feel that there is something more in the Gospel, than a meagre skeleton of doctrines. They will be apt to think that the words which he speaks to them—resembling so often the tone of Christ and His Apostles—are, like them, spirit and life. They will take the draught as a healthful and vivifying portion; and find, too late, that it is a deadly mixture of hemlock and nightshade. Here is the danger—in this covert insinuation of false principles—this gilding of a nauseous pill. If there were less in the book which counterfeits the emotions that spring from religion, the operation of its poison would be comparatively circumscribed.

The danger, in the present instance, is incalculably increased by the surpassing enchantment of the style,—which, though not distinguished by the precision of Stewart, the energy of Burke, or the exquisite elegance of Hall, has a charm about it which holds the reader spell-bound from the beginning to the end of the volume. We will venture to assert that no man ever took up the book who was willing to lay it down, until he had finished it; and very few, we apprehend, have finished it, who were

willing to dismiss it without another, and, perhaps, still another perusal. Mr. Morell is never dull; in his abstrusest speculations, in his most refined and subtle efforts of analysis, there is an unction which fascinates the reader; he has the art, the rare and happy art, of extracting from the dry bones of metaphysics, a delightful entertainment. The sorcery of his genius, and the magic of his eloquence, conceal the naked deformity of his principles, and beguile attention from the hideousness of the object, by the finished beauty of the painting.

The transparency of his diction, the felicity of his illustrations, the admirable concatenation of his thoughts, his freedom from the extremes of prolixity and brevity, and his skill in evolving and presenting in beautiful coherence and consistency, the most complicated processes of thought, justly entitle him to rank among the finest philosophical writers of his country. Imbued, as he is, with the spirit of German philosophy, and thoroughly conversant with the productions of its best masters, it is no small praise, that in his own compositions, he has avoided all affectation of foreign idioms, and that, at a time when our language seems likely to be flooded with the influx of a "pedantick and un-English phraseology." He has found his mother-tongue amply adequate to the expression of his thoughts; and even the misty ideas of Germany, which its own authors have seldom been able to render intelligible in a dialect of amazing flexibility and compass, are seized with so firm and masculine a grasp—are so clearly defined, and so luminously conveyed—that we hardly recognize their identity, and cannot but think, that if Kant could rise from the dead, and read his speculations in the pages of Morell, he would understand them better than in his own uncouth and barbarous jargon. We could wish that all importers of German Metaphysics and German Theology, would imitate the example of Mr. Morell in his use of the vernacular tongue. We want no kitchen-Latin—and we strongly suspect that any ideas which refuse to be marshalled in English sentences, or to be obedient to English words, are unsuited to our soil, and had better be left to vegetate or perish on the banks of the Rhine.

As Mr. Morell nowhere tells us precisely what he means

by the philosophy of religion, we are left to collect its import from his occasional statements of the scope and design of philosophy in general, his definition of religion, and the nature of the whole discussion. Religion he carefully distinguishes from theology: they are, as he insists in his former work,* "two widely different things. Theology implies a body of truth, founded upon indisputable principles, and having a connection capable of carrying our reason with it, running through all its parts.—Religion, on the other hand, is the spontaneous homage of our nature, poured forth with all the fragrance of holy feeling into the bosom of the Infinite. Religion may exist without a theology at all, properly so called." Or as the same sentiments are expressed in the work before us.

"Let it be distinctly understood in the outset, that we are speaking of religion now as a fact or phenomenon in human nature. There is a very common, but a very loose employment of the term religion, in which it is made to designate the outward and formal principles of a community, quite independently of the region of human experience, as when we speak of the Protestant religion, the religion of Mohammed, the religions of India, and the like. The mixing up of these two significations, in a philosophical treatise, cannot fail to give rise to unnumbered misunderstandings; and we emphatically repeat, therefore, that in our present use of the term, we are not intending to express any system of truth or form of doctrine whatever; but simply an inward fact of the human consciousness—a fact, too, the essential nature of which it is of the utmost importance for us to discover."—*pp.* 62, 63.

By religion, then, we are to understand, not a system of doctrine or a creed, but those states of the mind, and those inward experiences of the heart, which spring from a sense of the Infinite and Eternal. But religion, in general, occupies a very subordinate place in the book—it is only introduced at all, in order to prepare the way for what Mr. Morell denominates "the Christian consciousness." It is Christian experience, particularly, which he proposes to investigate. But what is the *philosophy* of religion? We have a clue to what the author means by it, in the following passage of the preface:

* Vol. 2nd, Appendix, 2nd Edition, p. 650.

"All great systems of philosophy are simply methods ; they do not give us the material of truth, they only teach us how to realize it, to make it reflective, to construct it into a system."—*p. xxiv.*

The inquiries which, in conformity with this definition, a definition, we would add, rather of logick than philosophy, we should expect to find him conducting, as obviously falling under the import of his title, are such as have reference to the department of the soul, in which religion is pre-eminently seated, the nature and origin of our religious affections, the laws of their developement and growth, the process by which a theology may be formed, and the grounds of certainty in regard to religious truth. In this expectation we are not disappointed ; these are the high themes that he discusses ; the pith and staple of his argument. But we must take the liberty to say that, in our humble judgment, the analysis of these points, whatever appearances of candour and impartiality may be impressed upon it, was instituted and shaped with special reference to a foregone conclusion. The author was in quest of what Archimedes wanted to move the world, a *πῶν στῶ*, by means of which he could overturn the foundations of the Christian faith. There was a darling hypothesis in relation to the authority of the Bible, which he was determined to establish ; and with an eye to this result, his philosophy, though digested into the form of a regular and orderly developement of principles, was invented and framed. It is a species of special pleading, ingeniously disguised in the mask of philosophical research, against the great distinctive feature of Protestant Christianity. When we contemplate the havock and desolation of his theory—the Bible, as an authoritative standard of faith, and creeds and confessions, as bonds of Christian communion and fellowship, involved in a common ruin, with nothing to supply their place but the dim intimations of sentiment and feeling, chastened and regulated by the natural sympathy of earnest and awakened minds—we might be appalled at the prospect, if it were not for the consolatory reflection which the author himself has suggested, that his "philosophy does not give us the material of truth."

But to be a little more minute—the book is divided into twelve chapters—the first of which presents us

with a general survey of the human mind. And as two of its powers are found to be of fundamental importance to the subsequent discussion, the second is devoted to a somewhat extended elucidation of the distinction betwixt them. In these two chapters the "philosophical groundwork" is laid of the author's whole system. If he is at fault in any essential point of his analysis, or has misapprehended the nature and relations of the "two great forms of our intellectual being," which play so conspicuous a part in his theory, his speculations labour at the threshold, the foundations are destroyed, and the superstructure must fall to the ground. Since a human religion must be adjusted to the faculties of the human mind, an important step is taken towards the determination of its real nature, when these faculties are explored and understood. Mr. Morell is, accordingly, conducted by his mental analysis, to an inquiry into "the peculiar essence of religion in general," which he prosecutes in the third; and to a similar inquiry into the essence of christianity in particular, which he prosecutes in the fourth chapter of the book. He is now prepared to enter into the core of the subject; and as it is in the application of his psychology, to the affiliated questions of Revelation and Inspiration, and to the construction of a valid system of theology, that the poison of his principles most freely works, we must invite particular attention to his opinions upon these points—the developement of which occupies the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters of the work.

Revelation he regards as "a mode of intelligence"—a process by which a new field of ideas, or a new range of experience, is opened to the mind. It is precisely analogous to external perception, or that more refined sensibility to beauty and goodness, upon which we are dependent for the emotions of taste and the operations of conscience. It consists in the direction of an original faculty, to a class of objects which it is capable of apprehending. It is wholly a subjective state, and should never be confounded with the things revealed—a spiritual clairvoyance, which brings the soul into contact with spiritual realities, and enables it to gaze upon invisible glories. Hence an external revelation, or a revelation

which does not exist in the mind, is a contradiction in terms. We might just as reasonably suppose that the Bible, or any other book, could supply the place of the senses, in giving us a knowledge of the material world, as to suppose that it can supply the place of revelation, in giving us a knowledge of religion. It can no more see for us in the one case, than in the other—this is a personal operation—a thing which every man must do for himself. And as each individual must have his own power of perception, that he may know the existence of the objects around him, so each individual must have a personal and distinct revelation in himself, that he may come into the possession of the “Christian consciousness;” he must be brought immediately into contact with the object, and contemplate it “face to face.” Inspiration is not essentially different from revelation; they are rather different aspects of the same process. As in all immediate knowledge, there is an intelligent subject and an intelligible object brought into union, revelation, for the convenience of distinction, may be regarded as having primary reference to the act of God, in presenting spiritual realities to the mind; and inspiration to whatever influence may be exerted upon the soul, in order that it may be able to grasp and comprehend the realities presented. Revelation, in other words, gives the object—inspiration, the eye to behold it. The concurrence of both is essential to the production of knowledge. As inspiration, therefore, indicates, exclusively, a state of the mind, and that, a state in which we are conscious of immediate knowledge, it cannot be affirmed of any class of writings, nor of any processes of reasoning. An inspired book, or an inspired argument, is as senseless a form of expression as an intelligent book, or an intelligent argument. Hence the whole question of an authoritative standard of religious truth, commended to our faith by the testimony of God, is summarily dismissed as involving an absurdity; a discovery which relieves us from all those perplexing speculations in relation to the proofs of a divine commission, and the criteria which distinguish the word of God from the delusions of man, or the impostures of the devil, upon which theologians, from the earliest age, have been accustomed, in their ignorance and folly, to waste their

ingenuity. The doctrine is avowed, openly and broadly avowed, that God *cannot*, without destroying the very nature of the human understanding, put us in possession of an infallible system of truth. A book, or an argument, can be inspired in no other sense than as it proceeds from a man under the influence of holy and devout sensibilities, and contains the results of his reflection, in the development of which the Almighty cannot protect him from error, upon the facts of his own experience. The Pilgrim's Progress is, accordingly, divine, or the word of God, in precisely the same sense in which the Scriptures are divine; and the productions of Prophets and Apostles are entitled to no different kind of respect, however different in degree, from that which attaches to the writings of Owen and Baxter and Howe. Theology, in every case, results from the application of logick and philosophy to Christian experience—it is necessarily a deduction from subjective processes, and not the offspring of the comparison and arrangement of doctrines derived from an external source. Being the creature of the human understanding, and the understanding being above or below, we do not know exactly where the author places it—the immediate guidance and control of God, every theology must be fallible and human, whether it be that of Paul, or Peter, or James, or John, or—for such is the fearful sweep of the argument, that of Jesus Christ himself.

Having settled the principles upon which theology must be constructed, he proceeds to apply them in the eighth chapter, with remorseless havoc, to the popular faith of his age and country. His next step is to investigate the grounds of religious fellowship, an investigation which turns out to be a spirited and earnest assault upon creeds and confessions. When the Bible is gone, these beggarly children of the understanding can, of course, show no cause why sentence of death should not be pronounced upon them. The tenth chapter, which is a sort of summary of all his previous speculations, discusses the grounds of certainty in reference to spiritual truth, which are resolved partly into our own consciousness, or immediate knowledge of its reality, and partly into the consciousness of other similarly inspired people. The eleventh chapter, on the significance of the past, seems to us to be a logical

appendage of the seventh or eighth, mercifully intended to relieve our minds from the despondency and gloom which were likely to overwhelm them on account of the loss of the Bible and the feebleness and imperfection of the instrument which we must use in its place in "realizing" a system of faith. After all, he tells us, among earnest and awakened minds, there is no danger of miscarriage. Error is the fiction of bigotry rather than a stern and sober reality. All contradictions and discordancies of opinion are only the divergencies, or polar extremities, of some higher unity of truth, in which they are blended and reconciled; as the numberless antagonisms of nature contribute to the order and harmony of the universe. The progress of theology depends upon the success of the effort to discover those higher realities in which heresy and orthodoxy sweetly unite, and hence all opposition to error and zeal for the truth—overlooking the important fact that they are different phases of the same thing—that error, in other words, is only a modification of truth, are very wicked and indecent.

The relation between Philosophy and Theology is the subject of the last chapter, in which he undertakes to vindicate himself from the anticipated charge of rationalism. How successful he has been we shall see hereafter, but one thing is certain, his rationalism has but little tendency to exalt the understanding. In the pictures which he occasionally draws of a perfect Christian state, this perverse and unruly faculty, it seems, is to be held in abeyance—the soul is to be all eye—all vision—everlastingly employed in the business of looking—so completely absorbed in the rapture of its scenes, that it cannot descend to the cold and barren formalities of thought. But while the understanding is degraded, another element of our being is unduly promoted. Throughout the volume we find attributed to sympathy the effect, in producing and developing the divine life, which the scriptures uniformly ascribe to the Holy Spirit. Society and fellowship are, indeed, the Holy Ghost of Mr. Morell's gospel. They beget us again to a lively hope—they refine and correct our experiences—they protect us from dangerous error, they establish our minds in the truth, and through them we are enabled to attain the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus.

From this general survey of the scope and contents of the book, it must be obvious to the reader, that we are called to contend with a new and most subtle form of infidelity. The whole ground of controversy is shifted. The end aimed at is the same, the destruction of the Bible as a divine revelation, in the sense in which the Christian world has, heretofore, been accustomed to use the term, but the mode of attack is entirely changed. The infidels of former times impugned Christianity either in its doctrines or evidences, but never dreamed of asserting that an external standard of faith was inconceivable and impossible. Some denied that it was necessary, the light of nature being sufficient for all the purposes of religion—but the ground generally taken was, that the scriptures were wanting in the proofs, by which a divine revelation ought to be authenticated, or that they were self-condemned in consequence of the absurdity and contradiction of their contents, or that no proofs could ascertain to others the reality of a revelation to ourselves; but whatever was the point of assault, whether miracles, prophecy or doctrines, the genuineness and authenticity of the records, the origin and propagation of Christianity in the world and its moral influence on society, it was always assumed that *there was sense* in the proposition, which affirmed the Bible to be a divine and authoritative standard of faith. Elaborate apologies for it, under this extraordinary character, were deemed worthy of the powers and learning of the most gifted members of the race. But Mr. Morell takes a widely different position. He undertakes to demonstrate, by a strictly *a priori* argument, drawn from the nature of the mind and of religion, that a revealed theology is a psychological absurdity. His design is, from the philosophy of Christian experience, to demolish the foundations of Christianity itself. His method requires him to attack neither miracles, prophecy, nor doctrines—you may believe them all—provided you do not regard them as proving the Bible to be a rule of faith, nor receive them on the ground that they are attested by the seal of Heaven. In the application of his boasted reflective method, he has plunged into the depths of consciousness and fetched from its secret recesses the materials for proving that, in the very nature of the case, every system of doctrine not only *is* but *must* be human in

its form and texture. It is on this ground that we charge him with infidelity. He takes away the Bible, and when that is gone, we deliberately assert that all is lost. He talks indeed, of his intuitions and fellowship and sympathy and his all powerful organon of reflection, but when he proposes these as a substitute for the lively oracles of God, our minds labour for a greater ability of despising, than they have ever had occasion to exert before. Let the authority of the Bible be destroyed, and Christianity must soon perish from the earth. Put its doctrines upon any other ground than a "thus saith the Lord," and every one of them will soon be denied, and we shall soon cease to hear from the dim territory of feeling, in which Mr. Morell has placed religion, any definite reports of God. What has been the effect upon himself, since he has declined to receive his theology from the Bible? How many of the doctrines which he was, no doubt, taught in his infancy and childhood, has he been able to "realize" by his own method of construction! The plan of his work has not required him to treat of particular articles of faith, but from occasional glimpses which we catch, it is easy to collect, that his creed is any thing but evangelical. The doctrine of the incarnation, for example, is reduced to nothing but "the realization of divine perfection in humanity." "We need," says the author,* "to have the highest conceptions of divine justice and mercy, and the highest type of human resignation and duty, realized in an historical fact, such as we can ever gaze upon with wonder and delight; not till *then* do they become mighty to touch the deepest springs of our moral being." Jesus is, accordingly, represented as a finished model of ideal excellence, combining in his own person all that is pure and lovely and sublime, a living embodiment of the moral abstractions which, it seems, are powerless to affect the heart until they are reduced to "an historical and concrete reality," and which *then*, as if by an electric shock, or a wizard's spell, can stir the depths of our nature, rouse our dormant energies and inspire us with zeal to imitate what we are obliged to admire. Hence the whole mystery of godliness—of the word made flesh—is a very simple affair; it is just God's giving us a pattern to copy. This is what reflection makes of it from the intui-

* p. 241.

tions of religion without the Bible. Justification by faith, the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*—"the very life-spring," as Mr. Morell admits*—"of the Reformation," fares no better in his hands, as it passes, through his constructive method, from the region of experience to that of doctrine. It is not a little remarkable, too, and sets this method in a very unfavourable light, that while our author professes to have the same "*moral idea*" with Luther and the reformers, his statement of it as a *doctrine* is precisely *opposite* to theirs. Total depravity and the consequent necessity of regeneration, he must, to be consistent, deny, as his theory requires that religious sensibility, even in our fallen state, should be viewed as an original faculty of the soul, and from the beginning to the end of the volume there is not a single passage which even remotely squints at the doctrine of atonement, in the sense of a satisfaction to the justice of God for the guilt of men. What then of *real* Christianity does he believe? Echo answers, what.

These specimens are sufficient to show what success crowns the efforts of our author in constructing a theology without the Bible. We want no better illustration of what is likely to become of our religion when we give up an external standard for the dim intuitions of inspired philosophers. We are not, however, without other lessons of experience, which Mr. Morell must admit to be applicable. Upon his principles, the construction of the universe is a process exactly analogous to the construction of a creed. The ontological systems of the German masters may, accordingly, be taken as a fair sample of what reflection is able to achieve in the science of world-making—and judging from them, we can form something more than a conjecture, of the extravagance and folly which will be palmed upon us, for the pure and wholesome doctrines of the cross, should the same method be admitted into the department of Christian theology—it would be sheer insanity to suppose that it will make less havock of our creeds, than it has made of nature, of the soul and God. Upon one thing we might count with certainty—the being speedily overwhelmed with a species of Pantheism, in which all sense of duty and religion would perish. The fatalism of Mahomet has the merit of being consistent, but the

* p. 253.

transcendental philosophy, as if impelled by an irresistible instinct to contradictions and absurdity, makes its boast, in one breath, of the demonstration of the essential and indestructible freedom of man as its greatest triumph, and, in the next, does not scruple to deduce the contingent, finite and variable, from their *necessary relations* to the absolute, infinite and eternal. No man can turn from these speculations and laugh at the Geeta, or the Ramayuna of Valmeeki. They teach us—what it would be madness to disregard; that, in relation to theology, the real issue is between the Bible, or a wild imagination “in endless mazes lost;” between the Bible, in other words, and Atheism. We do not hesitate, therefore, to rank Mr. Morell’s book in the class of infidel publications. He has assailed the very foundations of the faith, and in resisting his philosophy, we are defending the citadel of Christianity from the artful machinations of a traitor, who, with honeyed words of friendship and allegiance upon his tongue, is in actual treaty to deliver it into the hands of the enemy of God and man.

Entertaining these opinions of the character and tendency of the work, we shall make no apology for entering, with great freedom, into a critical estimate of its merits. It is, perhaps, only the first fruits of what we may yet expect from larger importations of the same philosophy into Britain and America, and, as is generally the case with first fruits, it is probably the best of its kind. We apprehend that no man, who shall undertake a similar work, will be able to bring to it a larger variety of resources, a more profound acquaintance with ancient and modern speculations—a nicer critical sagacity or an intenser power of reflection than have fallen to the lot of Mr. Morell, and we are glad that it is a man, thus eminently gifted, the great hierophant of German mysteries, and not the humble and contemptible retailer of oracles, which are hawked about as divine only because they defy all effort to understand them, who has brought on the first serious collision in the field of English literature, betwixt evangelical religion and the new discoveries in metaphysics. The vigour of *his* assault may be taken as a fair specimen of the power and resources of the enemy, and we rejoice in being able to say, that whatever vague and undefined fears may have

floated through our minds, for the security of our faith, while the conflict was yet at a distance, and the proportions of the foe unduly magnified by the fogs and mists through which he was contemplated, have turned out to be, upon the first demonstration of his real dimensions and his skill in battle, like the shudder and dismay conjured up by a moonlight ghost.

The book may be considered in the double light of a philosophy and an argument—the philosophy supplying the premises of the argument. We intend to examine it in both aspects, and as, in every instance of ratiocination, the first and most obvious inquiry is in regard to the validity of the reasoning, does it hold?—do the premises contain the conclusion?—we shall pursue, in the present case, the natural order of thought, and inquire into the merits of the argument before we investigate the claims of the philosophy. We hope to show that there is a double escape from the infidelity and mysticism into which the author would conduct us—one through the inconclusiveness of his reasoning, the other through the falsehood or unsoundness of his premises—he is signally at fault both in his logic and philosophy.

The fundamental proposition of the treatise, in which its preliminary speculations were designed to terminate, and upon which its subsequent deductions are dependent for all the value they possess, is that a valid theology is *never* the gift of Heaven, but is *always* the creature of the human understanding. This is assumed as a settled point in the last six chapters of the book. The seventh, which developes the process by which, in conformity with the laws of mind, we are able to construct a theology for ourselves, evidently takes it for granted that it is a matter which we have to do for ourselves, unless the author intended these discussions as a mere exhibition of his skill, an amusing play of ingenuity and fancy, like Ferguson's Natural History of Society or Smith's theory of the origin of language. If God has given us a body of divinity it is of very little consequence to speculate on what might have taken place, had we been left to ourselves. Theology, in this aspect of the case, being reduced to the condition of any other science, perhaps the method described by our author is, as he asserts it to be, the *only* method by

which we could successfully proceed. But the very stress of the controversy turns upon the question—whether we have been left to ourselves—whether theology is, in fact, like all other sciences, the production of man, or whether God has framed it for us, ready to our hands. The same assumption, in regard to the human origin of theology, pervades all the speculations of the eighth chapter, professedly on Fellowship, but really on creeds and confessions. If there be a faith once delivered to the saints, it may be our duty to contend for it, and to withdraw from those who consent not to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ and to the *doctrine* which is according to godliness, and to reject those, after the first and second admonition, who bring in damnable heresies. If there be such a thing as a form of sound words, there may be an obligation to teach it, and hence an analogy betwixt the church and the school, in consequence of which believers may be termed disciples, ministers, teachers, and Christ the great Prophet of all. These things cannot be gainsaid until we have something more than assertion that there is no authoritative type of doctrine into which we ought to be cast. As to the chapter on Certitude, that never could have been written by a man in whose philosophy it was even dreamed of, that there might be a ground of assurance in a divine testimony fully equal to dim and misty intuitions which require to be corrected by the generic consciousness of the race. Let it be admitted that God has given us a theology, and evinced it to be His, by signs and wonders, or any species of infallible proofs, we certainly need no firmer basis for our faith than that the mouth of the Lord has spoken. All such speculations as those of our author are darkening counsel by words without knowledge. The relation, too, in which philosophy stands to theology, the subject of the last chapter of the book, is materially changed, when it is denied that philosophy is the organon to form it, or when the whole question concerning the truth or falsehood of any doctrinal system is made a question of *authority* and not a question of abstract speculation.

It is hence obvious, that the human origin of theology is the soul of the system, it pervades all his speculations. Without it one-half of his book falls to the ground, and

the conclusions, which palpably contravene the popular faith, are stripped of all plausibility and consistency. As a logical production, his entire treatise is a failure unless this principle can be established.

Now, has it been proved? Has the author any where demonstrated, that theology, as contra-distinguished from religion, must *necessarily* be human, and *can* possess no other authority but that which attaches to it from the laws of thought? or has he even succeeded in showing that, as a historical fact, it *is* human, though it *might* have been otherwise, and, therefore, subject to the same criticisms to which every human production is amenable? Let it be remembered, that the real issue, betwixt himself and the popular faith, is, whether or not God *has* communicated, in the language of men, a perfect logical exposition of all the truths which, in every stage of its religious developement, the human mind is capable of experiencing. Mr. Morell denies, the popular faith affirms: if he can make good his negative, then man must create his theology for himself—his speculations, upon that point, become natural and proper, and all the conclusions which are subsequently drawn from them in relation to fellowship, certitude and the precise office of philosophy, with respect to systems of Christian doctrine, become consistent and legitimate. If, on the contrary, he fails to do so, then all these speculations are premature—they have no solid foundation in truth; and though they may still be interesting, as a new and curious department of fiction, they should drop the name of philosophy, or couple it with that of romance, and assume a title which would indicate the fact, that their logick is purely hypothetical.—Has he succeeded, or has he failed? This question we shall be able to answer, by considering what the exigencies of his argument demand, and the manner in which he has addressed himself to the task of meeting them—by comparing, in other words, what he *had* to do with what he *has* done. What, then, is necessary in order to prove that no such divine communication, as the popular faith maintains, has ever been made to men? There are, obviously, only two lines of reasoning that can be pursued in an argument upon this subject. It must either be shown, *a priori*, that such a divine communication is

impossible, involving a contradiction to the very nature of theology—or *a posteriori*, that such a divine communication, as a matter of fact, *never has been made*, or what, upon the maxim—*de non apparentibus, &c.* is equivalent to it—*never has been proved*. This last proposition may be established, in turn, either by showing that no testimony or no evidence can authenticate such a communication; or that the evidence, in the given case, falls short of what ought to be afforded; or that it is set aside by countervailing evidence; or that there is positive proof, that some other method has been adopted. This seems to us to be a true statement of the logical condition of the question. Mr. Morell was bound to prove either that a divine revelation, in the ordinary sense of the terms, is impossible, a psychological absurdity; or that no book, professing to be a revelation, is worthy of credit—there *can* be, or there *has* been none. This being the state of the controversy, let us proceed to examine how he has acquitted himself in disposing of these points—the last of which, alone, has given rise to a larger body of literature than any other subject in the world.

The premises of the argument, in both aspects, whether *a priori* or *a posteriori*, are contained in the chapters on Revelation and Inspiration. It was evidently the design of these chapters to developé a theory which should explode the vulgar notions in relation to the Bible, as at once absurd, in a philosophical point of view, and destitute of evidence, as a matter of fact. His whole view of inspiration he represents as “a protest and an argument”* against “the formal use of the letter of Scripture,” which is made by “those who ground their theology, professedly, at least, upon an induction of individual passages, as though each passage, *independently of the spirit of the whole*, were of divine authority.” “To suppose that we should gain the slightest advantage,” by accuracy of definitions, and consistency of reasoning, on the part of the sacred writers, “implies,” he informs us,† “an entire misapprehension of what a revelation really is, and of what is the *sole method* by which it is possible to construct a valid theology. An actual revelation can only be made

* p. 205. † p. 175.

to the intuitional faculty, and a valid theology can *only be constructed* by giving a formal expression to the intuitions thus granted." We understand these passages, especially when taken in connection with the spirit of the whole discussion, as distinctly asserting the proposition that theology, as a formal statement of doctrine, can *never* be divinely communicated, and that upon the ground, that it involves elements which are incompatible with the very nature of revelation—a *revealed* theology being a contradiction in terms. Clearly, if "the giving of a formal expression to the intuitions" of religion, be the *sole* method by which it is *possible* to construct it—there is no place for an authoritative standard of faith.

Now does the author's theory of revelation, admitting it to be true, preclude the *possibility* of a *divine* theology? We shall not deny—for we have no disposition to dispute about a word—that it is inconsistent with a *revealed* theology, in the *author's sense* of the term. We may here take occasion to say that much of the impression which his reasoning makes upon the mind of his readers, is due to the ambiguity of language. *They*, from old associations and familiar usage, mean *one* thing by revelation; and he, *another*; and it is hard to keep distinctly in view that conclusions, which may be legitimate in *his* sense, may not be legitimate in *theirs*. If Mr. Morell chooses to restrict the application of the term to the subjective processes by which the mind is brought into contact with spiritual realities, and then infers that an external standard of faith cannot be a revelation—the inference may be just—but it no more concludes against the reality or possibility of such a standard, than to restrict the term animal, exclusively, to quadrupeds, and then infer that neither men nor birds were animals, concludes against the truth of their existence, or their possession of life. What Mr. Morell undertakes to settle, is not a question of words and names: not whether the Bible shall receive this title or that, (no one dreams that it is a spiritual vision, or any special mode of intelligence,) but whether God *can* communicate in writing or in any other form, a perfect logical exposition of those very intuitions, which he makes it the office of revelation to impart. That such a divine communication is, in the

nature of the case, *impossible*—not that it cannot be *called* by a given name—is what he represents his theory of revelation as necessarily involving, and what, if it does not involve, it is not pertinent to the argument.

This theory is designed to give an answer to the question—*in what manner* does a man become a Christian? The essential elements, included in that form of man's religious life which he denominates the Christian consciousness, having been previously enumerated, he proceeds, in his account of revelation, to describe the "process by which such phenomena of man's interior being are produced—the secret link which unites them with an outward causality, and the laws by which they are brought into existence, regulated, and finally developed to their full maturity." It is only "in relation to the *method*, by which it is communicated to the human mind," that Christianity can be properly designated "as A REVELATION from God."* That is, if we understand the author, it is the office of revelation to excite the emotions which are characteristic and distinctive of the religion of Jesus. It has reference, therefore, exclusively to what, in common language, would be styled experimental religion, and includes nothing but the means by which the state of heart is engendered, which entitles a man to be considered as a real, in contradistinction from a formal believer.

But as religion consists, essentially, in emotions; and emotions are dependent upon that form of intelligence which supplies the objects adapted to awaken them—a direct correspondency always subsisting between the intellectual and emotional activity—the question arises, to which faculty are we indebted for the objects that awaken religious emotions? We must *know* them—they must be *present* to the mind, or no affections can be excited; through what form of intelligence, then, do we become cognizant of spiritual realities? The answer is, intuition.

"In considering, then, under which of the two great generic modes of intelligence, we have to class the particular case involved in the idea of a revelation, we can have but little hesitation in referring it, at once, to the category of intuition. The idea of a revelation is universally considered to imply a case of

* p. 122.

intelligence in which something is presented *directly* to the mind of the subject; in which it is conveyed by the immediate agency of God himself; in which our own efforts would have been unavailing to attain the same conceptions; in which the truth communicated could not have been drawn by inference from any data previously known; and, finally, in which the whole result is one lying beyond the reach of the logical understanding."—*p.* 126.

The author, then, proceeds to run the parallel betwixt this account of revelation and intuition in its lowest form, that of external perception, and finding a perfect correspondence, he does not hesitate to rank them as kindred species of the same mode of intellectual activity. But to make assurance doubly sure, he undertakes to show that revelation *cannot* be addressed to the understanding—"that the whole of the *logical* processes of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them; that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it."* His meaning is that no new original elements of knowledge, or as Locke would call them, no new simple ideas, can be imparted to the mind by definition, analysis or reasoning. He regards revelation as a source of original and peculiar ideas—like the eye or the ear, or what Hutcheson felicitously styles the internal senses of the mind. "The object of a revelation, is to bring us altogether into another and higher region of actual experience, to increase our mental vision, to give us new data from which we may draw new inferences, and all this lies quite apart from the activity of the logical faculty."†

The author still further, though not more plainly, develops his views in the answer he returns to the question, "could not a revelation from God consist in an exposition of truth, made to us by the lips or from the pen of an inspired messenger, that exposition coming distinctly under the idea of a *logical explication of doctrines*, which it is for mankind to receive, as sent to us on divine authority." Let us hear him upon this point:

"Now this is a case of considerable complexity, and one which

* *p.* 131.† *p.* 133.

we must essay as clearly as possible to unravel. First of all, then, we have no doubt whatever but that there have been agents commissioned by God to bring mankind to a proper conception of divine truth, and comprehension of the divine will. But now let us look a little more closely into their real mission, and consider the means by which alone it was possible for them to fulfil it.

"These divine messengers, we will suppose, address their fellow-men in the words and phrases they are accustomed to hear, and seek in this way to expound to them the truth of God. If we imagine ourselves, then, to be the listeners, it is needless to say, that so long as they treat of ideas which lie *within* the range of our present experience, we should be well able at once to comprehend them, and to judge of the grounds on which they urge them upon our attention. But it is manifest that such a discourse as I describe could in no proper sense be termed a *revelation*. So long as the divine teacher keeps within the range of our present intellectual experience, he might indeed throw things into a new light, he might point out more accurately their connexion, he might show us at once their importance and their logical consistency; but all this would not amount to a *revelation*, it would give us no *immediate* manifestation of truth from God, it would offer no conceptions lying beyond the range of our present data, it would quite fail in bringing us into contact with new realities, nor would it at all extend the sweep of our mental vision. Mere exposition always *presupposes* some familiarity with the subject in hand; one idea has always, in such a case, to be explained by another; but supposing there to be an entire blindness of mind upon the whole question, then it is manifest that all mere logical definition and explication is for the time entirely thrown away.

"Illustrations of this are as numerous as are the sciences, or the subjects of human research. Let a man, for example, totally unacquainted with the matter, hear another converse with the greatest clearness about differential quantities in physics or mathematics—how much of the explanation would he be able to comprehend? He has not yet the experiences of space, number, or motion, on which the intelligibility of the whole depends; and in want of these, the whole of the explanations offered are involved in the darkest obscurity. Take up any other subject, such as biology, ethics, or metaphysics, in their higher and more recondite branches. Explication here is of no avail, unless the mind first realize for itself, and reproduce in its own thinking, the fundamental conceptions of the teacher. What is

true of perceptive teaching, in the case of the infant, is true, in a modified sense, of all human education, to the most advanced stage of intelligence. You must, in every instance alike take proper means to awaken the power of vision within, to furnish direct experiences to the mind, in brief, to give clear intuitions of the *elements* of truth, before you can produce any effect by the most complete process of defining or explanation.

Let us return, then, to the supposed case of the inspired teacher, and proceed with our analysis of the conditions that are necessary to his becoming the medium of a revelation, properly so called. We have seen that, if he always kept within the region of our present experience, there would be no fresh revelation made to us at all: but now, let us imagine him to *transcend* the present sphere of our mental vision;—it is evident from what I have first said, that in such a case we should be by no means in a condition to comprehend his meaning; on the supposition, of course, that he was to confine himself to *mere exposition*. The only way in which he could give us a revelation of truth hitherto unrealized, would be by becoming the agent of elevating our inward religious consciousness up to the same or a similar standard as his own; which is the same thing as if we had said that all revelation, properly so called, can be made to us primarily only in the form of religious *intuition*.”—*pp.* 134—137.

We have now said enough to put our readers completely in possession of the author's views of revelation. It implies a direct perception of spiritual realities—a gazing upon eternal verities, which, upon the principle that the eye affects the heart, produces those peculiar emotions in which the essence of religion consists. It communicates to us the elemental ideas of all religious knowledge—the primary data, without which the science of theology would be as unmeaning as the science of optics to a man born blind. As perception gives us all our original and simple ideas of matter—the moral sense, our notions of the good—taste, our notions of the beautiful and sublime—so revelation imparts to us the ideas of God, of Christ, of redemption and of sin. The subjective processes in all these cases are the same. Nature, the beautiful, the good, are just as truly and properly revelations, as the verities embraced in Christian experience. There was, however, in the case of Christianity, a series of “divine arrangements, through the medium of which the loftiest and purest conceptions

of truth were brought before the immediate consciousness of the apostles, and through them, of the whole age; at a time, too, when, in other respects, the most universal demoralization abounded on every side.* These arrangements the author admits to be supernatural—the result of a “divine plan, altogether distinct from the general scheme of providence as regards human developement.” But the revelation consequent upon them is purely natural—man was elevated to a mountain which commanded prospects beyond the ordinary range of his eyes—but the vision which ensued was in strict obedience to the laws of sight.

Now we ask our readers to ponder carefully this account of revelation, and to lay their fingers on the principle which either directly or indirectly proves, that a perfect standard of theology cannot be imparted to us by God, or that any and every theology *must* be the offspring of the human understanding. This account, we are told, is at once a protest and an argument against the popular notions on the subject. The protest we can find—it is patent on every page—but the *argument* we are utterly unable to discover. Does it follow that because religion, as a matter of experience, is divine, therefore theology, as a matter of science, *must* be human? Does it follow that because God gives us all the direct and immediate cognitions out of which the science can be *framed*, therefore, He is unable to construct the science Himself? Does it follow that because He makes us feel and see, therefore, He is incompetent to describe either our visions or emotions? We confess that our sincerest efforts cannot render palpable to our thinking faculty the least incongruity betwixt the notions of a divine theology, and a revealed religion in the sense of Mr. Morell. For aught that we can see to the contrary, his whole psychology might be granted—all that he says of the understanding and intuition—their differences and relations—with his whole scheme of revelation—all might be granted—and yet nothing be conceded at all destructive of the doctrine, that we have a faith, ready developed to our hands, which we are bound to receive upon the authority of God. We might no longer call it a *revealed* faith, but it would be none the less infallible and divine on that account.

* p. 145.

Mr. Morell admits that man can construct a theology for himself, that he is able to give a definite form and scientific basis to his religious life, and to the spiritual truth involved in it." The intuitions of religion, like all other intuitions, can be submitted to the operations of the understanding; they can be compared, classified and arranged; they are as really the materials of a science as the facts of perception, or the phenomena of conscience. Now what is there in the process of constructing a science from religion, which limits it exclusively to man? Is there any absurdity in supposing that God can communicate, in writing or in some other form, a perfect logical exposition of all the intuitions which, in every stage of its religious history, the human mind is capable of experiencing? any absurdity in supposing that God can do perfectly and infallibly for His weak and ignorant creatures what it is conceded they can do imperfectly and fallibly for themselves? What is there inconceivable in God's giving a logical and formal expression to the religious mind of man? We do not deny that a divine theology, though it might be strictly scientific in its form, and capable of the same proofs to which all human sciences appeal, must yet challenge our assent upon a higher ground. It is to be received—not because it accords with our experience, but because it is the testimony of God. It comes to us and *must* come to us with authority. It is truth because it proceeds from the fountain of truth. If Mr. Morell contends that this peculiarity removes it from the category of science, we shall not dispute about a word; all that we contend for is, that it is and must be a more full and complete representation of all the phenomena of religion than reflection itself could give with the aid of the best conceivable organon, applied to intuitions as strong, distinct and clear as the most definite perceptions of sense.

It is clear that Mr. Morell, in representing his scheme of revelation as an *a priori* argument against the possibility of a divine theology, has quietly assumed that the agency there described is the *sole* agency of the Deity in relation to the religion of His creatures. He seems to think that the Almighty exhausted Himself in the production of spiritual perceptions, and therefore, *could* not reduce them to the forms of the understanding; that in the process of engen-

dering religion he lost the ability to describe it. But where is the proof that revelation, in our author's sense, includes the *whole* agency of God? Not a particle is adduced—and hence as a divine theology is not inconsistent with a revealed religion—as there is no shadow of contradiction betwixt them—and not the slightest proof that the revelation of religion is the only form in which God condescends to His ignorant and sinful creatures, Mr. Morell has signally failed to establish, on philosophical grounds, the human origin of theology. His premises do not contain his conclusion. For aught that he has alleged to the contrary, we may be as truly indebted to the divine benignity for a perfect and infallible standard of faith as for those other operations in consequence of which we feel the pulsations of the Christian life.

The only thing, indeed, in the whole chapter on revelation, which seems remotely to bear upon the subject, is the passage already quoted, in which he states the question only to evade it. He shows, indeed, that a logical explication of doctrines could not awaken ideas in a mind destitute of the capacity to apprehend them. We may cheerfully concede that no painting can make a blind man see, that no musick can ravish a deaf man with the rapture of its sounds; but still the painting and the musick may both exist and be perfect in their kind. No one claims for a divine theology the power of making men Christians; it is universally conceded that the letter killeth; but the controversy betwixt Mr. Morell and the popular faith is whether that letter can exist. It is a poor evasion to say that because it cannot perform an office which no one has ever thought of ascribing to it, that, therefore, it is essentially and necessarily inconceivable as a real and substantive entity. All that our author proves is that it cannot enlighten; that it can impart no new simple idea; that it presupposes all the elemental germs of thought which enter into theology, as natural philosophy presupposes the informations of sense, and psychology those of consciousness. It supposes, in other words, that men are capable of religion, but it by no means follows that because a divine theology can neither create the religious faculty nor immediately produce its appropriate intuitions, therefore it cannot express them with logical exactness, nor describe

the objects on which they are dependent. Moral philosophy cannot originate a conscience, but it may still be a scientific exhibition of all the operations of the moral nature. What Mr. Morell's argument requires him to prove is that a divine theology is impossible—that a science of religion being admitted, that science *cannot* be imparted to us by God; it *must*, from the nature of the case, be *human* in its origin; and this proposition is not affected by the inadequacy of such a science to accomplish a certain subjective effect, unless it can be shown that its ability to do this is the condition of its existence.

But, perhaps, the proof we are seeking may be found in the chapter on Inspiration. It is the object of that chapter to show that

“Inspiration does not imply any thing generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity, peculiar to the individuals thus highly favoured. We must regard the whole process of inspiration, accordingly, as being in no sense *mechanical*, but purely dynamical; involving, not a novel and supernatural faculty, but a faculty already enjoyed, elevated *supernaturally* to an extraordinary power and susceptibility; indicating, in fact, an inward nature so perfectly harmonized to the divine, so freed from the distorting influences of prejudice, passion and sin, so simply recipient of the divine ideas circumambient around it, so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven, that truth leaves an impress upon it which answers perfectly to the objective reality.”—*p.* 151.

All which, being interpreted, is that inspiration and holiness, or sanctification, are synonymous terms. The author apprehends, in its literal sense, the benediction of our Saviour on the pure in heart, and makes them seers not only of God, but of those things of God, which the apostle assures us, none can understand but the Spirit of God Himself. It will certainly strike our readers as a novelty, that there should be any inconsistency betwixt the grace of holiness and the gift of knowledge. They will be slow to comprehend how sanctification and instruction *can* be contradictory processes—so much so, that He who *sanctifies* cannot *teach*. Sanctify them through thy truth—

thy word is truth—through sanctification of the spirit and belief of the truth. For aught that we can see it may be granted to the author, that the measure of piety is the exact measure of ability to appreciate, to understand, to know divine truth, that holiness is essential to a living faith, and yet it will not follow that God cannot communicate the truth, with which, as holy beings, we are brought into harmony. If our holiness were perfect, it would enable us, according to the author, to apprehend the objects of religion in their concrete reality, but not in their scientific form; and there is nothing absurd in the idea, that the things which have aroused our moral sensibilities should be presented, in their full and perfect proportions, to the contemplation of the understanding.

It may be objected, however, that although Mr. Morell's philosophy does not prove a divine theology to be impossible or absurd, in the strict acceptation of the terms, yet it demonstrates, what, in reference to any dispensation of God, amounts to the same thing, that it is unnecessary or useless. This is no doubt the *real* scope of his argument, though he has been bold enough to assert that the *only way*, the *sole method* by which a valid theology can be constructed, is by human reflection on the phenomena of religion. But widely different as the issues of possibility and expediency evidently are, we shall concede, in the present instance, that the proof of uselessness is tantamount to the proof of absurdity, and proceed to inquire how Mr. Morell has succeeded in even this aspect of the case. "To a man utterly ignorant," says he,* "of all spiritual conceptions, and altogether insensible to divine things, the mere exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity is *useless*. He does not grasp them at all in their proper meaning and intensity; ranging as they do beyond the sphere of his present experience, the very terms of the propositions employed awaken no corresponding idea within his mind." That is—theology, under a certain contingency, is *powerless* to produce a given effect. But a specific incompetency and a general uselessness are very different things. Because, in a "man utterly ignorant of all spiritual conceptions and altogether insensible to divine

* p. 137.

things," the mere exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity cannot supply the place of faculties to apprehend them, it by no means follows, that to the man who has spiritual conceptions and is "sensible to divine things," that theology may not be of incalculable service. To a man destitute of senses, natural philosophy would, no doubt, be a very unintelligible jargon—but does it follow that it must be correspondingly useless to one who has all the simple ideas of which it is composed? But Mr. Morell has himself settled the question. He represents theology, in our present condition, as a *necessity** of our nature, and ascribes to it offices of immense importance in the developement of the religious life. It is true that he has his eye only on *human* theology, but the uses which he admits are not at all dependent upon its *origin*, but upon its *truth*. It answers these valuable ends, not because it has been reached by reflection, but because it has a real existence and is capable of a real application. It is the thing itself which is useful, and not the mode of its discovery. It would seem, too, that the more perfect it was, the better; and that the circumstance of its being divine, so far from detracting from its value, would immensely enhance it. Let us now attend to the author's admissions:

"Theology, having once been created, can be presented didactically to the understanding before there is any awakening of the religious nature, and can even lead the mind to whom it is presented to such an interest in the subject as may issue in his spiritual enlightenment.—*p.* 207.

Here it is obvious that the use of the theology is not at all dependent upon its origin—it is useful to a mind which has not been in a situation to construct a system reflectively for itself. This is just what we attribute to a divine theology; it is the means under God of awakening the religious nature, the incorruptible seed by which we are begotten to newness of life, and the standard to which all our experiences must be brought, and by which their soundness must be tried. This single consideration, that the science of religion may be the means of awakening the religious nature, that theology may be the parent of piety, is enough to set aside all that the author has said against

* *p.* 196.

the value of a logical exposition of the truths and doctrines of Christianity.

The following remarks, professedly intended to elucidate the subject, are applicable with tenfold power to such a system as the Bible claims to be. We ask nothing more than what the author has himself suggested to remove all cavils against the letter because it killeth, while the spirit only is competent to quicken into life :

“The uses of Christian Theology are :—

1. To show the internal consistency of religious truth. Little as we need to see this consistency whilst our inmost souls are burning with a deep and holy enthusiasm, yet in the ordinary state of human life, beset as we are with a thousand repressive influences, it is highly important to strengthen ourselves with every kind of armour against scepticism and indifference. In proportion as our zeal and excitement become cooler, do we need so much the more the concurring testimony of reason to support us in the pursuit of the Christian life. It is upon this we fall back, when the fire of life burns dim, until we can kindle it again from the altar of God. Hence the importance of having Christian truth presented to us in such a form, that we may see its harmony with all the laws of our intellectual being, and have *their* witness to seal its truth on our hearts.

“2. Another use of Christian Theology is to repel philosophical objections. The unbeliever has not the witness within himself; and what is more, he would fain destroy the validity of the truths of Christianity to others, by affirming their inconsistency with reason or with one another. The moral influences of the religious life do not *answer* these objections, although they may disarm them greatly of their force. To answer them, the truth conveyed in the religious life must be made reflective and scientific;—then, indeed, and not till then, can itself be maintained, and its consistency be defended upon the grounds of the philosophical objector himself.

3. A third use of Christian Theology is to preserve mankind from vague enthusiasm. A strong religious excitement is not inconsistent with a weak judgment, a feeble conscience, and active tendencies to folly, and even sin. Under such circumstances, the power of the emotions will sometimes overbalance the better dictates of Christian faith, love, and obedience, so as to impel the subject of them into something bordering upon fanaticism. Against this evil, religion alone is often unable to struggle; it needs the stronger element of calm reason to curb these wandering impulses, and bring them into due subjection to duty and

to truth. Here, then, the influence of *theology* bears upon the whole case; and to its power is it mainly owing that the intense incentives offered by Christianity to the emotive nature of man have been so ordered and directed as to keep him from vague enthusiasm in his belief, and an unsafe fanaticism in his actions.

"4. The last use we mention to which theology may be applied, is, to embody our religious ideas in a complete and connected system. In this form they appeal to every element in the nature of man. The moral influence they exert upon the whole spirit is coupled with the power of their appeal to the reason, and the intellect of mankind becomes *satisfied* as his heart becomes softened and renewed.

"Such in brief are some of the principal uses of theology formally considered."—*pp.* 225—227.

Having shown that our author has signally failed in his *a priori* argument against the existence of a divine standard of theology, that is, that his philosophy even upon the supposition of its truth, is not inconsistent with the popular faith in regard to the *authority* of the Bible, we shall next notice the several considerations by which he attempts to prove that, as a matter of fact, no such divine standard has ever been vouchsafed to our race. His first argument is drawn from the proofs by which Christianity has been revealed to man.

"The aim of revelation," he informs us, "has not been formally to expound a system of doctrine to the understanding, but to educate the mind of man gradually to an inward appreciation of the truth concerning his own relation to God. Judaism was a propædæutic to Christianity; but there was no formal definition of any one spiritual truth in the whole of that economy. The purpose of it was to school the mind to spiritual contemplation; to awaken the religious consciousness by types and symbols, and other perceptive means, to the realization of certain great spiritual ideas; and to furnish words and analogies in which the truths of Christianity could be embodied and proclaimed to the world. If we pass on to the Christian revelation itself, the mode of procedure, we find, was generically the same. There was no *formal* exposition of Christian doctrine in the whole of the discourses of the Saviour. His life and teaching, his character and suffering, his death and resurrection, all appealed to the deeper religious nature of man; they were adapted to awaken it to a newer and higher activity; instead of offering a mere explication to the understanding, they were intended to fur-

nish altogether new experiences, to widen the sphere of our spiritual insight, to embody a *revelation from God*. The apostles followed in the same course. They did not start from Jerusalem with a system of doctrine to propound intellectually to the world. It would have been no revelation to the world if they had; for with his moral and spiritual nature sunk down into insensibility and sin, man would have had no real spiritual perception associated with the very terms in which their arguments and propositions must have been couched. The apostles went forth to awaken man's power of spiritual intuition; to impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, and of heavenly love. This they did by their lives, their teaching, their spiritual *intensity* in action and suffering, their whole testimony to the word, the person, the death and the resurrection of the Saviour."—pp. 139—40.

We do not remember ever to have seen a more signal exemplification of a theory breaking down under its own weight, than that which is presented in the preceding extract. The end of all revelation is to furnish, we are told, intuitional perceptions of religious truth; it cannot, therefore, be addressed to the understanding, neither can it contain logical and definite statements of doctrine. But still this revelation is to be imparted through the instrumentality of commissioned agents, and these agents fulfil their vocation by *teaching*. Now if the reader will turn to the second chapter of our author's book, in which the distinctions are drawn out at length betwixt the intuitional and logical consciousness, he will find that the very first point insisted on, is that the "knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *representative and indirect*; while that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *presentative and immediate*." To produce an intuition, consequently, the mind and the object must be brought together in actual contact. It must not be some description or representation, but the reality of truth itself which must stand face to face with the knowing subject. Where essential existence, or original elements of knowledge are concerned, the power of language is utterly inadequate to convey any ideas to the mind; the intuitions themselves must exist, or all efforts to awaken the conceptions are utterly hopeless. If, in conformity with these principles, Christ and His Apostles were commissioned to

make a revelation to men whose moral and spiritual nature was sunk down into insensibility and sin, all that they could have done was to present the spiritual realities which they themselves apprehended, and then impart a corresponding power to perceive them. They went, according to the theory, among the blind, to make known glorious objects of sight. Their first business must have been to place the objects within the reach of the eye, and then purge the eyes to behold them. This is the only way in which we can conceive that they could have succeeded in effecting vision. But what has *teaching* to do with this process? All the knowledge acquired from another, through the medium of signs, is indirect and representative; and, therefore, addressed not to intuition, but to the understanding. How will our author explain this inconsistency? He, in the first place, represents Christ and His Apostles as spiritual mesmerizers, whose whole business it is to bring their fellow-men face to face with a class of transcendental realities, and then, at the very time that he is disproving the possibility of an appeal to the understanding, he converts them into teachers, dealing not with the realities themselves, but with their signs and logical exponents. They awaken intuitions by *teaching*! Hence upon his own admission, the process by which Christianity has been revealed to man, is *not* in accordance with the fundamental principles of his system. The inconsistency of his statements is still more glaring in reference to the Mosaic institute. That, it seems, was a propædæutic to Christianity; but it had nothing logical, nothing in the way of representative instruction; and *yet awakened the religious consciousness by types and symbols*. Now we would humbly ask what are types and symbols, but a *language* through which, in the one case, instruction is communicated by means of analogy, and in the other by means of visible and significant signs?—In what way could these figured representations of truth suggest the spiritual realities to the mind, but through the operations of the understanding, comparing the type with the anti-type—the sign with the thing signified? From the author's own account, then, it is evident that both Judaism and Christianity were propagated by appeals to the understanding; that the agents of the revelation, in

both cases, were, in the strict and proper sense of the term, teachers, and that it was a part of their commission to embody, in language of some sort, the high conceptions to which they were anxious to elevate their race. These conceptions, when embodied in language, became doctrines; so that there must have been, to the same extent to which Christ and His Apostles were teachers, "a formal exposition of Christian doctrine."

But we would ask our author how, apart from didactic appeals—which, we have already seen, he confesses may be the means of spiritual awakening—spiritual intuitions could be engendered by any merely human agency? In what way is it possible for one man to present a spiritual reality to another, except through its verbal sign, or by a description of the occasions on which the intuitions are experienced? His whole office *must* be logical. He can neither give eyes to see, nor can he bring the objects themselves in their essential and substantive existence into contact with the mind. He can, in other words, *do nothing*, according to Mr. Morell's own psychology, but make a logical statement of his own experiences. How could the Apostles, for example, impress upon the world the great conceptions of sin, of righteousness, of judgment to come, of salvation, of purity, of heavenly love, but by some definite, that is to say, logical expression of these very conceptions as they existed in their own minds; or if they were simple and elementary ideas, by referring to the occasions or circumstances connected with their first suggestion to themselves. The *intuitions* they could no more produce, than they could create a soul. Through a strong ideal presence of the scenes amid which their own experiences had been awakened, they might rouse the latent susceptibilities of their hearers—but their office terminated with the descriptions suited to produce this presence, which is purely a logical process. "Their testimony to the word, the person, the death and the resurrection of the Saviour," must, in the same way, have been conveyed in words—they could only hope to reach the sensibilities through the understanding—they could set Christ and his life in vivid distinctness before the minds of men, but it could only be by signs which represented the realities—and therefore their appeals must

have been exclusively logical. Their intensity in action and suffering, as a mere phenomenon, suggested no definite idea—it might have been madness, fanaticism or any other extravagance—it could have no moral import to spectators, until it was explained—and we see no way of explaining it but by signs which should represent the moral enthusiasm from which it sprung. Hence, according to the author's own showing, the labours of Apostles and Evangelists were confined exclusively to the faculty which deals with signs. They testified to facts, and embodied in words the great moral conceptions which these facts involved ; and hence Christianity, then, *was diffused*, so far as the agency of men was employed, by addresses to the logical faculty. The Apostles taught, testified, acted—their teaching and testimony were obviously to the understanding, and action has no meaning except as its principles and motives are understood. Direct appeals to the intuitional consciousness would evidently have been preposterous. That faculty deals immediately with things themselves—and unless the Apostles were gifted with power to command the presence of spiritual realities at pleasure—to bring God and Heaven and Hell into direct contact with the minds of men—and possessed a similar power over the hardened hearts, the slumbering consciences, and the stupid sensibility of their age—unless they could give eyes to the blind, and ears to the deaf—to have sent them into the world to awaken religious intuitions, would have been about as sensible an errand as to have sent them into a cemetery, to quicken corpses and make the dead entranced admirers of the beauty of nature. If they were to be debarred from addressing the understanding, we are utterly at a loss to conceive in what manner they would proceed. Mr. Morell has involved himself in perplexity and contradiction by confounding the real mission of the Apostles, which was purely logical, and from the nature of the case could not have been otherwise, with the results which God intended to effect, and which, if he likes the expression, were purely intuitional. The whole process, as it is described in the New Testament, is plain, simple, intelligible. It consisted, in the first place, in that very logical explication or statement of doctrines which Mr. Morell so much abhors ;

and then in a process of supernatural illumination, which it was the prerogative of God alone to communicate.—The Apostles described the realities of religion, and the Holy Ghost enabled the hearers to understand. They made the sounds, the Spirit imparted the hearing ear; they presented the scenes, the Spirit gave the seeing eye; they announced the truth, the Spirit vouchsafed the understanding heart. They, in other words, upon the authority of God, proclaimed an infallible theology; and the Spirit of all Grace produced the religion of which that theology was the logical expression. He used their truth to renew, to sanctify, to purify, to save. Their business was to *teach*; it was the office of an agent more august and glorious than themselves to awaken the conceptions which that teaching embodied.

It is particularly in the chapter on Inspiration, that the author points out the difficulties with which the vulgar theory of the divine authority of the Scriptures is encumbered. We have seen that he regards inspiration as equivalent to holiness; and most of the chapter is occupied in refuting what he has chosen to designate the mechanical view of the question. It is, of course, indispensable to the authority of the Scriptures, as the word of God, that the men who wrote them should have written as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Any hypothesis which sets aside a divine testimony to every statement and doctrine of the Bible, is inconsistent with the exercise of that faith which the Scriptures exact, and which is the only adequate foundation of infallible assurance. So far as responsible authorship is concerned, a divine rule of faith must be the production of God. The object of such a rule is not simply to give us truth, but truth which we know to be truth, specifically on the ground that the Lord has declared it. Hence the theory of "verbal dictation," which our author declares,* "has been so generally abandoned by the thoughtful in the present day," is the only theory which we have ever regarded as consistent with the exigencies of the case—the only theory which makes the Bible what it professes to be, the WORD OF GOD, and an adequate and perfect measure of

* p. 154.

our faith. If its contents, in any instances, however insignificant, rest only upon the testimony of the human agents employed in writing it; in those instances we can only believe in man; the statements may be true, but they cease to be divine and infallible; and the assent which we yield to them becomes opinion and not faith.—If, therefore, the author has succeeded in demolishing the theory of verbal dictation, or of a distinct commission, which he treats separately, though they are only different expressions of the same thing, it must be confessed that, however he has failed in his philosophy, he has completely triumphed in the *a posteriori* aspect of his argument.

His first consideration is, that “there is no *positive* evidence of such a verbal dictation having been granted.”—This is summary enough. But the reason assigned is still more remarkable.

“The supposition of its existence would demand a two-fold kind of inspiration; each kind entirely distinct from the other. The Apostles, it is admitted, were inspired to preach and to teach *orally*, but we have the most positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words. Often they were involved in minor misconceptions; and sometimes they taught specific notions inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul. The *verbal* scheme, therefore, demands the admission of *one* kind of inspiration having been given to the Apostles as men, thinkers, moral agents and preachers, and another kind having been granted to them *as writers*.”—*p* 155.

In the first place, this two-fold inspiration is the result of Mr. Morell's own arbitrary use of language. If he chooses to describe the influences under which men are converted and sanctified as *one* kind of inspiration, the theory of verbal dictation, of course, implies another; but another, by no means inconsistent with the former. The process by which a man is transferred from sin to holiness, is very different from the process by which he receives a message to be announced in the terms of its conveyance. There is nothing in personal integrity incompatible with the office of a secretary or amanuensis.

In the next place, Mr. Morell begs the question in assuming that the commission of the Apostles as teachers

and preachers, involved no other inspiration but that which changed their hearts. The very stress of the controversy turns upon the question—what was the Apostolick commission? Whatsoever it was, it is universally conceded, that it extended to their writings in exactly the same sense in which it extended to their preaching. If their preaching, in the discharge of their functions as Apostles, were not verbally dictated, no more were their letters. If they *spoke* not by the Holy Ghost, neither did they *write* under His suggestions. “But,” says our author, “we have the most positive evidence that this commission did not extend to their very words.” This, if it could be proved, would settle the question. But there is something in the first commission which our Saviour gave to the twelve, when He sent them out to the lost sheep of the house of Israel, which seems to be in such palpable contradiction to this confident assumption, that we must be permitted to hesitate whether the evidence can be regarded as superlatively positive. “Behold,” says the Master, “I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves—be ye, therefore, wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. But beware of men; for they will deliver you up to the councils; and they will scourge you in their synagogues; and ye shall be brought before Governors and Kings for my sake, for a testimony against them and the Gentiles. But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak; for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak. FOR IT IS NOT YE THAT SPEAK, BUT THE SPIRIT OF YOUR FATHER WHICH SPEAKETH IN YOU.” Or, as it is more pointedly in Mark, “IT IS NOT YE THAT SPEAK, BUT THE HOLY GHOST.” Paul, too, for whom, by the way, the author has no great partiality, professed to speak the things which had been freely revealed to him of God, “not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth;” and had the arrogance to treat his communications “as the commandments of the Lord.” But what is the *most positive evidence* to which Mr. Morell refers? Why, that the Apostles “were often involved in minor misconceptions, and sometimes they taught specific notions, inconsistent with a pure spiritual Christianity, as Peter did when he was chided by Paul.” Peter *taught* no such thing. He was

guilty of dissimulation *in conduct*. He knew the truth and acted in consistency with it before that certain came from James, but when they were come, he was tempted to humour their prejudices. Paul reproved him distinctly upon the ground that he was acting in contradiction to what he knew to be the truth of the Gospel. This case, therefore, only proves that Peter, as a man, was partially sanctified ; it does not prove that, as an Apostle, he was permitted to fall into doctrinal error. As to the other minor misconceptions, to which our author refers, it will be time to explain them when we know what they are.—Mean while, we may be permitted to remark that, in this case of Peter, the author has confounded holiness of character with the Apostolick commission. The only inspiration which he seems able to conceive, is that of personal purity ; and if a man has any remnants of sin cleaving to his flesh or his spirit, he is, accordingly to Mr. Morell, imperfectly inspired. This, we repeat, is a begging of the question. No one maintains that the Apostles, as men, were perfect ; they were sinners, under the dominion of grace ; but as Apostles, in their official relations, it is the doctrine of the popular faith, that they were the organs of the Holy Spirit in communicating to the Church an infallible rule of faith and practice. It is no presumption against this hypothesis, that they were subject to the weaknesses of fallen humanity ; the treasure was put in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power might be confessed as springing from God. It is surely miserable sophistry—when the very question in debate is, what was the Apostolick commission—quietly to assume a theory, and then make that theory the pretext for rejecting another account. And yet this is what our author has done ; he assumes that the Apostolick commission consisted exclusively in the elevation of the religious sensibilities, and then upon the ground of this assumption, rejects the hypothesis of verbal dictation, as requiring a commission, for the writers, distinct from that of the Apostolick office. We suspect that it would be no hard matter to prove any proposition, in heaven or earth, if we can only be indulged in the liberty of taking our premises for granted.

The author's second argument,* upon which, very prudently, he does not insist, is drawn "from the fact, that we find a distinctive style, maintained by each separate author." He regards it "as a highly improbable and even extravagant supposition, without the most positive proof of it being offered, that each writer should manifest his own modes of thought, his own temperament of mind, his own educational influence, his own peculiar phraseology; and yet, notwithstanding this, every word should have been dictated to him by the Holy Spirit." If Mr. Morell had investigated, a little more fully than he seems to have done, the grounds of the popular faith, he might have found in this very circumstance, which he considers so extremely improbable and extravagant, a fresh illustration of the wisdom of God. The external proofs of inspiration, which consist in the signs of an apostle or prophet, found either in the writer himself, or some one commissioned to vouch for his production, require, in most cases, a knowledge of the author. And in conducting an inquiry upon this point, the internal evidence, arising from style, structure and habits of thought, materially contributes to a satisfactory result. In the first stage of the investigation we consider the productions simply as human compositions, and God has wisely distributed the gift of inspiration so that while He is responsible for all that is said, the individual peculiarities of the agent shall designate the person whose instrumentality He employed. He has facilitated our inquiry into the human organ of the Holy Spirit. Having ascertained ourselves as to the human authors or their works, the next question is—as to the claims which they themselves put forward to divine direction. What are these claims and how are they substantiated? If they pretend to a verbal dictation and then adduce the credentials sufficient to authenticate it, we have all, which, in the way of external evidence, could be reasonably exacted. The epistle to the Romans, for example, is put into our hands as a part of the word of God. The first question is—who wrote it? If it can be traced to Paul, we know that he was an apostle of the Saviour and enjoyed whatever inspiration was attached to the apostolick office. He possessed in an eminent degree the signs of an apostle, and if it were one of

* p. 156.

the privileges of the office, that those who were called to it should, in their publick instructions and testimonies for Jesus, speak the language of the Holy Ghost, as soon as we are convinced that Paul was the writer of the document, its ultimate emanation from God is settled. Now it obviously facilitates this inquiry to have the mind of Paul stamped upon the letter—to have it distinctly impressed with his image, while it contains nothing but the true and faithful sayings of God. It is consequently no presumption against the divine dictation of a book, that it should exhibit traces of the hand that was employed.

The third argument* mistakes altogether the very end of inspiration. The object was to furnish a statement of facts and an exhibition of doctrines, which should be received with a faith infallible and divine, upon the sole consideration that God was the author of both. Its design was to give us a *rule of faith* and *not a standard of opinion*. It was to be a divine testimony—and therefore whatever might be the moral and religious qualifications of the writers—however competent they might have been upon their own authority to have told us the same things, their words could, in no sense, be received as the real oracles of God. The Lord Himself must speak; and this being the purpose of inspiration, verbal dictation detracts in no way from the character or worth of the apostles. What they were inspired to teach others, was received by themselves upon the same ultimate ground on which it is received by us. They were channels of communication—not because they were *fit* to be nothing else—but because the end intended to be answered necessarily precluded any other relation on their part, to the message conveyed.

The fourth argument, which is a repetition, almost for the hundredth time, of the incompetency of the Bible to change the heart and enlighten the understanding, though the author presents it here as a "*moral demonstration*" against the theory of verbal dictation, has already been sufficiently answered in what we have said of the uses of theology. Will Mr. Morell never learn to distinguish between an inadequacy to produce a given effect and universal worthlessness? Is the eye useless, because it can-

* p. 156.

not hear, or the ear useless, because it cannot see? And must a divine standard of theology be utterly good for nothing, because it cannot perform the office of the Holy Spirit? Is there nothing else that it can do? Has not he himself repeatedly admitted that a *human* theology subserves many valuable purposes in the economy of religion? and in the name of truth and righteousness what is there in the mere circumstance that it *is human*, to give it such an immense advantage over one that is divine?

The theory of a distinct commission, which the author treats separately from that of verbal dictation, though they are only different expressions of the same thing, he summarily dismisses, as destitute of any satisfactory evidence, and indebted for "its growth and progress in the Church to the influence of a low and mechanical view of the whole question of inspiration itself."* The compositions of the prophets and apostles, whether in the Old or New Testaments, he considers as the spontaneous effusions of their own minds, prompted by the motives which usually regulate good men, in their efforts to promote the welfare of their race. The purpose to write and the things they should write were equally the suggestions of their own benevolence and wisdom. The theory of a distinct commission, on the other hand, asserts that they were commanded to write by the special authority of God, and that the things which they wrote were dictated to them by the agency of the Holy Spirit. The settlement of this controversy evidently turns upon two points—the light in which the writers themselves regarded it—or in the absence of any specific information upon this head, the light in which it was regarded by those who were competent to judge. If they claimed a distinct commission, or those whose testimony ought to be decisive, awarded it to them, there is an end of the dispute. With relation to the books of the Old Testament, we receive their verbal inspiration upon two grounds. The first is the testimony of the Jewish Church, which in the successive generations contemporary with the successive writers in its canon, known to them, however unknown to us, possessed the means of determining with accuracy, whether the several authors exhibited

* p. 160.

themselves the external proofs of a divine commission, or in the absence of such proofs, whether their productions were vouched by the seal of those who were competent, from the same proofs, to give an infallible decision. The second is the testimony of Christ and His Apostles. These witnesses are competent to judge; now the question is, what judgment did they give? in what sense did they receive these books as coming from God? We shall not here enter into the question concerning the notions of the Jews, although they are patent upon almost every page of the New Testament; but we confidently assert, that Christ and His Apostles distinctly and unequivocally awarded to the prophets of the ancient dispensation precisely the verbal inspiration in their writings, which Mr. Morell labours to subvert. Paul declares that all scripture is given by inspiration of God.* Peter, a little more definitely—that holy men of God *spake* as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.† Our Saviour rebuts a malignant accusation of the Jews, by an argument which turns upon the divine authority of the *words* of the Old Testament;‡ and passages are again and again quoted by His apostles as the *ipsissima verba* of the Holy Spirit. Well *spake* the Holy Ghost, says Paul, by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers.§ Wherefore as the Holy Ghost saith—to-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.|| The Old Testament is compendiously described as the oracles of God,¶ and the apostle informs us that it was *God* who, at sundry times and in divers manners, *spake* in time past unto the fathers by the prophets.** Paul goes so far as to identify the scripture with God himself—attributing to it what was absolutely true only of Him. The scripture saith unto Pharaoh—the scripture foreseeing that God would justify the heathen—the scripture hath concluded all under sin. It is absolutely certain from these references that Christ and His Apostles regarded the Old Testament as *verbally* inspired—and the prophets being nothing but the agents through whom the Holy Ghost communicated His will. It is of no consequence, therefore, whether we know the human authors of the different books or not—or the times

* 2 Tim. iii. 16. † 2 Pet. i. 21. ‡ John, x. 33—36. § Acts, xxviii. 25.

|| Heb. iii. 7. ¶ Rom. iii. 2. ** Heb. i. 1.

at which they were written, or even the country in which they were composed; it is enough that what constituted the canon of the Jews in the days of our Saviour, was endorsed by Him and His own chosen apostles as the word of God. He and they referred to that canon as *a whole*, under the well known titles of the Scriptures, the Law, the Prophets, and the Psalms, treated it generally as authoritative, called it specifically the oracles of God, and quoted particular passages in a way which they could not have done if there had been no distinct commission to write them. But these considerations, it appears, are nothing to Mr. Morell. Because we are not in possession of the evidence which justified the reception of each particular book into the Jewish canon, he triumphantly asks, upon the hypothesis of verbal dictation, "what chance have we of being successful in proving the inspiration of the Old Testament against the aggressions of the sceptick."* "The fact," he adds, "upon which many lay such remarkable stress, that Christ and His Apostles honoured the Old Testament, is nothing to the purpose, as far as the *nature* of their (its) inspiration is concerned." But is it nothing to the purpose that Christ and His Apostles distinctly declare to us that it was *God* who *spoke* by the prophets, that the scriptures are called by our Saviour the *Word of God*, and particular passages are repeatedly cited as the *ipsis-sima verba* of the Holy Ghost? Is this *kind* of honour nothing? But he continues:

"They honoured the *Divine* and *Eternal* in the old dispensation. They honoured the men who had been servants and prophets of the most High. They honoured the writings from which their spirit of piety and of power breathed forth. But never did they affirm the *literal* and special divinity of all the national records of the Jewish people, as preserved and read in the Synagogues of that day.—pp. 178.

No doubt Christ and His Apostles honoured the *Divine* and *Eternal* in the old dispensation, but if the scriptures are to be credited they also honoured the divine and *temporary*. They honoured *every thing* that *was* divine, whether it was to remain or be done away. The Master fulfilled *all* righteousness. As to the *men*, who had been

* p. 178.

servants and prophets of the most high, they said very little about them—at least very little is recorded. But it is certain that they *never* honoured the writings of the prophets because they were the offspring of pious and devotional feeling. It was not because the spirit of the men was in them, but because the spirit of God was there, that they attached the importance which they did to the books of the Old Testament; and the passages which we have already quoted, put it beyond any reasonable doubt that they *did* regard God as the real and responsible author of these books. Their testimony is, or ought to be decisive of the question.

The author's opinion of the inspiration of the New Testament may be collected from the following passage, which, though long, cannot be conveniently abridged:

“Passing from the Old Testament to the New, the same entire absence of any distinct commission given to the writers of the several books (with the exception, perhaps, of the Apocalypse of John) presents itself. Mark and Luke were not apostles, and the latter of them distinctly professes to write from the testimony of eye witnesses, and to claim the confidence of Theophilus, for whom his two treatises were composed, *on this particular ground*. Matthew and John wrote their accounts somewhat far in the first century, when the increase of the Christian converts naturally suggested the necessity of some such statements, at once for their information and for their spiritual requirements generally. Finally, Paul, as we know, wrote his letters, as the state of particular Churches seemed to call for them; but in no case do we find *a special commission* attached to any of these, or of the other epistles of the New Testament.

“Added to this, the light which history sheds upon the early period of the Christian Church shows us that the writings which now compose the New Testament Canon, were not at all regarded as express messages to them from God, independently of the conviction they had of the high integrity and spiritual developement of the minds of the writers. They received them just as they received the oral teachings of the apostles and evangelists; they read them in the Churches to supply the place of *their* personal instructions; and there is abundant evidence that *many other writings* which now form the New Testament were read with a similar reverence, and for a similar edification.

It was only gradually, as the pressure of heresy compelled it, that a certain number of writings were agreed upon by general

consent as being *purely apostolic*, and designated by the term *homologoumena*, or agreed upon. But that much contention existed as to which should be acknowledged canonical, and which not, is seen from the fact that a number of the writings now received were long termed "antilegomena," or contested; and that the third century had well nigh completed its course before the *present canon* was fixed by universal consent. All this shows it was not any distinct commission attached to the composition of certain books or documents, which imparted a divine authority to the apostles's writings, but that they were selected and approved by the Church itself as being veritable productions of men "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"—men who were not inspired *in order* to write any precise documents, but who wrote such documents, amongst other labours, by virtue of their being inspired.

"The conclusion which we necessarily draw from these considerations is, that the canonicity of the New Testament scriptures was decided upon, solely on the ground of their presenting to the whole Church clear statements of *apostolical Christianity*. The idea of their being written by any special command of God or verbal dictation of the Spirit, was an idea altogether foreign to the primitive Churches. They knew that Christ was in himself a divine revelation; they knew that the apostles had been with him in his ministry; they knew that their hearts had been warmed with his truth, that their whole religious nature had been elevated to intense spirituality of thinking and feeling by the possession of his Spirit, and that this same Spirit was poured out without measure upon the Church. Here it was they took their stand; in these facts they saw the reality of the apostolic inspiration; upon these realities they reposed their faith, ere ever the sacred books were penned; and when they *were* penned they regarded them as valid representations of the living truth which had already enlightened the Church, and as such alone pronounced upon their canonical and truly apostolic character."—*pp.* 163—165.

The substance of these observations may be reduced to three points.—1. That the writers of the New Testament made no pretensions to the sort of inspiration implied in the idea of a divine commission to write. 2. That the primitive Church did not look upon their productions as the words of the Holy Ghost; and, 3. That the collection of books which constitute the canon of the New Testament was made—not that it might be an authoritative rule of

faith, but that precious mementos of the apostles and of apostolick preaching might be embodied and preserved.

Every one of these propositions is grossly and notoriously false. There are three considerations which to any candid mind put it beyond all reasonable controversy, that the apostles and evangelists *must* have claimed the plenary inspiration for which we contend. The first is that the Saviour, on no less than four different occasions, promised to the twelve the verbal dictation of the Spirit, when they should be called to testify for Him. The last promise has no limitation as to time and place, and the language in which it is couched deserves to be seriously pondered. "Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth; for He shall not *speake* of Himself, but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He *speake*, and He will show you things to come."* These promises explain the nature of the apostolick commission—at least so far as oral teaching was concerned. When the apostles *spoke*, it was not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth. The second consideration is that the apostles placed their *writings* upon the same footing exactly with their oral instructions. *Est enim scripturæ et prædicationis par ratio.*† The third is that they attributed the same authority to their own compositions which they awarded to the scriptures of the Old Testament. Peter refers to the epistles of Paul with the same reverence with which he refers to the canon of the Jews.‡ and Paul quotes the law of Moses and the gospel of Luke as entitled to equal consideration.§ If now our Saviour promised the verbal dictation of the Spirit in the oral teaching of the apostles—and they ascribed the same authority to their writings which belonged to their preaching—if they reckoned their own compositions in the same category with the Law, the Prophets,

* John, xvi. 13. The other instances are—Matt. x. 19, 20. Mark, xiii. 11. Luke, xii. 11, 12.

† 2 Thess. ii. 15. 1 Cor. xv. 1. John, xx. 31. 1 John, i. 1—4.

‡ 2 Pet. iii. 16.

§ 1 Tim. v. 18. *The labourer is worthy of his hire* is a passage found nowhere else as quoted by Paul but in Luke x. 7, and there it occurs exactly in the words of the apostle.

and the Psalms, and distinctly traced these to the immediate suggestions of God, what more can be required to establish the unqualified falsehood of Mr. Morell's first position upon the subject? But Luke, it seems—whom, be it remembered, Paul quotes as of equal authority with Moses—virtually disclaimed this species of inspiration, since “he professes to write from the testimony of eye-witnesses and to claim the confidence of Theophilus, for whom his two treatises were composed, *on this particular ground*.”* Mr. Morell is particularly unfortunate whenever he deals with scripture. The memorable words of our Saviour to Nicodemus, God so loved the world, &c., he very amusingly expoundst as a discovery of one of the apostles—a bright ray of intuition, beaming from a mind intensely heated by the marvellous scenes connected with the history of Jesus. And here he blunders sadly in reference to the beloved physician. Luke does not say that *he* wrote from the testimony of eye-witnesses, but that *others* had done so. He simply ascribes to himself, according to our English version, an accurate knowledge of the facts, or according to another version, a thorough investigation of them; and he claims the confidence of Theophilus, because he himself was perfectly ascertained of the truth of what he wrote.” His own mind had reached certainty—by what particular steps is not made known to us, and he was anxious to impart the same certainty to the friend to whom his treatises are addressed. Nothing hinders but that this very investigation may have been prompted by an impulse which terminated in that very dictation of the Spirit, without which his book is entitled to no special authority. Mr. Morell is not surely to learn that the theory of verbal inspiration contemplates something more than organic influence—that it represents the sentiments and language as the sentiments and language of the writers as well as of the Holy Ghost. God employed the *minds* of the apostles, with all their faculties and powers, distinctively as *minds*, and not as machines, to communicate His own will in His own words to mankind. Through their thoughts, memories, reasonings, studies and inquiries, He infused *His* truth into their hearts, put His words into their lips, and impressed His own declarations on the written page.

* p. 163. † pp. 247, 8.

How these things can be, we profess not to determine. *Our* philosophy cannot penetrate the mysteries of God. But we have the faculty of believing where we cannot explain. The *incarnate* word was man and God in one person and two distinct natures—and His divinity stamped ineffable value upon the deeds and sufferings of his humanity. The *written* word is divine and human in mysterious concurrence, and the divine invests it with all its value and authority as a conclusive standard of faith. "We grant," says Dr. Owen,* "that the sacred writers used their own abilities of mind and understanding in the choice of words and expressions. So the preacher sought to find out acceptable words—Eccles. xii. 10. But the Holy Spirit who is more intimate into the minds and skill of men than they are themselves, did so guide and operate in them, as that the words they fixed upon were as directly and certainly from Him, as if they had been spoken to them by an audible voice." "God," says Haldane,† "did not leave them to the operation of their own mind, but has employed the operations of their mind in His word. The Holy Spirit could dictate to them His own words in such a way that they would also be their own words, uttered with the understanding. He could express the same thought by the mouth of a thousand persons, each in his own style." It is upon this obvious principle that God employed them as intelligent agents, that they were required to give attendance to all the ordinary means of improving their faculties—to reading, study, meditation and prayer—to mutual consultation and advice—and to all the ordinances of the Christian Church. They were, by no means, like Balaam's ass, the passive vehicles of articulate sounds—God spoke through their *voice*, and communicated ideas through *their minds*.

The second proposition—that the primitive Church did not look upon the writings of the Apostles and Evangelists as verbally inspired, is so ludicrously false, and betrays such disgraceful ignorance of the history of opinions upon the subject, that very few words will be sufficient to despatch it. It is well known to every scholar, that the

* Works, vol. ii. p. 159. Holy Spirit, book 2nd, chap. 1.

† Haldane on Inspiration, p. 117.

theory of verbal dictation, stated often in such forms as to make the sacred writers merely passive instruments of divine communications, is the *oldest* theory in the Christian Church. Justin, Athenagoras, Macarius, and Chrysostom very frequently compare them to musical instruments, which obey the breath of the performer in the sounds they emit. Macarius tells us that the Holy Scriptures are *epistles*, which God, the King, has sent to men.* Chrysostom affirms that "all the Scriptures have been written and sent to us, not by servants, but by God, the master of all"—that "the words which they utter are the words of God himself." He tells us farther that even their very syllables contain some hidden treasure; that nothing is vain or superfluous about them, every thing being the appointment of the wise and omniscient God. The same opinions are found also in Origen, Cyrill of Alexandria, Irenæus, and Gregory Thaumaturgus. And yet the primitive Church attributed no verbal inspiration to the authors of the Gospels and Epistles! It is notorious, too, that the same terms of respect, which the Jews were accustomed to appropriate to their canon, were promiscuously applied by the Christian fathers to the whole canon of the Christian Church, and to the books particularly of the New Testament.† They were called by Irenæus, *Divine Scriptures, Divine Oracles, Scriptures of the Lord*; by Clement of Alexandria, *Sacred Books, Divine Scriptures, Divinely inspired Scriptures, Scriptures of the Lord, the true Evangelical Canon*; by Origen, the whole canon was called the *Ancient and New Oracles*; by Cyprian, the books of the New Testament were distinguished as *Books of the Spirit, Divine Fountains, Fountain of the Divine Fulness*. We hope Mr. Morell will look a little into history before he ventures to assert again, that "in the early period of the Christian Church, the writings which now compose the New Testament Canon, were not all regarded as express messages to them from God."

The third proposition is, that these books were not col-

* All the quotations which follow may be found with many others in Suicerus, Article *γραφη*, and Conybeare's Bampton Lectures; Lecture 1, at the end. The reader is also referred to Taylor's Doctor Dub. Book 2d, Chap. 3d, Rule 14.

† Paley's Evidences, Part 1, Chap. 9, § 4.

lected because they were the canon or authoritative rule of faith, but because they contained interesting memorials of Apostolick teaching and labours. If Mr. Morell has not sufficient leisure to peruse the documents of Ecclesiastical antiquity, he will find in the treatise, appended to the *Corpus et Syntagma confessionum*, or the consent of the ancient Fathers to the doctrines of the Reformation, a very satisfactory account of the precise light in which the primitive Church looked upon the Holy Scriptures. In the mean time we may inform our readers that it had exactly the same notions of their divine authority, as the arbiter of faith and the judge of controversies, which all Evangelical Christians now attribute to them. "It behoveth," says Basil of Cæsarea, "that every word and every work should be accredited by the testimony of the inspired Scripture." "Let the inspired Scriptures," he says again, "ever be our umpire, and on whichever side the doctrines are found accordant to the divine word, to that side the award of truth may, with entire certainty, be given." And still again, "it is the duty of hearers, when they have been instructed in the Scriptures, to try and examine, by them, the things spoken by their teachers, to receive whatever is consonant to those Scriptures, and to reject whatever is alien; for thus they will comply with the injunction of St. Paul, to prove all things, and hold fast that which is good." "We have known the economy of our salvation," says Irenæus, "by no other but by those by whom the Gospel came to us; which truly they then preached, but afterward, by the will of God, delivered to us in the Scriptures, which were to be the pillar and ground of our faith."

The facts upon which Mr. Morell relies to give countenance to his notions, in reference to the early estimate of the Scriptures, prove to our minds exactly the reverse. Why, when the primitive Christians were pressed by heresy, were they so anxious to be ascertained of the Apostolick writings, if these writings were not a standard of truth? Why so cautious in their inquiries; so watchful against impostures and frauds; so thorough in their investigations, if when they had agreed upon the genuine productions of the Apostles, they were no nearer settling their controversies than they were before? Can

any satisfactory reason be assigned, but that of the eloquent and fervid Chrysostom:

"The Apostolical writings are the very walls of the Church. Some one, perhaps, may ask, what then shall I do, who cannot have a Paul to refer to? Why, if thou wilt, thou mayest still have him more entire than many, even with whom he was personally present, for it was not the sight of Paul that made them what they were, but his words. If thou wilt, thou mayest have Paul and Peter and John, yea, and the whole choir of Prophets and Apostles, to converse with thee frequently. Only take the works of these blessed men and read their writings assiduously. But why do I say to thee, thou mayest have Paul; if thou wilt, thou mayest have Paul's master; for it is He himself that speaketh to thee in Paul's words."

The Apostles themselves were to the first churches which they collected the oracles of God. They were inspired to teach and publish the whole counsel of God, in reference to the Church. The words which they spake were not theirs, but Christ's who sent them. To all future generations, their *writings* were designed to occupy the position which they themselves occupied to the first converts. In these writings *we* now have what God originally spake through them. The care and anxiety of the primitive churches, to guard against delusion and deceit, were owing to the belief that all Apostolick compositions, that is, all compositions written either directly by themselves, or commended as inspired by their approbation, were, in the proper acceptation of the term, canonical; they were a rule of faith—they were the word of God. This being the state of the case, no book was received as of Apostolical authority, but after full and complete investigation. The evidences of its origin were thoroughly canvassed. The question was, what books has God sent to us; or in the language of Chrysostom, what epistles has God sent to us as the standard of truth? The answer was, those which the Apostles, in the discharge of their Apostolick commission, either wrote themselves or sanctioned as written by others. What books were these?—The primitive Church finally settled this question when it agreed upon the canon of the New Testament. The whole history of the matter shows that these documents were honoured—not as memorials of Peter, James and

John, but as the words of the *Master* communicated through them. Mark and Luke were not Apostles themselves, and yet they are included in the canon, and entitled to the same authority with Paul or any other Apostle. The reason was that the early Church had satisfactory evidence that they wrote under the same guidance which was promised to the twelve. Mr. Morell is therefore grossly at fault in maintaining that the Apostles themselves made no pretensions to verbal or plenary inspiration—that the Primitive Church did not accord it to them, and that their writings were not regarded as a divine and infallible canon of truth. The testimony of history is clearly—strongly—decidedly against him; and any conclusions against the theory of a divine commission, which he has drawn from the monstrous propositions which, as we have seen, have no existence but in the fictions of his own fancy, are nothing worth.

There remain two other arguments by which he attempts to set aside the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures—the first is the defective morality of the Old Testament, and the second is the inconsistencies and discrepancies of the sacred writers. As to the first it is obvious, from the whole tenor of the New Testament, that it professes to make no new revelations in morality—it is only a commentary on the Law and the Prophets. The great principle which is supposed by many to be characteristic of the Gospel, that we should love the Lord our God with all our hearts, and our neighbours as ourselves, is distinctly inculcated by Moses; while patience under injuries, alms to the indigent, and kindness to the poor, afflicted and oppressed, are the reigning spirit of the ancient Institute. The Israelites were indeed commissioned to wage exterminating wars against the devoted objects of divine wrath—but in these instances they were the scourge of God. It was not to gratify their private resentments or national ambition, but to execute the vengeance of Heaven, that they were commanded to destroy the tribes of Canaan. They were as the plague, pestilence and famine in the hands of the Almighty—God was the real destroyer—they were but the instruments of His will—and they departed from every principle of their Institute, if they suffered themselves to be influenced by

private malice. There are other instances in which deeds of treachery and deceit are *recorded*, but there is a huge difference betwixt recording and approving them. The drunkenness of Noah—if indeed he were drunk, which we very much doubt—the lies of Abraham, the cruelty of Sarah, the incest of Lot, the frauds of Jacob, and the adultery of David, were written not for our example, but our warning. There are other instances in which the moral import of the same material action was very different then from what it is now. There can be no doubt, that in the progress of society, relations may be developed and causes unfolded which shall make an act criminal in one age that was perfectly blameless in another. Incest was lawful in the family of Adam—under a certain contingency a Jew might marry his brother's widow—and it remains to be proved that in the early condition of eastern civilization, the habits and customs which now provoke our censure were possessed of the same moral import which attaches to them now. With these distinctions and limitations we have no hesitation in asserting that the morality of the Old Testament is precisely what we might expect it to be upon the theory of verbal inspiration. The great duties of piety and religion—of truth, justice and benevolence—the charities of life—the virtues of the citizen, the master and the man, the husband, the father and the son, are all impressed under the ancient economy with the sanctions peculiar to that Dispensation. There is nothing impure, immoral, unworthy of God.

As to inconsistencies and discrepancies in the sacred writers, which cannot be fairly explained, we simply deny them. Mr. Morell charges them with inconclusiveness of reasoning—defects of memory—and contradictions to science and themselves in their statements of fact. When he condescends to specify the instances, and to *prove* that his allegations are true, it will be time to answer yet again these exploded cavils of infidelity, which have a thousand times been refuted, and which he ought to know to be worthless. In regard to defects of memory, we beg him to recollect that any effort to substantiate this charge may involve an effort to cast a serious imputation upon the moral character of Jesus Christ himself. If there was any thing which he distinctly and unequiv-

orally promised to His Apostles, it was that the Holy Ghost should teach them all things and *bring all things to their remembrance*, which He himself had said unto them.

There is indeed one specification which he has made; the inconsistency of geological speculations with the Mosaick cosmogony. Mr. Morell, however, is not ignorant that the Mosaick narrative contradicts not a single fact of descriptive geology—all that it reports of the shape of the earth—its minerals and fossils—its marks of convulsion and violence—all these *facts* may be fully admitted, and yet not a line of Moses be impugned. It is only when the geologist proceeds to the causes of his facts, and invents hypotheses to explain them, that any inconsistency takes place—and this inconsistency is evidently not betwixt geology and religion, but geologists and Moses. It is a war of theories—of speculation and conjecture against the historical fidelity of a record, supported by evidence in comparison with which they dwindle into the merest figments of the brain.

There is one other consideration which demands our notice—and which we have reserved to this place, because it is evidently not an argument against the abstract possibility of a divine theology—being not at all inconsistent with the patristic notion of organic inspiration—but against that view of the manner in which it has been communicated that we have felt it our duty to defend. Mr. Morell asserts :

“ That the whole of the *logical processes* of the human mind are such, that the idea of a revelation is altogether incompatible with them—that they are in no sense open to its influence, and that they can neither be improved nor assisted by it. All our logical processes of mind—all the operations of the understanding take place in accordance with the most fixed and determinate laws, those which are usually termed *the laws of thought*. Whatever can be inferred by these laws, whatever can be derived in any way from them, must be strictly within the natural capacity of the human mind to attain. If, on the contrary, there be any thing which these laws of thought are naturally unable to reach, no extraneous influence whatever could give them the power of reaching it. The laws of thought are immoveable—to alter them would be to subvert the whole consti-

tution of the human intellect. Whatever is once within their reach is always so. Correct reasoning could never be subverted by revelation itself; bad reasoning could never be improved by it."—*pp.* 131, 2.

We are not sure that we understand this passage. If the author means that our logical processes do not originate the materials upon which they are employed, what he says may be true, but it is nothing to the purpose—but if he means that to a mind, already in possession of all the simple ideas upon which it is to operate, God, in consistency with its own laws, cannot secure the understanding from error, what he says is contradictory to the revelation of a theology, through the agency of men, upon any other hypothesis but that of organic inspiration. The question is not whether any divine influence can make bad reasoning good, or good reasoning bad—but whether God can exempt men from the bad, and infallibly conduct them to the good, without subverting their intellectual constitution.

Mr. Morell will hardly deny that if all the conditions and laws which ought to be observed in the processes of the understanding were faithfully regarded, there would be no danger of fallacy or mistake. Error is the result of disobedience or inattention to the laws of our own nature—the punishment of intellectual guilt. The naked question then is, whether God, by any subjective influence on the soul, can preserve it from eccentricity and disorder, and keep it in harmony with the essential conditions of its healthful operation. Surely it is no *subversion* of the *constitution* of the mind, to have that constitution protected from violence and encroachment. The soul is more truly itself when it moves in the orbit prescribed for it, than when it deserts its proper path, and wanders into forbidden regions. If God cannot exert a controlling influence upon the understanding, it must be because there is something in the nature of its faculties or exercises incompatible with the direct interference of the Deity. Now the faculties which belong to it are, according to our author's own statement,* memory, conception, imagination, abstraction and generalization, to which

* p. 15.

may be added, the association of ideas—the processes which belong to it are definition, division, judgment and reasoning, whether inductive or deductive. Not to enter at this stage of the discussion into any metaphysical analysis, it is obvious that these faculties exist, among different men, in very different degrees of perfection—and these processes are conducted with very different degrees of correctness—and yet their essential nature is the same in all. If, then, by the act of God, there can be different degrees of memory in different persons without any infringement of the laws of memory, why may there not be different degrees in the same person? If God can make one man reason better than another, without disturbing the laws of ratiocination, why cannot He make the same man reason at one time better than he reasoned at another? Can He not impart additional clearness to conception—vigour to imagination—nicety to analysis, and accuracy to the perception of those resemblances and relations upon which generalization and reasoning proceeds? The truth is, one of the most mysterious features connected with the human mind, is its susceptibility of growth and improvement—without receiving additions to its substance. Perfectly simple and indiscerptible, in its own nature, incapable of enlargement by accretion, it yet begins, in the simplest operations of sense, to exert an activity, which waxes stronger and better in every successive period of its existence, and to the developement of which there seem to be no natural limits. All the expressions by which we represent this change, are borrowed from material analogies, and are evidently liable to the abuse which, from such applications, has made the history of philosophy too much a history of confusion. In relation to our minds, much more than in relation to our bodies, we are fearfully and wonderfully made.* And if the *natural* order of improvement is a mystery, profound and impenetrable; if we are unable to comprehend, much less to explain, how a single substance—remaining unchanged in its essence—shall exhibit those wonderful phenomena which we can liken to nothing but growth, expansion and enlargement in material objects, surely it is too much to say that, in this world of mystery, another mystery still, cannot be found—that of *supernatural* im-

provement, in which every faculty shall faithfully obey the laws of its structure. To us the idea, that any creature, in any of its operations, can be independent of God, involves a gross contradiction. Absolute dependence is the law of its being. As without the concursus of the Deity, it must cease to exist, so His sustentation and support are essential to every form of action—every degree of developement—every step in improvement. It is only in God that it can live and move, as it is only in God that it has its subsistence. We see no more difficulty in supposing that God can superintend and direct the various processes of the understanding, than in admitting that he created its powers in the first instance, and impressed upon them the laws which they ought to observe. Providence is no more wonderful than creation.

Mr. Morell admits that the Deity can exert a subjective influence upon the intuitional faculties—that *they* can be elevated to a supernatural degree of intensity, and that this is actually done in the phenomenon of inspiration. Why, then, should the understanding not be accessible to God? If He can touch the soul in one point, why not in another? If He can improve its vision, what hinders but that He may regulate and assist its reflection? That He can turn the hearts of men as the rivers of water are turned—that the spirits of all flesh, in the full integrity of their faculties, are as completely in His hands as clay in the hands of the potter—that He can bring every proud thought and lofty imagination into humble obedience to his will—that the whole man is absolutely and unresistingly in His power, so that He can direct its steps without a contravention of the laws of its being—is the only hypothesis upon which the great evangelical doctrine of regeneration is consistent or possible. The work of the Spirit is represented as extending to the whole soul—it gives eyes to the blind—ears to the deaf—knowledge to the ignorant—wisdom to the foolish. It enlightens the mind—purifies the heart—cleanses the imagination—purges the conscience—stimulates the memory—quickens the judgment and imparts an unwonted aptitude in the perception of spiritual relations. As there is not a faculty which has not suffered from the ruins of the fall—so there is not a faculty which does not share in the restoration of grace. The testimony of scrip-

ture may be nothing to Mr. Morell—but as his presumptuous assertion is unsupported by any thing in his own mental analysis—as it is inconsistent with the analogy which the case of intuition, confessed by him to be susceptible of supernatural influence, obviously suggests—as there is nothing in the nature of the understanding, in any of its faculties or exercises, which places it beyond the reach of divine regulation—as there is no more absurdity in God's governing than in God's creating its powers—we may safely receive the declarations of the Bible, as well as the dictates of common sense, until we have some better reason for calling them into question, than the *ipse dixit* of a transcendental philosopher. And that theory is certainly reduced to a desperate extremity, which allows its author no refuge but a bold and impudent denial of the essential attributes of God. Whatever does not involve a contradiction and so prove itself to be nothing, lies within the boundless range of possibilities, which Almighty power can achieve. It is the folly and blasphemy of the wicked to reduce their Creator to their level—to make Him altogether such an one as they themselves, and to measure His resources by their own insignificant capacities. It is His prerogative to lift his hand and swear that as He lives forever, so He shall accomplish all His will—and rule alike the minds and bodies He has framed. Our God is in the Heavens. He has done whatsoever He hath pleased—and if among the things which have pleased Him were the purpose to communicate a divine theology through the minds and understandings of men, there could have been no impediment which his power could not easily surmount.

We shall here finish our examination of the book before us, with reference to the soundness of its logick. The single point to which our remarks have been directed is, whether the conclusions are legitimately drawn from the premises. We have admitted, for the sake of argument, the principles of the author's philosophy. We have called in question, neither his psychology, his analysis of religion, nor his accounts of revelation and inspiration. Our object has been to discover whether, granting all these, the popular faith in regard to the authority of the scriptures is necessarily subverted. We have attempted to

show that, though his philosophy pretends to be an *a priori* argument against the possibility of this notion being true, it demonstrates nothing to the purpose—that revelation, in *his* sense, is not *exclusive* of revelation in its common and ordinary acceptation—and that *his* inspiration is, by no means, inconsistent with the inspiration of the vulgar faith. Divest his argument of the ambiguity of language, and of the gratuitous assumption that the agency which he admits is the *sole* agency of God, and it is divested of all pertinency and force. We have gone still farther and convicted of weakness and confusion all his efforts to render useless and unnecessary the existence of a canon, such as the Bible professes to be. Out of his own mouth have we condemned him. As a *philosophical* argument, therefore, we are compelled to say, that his book is utterly wanting. That so far from demonstrating that a revealed theology is a psychological absurdity, he has beaten his drums and flourished his trumpets, when the enemy had not been even in sight. We have also followed him in his arguments addressed to the question as a matter of fact. We have seen that he is at fault in charging the popular faith with a total destitution of positive proof, and that all his objections to the plenary inspiration of the scriptures, whether founded on varieties of style, the necessity of divine illumination, the diminution of our respect for the sacred writers, the history of the canon, the immoralities, absurdities and contradictions of the Bible, or the alleged impossibility of a divine revelation through the understandings of men, are capable of an easy and obvious refutation. The conclusion of the whole matter is, that as an infidel assault, his book is a signal failure. For any thing that he has proved to the contrary, by either *a priori* or *a posteriori* reasoning, the Bible may be what the Christian world has always been accustomed to regard it. But a harder task remains yet to be performed. His philosophy must be brought to the touchstone of truth—and we hope, at no distant day to be able to convince our readers that no better success has attended his speculations, than has rewarded his efforts to apply them.

ARTICLE VI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Loyola: and Jesuitism in its Rudiments.* By ISAAC TAYLOR, Author of the *Natural History of Enthusiasm.* New York. Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 285 Broadway. 1849. pp. 416.

It is almost useless for us to say any thing in commendation of a book that bears the name of Isaac Taylor. The author of the "Natural History of Enthusiasm," "Fanaticism," "Spiritual Despotism" and "Ancient Christianity," has already earned the reputation of being one of the profoundest thinkers of his age—and after a careful perusal of the work before us, we are satisfied that it will detract nothing from his fame. It is divided into two parts—the first containing an extremely interesting sketch of the Personal History of Loyola—and the other an account of Jesuitism in its Rudiments. Throughout the treatise we are constantly presented with those rich and brilliant gems of thought which adorn all the compositions of the author—pregnant suggestions which comprise volumes in a sentence; which, before you are aware, drive you from your seat and make you involuntarily close the book that you may go off and ruminate. We were particularly impressed with the two first chapters in the second part; and the last, on Pascal and the Provincial Letters, places in a very clear and convincing light the utter impossibility of reforming the Popish Church. If any one expects to find mere declamation on the evils of Jesuitism he will be disappointed in the volume—but he will find, what is far better, a masterly analysis of the canonical scriptures of the society—he will find that falsehood, fraud and duplicity are the natural and necessary fruits of the system; that it was conceived in sin and brought forth in iniquity. Mr. Taylor's critique on the Letter on Obedience lays bare the hollowness, absurdity and wickedness of the fundamental principle of the order, and upon reflecting minds, will have the effect of an intensely argumentative invective. We sincerely hope that the book may have

an extended circulation. It is timely—it is able—and, as far as it goes, it is thorough. The edition of Messrs. Carter & Brothers is neatly printed, on substantial paper, and may be procured at a very low price.

2. *An Address on the occasion of the Author's resigning the office of President of Miami University, Commencement day, August 9th, 1849. By E. D. MACMASTER. Cincinnati: Printed by J. Ch. & U. P. James. 1849. pp. 36.*

Though some parts of this Address possess only a local and temporary interest, the larger portion of it is of permanent and universal value. The author exposes with great earnestness and vigour the prevalent misconceptions of the true and proper object for which a College is established. His remarks on this head are eminently reasonable—and, unfortunately, apply, with equal force, to other latitudes beside that of Miami. Every scholar will sympathise with his keen invective against the inordinate devotion of the great mass of the community to mere material objects—the spirit of coarse and vulgar utilitarianism, which is as fatal to a refined and elegant literature as to the pure sentiments of devotion. The author also exposes, as one hindrance to the success of Colleges, the want in the community generally of a practical sense of the necessity, as a preparation for professional studies, of exact and sound scholarship, and of thorough intellectual discipline. He further dwells upon the establishment of numerous Church Colleges, and the prevalent feeling naturally fostered by their friends, that State Colleges are unfitted to secure a proper religious character to youthful education. He concludes with depicting the evils which result from an officious intermeddling from without with the internal affairs of a College. All these points are well and pointedly discussed, though occasionally the style descends to a level which is not exactly suited to our taste. But the general sentiments of the Address we cordially endorse. He

has, in our judgment, laid bare the true causes which prevent Colleges, every where, in this country, from being what they ought to be, and from doing what they ought to accomplish. The great end of the Academick curriculum is so inadequately apprehended—the rage for the useful—the immediately, practically, tangibly useful, is so inconsistent with classical pursuits—the importance of intellectual discipline as a preparation for professional studies, is so imperfectly acknowledged; and there are so many masters who aspire to impress their own rude and undigested notions upon the community, that the wonder is that, amid so many discouragements, so much after all is really achieved. True merit, however, will eventually be rewarded. The College which devotes itself with a steady perseverance to its true vocation—which refuses to enter into a pitiful scramble for numbers—which asks, not *how many*, but *how well* it shall educate, will finally command the confidence of the publick, and be enabled to dispense its blessings on a scale somewhat commensurate with its ambition. Let it not yield to popular prejudices and idle clamours in the first instance, and it will soon hold the reins in its hands. It will elevate the community to its own standard.

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3. *An Inquiry into the alleged tendency of the separation of Convicts, one from the other, to produce disease and derangement; by a Citizen of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia. E. C. & J. Biddle. 1849. pp. 160.*

There is no such thing as prison-discipline in South Carolina. One good effect of circulating such productions, as the one just named, among us, may be to remind us that a great work of philanthropy remains yet to be undertaken in this State. It is true that the condition of our society has been eminently healthful—and we have not consequently felt the importance of attempting to reform, while we rebuke and punish criminals. Hence the controversy between the solitary and social systems is almost entire-

ly unknown in our borders; and we have not ourselves paid sufficient attention to it to give a decided opinion. Our leaning, however, is very strongly to the views ably and pungently maintained in this pamphlet.

4. *A Memoir of the life of James Milnor, D. D. late Rector of St. George's, New York. By Rev. JOHN S. STONE, D. D. Rector of Christ Church, Brooklyn. Published by the American Tract Society. 8vo. pp. 646.*

This Memoir will be read with special interest by the evangelical portion of that communion to which Dr. Milnor was attached: but a man so Catholic in his spirit and labours is the property of the Church universal, and will be cherished in memory by all those who love the image of Christ wheresoever it is found. There is a propriety too that this memoir should issue from the press of that Society to whose interests the subject of it devoted so much of his time and care; although it is apparent that this circumstance placed no little restraint upon his biographer. Indeed, the construction of this memoir is unskilful and clumsy throughout. If it be the design of biography to reveal the interior life of good and great men, to put the reader into easy companionship with them, to open each private door, to give access to the table, to the fire-side, to the undress behaviour and conversation, then has Dr. Stone signally failed in his undertaking. He has rather placed his friend in a show-case before admirers at a distance, than permitted them to share his society and friendship. We are conducted, for example, over more than 600 8vo. pages, and scarcely learn that Dr. Milnor had sons and daughters; and this only by the dry mention of the occasional sickness of one, or as he draws materials from the reminiscences of another. The correspondence too—so important an element of all biography—has little of continuity or reciprocity; which imparts a dry, essay-like form to Dr. Milnor's letters, which doubtless the originals had not, and which

the copies would not have, if they were strung upon any thread which should connect them together. But if to be "the prince of biographers," one must be a Boswell, it is scarcely a disgrace not to excel in this species of composition.

There are, however, many points of interest in this volume. It is refreshing to be brought in contact with so worthy an exponent of that portion of the Episcopal Church to which our Christian sympathies have always been given; it is pleasant to observe the power of divine grace arresting the successful lawyer and the busy statesman, and making him a quiet yet an earnest preacher of righteousness; it is instructive to trace the operations of that "free Spirit" who by gradual steps leads the sinner first from darkness into the twilight, and thence into the noonday of Christian truth and hope; and lastly it is comforting to see how much can be accomplished in life by sound judgment, and force of Christian character, without those rare intellectual endowments which must always be the prerogative of the few.

Dr. Milnor's visit to Europe, which occupies a large portion of the book, affords an insight into the religious society of England, and suggests many hints concerning the nature of Christian intercourse, and the modes by which it may be made profitable.

In close, we cannot forbear remarking upon the sectarianism of a Church which by system forces its best ministers upon the platform and into the committee rooms of voluntary societies, as the only way in which the hand of ministerial fellowship can be extended to the pious of other persuasions, and thus the Church Catholic be practically recognised. Nor can we withhold our astonishment at the absolutism of a government which permits a lordly prelate to rebuke, almost to interdict, a godly pastor only for encouraging a prayer meeting among his people. These things are for a lamentation, and will always excite sympathy in behalf of those who are so unnaturally and unscripturally restrained.

5. *Narrative of the United States Exploring Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea; by W. F. LYNCH, U. S. N., Commander of the Expedition. With Maps and numerous illustrations. Philadelphia: 1849.*

This book has now been long enough before the public to have a judgment passed upon it, not only by many individual readers, but also by many of our cotemporary journals. The expedition is honourable to Lieut. Lynch, who planned and executed it, and honourable to our republic, which we are glad to see taking her place, in her national capacity, among those governments of the civilized world, which have sought to enlarge the bounds of human knowledge. The expedition was absent from home rather more than a twelvemonth, and accomplished its important mission with a trifling expense and no detriment to the public service. The appointments and arrangements for the expedition seem to have been made by the commander with singular completeness and energy. The store ship Supply came to anchor in the bay of Acre, under Mount Carmel, on the 28th of March, 1847, and landed the party, with two boats, one of copper and the other of galvanized iron. These were drawn on trucks by camels—the first time, perhaps, in the history of the world, that this animal was ever harnessed,—across Palestine to Tiberias, where they were launched upon the sea of Galilee. On April 10th, they commenced the descent of the Jordan, which had before been attempted and accomplished by Lieut. Molyneaux of the British Navy, who died, however, before he could communicate to the world the result of his experiment. On the 18th of April they entered the Dead Sea, having spent a week in descending the river. The Jordan was found to be interrupted by frequent and fearful rapids, down which their boats plunged with headlong violence. There were no less than 27 threatening ones, besides many of lesser magnitude. This descent puts at rest the doubts of the celebrated geographer Carl Ritter, and Dr. Robinson, as to the great difference between the levels of the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea. Dr. Robinson had supposed that the flow of the Jordan, if swift, was silent and without cataracts. It was argued that it could not descend the great distance of near-

ly a thousand feet in 60 miles. The mystery is solved by the tortuous course of the river, which in 60 miles of latitude and 4 or 5 of longitude, is found to traverse 200 miles.

On the Dead Sea Lieut. Lynch and his party passed 22 days and nights, crossing it in a zigzag course, in different directions, sounding, and ascertaining also the topography of the coast. The monotony of this labour was varied by a visit to the castle of Kerak in the land of ancient Moab, which proved to be a perilous undertaking. Lieut. Lynch thus sums up the result of his labours:

"We have carefully sounded this sea, determined its geographical position, taken the exact topography of its shores, ascertained the temperature, width, depth, and velocity of its tributaries, collected specimens of every kind, and noted the winds, currents, changes of the weather, and all atmospheric phenomena. These, with a faithful narrative of events, will give a correct idea of this wondrous body of water, as it appeared to us.

"From the summit of these cliffs, in a line a little north of west, about sixteen miles distant, is Hebron, a short distance from which Dr. Robinson found the dividing ridge between the Mediterranean and this sea. From Beni Na'im, the reputed tomb of Lot, upon that ridge, it is supposed that Abraham looked "toward *all* the land of the plain," and beheld the smoke, "as the smoke of a furnace." The inference from the Bible, that this entire chasm was a plain sunk and "*overwhelmed*" by the wrath of God, seems to be sustained by the extraordinary character of our soundings. The bottom of this sea consists of two submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the last averaging *thirteen*, the former about *thirteen hundred* feet below the surface. Through the northern, and largest and deepest one, in a line corresponding with the bed of the Jordan, is a ravine, which again seems to correspond with the Wady el Jeib, or ravine within a ravine, at the south end of the sea.

"Between the Jabok and this sea, we unexpectedly found a sudden breakdown in the bed of the Jordan. If there be a similar break in the water-courses to the south of the sea, accompanied with like volcanic characters, there can scarce be a doubt that the whole Ghor has sunk from some extraordinary convulsion; preceded, most probably, by an eruption of fire, and a general conflagration of the bitumen which abounded in the plain. I shall ever regret that we were not authorized to explore the southern Ghor to the Red Sea.

"All our observations have impressed me forcibly with the conviction that the mountains are older than the sea. Had their relative levels been the same at first, the torrents would have worn their beds in a gradual and correlative slope;—whereas, in the northern section, the part supposed to have been so deeply engulfed, although a soft, bituminous limestone prevails, the torrents plunge down several hundred feet, while on both sides of the southern portion, the ravines come down without abruptness, although the head of Wady Kerak is more than a thousand feet higher than the head of Wady Ghuweir. Most of the ravines, too, as reference to the map will show, have a southward inclination near their outlets, that of Zerka Main or Callirohoe especially, which, next to the Jordan, must pour down the greatest volume of water in the rainy season. But even if they had not that deflection, the argument which has been based on this supposition would be untenable; for tributaries, like all other streams, seek the greatest declivities without regard to angular inclination. The Yermak flows into the Jordan at a right angle, and the Jabok with an acute one to its descending course.

"There are many other things tending to the same conclusion, among them the isolation of the mountain of Usdum; its difference of contour and of range, and its consisting entirely of a volcanic product.

"But it is for the learned to comment on the facts we have laboriously collected. Upon ourselves, the result is a decided one. We entered upon this sea with conflicting opinions. One of the party was skeptical, and another, I think, a professed unbeliever of the Mosaic account. After twenty-two days' close investigation, if I am not mistaken, we are unanimous in the conviction of the truth of the scriptural account of the destruction of the cities of the plain. I record with diffidence the conclusions we have reached, simply as a protest against the shallow deductions of *would-be* unbelievers."

The expedition visited of course Ain Jidy (Engeddi) the ruins of Massada, the famous castle of Herod the Great, the mouth of the Arnon in the Wady Mojob, and the mountain of Usdum (Sodom) with its pillar of salt. Of all these there are very good plates in the volume from the drawings of Lieut. Dale. We share in the regret of Lieut. Lynch that he could not have explored the Wady El Ghor, levelling upwards and downwards to the Gulf of Akaba. The castle of Machaera and the warm springs of Callirohoe should also have been visited. Lieut. Lynch confirms the oft re-

peated assertions of travellers respecting the buoyancy of the waters. He speaks of the sea as covered at times by a dense mist of a purple tinge, which, contrasted with the motionless waters beneath, gave the whole the appearance at a distance of a vast caldron of metal, from which rose the fumes of burning sulphur, the whole, however, being the effect of evaporation. In the night time, too, when agitated, the sea was one wide sheet of phosphorescent foam, and the waves, as they broke, threw a sepulchral light on the dead bushes and scattered fragments of rock upon the shore. Swallows, snipes, gulls, partridges, wild ducks, and storks, were observed in various places along shore. But except the fish at the mouths of the streams pouring into the sea, where the waters are fresh, there is no evidence that any thing lives within it. The water indeed when subjected to a powerful microscope, after the return of the expedition, showed no sign of animal life. What was seen and ascertained respecting the sea, the pillar of salt at Usdum, and the sombre and gloomy appearance of the whole surrounding coast, is a sufficient foundation for all the stories which have been related of these mysterious waters. The fate too of those who have attempted to explore it, will fulfil its fearful cognomen, the Sea of Death. Costigan, Lieut. Molyneaux, and now Lieut. Dale of this expedition, have fallen victims, either to the malaria there engendered, or to their extreme exposure to heat and fatigue in their explorations. Having completed the exploration of the sea, the party levelled upward, commencing on the Dead Sea in the pass Ain Turabeh, past the Greek Convent Mar Saba and the city of Jerusalem, to the height of land between the Dead Sea and the Mediterranean, and then downward to the coast at Jaffa. The height of land was found to be a little less than 4000 feet above the surface of the Dead Sea, and the depression of that surface below that of the Mediterranean a little over 1300 feet. After completing these surveys, the party passed along the coast to Acre, thence to Nazareth, and to the Sea of Galilee. Here to their great regret and ours, they found themselves without the means of exploration, the boat they had ordered to be built not being ready. They ascended to the sources of the Jordan, and visited Damascus and Baalbec, but without adding much to our knowledge of

the regions they traversed. On their return, Lieut. Dale, the second in command, died with the same slow nervous fever which carried off Costigan and Molyneaux, a sad termination to a most useful expedition. In common with others we regret the haste with which this work has been brought to the press. It were better had the author waited till the report of his party could be properly issued in a more authentic form, and his materials could have been better digested. The surreptitious publication of the narrative of the expedition by Montague would not probably have greatly interfered with the sale of his volume.

6. *A Compendium of Ecclesiastical History.* By Dr. JOHN C. L. GIESELER, Consistorial Counsellor and Ordinary Professor of Theology in Gottingen. From the fourth edition, revised and amended. Translated from the German, by SAMUEL DAVIDSON, L. L. D., Prof. of Bib. Lit. and Eccl. Hist. in the Lancashire Independent College. 8vo. New York; Harper & Brothers. 1849.

This History of the Church first appeared in Germany twenty years ago, and has been before the American public since the year 1836, in the translation of Cunningham, which was made from the third German edition. Its character and merits are better known to the Theologians of this country, than in England, where this new translation has been recently brought out. Dr. Davidson, whose reputation as a scholar has been established by his learned works on Biblical Criticism and Interpretation, and whose familiarity with the German literature and language eminently qualify him for the work, is the translator; and he was moved to undertake it, because he desired a text as the substratum of his lectures in this department, and could find none so suitable for his purpose as this. The fourth edition exhibits such great improvements upon the third, and such enlargement, that he thought it more desir-

able to translate it anew than to remit his students to the American edition.

The text of this history is exceedingly condensed and curt, a mere outline, giving the results to which the author has arrived, but the notes in the margin are ample, furnishing not only references to authors, but quoting, in the original, those sources from which the history is drawn. It thus supplies to the student the want of a costly and extensive library, and places before him without the trouble of protracted research the original authorities. In the hands of a teacher, who shall expand the narrative portion and compel the student to make himself acquainted with the substance of the notes beneath, it must be a valuable classic. We have often regretted that there is so little disposition among our students of ecclesiastical history to draw from original sources of information. This book rightly used will beget and promote the spirit of research. Yet it is far from an interesting book for the general and continuous reader, who does not wish to be delayed by the notes in the margin. It is too much of an outline and too dry. Hence it is often spoken of in a tone of disappointment by those who do not understand and appreciate its design. In the two first volumes, which are the only ones of the new translation we have yet received, the book presents the appearance of a digest from the fathers, having above it a slender line of text, which the notes beneath are designed to illustrate. Though we cannot agree with the translator that there are only two histories of the Church that deserve to be read and studied, this and the history of Neander, both *ex fontibus hausti*, an opinion he quotes from Brettsneider, we still recommend Gieseler as an invaluable reference book to the original authorities, as well as to the modern learning of his nation on this subject, and as a book which ought to be in the hands of every student. The present edition is brought out by the Harpers, on fine paper and in their usual excellent style.

7. *The Progress of Ethnology, an account of recent Archaeological, Philological and Geographical Researches in various parts of the globe, tending to elucidate the Physical History of Man,* by JOHN RUSSELL BARTLETT, Cor. Sec. of the Ethnological Society, and For. Cor. Sec. of the New York Hist. Society. Second edition. New York: Bartlett & Welford. pp. 151.

We have been greatly interested in this admirable essay on the progress of Ethnology, which is published separately, and also in the transactions of the American Ethnological Society for 1848. It gives a succinct account of the researches which have been making within a few years past in various parts of the earth, tending to make us better acquainted with the family of man, and his present condition and his past history, and with those heretofore unexplored portions of the earth, of which we have known so little. If our readers wish a pleasant ramble over the track of these multifarious researches, here is a competent and entertaining guide.

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8. *The Preadamite Earth: by JOHN HARRIS, D. D., President of Cheshunt College. Author of the "Great Teacher," "Great Commission," "Mammon," etc.* Boston. 1847. pp. 285. 18mo.
9. *Man Primæval: or the Constitution and Primitive Condition of the Human Being. A contribution to Theological Science. By the same author.* Boston. 1849. pp. 480. 18mo.

These two works belong together and are both entitled Contributions to Theological Science. The reputation of the author as a writer, will draw to them the attention of many. Hitherto he has confined himself to subjects more within the reading of ordinary Christians, to matters of practice, rather than of speculative philosophy. He now soars into the higher regions of meditation, and has constantly before him the aim of connecting theological speculation and the facts and reasonings of modern science together.

Astronomy, Geography, Geology, Botany, Zoology, Phrenology, and Physiology, all lend their aid. To Phrenology he gives little quarter, but his reasonings are based on the demands of the Geologist for a long period before the creation of man. Man he regards, geologically speaking, of recent origin. Through all that indefinite period between the first creation of matter and the formation of man, and since that period on, the Creator has been putting forth higher and still higher manifestations of his attributes. First power was displayed in the creation of organic matter, then wisdom, when, after an incalculable period organic life was brought into being, then goodness, when beings were produced capable of the enjoyment of happiness. Such were the manifestations of the divine character in the Pre-Adamite earth. Then comes in the order of creation the angelic world, displaying the holiness and justice of God, then man partaking of each of the former creations, of physical, organic, and animal existence, created after the angels, because of superior constitution and higher destiny, and manifesting the attribute of mercy, as well as the other attributes displayed in former exertions of creative power. The writer discusses, in passing, the subject of the Unity of the Race, very compendiously, but in much the same method as has been exhibited in these pages. Like the other writings of Dr. Harris, clearness and compactness of style is sacrificed to a musical and rotund diffuseness, which in the end fatigues the reader. On all his speculations we are not prepared to pass our judgment. The field he has opened before him is one of vast amplitude, and can be well and satisfactorily covered only by the most philosophic mind.

10. *Two Lectures on the Connection between the Biblical and Physical History of Man. Delivered by invitation, from the Chair of Political Economy, etc., of the Louisiana University, in December, 1848. By JOSIAH C. NOTT, M. D., of Mobile, Alabama. New York: Bartlett & Wellford. 1849.*

These Lectures of Dr. Nott have reached us since the preceding pages of this Review were penned. It will be at once perceived

that we can have had no allusion, therefore, in what we have said, to the views of this author. We did indeed know that he had written before on the subject, but his former writings did not happen to be at hand, nor present especially to our mind. Our object has been in some little manner to forestall that skepticism, which we apprehended was about to be revived amongst us, and which was likely to take its stand on this subject, and in consequence of present agitations, obtain a strong hold on many of our people. We now see, sooner than was anticipated, to what point the views advocated by the opponents of the Unity of the Race are continually tending, viz: to a denial of the plenary inspiration and present integrity of the scriptures, of the genuineness of the Pentateuch, and indeed of the credibility of any and every portion of the word of God which the advocates of the Unity have supposed to bear on the question. The writer of these Lectures could have been prompted to make an attack on the word of God, which he knew would be most offensive to every believer in Divine Revelation, only by perceiving how his doctrine of a diversity of race clashed with it. One or the other, in his view, must lower its flag, and he was determined that Moses and Paul should bow before the philosophy of man. So much only can we now say. So far as we are concerned, the poison must at this time go forth without its antidote. Our pages are already crowded beyond our limits, and much as it is to be regretted, we must hold our peace.

SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

1. *Address of the Southern members of Congress to their constituents, Washington City, Jan. 1849.*
2. *Lecture on the North and the South, delivered before the Young Men's Mercantile Library Association of Cincinnati, Ohio, January 16th, 1849: by ELWOOD FISHER. 8vo. pp. 24.*
3. *Mussey's review of Fisher, on the North and the South. Cincinnati: 1849. 8vo. pp. 98.*
4. *Practical Hints on the comparative cost and productiveness of the culture of Cotton, and the cost and productiveness of its manufacture. Addressed to the Cotton planters and capitalists of the South. By CHAS. T. JAMES. Providence: 1849. 12mo. pp. 68.*

We cannot repress a sigh from our very heart, as we take up the pen to discuss the subject of these publications. Its magnitude and difficulties are enough to make any mind serious and even sad. We are almost ready to despair, too, of a satisfactory and peaceful settlement of the questions it involves. The conviction that the season for discussion has passed, and the time for action come, is also growing upon us. We have scarcely a hope that aught we shall say, will influence the result so much as a

hair's breadth. When was the voice of reason or argument ever heard or heeded in such clamour and strife of ambition, pride, passion, avarice, fanaticism, and revenge? Nevertheless it may be our duty to speak. The martyr at the stake should with his last breath bear witness for God and truth, even though, by the madness of his murderers, not a whisper of his voice should be heard. And if in this contest the South is to be a victim, let her do honour to her own convictions by a faithful testimony to the truth which it has been given her to understand and uphold.

We intimated that the time for discussion has well nigh gone by. The strife of argument has been hotly waged for some twenty years. The south has met her assailant on every field of debate, political, moral, and religious. And if any thing has ever been proved and demonstrated again and again, it is THE LAWFULNESS OF SLAVERY, whether judged by the divine word of Holy Scripture, or tested by the conclusions of human reason. At least this is our conviction. So clear and triumphant do we consider the argument on the side of the South, that where it has failed to convince, we believe further discussion to be useless. We would as willingly argue with men who deny the evidence of their senses. We have gone with our opponents to the inspired word of God, and proved beyond the possibility of sober denial, that though slavery existed at least from the time of Abraham, there is not, from first to last, so much as an implied condemnation or prohibition of it; and not only so, but that God gave laws for its regulation, recognised its existence, and *expressly authorized* the Israelites to procure slaves of their heathen neighbors.—In the New Testament our defence is impregnable. It regulates the institution of slavery, and thus by fair implication authorizes its existence; commands slaves to be obedient to their masters, and submissive to punishment; and rebukes those who teach otherwise. We are well aware of the miserable evasions by which our anti-slavery friends try to break the force of these facts. But unworthy of serious answer, they awaken only our compassion. We really pity men who are driven to the necessity of using such

subterfuges, and yet will not honour themselves by yielding to conviction.

Out of the field of scriptural evidence, and on the ground of natural law and justice, our defence has been equally successful. It has been repeatedly proved that every distinct society, or community of men, has the right to organize and arrange its own civil, social, and political institutions, and the relations between its members; to deny civil and social equality to any class, when such equality would be incompatible with the well being of the state; and to deprive of all political rights and of liberty, to imprison, or to put to death, those whose citizenship, liberty, or life would endanger the rights, property, or lives, of the community. The exercise of this right does not always require conviction of crime against the persons on whom it is exercised. This is proved by the acknowledged right to deny political privileges to females and minors; to restrict the right of suffrage to those who possess a prescribed amount of property or of education, and to natives; to bind minors in servitude to their parents; and to arrest vagrants and compel them to earn an honest livelihood. If the South, then, judges the civil and social equality, and personal liberty of the blacks, incompatible with the well being, rights, property or lives of the community, she has the right to deny them that equality and liberty—in other words to keep them in a state of slavery. All that is incumbent on her to justify her exercise of the right before God and men, is to show good and sufficient reason for judging their equality and liberty to be inconsistent with her welfare. This she has done, over and often, though it needs no proof. If any think that the well being, property, rights and lives of the South would *not be* endangered by elevating the negroes to civil equality, or even by releasing them from the bonds of slavery, we shall not waste time on their madness.

Again, it has been proved that the maxim, "*partus sequitur ventrem*"—or that the offspring inherits the status of the parent, is a law of nature, reason, religion, and providence, and that *no man has any rights* but those to which he is born, or which belong to that condition in which God places him by the hand of his providence.

One of these rights undoubtedly is to improve his condition, or the right to acquire other rights, *provided* he can do so without violating the rights of others. He that is born a slave, therefore, has no right to liberty, and can acquire none, so long as the right of his master to his service stands in the way. That may be forfeited under certain conditions—it may be resigned—or it may be sold to the slave—when he justly and rightly becomes free.

It has been further shown that there is nothing in the relation of master and slave, contrary to natural law and justice. This has been demonstrated by a correct *definition* of slavery. Nothing more is necessary in order to show that it may be lawful and just, than simply to state clearly *what it is*. A great deal of the confusion and fanaticism in connection with the discussion of the subject has grown out of the want of noting *the thing* which constitutes the essential characteristic of slavery. In the minds of many it is the exact correlative of *tyranny*. Others consider it the same thing as regarding and treating men as *things*, chattels, brutes. Some have defined it as "*involuntary or compulsory labour*;" but besides the vagueness of the words involuntary, or compulsory, this definition does not distinguish slavery from the bondage of minors and apprentices. Others describe it as "*labour without compensation*." This definition is not only open to the same objection, but it is palpably, undeniably, and outrageously false. The labour of our slaves is not "without compensation." On the contrary we affirm they are better paid than the labouring class in any country in the world. And it is curious to hear the same men one-while abusing us because, as they assert, we "keep back the hire of the labourers who reap our fields," and then at another time abusing the institution because slave labour is more expensive and less profitable than free labour! How could it be so if we did not *pay* more for it? But the slave is paid for his labour. He has secured to him *an annuity for life*—which annuity includes a sufficiency of wholesome food and clothing, a home and shelter, medical attendance, all these in sickness and in old age, a decent burial when dead, and provision for his wife and children

if he chooses to marry. These are also secured to him under all contingencies of failure of crops or markets, revulsions of trade, or bankruptcy of his owner. The moment the latter is unable to render this compensation, the law takes his slave out of his hands, and commits him to another who is able. If he is able, and refuses to fulfil his obligation, the law, by adequate penalties, enforces his duty. To define slavery, therefore, as unpaid labour, is, as we said, plainly and outrageously false. And all the heart-breaking pictures of wretched men and women toiling out life, in sweat and blood, for the profit of cruel oppressors, and without remuneration, drawn to kindle the indignant sympathies of the world, are just so many fables. And all the pious anathemas heaped on the South for eating the bread of unrequited toil, are gratuitous and unmerited abuse, vented in blind, unreflecting fury. Some have no better sense than to reply that what is given to support the slave is only a part of the produce of his own labour, while the owner appropriates the greater part to his own use. But this is equally true of free labour. A white man hired at the North for a day, or a month, or a year, is paid out of the proceeds of his own labour. He receives, too, only a part of its profits, while the employer reserves the remainder for himself. No man expects to pay a labourer the full amount of the produce of his work. Whenever wages equal, or exceed, the value of the labour, employers cease at once to hire. The advantage the slaves possess is, that whatever may be the profits of their labour their wages are unvaried. If their labour produce nothing, yet their pay is secured. We are personally acquainted with a small plantation, the owner of which will be obliged to appropriate six hundred dollars this year for the support of the slaves, over and above the proceeds of their industry. This, too, is not an unusual circumstance. If, then, the difference between the remuneration of the slave and the profits of his labour is occasionally larger than would seem just, this compensates for it. Sometimes he receives more than he earns. Always his pay is certain, secured against all contingencies, and without anxiety, or painful fears and apprehensions of his own. If it be said that the annual appropriation for

the slave is less than the value of a year's labour, we reply he performs less work than a hired white man, and is entitled to less. If it be said that he receives a less proportion of the proceeds of his labour, we reply that is not always the case—Sometimes he receives all the proceeds, and even more—and if he does receive a smaller share than hired labourers, it is compensated for by his support in sickness and old age.

The essential characteristic of slavery is *the right of the master to the labour of the slave for life*, or as long as he is physically able to labour. This constitutes it slavery. This circumstance, that the right of the master extends through the life of the slave, and this only, is the specific difference between that and hired labour, or the bondage of minors and apprentices. This is that "*property in man*" about which so much indignant eloquence has been evoked from the lips of unthinking zealots. The right of one man to the labour of another is confessedly just and lawful in the case of hired operatives, minors and apprentices. And it can never be shown that the mere circumstance that this right extends over the whole time of life, converts it into a sin and outrage. If I may lawfully possess a claim to the service of another for a year, there is evidently nothing in the relation itself to make it unlawful to hold such a claim for a longer time. The right of the master to the labour of the slave for life is all the *property* he has in him. Neither the soul nor the body of the slave is the property of the master. It is not so in fact, or in law. I can maim, burn, eat, or kill the body of my *ox*, for that is my property. But I can do neither with the body of my slave; if I do, the law of the land arrests and punishes me as a trespasser on the rights and property of another. By the laws of the South, the slaves are regarded and protected as *persons*, and *not as things*, the outcries of blind philanthropy to the contrary notwithstanding—not as persons having *all* the rights of white men, but yet as persons, as *men*; whom to maim is a felony, and to kill with malice aforethought is murder in the first degree. What our laws hold and treat as a chattel, or *thing*, is the right to the slave's labour. This is of course a species of property,

the tenure of which must necessarily be regulated by law. Man's wisdom has divided property into the two classes of real estate and personal property, or chattels personal, with different laws for the regulation of each. In defining, therefore, the nature of property in slaves, our laws simply refer it to the second class,—or declare that it shall be regulated by the laws which regulate personal property. This is a very different thing from treating them as brutes and things. The law of Louisiana classifies this property with real estate, and subjects it to the same regulations; and it would be just as reasonable to say that treats them as dirt, or bricks and mortar. It is true that our laws in their phraseology speak of the "slaves," and not of the simple right of the owner to their labour; but this is for the sake of convenience, and the whole tenor and spirit of our legislation prove that slaves themselves are regarded as persons, and the right to their labour only as personal property, or *a thing*.

This definition of the nature of slavery wipes off all that reproach which is heaped on us for "buying" and selling men and women, and "trading in the souls and bodies of human beings." We do not buy and sell their bodies or souls, but simply *the right to their labour*. This right is plainly transferable; and if it be lawful to hold it, it is to buy or sell it. The powers of the master over the person of the slaves is given in order to secure the benefit of his right to their labour. For this purpose he has power to control their place, and to compel them to labour by corporeal punishment, which does not endanger life or limb. The master is not, an irresponsible tyrant, a petty absolute monarch, but, *quoad hoc*, an administrator of law, legally authorized to enforce his own right. And this office is committed to him, because this is by far the most convenient, efficacious, and beneficent plan to secure it. There is not one master in ten thousand who would not punish his slave more leniently than a magistrate or court of law for the same offence. His power is not irresponsible and unlimited: nor is it in very many cases exercised with unnecessary severity. The interest of the master himself, the force of public opinion, in the vast majority of cases religious and moral principles, and in others fee-

lings of common humanity which are not wholly wanting in the worst, restrain the hand of cruelty, even where the laws do not. And as to the current misrepresentations of Southern inhumanity towards our slaves, we only reiterate our positive, indignant denial.

We do not intend what we have said to be taken as all we have to say in defence of slavery. We mean simply to indicate some of the points which we consider to have been proved, and to declare our conviction that property in our slaves is a right which has been righteously acquired, and is lawfully held, justly enforced, and for the most part properly guarded, and humanely exercised. In all these respects we consider our opponents beaten most completely, and the South full justified before God and men. And indeed it would appear from the signs of the times, that the argument against slavery on religious and moral grounds is about to be given up. The controversy is becoming a political contest—a struggle for power on the part of the north—and the great argument against slavery now insisted on, is its *bad economy*, its injurious effects on the wealth and physical prosperity of the country.

The address of the southern Members of congress to their constituents presents the political aspect of the subject. Mr. Fisher's lecture is an able defence of the economy, or profit, of slavery. Mr. Mussey's pamphlet is an attempt to repute the argument and conclusions of Mr. Fisher. And we propose to present from these and other sources the leading facts in connection with both these points.

We have long been satisfied that the opposition to slavery is not chiefly, or generally, the result of moral or religious conviction. With some it may be so, but they constitute a small fraction of its force. It is partly the fruit of a growing political radicalism which, ever and anon, lifts its fearful form in all the free states—a radicalism which flourishes in every civilized country of the world except the Southern states of this Union—which we believe to be an inevitable result of modern civilization where slavery does not exist—which wages reckless war with all the sacred rights and holy institutions of mankind,

and aims to level down to its own degradation all that is above it—and against which we honestly believe slavery to be our only safeguard and defence. This party opposes slavery, not, as it pretends, because the slaves are oppressed, but because the masters are exalted. Its zeal is not for the slaves, but against the masters. Mr. Mussey, (no friend of the south, however,) indicates the secret of the opposition on the part of others, in these remarks. "The northern farmer or mechanic, who pays for his daily bread and his manly pride, or has bought independence by the sweat of his own brow,—who fares less sumptuously every day—if he contrast his own condition with that of the luxurious planter, cannot help feeling that there is some natural injustice in this state of inequality." "He sees only negro slavery as the agent of this whole distinction; and it is not long before he feels—he *knows*—that slavery is politically a curse, and slaveholding morally a crime." One source, then, of opposition to slavery is a mean envy. This we have long believed, but would not have ventured publicly to assert, had it not been done for us by one of themselves, a zealous advocate, too, of the glory and "manly pride" of the North.

But a chief cause of the anti-slavery feeling is to be found in our political history. One ground of this lies in the article of the Constitution which allows the South votes for three fifths of the slaves in our delegation to the Congressional House of Representatives. This the Northern demagogues rant and rage about continually as grossly unjust and unequal, until their uninformed hearers are ready to shoulder arms, march to the Capitol and by force drive home our delegates. And yet this article of the Constitution was solemnly agreed to by all the Northern States, when they formally ratified and adopted it. Besides, do not our Northern friends see that if our slaves were emancipated, instead of having a vote for only three-fifths of them, we would have a vote for *all*? So that our power in Congress would be actually and largely increased instead of lessened. This article was in fact a concession on the part of the South and not on the part of the North. We have a vote for only a portion of our inhabitants, while they have a vote for all theirs. Another ground of com-

plaint against the South is that of eleven Presidents of the Union, only three (leaving out Gen. Harrison) have been taken from the North; and in sixty-four years, (including Gen. Taylor's term,) only twelve have been filled by northern Presidents.* This is the cause of no little bitterness among the people of the North against the South. We will not say that they have no reason to be angry with us, if we have been able to furnish greater and better men for the office of our chief magistracy. But we do say, it is somewhat curious, that, when Southern Presidents have been elected by Northern votes, they should complain of it. But what has, perhaps, irritated the North still more, is the fact that the South has in most cases succeeded in carrying the measures and principles she has advocated in our federal legislature. These things, however absurd it may be, have kindled envy and animosity in the North against the South. We have never met a Northerner who could speak of them with any

* The following table shows how some of the principal federal offices have been divided between the north and south, from the commencement of the government to March 4th, 1849. The figures denote the number of years during which these offices have been filled by citizens of each section. The short presidential term of Gen. Harrison, and some fractions of years, have been omitted, and Gen. Taylor's term is not included:

	Northern	Southern.
Presidents,	12	48
Vice Presidents,	40	20
Chief Justices,	11	48
Secretaries of State,	20	40
do of Treasury,	46	14
do of War,	34	25
do of Navy,	40	19
Postmaster General,	35	25
Attorneys General,	20	39
Speakers of House of Representatives,	28	37

In the sixteen Presidential elections, 3456 electoral votes have been cast, 1945 by Northern States, and 1511 by Southern States; 790 votes have been given by the North for Northern candidates, and 1190 by the South for Southern candidates, 1155 by the North for Southern candidates, and 321 by the South for Northern candidates.

It will be observed from this table that all the most important offices—those demanding the highest talent, influence, and weight of character, have been for the most part filled by Southern men. Thus the President, the Chief Justice, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, have been, during the greater part of the existence of the government, selected from the South. And *these* are the officers chief in dignity and importance. These having been taken from the South, the others inferior and secondary, have been generally Northern men.

equanimity. Though seldom alluded to in our public controversies, yet they are used at home by Northern demagogues, and fanatics, and political aspirants, to inflame the minds of the people, and unite them in opposition to the South and Southern institutions. Even Dr. Channing demeaned himself to say that the South exerts "a disproportionate share of influence on the confederacy," and to use it as an argument against the admission of Texas. The South is represented as having engrossed all the public offices, honours and emoluments, passed all their own measures, and ruled over the subject North with despotic sway. The latter is urged to unite, assert their supremacy, throw off the hateful tyranny, and rule as they have been ruled. And the plain, direct way in which to carry their object is to insist on no further extension of slavery—no more slave States—so that the South may be reduced to a feeble and helpless minority. Here is one secret of the anti-slavery and free-soil excitement. One of the abolition delegates openly declared on the floor of Congress, in a moment of triumph, that it is "a struggle for power." Arguments against slavery on moral, religious, and economical grounds are used as pleas and pretences, but they are nothing more. Devilish ambition steals the livery of heaven and adopts the language of Canaan to cloak its designs and conceal the accent of its diabolic tongue. But nothing could be more unjust than the wrath of the North against us in reference to our political ascendancy. If the South has won the honours, the North has gathered all the spoils. It is notorious that by far the greater part of the patronage of the general government has been bestowed on the North; and where the South has received one dollar for harbors, rivers, other internal improvements and public works, the North has taken thousands. And if the South has succeeded in carrying most of her legislative measures, the North has carried those which tended to her pecuniary advantage and to the loss and ruin of the South. The North has flung away the empty eclat of place, and the seat of profitless office, but true to her native instinct has grasped with both hands the gains and rewards.

We should not overlook another cause of the anti-slavery movement, perhaps as potent as any. It is what

Mr. Fisher calls "the fearful struggle of Northern labour for subsistence." It is a well known fact, that in countries where slavery does not exist, and the system of so called free labour or hired service prevails, that the inevitable tendency and result is to reduce the wages of the labourer down to a bare subsistence, when he receives in return for his labour only enough to support life. When things get to this point, pauperism and starvation come in like a flood. Times will occasionally arise, from interruptions of business and scarcity of employment, when the labouring class will not receive enough for their subsistence. This is the case with the older and more populous countries of Europe. And as the labouring class constitute a large portion, if not the majority, in every community, oftentimes hungry and famished for bread, they will rise in fearful convulsions to threaten and overturn the laws and institutions of the State. Hence the Chartism of England, the Red republicanism and socialism of France, the radicalism of Germany, and the starvation, crime, and rebellion of Ireland. The newness and extent of our Northern States have heretofore caused such demand for labour, and consequently high wages, that they have so far escaped this calamity. But they are rapidly approaching it. The natural increase of population, and the vast immigration from Europe, are crowding them with labourers. Wages are tending downwards to the point of bare support. A "fearful struggle for subsistence" has commenced. The only remedy is *more room*, larger territory, more new lands. White labour cannot, or will not, compete with black labour. At any rate experience has proved that they cannot coexist to any considerable extent. Hence the general expulsion of free blacks from the workshops of the North, the jealousy and riots between the two classes in Northern cities, and even the laws against coloured mechanics, slave or free, in at least one Southern State. Out of these facts grows a great deal of the opposition to slavery among the people of the North. Hence the cry "no more slave territory"—and "free soil." Hence the general fixed determination of the North to confine slavery to its present limits, and to take ALL our lately acquired territories for their own use.

We find, therefore, the great elements of opposition to

slavery, in a growing radicalism ; a feeling of inequality and disadvantage, or mean envy ; political ambition ; and competition of labour. And herein lies its strength and our danger. Religious fanaticism might be despised. False philanthropy is a harmless folly. Neither of them ever subverted a great civil institution, or much influenced the state of society. But among the elements we have mentioned are natural instincts and universal passions which move nations, and overturn empires. They are gathering to a head against the South, and combining for a contest in which they will neither stay nor spare till they win the prize.

But when men have determined on a great work of wrong and injustice they are never at a loss for a holy pretext to excuse it. Accordingly, anti-slavery has set forth various pleas to justify the wholesale robbery it has purposed. Our ears have been so long stunned with the cry against "the *evil* of slavery," that the South had almost come to acknowledge it herself. But when we undertake to examine the matter and ask what is meant by "the *evil* of slavery," where is it, and what? we honestly declare we cannot find it. Is it meant that to hold a slave is a sin? Conscience and our Bibles tell us it is not. Is it meant that we trespass on any natural or just right of the slave? Common sense, reason, and nature testify and prove that we do not. Is it meant that a great deal of sin is committed in connection with the institution? We admit it, but what does that prove? There is a great deal of sin committed in connection with government, and even with the Church. Is it said these evils are inseparable from slavery? So are they, in the present condition of human nature, in the case of government and the Church. Does slavery injure the negroes in any respect, physical, intellectual or religious? We point to what they were when brought from Africa, and what they are now. The benefit of slavery to them has been immense, in all these particulars. They have unquestionably improved far beyond any example of history. And this single fact, the rapid, constant advance of our slaves, physically, intellectually, and morally, is unanswerable proof against the clamour of abolition about the degrading, injurious, and oppressive nature of the institution. It has

improved and elevated the negro in every respect. It is said that there is a great deal of ignorance, vice, and superstition among them. So there is, but there is less than at first, and it is steadily decreasing. So there is in the labouring class of every country. Is it meant that it would be better for the negroes to have their freedom? Look at Hayti, Jamaica, the free blacks of the North, and hear one loud, emphatic, *no*. Is it meant that it would be better for every one to be free, rich, and happy? So it would, but the millenium has not come yet. Is it meant that slavery dooms the black race to perpetual ignorance and depression, without the possibility of raising their position? That remains to be proved. So far it has steadily improved them, and where the process will stop, none can tell. It has to be proved in the second place, and that against all experience, that emancipation will elevate and improve them. And it has to be proved, in the third place, that the negro race is capable of such improvement as will qualify it to live on terms of equality with the white—a question, the negative of which is entirely compatible with the doctrine of the unity of the human race. A Northern Review, which has often ably defended the South, in a late article, which grieved us to the heart, has asserted that the South has enacted laws for the express purpose of keeping the negroes in ignorance and degradation, in order to keep them slaves. This we flatly deny. The laws which are referred to were passed to protect the South from the wild and wicked efforts of Northern incendiarism—not to shut out the light of truth and religion from the minds of the slaves, but to exclude the entrance of falsehood and delusion—to preserve them as well as ourselves from the attempts of madmen, which would have plunged all into barbarism and ruin. We repel such charges with indignation, and appeal to our past history, and present efforts, to prove the general disposition to instruct, improve, and christianize the slaves. We ask again, therefore, wherein consists “the *evil* of slavery?”—Ah! we have found it, at last. Here it is—slavery is *bad economy*. It impoverishes the country where it exists. It is a foe to the wealth of the State. It consumes and destroys the resources of the South. It has covered our land with old fields, depopulated the old slave States, and re-

duced them to poverty. It would therefore be a sin and a shame to extend this withering, wasting curse to the fair and fertile vallies of New Mexico and California.

We had been so long accustomed to hear the prosperity of the North, and the comparative poverty and decay of the South, asserted without contradiction, that we had begun to take it for granted. Our hearts have often bled within us when we passed by the forsaken red hills of South Carolina and Georgia, and thought of the green meadows, and smiling farms, of New-England, skirting every stream, and gleaming on every mountain side of her happy land. Still we have always suspected that things are not exactly as they seem. And it has often been our duty and pleasure to repel the charge of a want of energy, industry, and thrift in the South. We owe to Mr. Fisher an able defence of our dear home and dearer institutions, as to this point, based on the facts and figures of history. His lecture is an admirable specimen of clear, concise, cool argumentation. We have observed in it not a single indication of prejudice, or bias of feeling. He reasons not like a partizan, except it be a partizan of truth and justice. In these respects he is in pleasing contrast with his antagonist, Mr. Mussey, whose fierce but feeble defence of Mr. Webster, flings at "the democracy" and at "abstractionists," one-sided misrepresentations, sarcasms, and abuse, betray the weakness of his cause and the prejudice of his opinions. He has satisfactorily answered Mr. Fisher on some minor points, but leaves the main conclusions unimpeached, and makes admissions fatal to his argument. The force of much of his reasoning may be judged from the fact, that in reply to Mr. Fisher's statement of the much greater longevity of persons engaged in agriculture, he triumphantly adduces the still greater longevity of *paupers* in an alms house! A man who can be guilty of this patent folly, commits suicide on all his own reasoning. His essay is much longer as well as much weaker than Mr. Fisher's, and may be considered only the first attempt of an over zealous advocate to answer him. We are sorry to see Mr. M. condescend to that old shift of a weak argument, in trying to stigmatize his opponents as "metaphysicians," and "abstractionists." It is unworthy even of him.

The first object of Mr. Fisher's Lecture is to show that "the South is greatly the superior of the North in wealth, in proportion to the number of their citizens respectively." This he does by a comparison of wealth and population, derived from the census returns taken by the General Government, and other authentic sources. We shall sum up the principal facts and results which he thus obtains. When the Constitution of the United States was adopted, the North and South were very nearly equal in population, territory, commerce, and wealth. From that time up to the year 1816, the South *took the lead* of the North in commerce and manufactures, while in 1815 the property of the South averaged \$312 per individual, and the property of the North only \$240. Thus for twenty five years after our present government was organized, the South excelled the North in all these respects. Since 1816 the Federal Government abandoned the plan of raising its income by direct taxation, and resorted to a tariff of duties on foreign imports. From that period the commerce and manufactures of the South have not prospered, but it is an error to suppose that therefore she has had a decline in general prosperity. Compare for example Massachusetts, the pride of Northern wealth and prosperity, with Maryland. In 1840 the average property of a free person, in the latter, was \$531,—in the former only \$406—Maryland, in proportion to her population, being about 25 per cent the richer. New York is boasted of as the very grandest product of free institutions, while Virginia is constantly referred to as a melancholy example of the evil of slavery. But the average wealth of Virginia is \$758 for every free white person, while that of New York is only \$260, or a little more than one-third as much. Virginia is perhaps the richest community in the world. In Kentucky the average value of property is \$456; in Ohio it is only \$276. Thus it is manifest that the slaveholding States, which have been regarded as the victims of poverty and ruin, are much richer than those free States which have been considered the most flourishing communities the world ever saw. If you deduct the value of the slaves from the property of these Southern States, their average wealth will still remain larger than that of the Northern. If you deduct the

value of the slaves, and also count them as persons, and give them a share of property, still we have the same result, the average wealth of the South is greater. "So that in no aspect of the question whatever, is there any foundation in fact, for the popular delusion, that the Southern States, or any of them, are either now or heretofore, or likely to be hereafter, inferior to their Northern neighbours in wealth,—but the reverse." Such, at least, is the testimony of official documents on the subject—the highest authority that exists.

Mr. Fisher next proves that the South is not only richer, but that its wealth is more equally distributed, and secures more comfort. This he does by a comparison of statistics between Virginia and Kentucky, and New York and Ohio, which shows that the two former contain more freeholders, build more houses during a year, and use more pleasure carriages, in proportion to their population, than the two latter. Again, in determining the comparative comfort of two communities, the quantity and quality of food they consume is a well established criterion.—By this test the superiority of the South is manifest. Virginia produces and consumes much more than Ohio or New York, in proportion to her population, of animal food, wheat and Indian corn, the most substantial and costly materials of food. New York is resorting to the potato, the cheapest and least wholesome food, and in Massachusetts the production of the finer sorts of bread-stuffs is rapidly declining.

But having proved the superior wealth and comfort of the South, we wish to know the causes and reasons of it. The original methods of acquiring wealth were conquest and commerce. Later, manufactures were added. England has combined the three, and acquired wealth without a parallel. But a great increase of commerce and manufactures results in collecting large masses of people in towns and cities, which causes great inequality, depravity, increase of want, and crime—consequences fatal to liberty, prosperity, and independence. Where this system exists, the attractions of cities continually draw to them wealth and population, and so aggravate the evil which disgraces civilization, and will, in the end, destroy it. This undue tendency to city life was first successfully

encountered and conquered by the institution of slavery. This, for the first time in the history of the world, has made agriculture so profitable and attractive as to render rural life the favourite of wealth, and the abode of elegant manners and refined taste. Agriculture is more productive than commerce or manufactures, and requires less labour and skill. The fecundity of nature can never be equalled by art. A grain of wheat, when sown, will produce a hundred fold. But no fabric of the loom, or cargo of a ship, can have its value so increased without much more labour and skill. Besides, the farmer holds the subsistence, and consequently the property of his fellow men, in his power. They are dependent on him for food and clothing, the first necessities of life, and he will make his own terms. This power, in the hands of agriculture, can rule the world. In wars, between agricultural and commercial nations, the former have generally conquered. Thus Athens was overcome by Sparta, Greece by Macedon, Carthage by Rome. Even in England, whose commerce and manufactures are so extensive, agriculture still retains pre-eminence in wealth and political power, though it includes only one-third of the population. The agriculture of the South controls an extraordinary portion of the food and clothing which the world consumes, and hence makes a corresponding increase in wealth. Again, living in towns and cities is far more expensive, and injurious to morals, health, and life, and consequently less favourable to the accumulation of wealth. It is true there is a greater display of wealth in the city, but this very fact proves the extravagance of city life, and is a cause of real poverty. It is true also that the average wealth of the inhabitants of cities exceeds that of the rest of the State. But this wealth is not the product of city employments. It is brought there by those who seek the trade of the city, because they cannot acquire large fortunes in a country where there is no slavery.

If it be said that the Northern States are more populous, and if the average wealth of their individual citizens is less, the aggregate wealth of the State is greater, this is of no consequence to the argument. The great question is as to the general comfort and prosperity of the

people, as affected by their peculiar institutions and pursuits. The population of Ireland, and therefore her aggregate wealth, is much greater than of any of our States; and yet her people die, by thousands, of starvation.

It is said that the system of the South is depopulating, and the country thinly settled. If it be meant that her system is incompatible with a dense population, it is true, but not to be regretted. It has been shown that the concentration of people in large towns and cities, is not desirable. Large farms and plantations are also necessary to the prosperity and improvement of agriculture. Experience has proved that a dense population, and the consequent minute subdivision of land, is fatal to agricultural improvement. Witness Ireland, a part of Scotland, and France, where under the most favourable circumstances for the prosperity of agriculture, the average value of land is only five or six dollars per acre,—less than in Virginia. The fact that many planters in the older slave States, find it more profitable to remove to the new lands in the West, than to renovate the old at home, and accordingly emigrate, is a proof of their thrift and enterprise.

Mr. Fisher further proves that the white population has had a larger increase at the South than at the North.—Since 1820 it has been about 65 per cent in the former, and about 60 per cent in the latter. This refutes another imputation very current at the North against the South. It is said that slavery degrades labour, and therefore, as the white people of the South refuse to work, and live in idleness, they become dissipated and vicious. This cannot be so, for prevailing vice is fatal to the increase of population. There is another striking fact. The vices of society affect chiefly *males*, young men and boys. If, therefore, the South is more immoral than the North, it would appear in the deficit of the male population. But the reverse is the fact. The excess of males at the South, above the females, is much larger in proportion than at the North. Massachusetts has several thousand more females than males. The temptations and vices of Northern cities destroy their men, while the rural habits and domestic influences of the South preserve them.

Another important consideration in estimating the condition of a country, is the number of its paupers, or persons supported by charity. In the whole State of New York, there was in 1844 one pauper for every seventeen inhabitants; in 1847 about one person out of every five, in New York city, was dependent, more or less, on charity. In Massachusetts one person out of every twenty, is a constant or occasional pauper. In these two States pauperism is increasing ten times faster than wealth or population. It includes large numbers of able bodied men, who cannot, or what is worse, will not earn a subsistence. It is a mistake to suppose that the paupers of the North are furnished by the foreign immigrants. They do not supply more than their due proportion. This year, 1849, New York, according to the estimate of the Governor, required \$400,000 to support her beggars.

This fearful curse and terrible burden is not felt at the South. We have scarcely one pauper for each county, and beggary is unknown, except by a few strolling foreigners.

Again, compare the North and South as to public crime. Official documents prove that there are four times as many criminals in proportion to the white population in New York, as in Virginia; and twice as many in Massachusetts and in all the New England States together. There are twenty-five per cent more in Ohio, according to population, than in Kentucky. One-half of the criminals of the latter came from the single county in which Louisville, her principal town, is located, and one-third of the whole number were born in free States. So much for the Northern States, old and new, as compared with the Southern in crime. "The results are uniformly and largely in favour of the South." If we look at the large cities of the North, the amount of crime is still greater, and truly appalling. In Boston one out of every fourteen males, and one out of every twenty-eight females, is arrested annually for criminal offences. In New York the proportion is about the same. There are more criminals in the single city of New York, than in all the Southern States together. In the New York penitentiaries, there are 254 women. In the penitentiary of Kentucky, there is not one. It may be supposed that a

large proportion of criminals, at the North, are found among European emigrants. But facts do not prove it to be so.

Moreover, while the South has been more secure than the North from individual crime, it has been still more exempt from social disturbances, riots, and mobs.* And it is remarkable that this country and Brazil, the only two nations on this continent where slavery prevails, are the only two that have succeeded in establishing firm and prosperous, social and civil institutions.

Such are the leading facts and conclusions of Mr. Fisher's Lecture. We have no doubt that further and more careful investigation would require us to modify some of them, and perhaps reject a few. But we believe them to be substantially true and irrefutable. The North, however, will probably treat them with contempt, and the South itself receive them incredulously. They will be summarily disposed of by the short argument of an appeal to the senses. It will be said that it is only necessary to look with the outward eye, at the face of the two sections, to see their fallacy. The whole aspect of the North is one of prosperity and wealth—crowded and well cultivated farms—comfortable, handsome dwellings—flourishing towns and cities—multiplied and prosperous manufactories—public works, and internal improvements, and all those visible demonstrations which betoken general prosperity and abounding wealth. While on the other hand the South presents a sparse population, exhausted and forsaken lands, ill-cultivated plantations, rude and often dilapidated dwellings, few manufactories, rail roads, or canals, and no large cities. These, it is insisted, are facts patent and plain to every man's observation; and too conclusive to be set aside by "metaphysics" and

* There is scarcely a mail that arrives that does not bring the tidings of a spirit of insubordination and contempt of order in Baltimore and Philadelphia, to which we may add New York and Boston. The Boston Journal has the following:

"Outrages upon person and property are, we regret to say, becoming quite frequent in this and the neighboring cities and towns, so that it is absolutely unsafe to walk abroad at a late hour in the evening. Incendiarism is rife also, and scarcely a night passes without one or more incendiary fires within a short circuit around Boston." Since 1836 the riots in Philadelphia have cost the city about a quarter of a million of dollars.

"abstractions." And thus the world goes on grasping at the lies of sense, while it discards the lessons of experience, truth, and reason. The wealth of the North makes a greater show to the eye, because it is concentrated on a smaller space, while that of the South is extended and dispersed over a greater proportional area. That which, at the North, is heaped up on one square mile, is spread at the South, over two, or five, or ten. The labour which is here extended over five acres, is there concentrated on one. The natural result is a greater appearance of wealth at the North, but it is appearance only. If the dwellings of the North are generally better, it is partly because the climate of the South, fortunately, does not require them to be so costly and comfortable,—partly because the same climate causes them more rapidly to lose their good looks, and to decay,—and partly because the dense population, and constant inspection of close neighborhood, naturally beget more taste, rivalry, and expense in such things, at the North.

Some of the apparent evidences of prosperity, at the North, are proofs of its real poverty. It is the excess of population, low remuneration of labour, and demand for bread—that "fearful struggle for subsistence," which has brought its barren hills into cultivation, compelled the expensive renovation of old lands, stimulated every branch of manufactures, and even created a literature. It is because thousands want wealth, that they write and publish. The South, driven to no such extremity, lacks the needful stimulus to literary exertion, and prefers the greater luxury of reading. It is the same cause which has extended the commerce of the North. Poverty at home drives people abroad. And it must be extreme to induce so many to endure the hardships and low wages of sailor life. The spirit of enterprise and adventure, no doubt, has its influence. But labour is a curse. All men feel it to be so, and nothing but a hard necessity makes it to be borne. In a few cases, avarice, ambition, lust for the position and power which wealth gives, perhaps habit and education, may induce men to toil after they have gained a competency. And in Literature, a genuine love for it sometimes secures its cultivation. But it is necessity which governs the mass, puts them into the harness,

and drives them to the end. It is just because a competence is so general, and so easily secured at the South, that her industry has not been forced to develope itself in so many directions as that of the North. Go into the plain home of a Southern farmer. His house, perhaps, is not carpeted—the fresh air pours in through a hundred unnoticed crevices; and marks of carelessness and waste meet you on every hand. But the truth is, he is not compelled to be careful. He wastes because he has abundance. He throws more meat and bread to his dogs, than a similar family at the North would have the means to eat themselves. He does not shut out the cold wind, because more of it never blows than is good for his health and comfort. His income is not spent in expensive furniture, because he has not a dozen curious neighbours to look at it every day, to envy or be envied; and perhaps the want of society has, in some cases, prevented the formation of a taste for such things. But his barns and larder are filled with plenty. His children never cry for bread, and even his slaves learn to waste and squander in their abundance.* He exhausts and forsakes his land in one place, because he can obtain new fields with less expense than he can renovate the old. He does not save his rags, nor sweep his hen-coop, for his family does not need such economising, and he can bestow his time and labour more profitably. His home is not like that of his Northern brother, burnished as bright and nice as a new pin; but he has ten times the substantial necessities and comforts of life. In the residences of our wealthy planters, however, constituting a very large class of the population, there are as much comfort and splendor, and as many of the elegant luxuries of the civilized world, as can be found any where. Mr. Fisher says:

“The South exhibits the remarkable phenomenon of an agricultural people, distinguished above all others of the present day, by the elegance of their manners, and the intellectual tone of their society.”

It is true the South is far behind in railroads, canals, turnpikes, bridges and such internal improvements. One

* The practice is said to be a very common one in New England, for labourers to board at tables from which meat is excluded; as being beyond the means of the lodgers.

reason is that she has more navigable rivers than the North. Less mountainous, her natural roads are more level, and require less improvement. The country generally is nearer the sea-coast. And the sparseness of population has also contributed to prevent these public works. They require a thickly settled country, great condensation of wealth, and abundance of cheap labour. The South has neither, and we rejoice in it. If, as we believe, she has developed her internal improvements as rapidly as the principles which govern the economy of such works authorize in her circumstances, she has justified her industry and enterprise. That she has not done wisely in neglecting manufactures we cordially admit, and deeply regret. But happily her own misfortunes and the infatuated measures of the North are rousing her attention to her duty and interest in this particular. To invite attention to it, we have named the Essay of Mr. James at the head of this article. Though apparently written to benefit a particular enterprise, it demonstrates clearly the profits of cotton manufactures, the facilities which the South possesses for their establishment, and the best method for their management. We do not believe the South can ever equal the North in the variety and extent of her manufactures. Our circumstances, institutions, policy, and dispositions forbid it, and we are glad of it. Fortunately our necessities will not probably force it upon us. But there can be no question but that the greatest advantages would result from the increase of this branch of industry at the South. It would divert capital and labour from the overstocked branches of agriculture, lessen the quantity and raise the price of our cotton in foreign markets, give employment to white mechanics and labourers, keep at home thousands of dollars annually paid to foreign and Northern manufactories, as facts and experiments prove yield a large profit to those embarked in it, and go far to arrest the folly of Northern fanatics. Let them hem in slavery to its present limits. They will lay upon us the dire hand of necessity. In fifty years we will manufacture at home every pound of cotton we produce. Then woe to them! The immediate and rapid extension of manufactures at the South will make them feel their danger, and touch them, where they were never touched in vain—

in their gains. Every factory erected in the South will be a wall of rock against their unjust and infatuated purposes.

The South is continually reproached with a want of industry, energy, and enterprise, and this is charged on the institution of slavery. But can any one believe her industry would be more productive if her negroes were free? Undoubtedly it would be more so, if they were all enlightened, moral and Christian. But it seems to be forgotten that they are semi-barbarians, and at best only half christianized. And herein lies one great fallacy of anti-slavery reasoning. It is perpetually charging on *slavery* evils social, moral, economical, and religious, which so far as they exist are not due to slavery, but to the existence in our midst of three millions of semi-savage and half civilized Africans. This is the great burden and evil of the South, and truly it is in some respects a tremendous calamity. But *slavery* is its remedy—the only one possible—the one necessary, right, just, and good. It not only goes far to deliver the South from the evil of such a population, but as we have said has rapidly civilized and christianized these barbarians.

There is one fact which acquits the industrial energy of the South of all the opprobrium which has been heaped upon it. The skill and industry, which in sixty years have raised the production of cotton from nothing to twelve hundred and fifty millions of pounds per annum, need no defence. In 1834 the number of cotton bales produced in the South, was 1,254,000; in 1848 it was 2,700,000. Thus in fourteen years the enterprise of the South more than doubled the amount of this immense production. The Englishman McCulloch, says the increase and extent of this branch of agricultural industry is without a parallel in the history of the world. It speaks for itself, and ought at once to silence every assertion of our imbecility and indolence. Let it be remembered, too, that enormous production is the result of Southern skill and enterprise applied to the management of labourers who for the most part are half savages. The merit may be fairly claimed, of having accomplished so much, by the agency of the most indolent, stupid, and unproductive, of all races. For an example of Southern enterprise and industry look at

the Cherokee county of Georgia. Ten years ago it was a wilderness. Now it is the home of a comfortable industrious people, sprinkled all over with thriving villages, embosoming in every valley beautiful and productive farms, with neat and commodious dwellings, and not without its rail roads and manufactories.

In one respect the industry of the South is defective. It is not inventive and adventurous. It confines itself too much to one channel, and to old methods. Its energies have been directed too exclusively to one branch of production. It has overdone the cultivation of cotton, and neglected other important and profitable employments of labour. This is owing partly, no doubt, to the peculiar genius of the Southern mind, and partly to the great profit of the cotton culture, and the ease with which it is pursued. The labour of our slaves can be much more easily applied to agriculture than to any thing else. Cotton is its most profitable product in the greater part of the South. Naturally, therefore, that has absorbed nearly all our attention. Necessity, the mother of invention, has not been laid on us. But it is beginning to be; and the result is seen in our multiplying various branches of manufactures and mechanics. And if the North does not wish to convert the South, and that speedily, from a buyer into a seller—from a customer into a competitor, let her not compel us to divert our capital and labour into new channels. What we have done in cotton we can do in other things. We have all the minerals the North has, and more beside. We can produce all the bread stuffs and animals we require, and have abundance to sell. We can produce also the Irish potato, when we need it, Mr. Mussey to the contrary notwithstanding. And we can manufacture our own cotton and wool. We can do it at less cost than the North can, and after a while just as skilfully.* We have a longer sea coast, harbors and seaports, and all the materials for commerce and shipping. When necessity requires it we shall have sailors. We do not wish to make an extensive change in our system. But if we

* At a recent exhibition of the Franklin Institute, at Philadelphia, the "drillings, sheetings, and shirtings," from the Graniteville Factory in South Carolina, took the first premium. The "shirtings" of the Charleston Cotton Factory were awarded a premium at the same exhibition, and pronounced to be of a quality that would compare with any manufactured in New England.

mnst, we can and will. We are beginninng already. Let the North pursue the course she has pursued and the course she threatens, and the result is inevitable. There are natural laws which rule in the progress of nations and in defiance of man work out their necessary effects.

Another ground on which some oppose the extension and perpetuity of slavery is, what they believe to be its injurious effects on the intellectual, moral and religious condition of the country. The proportional number of persons who cannot read, is greater at the South than it is at the North. This is easily explained by the sparseness of population where these persons are found, which renders a system of free schools impossible. And we would be willing, at any time, to compare even these unfortunate citizens of the South, in point of morals and intelligence, with the lower class in the North, or in free, enlightened England. The North produces a multitude of books and authors: the South, few or none. We have given one reason for this difference. The South, however, reads and studies books, if she does not make them. So far as our observation extends, there is a larger proportion of standard works in literature and science bought and read at the South than at the north. The activity, ardor and enterprise of the Southern mind, impel to action, rather than to the tedious toil of authorship. When a great mind is given to us, the open field of politics, or of professional life, is far more inviting than the student's sickening and solitary cloister. But where has Southern intellect and learning been brought into contact with Northern, and found wanting? Not on the arena of Federal politics. For there, by the complaints of the North, we are blamed for winning all the offices, honors, and influence. How have we done it? Not by superior numbers; we have always been in the minority—not by greater union and cooperation; we have been constantly divided—not by arts of mean trickery and corruption; our politicians will hardly be charged with more of these than others—not by boldness and violence; for our Northern friends are not cowards. How, then, if not by the force of superior talent, eloquence, and statesmanship? The North is overflowing with clergymen, and the South exceedingly destitute. Yet in two or

three years, four prominent Presbyterian churches in Northern cities have invited Southern ministers to their pulpits. We would not be permitted to say that they were pleased with mere oratorical display without sense and learning. We need only refer to the military history of the country, for a comparison of Southern and Northern genius in that line. Mr. Mussey draws quite a lively picture of Southern talent, in contrast with the cool, thorough, logical, learned North. We thank him for the amusement it furnished us. It is well drawn, and, no doubt, from life. We could put our hands on examples which illustrate it exactly. But we can select as many which would just reverse his description. It is too long to quote, and, like all general classifications of character, fallacious and deceptive. Such characteristics are, usually, caricatures. The truth of Mr. Mussey's may be judged from one portion of it. He says—"if we follow them both, the Northern and the Southern, from the scenes of their rudimental instruction to the colleges, where the higher acquirements for maturer minds are inculcated—to Harvard or Yale—the patient and laborious student, the critical linguist, the mathematician, the natural philosopher, the essayist,—these are from the North; the star of the literary club, the declaimer, the forensic speaker, the light of the social circle—these are from the South." This may be true of Harvard and Yale, where an exceedingly small proportion of the students are from the South—where those who are sent from the South are quite young men, from sixteen to twenty years of age, who have to contend with students from twenty to thirty—and, generally, sons of wealthy parents who feel but little stimulus towards the toil of laborious study. We were personally acquainted, for a few years, with another eminent Northern college, where the proportion of students from the South was greater than it is at Harvard or Yale, and where Northern and Southern talent was brought into fairer competition. Here, though we say it who should not, the results were very different. The Southern students were not only the declaimers and literary stars, but they were the mathematicians, linguists, metaphysicians, and philosophers. Though greatly inferior in numbers, they took most of the honors given for

scholarship, as well as those given for literature and eloquence. In one class, the largest, at that time, ever graduated at the institution, only a third of which were Southerners, they filled the *five* highest grades of scholarship, and took *all the honors*. It may be said that the Southern mind matures sooner than the Northern, and that, therefore, a college course is no test. But to this we reply, that Northern students are, generally, much older. We take no pleasure in these comparisons. They are somewhat odious, and of little advantage. But if we have become fools in glorying, "ye have compelled us."

As to the comparative morality of the free and slave States, the statistics of public crimes, furnished by Mr. Fisher, are very largely in favour of the latter. With respect to those vices which cannot be brought under the cognizance of Courts of Law, we confidently believe Southern morals to be equally superior. We know the impression at the North is almost universal that the South is the very hot-bed of all ungodliness, impiety, and uncleanness. But this impression is not founded on any sufficient information, or any intimate knowledge of the state of Southern society. When the attempt is made to confirm it by facts and authentic observation, it will be time enough to meet and disprove it with equal evidence to the contrary. We oppose to it our impressions in favour of the South—the oft repeated assertion of the equal comparative purity, propriety, and order of our social state—and our indignant denial of the slanderous misrepresentations of Southern morals. At any rate, from all we can learn of the morality of Northern society, we are well content to remain as we are—a slaveholding people, and invite the world to compare us with our neighbours. Our sins are not few or small. But if we are to be stoned, let it be by those who are themselves without sin.

How is it in the matter of religion? In proportion to our population, have we not as many churches, ministers, and members as the North? Are they not as consistent in their walk, as pure in doctrine, and as rigid in discipline? Are not our Sabbaths as well observed, and our Bibles as much revered? Where have been the greatest and most dangerous religious apostasies? In

free New England is the stronghold of Unitarianism, with its train of soul-destroying German follies. The great apostacy in the Presbyterian church, was in the North.—There, too, is the only soil in which Universalism has flourished. We never saw a preacher of that heresy at the South, who was not a Northern man. The few Unitarians and Universalists at the South, are nearly all imported from the same quarter. We have a good many infidels, as every part of the world has, but they have never been able to form a body and an organization with us, as they have at the North. It is notorious, too, that gross religious fooleries and fanaticism, such as Mormonism and others of its class, spring up and prosper there, but do not exist and cannot succeed in the South. The want of a dense population, with its attendant circumstances, may partly account for these facts; but then, *that* is to be ascribed to the existence of slavery. Besides, the sparseness of population renders it more difficult to affect them by the institutions of the Gospel. So that the present religious condition of the South has been secured under this great disadvantage.

We do not wish to be understood as justifying *every thing* connected with Southern slavery,—as maintaining it to be the best conceivable state of human society,—or as denying that any evil results from it. Any man might be justly reckoned mad, who would take such positions with regard to any institution in the world. The question is not as to what, in the general, or at the North, is the best form of civil and social institutions; but what is best here, at the South, under present circumstances? We have three millions half savage Africans, interspersed through all the South, who have never been any thing but slaves. What shall we do with them? That is the momentous question. Would freedom be to them a blessing and benefit? Are they competent to enjoy it? Would it make them better, happier, or more useful? Granting it would be better for them to be emancipated, would it be better for the six millions of whites? Granting that it is better for the North to be free from slavery, it is still a question whether it would be so for the South. Granting that slavery is an injury to the wealth, morals, civilization, and religion of a country, it does not follow but that

in the peculiar situation of the Southern States, it has been an advantage in all these respects. And it is still a further question whether emancipation would prevent that injury—or rather, we should say, it is not a question. It is palpably plain that three millions of semi-barbarians intimately mixed with the people of the South, would be an intolerable curse, in any relation but that of slaves.—But why, we are asked, do you not adapt your system to their gradual civilization? We reply again, our system is having that effect as rapidly and as successfully perhaps as possible. The main hindrances have been forced on us by the madness of abolitionists. But we reply further that we believe the negro race is incapable of an improvement which will qualify it to live on terms of equality with the white. At any rate such a result is not attainable within a period which it is practicable to foresee, or to provide for. The only alternative is an entire separation of the two races, or *slavery*. The first is impossible. The second becomes a sacred and solemn duty—just, and right, and good.

With such convictions it is not surprising that the South should be deeply grieved and alarmed by the measures of the North, as depicted in the address of the Southern members of Congress. This address is a calm but solemn and resolute declaration of the rights and duties of the South. It sets forth the chief aggressions of the North, perpetrated and threatened with their fearful consequences to the Southern States, if not arrested.—The rights of the South, to the service of the slaves, was guaranteed by the Constitution. It expressly provided, for example, that if a slave escape, and take refuge in a free State, he shall be delivered up on claim of his owner. Nothing could be more express than this provision. It was unanimously adopted by the Convention which framed the Constitution, solemnly ratified by the free States when they adopted it, and has been confirmed by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. And yet it is openly resisted and violated, and in effect nullified and abrogated, by the free States. An attempt to recover a fugitive slave, is met with resistance in every form; resistance from the laws of the free States, from Judges and Magistrates, and when these fail, from mobs,

force, and violence. A master cannot regain possession of his slave without the hazard of insult, heavy pecuniary loss, imprisonment, and even of life itself. A citizen of Maryland was killed in an effort to enforce his claim to a slave, under this provision. Some of the free States have gone so far as to pass laws making it a penal offence for any officer or citizen of those States to assist in executing this article of the Constitution. The subject, therefore, assumes the grave aspect of a flagrant violation of the Constitution—of the fundamental terms, conditions, and provisions, under which the Union was formed.

Citizens of the North have moreover pursued, for fifteen years, a system of measures with the avowed design and tendency to subvert the institutions of the South, and rob us of the peaceful possession and benefit of our property. By the constant agitation of the subject, petitions to Congress, circulation of inflammatory and seditious publications in the South and among the slaves, combinations and societies to promote abolition, secret organizations to aid the escape of slaves, and secret emissaries in the South itself, they have endangered the domestic tranquillity, property, lives, and the very existence of the South. We hold that if we have the right to own slaves, as guaranteed to us by the Constitution, and sanctioned by the North itself, we have the right to hold them in peace and quietude, free from disturbance, direct or indirect. Such aggressions, between independent nations, would be justly considered as cause for war. And if any State cannot or will not restrain its citizens from such trespass on the safety of another, it becomes itself responsible. When the Union and Confederation of the States is taken advantage of, the more successfully to perpetrate it, it rises from an injury to an outrage, and adds to injustice a violation of good faith. And when the Union and the Constitution fail to secure the ends for which they were established, one of which was "*to ensure domestic tranquillity*," they cease to be not only desirable and useful, but binding and obligatory. This last is the point to which the South is in danger of being driven—reluctantly, sorrowfully, and in despair. But on the head of her cruel and infatuated adversaries will lie the shame and the guilt.

The wrongs we have mentioned might have been borne. We would have contended against them, as best we could. But the lust of power, and the spirit of aggression have invaded our Federal legislation; and Congress, our last protector, threatens to become the engine of our oppression, and the agent of our ruin. The House of Representatives have entertained propositions denying the right of property in slaves; to prohibit slavery, and the selling and buying of slaves in the District of Columbia; to admit slaves to vote on the question of their own emancipation; and to abolish slavery in all the forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards, and other public buildings belonging to the United States, including of course those within the slave States. Some of these propositions obtained a majority in the House, and all of them were sustained by a large number of votes. Congress passed a bill prohibiting slavery in the territory of Oregon. And as that institution did not exist there, and certainly never would, why was such a bill enacted unless as a wanton, unnecessary exercise of power, to insult and degrade the South? And now to crown and consummate the whole, as the next act of injustice and oppression, the North unanimously avows its fixed resolve to prohibit slavery in every part of the new territory acquired from Mexico, to prevent the formation of any more slave States, and thus virtually to rob the South of all share in that large and valuable country, to exclude our citizens from its settlement, and appropriate ALL of it, to the last inch, to their own use. We solemnly declare this to be a wrong and an outrage unparalleled in the history of Christian nations, and protest against it in the name of all honor, justice, right, and good faith. It is useless to say these territories are open to our occupancy, if we choose to enter them without our slaves. We cannot enter them unless we can take our property with us. Of what value would the land be without the labour necessary to cultivate it? To exclude our property and labour, is in effect to exclude us. In the war with Mexico, by which these territories were acquired, the South contributed far more than her full share of men, to say nothing of money. With little more than half the white population of the North, she furnished about double the

number of volunteers. Her soldiers, to say the least, bore an equal part in the dangers of every campaign, and rendered equal service on every field of battle. On all principles of right, equality, and justice, therefore, she is entitled to participate fully in the results of the contest.—But now she is forbidden to place her profane feet on the soil won by the valour, and wet with the blood, of her gallant sons.

Our Government is a confederation of distinct, sovereign, and independent States. To them the Territories belong as common property. The States are joint owners and co-partners: and each is entitled to its proportional share of the common property. It is a fundamental principle in our Constitution, that the States are equal in rights and dignity. Therefore, for one portion of the confederacy to appropriate to itself the whole of a common property, is an act of robbery. It subverts the basis, and destroys the very nature and character, of the Union. It annihilates the equality of the confederates, and sinks the excluded portion to the condition of inferiors and *subjects*. The North may think slavery the wickedest and worst institution that ever disgraced humanity. But they formed the Union with us when we were slaveholders, recognised the right of slavery, and guaranteed us equal rights in the confederacy, notwithstanding. And now to make slavery a pretence for this wholesale plunder, is a flagrant and barefaced violation of honour, justice, good faith, and constitutional rights.

The South, and particularly Mr. Calhoun, who is understood to have written the Address, have been charged with wishing Congress to extend slavery. But this document takes the ground that Congress has the right neither to restrict nor to extend that institution. It would be as unjust and unconstitutional for Congress to discriminate in favour of the South, as against it. Congress is bound to hold an even, impartial way—dealing fairly, justly, and equally with every portion of our great republic. What we contend for is, that Congress should let the matter alone—should not prohibit us from entering the territories of the United States, because we are slaveholders—that our property should not be excluded while that of others is admitted—that we should not be in fact

disfranchised of a privilege in our own country which is allowed to all others, citizens and foreigners, without discrimination as to character, profession, or colour—any body, every body, may freely enter and remain, we only being excluded. The position of the South is defensive. We have insisted on no positive act to which the North objects. The celebrated Missouri compromise was adopted by the almost unanimous vote of the North. We were willing to extend the line it established between the free and slave States, to the Pacific Ocean, and abide by it. The North refused, and repudiated its own compromise. We proposed to let the whole matter alone, and leave it to be decided by the territories themselves, when they came to form State Constitutions and seek admission to the Union. The North refused that. We offered to leave the right of slavery in the territories, to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States. The North refused that; what more can we do? The North will agree to no compromise, make no concession. Her unbridled lust demands all, every thing. The lion's share will not content her. The remembrance of the past, hallowed by so many tender and glorious associations in the history of our common country,—the solemn compacts of the Constitution,—the earnest appeals of the South to her honour, her justice, her generosity, and her brotherly kindness,—all seem powerless to arrest her purpose. The value of the prize has awakened her remorseless avarice, and she resolves, eager and insatiable, to seize the whole. We quote from Mr. Fisher:

“When the North American colonies confederated for resistance to Great Britain, the territorial area of the Southern portion of them was 648,202 square miles—that of the Northern only 164,081, or about one-fourth as large. Virginia alone had, by Royal charter, the whole Northwestern territory in her limits, and during the war had confirmed her title by the patriotism and valour of her own citizens—who rescued even Illinois from British power. But before the present Constitution was formed, Virginia, with a magnanimity almost infatuated, had ceded to the confederacy, for the formation of free States, the whole Northwestern territory, now constituting the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, containing 261,681 square miles, and making the territory of the free States rather

more than that of the slaveholding. The object of this cession and the ordinance of 1787 was to equalize the area of the two sections. The acquisition of Louisiana in 1803, added 1,138,103 square miles to our territory, of which, by the Missouri compromise, the South obtained only 226,013 square miles, or about one-fifth—the other four-fifths, notwithstanding it came to us as a slaveholding province, were allotted to the North, which thus had acquired more than 700,000 square miles of territory over the South. Florida and Oregon were acquired by the treaty of 1819, by which the South got 59,268 square miles, and the North 341,463, making the North about 1,000,000 of square miles the most. In 1845 Texas was annexed, which added only 325,520 square miles to the South, even if all Texas were included. In 1848 we obtained 526,078 square miles more in the territories of New Mexico and California. And now the North claims the whole of this also—and not only this but half of Texas besides, which would make the share of the North exceed that of the South nearly 1,500,000 square miles—a territory about equal in extent to the whole valley of the Mississippi, and leaving the South only about 810,812 square miles, while the North retains 2,097,124, or nearly three-fourths of the whole! And this, too, when the South contributed her full share of the men and money by which the whole territory was obtained. In the Revolutionary war the South furnished an average of 16,14 men in each year, and the North 25,875, which nearly corresponds with their respective number of citizens, and that, too, although the war was waged chiefly against the large cities of the North—cities being in war the most tempting and the most vulnerable points of attack. In the war with Mexico the South supplied two-thirds of the volunteers which constituted three-fourths of the entire force employed. The revenue by which these wars have been supported, the public debt paid, and the price for the territory furnished, has been raised chiefly by duties which have notoriously operated designedly and incidentally to promote the industry and capital of the North, and to oppress those of the South.

“If, after all this, the South should submit to be plundered of her share of the territory now in dispute, when, as an agricultural people, she requires her full proportion, she would be recreant to her interests, her power, her right, her honour, and her fame—recreant to her history and her destiny.”

There is another view of this subject, which is well calculated to excite the greatest alarm in the South. By a provision of the Constitution, a majority of three fourths

of the States can alter and amend it at their pleasure.—The effect of excluding the South from all share in the territories, will very soon be to create more than that majority of free States. We shall then be in a helpless and hopeless minority. The Constitution will no longer furnish the shadow of protection to our rights and institutions. The free States will possess the power to modify and change it at their will. They can so amend it as to give Congress the power, at once, to abolish slavery in the Southern States themselves, and at a single blow to demolish every trace of its existence. This is the dreadful issue to which the course of the North directly tends. We cannot doubt such is the ultimate design of many anti-slavery leaders. And we call on the South, earnestly and solemnly, to contemplate the gulf to which they are driven. It is an abyss without a bottom, and dark as the pit of hell; full of all calamities, and resounding with the cries of despair. Some may think the question of excluding slavery from the territories, not worth a national struggle. In itself it may be so. But in its consequences it involves all we value. If carried by the North, it will undoubtedly lead to the extermination of that institution where it now exists. The way to accomplish this is plain and easy. The North, in fixed and unscrupulous determination, has entered on that way.—It may be thought that her sense of justice, or at least her humanity and mercy, will prevent the consummation of so dire a purpose. We point to the past, and ask what ground does that afford for such a hope. He little understands the nature of fanaticism, and the love of power, who thinks to limit their excess by the claims of justice or mercy. It is a fact, too, that the controlling political power of the North is falling into the hands of its increasing mass of ignorant, debased, radical, and corrupt populace, who are insensible to such motives, and know no boundary to their violence but the want of power. They are deeply infected with radicalism and the doctrines of French communism. They are oppressed with want and toil, and sore distress. They are driven by all the passions of human nature in its worst estate.—They are inspired with all the energy of Anglo-Saxon

blood. They have scented the prey, and pitiless as famished wolves, they have sprung to the chase.

There is another aggression threatened by the North, which we should not overlook. That is, to prohibit what they call the internal slave trade—or the transfer of slaves from one slave State to another. This is proposed to be done under cover of that clause of the Constitution which authorized Congress to forbid “the migration or importation” of slaves after 1807. Northern men have the folly, or wickedness, to contend that under the word “migration,” is included all removal of slaves from one State to another. Argument against such perversion is plainly useless. Mr. Madison, the highest possible authority, in a letter to Mr. Monroe in 1820, wrote: “I have been truly astonished at some of the doctrines and declarations to which the Missouri question has led; and particularly so at the interpretation of the terms ‘migration or importation.’” “Judging from my own impressions, I should deem it impossible that any one who was a member of the general Convention could favour an opinion that the terms did not *exclusively* refer to migration and importation *into the United States*.” This will strike every candid mind as the true meaning of that clause. And to make it the ground of prohibiting the free transfer of slaves within the United States, would be a wresting of it as monstrous as it would be glaring. Yet this extremity of anti-slavery outrage is seriously advocated, and will probably be soon attempted. The object is by crowding the slaves together where they are to render them valueless, and thus to hasten emancipation.

We have now given the leading topics and suggestions of the Address, with occasional thoughts of our own. If any of our readers have not perused it for themselves, we earnestly entreat them to do so as soon as possible. Calm and dispassionate in manner, eminently Southern and patriotic in spirit, and free from all bias of party, it contains matter well worth the attention of every citizen of the South. It is signed by forty-eight members of Congress, of both political parties, and comes in the imposing form of a solemn warning from those we have appointed to be the guardians of our rights and interests.

The South is often blamed for its violence and ultra-

ism on this subject. But it is easy for those whose interests are not so vitally concerned, to preach to us of calmness and sobriety. Let not the madman, scattering firebrands, arrows, and death, exhort his neighbours to be cool and quiet. Our domestic tranquility, our property, our civil institutions, our lives, our very existence as bodies politic and social, are endangered. Our rights under the Constitution, our political equality, our independence, and finally our right to govern ourselves, are at stake. And the people who thus peril every thing we value as men, rebuke our indignation and even our anxiety. Is it for the children of those who, rather than submit to a paltry tax unjustly imposed, dissolved the political bonds which united them with England, and warred for independence to the death, to exhort us to be patient and quiet under injustice and oppression? The spirits of their fathers rise from a hundred battle fields to chide into silence their degenerate sons. Suppose the South had the majority in Congress, and were to proclaim her intention to establish slavery in every portion of the new territory. What would be the feeling of the North, from Maine to Iowa? one of indignation, scorn, and defiance. Those who talk to us of calmness and moderation, now, would then be quick to repel injustice with fierce and resolute resistance. And most righteously. They would be unworthy of the name of American freemen, and deserve to be oppressed and degraded, if they could do otherwise. We are accused of most atrocious sin and crime in holding slaves, and in our treatment of them stigmatized as infamous, held up to the contempt of the world, refused Christian communion, excluded from pulpit and sacramental table, and harassed by an agitation which threatens with dread and disturbance every home and fireside in our land—and yet we are reproved for being too sensitive and excited. Our secure and peaceful homes are transformed into magazines of explosive combustibles, and while our brethren fling into them firebrands, they tell us to be calm and still. Every attempt to resist, or even remonstrate, is regarded as little less than treason, and clamoured down as tending to bring about *disunion*. The South loves the Union, and will not dissolve it till driven to the last extremity. But

when it fails to secure the ends for which it was established, when its fundamental terms and principles are annulled, when it is no longer upheld in justice and equality, when it becomes the source of wrong and oppression and danger, it cannot and ought not to be maintained. The South has endured much, and will endure more, to preserve it. But to expect her to sacrifice to that every thing she values, is too much. They are the enemies of the Union, who disregard its conditions and compacts—who make it subservient to the interests of a section—who use it to annoy and endanger a portion of the confederacy—who compel us either to dissolve it, or to submit to measures which we deem unjust, unconstitutional, and utterly ruinous to our welfare. The South will gladly make concessions if any are made to her. She will consent to any fair and honourable compromise. We know her mind and spirit, when we say this. She does not wish the North to dishonour herself by yielding to any act of injustice, or unfair demand. But tamely to let herself be dragged to the precipice which lies before her, we believe in our conscience she ought not, and trust she never will. When the alternative is presented either to be hurled from its brink, or risk the horrors of disunion, we cannot long debate which of the two to choose. Either is fearful to think of. But it is better to perish, if perish we must, contending for our rights, than to die like cowards, basely submitting to wrong. If they would hear us we would implore our Northern brethren to pause, ere they consummate their purposes. We could even pray them with tears, that we may be spared the dreadful necessity about to be imposed upon us. Do they think we have not the spirit of American freemen, nor even the instincts of men? We know the North is accustomed to regard the remonstrances and warnings of the South as empty bravado. But if we have not utterly mistaken the feelings of our people, there is truth and meaning in the language they utter on this subject. In this matter we have no party or division. We are of one mind and one heart. The first ebullition of excitement has passed away, and we have settled down in the firm resolve of men who are ready to act. We are in fact calm and quiet at last, but it is the tranquillity of those who are prepared

and determined. We do not mean to threaten. We understand the temper of the North too well to attempt that. But we wish them to understand the posture of the South—not to be deceived by appearances—not to argue from the past—not rashly to involve us in a struggle which must end in our common dishonour and ruin. We wish we could disabuse their minds of another mistake. It is commonly supposed at the North, that there is a large party at the South secretly opposed to slavery. This is a grand delusion. We do not believe there is a man of us who doubts the lawfulness and expediency of the institution, under present circumstances. We know of none. There are some who do not think it the best possible condition of society—who if they could with a wave of the hand transform the state of things at the South, changing the negroes into intelligent, christian freemen, and translating them to Africa, and preserving the white population from the disastrous results of such a revolution, would do it tomorrow. But these mere theoretical views leave them still practically defenders of slavery. And when the worst comes to the worst, even these will be found heart and hand with their own brethren against the world.

There are some who will find fault with the appearance of such an article as the present in the pages of this Review. We have honest and honoured brethren at the North who will tell us we ought to pour oil on the troubled waters. Our object is peace; but we frankly declare it is peace on terms of right and justice. We know not how to obtain it but by making known the convictions, feelings, and determinations of the South. If these are understood we have a faint hope they will be respected. There are times when the duties of the citizen and the duties of a Christian blend and combine—when even the Minister of religion must assert his political rights and the rights of his country. At certain junctures patriotism and religion become one and the same. Such was the case in the days of our revolution. Such we solemnly believe to be the case now. Not to speak out for the South, not to act with her and for her, not to identify ourselves with her in this question, would in our view be as recreant to our duties as Christians, as it would be to our obligations as citizens. And we can assure both North

and South that the religious communities of these Southern States will in this controversy make common cause with their fellow citizens. We have not found a dissenting voice or a wavering heart among them all. They are ready.—In fact the Christian people of the South, *are the South*—they constitute the great mass and body of the people—they embrace the greater part of the wealth, influence, and intelligence of the country—it is their rights, property, lives, and cherished institutions which are endangered. They are ready, therefore, to risk all to save all. They are ready to take the front rank in the time of need. They are ready in the name of the Lord, with a conscience void of offence, and with prayers for those who vilify and wrong them, to do all their country can expect of faithful citizens. And in connection with this point we wish, plainly but kindly and respectfully, to suggest to a portion of our Southern fellow-citizens what we regard as a very important consideration. We are sorry to know that in a few instances, well meant efforts of Southern Christians to teach our slaves the doctrines and duties of the Gospel, have met with discouragement and opposition. We admit the South has a right to be jealous and watchful on this subject. But certainly when such attempts are made by Southern men, fully identified in conviction, sympathy, and interest with the South, they have a right to the confidence of the community. Nothing could be more destructive to the union, harmony, and strength of the South, or more dangerous to the permanence of slavery, than to alienate the minds of Southern Christians from that institution, or to bring their religious convictions into conflict with the policy of the South. But this will be the inevitable result of preventing or obstructing their efforts to christianize our slaves. Under all their imperfections, and under all the differences of denominations, lie a deep conviction of sacred duty, and an earnest desire, to preach the Gospel to every creature. They feel that their obligations to God, paramount to all others, imperatively require them fully and faithfully to teach religion to the slaves. They believe not only that the Bible sanctions slavery, but that the tendency of its teaching is to make the slaves more docile, obedient, faithful, contented and profitable. Wherever the experiment has been fairly made by competent persons,

(and they can point to examples,) such has been the result. They are ready to maintain the rights of the South, therefore, against any and every aggression, but they insist, they must insist, they feel bound by the highest and holiest principles which govern the hearts of men to insist on their right to christianize the slaves. While they guide their plans and efforts within the laws and statutes of the country, they cannot consent to be hindered or forbidden. Any attempt for this purpose would instantly bring convictions of duty as Christians into collision with their position as defenders of slavery. It would place them in a dilemma where they must sacrifice either their conscientious and religious convictions, or their attachment to a civil institution. And it needs no prophet to tell us the result when the religion of a people is arrayed against a political and social establishment. For the sake, therefore, of our common country and common interests, we entreat our fellow citizens to be tender and cautious in this matter—to respect the conscience of Southern Christians—to confide in the fidelity of the Southern Churches to Southern rights and institutions. They have studied this subject in all its bearings. They are anxious to do their duty both to God and to their country, and earnestly desire that their obligations in these two respects should not be made incompatible. They pledge their lives, and fortunes, and sacred honor to the South. And in return they ask that no measures on the part of their fellow citizens shall compel them to choose between opposition to slavery and unfaithfulness to conscience and to God. We have thought it best to say this much, and to say it plainly. It is important for us to understand each other. We must respect the sentiments and feelings, every party of all the others. There must be reciprocal concessions, and indulgence, and moderation, and tenderness. Discord and divisions among ourselves will be suicidal. The day of our doom will have come, when we meet each other in a strife of conscience or of interest.

We are sorry to confess that a very few persons seem to believe that to give the institutions and blessings of the Gospel to the slaves, will destroy slavery,—that it will so enlighten and improve them as to lead to speedy and successful insurrection. We can regard this as nothing

less than infidelity, and it lands us at once in the conclusion that Christianity and slavery are incompatible. If the Gospel be true, then it is best for all men,—will make any and every class better and happier,—and all men ought to have it. If it be inconsistent with our institutions, then either it is false, or they are wrong; and we must give up the Bible, or condemn slavery. Hence resolved to maintain slavery at all hazards, these men denounce every effort to teach the negroes the duties and doctrines of the Gospel. They are at one extreme and the abolitionists at another. Make the masters Christians, say the abolitionists, and they will not hold slaves. Make the slaves Christians, say the infidels, and they cannot be kept in slavery. Between these two the Churches of Christ in the South take their stand. With the Bible, the word of invincible and eternal truth, will they overcome both the one and the other. From the fury and madness of abolition, they calmly appeal to the word and to the judgment seat of the divine master. Against the unbelief of infidelity they oppose the faith and fruits of the Gospel. If the arguments of reason, the dictates of common sense, the facts of experience, and the truths of Scripture, prevail nothing with the blindness of the first or the doubts of the second, they can only take their place by the cross of our great God and Saviour, and proclaim their unchangeable witness, their immovable purpose—saying to abolition, “if the Gospel *will* abolish slavery, be content! we are doing all we can to abolish it, for we are doing all we can to make master and slave Christians,”—and to infidelity, if *religion* will destroy slavery, so be it! “Whether it be right in the sight of God, to hearken unto you more than unto God, judge ye. For we cannot but speak the things which we have seen and heard.”

Here we lay down our pen, wearied, and withal sad, even as when we began. We have written in sober earnest, oft-times with a trembling and anxious heart, always in sincerity and in the fear of God—whether with wisdom and understanding, we cannot tell. We have handled topics and principles which involve the destiny of nations, the laws of nature and Providence, and the high interests of Christ's kingdom in the world. We have touched upon subjects which move the deepest and strongest feelings of our

heart. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if we have spoken unadvisedly with our lips. We have desired to do good—to our whole country, North and South,—our common, our great, our happy country. But what our writing shall avail we know not. We commit it to the charity of our readers, and to the favour of God.

ARTICLE II.

Narrative of the United States Expedition to the River Jordan and the Dead Sea, by W. F. LYNCH, U. S. N. Commander of the Expedition. With Maps and numerous Illustrations. Philadelphia, Lea & Blanchard, 1849, 8vo.

It is a favourable indication in the present fluctuating condition of the world, that so many persons, not invested with Ecclesiastical dignity, are found directing their attention to subjects vitally connected with the interests of Christianity. In the wide field of research necessary to be explored, in order to the establishment and illustration of the truths of the Bible, the Clergy are not left to labour alone. The Almighty has wisely raised up those who are more competent to the tasks which they have assigned themselves, and who must be free from the charge of priestcraft and design. To the stores of Oriental and Biblical Literature, to the discussions of the *questiones vexatæ* in theological controversy, and to the treatises on experimental and practical piety, the laity of both sexes have added, and we trust will continue to add, invaluable contributions. And if we are to credit the statements of a contemporary,* high attainments in the department of Biblical Literature, are, in England at least, “an actual bar to advancement in the Church.” And thus a most potent obstacle is thrown in the way of devoting the talents of the Clergy to this important branch

* North British Review, May No. 1849, p. 99.

of learning, leaving the field open to the exertions of laymen, who have more leisure and more abundant means at their disposal. "Episcopates, deaneries, and rich incumbencies," are studiously withheld from such men by the Government, and conferred in preference on those who have distinguished themselves in classical learning.

Whether it is in any degree from this cause, that so many who have never been invested with the holy office, are found turning their attention to sacred subjects, we pretend not to say. Certain it is, that on this side of the Atlantic, great proficiency in Biblical Literature must ever go unrewarded, except here and there in a professorship endowed for that purpose. The indefatigable student must plod his weary way through toils and discouragements, with few to sympathize with him or appreciate his acquirements; and with little to compensate him ultimately, except the pleasures flowing from the knowledge of the rich truths with which he has stored his mind.

It is not so in regard to works on practical and controverted subjects. These catch the breeze of popular feeling, find their way into every hamlet, and, to a much greater extent, demonstrate the truth of the saying that "the labourer is worthy of his hire."

Of the laymen who have lately appeared before the world, on subjects intimately connected with the Holy Scriptures, we might mention the Duke of Argyle on Presbytery; Layard, on Ancient Nineveh; Smith, on the Voyage and Shipwreck of Paul; Bunsen and Cureton, on the Epistles of Ignatius; and last, though not least, the Expedition to the Jordan and the Dead Sea, by our own indefatigable countryman, W. F. Lynch, of the American Navy.

According to Lieutenant Lynch's own statement, he had long entertained and cherished a desire to visit the lands of the Bible. When a young Midshipman, and one of that band who had the honour of escorting the great Lafayette back to his own country, he formed the desire, which was almost a quarter of a century in reaching its fulfilment. In that voyage, says he:

"My previous desire to visit the land of the Iliad, of Alexander, and of Cæsar, became merged in an insatiate yearning to look on the country which was the cradle of the human race,

and the theatre of that race's mysterious destiny: the soil hallowed by the footsteps—and consecrated by the tomb, of the Savior." p. 18.

Twice, at different intervals since that time, he was disappointed in his expectations of making the intended voyage. But at length, on the 8th day of May, 1848, the town of Vera Cruz having fallen before the superior power of the American arms, and there being nothing left on the field of war for the Navy to perform, he preferred an application to the Hon. John Y. Mason, then Secretary of the Navy, for a commission to visit and explore the region and waters of the Dead Sea.

This expedition was the more important, as such an exploration had never been made by any travellers to this region; and many of the reports concerning it were manifestly, in a great degree, fabulous. A few individuals only, of those who had visited the shores of the Dead Sea, ever attempted to navigate it. And of these, two enterprising gentlemen, Costigan, an Irishman, and Lieut. Molyneux, of the British Navy, died without being permitted to give the results of their labours to the world,—the one, on the shores of the sea, and the other, soon after leaving them. The extent of this mysterious water had never been ascertained by any accurate measurement; and as the reports of different travellers show, their estimates were all conjectural, and, as might be expected, contradictory. To ascertain this, then, and the various depths, and the nature of its bottom, by accurate soundings; and to prove, from geological research, that the shores, bottom, and adjacent region, corroborate the truth of the Scripture account of the overthrow of the Cities of the Plain, was undoubtedly an important desideratum to the Christian world.

On the 31st. of July following, Lieut. Lynch received from the Navy Department a notice of a decision favorable to his application, accompanied by an order to commence the necessary preparation for the expedition.

On the 2d. of October, he was ordered to the command of the United States Store Ship, "Supply," which was designed to carry stores to our naval squadron in the Mediterranean. While the vessel was being prepared and furnished for this duty, Lieut. Lynch procured the con-

struction of two metallic boats, the one of copper, and the other of galvanized iron, capable of being taken to pieces and carried on the backs of camels across the country, from the Mediterranean to the Sea of Gallilee. The object of these strong vessels was to descend the fearful rapids of the Jordan, and to navigate the heavy waters of the Dead Sea. But lest the reconstruction of the boats, after being taken to pieces, might prove a failure, he procured two low carriages of suitable proportions, to transport them as far as the Sea of Gallilee. In the meantime, he shipped ten seamen for the crews of these boats; and it is a fact worthy of note, that these men, all native born Americans, were men of strictly sober habits, and pledged to abstain from all intoxicating drinks; and

"To this stipulation under Providence," says our author, "is principally to be ascribed their final recovery from the extreme prostration consequent on the severe privations and great exposure to which they were unavoidably subjected." p. 14.

Associated with the commander, were Lieut. J. B. Dale, and Passed Midshipman R. Aulich, both excellent draughtsmen, and, in other respects, highly qualified to assist in the expedition. And as the region designed to be explored was in the Turkish dominions, Lieut. Lynch was directed to apply, through Mr. Carr, our Minister at Constantinople, to that government, for the necessary permission. The wisdom of this course is manifest, as this was a national and not a private expedition; and by an official permission from the Sultan, not only might conflicts be avoided with the officers of his government in the East, but aid and protection against the Arabs obtained if necessary.

Having made the intended preparations, and being furnished with an adequate supply of gum-elastic water-bags for life preservers, arms, ammunition, instruments, oars, tents, provisions, &c. the expedition set sail from New York on the 26th of November, 1847. On the 19th of December, they passed Cape Trafalgar, where the English fleet met the united naval forces of France and Spain, and the gallant Nelson fell; and the same afternoon brought them to anchor immediately abreast the town of Gibraltar. Here, being alarmed by the appear-

ance of the small pox among the crew, orders were forthwith given to sail for Port Mahon, the principal rendezvous of our naval squadron in the Mediterranean. Port Mahon, where they arrived after a boisterous sail of eight days, is the chief town of the Island of Minorca, and is believed to be the place where Hanibal took the oath of perpetual enmity against the Romans. This place our author finds serious fault with, as the winter rendezvous of our vessels in that sea, both on account of its demoralizing influence on our crews, and the dangers to which the squadron would be exposed, in the event of a war with either France or England. Leaving Port Mahon, after a tedious delay, on the 4th of February, 1848, and touching at Malta, the scene of the shipwreck of the *Apostle Paul*, without any occurrence of interest, the vessel was anchored off the city of Smyrna, on the 16th of the same month.

Here, after a delay of two days, our author, with his companions, left the "Supply," and embarked in an Austrian steamer for Constantinople, in the beautiful and far famed harbour of which, called the "Golden Horn," they awoke on the second morning after their embarkation.

This visit to the renowned city of Constantine, the first Christian that ever wielded the empire of Rome, was, principally, for the purpose of obtaining from the Turkish government the firman, or permission, to pass through the dominions of the Sublime Porte; but many other objects of high interest presented themselves, of which our limits will not permit us even a passing notice. Here the party met with Dr. Davis, of South Carolina, at the head of a model farm of two thousand acres, and an agricultural school, the main object of which is the introduction of the culture of the cotton plant into the Ottoman territories. This gentleman, who is no less favourably known in his native State, sustains in the dominions of the Sultan a very high character; and, in the opinion of Americans, Turks and Franks, is admirably qualified for the position he holds. By Dr. Davis they were kindly entertained, and also by Dr. Smith, who fills the important office of Geologist to the Ottoman government, to whom they were indebted for many scientific suggestions. The same kind attention was bestowed by Bishop South-

gate, and by the members of the "Evangelical Mission."

During his stay in Constantinople, Lieut. Lynch obtained, through Mr. Carr, the honour of a presentation to the Sultan. After the usual preliminaries of pipes and coffee, the invariable Turkish welcome to a visitor, given by Sheffie Bey, the chief secretary of the Sultan, he was led across the court yard into a spacious hall, from which two flights of stairs led to an elevated platform, adjoining the audience chamber. Here an unexpected difficulty occurred, which had well nigh prevented the gratification of the expected audience. The chamberlain in attendance objected to his sword, and demanded that he should lay it aside, before being admitted into the royal presence. Lieut. Lynch, however, with true republican independence, maintained that his sword was a part of the uniform of his country; and that as the audience was given him as an officer of the United States, he could not dispense with it. He inquired whether the custom had been complied with by Mr. Carr and other officials, but in the mean time had formed the resolution, without regard to precedent, not to be admitted without it. The discussion was at last ended by the secretary, who having probably referred the matter to the Sultan himself, came forward and decided that he should retain his sword. What followed we prefer to give in the author's own words:

"The discussion at an end, we ascended the stairway, which was covered with a good and comfortable but not costly carpet, and passed into a room more handsomely furnished, and more lofty, but in every other respect of the same dimensions as the one immediately below it. A rich carpet was upon the floor; a magnificent chandelier, all crystal and gold, was suspended from the ceiling, and costly divans and tables, with other articles of furniture, were interspersed about the room; but I had not time to note them, for on the left hung a gorgeous crimson velvet curtain, embroidered and fringed with gold, and towards it the secretary led the way. His countenance and his manner exhibited more awe than I had ever seen depicted in the human countenance. He seemed to hold his breath, and his step was so soft and stealthy that once or twice I stopped, under the impression that I had left him behind, but found him ever beside me. There were three of us in close proximity, and the stairway was lined with officers and attendants, but such was the death-like stillness, that I could distinctly hear my own footfall, which, unaccustom-

ed to palace regulations, fell with untutored firmness upon the royal floor. If it had been a wild beast slumbering in his lair that we were about to visit, there could not have been a silence more deeply hushed.

Fretted at such abject servility, I quickened my pace towards the curtain, when Sheffie Bey, rather gliding than stepping before me, cautiously and slowly raised a corner for me to pass. Wondering at his subdued and terror-stricken attitude, I stepped across the threshold, and felt, yet without perceiving it, that I was in the presence of the Sultan.

* * * * *

"The room, less spacious, but as lofty as the adjoining one, was furnished in the modern European style, and like a familiar thing, a stove stood nearly in the centre. On a sofa, by a window, through which he might have looked upon us as we crossed the court, with a crimson tarbouch, its gold button and blue silk tassel on his head, a black kerchief around his neck, attired in a blue military frock and pantaloons, and polished French boots upon his feet, sat the monarch, without any of the attributes of sovereignty about him.

"A man, young in years, but evidently of impaired and delicate constitution, his wearied and spiritless air was unrelieved by any indication of intellectual energy. He eyed me fixedly as I advanced, and on him my attention was no less intently rivetted. As he smiled I stopped, expecting that he was about to speak, but he motioned gently with his hand for me to approach yet nearer. Through the interpreter, he then made me welcome, for which I expressed my acknowledgements."—*pp.* 74—76.

During the interview, which was brief, Lieut. Lynch, in the "name of the President of the United States," presented the Sultan with some biographies and prints, illustrative of the character and habits of our North American Indians, the productions of American artists. These his Sublime Highness received with manifest tokens of regard, and with the assurance that he would treasure them as mementoes of the good feeling of our government towards him. His countenance, voice, and whole demeanour were indicative of the extreme of mildness and gentleness of disposition; and as a token of his kindness, he expressed to the Grand Vizier a desire to present his visitor with some suitable gift. Lieut. Lynch replied that he would not be willing to accept any present in return for that which he esteemed so signal an honour, even if the constitution of

his country permitted; and remarked in addition, that more than any present he would prize the granting of the firman.

Thus ended the interesting interview between our traveller, a subordinate officer in the American Navy, and the ruler of the Ottoman empire; an honour never before granted to any but officers of the highest rank. There was one circumstance that was deemed worthy of remark: neither in the court nor in the palace was there seen a soldier; and but for the obsequiousness of the numerous attendants, the whole scene might have been taken for a visit to a wealthy private gentleman.

Through the kind efforts of our Minister, Mr. Carr, the firman was at length obtained, of which the following is a literal translation;

"Governors of Saida and Jerusalem! Captain Lynch, of the American Navy, being desirous of examining the Dead Sea (Bahr Lut,) his legation has asked for him, from our authorities, all due aid and assistance.

"You will, therefore, on the receipt of this present order, give him all due aid and co-operation in his explorations. Protect, therefore, and treat him with a regard due to the friendship existing between the American government and that of the Sublime Porte.

(Signed)

MUSTAPHE RESCHID PASCHA,
Grand Vizier.

"MUSTAPHA PASHA, *Governor of Saida.*

"ZARIF PASHA, *Governor of Jerusalem.*

"Stambohl, March 7th, 1848."

The desired instrument having been obtained, Lieut. Lynch and his companions lost no time in rejoining the "Supply," and set sail for Beirút, on the coast of Syria, at which place they arrived on the 25th of March.

At Beirút they were joined by Dr. Henry J. Anderson, of New York, whose valuable services, both as a Physician and a Geologist, were secured for the whole tour. He was directed to proceed across the country, from this place, for the purpose of making a geological reconnoissance, and if practicable, to join the caravan on the route from Acre to Tiberias. Through the kindness of the Rev. Eli Smith, of the American Board of Foreign Missions, they secured the services of an intelligent young Syrian named Ameuny, as dragoman or interpreter. An Arab by the

name of Mustapha was also engaged to accompany them in the capacity of cook. From Beirút the party sailed along the coast southward, and passing Acre, landed near the village of Haifa, at the base of Mount Carmel, on which the prophet Elijah contended with the prophets of Baal; and to whose summit, on account of its graceful form and verdant beauty, the head of the bride is compared in the Song of Solomon.

Here, from the difficulties of preparation for a land journey to the Jordan, the men began to regard the expedition as any thing else than a "party of pleasure," as it had been illiberally termed by some of their countrymen at home. The horses which were procured to draw the boats were found to be miserable galled creatures, and for the most part unaccustomed to the harness. Finding it impossible to proceed in this manner, the boats and other articles were sent by water across the bay to Acre, while the empty trucks were, with difficulty, taken by land to the same place. Near this place empty into the sea the Nahr Muhutta, the river Kishon of the Old Testament, and the Namaan, or Belus, near which Pliny says the Phenician sailors discovered the mode of making glass, by observing the alkali of the sea weed which they burned, uniting with the melted silex of the shore. At Acre our voyagers beheld the "Supply" stand out to sea, with feelings of deep solemnity, not knowing whether they should ever be permitted to tread her decks again. And in the mean time their difficulties were multiplied by frightful reports of the hostilities of the Arab tribes on the Jordan, and the exorbitant demand of the governor of Acre, for furnishing them with necessary supplies and protection. At this crisis, however, Lieut. Lynch was fortunate in obtaining the friendship and assistance of a celebrated Sheik of the Bedowin Arabs, named Akíl Ayd, and a deposed Sherif of Mecca, a lineal descendant of Mohammed the prophet. To the influence of these two men, the first of whom was termed the Achilles, and the other the Nestor of the expedition, Lieut. Lynch thought it was owing, in some degree, that they were never attacked by the Arabs, during the time they were among them.

With these two distinguished Oriental chiefs, and fifteen followers of the Bedowin tribe, all well mounted, the

party set out from Acre, on the 4th of April, on their journey toward the Sea of Galilee. Finding it impossible to obtain the requisite supply of horses, for the transportation of the boats and baggage, the novel experiment was made of harnessing camels, which, to the great joy of the travellers, proved triumphantly successful.

"The metal boats, with flags flying, mounted on carriages drawn by huge camels, ourselves, the mounted sailors in single file, the loaded camels, the Sherif and the Sheik, with their tufted spears and followers, presented a glorious sight. It looked like a triumphant march."—*p.* 146.

During this part of their journey they passed at a short distance on their right the city of Nazareth, where the Saviour spent the early years of his stay upon the earth, and on their left, Cana of Galilee, the scene of the first miracle. On the same day they encamped near the walled village of Turan, not far from which, at the foot of Mount Tabor, three thousand French under command of Kleber so gallantly defeated nine times their own number of Turks. In this village Lieut. Lynch, accompanied by Akil and Sherif, was entertained by the Sheik with pipes and coffee, the usual rites of hospitality among these people, and here Dr. Anderson again joined the party.

Having now made an ascent of more than 1500 feet above the plain of Acre, the Sea of Galilee, and the Bashan mountains beyond, appeared in the distance. In this region the dreary waste-like appearance of the treeless and houseless country, was relieved by the slopes and valleys of unenclosed fields of grain, in which ragged fellahin or Arab peasants were industriously engaged in ploughing. A steep, rugged, and difficult descent brought them at length to the sea, so frequently presented to view in the history of the Son of God upon earth, and consecrated by so many of his wonderful works of benevolence to man.

The indigenous wild flowers, mentioned by our author thus far, are the scarlet anemone, the thorny shrub merar, and the blue convolvulus, of which the latter is the most abundant. Without the walls of Haifa, he saw the carob tree, which bears a hod or bean, resembling that of the catalpa, supposed to be the "husk" spoken of in the parable of the prodigal son. The prevailing rock along the route,

is limestone ; but after passing the Lubieh, several specimens of quartz and trap were found ; and on the elevated plain which overlooks the sea, the trap appeared in numerous scattered fragments, succeeded by huge boulders down the descent, of which large masses crop out along the shore.

Tiberias, (in Arabic Tubariyeh,) at which the party arrived on the 6th of April, is a walled town of some magnitude, on the borders of the sea of Galilee, remarkable for having been laid in ruins by an earthquake in 1837, which destroyed 700 out of 2500 of its inhabitants. Tiberias and Safed are the two holy cities of the Jews, in the territories of ancient Galilee, as Hebron and Jerusalem are in Judea. On a strip of land, where the heights recede some distance from the waters of the lake, stands the town of Tiberias, about half a mile in length. Its wall, which was once near twenty feet high, is now standing only with breaches, just as it was left by the throes of the earthquake twelve years ago.

Here the party rendezvoused, after a tedious and difficult journey over a broken and almost impassible region. They had now reached the long wished for valley of the Ghôr, which was to be the principal scene of their operations. All the labours and difficulties, and tiresome delays, which they had heretofore endured, were but preparatory to the great object of the expedition. Now they must encounter the fearful rapids of the Jordan, the dangers of attack from the hostile tribes along the shores, and the unknown perils of that mysterious sea, whose history presents so conspicuous a view of the retributions of God upon guilty men. They secured here a portion of a building, not only for their accommodation during their brief stay, but for the purpose of preparing their instruments, which they found uninjured by the roughness of the road, for the expedition. On the shores of this lake, where they remained four days, they ate delicious fish, taken from the same water on which the fishermen of Galilee so often toiled, the same species of the finny tribe, perhaps, of which they caught at one draught, by the command of the risen Saviour, "an hundred and fifty and three." Having, with great difficulty, succeeded in bringing the two metallic boats down the precipice from

the mountain, they launched them on the same blue wave on which the intrepid Peter, "beginning to sink, cried, Lord save me," and where the God-man, in the exercise of his omnipotence, said to the winds and the waves, "peace, be still."

A brief survey of the lake was all that the time would permit to be made. The waters of the Jordan, now at the Spring flow, were fast subsiding, and it was necessary to make the descent before they sunk to the low water mark, and while the vessels might pass over the numerous obstructions that lay imbedded in the stream. The bottom of this sea they ascertained to be a concave basin, and at its greatest depth, twenty-seven and a half fathoms, (165 feet ;) but from abundant rains and rapid evaporation, the depth is always fluctuating. The water is cool and sweet, and produces five species of fish, all which, as far as our travellers could ascertain, were very delicious.

In order to assist them in the transportation of their baggage down the Jordan, and on the Dead Sea, the Commander purchased an old frame boat, and the only one on the lake, which he fitted up and named the "Uncle Sam." The owners of the camels which were brought from Acre, being unwilling to trust them further, it became necessary to obtain another supply of these "ships of the desert," in order to carry the tents, provisions, and other articles by land down the valley of the Jordan.

Here the party were visited by the Prince of the upper tribes of the Jordan, who called himself "Emir Nasser Arar el Guzzaway," who, from his prodigious alimentive capacity, Lieut. Lynch thought better deserved the sobriquet of guzzle-away. He kindly proffered his friendship and aid, and the hospitalities of his tribes, which were gratefully accepted, and he accompanied the caravan through his own territories.

Lieut. Lynch now assigned to each individual his own special duties, rightly deeming that a proper division of the labour would render its performance more expeditious and more perfect. Mr. Dale, to whom was assigned the command of the land party, was directed to take topographical sketches of the country through which he should pass, and such other notes as he might be able.

Dr. Anderson undertook his already allotted duties of making geological observations, and collecting specimens. Mr. Bedlow, who had joined the expedition at Constantinople, was directed to note the aspect of the country, and the incidents of the journey; and to Mr. Francis Lynch was assigned the herbarium, and the duty of collecting botanical specimens. Lieut. Lynch himself, taking command of the "Fanny Mason," one of the metallic boats, took upon himself the task of noting "the course, rapidity, colour, and depth of the river, and its tributaries,—the nature of its banks, and of the country through which it flowed—the vegetable productions, and the birds and animals, with a journal of events." Mr. Aulick, who commanded the "Fanny Skinner," the other metallic boat, assumed the duty of sketching the topography of the river, and its shores.

For the land party, under command of Mr. Dale, were detailed Dr. Anderson, Mr. Bedlow, Mr. Lynch, Sherif, Akil, Mustafa, and ten Bedawin Arabs, to act as videttes. These were directed, for the safety of the expedition, to keep as near to the river and the party in the boats, as the nature of the country would permit. The report of two guns, fired in quick succession, was to be considered an indication of attack upon the boats, and a signal for them to leave the baggage, and hasten with all speed to their assistance.

All things being at length in readiness, both parties took their departure from Tiberias, the one filing away through its narrow and filthy streets, and the other bearing down with flying colours over the smooth waters of the lake, for the entrance into the Jordan. The river party consisted of the two "Fannies," and the "Uncle Sam," manned by Arab boatmen; the land party in all of about thirty horsemen. In one hour and forty minutes from the time of embarkation, the boats had reached the outlet of the sea, and entered the current of the river, passing on their right the ruins of ancient Tarrichæ, remarked by Strabo as being famous for salt fish. Here the valley of the Ghôr is about three-fourths of a mile in width. The average breadth of the river is seventy-five feet, the banks are rounded, and about thirty feet high, decked with the scarlet anemone, the yellow marigold,

the water lily, and the asphodel, but destitute of tree or shrub. In a few hours the boats came in sight of the ruined bridge of Semakh, which is described as being extremely picturesque. Here, from the fallen fragments having obstructed the course of the river, it was with extreme difficulty and danger that the boats were passed over the rapids. The "Fanny Mason," which led the way, dashed and hung upon a rock in the middle of the stream, bending and quivering from the violence of the waves that dashed furiously against her, when the "Uncle Sam," unskilfully guided by her Arab crew, came in collision with her; but striking her accidentally at a favourable angle, dislodged her, and both shot down the rapids together. The "Fanny Skinner," drawing less water, and having the advantage of an explored channel, passed over without difficulty.

Having moored the boats safely on the right bank of the stream, the crews proceeded to join their companions again, who had already pitched their tents for the night on an adjacent knoll, which overlooked the scene of their recent perilous adventure. This was the first night spent on the banks of the Jordan, which, after the fatigues of the day, might have been appropriately given to repose, but for the breaking loose of Dr. Anderson's horse, and the plunging of the Bedawin horsemen in the river, on their return from the residence of the Sheik of Semakh, whither they had gone to enjoy a supper of mutton and rice, which the Sheik, by a singular condition in his land tenure, is bound to afford to all travellers.

Here the soil is a dark loam, covered with the purple flowers of the thistle. There was found also the pink oleander, the Adonis or Pheasant's eye, the Briony, the Scabiosa Stellata, and two kinds of clover,—one of an unusual variety, with a thorny head, and the other with purple flowers,—and two specimens, which being entirely new, were permitted, for the time, to pass unnamed.

On the next day, the 11th of April, the little vessels were compelled to encounter a rapid, or succession of rapids, no less dangerous than the "Jisr Semakh" of the preceding day. Surrounded by strange Arabs, who might have caused them serious trouble, the men were compelled to unload the boats, and themselves in water up to

their waists, to shoot them down the perilous descent.— During this day they passed several other rapids, and late in the evening reached the falls of Buk'ah, where they encamped for the night. For the first time since entering the Jordan, they found canes growing on its banks, and also small trees, chiefly the Turfa, (tamarisk,) the Sifsaf, (willow,) and tangled vines beneath. During this part of their truly rough voyage, they killed an animal called by the Arabs, the water dog, having the form of a lobster, the head of a mouse, and the tail of a dog. They saw also the partridge, the owl, the heron, the snipe, the hawk, the duck, and many other birds, some of them in great abundance; and besides, trout and other denizens of the watery world.

The following days were passed much in the same manner as the preceding, plunging down dangerous rapids, at the imminent risk of both boats and crew, and taking notes of the journey. The "Uncle Sam" foundered, leaving the two "Fannies" to complete the voyage, evincing clearly that no wooden structure can be relied on to navigate these tumultuous waters. Dr. Anderson was despatched with an escort, to Um Keis, the Gadara of the New Testament, for the purpose of making a geological reconnoissance, with directions to return to the camp the same evening. On entering the territories of the hostile tribes, by the advice of Akil, the land party crossed the river, and proceeded down on the east side, while their Arab friends remained on the west, keeping the boats immediately between them. Eight days were employed in descending this stream, any thing but pleasing to the navigator, consisting of an almost uninterrupted succession of falls and rapids, and even more tortuous in its course than the mighty father of waters of our own country.

Nothing of importance occurred during the remainder of the rough and perilous voyage, beyond what has already been noted. Toiling all day in the watery element, and dashing over foaming cataracts at an angle of 60° , and spending sleepless nights of watching against surrounding foes, made the undertaking any thing but a pleasure excursion, and required something more than the mere spirit of romance, to induce the members of the expedi-

tion to persevere. Twenty-seven dangerous rapids were passed, and a number more of less note. In a distance of little more than sixty miles in a direct line, between the Lake of Genesereth and the Dead Sea, from its extreme crookedness, the Jordan traverses a distance of 200 miles. It flows between high banks, which form the terraces of another and wider valley, terminating with the broken and precipitous heights on both sides of the Ghôr.

The geological formation of this valley, from the Sea of Tiberias to the Dead Sea, is distinctly ascertained to be masses of silicious conglomerate, with occasional limestone, which preponderates on approaching the Dead Sea. Basalt is found; also, Quartz and Conglomerate, in the bed of the river, covered with deposits of oxide of iron and manganese. The upper terrace on which the caravan travelled, averaged an elevation of about 500 feet above the lower one, and at first was found covered with fields of grain, but became more barren on descending farther south.

Besides the botanical specimens already mentioned, there were noted the dilbeh or plane tree, Zukkum or wild olive, Acacia, oak, cedar, ghurrah, fragrant oleander, crimson poppy, golden daisy, fennel, laurestinus, castor bean, Bisbas, a yellow, and Bughuk, a crimson flower, the Kelakh resembling the castor bean, and several other unknown varieties. Nearer the mouth of the Jordan, were found the Osher plant, bearing the apples of Sodom, of which we shall speak further on, and the Nubk or Spina Christi, of which the Redeemer's crown of thorns is said to have been made.

Of the animal tribes, there are mentioned in addition, bulbuls, swallows, pigeons, storks, gazelles; and from the tracks seen, the tiger is known to exist in the valley.

From the plains of Jericho, the caravan caught the first glimpse of the Dead Sea and the mountains of Moab beyond. And on the 18th of April the parties both started from the Pilgrim's Ford on the river where they rendezvoused, by their appropriate routes, for Ain el Feshka on the western shore of the Dead Sea. In descending the river towards the entrance of this wonderful lake, fetid odors were detected, supposed to arise from small streams flowing in on the right and left banks. In less than three

hours the boats passed out of the stream, and entered upon the waters of the sea. At the mouth, the Jordan is 180 yards wide, and three feet deep, inclining towards the eastern shore of the sea. A fresh wind blowing from the northwest, welcomed the first entrance of the expedition, which soon increased to a gale; and the sea rising with the wind, the heavy laden vessels experienced as much difficulty as they had done in descending the cascades of the Jordan. "From the extreme density of the water, it seemed as if their bows were encountering the sledge hammers of the Titans, instead of the waters of an angry sea." The spray arising from the foaming of the briny waters, produced a prickly sensation wherever it touched the skin, and was exceedingly painful to the eyes, leaving incrustations of salt after its evaporation.— Finding the dangers of the storm increasing, the party made for the northern shore, with their "arms, coats, and skins, coated with greasy salt; and their eyes, lips, and nostrils smarting excessively."

"At times it seemed as if the Dread Almighty frowned upon our efforts to navigate a sea, the creation of his wrath. There is a tradition among the Arabs, that no one can venture upon this sea and live. Repeatedly the fates of Costigan and Molyneux had been cited to deter us. The first one spent a few days, the last about twenty hours, and returned to the place from which he had embarked, without landing upon its shores. One was found dying upon the shore, the other expired in November last, immediately after his return, of fever contracted upon its waters." p. 269.

But Heaven smiled more auspiciously upon our adventurers. The storm suddenly abated; and from the extreme density of the water, the sea as rapidly subsided. As if for the first time, permission was granted from on High, to explore the mysteries of this scene of Divine retribution, and reveal them to the world. And the same Almighty Being who commanded peace on the Lake of Genesareth, wielding the same unlimited control over the elements, now as then, made them yield obedience to his will. Pulling now swiftly over a calm sea, which only a few minutes before was rolling in frightful billows, the party hastened to join their companions of the caravan, at the appointed place of rendezvous. They reached Ain

el Feshka after some difficulty, and having partaken of their evening repast, they retired, amid dust and fetid marshes, to enjoy their first night of sleep on the shore of the Dead Sea. How different this spot now, from what it was before the crimes of its inhabitants called down the avenging fires of Heaven upon it! The valley, which was "even as the garden of the Lord," is now only a cheerless, barren waste, bearing evident marks of the awful dealings of the Almighty with it. Nothing "lives, moves, and has its being" in this divinely accursed water. The only evidence of animal life, which had as yet appeared, were a flock of gulls flying over, and some frogs, croaking their nightly serenade to our weary travellers on the shore.

In passing from the mouth of the river to their encampment at Ain el Feshka, a peninsula was discovered on the north-western shore, which, on account of the low narrow isthmus that connects it to the main land being covered with water, has been taken by some for an island. The northern shore is described as an extensive mudflat; the north-western a pure gravel bed, sloping gradually from the mountains to the sea; and the whole eastern coast is a line of barren and rugged mountains, a part of the Hauran range, which, beginning at a point south of Damascus, runs southward beyond Bozrah in the land of Edom.

From Ain el Feshka, the first encampment, two lines of soundings were taken, under the direction of Mr. Dale and Mr. Aulick, the one directly across, and the other diagonally to a black chasm in the mountains, which proved to be the "Zerka Main," or outlet of the hot springs of Callirhoe. In the direct line the greatest depth ascertained was 696 feet. In the other line, running diagonally S. E. a level plain was discovered at the bottom, extending almost the entire width of the sea, with an average depth of 1020 feet. The lead brought up from the bottom, at different soundings, blue mud and sand, and crystals of salt, some of them perfect cubes.

From this place, where they remained two days, the explorers coasted southward to Ain Jidy, the Engedi of the Old Testament, where David sought refuge from the fury of Saul. Passing in their course eleven wadys or ravines,

which break down through the precipitous heights of the western shore, and several peaks which are carefully noted, they hauled up the boats where the stream from the fountain Ain Jidy descends from the mountain, and loses itself in the plain below. This place, which was selected as the home of the party during their future operations on the sea, was called, in honour of the father of our country, "camp Washington."

"Instead of the fine grassy plain, which, from Dr. Robinson's description, we had anticipated, we found here a broad sloping delta at the mouth of dry gorges in the mountains. The surface of this plain is dust covered with coarse pebbles and minute fragments of stone, mostly flint, with here and there a nubk and some ozier trees." "The whole aspect of the country, these few trees and patches of vegetation excepted, was one incinerated brown. The mountain, with caverns in its face, towered fifteen hundred feet above us; and one-third up was the fountain, in a grove of Spina Christi. It was a spot familiar to the imaginations of all,—the 'Diamond of the Desert,' in the tales of the crusaders." p.p. 290, 291.

A little before reaching this place, an extensive ruin was discovered in the face of the mountain, consisting of several caverns, defended by walls on the front and two sides, evidently designed as a protection of the inhabitants, against the intrusion of enemies without. And here again were found apertures leading to the same kind of subterranean recesses; but from their situation now inaccessible to man. And as this was in the wilderness of Engedi, this excavation may be the very cave of Adullam, where David, in deep despondency, cried, "I looked on my right hand, and beheld, but there was no man that would know me; refuge failed me; no man cared for my soul." Similar excavations had been discovered by the caravan the evening of their first approach to the Dead Sea, all perhaps at some period, places of refuge for the people of Israel from the violence of their enemies.

Here the same sulphureous odors greeted the olfactories of the voyagers as previously mentioned, arising not from the heavy and bitter waters of the sea, but from the fresh water streams that poured down the sides of the mountains, and the mineral and vegetable matter on which they fell.

Being reinvigorated by supplies of fresh provisions, brought by Dr. Anderson from Jerusalem, preparations were made for an extensive and thorough survey of the sea and its shores.

The first object to which their efforts were directed, was the peninsula, connected with the Arabian shore, and extending at its southern extremity, west, more than three-fourths across the whole width of the sea. To the northern point Lieut. Lynch steered in company with Dr. Anderson. Of the peninsula there never had been a survey, nor indeed any description worthy of reliance. Seetzen, who travelled around the southern part of the sea in 1806, has it laid down on his map, but far from being correct. Irby and Mangles traversed the whole of it in 1818, but as their plan was drawn from memory, some months after leaving the place, a true picture of neither land nor sea is given. Dr. Robinson, twenty years later, viewed it from two points on the western shore, Ain Jidy, and a high cliff near ez Tuweirah, and differs from our author principally in supposing the southern point to be much longer than it really is, with a considerable extent of water between it and the eastern shore. This mistake of Dr. Robinson is the more remarkable as it was within about twenty days of the same season of the year, when both observations were made, when the sea might well be supposed to be about the same height;—probably the result of illusion. The breadth of the strait between the peninsula and the western shore, which Irby and Mangles supposed to be only one mile, Dr. Robinson more correctly estimated. By accurate measurement Lieutenant Lynch ascertained the width to be about two miles.

The peninsula “is a bold, broad promontory, from forty to sixty feet high, with a sharp angular central ridge some twenty feet above it, and a broad margin of sand at its foot, encrusted with salt and bitumen; the perpendicular face extending all round, and presenting the coarse and chalky appearance of recent carbonate of lime.—There were myriads of dead locusts strewed upon the beach near the margin of the sea. The summit of the peninsula is irregular and rugged; in some places showing the tent-shape formation; in others, a series of disjointed crags. On the western side, the high peninsula,

with its broad margin, extends to the southward until it is lost in the misty sea.

Dr. Anderson describes the peninsula as a loose calcareous marl, with incrustations of salt, and indications of sulphur, nitre, gypsum, marly clays, &c.; and the northern extremity, which he estimates one-third higher than I do, as chalky, with flints; the texture soft and crumbling.

There were a few bushes, their stems partly buried in the water, and their leafless branches encrusted with salt, which sparkled as trees do at home, when the sun shines upon them after a heavy sleet. Such an image presented to the mind, while the frame was weltering with heat, was indeed like

"Holding fire in the hand and thinking of the frosty Caucasus." "Save the standing and prostrate dead trees, there was not a vestige of vegetation." p. p. 297, 298.

Before leaving this part of the sea, Lieut. Lynch paid a well deserved tribute of respect to the memories of his two predecessors, by giving to the northern point of the peninsula the name of "Point Costigan," and to the southern, that of "Point Molyneux."

In the exploration of the southern part of the sea, Lieut. Lynch was not able to find any ford, either by soundings, or from the reports of the Arabs, as laid down on Dr. Robinson's map, on the authority of Seetzen, Irby and Mangles, and an Arab Sheik. This latter person affirmed to Messrs. Robinson and Smith, that he had himself forded the sea, some years before, from a point near the pass Zuweirah to the south side of the peninsula.—Irby and Mangles state that they saw a caravan ford the straits from the peninsula to the western shore; and as some of the beasts were asses, the water could not have been very deep. But by accurate soundings, both these places were ascertained to be beyond fordable depth.

On the southwestern shore of the sea, the celebrated salt mountain of Usdum was discovered, which has, in past ages, been the fruitful theme of exaggeration and fable. This mountain, called by the Arabs, Hajr Usdum, the "Stone of Sodom," was seen by Seetzen, and also by Dr. Robinson, whom the Arabs informed that it was com-

posed of rock salt, too bitter for culinary purposes, but sometimes used as a medicine for sheep.

"Soon after, to our astonishment, we saw on the eastern side of Usdum, one-third the distance from its north extreme, a lofty round pillar, standing apparently detached from the general mass, at the head of a deep, narrow, and abrupt chasm. We immediately pulled in for the shore, and Dr. Anderson and I went up and examined it. The beach was a soft, slimy mud, encrusted with salt, and a short distance from the water, covered with saline fragments and flakes of bitumen. We found the pillar to be of solid salt, capped with carbonate of lime, cylindrical in front, and pyramidal behind. The upper or rounded part is about forty feet high, resting on a kind of oval pedestal, from forty to sixty feet above the level of the sea. It slightly decreases in size upwards, crumbles at the top, and is one entire mass of crystallization. A prop or buttress, connects it with the mountain behind, and the whole is covered with debris of a light stone colour. Its peculiar shape is doubtless attributable to the action of the winter rains. The Arabs had told us, in vague terms, that there was to be found a pillar somewhere upon the shores of the sea; but their statements, in all other respects, were so unsatisfactory that we could place no reliance upon them." p. 307.

It is much to the credit of our author, that he refrains from all speculation upon this wonderful object, and is content to remark that it "reminded us at least of the catastrophe of the plain." Whether it is the identical pillar into which Lot's wife was changed, on that dreadful morning when she turned to look back with a yearning heart upon the sinful pleasures of Sodom, or even near the same spot, must ever be a matter of mere conjecture. The most probable supposition is, that it does not stand in the way that leads to Zoar, whither the unfortunate woman was flying when she was firmly fixed to the spot as a monument of God's wrath. This "little one," to which Lot fled, and the mountains of Moab where he afterwards dwelt with his two daughters, most probably lay in an eastern, and not western direction from the scene of destruction.*

* Vide Robinson's *Researches in Palestine*, &c. vol. ii. p. p. 480—481, 648—651.

The whole of the southern sea is described as an unbroken scene of desolation, commemorative of the retributions of the Almighty visited upon its once guilty inhabitants. It continues to shoal out, as it approaches the hills that bound it on the South, until it terminates in a marsh of light coloured mud, with a smooth shining surface.

While in this region, Lieut. Lynch and his companions visited Kerak, the Capitol of Moab, where they found about one thousand Christian Arabs, who are kept in a state of most grievous oppression by their Mohammedan neighbours. With them, they enjoyed a pleasing interview, and parted from them with many demonstrations of regret. Having been greatly reduced in worldly substance within the last seven years, by the sirocco and locust, they made a pathetic appeal to their Christian brethren in this more highly favoured land, for assistance to complete a church, which has been for some time in course of erection.

Returning from this visit, during which they narrowly escaped an attack by the Arabs, the party severally visited the "Zerka Main," and Wady Moheb, the Arnon of the Bible, of which, as our limits allow us only a passing notice, we must refer our readers to the volume itself. Mr. Aulich was deputed to complete the topography of the Arabian shore, and take bearings at the mouth of the Jordan, while the commander himself returned to visit Ain Turabeh, on the west. The survey being at length completed, which occupied, in all, twenty-two days, preparations were made for leaving this scene of laborious and dangerous operation. During the time, the party encountered three siroccos or burning winds, so hot as to blister the skin wherever it was exposed to the blast. But amid all the dangers and severe privations which they suffered, the members of the expedition never allowed their fortitude to fail, but persevered nobly to the completion of the arduous undertaking. And it is truly a matter of devout thankfulness to God, that no one of the whole party was permitted to fall, after the manner of all who had attempted the work before them. No case of malignant disease occurred, and but one which kept its subject from the performance of his ordinary duties.

To attempt a minutely detailed account of the survey, would extend this article beyond our limits. For the desired information, we refer our readers to the volume itself, and also to the more elaborate and systematic work of Dr. Robinson, with which our author, in the main, agrees. With all the high commendation which is due to Lieut. Lynch himself, for his truly noble zeal and self-sacrifice, we are constrained to say, that his work would have been more acceptable to general readers, if it had partaken more of the book, and less of the journal, form. But as the writer modestly disclaims all pretensions to authorship, let us render him the meed of praise which he justly merits. The work is just what it purports to be, a journal of travel; and furnishes data accurate, and to be relied upon, for the future geographer, which had never before been given.

The Dead Sea is now fully ascertained to be, by accurate survey, a vast pool or lake, covering the whole valley of the Ghor, to the heights on each side. The length is about forty miles from the mouth of the Jordan to the southern extremity. The width, which varies but little at any place, is about nine miles. The body of the sea lies almost due-north and south, the northern end being a little east, and the southern, west of the same meridian. Through the whole length, a current is perceptible in the centre, doubtless from the impetus of the waters of the Jordan, and backward currents near the shores, the waters deflected by the southern shore. The whole bottom of the sea was ascertained to consist of two sunken plains, the one, extending from the mouth of the Jordan to the northern point of the peninsula, averaging a depth of about thirteen hundred feet; the other, which forms the whole southern portion, is only, on an average, about thirteen feet deep. At the distance of three-fifths of the whole length of the sea, from the northern end, is Point Costigan, the northern extremity of the peninsula, the western side of which is about seven miles in length, approaching, at Point Molyneux, to within about two miles of the Judean shore. The soundings indicated a bottom of soft mud, blue, brown, gray and yellow, and sand, with crystals of salt. The water of the sea is perfectly inodorous; and the reports of birds being unable

to fly over it, on account of its noxious exhalations, clearly proved to be fabulous. The fetid odors so often met with, arise entirely from the marshes produced by the streams that are precipitated down the sides of the mountains, combining with the mineral and vegetable matter existing there. That no living thing can exist in the water is now conceded, and was tested by some of the party, who made the experiment with fish caught in the Jordan. And Lieut. Lynch, in a note, states that, "since our return, some of the water of the Dead Sea has been subjected to the action of a powerful Microscope, and no animalculæ, or vestige of animal matter could be detected." p. 377. The great buoyancy of the water, mentioned by other travellers, is confirmed by our author, and would naturally suggest itself to our minds, when we consider its uncommon specific gravity. The four analyses laid down in Dr. Robinson's work are, that of Dr. Marcet, of London, 1807; Gay Lussac, of Paris, 1818; Prof. C. G. Gmelin, of Tubingen, 1826; Dr. Apjohn, of Dublin, 1839; and are as follow, viz:—Dr. Marcet, 1211; Gay Lussac, 1228; Prof. Gmelin, 1212; Dr. Apjohn, 1153, distilled water being 1000. The relative density ascertained by Lieut. Lynch, was 1.13, distilled water being 1, considerably less than the estimate of either of his predecessors. The boats used, with exactly the same burthen, drew one inch less water here than in the Jordan; and an egg, which would have sunk in the Mediterranean, floated two-thirds above the surface. The same results were obtained by bathing, as had been by previous experiments. The opinion that it would not dissolve common salt was most conclusively exploded. While distilled water dissolved 5-17 of its own weight of salt, that of the Atlantic 1-6; the water of the Dead Sea held in solution 1-11 of its own weight.

The body of the mountains, on both sides, is limestone, except Usdum, which is rock-salt. Specimens were found of trap, tufa, red sandstone, flesh colored flints, carbonate of lime, and some others; and Lieut. Lynch suspects the existence of an abundance of the precious metals.

The living creatures seen, both birds and beasts, were,

generally, of a stone color, resembling the rocks on the shores.

Of the varieties of plants, which appear only where a fresh water stream falls into the bason of the sea, we deem it necessary to mention only a few—the cane, ghurah, tamarisk, pistacha, the terebinth of Scripture, date palm tree, acacia seyal which produces gum arabic, nubk the spina Christi of Hasselquist, and the osher or apple of Sodom. This last, of which four jars were gathered and deposited in the Patent Office at Washington, was then in bloom. The stalk grows from ten to fifteen feet high, and from six to eight inches in diameter, with a grayish bark, in longitudinal ridges, resembling the sassafras. Its bloom is small, of a delicate purple colour, and grows in clusters, its leaf dark green, resembling the caoutchouc; when broken, the leaves and branches discharge a white viscous fluid, like that of the milk weed, which the Arabs call leben-osher, (osher-milk) and regard as a cure for barrenness. The fruit, when ripe, is yellow, and resembles a large orange, hanging in clusters of three or four together. On being pressed, it explodes with a puff, leaving in the hands only the shreds of the rind, and the inner fibres. Within, is contained the seed, and a fine silk, which the Arabs use for gun matches, because of its ready combustibility.

The Spina Christi, called also the nubk or lotus tree, has small dark green, oval shaped leaves, resembling the ivy, of which the crown of thorns is said to have been made. Its thorns are half an inch long, and its fruit, the dhom apple of the Arabs, is slightly acid and pleasant to eat.

Around the margin of the sea, are found small trees or shrubs, perfectly dead, killed, perhaps, by some extensive flow of the sea. These fragments of vegetation, and the sands of the beach, are covered with saline incrustations resembling sleet, from the overflowing of the sea, and the evaporation of the spray that rises from the water.

Sulphur was frequently picked up in lumps, and also, asphaltum or bitumen, which gives the name Asphaltites to the lake. It is a remarkable fact, well ascertained in reference to this substance, that it is found in large bodies after an earthquake, floating on the surface of the water,

and carried away by the natives as an article of merchandize. A large mass, like a house, was found by the Arabs, after the earthquake of 1837, which was sold for two or three thousand dollars.

The depression of the surface of this sea, below that of the Mediterranean, remains now no more a matter of uncertainty. The trigonometrical measurement so ardently desired by Dr. Robinson, was accomplished by our party, under the direction of Lieut. Dale, subsequent to leaving this place. The whole distance from the Dead Sea to the shore of the Mediterranean, near to Jaffa, by way of Jerusalem, was levelled with as much accuracy, perhaps, as the most skilful engineers, with the best instruments, could perform the task. The result was, that the surface of the Dead Sea is a little more than thirteen hundred feet below that of the Mediterranean, and nearly three times as much lower than the city of Jerusalem.

Here we feel under the necessity of closing our remarks on the phenomena of this most wonderful of all the waters of the earth. But we must crave the indulgence of inserting a few paragraphs from Lieut Lynch himself, as the result of his own observations. He says

"We have carefully sounded this sea, determined its geographical position, taken the exact topography of its shores, ascertained the temperature, width, depth, and velocity of its tributaries, collected specimens of every kind, and noted the winds, currents, and changes of the weather, and all atmospheric phenomena. These, with a faithful narrative of events, will give a correct idea of this wonderous body of water, as it appeared to us.

"From the summit of these cliffs, in a line a little north of west, about sixteen miles distant, is Hebron, a short distance from which, Dr. Robinson found the dividing ridge between the Mediterranean and this sea. From Beni Naim, the reputed tomb of Lot, upon that ridge, it is supposed that Abraham looked "toward *all* the land of the plain," and beheld the smoke "as the smoke of a furnace." The inference, from the Bible, that this entire chasm was a plain sunk and "*overwhelmed*" by the wrath of God, seems to be sustained by the extraordinary character of our soundings. The bottom of this sea consists of two submerged plains, an elevated and a depressed one; the former averaging *thirteen*, and the last thirteen hundred feet below the surface. Through the northern, and

largest and deepest one, in a line corresponding with the bed of the Jordan, is a ravine, which again seems to correspond with the Wady el Jeib, or ravine within a ravine, at the south end of the sea.

"Between the Jabbok and this sea, we unexpectedly found a sudden break down in the bed of the Jordan. If there be a similar break in the watercourses to the south of the sea, accompanied with like volcanic characters, there can scarce be a doubt that the whole Ghor has sunk from some extraordinary convulsion; preceded, most probably, by an eruption of fire, and general conflagration of the bitumen which abounded in the plain. I shall ever regret that we were not authorized to explore the southern Ghor to the Red Sea.

"All our observations have impressed me forcibly with the conviction that the mountains are older than the sea. Had their relative levels been the same at first, the torrents would have worn their beds in a gradual and correlative slope;—whereas, in the northern section, the part supposed to have been so deeply engulfed, although a soft bituminous limestone prevails, the torrents plunge down several hundred feet, while on both sides of the southern portion, the ravines come down without abruptness, although the head of Wady Kerak is more than a thousand feet higher than the head of Wady Ghuweir. Most of the ravines, too, as reference to the map will show, have a southern inclination near their outlets, that of Zerka Main or Callirohoe especially, which, next to the Jordan, must pour down the greatest volume of water in the rainy season. But even if they had not that deflection, the argument which has been based on this supposition would be untenable; for tributaries, like all other streams, seek the greatest declivities without regard to angular inclination. The Yermak flows into the Jordan at a right angle, and the Jabbok with an acute one to its descending course.

"There are many other things tending to the same conclusion, among them the isolation of the mountain of Usdum; its difference of contour and of range, and its consisting entirely of a volcanic product.

"But it is for the learned to comment on the facts we have laboriously collected. Upon ourselves, the result is a decided one. We entered upon this sea with conflicting opinions. One of the party was skeptical, and another I think, a professed unbeliever of the Mosaic account. After twenty-two days close investigation, if I am not mistaken, we are unanimous in the conviction of the truth of the Scriptural account of the destruction of the cities of the plain. I record with diffidence the conclusions

we have reached, simply as a protest against the shallow deductions of *would be* unbelievers."—pp. 378 —380.

Taking the metal boats to pieces they carried them up the mountains, and made preparations for their departure. Taking Mar Saba and Jerusalem in their route, they proceeded to Jaffa on the Mediterranean, during which time the process of levelling, before alluded to, was carried on. At Acre the party divided. Charles Homer having been accidentally wounded in the arm by the discharge of a gun, was sent with Messrs. Aulick and Bedlow, and three men, to Beirut, while the rest turned back to explore the regions of the upper Jordan. At Baalbec sickness began to appear among them, of whom Lieut. Dale was the most dangerously affected. Without completing the examination of these ruins, it was determined upon to return with all possible speed to Beirut, where medical aid could be obtained. The "Supply" not having yet arrived, Mr. Dale rode to Bhamdhun, twelve miles distant, in order to enjoy the benefit of the mountain air. Here, in the house of the Rev. Eli Smith, he received all the sympathy and kind attention which this devoted Christian Missionary and his pious family could bestow. But declining gradually under the same low nervous fever which had carried off Costigan and Molyneux before, on the 24th of July he sunk to rest in so gentle a manner, that it was difficult to perceive the moment of dissolution.

Thus death demanded his tribute at last; and one of the most useful and beloved of the whole party was taken. It was the earnest wish of the commander to carry the mortal remains of his companion and friend home, and they were brought, by night, to Beirut for that purpose, and enclosed in three coffins. But on account of an accident which occurred, in bearing them from the shore to the vessel, and the superstitious fears of the French captain and his crew, they were landed again, and interred beneath a Pride of India tree in the Frank Cemetery. The funeral services were performed by the Rev. Mr. Thompson; "after which the sailors advanced and fired three volleys over the grave; and thus amid unbidden tears and stifled sobs, closed the obsequies of our lamented companion and friend."

Taking passage on board a French brig, Lieut. Lynch
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and his remaining companions reached Malta, after a sick and tedious passage of thirty-eight days. Being joined by the "Supply" on the 12th Sept. they sailed for New York, where they arrived early in December, having been absent a little more than a year.

After the principal part of this article was written, the North British Review came to hand, containing a review of Lieut. Lynch's work, in connection with another compiled from the notes of a member of the expedition. The critique, it cannot be denied, is decidedly John Bull-ian, strongly impregnated with the bitter waters of jealousy, little less pungent perhaps to the writer's own palate than the acrid brine of Asphaltites itself, acidulated with the cider of the dhom apple. But whatever may be the views and feelings of our transatlantic brethren towards us, by their own constrained admission, the ablest work on Palestine ever written, and indeed the only one that even approximates perfection, is the product of American genius. And it is a no less notorious and gratifying truth, that the same infant Navy of the far distant American Republic, which first dared to dash defiance at the unjust extortions and cruelties of Tripolitan piracy, while that splendid power that claimed to sit as ocean queen, and see no sorrow, recoiled from the undertaking, has been now permitted to glory in the honour of making the first successful exploration of the Jordan and the Dead Sea.

ARTICLE III.

Critical Remarks on the Institution of the Lord's Supper. By the Rev. W. M. SMYTHE, A. M. Dallas Co. Alabama.

Jesus took bread and blessed it (*ευλογησας*) and brake it. And he took the cup and gave thanks (*ευχαριστησας*) and gave it to them.

Matt. xxvi. 26, 27,

And as they did eat, Jesus took bread and blessed (ευλογησας) and brake it. And he took the cup, and when he had given thanks (ευχαριστησας) he gave it to them.—*Mark xiv. 22, 23.*

And he took bread and gave thanks (ευχαριστησας) and brake, and gave unto them,—*Luke xxii. 19.*

And when he had given thanks (ευχαριστησας) he brake it and said, take, eat.
I. Cor. xi. 24.

The Bible is its own best interpreter. Man may err, and often does, but the word of inspiration is infallible and abideth forever. It is like its great author, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. It gives no uncertain response ; it teaches no false doctrine.

In ascertaining the meaning of Scripture, questions often arise that baffle the skill and the judgment of the most learned and intellectual.

The great desideratum, then, in the interpretation of the Holy Writings, is to find out, if possible, the sense which the Spirit of Truth intended, and the writers themselves attached to their own language. Having obtained this, and comparing spiritual things with spiritual, we may rest assured that we will be guided into the knowledge of the truth as it is in Christ Jesus our Lord. Our foundation will be laid deep and broad in the everlasting rock, in place of the shifting sands ; and the winds of public opinion may expend their feeble force upon the indestructible fortress of divine faith.

We have often been pained at the ignorance of some who minister in holy things, who, attempting to be wise and learned, handle the word of God deceitfully, and lead his people into damnable error. Such men are a curse to the Church. They are blind leaders of the blind.

But it is not our object in this paper to sit in judgment upon others ; we aim at a higher and holier undertaking. We wish to investigate, as far as we are able, and have opportunity, the verses placed at the head of this article, and to discover, if possible, the exact import of some expressions contained in them.

Before and since we came into the ministry, we have often heard, with sorrow we confess, great and good men, at the celebration of the Lord's Supper, use such language as the following in their introductory prayer, "Grant O Lord, that so much of this bread and wine, as shall be used on the present occasion, may be set apart from a com-

mon to a holy use." This they call *consecrating* the elements, and when asked for their authority, they refer us to the Saviour's example, when he instituted the ordinance. We are well aware that the consecration of the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper, was at a very early period introduced into the Church and performed with great formality, and with a set of words and prayer, which were a source of frequent and bitter discussion in different Churches.

It would not add much to our knowledge to enumerate all the various controversies that have prevailed on this subject. They were more curious than profitable. In general, the Church has agreed that the elements should be set apart to a sacramental use by prayer. The words in the original institution, were uniformly included in the consecrating prayer. Some even went so far as to maintain that a personal invocation of the Holy Ghost was essential to a due consecration of the elements.

The Scripture is exceedingly plain on the subject; it gives not the least intimation of any mystery or difficulty connected with the institution. Every thing about it is simple, and easily understood, even by the most unlettered.

The question now comes up. Did our Saviour bless the bread and wine? We hold to the opposite opinion, for reasons which we will state. The word "*it*," which has been improperly supplied in the English version,—it is neither in the Greek nor Latin—has led many into the opinion we are opposing. In the passages where the institution is recorded, whether the word *blessed* or gave *thanks* is used, we believe it refers not to the bread and wine, but to *God*, the giver of every good and perfect gift.

No blessing, therefore, of the elements was intended; *they* were already blessed, in being sent as a gift of kindness from the Lord of Creation. *Blessing* and *touching* the *bread* are *Popish* ceremonies, not sanctioned either by the word of God, or the practice of the Church in the days of her purity, and should have no countenance from Protestants. He who will say, that this is a matter of small importance, ought to reflect, that from this very practice arose the *elevatio hostiae*, elevation of the host, in the Church of Rome. We solemnly believe that it is

fraught with dangerous error to the whole ordinance of Heaven.

The Greek gives no countenance to the view we are combating. Both the Evangelists, Matthew and Mark, use the word *ευλογησας*, *blessed* in reference to the *bread*, while they use *ευχαριστησας*, *gave thanks* in reference to the *wine*. Luke and Paul use *ευχαριστησας*, in reference to both elements. But instead of *ευλογησας*, in Matthew, *ευχαριστησας*, is the reading of ten MSS. in uncial characters, of the Dublin *codex rescriptus*, published by Dr. Barrett, and of more than one hundred others of the greatest respectability. This also is the reading of the *Syriac* and *Arabic*, and is confirmed by several of the primitive fathers. Oriental use would incline us to believe that the meaning is, *gave thanks to God*. The Jews have in their rituals a prayer used at their meals, which they call *Bracha*, that is, the "blessing" or "benediction." On taking the bread they say: "Blessed be thou our God, King of the universe, who bringest forth bread out of the earth." Likewise on taking the cup, they say: "Blessed be our God, King of the universe, the Creator of the fruit of the vine." The Mahomedans follow the example of the Jews, constantly saying, before and after meat, "In the name of God, the most merciful, the most compassionate." From this we see that no more is meant than the *giving of thanks*, and from this custom we have derived the practice of saying grace (thanks) before and after our meals.

Ευλογησας, is compounded of *ευ* and *λογος*, to speak well of any one, hence *to praise, to celebrate*. In this sense it is used in Luke I, 64: He spake, and praised (*ευλογων*) God; II, 53: Praising and *blessing* (*ευλογουντες*) God; James III, 9: Therefore *bless* (*ευλογουμεν*) we God. We might quote numberless other passages which go to prove our position, that the Saviour did not bless the bread, but that he gave thanks to his Heavenly Father.

The *change* of the word, when he took the cup, strengthens our view. If he *blessed* the *bread*, we are assured that he did not *bless* the *wine*; for he does not use *ευλογησας*, but *ευχαριστησας*, in reference to the cup; which, as far as we know, never means to *bless*, but to *give thanks*. The advocates, therefore, of consecrating the elements, cannot, by the utmost ingenuity, and distortion

of Scripture, which they may employ, obtain more than *one* consecrated element, namely, the *bread*.

But Luke and Paul cut off every hope of our opponents. They use *ευχαριστίας*, *gave thanks*, in reference to the bread. This destroys every vestige of an argument in favour of those who differ from us, and we think completely establishes our position, that our Lord Jesus Christ, in the institution of the Supper, did not bless the bread and wine.

There is one passage which seems strongly to militate against our view; it is found in I Cor. 10, 16, "The cup of blessing, which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ. The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ?" Formidable as this appears, we believe it favours our opinion, rather than our opponents. Literally translated it means, "*for which we speak good words of praise and thanks*."—Macknight renders it "The cup of blessing *for* which we bless." Ambrose says, "The Apostle calls it the cup of blessing, because when we have it in our hand we praise and bless with admiration of his ineffable gift, Him who shed his blood for us. The Paschal cup was called by the Jews, 'the cup of blessing,' because they gave thanks for it. Calvin translates it '*calix benedictionis, cui benedicimus*.' The cup of blessing *for which* we bless.—Whitby uses the same language, "The cup of blessing which we bless—or receive with thanksgiving to God for it." Neander, in his "Life of Christ," says: The *giving of thanks*, before the distribution of the bread and wine, corresponds to a similar act on the part of the head of the family, in the Jewish Passover feast, in which *thanksgiving* was offered for the gifts of nature. We may infer, therefore, that Christ's thanksgiving had reference partly to the creation of all material things for man, (bread and wine symbolizing all God's gifts in nature.)" In his Church History, vol. i. p. 324, he uses similar language: "The Jewish passover was a festival of thanks for the favour which the Almighty Creator of nature showed the people whom he honoured with his especial guidance. The father of the family, who kept the passover with his household, and distributed bread and wine among the guests, *praised God* who had bestowed these fruits of the

earth on man. Hence the cup of wine over which this *giving of thanks* was pronounced, was called *the cup of praise or thanksgiving* ποτηριον ευλογιας that is ευχαριστιας." Justin Martyr says. "The bread and a cup of wine is brought to the president of the brethren, and he taking them, offers *praise and glory* to the Father of all, through the name of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and maketh a very long *thanksgiving*, because he hath thought us worthy of these gifts; and when he has concluded the *prayers* and *thanksgiving*, all the people present approve it with acclamation, saying Amen."

From these opinions of good and learned men in every age of the Church, we are forced to the conclusion, that this passage does not support the doctrine that the sacramental elements were blessed by the Saviour, or subsequently by the Apostle Paul.

Therefore we have no warrant from Scripture for the practice which many adopt of *consecrating* the bread and wine.

We might continue this discussion to an indefinite length, but we have said enough to convince any impartial inquirer after truth, what is the Bible view of the subject.

I hope that for the future, our dear brethren in the bonds of the Gospel will avoid every expression at the Lord's table, that might be tortured into the idea that the elements are any thing more than simply *common* bread and wine.

ARTICLE IV.

THE MARK OF CAIN AND CURSE OF HAM.

It has been our object in former pages of this Review, to defend the teachings of the Scriptures, as to the unity of the human race, and to point out those causes which may have operated, in the special Providence of God, to produce the varieties found existing in the family of man.

We see nothing in the views then expressed, that we would wish to retract, nor any other hypothesis, better sustained by facts and probabilities, to account for the diversities which have arisen among men. In the positions we assumed, nothing is advanced which the most judicious and learned divines of the Protestant and Romish faith have not in all ages maintained, and nothing which has not approved itself to the great body of the intelligent and sober minded men of other learned professions. We are not ashamed, therefore, of the company we are in, nor in the least moved by the learning and science of the men who oppose us. On the one side is the word of God, and the common belief of those who receive it. On the other is philosophy, carping at the declarations of the divine word, and convulsively striving to prove them false. It is the same contest, though on different ground, with that waged between the early Christians, and Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian, the Apostate; the contest between Reason and Revelation, the philosophy of men, and that Heaven-descended philosophy which is found embalmed in the language of inspiration. The old leaven of infidelity, once active in our own community and elsewhere, has never been wholly expelled. It is working yet, showing itself now here, and now there. We have believed that it would manifest itself in unexpected developements whenever a favourable opportunity should arrive. Did not the Scriptures reveal to us the existence of a watchful and wary Spirit, the fomenter and presiding genius in all evil, who, outliving the various generations of men, recruits from among them his often baffled hosts, and at every fitting juncture, leads on his new levies, themselves unconscious of defeat, in a new onset against the truth, we would be forced by the course of events, to believe it. Here, behind this question, the most exciting of all others amongst us at present, we have feared that we should find him planting his old batteries, which have been dismantled in many a former war, but which have been now again refitted, and that they would be served by new, zealous, and confident assailants, vainly waiting for their hour of anticipated triumph. By assuming false grounds in defence of that which is just and true, we may give our

enemies an advantage over us. And we have regarded it peculiarly incumbent on right minded men, to avoid being led away by the glare of seeming learning and science on the one hand, and on the other, to see to it that they take no positions which will weaken a good cause by their being compelled afterwards to abandon them.

Some who admit substantially the unity of the human race, deny that there have been any natural causes in operation at any time, adequate to produce the diversities existing among men, and maintain that there has been a miraculous intervention of Deity, by which he has directly, and in violation of existing laws, produced changes of complexion, conformation, and constitution, stamped inferiority upon one particular race, and doomed it, by this very circumstance, to perpetual servitude. It is in these assertions usually forgotten that the red, yellow, tawny, and melanous complexions are all to be accounted for, as well as the deep black of the Ethiop, and that the conformation of the Chinese and Peruvian heads is just as wide an aberration from the Grecian or Caucasian type as that of the negro. The mind dwells alone upon the latter, and men of high distinction are found to satisfy themselves with saying that God has put the *mark of Cain* and the curse of Ham upon the Ethiopian race, and therefore doomed them to perpetual degradation. We could wish that these things were more considerately said. Surely if the Ethiopian hue and features came from the curse of Ham, they do not come from the curse of Cain, and if from the malediction of Cain, then not from that pronounced upon the descendants of Ham. If the peculiarities of the negro constitute that mark which was set upon Cain, how, we ask, have they been transmitted?—If the deluge was universal, the Cainites were all destroyed in the flood. One family alone was preserved in the Ark, and that descended from Seth and not from Cain. If, as has been suggested, Ham, the second son of Noah, might have married a daughter of Cain, and she have been preserved in consequence of her connexion with the family of Noah, even then, by the supposition, the posterity of Ham would have been but mulattoes, and not negroes of full blood, and their peculiarities by intermarriage would soon have disappeared.

But why reason on such absurdities? There is not the least evidence that if a mark was set upon Cain, it was transmitted to his descendants. His daughters at least were fair.* Nor is there the least proof that any note or mark was really set upon the person of Cain, by which he was distinguished from other men. It is only by what is, in our view, an evident mistranslation, that this idea was ever originated. It was not God's design that Cain should be cut prematurely off. It was His intention that he should be the parent of a numerous progeny, and the founder of States and cities in the Antediluvian world.—And when his mind was occupied with that dread of an untimely end, which he was conscious he deserved, and which almost subverted his powers, God, to reassure him, appointed him a sign,† or gave him a token, by which he might be convinced that his life would be spared; and at the same time, he denounced sevenfold punishments upon whomsoever he might be, who should take his life. A notion which has nothing to sustain it but a misinterpretation of Scripture, might as well be buried in oblivion for the future.

We have long thought it equally futile to trace the physical peculiarities of the Ethiopian to "*the curse of Ham*." Indeed, if we attend to the language of the Scriptures themselves, we do not read in them of any curse pronounced upon Ham. Ham had offended in exposing the nakedness of his father, Noah. But the curse is pronounced; not upon Ham, but upon Canaan, his son. "And he said cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren." "Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant." It has been believed by many, that though this curse seems to be connected with the preceding incidents in the narrative, this apparent connection arises from the extreme brevity of the story, in which the events of years, and even of centuries, are, of necessity, placed in immediate juxtaposition. It is argued that the name of *Canaan*

* Gen. vi. 2.

† See lxx. Gen. iv. 15, and Stackhouse Hist. 46, note.

being introduced, who was the *youngest* son of Ham, implies that this curse was pronounced long after the flood, and shortly before Noah's death, while the incident of Noah's supposed drunkenness occurred long before. But if the two were connected, the conduct of Ham, in which, probably, Canaan participated, so that he was even the chief offender, was the occasion and not the ground of the curse, which had been all along present, as a pre-determined event, in the mind of God. Now, before it can be shown that the physical peculiarities of the African negro, and his alleged intellectual inferiority, have resulted from this curse, it must be shown that he is descended from Canaan. This is a task to which we commend the advocates of this opinion. When they have proved it, there will be some more ground for their hypothesis than they have now to stand upon. From Canaan were descended the Sidonians, or Phœnicians, the Arkites, Sinites, Arvadites, Zemarites and Hamathites; the Hittites, Jebusites, Amorites, Girgasites and Hivites; the Amalekites, the Rephaim and the sons of Anak, the Kenites, Kenezites and Kadmonites. Most of these last tribes occupied Palestine in the times of Abraham, and were either dispossessed or subjugated by Joshua.

The splendour, wealth and commerce of Tyre and Sidon, and their numerous colonies, are known to all. Tyre was the Liverpool of these ancient times, and Carthage, her most flourishing colony, the rival of Rome. Her colonies were scattered over Cyprus, Cilicia, Pisidia, Chios, Lesbos, Tenedos, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Thrace, the Euboea, Crete, Beotia, Illyria, Malta, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, Tuscany and Spain. Their vessels are said to have passed out of the Mediterranean, to Ireland, England, and the islands north of Great Britain. Hanno, the Carthaginian, sailed along the western coast of Africa, perhaps as far as the bight of Benin. They traded with India, on the east, and the Island of Ceylon, and under Pharaoh Necho, circumnavigated Africa. The race of Phœnician shepherd kings reigned, according to Manetho, for many years over Egypt, and Cadmus, the Phœnician, gave letters to Greece. The language spoken by all these tribes of men, varied scarcely at all from that spoken by the Jews, as the fragments and inscriptions

on monuments and coins collected by Bochart, and still more perfectly by Gesenius abundantly show. Does any one believe that Hiram, King of Tyre, or Pygmalion, that Hannibal, Hanno, and Hasdrubal were negroes? Were they black, woolly haired men, with thick lips, projecting jaws, and retreating forehead? If any one doubts, let him examine the coins of Tyre, Sidon, Acco, Laodicea, Marathus, Berytus, Cilicia, Panormus, Heraclea, Syracuse, Cossura, Gades, Sexti, Belo, Mallaga and Siga; each bearing the effigies of some distinguished ruler, and a legend in the Phœnician or Punic tongue; and see if he can trace the least approximation to the Ethiopian type.* There could not be found, we are persuaded, a collection of coins of any Northern European people, exhibiting a wider departure from the features and conformation of the negro. Whatever connection the tribes of northern Africa may have with this ancient stock, it is impossible to show, historically, any such connection between Canaan and those tribes of middle and south Africa who are represented in the slave population of America.† As to the complexion of the ancient descendants of Canaan, there is no reason to believe that it was in any respect darker than that of the descendants of Abraham. The European portion of these people have long since mingled with the inhabitants of southern Europe, and are lost among them. The Arkites, Sinités, Arvadites, Zemarites, and Hamathites are commingled with the inhabitants of Asia Minor and Syria. The ancient Carthaginians, and those

* See Gesenius *Monumenta Phœnicia*. Tab. 34—44.

† The testimony of Procopius (*de Bello Vandalico*, 2.10) is suspected by some, perhaps unjustly. He relates that the Canaanites, after they perceived that they could not maintain their ground against Joshua, fled first into Egypt, and there not finding space to settle in so crowded a population passed over into (North) Africa. He then adds that, occupying many cities, they held the whole of Libya to the pillars of Hercules. They then came and dwelt near me, and built a citadel in Numidia, where now is the city called Tigisis. There are two pillars made of white stone, near a large fountain, having Phœnician letters inlaid, saying, in the Phœnician tongue, "we are those who fled from Joshua, the robber, the son of Naue." The use of this language prevailed in North Africa till the sixth century. St. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, often mentions it as spoken by the country people in his day, complains of it as one of the obstacles which prevented the inculcation of Christianity, and rejoiced when he found a presbyter skilled in the Punic, who could take charge of the new bishopric of Fus-sela, a short distance from Hippo.

who had taken refuge in those lands when fleeing from the face of Joshua, the son of Nun, are, doubtless, still found among the native tribes of Mauritania, of Mt. Atlas, and other regions of north Africa. The name Canaan, may signify the "*knee-bender*." And he has bent the knee to Shem and Japheth in former times and on other shores, but he has never bent the knee, nor been a servant of servants to Shem and Japheth, unless, perhaps, in a few stray individuals on the shores of America. He was humbled by Joshua, conquered by Alexander, subjugated by the Romans, and has been oppressed by the Tartars and Saracens, but if he has contributed to swell the ranks of the enslaved Africans, it is probably the ranks of the more northern tribes, and if he has, in any of his branches acquired the hue of the Ethiop, which we are not inclined to doubt, it has been within the period of authentic history, and, probably, since those sculptures were made on the Egyptian monuments, which exhibit the Ethiopian contour and complexion as they now are. At the time of the voyage of Hanno, the Carthaginian, the Ethiopians are spoken of as distinguished from his own people, who were of the Canaanitish stock.

This dilemma then presents itself to those who so strenuously identify the Ethiop with Canaan. Either they must admit that the negroes have shown themselves to have been among the most intelligent and enterprising nations of antiquity, who thundered under the lead of Hannibal at the gates of Rome, and vexed with their prows the waters of every sea navigated by the ancients, or if they were at that time white men and are now black, they must admit that they have become so within the moderate period of 2200 years, and 2400 years at least since the prophecy of Noah was pronounced. We care not which horn of the dilemma they may take. So far as the natives of maritime Nigritia are concerned, from whom our slaves are derived, the argument is historically a failure.

It is extremely doubtful if the curse has respect to any of Ham's descendants excepting Canaan. The Canaanites stood in aftertimes in the way of the chosen people of God. They were a race even now doomed in the sovereignty of God to be defeated, conquered and subjugated.

Nothing is said in the narrative of any other descendants of Ham. We do not doubt that the African negro descended from this son of Noah. But if the posterity of Ham were accursed *without exception*, the same degradation, and the same physical marks of it should be manifested by all.

Who then are the descendants of Ham? In the first place, Cush was his son. Nothing is more clear from history, than that his descendants settled in Asia, along the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf, in South Arabia, along the Red Sea, especially towards its southern part, where they crossed over into Africa, and extended themselves at length westward on that continent. The word Cush is usually translated in the Septuagint by the word Ethiopia, and *this* word as used by the Greeks denoted both an Asiatic and African people. Homer speaks of them as a divided race of men, living at the extreme east and the extreme west.* Strabo, as a two-fold people, lying extended in a long track from the rising to the setting sun; and Herodotus† distinguishes the Eastern Ethiopians in Asia from the Western Ethiopians in Africa by the straight hair of the former and the curly hair of the latter. There was probably no regard had to the Ethnological derivation of men in the application of this term by the Greeks. But there is the most abundant evidence from the Scriptures, that the Cush or Ethiopia of the Bible referred sometimes to Asiatic and sometimes to African tribes. The descendants of Cush were Nimrod, the first king of Shinar, i. e. Babylon and Mesopotamia, where he founded Babel, his metropolis on the Euphrates, Erech and Accad on the Tigris, and Calneh, afterwards called Cesiphon by the Greeks. According to one interpretation, he was the founder also of Nineveh, Rehoboth, Calah and Resen, thus laying the foundation of what subsequently were two great empires, the Babylonish and Assyrian. Another son of Cush was Havilah, who settled in Arabia, probably in the vicinity of Mecca; another, Sabtah, settled in southern Arabia; another, Ragma, settled in eastern Arabia on the Persian Gulf, and his sons Sheba and Dedan in the same vicinity or in South Arabia. Two sons only of the numerous

* Odyss. 1, 23,

† vii. 69, 70.

family of Cush appear to have settled originally in Africa, Seba, who probably settled in Meroe within the Astaboras, its eastern branch, and the main stream of the Nile, between Egypt and Abyssinia; and Sabtecha, who seems to have occupied the eastern coast of Africa. The second son of Ham was Mizraim, the father of the Egyptians, from whom came the Ludim, probably of central Africa, the Annamim, who inhabited the deserts around the temple of Jupiter Ammon, the Lubim or Libyans, the Pathrusi of upper Egypt, the Casluhim or Colchians, from whom came the Philistines, and the Capthorim or inhabitants of Crete. The third son of Ham was Phut, believed to have inhabited Mauritania, and some regions also of central Africa. The celebrated Archaeologist and Geographer Ritter says, that hordes of people have been poured out of Futa in central Africa, and both Josephus and Pliny mention Phutes as a river of Africa.

Let us enquire now what are and have been the physical characteristics of these various sons of Ham. Have these various nations, as long as they have been known in history, possessed the same physical type and complexion? Have not their typical forms varied from that of the Caucasian through every degree of change to the Ethiopian? Do we not find among them, at this day, the yellow, brown, or black Arab, the red or copper coloured Copt or Egyptian, the swarthy Moor, the comparatively light coloured Galla and Abyssinians, and the black natives of Nigritia? We are not informed that the Philistine or Tyrian was distinguished at all from the Jew by complexion, in the days of David and Solomon, two thousand years after the prophecy of Noah was pronounced.

What we now ask is, that those who extend the curse pronounced upon Canaan, over the whole race of Ham, and ascribe to this curse the variations of these men from the prevalent type, should inform us how it is that the curse has affected them so variously; giving to the full Ethiop the prominent lips, the flat nose, the retreating forehead, the long heel, the wooly hair; giving to others, frizzled hair, Grecian features, and a black skin; to others straight hair, and a yellow complexion; to others a brown, to others a red or copper coloured tint; and leaving others probably no darker than the dark complexioned white

man. Truly the curse entering into the bones of different members of the family of Ham has affected them differently. If we judge by colour, some of them are no more accursed than the Chinese, or the American Indian, or the Hindoo. If you judge by features without reference to colour, some of them are no more cursed than many a European. The facts in the case, we beg leave to say, render our minds entirely skeptical as to any connection between the physical characteristics of the race of Ham and the curse pronounced by Noah upon Canaan. The only thing indicative of any connection between the physical peculiarities of Ham's descendants and the prophetic declaration of Scripture, is in the name of Ham himself. As Japheth signifies *enlargement* and Shem renown, so Ham signifies, *warm, hot*, and possibly by association *black*. Egypt is called in Scripture the land of Ham, and on the monuments, even on the Rosetta stone itself, CHEME, which Plutarch took to signify blackness, and referred to the dark colour of the soil. De Iside et Osir. vii. The name Ham may refer to the fact that Ham's descendants would occupy southern and warm countries, and may possibly refer to the physical effect the glowing heat, which should beat upon them, would at length produce.

We are as little disposed to rest the Scripture *defence* of slavery on this prophecy of Noah. First, because, as we have already said the argument is, historically speaking, an entire failure. The slaves amongst us are not Canaanites, or if there should be now and then a descendant of Canaan among them, there is probably scarcely one in a thousand. And secondly, because prophecy forms no rule of duty to man, but is a revelation of that secret will of God according to which things are ordered, and not of that revealed will which is our law and guide. If prophecy were a rule of duty, Judas ought to have betrayed Christ, and both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles, and the people of Israel, did right in gathering together against the holy child Jesus, to do whatsoever the hand and counsel of God determined before to be done. If prophecy be a rule of duty, the most unseemly and atrocious acts may be freely performed. The institution of domestic slavery has its surest defence in the sacred Scriptures. And it is a pity that its defence should

be marred by forced interpretations and insecure arguments, which the opponents of the institution may triumphantly overthrow.

It has been indeed alleged that the race of Ham has ever been in subserviency to the descendants of Japheth and Shem; and Mede says that "there never hath been a son of Ham who hath shaken a sceptre over the head of Japheth; Shem hath subdued Japheth, and Japheth hath subdued Shem, but Ham never subdued either."—But this assertion of Mede is not strictly true, for Ham founded the splendid monarchies of Assyria and Babylonia. The Egyptians long held the Hebrews in bondage, and Shishak, the Sheshonk of the monuments, subsequently subdued them. Sesostriis conquered a great part of Europe and Asia, and the Carthaginians often defeated the Romans in battle. If Heeren's opinion be true, (which we doubt,) Ethiopia gave civilization to Egypt. According to all Antiquity, Egypt or Phœnicia gave literature to Greece. These are some of the instances in which Ham, in past ages, has shown his superiority over Japheth and Shem. These things must not be forgotten amid the degradation into which the race of Ham has now sunk.

It is a fact, too, which we desire those who oppose us to account for, that nations, historically and genealogically of the most different descent, should be reckoned by Physiologists among one and the same variety of men. We are told that the Jews, Arabs, Hindoos, Egyptians, and European nations are all of the Caucasian type. Yet these men descended, some from Ham, some from Japheth, and some from Shem. Does not this fact go to show that the several types are not derived from the three sons of Noah respectively, but are varieties which have arisen in each of these lines of descent, and having once arisen, been perpetuated in the lines in which they are now found? Another striking fact is, that the Jews, Babylonians, Assyrians, Arabians, Egyptians, Phœnicians, and Carthaginians, spoke the same tongue, and needed no interpreter between them, for a thousand years after the confusion of tongues at Babel; and the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, and Hebrews, while their distinctive language lasted, always spoke the same tongue, with almost no di-

alectic variations.* Yet a part of these nations were descended from Shem, and another part from Ham. Indeed the argument which proves our race to have a common origin and parentage, is one of vast variety and strength. Like those fibres in some objects of nature, which, crossing each other like a net work in every direction, hold together in one body the mass they interpenetrate and enclose, so this many sided argument, these physiological, linguistic, antiquarian, and historic proofs, show the family of man to be one, and though separate in themselves, mutually confirm and sustain each other.

The opinions in reference to which we have thus briefly expressed our dissent, are no otherwise injurious than as they present an unsound basis on which to rest the Scripture defence of slavery. They imply no disrespect to the sacred volume, but the reverse. Some of the remarks, therefore, with which this brief article is prefaced, are unsuitable if applied to them. They were designed to refer rather to a third hypothesis, which will be considered in the following article, to which this may be regarded, if the reader will, as introductory, an hypothesis which we are obliged to reject, if we continue to receive the Scriptures as the oracles of God.

ARTICLE V.

Two Lectures on the Connection between the Biblical and Physical History of Man. Delivered by invitation, from the Chair of Political Economy, etc. of the Louisiana University, in December, 1848. By JOSIAH C. NOTT, M. D. of Mobile, Alabama. New York, 1849.

The closing words of the preceding article, have spoken of it as originally designed to be introductory to the one upon which we now enter. We, therefore, ad-

* See Gesen. Monumenta Phœnicia.

vance without further preface, to consider another theory concerning the race of man, which the Lectures, the title of which is given at the head of our article, bring before us. This is the theory which we suppose, from various expressions, is adopted by Dr. Nott: *that the Bible gives us an account of the Caucasian race only*, which he says "is probably the true Adamic race, whose history is so dimly shadowed forth in the Pentateuch." He quotes Lanci, "the first philologist of our day," to prove that Adam must be literally translated THE RED, from the Arabian *Dem* (?) "to be red," whence *Adama*, red-earth. DEM, also means *blood*, and the sense of the word Adam is the "red man," or "il rossicante," the *blusher*. Now, since it is only the Caucasian race that can blush, it is probably only the Caucasian race that the Hebrews meant by Adam.* Dr. Nott further says, that "it is to the pure Caucasian we must turn, as, probably, the last and most perfect work of the Almighty. The latter is probably the true Adamic race, whose history is so dimly shadowed forth in the Pentateuch." "No one, informed on the subject, can affirm that man did not exist ages prior to the six days of *our* creation."

We need not inform our readers how *contrary* this hypothesis is to every declaration of the Scriptures, and how impossible it is, they being true, that the other varieties of men should have been created before Adam, always represented as the first man, and the first human occupant of the new formed earth; and how impossible it is, in accordance with the whole tenor of their teachings, that other races should have been created since,

* It is no proof of the scholarship of Lanci, which, however, we do not mean to question, that he could trace the resemblance between the name of Adam and words of the same ultimate root which signify *to be red*. The same could easily be done by the merest smatterer in Hebrew. We know not why an argument might not be made out of the same philological material, to prove that Adam was an Indian, and that Moses gives an account of the *homo Americanus*. A more probable reason for the name is found in the fact that Adam was formed of dust taken *Min-Adama*, 'from the ground,' and that the name was designed to remind him of his origin, in contrast with that of the second Adam, the Saviour of men. The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from Heaven. As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy. Comp. Joseph Ant. i. 1, 2; and Rosenmueller on Gen. i. 26. If there is any allusion to the complexion of the first man in the name, there is abundant evidence that men of other complexions have, nevertheless, descended from him.

either before the flood or after, having no connection of consanguinity with him. He is represented as existing at first alone, and exercising lordship over the inferior creation, as the representative of his entire race; as receiving a help-meet for him, at the hand of the Creator, whom he calls prophetically Eve, *the mother of all living*. To them, and only to them, was the command given, "Be fruitful, and multiply and replenish the earth, and subdue it." On him, as the representative of mankind, were privileges conferred. With him was a covenant made, the provisions of which affected the entire race. The early chapters of Genesis represent the whole Antediluvian world as descended from him. At length, for their sin, this world was destroyed, "and only Noah remained alive, and they that were with him in the Ark." From these "were the nations divided," or *dispersed abroad*, "after the flood."* Of Shem, Ham, and Japheth "was the whole earth overspread."†

It is vain to conjure into existence difficulties respecting the Book of Genesis, to set aside its patent testimony as to the derivation of the nations, and the unity of the race. The Bible stands or falls *as a whole*. Every succeeding part implies the existence of this, and of the facts it records. Our Saviour alludes to the Mosaic record of the creation of man. "Have ye not read that He which made them at the beginning, made them a male and a female?"‡ "The first man," says Paul, "is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from Heaven." "The first man, Adam, was made a living soul; the last Adam was made a quickening Spirit" "As by one man, sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death hath passed upon all"—"as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous."§ The history of the creation of Adam is represented by Christ and the Apostle Paul, as being precisely that which is found in the first chapters of Genesis, and the liability to death of the whole race, and their unholy nature, is directly traced to the sin of Adam, their progenitor, as its cause. In like manner is the history of Noah and of the flood, and of the times preceding it, refer-

* Gen. x. 32.

† ix. 19.

‡ Matth. xix. 4.

§ 1 Cor. xv. 45, 47; Rom. v. 12, 19.

red to by Christ, by Paul, and by Peter who speaks of Noah and the eight souls that were with him in the Ark, as being saved by water, when God brought the flood upon the world of the ungodly.* It is plain that Christ, Paul, and Peter received the Book of Genesis, and the early part of it just as it is, though Dr. Nott, in his wisdom, finds in it nothing but "positive contradictions," "ignorance of facts," "palpable inconsistencies," "unhistoric" statements, "inconsistent facts," "irreconcilable" assertions, and "confusions worse confounded."

We freely accord to Dr. Nott all those private virtues, and that eminence in his honourable profession, which we doubt not he possesses, and we would earnestly desire to separate between the character which belongs to him as a citizen and a man, and that which he assumes as an assailant of the religion we are bound to defend. If we speak of him in this light, it is because he has placed himself, of his own accord, in antagonism to the truth of God, to whom we hold a higher allegiance than any we acknowledge on earth. If we speak freely of the book he has sent into the world, it is not in any spirit of enmity to him. For this freedom of speech he is doubtless prepared. "We have determined," says he, "to start the ball," "and we stand prepared to meet any issue."

We must say, then, that we have read this book with painful astonishment. And we know not which most excites it, the respect he seems in some sentences to manifest for revealed religion, or the air of boldness with which he attacks the Scriptures in every thing which makes them of the least value to man. Our amazement is not diminished when we consider the trifling cause of all this outcry against the Scriptures. He imagines the Ethiopian to be of a different race from ourselves. He cannot account for his colour and conformation from natural causes. He *wishes* that he may not be of the same race. He does not want to view him as even a remote descendant from the same stock with himself. There are certain political and certain physiological reasons why he should not. The Scriptures, however, affirm that God hath made of one blood all nations of the earth. The

* Matth. xxiv. 38; Heb. xi. 7; 1 Pet. iii. 20; 2 Pet. ii. 5.

Scriptures, then, as an infallible rule of faith, shall bow their head. Their doom is sealed. Their reign is over. They are weighed in the balances, and found wanting.

The language of respect for the Scriptures, to which we have alluded, is as follows :

"If there be a future existence in store for us, certainly the subject of all others, which should engage our serious attention, is religion." "The unity of the race can only be deduced from forced constructions of the Old and New Testaments (!) and a persistence in this error is calculated to subvert and not uphold our religion." "We beg leave, at the outset, to disclaim any intention to call in question the well authenticated and important portions of the Scriptures, or to deny their inestimable value to man." "Our object is not to war against genuine revelation." "Jerusalem was the centre of a bright light to a dark world, and in this faith the *younger* (?) Isaiah closed his magnificent strains." The inspired writers placed themselves above all philosophers of antiquity, and looked to God alone for the physical as well as the *moral* laws of the universe."

Notwithstanding the intimation respecting "the younger Isaiah," which is a sufficient hint, as to the type of theology embraced by the writer,* it might be supposed, from these expressions, that he was a believer in revealed religion and had its interest at heart. But it is not long before he undeceives us. It is very plain that the only religion he admits is the religion of nature, and that the inspiration of the sacred writers he alludes to, is an inspiration which does not secure them from error; that it is an inspiration which leaves them to commit the most egregious blunders of statement, and to produce writings the most confused and contradictory. Though he disclaims any intention of calling into question the well authenticated portions of the Scriptures, the very disclaimer implies that there are portions which are not well authenticated and important. But these very portions were received by Christ and the Apostles as parts of that Scripture written by men moved by the Holy Ghost, and the most important conclusions both as to doctrine and duty were based upon them.

The objections of Dr. Nott are so miscellaneous, embrace so many minute particulars, and are so devoid of a

* *Fenum habet in cornu.*

just arrangement ; as to leave us at a loss where to commence our reply, or how to confine it within proper limits. One remark, however, we premise, as to the authorities on which he relies. "So far from appealing to infidel writers," says he, "we shall advance no opinion in relation to the *texts* or interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, which is not based upon the most learned and authoritative theologians of the present century." But who are the most learned divines ? Certain divines of Germany.

"The father land of Luther, Gesenius, Ewald, Eichorn, Hartman, Gabler, the Rosenmuelers, De Wette, Strauss, and other commentators, who have no equals in England or America." The divines of "New England, the land of such Theologians as Channing, Norton, Palfrey, etc." "It is men," he adds, "of this stamp—men who alone possess the knowledge requisite for deciding such questions—that dare teach that the Bible manuscripts have not come down to us untarnished by human hands ; and that the Pentateuch is an anonymous production of unknown origin, compiled many centuries after the time of Moses, and consequently of no authority in settling questions of science."

These, with Munk, Pauthier, Burke of the *Ethnological Journal*, and Mr. Gliddon, are the *Dii Majores* of Dr. Nott's *Mythology*.

As to one of them, the noble reformer Martin Luther, we know not by what right he is canonized in this catalogue of saints. We cannot say how he would handle these lectures. Whether he would say as did of Tetzels, "I will soon make a hole in his drum," we know not, but of this we are certain, the Dr. would find him a rough assailant, and might wish he had kept his lucubrations by his side nine years longer, doubling the Horatian maxim. As to the others, we are willing to admit the genius and eloquence of Eichorn, the Hebrew learning of Gesenius, the linguistic ability of Ewald, the poetic taste of De Wette, and the useful industry especially of the younger Rosenmueler ; but as authorities in matters of doctrine, and especially, as to the inspiration of the Scriptures, any one who knows them, at once perceives that they cannot be relied on for a moment. As to Strauss, who left his country *per force* for his country's good, his system utterly subverts all revealed religion ; it varies not essentially from that of

Woolston and Collins. So loose have been the German notions for many years, the most decent of the English Deists, had they resided in that country, might have been installed as professors of Theology, without producing any great commotion. Rosseau, Hobbes, Gibbon, and even Paine and Voltaire, had they been only a little more decent, and wrapt their opinions in transcendental mist, might bring forth from the professor's chair, their objections to the historic truth and genuineness of the Scriptures, without danger of being called to account. It is surprising how those hypotheses which were deemed rank infidelity in them, how the same arguments they suggested, are received by a large portion of the German neologists, as ingenious and solid. But it is remarkable that only those scholars of Germany should be mentioned who in one form or the other are of the latitudinarian stamp; that the Dr's. ear refused to hear or his eye to see the names of Hengstenberg, Olshausen, Luecke, Havernick, and Tholuck; and that on the long roll of New England theologians, only Channing, Norton, Parker and Palfrey could attract his notice. These are men to whose authority either as unbiassed scholars or divines we do not defer. We believe their influence to be subversive, not only of the true teachings of the Bible, but of the Bible itself as the inspired and authoritative revelation of God to man. It is marvellous that he should say that "it is men of this stamp alone who possess the knowledge requisite for deciding such questions," when there are men equally learned in Germany with those he has mentioned, who adhere to the faith of Luther; and when in New England and out of it, there are theologians in abundance, in comparison with whom Channing, Parker and Palfrey, are mere sciolists in 'philology and archaeology.' These "men alone dare to teach that the Bible manuscripts have not come down to us untarnished by human hands!" In what dark corner of the earth has Dr. Nott been hidden? Where are the men, orthodox or heterodox, who, since the days of Owen, have contended for the immaculate purity of the Greek and Hebrew Manuscripts? It requires no great daring to affirm that they exhibit errors of transcription, as without perpetual miracle they must. But that "the Pentateuch is an anonymous writing of unknown

origin, compiled many centuries after the time of Moses," by no means all these men would *dare* affirm. When did Luther attack the Pentateuch? And how can Eichorn and Rosenmueler, both of whom wrote expressly in defence of its genuineness as a writing of Moses, be brought forth as impugning that genuineness, and assigning it to a later age? It would astonish Jahn, whom Dr. Nott ranks on another page* with the "great philologists and theologians of the continent," if he could now rise from the dead, to learn that he had been quoted in connection with those who have "made the composition of the Pentateuch gradually descend to a *thousand years after Moses*."† Would that there were a tythe of the candour and fairness of mind in the writers on whom Dr. Nott relies, which there was in this judicious and able divine of the Romish Church.

Dr. Nott's objections to the Scriptures are very numerous. Some are more formally stated, others are 'flings' *against the sacred* text, with a view apparently of discrediting it. Speaking of "the pages of the physical world," he says, quoting from another, "no transcribers or ignorant translators have been able to erase or interpolate its texts; they stand before us in the same genuineness as when first written." This disparaging of the sacred volume, and giving the precedence to science and human reason, besides the spirit it indicates, betrays a want of acquaintance with the true facts in the case. "Of the 100,000 various readings in the text of the New Testament," says Taylor, "it would be hard to select 100 which an English reader, would deem important to the text where they occur. And of that hundred there would not be more than one or two which could in any way affect questions of fact, of doctrine or practice."‡ And professor Stuart, an authority which Dr. Nott seems to respect, says that "not the hundredth part of the mass of various readings amounts to any thing more than the question whether the word honour shall be spelled without the *u* or with it." The same is the testimony of Andrews Norton, whom Dr.

* p. 114.

† See his laboured and successful answer to this theory in his Introduction to the Old Testament.

‡ On the Transmission of Ancient Books.

Nott, for other purposes, freely quotes. "Of the various readings of the New Testament," says he, "nineteen out of twenty, at least, are to be dismissed at once from consideration." "Of those which remain a very great majority are entirely unimportant. They consist in different modes of spelling;" "in the insertion or omission of particles, such as *av* and *de*, not affecting the sense.*

To remove all doubt, however, we give from De Rossi,† all the various readings in the more than 800 MSS. and editions collated by himself, so far as the ten first chapters of Genesis are concerned, which the Dr. finds so confused and contradictory.

CHAP. I.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| vs. 11, tree | and tree, |
| 12. after his kind | after his kind upon the earth, |
| 14. in the firmament of heaven | in the firmament of heaven to give light upon the earth. |
| 26. after our likeness | in our likeness, |
| <i>ibid.</i> and over all the earth, | over all the earth, |
| 30. every herb, | and every herb. |

CHAP. II.

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| vs. 12. good | very good |
| 19. called every living creature, | called the name of every living creature, |
| 24. and they shall be one flesh | and they two shall be one flesh. |

CHAP. III.

- | | |
|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| vs. 7. fig leaf | fig leaves, |
| 10. and said | and said to him |
| 16. Unto the woman | But unto the woman |
| thy sorrow | thy sorrows |
| 19. shalt thou eat bread | shalt thou eat thy bread |
| 20. the Man [or the Adam.] | Adam. |

CHAP. IV.

- | | |
|----------------------------------|--|
| vs. 8, and Cain talked with Abel | and Cain said to Abel his brother. |
| his brother, | Let us go into the field. |
| | [This reading exhibited only in the ancient versions.] |
| 11. from thy hand | from thy hands |
| 17. after the name of his son, | by the name &c. |
| 25. and called | and he called |

CHAP. V.

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| vs. 2. and blessed them | and God blessed them, |
| 3. in his own likeness, | after his own likeness, in his image |
| after his own image | |
| 18. And Jared lived a hundred | and Jared lived sixty-two years |
| and sixty-two years | |
| 23. was | were |
| 25. a hundred eighty and seven | eighty and seven years |
| years | |

* Genuineness of the Gospels, Vol. I. Additional notes, p. 38.

† Kennicott's would also be given, if at hand, but would not materially change the sense.

29. concerning our work and toil our works and toil of our hand
 of our hands
31. was were
32. and Noah was the son of 500 and Noah lived 500 years
 years
 and Noah begat Shem, Ham, and begat Shem and Ham.
- CHAP. VI.
- vs. 7. from man, unto beast, from men, and unto beast,
 unto the fowl and unto the fowl
10. Shem, Ham, Shem and Ham.
11. and the earth was filled and was filled
19. of all flesh and of all flesh
20. of every creeping thing and of every creeping thing.
- CHAP. VII.
- vs. 1. And Jehovah said And God said
 2. of every beast of the beast
 9. As God had commanded as Jehovah commanded
 11. the same day wanting
 19. under the whole heaven under heaven.
- CHAP. VIII.
- vs. 8. from off the face of the earth from the earth,
 11. an olive leaf olive leaves
 15. God Jehovah
 16. and thy wife and thy sons and thy sons and thy wife
 19. every beast, and every beast,
 every creeping thing, and every creeping thing,
 whatsoever creepeth or whatsoever creepeth.
- CHAP. IX.
- vs. 2. upon all that moveth and upon all that moveth
 5. at the hand of every man's and at the hands &c.
 brother
 7. bring forth abundantly and bring forth abundantly
 10. of the cattle and of the cattle
 29. was were
- CHAP. X.
- vs. 1. Ham and Ham
 3. and Riphath and Diphath
 4. and Dodanim and Rodanim
 5. in their nations after their nations
 19. and Admah Admah
 20. in their nations after their nations.

These are absolutely the whole results of the laborious collation by De Rossi of the Hebrew MSS, for these first ten chapters. Not more than two or three of them are of the least importance, except for the confirmation they afford to the text; the proof they give, that in the innumerable transcriptions through which this text has passed for 3000 years, it has suffered so little. What right then has Dr. Nott to say that the "original Hebrew text has come down to us in so many mutilated forms, differing widely from the long lost original." It is an assertion which no true scholar, who is not swayed by some amazing prejudice, and

does not rush impetuously on to some foregone conclusion, would dare to hazard. Every one who has examined the subject knows that if all the various readings most divergent from the truth were incorporated into the text, and the true readings thrown away, neither the system of doctrines which the Scriptures should then deliver, nor the moral precepts they should exhibit, nor the series of historic facts which they should present, would be for substance different from those now found in the sacred pages. The various readings in the manuscripts of profane writings, which are equally numerous with those of the sacred Scriptures, have not impaired them.* They have not quenched the poetic fire of Homer, nor the eloquence of Demosthenes, nor the historic truth of Herodotus and Thucydides. And none but a pretender to scholarship would say that they have materially affected the verity of the Scriptures.

Dr. Nott again speaks, disrespectfully, of the ENGLISH VERSION of the Scriptures. He makes the astonishing assertion that "the Hebrew language may be said only to have been recovered within the last century by modern orientalists." Most surprising is it that any one could believe that the Jews should have wholly lost a knowledge of their ancient and sacred tongue. A nation of men that, in their better days, have had among them a numerous class of scholars belonging to every tribe, besides the sacerdotal order, while this was maintained,—pursuing with indefatigable zeal the study of their sacred books, under advantages such as Christian scholars in these days can scarcely ever hope to obtain; that these men should have known nothing of their ancient tongue; that the schools of Alexandria in Egypt, of Tiberias and Jabneh in Palestine, of Naardea, Pompedita, and Sora in Babylonia, and of Cordova and Seville in Spain, at a later period, with all the cognate dialects, the Arabic, Chaldee, and Syriac, sounding daily in their ears, should have known nothing of the Hebrew, and that a

* See Bentley's "Remarks on Free Thinking." He says "Wakefield has collected about 12,000 various readings of Lucretius (exclusive of mere differences of orthography) from five *printed* copies only, and Bekker has published more than 60,000 variations from his text of Plato, the MSS. used on each of the different writings being on an average about thirteen."

knowledge of it should only have been recovered by modern orientalists, displays an amazing want of reading, of scholarlike accuracy, and a credulity exceedingly rare except in an unbeliever. There never has been an age of the world, when it was impossible to obtain a knowledge of the Hebrew tongue; and many were the Jews in Egypt before Christ, of literary habits and acute minds, who could decypher her hieroglyphics, if *they* could shed any light on the Scriptures, tenfold better than Mr. Gliddon, "who has bestowed immense labour on Biblical criticism," and "has collected no less than 500 false renderings," &c.

Let us now look at Dr. Nott's proof of "the ignorance of the *authorized* translators of the pious King James and the British Parliament." We do not see that our translators were unacquainted with the fact that the root *a-dam* means *to be red*, or that they were guilty of any error in translating the word, when a noun, as the proper name of the first man in one case, as equivalent to "a man" in another, as signifying "mankind," being "remarkably applied in Numbers xxxi. 35, to *female* persons." Why does not Dr. Nott administer the calomel of criticism to speakers of the English tongue around him, and retrieve the King's English from confusion.—They speak continually of *Mr. Mann* and *Mrs. Mann*, of *a man*, of *man*, meaning *mankind*, "remarkably including female persons;" of *Mr. Good*, of *a good*, of *good*, and *goods*. If the English translators had not translated the word *Adam* as they have done, they would indeed have been guilty of egregious blundering.

Another proof of ignorance and incompetency is found in Leviticus xi. 20: "All *fowls* that *creep*, going on *all* fours, shall be an abomination unto you." "Were this version correct," says he, "it would prove the existence, in the days of Moses, of *four legged birds*!" Is Dr. Nott sure in what sense the word *fowl* was used in 1611?—Dr. Johnson defines it to be "a winged animal." Are there not winged creatures that also have four feet? Is there not the *vespertilio*, of which the common bat is but a single specimen? and if this be not intended, and the more probable opinion is adopted, that the reference is to insects which have both wings and feet, are *they* not flying crea-

tures? Were the six learned men who translated this portion of the Scriptures, and the learned critics from both universities appointed to review their work, and Bishop Bilson and Dr. Smith appointed to publish it, unacquainted with the *English* language? Mistranslation of the *Hebrew* there is not. It matters not whether the passage be translated creeping things that fly, or flying things that creep.

His example from Job xix. 23: "Oh that my words were now written! Oh, that they were *printed* in a *book*," which he regards as an "anachronism," is alike discreditable to him. Were these translators, does Dr. Nott, suppose, fools? Did they not know as well as he, that printing was not invented, at least in Europe, till 150 years before their own day? The translation was the nearest to the original, in their judgment, which would be intelligible to the common reader. The Hebrew word translated "book," usually signifies *a book*. The word translated "printed" means *engraved*; and "inscribed in a register," may be but little nearer the original than *printed in a book*. Neither ignorance nor blundering can be argued from this example merely. All that can be said is, that the words in one language do not exactly answer to words in another. The other example, with which Dr. Nott and H. Smith make merry, is at least as much misunderstood by themselves as it ever could have been by the translators. "Oh that one would hear me! behold, my desire is that the Almighty should answer me, and that mine adversary had written a book." Job xxxi. 35. "This," says Dr. Nott, is "authorized version"—"with a vengeance!" Mr. Gliddon's *Tau*, the symbol of Osiris, is as much out of place here as 'a pig in a parlour.' The Tav is the sign manual of the party accused, put in this case, by Synecdoche, for his bill in plea.

Oh that there were one [as a judge] to hear me!—
Behold my authenticated plea—
That the Almighty would reply as accuser!
That my opponent would write down the charge!—
Would I not wear it on my shoulder?
I would bind it on me as my crown.

The opponent or adversary is probably no other than God himself. And if there is a degree of boldness and audacity in Job, in this poetic language, what shall be

said of the ridicule which Dr. Nott appears to quote from some of those on whom he leans, when he represents Job as longing "with a refinement of vindictiveness, as the most terrible retribution he could inflict on an adversary, that the latter should actually write a *book*, in order that he might review him, as H. Smith has conjectured, in the *Jerusalem Quarterly*. "Review the Almighty!" Here is criticism "with a vengeance."

We do not deny that there are passages in our version which have been elucidated by later scholars, and are better understood than in a former age, and perhaps this, among others, is one. But it is not true that "this old translation is acknowledged by all who know any thing about it to be *very bad*." How different has been the judgment of other and the most learned men concerning it. John Selden speaks of it as "the best translation in the world." Bishop Horsely praises it as having "enriched and adorned our language." Dr. White, Professor of Arabic at Oxford, commends its "general fidelity," and says "the English language has acquired new dignity by it." Dr. Geddes affirms that "this of all versions must, in general, be accounted the most excellent." Professor Stuart represents it as the best effort at translation among the English divines, with the exception of Lowth's classic work on Isaiah, and J. W. Whitaker, speaking of it in the highest terms, says "it has occasionally happened that an individual, as inferior to them (the translators) in condition as in talents and integrity, is found questioning their motives, or denying their qualifications for the task which they so well performed."

But read the Scriptures in any translation, even the most imperfect, and you will find the same facts, the same doctrines, the same revealed truths. In spite of the religious bias of translators, the same doctrines, on the whole, gleam through the imperfect version, and the same historic facts. And may we not, without offence, ask the doctor, if he has himself mastered the Hebrew of the original text? And before he ventured his assertion, did he compare the Greek, the Chaldee, the Syriac, the Arabic, the Latin, the German, French, and English translations with it, and with each other? or has he taken his opinions at second hand? If he possesses the varied

learning of John Mason Goode, and some others, who have adorned his own profession, we will gladly listen to him.

Dr. Nott, however, is not satisfied with attacking the integrity of the sacred text, and the competency and fidelity of the English Bible. *He attacks the INSPIRATION of the book itself.* In the writing of the Scriptures there were two agents employed, the Spirit of God, the true Author of the whole; and man acted upon by the Spirit, and speaking as he was moved by the Holy Ghost. All Scripture, therefore, is given by inspiration of God. The men acted on by the Spirit, were acted upon as free and intelligent agents, and not as unconscious and senseless tools, and the peculiarities of their genius and previous culture were not lost from the writings which, under this celestial impulse, they produced. Yet might they not, at all times, at once perceive the full extent of meaning in that which the Spirit prompted them to write. Their knowledge might therefore be defective, as men, in reference to many points of science and learning. But the Spirit who inspired them, knows "all things, even the deep things of God." He brooded on the chaotic deep at the first creation, informed with vital energy the primaeval matter, was the Maker of all things, and all men and nations, and must understand all. His knowledge is not bounded by the confines of Palestine, nor the red shading of Dr. Nott's map, which so ostentatiously, as you open the book, flaunts forth its impious reproaches, if not expressly, yet by obvious inference, against the perfection of the Scriptures. The sacred writers "were ignorant, says Dr. Nott, of Astronomy, Geology, Natural History, Geography," &c. knew "nothing of the Americans, Chinese, Hindoos, Australians, Polynesians, and other races." "Who will question the fact that Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John were as ignorant of the north of Europe, the north and east of Asia, southern Africa, Australia, America, and Oceania, as we are of the geography of the Moon?" But was the great and Heavenly Author of these writings ignorant of them? the Maker of all ignorant of what he had made? the Ruler of all of the extent of his earthly domain? Whatever is written in the Scripture, must be consistent with truth, and consistent with science itself.

And such it manifestly is. There has never yet been discovered, in the whole compass of the Bible, a single statement irreconcilable with true science. In its entire compass, then, is not a scientific, geographic, nor historic error. Dr. Nott's exclamations respecting "the extraordinary account of the Garden of Eden," and the Mosaic cosmogony, do but betray his own want of research, or a determination to do what he may to discredit the Scriptures.

"We freely admit," says Gaussen, "that if there are any physical errors, fully proved, in the Scriptures, the Scriptures could not be from God. But we mean to show that there are none; and we shall dare to challenge the adversaries to produce one from the entire Bible. We are going still farther; and we shall show, on the contrary, how much latent science is concealed under the simplicity of its language.

"These two facts are analogous to that which you may observe in the words of a learned astronomer, conversing with his young children, and showing them with his finger, the earth and the heavens. If you followed him in these interviews, when his tenderness, stooping to their level, presents to their new-born intelligence, images and words which it can comprehend, you would then quickly remark his respect for truth, by a two-fold sign. First, he would never tell them any thing that was not true; and secondly, there would be in his words many indications that he knows more than he sees fit to communicate to them. He doubtless would not pretend to teach them science; but on the one hand, nothing in his discourse would contradict its principles; and on the other, many of his words would already indicate, that although silent upon them, he comprehended them. Afterward, when his children, having become men, shall review his words; not only will they find them exempt from all error, but they will also recognize that, skilfully chosen, they were already in pre-established harmony with science, and presented it to them in its germ, although they could not comprehend it. In proportion as their own knowledge shall increase they will see with admiration, under the reserve and the simplicity of his language, concealed wisdom, learned exactness, turns of phraseology, and forms of expression, which were in harmony with facts, then unknown to them, but long known by him."—*Theopneusty*, pp. 131, 136.

We are not informed in the Scriptures what the intelligent men of the Jewish nation knew and what they did not know, by those merely human means of knowledge

which were common to men. This, however, is true. Dr. Nott takes pleasure in understating the knowledge they actually had. *The Scriptures are fuller in their statements even in Geography, than any other ancient writings* which precede the days of the Greek Geographers, who, in comparison with the Old Testament, are but modern. They are so accurate as to constitute the best guide books to travellers in the countries in which the occurrences of the Scriptures took place. In their allusions to the more distant lands to which reference is made they exhibit no error. Where they speak of the distant West, they use the phrase which is translated in our version "the isles of the sea," or "of the Gentiles." *The habitable places of the sea* would be more in accordance with the original, and will include all countries which must be reached by navigating the sea. India is expressly mentioned in Esther i. i. and viii. 7, and 1. Mac. viii. 8, and if it did not embrace in their geography the whole of Hindostan, it extended far north of it, over a considerable portion of Tartary into the desert of Cobi. China is evidently intended by the land of Sinim, Is. xlix. 14, and has been called, from an unknown antiquity, throughout southern and western Asia, by the name Sin, Chin, or Jin. Porcelain vessels with Chinese inscriptions have been found in the monuments of Thebes. The Magog of Ezekiel is the country of the Mongolians. The Phœnicians were a bordering and friendly people, and Tyre was not further from Jerusalem, than Augusta in Georgia, from Charleston, or Montgomery from Mobile. The nearest inhabitants of Galilee might have gone down of a pleasant morning to market. All the knowledge of the Tyrian and Phœnician navigators, pouring in from Carthage, and their numerous colonies, scattered over the islands of the Mediterranean, on either side of it, and beyond the pillars of Hercules on the African and European coast, was easily accessible to the Jews.

They had resided in Babylon, the great centre of oriental commerce, had lived in Media under Darius the Mede, and in Persia under Cyrus the Great; many had served in the army of Alexander the Macedonian, and were probably among the invaders of India. They had occupied the central ground passed over by the caravan trade between

Persia and India on the one side, and Phœnicia and Egypt on the other. Before Paul and the New Testament writers lived, Africa had been circumnavigated by Tyrian sailors under Pharaoh Necho.* Hanno the Carthaginian had explored the coast of Western Africa, Arrian made the *Periplus* of the Erythrean sea, sailing around the coast of India on the east of the Indian Ocean, and down Africa on the west, a voyage which had probably also been often made before by the allied fleets of Solomon and Hiram king of Tyre. The voyage of Pytheas to the North Sea had taken place, and of Nearchus down the Indus and up the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Tigris. The Jews had long been familiar with Egypt. It was no wonderful feat to go there. They had never from Abraham to Paul lost their connection with it. From 301 to 180 B. C. the period of the Ptolomies, it was a place of shelter to them. In 153 B. C. Onias built a temple at Leontopolis which was long the rival of that at Jerusalem. At Alexandria they had the most splendid synagogue, with its accompaniment of schools, which existed in the whole world. The geographers Eratosthenes, Hipparchus and Strabo had already gathered from different sources a very considerable knowledge of the earth and its principal nations. Melas and Pliny were the contemporaries of the writers of the New Testament. It is impossible that men, living as these writers did, in the very central parts of the civilised world, should be so extremely ignorant of the inhabitants of different countries as Dr. Nott alleges. Especially may we suppose the Apostle Paul, a man of no mean condition, born in a city which according to Strabo excelled even Corinth and Athens and all other cities as a place of education, to have been acquainted with this knowledge then common to men of ordinary intelligence. Now these countries which they actually did know, are inhabited by the principal varieties of the human race. The Caucasian, Mongolian, and negro could not be unknown to them. The Mongolian they had seen in their wanderings towards central Asia, and the negro must have attracted their attention in Egypt. The Scythians, the pro-

* 616 B. C. This voyage was 2100 years before the Portuguese under the lead of Vaquez de Gama doubled the cape of Good Hope.

totypes of the modern Tartars, seven centuries before Christ, had invaded south western Asia, pushed their inroads as far as Egypt, and left their name in Scythopolis, in the valley of the Jordan. Dr. Nott does indeed struggle hard to show that the word Cush is wrongly translated in our English Bible by the word Ethiopia. And we are willing to admit that the one word is not the etymological equivalent of the other, and that in these modern times the word Ethiopian is not by usage applied to all the descendants of Cush, or Ethiopia to all the countries they inhabit. But it is true that by the ancients, Ethiopia was applied to both Asiatic and African nations. They used the term according to its sense, of nations "burnt black in the face," *αἰθρὸς τὴν οὐρανὸν*.

In like manner the name Cush, for which in the translation Ethiopia is substituted, is used in the Scriptures for Asiatic and for African countries. The Cush, in the description of the Garden of Eden, is probably the country east of the Tigris, and north of the Persian Gulf. Chusistan, a portion of Persia, bears the name, and Jonathan, the Targumist, on Gen. x. 6, evidently understands by Cush, an Asiatic people. But it is equally plain that the name Cush is also applied to an African country and people. Indeed so clear is this that Gesenius and Shulthess have wrongly contended that, in the Scriptures, it is applied to no other. It was a country which lay south of Egypt above Syene, the Meroe of the ancients, and the Abyssinia of the moderns. The Chub of Ezek. 29,* is either the Nubia of modern Geography, or a district called Chuba, still further south. The land of rustling, or clanging wings of Is. xviii, 1, beyond the rivers of Cush, is evidently the African Ethiopia, including Nubia, Kordofan, and Abyssinia.† Over this country, in the days of Hezekiah, reigned Tirhaka, a King of great renown, who also had obtained the dominion of upper Egypt. When Hezekiah was threatened by Senacherib, knowing that the Assyrian army was on the way to Egypt,‡ he marched to the relief of the Jewish monarch. He is the *Ταρακος* of Manetho, and the *Ταρακων* of Strabo, and his figure, name, and the expedition he undertook,

* Ezek. xxix. 10; xxx. 6, 9

† Strabo, 15, 6.

‡ Herodotus.

and the prisoners he captured, are recorded on the walls of a Theban temple at Medinath Abu, and on the mountain Barkal in Abyssinia.* And in spite of Dr. Nott's contemptuous questioning of the truth of 2 Chron. xiv. 9, it is very evident that Zerah, the Ethiopian, did come down with a "thousand thousand," *i. e.* many thousands, on "so insignificant a King as Asa." He came from Africa, not Arabia; among his soldiers were Lubim, an African people,† and he had 300 chariots, which were not used by the Arabs in their warfare.‡ The name Cush, too, has been found on the monuments as referring to an African people, as Dr. Nott, with a facility fatal to his argument, p. 140, allows. Indeed we find it used of the Prince of Ethiopia on a Temple at Beit-é-wellee in Nubia, where the conquests of Rameses the Second are found portrayed, under circumstances in which there can be no mistake, for the Ethiopian army, composed of negroes, is represented as routed before the chariot of the victor, and negro captives are led bound beside the conqueror. He is then exhibited, in another compartment, as receiving the tribute of the conquered nations, consisting of gold, panther's skins, tusks of ivory, logs of ebony, long horned oxen, bears, lions, giraffes, elephants, brought by a numerous procession of negroes; Egyptian Scribes are taking an account of the tribute: then he is pictured as investing "the royal son of Kush" with the vice-regal power over this subjugated country, his name and title being written in hieroglyphics over his head.§ On the

* Wilkinson's *Ancient Egyptians*, i. pp. 140, 387; Roscellini *Mon.* ii. tab. 8.

† 2 Chron. xvi. 8; Comp. 12: 4.

‡ In the invasion of Judah in the days of Rehoboam, by Shishak, [Sheshonk,] King of Egypt, in which he took Jerusalem and the "fenced cities of Judah," a vast army of Lubim, Sukkiims, and Cushites followed him. These Sukkiim are in the lxx. the Troglydytes, whom Strabo, L. xvii. 1, and Pliny *Hist. Nat.* vi. 29, 34, place in Meroe, and Rosenmueler,* identifies with the Shangalla, a negro race in Abyssinia. The victories of Shiskah, over Judah-melek-kah, "*King of the country of Judah*," are sculptured on the monuments at Karnak.

§ "The royal son of Kush, or Ethiopia, Amounemape-t, son of Poeri, the truth speaking." Gallery of Antiqu. from the British Museum, by S. Birch, part ii. p. 96. "*Kush*, barbarian country, perverse race, being," says Mr. Gliddon, "the Egyptian designatory name and title of Negroes prior to B. C. 1600." *Anc. Egypt.* p. 24, 26, 27, 59; Comp. Roscellini iii. 1, 277; Champollion *Eg. et Nub.* i. Planch. xi. xv. xvi.

* *Alterthumskunde*, iii. 353.

same is an address to the conqueror, "Beneath thy sandals is *Kol*, the barbarian land, *Kush* (Nigritia) is in thy grasp." Mr. Gliddon informs us that by the name *Kush* "the Egyptians exclusively designated the negro and Berber race in hieroglyphics," and though he denies that this name can be identified with the Cush of Scripture we beg leave to differ from him. We have traced the Scripture use of the word to the country south of Egypt, inhabited in part by the Berber and negro varieties of men. We have now monumental evidence, by his own admission, that the same word is applied to the full negro of Nigritia, thus connecting him with other Cushites, with Ham and with Noah. If the *KHEM* of the monuments is the Ham of the Scriptures, and the Kanana of the monuments is the Canaan of the Scriptures, why is not the monumental Cush, also the Cush of the Bible, extending westward over central Africa and including the negro race!

Thus signally does the effort to prove the Cush of Scripture, always to refer to a Caucasian race, fail of any solid foundation. Thus impossible is it to prove, in the face of facts, that the sacred writers were unacquainted with the negro variety of man. Josephus knew something of this country of Ethiopia, for he represents Moses, while yet in Egypt, making war, as a general serving under the Egyptian rule, upon Ethiopia, and subduing the people. The negro, too, had been fully described by Herodotus nearly five centuries before Christ, who became acquainted with him in Egypt, and afterwards found a colony of the same black skinned and woolly haired people in Colchis, on the shores of the Euxine.—When Jeremiah then asks, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots?" he as truly referred to the negro as a well known variety of men, as he did to the leopard as a well known variety of the feline race. That he should be ignorant of them, when they constituted to some extent the armies of Egypt, which were often contending with their natural enemies, the Babylonians, on the territories of the Hebrews, is beyond belief. So numerous were the negroes in the armies of Sesostris, that Herodotus seems to infer that the Egyptians themselves were *μελαχροες*, "a black skinned," and *ουλοτριχες*, a

woolly haired people.* It will be remembered too that Jeremiah spent the last days of his life in Egypt, whither he fled after the fall of Jerusalem, with the miserable remnant of his people.

In the original migration of nations, intercourse must have been kept up for a length of time between the migrating hordes and the parent stock, even as it is now. Commerce was rife over nearly the whole of the ancient world, as it is at this day. Many a Jew had seen the negro in Egypt. His ancestors had seen the temple at Karnac, perhaps, when it was building, and he had stood wondering in the Ramesium ages before Champollion was born. In countless things in which the moderns are ignorant, the ancients were wise. The sacred writers, then, did know the principal varieties of the human race, were acquainted with the Mongul, the Caucasian, and the negro, the varieties of men most unlike each other, and did notwithstanding affirm all nations of the earth to be of one blood, and to have descended from Noah, the second founder of the family of men, and from Adam, the first progenitor. Dr. Nott knows that this is the representation of the Scriptures, hence his inconsistent zeal, on the one hand, to destroy the belief of men in the integrity and inspiration of the word of God; and on the other hand, to force upon the divine word an interpretation, on the supposition that its declarations are true, which will suit his preconceived theories. A sad addition to the numerous proofs literature contains of the unhistoric spirit and easy faith which skepticism inspires.

The difficulties found by Dr. Nott with the ETHNOGRAPHY of the Bible fill us with increased amazement. The book of Genesis gives us a

“Fragmentary and confused sketch of a race descended from

* Herod. Euterpe S. 104. The passage of Herodotus is curious, and has been the *crux* of ethnological speculators: “The Egyptians were of opinion that the Colchians were descended from part of the troops of Sesostri. To this I, myself, was also inclined, because they are black, and have short hair and curling, which latter circumstances may not, however, be insisted on as evidence, because it is common to many other nations.” From this many, as Volney and others, have concluded that the ancient Egyptians were real negroes; and that their complexion was afterwards changed by intermixture with the Asiatics, Greeks, and Romans. But monumental evidence is against this. On these the negroes do not usually appear, except in the pomp of a conquering monarch, as defeated enemies or prisoners of war.

Adam and Eve." "To show in what confusion and contradiction the Mosaic account of the Adamic race is involved we quote a few examples." "The opinion of the learned and *pious* De-Wette, that the book of Genesis simply recorded the uncertain and mythical history of the *Hebrew race*." "The only rational explanation which can be offered for these discrepancies," (between Gen. i. and ii. as to the creation of man,) is that assigned by the most competent theologians of the present day, viz: that the book of Genesis is nothing more than an assemblage of very ancient fragments, (or traditions,) of unknown origin, put together without order, and consequently of no historic value." Again the Dr. says, "there were no human beings on the face of the earth, but Adam and Eve, and Cain; and who, we ask, was there to slay him?" [Cain.] "How did Cain get out of the presence of the Lord by going to the land of Nod? Where did he find his wife before there were any women of the Adamic stock? How did he build a city for himself and for what purpose?" "Is it possible any one can regard this as a part of genuine revelation?" "I should be glad if those who regard the book of Genesis as an essential part of Holy Writ would explain these palpable inconsistencies."

We pity Dr. Nott in his deep bewilderment. On the dark mountains where he is wandering we would fain reach him a helping hand. Our want of space to answer this avalanche of questions, in part prevents us, and in part the recollection that they have been answered many thousand times, and that if he had but sought in the right direction with a mind open to conviction his difficulties would have been removed. To our minds, there is a perfect unity of design pervading the book of Genesis, no undue repetition and no confusion. Viewed in a merely literary aspect, it is the most venerable monument of antiquity; in a historic or ethnographic light, the most valuable and satisfactory document in existence; and as a portion of the infallible rule of faith and practice for man, the foundation stone on which the whole edifice of revelation is built. Truly a writer may retrace his steps and enlarge his description, for important reasons, without being charged with discrepancy. He is little versed in classic literature, whose mind does not recur to similar instances in the most trustworthy and polished writers of antiquity. And the oriental style resumes and repeats

more than that of the west. If it could be *proved* that Genesis has in part been compiled from pre-existing documents, its inspiration would not fall away. These may have been written by patriarchs before Moses to whom God revealed his will ; or if the inspired Moses incorporated them into his writings, they have received, in each word and letter, the sanction of the Spirit of God speaking in him.

As to the other points, we can but say that we felt ourselves, as we read them, in the society of Thomas Paine, Rousseau, and Voltaire. In the genealogy of Adam but three of his children, Cain, Abel, and Seth are mentioned by name, and few only of his remoter descendants appear in the record. In the 930 years he walked upon the earth, his family must have been far more numerous than this, and his other children are expressly alluded to in the words "and he begat sons and *daughters*." "The mother of all living" was doubtless "a fruitful vine," and both she and Adam were in the vigour of their lives for a length of years which the post-diluvians knew nothing of. Cain was a married man when he slew Abel, and was then not less, probably, than 129 years of age. Seth, who was appointed by God to occupy the place of Abel whom Cain slew, was born to Adam when he was 130 years old.* The natural increase of the race of man is extremely rapid when no hindrance is interposed. "An island first occupied by a few ship-wrecked English in 1589, and discovered by a Dutch vessel in 1667, is said to have been found peopled after 80 years by 12,000 souls, all the descendants of four mothers."† When the Creator undertook to people a world, we may suppose that his providence arranged for this end, and no hindrance was allowed to interpose. It is believed that the death of Abel was the first which occurred in the family of man. It is not an unreasonable supposition, therefore, as figures will demonstrate, that the family of Adam embraced from 191,000 to 200,000 people at the banishment of Cain. How many of these adhered to the fortunes of Cain, from whom a large share descended, or whether any, we are not informed, nor are we told when he built his *city*. If he liv-

* Comp. iv. 17, 25. v. 3.
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† Wiseman's Lects. p. 145.
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ed as long as his father Adam, and built it in the closing period of his life, his own descendants born in the land of *Nod*, i. e. in the land of his *flight*, which the name denotes, were far more numerous than the numbers above mentioned would indicate. The same remarks will also apply to Nimrod. Though he may be, as is said in these Lectures, but of "the second generation from Ham," there was abundant time for a population to have arisen on the earth, after the flood, sufficiently numerous to build cities and found kingdoms.* The city Cain built was not probably extraordinary for size, but at first, at least, a mere *stockade*, "*earth-work*," or *fortress*.† Rome was not built in a day. It was once a hamlet or *blockhouse* on the Capitoline Mount. It was only the "beginning" of the kingdom founded by Nimrod, and the first foundations of Nineveh, Rehoboth, Calah, and Resen, of which the historian speaks. With Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Louisville, Lowell, Buffalo and San Francisco before him, the growth of the present generation, it is surprising that Dr. Nott cannot see that it requires but a brief time for places to which emigration tends, to rise to sudden wealth and eminence. Kingdoms, too, are often small in their beginning, which afterwards fill half the world with their arts and arms. Nor was it any more difficult for Cain to "get out of the presence of the Lord" than it is for unbelieving men to do so now. They now absent themselves voluntarily from the house and worship of God and the society of his people, or, having once been numbered among them, may be forcibly expelled. Had Dr. Nott been better acquainted with the phraseology of Scripture, he could have had no trouble in understanding what is said concerning the sons of God and the daughters of men in Gen. vi., nor have found any resemblance in this to the "ancient mythologies of India and Egypt."

These objections, and others which time does not allow us to touch, are brought forward to show that the book of

* See Bedford's Scripture Chronology, and his calculation of the population of the earth in each year from Noah to Abraham.

† "*Hir*, translated city," says Gesenius, is properly "*a place of watch or guard*," built with a wall or tower as a refuge of the keepers of flocks, an enclosure surrounded by a mound or wall, a nomadic *hamlet*, a *town*, a *city*, often not large, as there were 31 royal cities in Canaan, and 124 in the single tribe of Judah.

Genesis is unworthy of credit, and that therefore its Ethnology is to be rejected. "Its ethnological details" he says, "are devoid of all harmony, are inconsistent with each other, and contradicted by the early history of Egypt, China, India and America." To this we can only say, "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!" The xth and xith chapters of Genesis are unquestionably the most satisfactory ethnographical document on the face of the earth. It more clearly explains the origin of the various important nations of the old continent, than all the writings of antiquity besides. From Josephus down, there has been great uniformity in its explanation, and all soberly conducted antiquarian research, and almost every spade full of earth thrown out of the buried catacombs and palaces of Egypt and Nineveh, do but tend to confirm it.

Dr. Nott next proceeds to attack THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE BIBLE. "We shall first take up the chronology of Genesis alone, and show that it is destroyed by its own inconsistencies; and we shall then, by a comparison of the monuments of Egypt, China, India, America, &c. show that it has no historical ground work whatever." This is assuredly a large and boastful promise. We see him, a very Goliath, flourishing his spear like a weaver's beam, and defying the armies of Israel. Where are these monuments of INDIA? Are they of paper, earth, or stone? Does the Dr. refer to the Puranas and their Yugs, covering a period of 4,320,000 years? And where are his monuments of CHINA. Does he then believe that one emperor reigned 18,000 years, another 18,000, and another 45,600 years? Does he not know that the Chinese themselves regard their high chronology as fabulous, that their respectable historians do not venture to allude to it, except to call it in question? Says the Chinese historian Fung-chow,

"How is it credible that more than 10,000 years elapsed before the yang, or 'superior principle' was produced, and the heavens spread; and that 10,000 more elapsed before the yin, or 'secondary principle' was produced, and the earth formed; that 10,000 more passed away, before the yin and yang united to produce the various material existences; and, further, that 40 or 50,000 years more passed away, before the process of the two principles was finished, and the sages appeared! Such a tale is

contrary to all sense and reason. From the time of the sages Yaou and Shun, to the present age, is not more than 3000 and odd years. How can it be believed that 40 or 50,000 years elapsed after the formation of the heavens and the earth, before man appeared, or the earth and water were adjusted, and food supplied to human beings? or that, if the world had existed so long, these things should not have been arranged before Fuh-he and his successors? It is evident that Pawn-koo, the first man, according to the fabulous records of the Chinese, who acted at the separation of heaven and earth, could not have been long before Fuh-he, perhaps a thousand years, certainly not ten thousand; and the time of Fuh-he must have been very near Yaou and Shun, perhaps a hundred years, certainly not a thousand. No scholar should decline a thorough inquiry."*

Choo-foo-tze and Sze-ma-tzeen, two very celebrated historians of China, says Medhurst, pass these fabulous periods by as unworthy of notice. The traditionary period has much in it which coincides with antediluvian history. Yet Choo-foo-tze himself says, that "several things affirmed of this epoch were all pushed up by the people who lived in subsequent ages." Even Dr. Nott's authority, Pauthier, whom he pronounces "the greatest Chinese scholar of the age," who represents the Chinese records as giving evidence of a succession of emperors from 2637 B. C. down to the present day, does not in this statement ascend nearer than 609 years to the Deluge, according to the chronology of the Septuagint, or than 518 years, according to the chronology of Hales. "The great Fou-hi" of Pauthier, was, according to Medhurst, the patriarch Adam. He is represented as the founder of marriage, and was assisted by a woman named *Wa*, answering to the Hebrew *Chawah* or Eve. In the days of Yaou, their first king, answering perhaps to Noah, a great inundation occurred, the sky falling on the earth and destroying the race of men. The date of this inundation is fixed by Medhurst, from native documents, at 2296 B. C. and the beginning of Yaou's reign at B. C. 2356. These dates accord with those of the Hebrew text. If we assume the Septuagint chronology and Pauthier's statement, 5 or 600 years is no brief period. What might not the early population of a country have accomplished immediately after the flood,

* Medhurst's China, p. 15.

proceeding as they did from an intelligent ancestry, possessed of the arts of civilization, and taking possession of an unoccupied country under favourable auspices? The state of China can only be erected into an argument against revelation by a prejudiced or unreflecting mind.*

Most surprising of all is Dr. Nott's declaration that probably AMERICA contained an immense population, with an organized government, and an advanced civilization "as far back as the spurious Septuagint date for the deluge." The proof, which the researches of Squier and Davis in the Mississippi valley afford that America was peopled "*several thousand* years before the conquest," is to us exceedingly meagre, and "the extreme antiquity of the *mound-builders* of America," which looms so largely in the intellectual horizon of Dr. Nott, bears no proportion, as set forth in their interesting work, to the antiquity of the chosen people of God. We can discover no trace of an opinion in the book in question, that the authors had any idea of so high an antiquity in reference to the mound builders as the one asserted. They speak indeed of a chestnut and an oak growing upon certain of these ancient works, the one 21 and the other 23 feet in diameter, the last having 400 concentric circles to a foot, which would make the tree nearly 600 years old. To this they add, from the time the work was abandoned to the time when it was erected, a probable period of 400 years, which we think a *very* liberal addition, and the whole will barely make a period of 1000 years.† Towards the close of the ninth century then these works were constructed. It is very probable, we think, that they were not constructed so early by 300 years. But even if the forests covering them are of the second growth, as Gen. Harrison suggested, these earth works will fall short of the vulgar era, or certainly will not much transcend it. Nor do we see any thing so very wonderful in the works in the way of art. They certainly do not equal those found in Mexico and

* "Leaving out of the question the intelligent class of unbelievers in Christendom," says Dr. Nott, "imagine what a figure a Missionary must make in China, preaching the chronology and ethnology of Genesis, when the records of their own nation positively disprove every word he utters!!" We hope the extracts we have given from Chinese writers will aid the Dr. in *imagining*.

† Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi valley, pp. 14—16. 304 et seq.

South America, to which Stephens ascribes no very high antiquity, since he does not regard them as the works of a people who have passed away, and whose history has become unknown, but of the races found in the country by the Spaniards when they invaded it, or of some of their not very distant progenitors.* With these concur the dates given by Clavigero, which he professes to have drawn from native authorities.

The Toltecs arrived in Anahuac, or the country now called Mexico, migrating from the North.	A. D.	648
They abandoned the country,	" "	1051
The Chichimecs arrived,	" "	1170
The Acholhuans arrived about	" "	1200
The Mexicans reached Tula,	" "	1196
They founded Mexico,	" "	1325

These dates, Prescott, in his classical volumes on the conquest of Mexico, follows as the most likely to be true.† The Septuagint date of the deluge, "as far back as which the civilization of America probably extends," is 3246 B. C. The American monuments can hardly have been constructed till 648 years after Christ. They do not reach, therefore, the date in question, by nearly 3900 years.—Thus does the strange fancy of Dr. Nott, as to the age of the mound builders, and other antiquities of America, melt like frost work before the probabilities of history.

The last and most considerable objection for the defenders of Divine Revelation to meet, is that arising from the EGYPTIAN CHRONOLOGY. The objection is thus presented by Dr. Nott :

"And first, of Egypt, the land of mystery and wonders ; not only the tattered fragments of her history, which have been handed down to us by the Hebrews, Herodotus, Manetho, Eratosthenes, Eusebius, Diodorus, Josephus, etc. ; but her Pyramids of five thousand years, her massy and gorgeous temples, her obelisks, her stone tablets, her sepulchres of the dead, her numerous papyri, all with their countless inscriptions, and even the mummied skulls of primeval races found in her catacombs, bear witness that Egypt was old, populous and civilized, one thousand

* Incidents of Travel in Central America, Chiapas, and Yucatan, by John L. Stephens, II. pp. 442, 443.

† Prescott's Conquest of Mexico, i. p. 17, and iii. p. 411 and note, and p. 414.

years before God made his covenant with Abraham. Fifteen hundred years before the birth of Christ, when Pharaoh's daughter rescued the infant Moses in his little ark of bulrushes on the banks of the Nile; nay, even five hundred years earlier, when Abraham and Sarah, driven from the land of Canaan by famine, went, as supplicants, to the mighty Pharaoh's court, Egypt already must have contained some seven or eight millions of inhabitants; for the Pyramids were built, and great cities, temples, and monuments of art met Abraham's view in every direction. Egypt, too, must once have been an uninhabited wilderness, like other countries; and who can approximate the time required for populating, civilizing, and uniting into one great kingdom all the parts of this vast country, and thus laying the groundwork of that advance which we see so early recorded in her monumental history? The chronology of Egypt, even for some centuries beyond Abraham, is no longer a matter of speculation, while that of Genesis vanishes before it." p. 79.

In relation to the Egyptian Chronology every one remarks, who has attempted its resolution, the extreme difficulty of reconciling the inconsistencies of the old Egyptian Chronicle, of Manetho, of Eratosthenes, Eusebius, Josephus, Syncellus, Diodorus, and others, who have attempted to give the succession of Egyptian Kings.—Most explorers, as e. g. Ideler and Fabricius, have relinquished the attempt in despair, or have broken out in the most unmeasured condemnation of these "lying" chroniclers. Of late, however, these researches have been resumed with some more prospect of success, by the aid of the royal shields or *cartouches* which are found in Egypt. The first series of these, is the tablet of Karnac, found on the walls of a Theban temple, near the village of that name, and containing 61 names. The second is the tablet of Abydos, containing, when whole, 52 royal cartouches with names inscribed. The third is the Papyrus roll, in the museum at Turin, containing 200 names, and perhaps embracing 250 when the roll was perfect.* The discovery of these monuments of antiquity has renewed the zeal of the Egyptologists, the lists of Manetho, and others have been anew collated, and a considerable number of the names, in these numerous cartouches, have been, with more or less certainty, decyphered. Besides

* Another source is mentioned by Mr. Gliddon. Ancient Egypt, p. 64. The tomb of Gurnah.

the numerous confirmations of Scripture, which the manners and customs of Egypt, as depicted on the monuments, afford, several of the Kings, named in the sacred records, are found, e. g. Sheshonk, the Shishak of Scripture, with his Asiatic captives, among whom is one bearing a turreted oval, with the inscription Judah-melek-kah, "King of the country of Judah;" Sevechus, Shabatok, or So, Tirhaka, Pharaoh Necho, Pharaoh Hophra, and Artaxerxes. The portraits of the three first of these are also found depicted. "No less than 84 Canaanitish names, mentioned in Sacred Scripture, are found at Aboosimbal, Thebes, &c. written in the hieroglyphics."* And, as to chronological agreement, Champollion Figeac, Rosellini, Leemans, and Mr. Gliddon bring the Era of Menes within the limits of the Septuagint chronology. Mr. Gliddon makes the Era of Menes, the first historic King in the Egyptian records, to be 2750 B. C. 496 years after the Septuagint date of the deluge, and 576 years before Abraham. Sir J. G. Wilkinson, on the contrary, fixes it at 2201 years B. C. or 147 years after the deluge, according to the chronology of *Usher*.

It is well known to all who have turned their attention to this subject, that there is a great difference between the chronology of the Hebrew Bible, of the Septuagint, and the Samaritan Pentateuch. The deluge happened according to the Septuagint, B. C. 3246; according to the Samaritan Pentateuch, 2998; according to the Hebrew, 2288; according to the English Bible, 2348. The difference between the two extremes is 958 years. The creation of the world took place according to the Lxx. B. C. 5886; according to the Samaritan Pentateuch, 4304; according to the Hebrew Text, 4101; according to Archbishop Usher and the English Bible, 4004; making a difference, between extremes, of 1882 years.

This difference appears to be the result, not of accident, but of design, to have arisen not from the casual errors of transcribers, but from studied alteration or adaptation in the Samaritan and Hebrew computation, or in that of the Lxx. an adaptation which has occurred long subsequent to the time when the original Scriptures were written.

* Dr. Hawks's Egypt and its Monuments, p. 249.

Between Josephus and the Lxx. there is a substantial agreement. Demetrius and Eupolemus, as preserved by Eusebius, Theophilus of Antioch, Julius Africanus, Eusebius, Philo-Judaeus, and Epiphanius, also adopted the long chronology. The same was the case with Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Cyprian; with Hesychius, Timotheus, Theophilus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origen, Ambrose, and Lactantius. The same computation was adopted by the Synodus in *Trullo*, at the close of the 7th century. Eusebius did indeed reduce it by the sum of 300 years, and was followed by Jerome. Augustin added 130 years, and was followed by Paul Orosius, and Prosper Aquitanus. But the long chronology continues in use among the Greeks, Copts, Abyssinians, Armenians, Ethiopians, and Georgians, till the present day. The Russian church has, at least till a recent period, also retained it. The venerable Bede, in the 8th century, vainly endeavoured to conform the chronology to the Masoretic text. The Septuagint chronology reigned in the Latin church till the Reformation, after which time the Protestants exerted all their powers to overthrow this system, and to introduce that of the Hebrew Bible. Among them, however, Vossius, Pezron, Hayes, Jackson, Hales, and Russell, have contended, with great force of argument, for the longer computation of the Lxx. or one approximating to it. And we have long perceived a disposition in modern writers, to return to this chronology, independent of any reference to Egyptian matters. Russell has maintained that this was the chronology also of the Hebrew Scriptures, at the time of the Greek translation, and continued to be the universal chronology of the Jews for near 400 years after the Septuagint version was completed, until they were induced to alter the dates of their ancient chronicles, in order to weaken the arguments of their Christian opponents.*

Now within this larger chronology, as we have before said, the earlier Egyptologists, for the most part, including Mr. Gliddon, have brought the entire series of the Pharaonic Kings. The Chevalier Bunsen, however, now comes out with a chronology which transcends that of

* See Russell, Connection of Sacred and Profane Hist. vol. 1, Prel. Diss.

the Lxx. The Era of Menes, the first historic King of Egypt, he places at 3643 years before Christ, which carries it up 397 years beyond the Septuagint date of the deluge. "There exist," says he, "Egyptian monuments, the date of which can be accurately fixed, above 5000 years old." Again he says, that "Egypt is not the most ancient nation of the earth. They belong to the great middle ages of mankind."* Dr. Nott informs us that Lepsius has accumulated data by which the date of Menes is thrown back to 3900 B. C. We shall know better respecting these researches when they are fully published to the world. We see, however, no reason to doubt that such may be the conclusion to which this learned scholar has arrived.

Our enquiry is, have these gentlemen reached these conclusions by *certain steps*, and are they such as may not be set aside by future and more thorough search?—After considerable attention to this subject, we are by no means satisfied of their soundness. How can they be solid when they are built on a doubtful and sinking foundation? With the dynasties of Manetho, they all have infinite trouble. Of the interpretation of the Tablets of Abydos and Karnac, and of the Papyrus roll of Turin, they are by no means certain. Dr. Nott's own admissions vitiate the whole conclusion. "The last sixteen of these dynasties (Manetho's) have been fully confirmed by the researches of modern hierologists; and the first of them is established in the year 2272 B. C."

"The chronology of Egypt, up to this point, is well ascertained, but beyond this there is much uncertainty and confusion, arising from the unfortunate mutilation of her monuments by her selfish and barbarous conquerors.

"The principal difficulty in fixing the epoch of Menes, the first king or Pharaoh of the first dynasty, arises from the difficulty in deciding whether Egypt, previous to the sixteenth dynasty, was united during the whole time in one kingdom, and governed by one series of kings, or whether upper and lower Egypt, during a part of the time, may not have existed as separate kingdoms, governed by cotemporaneous monarchs. The monuments of many of these early kings have been verified but

* Egypten's Stelle, T. I. Einleit. s. 11. ii. p. 123.

the chronology is confused by the difficulty of determining which were and which were not cotemporary."—pp. 79, 80.

Mr. Gliddon also holds the same language concerning Manetho:*

"We have now," says he "reached a point of darkness, so dense, that a few observations will suffice to explain the difficulties of our position; on the one hand stands Scriptural chronology limiting us to a given period, between the Flood and Abraham; on the other we have the very *doubtful number of Manetho's kings and reigns*. A few years ago no one pretended to consider Manetho's first fifteen dynasties as worthy of notice, and even at the present day, there is *no reason* for accepting *the number of his kings*, or *the length of their reigns*, such as have been transmitted by his copyists. Therefore Manetho's period from the 4th to the end of the 15th dynasty is considered as improbable by me." "Making due allowance for *the possible repetition* of the same king's names in variations of cantouches or otherwise." "The number of 350 kings is far from being a mere fable, *without some foundation in fact*; and it is positively not an *exaggeration in toto*."†

We see in these words important admissions of the uncertainty of these testimonies, on which the conclusions of the decyphers of the hieroglyphics are built. The partisan aspect of Mr. Gliddon's work has called forth the comments of others. His residence in Egypt has made him an enthusiast, as was natural, in these studies, and given him an exalted idea of the antiquity of her people. The admissions which proceed from him are thus the more worthy of notice. In reference to the Tablet of Abydos he says:

"The mutilated condition of the Tablet itself adds to our difficulties." Of the Pyramids of Meroe he says, "They were all built, and were ancient in the days of Tirhaka, B. C. 700. 139 pyramids, at $22\frac{1}{2}$ years for a kingly generation, would be $3027\frac{1}{2}$ years; which is incompatible with all Scripture chronology. I am therefore inclined to consider the pyramids of Meroe to be the tombs of kings, *queens* and *princes*."

If *these*, then we ask, why not others?

The same admissions are made by Bunsen.

"The Egyptians" says he, "in early times, exaggerated the dates of their history." Of the tablet of Abydos he enquires, "were these,

* Ancient Egypt, p. 70.

† Egypten's Stelle, T. I. B. 1s. 78, 133, 135.

and those which are wanting all kings? and if so, of what dynasties? does it represent a pedigree or a series of reigning kings? and is it continuous, or does it merely comprise a selection of kings or princes chronologically arranged?" These questions he answers in a subsequent page. "The royal lines are in part lines of reigning Pharaohs, in part royal pedigrees, which are carried through with sons of kings not reigning." The reigns follow not all in immediate succession, but some of them must have been cotemporary." "Besides it is very doubtful if the sum of the reigns of one dynasty, represent the duration of the same, and do not rather merely express the total of the reigns contained in this dynasty, whether the kings were cotemporary or successive." "In this case Manetho must have found and given a key or chronological canon," (viz. in his three books of history to which his lists were originally appended,) "which is lost to us."

In his preliminary discourse to the second volume, Bunsen says:

"We found traces which rendered it probable that the lists of the old kingdom were not chronological but historical. It was probable to us, that the Egyptians, who generally appear to have been proud of the large number of royal names introduced into such lists the names of those prince who only as coregents, and for a short time, bore in the family the title Pharaoh. Every such king retains in the lists necessarily the full number of years which he reigned. When several reigned together, as for example brothers, or father and son, forming a common government, then a section e. g. of three reigns and 60 years, would embrace easily twice the number of royal names, and of years of reigning monarchs, if they reckoned all the numbers together. The chronological object in this case is kept in the back ground." "That this did happen is shewn by Manetho's own reckoning of the duration of the old and middle kingdom.*

We say nothing here of the question as to whether this Manetho were a real or a fictitious character, or whether his statements are in any one respect worthy of credence. Hengstenberg maintains *the whole work to be spurious, and the writing of a later age.*†

These very admissions show how much uncertainty attends the whole subject of Egyptian chronology, and how much is left to be supplied by the imagination of the enquirer himself. The different opinions arrived at by the

* Egypten's Stelle, in der Weltgeschichte, I, s. 78, 133, 135, II. s. 3.

† Egypt and the Books of Moses. Appendix.

different hierologists are themselves proof of the uncertainty attendant upon these investigations in their present state of progress. Further researches may lead to the discovery of further names, and also to a decision as to which of them reigned as sole sovereigns, and for how long a period. We have no fear that when the truth is ascertained it will be found to militate against the Scriptures. It is possible that when all things are adjusted, if they ever can be by this kind of research, the Hebrew chronology will be found to be substantiated, rather than the longer chronology of the LXX. If otherwise, the chronology of the LXX. will receive a confirmation which it now seems to require. Certainly there is no book which, like the Bible, has stood the test of every kind of research; and Wilkinson and Champollion Figeac have both borne their testimony that, as far as their investigations go, there is nothing on the Egyptian monuments which so much as tends to contradict it. And here we take occasion to say, in the words of another, that we are no more bound to reconcile the chronology of the Scriptures with that of the Egyptians, than these gentlemen are to reconcile the chronology of the Egyptians with that of the Scriptures. When they have completed their learned researches, and have come to some definite conclusion among themselves, and have fixed the chronology of the Egyptians upon *indisputable* evidence, then, if their chronology conflicts with that of the Scriptures we shall feel bound to enter the lists fairly against them, and not until then. Meanwhile we shall hold "Moses and the Prophets" to be as veritable historians as Manetho and all the Hierophants of Egypt, and the records of the Holy Scriptures as reliable documents as all the lists of royal lines, and as all the cartouches to be found on all the stones from the mouths to the cataracts of the Nile.*

A knowledge of the Egyptian hieroglyphics, it must also

Dr. Nolan, who has bestowed much study on these subjects, concludes that the tablet of Abydos is wholly genealogical, and that the lists of Manetho and the Turin Papyrus contain not a single monarchical succession, but the names, in numerous instances, of local and cotemporary sovereigns. He fixes the era of Menes at B. C. 2673, which while it is 385 years beyond the Hebrew computation of the Deluge, is 573 years later than that of the LXX.

* Egyptian Cronology analysed, Oxford, 1848.

be remembered, has not so long ceased from the world. They were not disused till the reign of Caracalla, 215 years after the Christian era. They were known alike to the Greeks and Romans. The very first names read in the hieroglyphics by Dr. Young and Champollion, were the Greek names of Berenice, Ptolemy, and Cleopatra. At Dendera and Esneh are the names, surnames, and cartouches of Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, Domitian, Trajan and Antoninus Pius. The Pamphylian obelisk standing in Rome, was cut in Egypt in honour of Domitian, about 80 years after Christ, and bears the inscription in hieroglyphics, "*Son of the sun, Lord of the diadems, Autocrator Cæsar Domitian Augustus.*"

Now what we affirm in relation to these things is that it was impossible that what was known to the Greeks and the Romans, should not also be known to the Jews. If the temple of Karnac was built as Bunsen affirms, 1000 years before Moses, (in which chronology we can by no means concur,) if, as he says, there were wealthy Jews in Alexandria in the times of the Ptolemies, who were men of learning, influence and power, they must have been fully aware of the chronology of Egyptian history. They were infinitely more capable of knowing these things than all the Champollions and Bunsens of the present day, and this knowledge was probably imparted to their countrymen elsewhere. If Moses was learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, and if Josephus was aware of the testimony of these monuments, they never would have willingly used a chronology which there was every thing around them to contradict. And as to God's inspiring Moses to give wrong dates, this is what no one, even of our opposers, would say. The difficulty which is made about the early Egyptian civilization, disappears when we dismiss the absurd theory that the first man was an infant in mind and a savage in refinement, and when we remember that the first progenitors of mankind, after the flood, were men acquainted with the arts of civilized life; that the deluge, though it swept away the works of man, swept not away the culture of man, but that this culture passed through the Ark and the family of Noah to the post-diluvian ages. It still further disappears when we recognize the special intervention of Deity

in the flood itself, the miraculous nature, or if this be foolishly denied, then the special providence of this event; when we consider how fast, under favourable circumstances, population multiplies, the mind is developed, and civilization shoots forward; and when we further consider that the plans of God, since unfolded, reveal in him a purpose, all along entertained, which pledged him to interfere for man's preservation, for the rapid re-peopling of the globe, and the formation of those communities which were to bear so important a part in the history of the world. With a genial clime, a soil rendered surpassingly fertile by the rich water of the Nile, and occupying a central point between three continents, and before commerce unfurled her sail so widely as now, a point which was the highway of nations, Egypt was bound to shoot upward in a luxuriant growth. To so young a people as we are, the early civilization and power of Egypt should be no miracle. Look at the almost miracle of less than three centuries, the wide diffusion of new races of men over the two Americas. Count their population, their ships, their inventions, and their cities. Were our own country denuded of forest to the degree Egypt was, and filled every where with granite, porphyry, and marble, as portions of it are, would *we* not now be building *our* habitation of the everlasting rock? and were our religion one of outward and symbolic forms, would we not be rearing our temples of granite and marble, in those massive proportions which the material itself suggests, and in a grandeur which would throw into the shade the temples of Thebes, Karnac, Dendera, and Esneh?

We say to Dr. Nott and all others who may homologize with him, that these attacks on the Scriptures, on the side of its chronology, do not alarm us. Thanks to the ingenuity and vigilance of the skeptical world, we are now used to them. The Bible, like most historical writings of an early age, is a historical treatise in part, as it describes events, gives the biographies or public acts of distinguished men, but is no otherwise a chronological treatise than as it gives occasionally the length of a patriarch's life, or of the reign of a king; justly regarding the events themselves, as connected in some way with the great scheme of redemption, and the circumstances

in the lives of these men as illustrating religious and moral truth, to be infinitely more important than chronological epochs. Yet where the Bible has casually given fixed dates, it has not been in the power of man to impugn them. The Indian chronology, the Chinese, and the Egyptian, have alike been sprung upon the theologian, but have vanished away when the torch of truth has been advanced into their caverns of darkness. The earlier Egyptian chronology, even Dr. Nott himself will not regard a whit more worthy of reliance than that of Chaldea, China, and India. The 30,000 years of Helius, son of Vulcan, the 3984 years of Saturn and the rest of the gods, and the 217 of the demigods, he will regard as fabulous as the Cali Yuga of the Hindoos and its period of 4,320,000 years, or the indefinite periods of the Chinese, exceeding 83,000 years. We are not ignorant of the Astronomical tables of the Hindoos, calculated backwards, as La Place has shown, nor of the Sinya-Sidhanta, their most ancient astronomical treatise, which they say was given by revelation to their nation more than two millions of years ago, but which must have been composed within the last 800 years. We well remember the story of Brydone as to the Sicilian pit, piercing through seven distinct lava beds, between which were layers of vegetable mould; and the reasoning he puts into the mouth of the canon Recupero, who concluded that the lowest of these beds, allowing 2000 years each for the strata of vegetable mould to form, must have flowed from Etna at least 14,000 years ago,—and we well remember that it was found on examination, that the intervening strata were not of vegetable mould, that the canon Recupero did not put forth any such conclusions, and that it does not require 200 years to form a stratum of good earth, under favourable circumstances, over lava. It was in reference, probably, to this effort of skeptical men, that Cowper wrote

“Some drill and bore
The solid earth, and from its strata there,
Extract a register, by which we learn,
That He who made it, and revealed its date
To Moses, was mistaken in its age.”

We well remember the excitement which the discovery of the Zodiac of Dendera produced when it was conveyed in triumph to Paris in the years 1820 and 21. The whole

tribe of Deists and Atheists were filled with exultation. M. Dupuis had already commented on it and given his opinion as to its great antiquity. Burkhardt had attributed to it an antiquity of 4000, and to that of Esneh 7000 years, and it had been contended that the Zodiacal system to which these Zodiacs belong, dated back 15,000 years. If the comparatively modern temples of Dendera and Esneh were so old, how great was the antiquity of those of Thebes and Karnac! how ancient the civilization of Egypt! how utterly irreconcilable with the chronology of the Scriptures! Infidel exultation had now reached its acme. *Ecce nodus dignus deo vindice!* Champollion the younger comes forward armed with his discovery, reads on the planisphere of Dendera AOTKPTP, Αυτοκρατωρ, emperor, and on the ceiling whence the planisphere had been detached, the names, titles and surnames of Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, and Domitian. M. Letronne, applying his vast erudition in the same direction, demonstrated that all so called Egyptian Zodiacs date from the Roman domination, that they in no respect relate to Astronomy, but belong to the phantasies of judicial astrology, and are mere *themes* of *nativity*.*

Sic transit gloria mundi! So bursts the more than South Sea bubble of modern infidelity! So melted the wings of many an Icarus, who thought himself soaring to the sun on this discovery! A pregnant warning to the author before us, who turns aside from a noble and honourable profession to do battle in a cause which must always be covered with defeat. On all such attempts He that sitteth in the heavens shall laugh, the Lord will hold them in derision.

We have been drawn into such extended remarks already that we know not if the patience of our readers will allow us to trespass yet further upon them. It is not the intrinsic merit of Dr. Nott's performance, nor the difficulty of meeting his declarations, which justify it. On the contrary, we are obliged to say, there is any thing but scholar-like accuracy in them, and of independent investigation, scarcely the trace. He leans upon others, and appears in a bravery of learning which costs him but the double

* Greppo.

process of copying into his note book, and copying from it. That note book must be a curious congeries of all the skepticism which he has been able to bring together for the last twenty years. Much of it is extremely familiar to us. We well remember the time when the High Priest of modern skeptics, some 18 or 20 years ago, was accustomed to shed his portentous light around us, to disturb the minds and unsettle the faith of men. He, too, though learned and ingenious elsewhere, like all infidels was shallow and credulous on these subjects, an unbeliever and yet a powerfully strong believer, having a faith extremely feeble in reference to revelation, straining at the gnat here, and swallowing the camel of infidelity there. The same doctrines appear to flourish luxuriantly now, when transplanted to Mobile.

The Dr. thinks himself very safe so long as he can lean upon Mr. George R. Gliddon.

"Owing to his great intimacy and extensive correspondence with the leading authorities of Europe, and his unrivalled opportunities for studying Eastern languages, he has been enabled to collect a most curious and interesting mass of material. To him are we greatly indebted for facilitating our labors, for he has not only directed our attention to the best printed authorities, but has, with his characteristic kindness, put at our disposal his manuscript notes. We claim the authority of Mr. Gliddon for almost every fact stated."—pp. 107, 108.

Mr. Gliddon is entitled to deserved praise for his efforts to popularize and make accessible Egyptian studies. We would not say a word to diminish his well earned reputation. But, if we mistake not, he makes no claim to original research, and though he may have heard the Arabic spoken no small part of his life, we much question the extent and accuracy of his oriental studies, or the soundness of his judgment, in applying the knowledge he really has, to the interpretation of Scripture. We suppose he would not claim to be a practised critic here, and judging from his published lectures he would shrink from attacking revealed religion in any way. And as to others whose names sound well, we would say: If Dr. Nott chooses to walk on trembling and quaking bogs, rather than on firm soil, and requires support, let him take something to lean on of broad base, and not the slender reed.

Most men are fond of the support of great names. It is pleasant when on an uncertain expedition to feel that we are in a strong company. If we are attacked, we can make the better resistance. If we are defeated there are others to share the shame of defeat. A long list of names, too, has, in certain connections, an imposing array. "Luther, Gesenius, Ewald, Eichorn, Hartmann, Gabler, the Rosenmuellers, DeWette, Strauss; such Theologians as Channing, Norton, Parker, Palfrey; such *savans* as Charles Hamilton Smith, Burke of the Ethnological Journal, and Dr. Morton, Pickering, Bartlett, Caldwell, Gliddon, Squire and Davis, Pauthier, De Lanci, Bunsen, Lepsius, De Saulcy, Letronne, Vies, Birch, Jahn, Professor Stuart, and above all, Munk. It matters not if some of these gentlemen may think that they have fallen in "with strange bed fellows." No matter if some of them may refuse to be yoked to this chariot. Praise for this one, exceeding praise for this, the height of eulogium for this, just in proportion as he runs counter to Moses and the Apostles, and studied depreciation of those who believe the Scriptures, and adhere to their testimony; exhibit the well known tactics of Rosseau and Voltaire, Thomas Paine and the whole troop of infidelity, and fully marks Dr. Nott as the present Hierophant of its mysteries.

We are prepared to join issue with Dr. Nott as to the antiquity of alphabetic writing and the genuineness of the Pentateuch. On the former point we can only say that there is evidence of its existence before Moses, our limits not allowing us to enter upon the proof. On the latter, a brief remark or two is all which the patience of our readers will now permit. Quoting from Munk, who says criticism has gradually made the composition of the Pentateuch descend to a *thousand years* after Moses, and ended by transforming into mysteries most of the historical events therein recounted,—“Such,” says Dr. Nott, “is the language of Munk—such is the language of wisdom and truth, and such are the wide spread opinions of the theologians of the continent of Europe.” He then breaks forth into a wail over the poverty of our language in names which can rank with such great philologists and theologians as Gesenius, Eichorn, Ewald, De Wette, Hartman, Jahn, Bohlen, Munk, Gabler, Strauss, &c. &c.

Most of these men are doubtless men of true learning. But a wrong principle in the outset may vitiate the whole of the most learned effort, and make it irrelevant trifling. The man who can take Strauss for a leader, or pin his faith on De Wette's sleeve, is enamoured of whatever is wide from sobriety and truth in religion. We beg leave, however, to remove from their proximity to these views respecting the Pentateuch, two of these names, which Dr. Nott may seem to have marshalled, though perhaps he has not really done so, with those who have opposed the genuineness of the Pentateuch, as a writing of Moses.—Eichorn, with all his faults on other points, has laboured strenuously and successfully in its defence, and Jahn is also one of the ablest maintainers of its Mosaic origin.

We recognize the argument of Dr. Nott against Moses, resting, though it does, like a tripod, on three feet, Munk, Norton, and himself, as an old acquaintance. It used to greet us some twenty years ago from the walls of our State College. The doctor seems to have thought it expedient to give the same argument an inauguration into the State College of Louisiana. The star of empire westward wends its way, and while these lands are in some measure escaping from its malign influence, this baleful meteor would seem to be in the ascendant there. We do not see, however, in all the efforts which have been made to keep up with the age, that the argument has been one whit improved in the twenty years service it has seen on the field of contest. It seems not to have gained many accessions from the labours of its learned fautors. It is the same round of oft refuted objections. We have seriously thought of constructing an argument on the same plan, to prove that Dr. Cooper did not write the treatise on political economy, once issued in his name, and it has even occurred to us to attempt one on these two lectures ascribed to Dr. Nott. Archbishop Whately's historic doubts, relative to Napoleon Buonaparte; Dr. Casuar's, as to Martin Luther; Schmucker's, as to William Shakespear; the Wolfian argument against the writings of the blind old Homer; and Father Harduin's argument to show that nearly all the books ascribed to the classic authors of Greece and Rome, those of Cicero, and the elder Pliny, the Satires of Horace and the Geor-

gics, alone excepted, were forged in the 13th century, encourage us to believe that the attempt would not be regarded as wholly a failure. With a reasonable degree of ingenuity, and a small share of effrontery, we do not deem it very difficult to construct an argument against the existence of almost any personage, or, judging by the stuff such reasonings are usually made of, against the genuineness of almost any writing. The argument of Berkeley against the reality of the material world, is well nigh irresistible; and Dr. Lardner has *demonstrated*, some years ago, that the Atlantic cannot be crossed by steam.

It is indeed the case that the book before us is not so well suited to such a purpose as some other document would be. A constitution professedly emanating from some high authority, and appealed to through a series of ages, for the regulation of civil and ecclesiastical affairs, would afford a greater number of real parallels with the Pentateuch. But if Dr. Nott were an ancient instead of a living author, if his lectures were an ancient instead of a modern book, if they came down to us the sole literary relick of a remote antiquity, if they were followed immediately, as the Pentateuch is, by but a single writing, and this of no great volume; if the next literary composition, now extant, were not written till 500 years after their production, and the next not till nearly 600 years; if these lectures were found written compactly, when first brought to the knowledge of the moderns, with no spaces between words, no punctuation, no sections, no paragraphs; and if now, under these circumstances, they should have been re-edited, divided into sections, the words separated from each other, and in this form published to the world, how many objections might an over critical man raise to their genuineness as the production of Dr. Nott? In the first place it might be doubted if the author were indeed a historical personage. Then, if this were admitted, and also that he wrote something, and that something were perhaps embodied *in* this book, it might be questioned whether the lectures, *as we now have them*, proceeded from his pen. 1. "They are evidently of a fragmentary character; the different fragments of which, some form separate little works apart, and are put together and united in a disconnected manner, &c. as any attentive rea-

der may judge." 2. "They show too many repetitions." 3. "The contradictions contained in these lectures, too, show that they cannot have proceeded from one author." Our space alone prevents the insertion of these repetitions and seeming contradictions, which we have drawn out at full length. But the conclusions to which this argument would lead is, that these contradictions are such as no one man, in his sober senses, can be believed to be guilty of, especially one claiming to belong to a profession, for countless ages, honoured for acuteness and close observation.

We mention these things as a specimen of what might be done with Dr. Nott's lectures, if they should be in existence 3000 years hence. If the world shall stand as long, cotemporary literature may be no more. Some of the least valuable writings of the old Romans are found preserved among the charred MSS. of Herculaneum. It is a bare chance, though not at all probable, that this book may be in existence. Other men may occupy this soil. The cities we now inhabit may be in ruins, or wholly obliterated from the earth. Convulsions, or the wear of elemental nature, may change the form of our coasts and continents, and the direction of our streams.—The Isthmus may be worn through, North be entirely dissevered from South America, and the Delta of the Mississippi be wholly changed, as it doubtless has been before, since the world was created. Some gloss may first be inscribed on the margin of these pages, and afterwards creep into the text. How easy, under these circumstances, to argue against the genuineness of this book, to imagine differences in style, the traces of a later hand; that the title page and other notes of identification, satisfactory now, did not proceed from the original writer, but are the conjectures of some subsequent age; that the book, which bears every appearance of being fragmentary, is a compilation thrown together from many ancient documents, by a later hand; the existence of civilization and of alphabetic characters, at so remote an age as the year 1849, might be questioned, and, as we have before said, even the enquiry raised whether Josiah C. Nott were a historic personage at all.

The positive argument, for the genuineness of the Pen-

tateuch, is a subject on which we cannot now enter. We indicate only the absurdity of this whole method of the higher criticism. It has been tested oftentimes, and found wanting. Books have been rejected which ought to have been received, and manifest forgeries have obtained the sanction of men, the most skilled in critical tact.

One thing, however, we cannot withhold, and this is our abhorrence of the levity and irreverence of this whole performance. "Does it not shock our ears and understandings," says this writer, "when we read in the 4th chap. of Exodus, after Moses had been solemnly commissioned, and sent by Jehovah to the Israelites, that while he was on his way, at a lodging place, Jehovah met him and sought to slay him? and many other passages quite as much out of character." What these many other passages are, Dr. Nott does not inform us. But he evidently is too superficial a reader of the Holy Scriptures to understand the solemnity and spirituality of their import. To him, doubtless, the covenant made with Abraham, in which the true believer discovers that plan of salvation which is the central truth of Divine revelation, and the only sufficient reason why there is a revelation at all, is a mere historic or moral myth, and those theophanies, so often spoken of in the Old Testament, and not unknown in the New, of no higher nature than the *machine** of a heathen mythologist. And he can see in the arrest, on the part of God, of Moses, his servant, by the way, as he was hieing to Egypt to lead, in God's name, the chosen people, and his sudden prostration by fearful disease, for living in neglect of the rite of circumcision, nought but some childish, fabulous, or vindictive proceeding on the part of Jehovah. We are sorry that Dr. Nott is able to appeal, as he does, as encouragement to himself in these views, to any who have borne the name of theologians. But it is too true that those whom, if they are in France, we call infidels; if in England, deists; are in Germany sometimes dignified with the name of Theologians. De Wette has asserted that the Pentateuch has no historic character at all—contains no one fixed historic point—is altogether mythical—and needs but metrical arrangement

* "Deus in machina."

to give it that character of poetry to which it is really entitled. Even Spencer, living in common sense old England, speaks of the rites imposed, or, as he says, adopted by God, *as tolerable follies*. Clericus understands the shame which invaded the breasts of our first parents, and which is expressed by the words "and the eyes of them both were opened," of their perceiving too late the noxious nature of the fruit they had eaten, from the pain in their intestines. Michaelis says if Moses speaks as if the seething a kid in its mother's milk was a crime against religion, he only designs to induce the people to cook kids in olive oil instead of butter, because they would taste better. The shining of Moses's face, when he came down from Sinai, was but an electric phenomenon, according to Eichorn; and after Hobbes, the same writer represents the pillar of cloud and fire as merely the usual signal for marching, which was made by the smoke of the caravan fire. Goethe complains "of the disagreeable matter" of the Pentateuch, and represents Moses as the Robespierre of the old world. "The thought shocks him," too, that God sent out his destroying angel over Egypt. It was the Israelites, according to him, who, at the instigation of Moses, undertook the anticipation of the Sicilian vespers. Even the pretended 'judgments of God,' were executed by a band of Sicarii led on by Moses.—Aaron and Moses were not excluded from the promised land by the justice of God, but Aaron was secretly put out of the way by Moses, and Moses by Joshua and Caleb, who thought it well to bring to an end the regency of a narrow-gifted man, which they had borne for some years, and to send him after many unfortunates he had slaughtered."*

So have written so called theologians, critics, and men of taste respecting the Scriptures, in their utter blindness and ignorance of the God of Heaven, and in the same spirit writes the author of these lectures, following boldly in their footsteps.

As to the PHYSICAL HISTORY OF MAN, so far as touched upon by Dr. Nott, we must leave it chiefly in abler hands.

* See Hengstenberg *Authentic der Pentateuch*, Prolegomena Bd. 1, and Prof. Ballentine's Translation of the same, *Bib. Repos.* vols. xi. and xii. for several of the foregoing facts.

The biblical part of his lectures is that on which he has laid out his strength, and it falls more fully in the line of our own pursuits. He has added nothing new to the argument against the Unity of our race, nor diminished aught from the force of the argument in its favour. The simple truth of the case, according to the plain, unperverted sense of the Bible, is, that all men, whatever be their type and complexion, proceeded from one stock, from one and the same progenitors. It is not the declaration of Genesis alone, but of the whole Scriptures, and is interwoven with the whole moral government of God and the scheme of redemption. Dr. Nott knows this is the teaching of Scripture, and because this teaching stands in the way of his theory, he seeks to destroy the credit of the Scriptures themselves *as the book of God*. If the Bible is of divine authority, all the varieties of mankind did proceed from one and the same stock, and have been produced by natural causes under the special providence of God, or by direct miraculous intervention. That it was the latter is the short hypothesis which is adopted by many of our most esteemed divines, but which Dr. Nott rejects, and in relation to which we have expressed our doubts, principally for the reason that we find historic evidence that, of the race of Ham, upon whom this change is supposed to be produced, whole nations were of the Caucasian type, and devoid alike of the features and hue of the negro. The Hamites of southern latitudes alone appear to have attained his physical peculiarities. Even that portion of Ham's descendants peculiarly smitten with the curse, remained; as far as we can trace them, Caucasian in their conformation and physiognomy, though some of them may have acquired, at length, the African hue. The ancient kingdom of Nimrod, too, whose ruins Layard has lately reopened to the light of the sun, though of the stock of Ham, commingled perhaps with Assyrians of the race of Shem, was made up of nations of the so called Caucasian type, and of light complexion. The same general fact holds true of the Japetic race. A large portion are Caucasian, another portion, perhaps equally large, are of the Mongolian type. The complexion of these men is of various tinge, from the xanthous complexion of the ancient German, to the beautiful but dark haired Osmanli, and the

tawny inhabitant of China and Japan. The same is true of the Shemites. Of these are the noble Persians, who for finely formed heads and beautifully chiseled features, and fair complexion, dispute the palm with the Greeks. Next are the Jews with more retreating foreheads but still of the Caucasian type, then the Arab, finely featured, but darker, and even sometimes quite black, yet with a personal beauty which might vie with that of the Greek. Then come the red tribes of America, partly perhaps of Japetic and partly of Shemitish origin. Thus the three types of humanity, the three most strongly marked complexions of men, and the three families of man as descendants from the three sons of Noah, do not at all coincide. What conclusion can we arrive at, then, than that the same causes operating, have produced analogous changes in the different families of men? And, if these causes be natural and not supernatural, what are they, so far as traceable by man, but climate, food, mode of life, education, and congenital and accidental variations, springing up, as they do, even now, among men, to some little extent, and, by the isolation of those among whom they occurred from the rest of mankind, in the providence of God, becoming permanent in successive generations?

It is replied to all this, that none of these causes are seen to produce these effects now. The negro does not become a white man nor the black man white. But it must be admitted, there are changes somewhat analogous. Climate does produce an effect, even Dr. Nott allows, to some extent. The effect, when temporary, is on the same tissue of the human body in which the pigment of the Ethiop is found. Some white men are born with features approaching the African, and some with features approaching the Mongolian, without their hue. The only thing which this theory supposes is, that, in the early ages after the flood, and before the first monumental evidence of the existence of various types and complexions of men, causes operated, under a special providence, with a rapidity and power far beyond that which is ordinary now. We deceive ourselves by supposing that all things were, from the beginning, as they are observed to be in the limited experience of the present generations of men, in the limited circle of our personal observation, or of express historic re-

cord. There are facts which baffle all human calculations. It is the ordinary rule that a generation of men passes away in about 30 years. But epidemics rage and death does a speedy work. It is the law of population that under favourable circumstances it should constantly increase. But, in the Sandwich islands, there has long been observed a gradual diminution of the inhabitants, without any assignable cause, and there is reason to fear that in a few years more, that race of men will become wholly extinct. In the lapse of a few years, changes are produced in the earth itself in particular localities, and sometimes even in a few days, or even moments of time, which the geologist, after the facts are faded away from the memory of man, will insist it required myriads of years to accomplish. And why should it not have been so in the family of man?

"Besides the partial laws with which we are acquainted, that there have been others once most active, whose agency is now either suspended or concealed, the study of the world must easily convince us. There were times, within the verge of mythological history, when volcanoes raged in almost every chain of mountains, when lakes dried up, or suddenly appeared, in many valleys, when seas burst over their boundaries and created new islands, or retired from their beds and increased old continents; when, in fine, there was a power of production and arrangement on a great magnificent scale, when nature seemed employed not merely in the yearly renovation of plants and insects, but in the procreation from age to age of the vaster and more massive elements of her sphere; when her task was not confined to the embroidering meadows in the spring, or to the paring away of shores by the slow eating action of tides and currents, but when she toiled in the great laboratories of the earth, upheaving mountains, and displacing seas, and thus giving to the world its great indelible features. And how are we to account for this, but by supposing in nature a two-fold action, one regular from the beginning, and uniform to the end, the other a mysterious slow-moving power, which though revolving on the same plane, travels over it with an imperceptible motion, proportioned to the wants of the entire system.

"We must allow that in the world's infancy, besides the regular ordinances of constant and daily course, causes necessary to produce great and permanent effects may have had a power, now no longer wanted, and consequently no longer exercised; that

there was a tendency to stamp more marked features upon the earth and its inhabitants, to produce countries as well as their vegetation, races as much as individuals.

"Such examples, to which I might add many others, seem to show the existence of hidden resources in nature, never called forth, save in her infant state. And it surely cannot be unphilosophical to suppose that impressions, meant to be characteristic and permanent, were then more easily communicated, and more indelibly stamped."—*Wiseman's Lectt.* pp. 144, 145, 147.

These considerations diminish much the certainty of those conclusions in geology and natural history, which affirm the necessity of almost infinite cycles of time to produce those effects seen in the natural world. The God of nature can stir into quicker action, or give a new direction to the powers of nature, for man himself within his limited circle can do so, and make them accomplish his purposes. Electricity, Chemistry and Steam, are, in our day, accomplishing wonders,—incredible, ages ago, if made known to our fathers,—under the directing mind of man. What may not natural causes in like manner do, what have they not in past ages done, under the directing mind of God? If the fact then be "*certain*, that the white, mongol, and negro races existed at least 5000 years ago," an assertion which we will receive with some reasonable deduction* from an antiquity quite so high, there is in this fact nothing incredible, if we suppose but an action of natural causes more speedy than what now meets our eyes.†

Dr. Nott allows that "the Unity of the race once abandoned, no limit can be set to the number of species." He consoles us for the apparent opposition of this hypothesis to the divine word, by the suggestion that the Almighty who created them "can take care of them without regard to the *opinions* of men." The fertility of hybrids, he maintains, building upon the doctrine of Dr. Morton upon this point, and affirms "that not only many distinct species of animals, but even *genera*, produce together prolific offspring." The fertility of mules is a necessary part of his doctrine. "The mulatto and half Indian" he says, "are no more negroes or Indians than a mule is a horse." "The

* Say 1500 years.

† See also, Guyot, *Earth and Man*, pp. 242, 245.

mulattoes descended from the *pure* white and black races are true *hybrids*." Indeed, it must be that he believes, that *nearly all mankind are MULES*, for he says, "probably a perfectly pure race does not now exist on the face of the globe." Yet as mulattoes are prolific, and the half Indians are prolific, and all the mixed races are prolific, the doctrine of the fertility of hybrids is to him extremely convenient for the moment. We wonder that the advocates of this doctrine do not reduce it more to practice than is common. By universal consent, the mule between the horse and the ass is more useful for plantation purposes, more hardy, and more easily kept, than either of the parent stocks. Why not dismiss these stocks altogether, and let the hybrids perpetuate themselves? Beat and bang a mule as you will, the proverb says, "a mule never dies." We commend the doctrine of Charles Hamilton Smith, and Drs. Morton and Nott, to our Kentucky drovers, and all other breeders of stock. It will open to them mines of wealth more exhaustless than Potosi and California!

It suits the doctor's purpose, however, only partly to hold to the *fertility* of mules.

"It is, we think, capable of demonstration, that in all our Atlantic and Northwestern States, the mulattoes are less prolific, less hardy, shorter lived, more liable to premature births and are, in every respect, physically inferior to either the pure whites or blacks; and further, that the mulattoes descended from the *pure* white and black races are true *hybrids*, which would become extinct if left alone to propagate amongst themselves."—*p. 46.*

Yet, this *sterility* does not appertain to *all* mulatto hybrids!

"When we come further south, as at Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans, &c. this law becomes much modified, and we find a class of mulattoes who are long lived, more hardy, more prolific, and in every respect, much superior to those of the north. The explanation of this apparent contradiction, is perhaps not very easy, and we suggested that it might be accounted for on the supposition that a stronger affinity or aptitude for amalgamation existed between the Negro and Celtic blood. A large portion of the population of these towns is composed of dark-skinned Spanish and French settlers, who have extensively amalgamated with the negroes, and a mixed race has thus sprung

up of very different appearance from the mulattoes of the northern States."—*p.* 47.

The doctor does not explain whether these Celts have within them already, some mixture of the negro blood, and are 49th cousins of the Ethiop, or whether they are the descendants of an original stock, one of the hundred or more God originally created, and intermediate in their primitive constitution between the negro and the white man.

On this whole subject, and on the "fossilised human bones," which, according to Dr. Nott, show that 'men may have existed upon the earth, prior to the six days of *our* creation,' we are very kindly permitted to quote from the forthcoming work of Dr. Bachman, of Charleston, who holds a reputation as a naturalist, in some departments, second to none in the United States, and whose name is not unknown to fame among the scientific circles of the old continent.* Dr. Bachman proposes to examine the questions of the unity of the human race, solely on the principles of science, and draws from the ample resources of his own observation. Dr. Bachman finds no more reason to suppose different races of men, from differences of the skull, than of sheep, horses, and swine, from the different formation of the skull in them; and no more reason, from differences of colour, to suppose difference of origin, than to make the same violent supposition to account for difference of colour in the horse, hog, squirrel, rabbit, and mouse.

"The greatest naturalists in all ages," says Dr. Bachman, "however diversified may have been their views in regard to Christianity, regarded all the races of men as composed of one species. Among these were Linnæus, Leibnitz, Buffon, Schreber, Erxleben, Humboldt, Blumenbach, Cuvier, Owen, &c. the lights of the world, who studied all the departments of nature—formed our genera and species, and designated their characters. Our friend, Dr. Morton, whose superior qualifications are fully admitted, has not yet entered on the field of argument, and although he has intimated that his mind at present leans to the opposite side, yet, as he is still pursuing his researches, we still hope

* THE DOCTRINE OF THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE, EXAMINED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENCE. BY JOHN BACHMAN. D. D. Charleston, S. C. Printed by C. Canning, 29 Pinckney-street. 1850.

to rank him as one of the advocates of the doctrine of the unity of the human race. In the last American work on Zoology, by Professor Agassiz, this eminent naturalist, after expressing an opinion that many animals must have been created at several points of the same zone,—proceeds to say:—"Even man, although a cosmopolite, is subject, in a certain sense, to this law of limitation. While he is everywhere the one identical species, yet several races, marked by certain peculiarities of features, are recognized, such as the Caucasian, Mongolian, and African races. And it is not a little remarkable that the abiding-places of these several races correspond very nearly with some of the great zoological regions."*

"And who are on the opposite side? Virey, who pronounces the negro "undoubtedly a distinct species from the beginning of the world,"† and divides mankind into two species, the white and the black, and suspects a certain fraternity between the Hottentot and the Baboon. Desmoulin divided men into 11 species; Borey into 15, and Broc into several sub-genera, and an infinite number of species,—and finally an American,‡ who can see no reason why we should not make an hundred species of men. There are, no doubt, others who have more recently entered into the field, whose works we have not seen. The Frenchmen belonged to a school of skeptics, of which Voltaire was at the head, and we may be allowed to suspect, that their minds might have been biased by the cheerless doctrine which they had imbibed.

"The American,‡ who seems recently to have laboured rather to deny the historical veracity of the Scriptures, than to prove the diversity of the races, may perhaps claim the attention of the theologians; but having produced no new fact or argument to bear on the subject to which we are restricted in this purely scientific discussion, he requires no further notice. Be this as it may, the world of science has never admitted these gentlemen into their ranks as naturalists. Their names are utterly unknown among them—not one of them, that we are aware of, has ever described a single animal, and it is evident that they were unacquainted with those characteristics on which genera and species are formed; hence they all disagree among themselves." pp. 35, 36

Dr. Bachman ascribes the varieties of men, neither to new creations nor to miracle.

"It must be observed," says he, "God might have created

* Principles of Zoology. Agassiz & Gould. 1848.

† Extracted from the French of Virey, by G. H. Guenebault, p. 35.

‡ Dr. Nott.

the first progenitors of our race, millions of ages earlier than at the time when they actually appeared, and if he so constructed the human constitution that it would, by its own organization, be capable of producing varieties that were to become permanent in their characters, the effect would be produced by a natural process—varieties of men would be formed without a miracle.—We all admit that the first pair of cow, of horse, of sheep, or of swine, was a miraculous creation. but if it was a part of their nature to produce the endless varieties which we daily meet with, then surely the production of these varieties is not miraculous, but a natural operation.

“The authorities mostly relied on for facts to prove the theory advocated by Dr. Morton, is ‘Griffith’s Animal Kingdom, by Cuvier,’ as the work is called, and the names of Griffith, Cuvier, and Col. J. Hamilton Smith, are so constantly quoted as authorities, that without careful examination the reader might be led to conclude that the facts were certified by several authors. Cuvier was not answerable for all the matter introduced into that production. Col. Smith prepared the synopsis on the species of mammalia, and affixed his name to many of the articles. He was also the author of the Natural History of the Equidæ, so frequently quoted by Dr. Morton: “The Natural History of the Dog;” as also of an article in the Ethnological Journal, recently quoted by Dr. Nott, in which an attempt is made to show that ‘fossilized human bones are found in company with those of extinct species of animals under circumstances that render it extremely probable that they were cotemporary,” and the writer remarks that he (Smith) “controverts the hasty opinions of Cuvier, and unsettles all previous conclusions on this point.” and then adds that “the most important human fossil is that found by Mr. Dickeson, near Vicksburg.” If this could be proved, then it would be seen that races of men had existed before the days of Adam, and hence the Mosaic chronology would evidently be false. We would, in this latter connection, digress for a moment, and briefly state the results to which all geologists of any reputation have arrived in regard to these pretended fossils.

1. “That there is not in any museum or any private collection in the world, a single human fossil that can be traced to any of the older formations.”

3. “That the specimen submitted to the American Association, and characterized as “what is perhaps the most important human fossil yet discovered,” is of modern origin. We were present at one of the meetings where this pelvis was submitted to the society for examination. Dr. Dickeson, an intelligent young

geologist, simply presented the specimen, which had been discovered by another individual who had picked it up in a ravine about 6 miles from Natchez. In Lyell's Second Visit to the United States, p. 151, we have an account of this bone. He decided that "it was a portion of the skeleton of a modern Indian that had been dislodged from some old Indian grave from the cliffs above, and fallen into the ravine beneath. It was stained black, as if imbedded in a peat or vegetable soil." We cannot but conclude from hence that men must be strongly wedded to a theory, who, whilst they are in possession, as far as we are informed, of the unanimous opinion of the most learned geologists, deliberately again venture to reproduce these exploded errors."—pp. 37, 42, 43, 44.

We trust these views of one who can speak with authority, will produce a proper impression on all who have been disturbed on these interesting questions by the crudely formed opinions of certain popular writers of the day.

Much has been made in the argument against the unity of the race, from the alleged inferior capacity of the negro brain. Tiedeman was quoted in a former number of this Review, to show that the cranial capacity of the negro is not inferior to that of the other races of men. Dr. Nott affirms that "Dr. Morton has established the fact that the cranial capacity of the Mogul, Indian, and Negro, and all dark skinned men, is smaller than that of the pure white man."*

* This statement is made in such form that it cannot be gainsaid. Yet, if Dr. Nott had used the term *Caucasian* instead of "the pure white man," it would not have been impregnable. Tiedeman's testimony is entitled to as much weight as Dr. Morton's, and his measurements have every appearance of being perfectly accurate. § He adds to his own the testimony of Dr. Hamilton, who also instituted measurements to the same end. If Dr. Morton's collection is the largest of any individual in the world, Tiedeman had the public and private collections of Germany, England, Scotland, and Ireland before him. Only in the crania of the Aboriginal tribe of America, had Dr. Morton the advantage. Of the other varieties, Tiedeman's measurements were more than twice as numerous. The respective number of skulls measured, is as follows:

	TIEDEMAN.	MORTON.
Caucasian skulls,	117	52
Mongolian "	20	10
Malay "	43	18
American "	27	147
Ethiopian "	41	29
	<hr/> 248	<hr/> 256

The following digest of Tiedeman's tables may be acceptable to those

§ Prof. Tiedeman of Heidelberg, on the brain of the negro, compared with the European and Orang-Outang, Phil. Trans. 1836, pp. 519, 520.

But it seems that this argument from the inferior size of the negro brain, is no longer insisted on by the advocates of diversity of race. Dr. Nott himself affirms that "absolute size of brain cannot be taken as an inevitable measure of intellect either in individuals or races;" that the "Hindoos and the Toltecs in America, are examples of small and active brains, while on both continents are found savage tribes with large ill-formed heads, utterly incapable (?) of civilization." Dr. Morton, too, while he re-

curious in such matters, and will be understood, if it is borne in mind that the weight is not of the actual brain itself, but of millet seed, with which various crania were filled to ascertain their relative capacity. Dr. Morton adopted the same method of filling the crania, but gives the measurement of the internal cavity in inches:

No. of Skulls.	Caucasian of Europe, Asia and Africa.	lb. oz. dr. gr.				Malay, American, Mongolian, and Ethiopian.	lb. oz. dr. gr.			
77	European skulls, }	3	5	2	30					
38	Average weight, }					Malay skulls,	3	4	6	21
4	Egyptian, "	3	4	4	56					
24						American, (Indian,)	3	3	7	12
18						Mongolian,	3	2	7	55
38						Ethiopian,	3	1	6	24
24	Asiatic "	3	0	0	36					

These were all skulls of males; the measurements of female skulls are not added. Omitting the Egyptian, which were but 4 in number, the average of the Caucasian is

3 2 5 33

Among the Ethiopian crania are those of natives of Congo, Madagascar, Loango, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique; Bushmen, Caffres, Hottentots, and Ashantees. His Asiatic embrace the crania of the following nations; one Russian from Orenburg, one Werschandier beyond Mount Taurus, one Armenian, one Arab, four Cingalese, eight Hindoos, one Birman, two Circasians, three Georgians, two Parsees. It thus appears that though the European Caucasians stand highest, the Asiatic Caucasians stand lowest for cranial capacity, and that if the average be taken of the *whole* Caucasian race, they will be inferior to all the rest, the Ethiopian excepted.

Dr. Morton tells us that he admitted but three Hindoo skulls into the number "because the skulls of these people are probably smaller than those of any other existing nation." But it obviously is improper to obtain the average of the Caucasian race from the skulls of the large headed nations. The 140,000,000 Hindoos are a full third, and the Asiatic Caucasians much more than half of the whole Caucasian variety of men the earth contains. Had the Caucasians of Asia been as fully represented in Dr. Morton's tables, as those of Europe and America, the relative proportions of the several varieties would, probably, have been changed. Dr. Bachman well says that the mensuration of Dr. Morton is but "the commencement of a long series of studies in reference to the Mammalians in general." It has not gone through, as it should do, the various races of men, nor is it, perhaps, possible that it should be completed by any one man.

presents the Hindoos as having the smallest brains, finds those of the Old Peruvians but a little larger ; and shows that, of the Aboriginal Americans, the Peruvians had the smallest brains, the Mexicans brains a little more capacious, and the barbarian tribes the largest of all.

Tiedeman, as well as Dr. Morton, alludes to the smallness of the Hindoo brain. The male skull giving the smallest internal dimensions in Tiedeman's tables (excepting two of North American Indians) is the skull of a Hindoo Brahmin. The largest skull in Tiedeman's tables is that of a Botecudo Indian, the next largest is of a Don Cossack, and the next of a Congo negro. The average of seventeen Hindoo heads, measured by Dr. Morton, gives to them an internal capacity three cubics inches smaller than the average of his twenty nine African heads. But the Hindoos are reckoned by him, as well as by Tiedeman, under the Caucasian variety. It should follow, if dimension of brain is certain evidence of talent, that there are Caucasian nations beneath the African in the scale of native intellect.

But Dr. Nott thinks that "size and form of the anterior lobes (all things being equal,) may be taken as a measure of intellect, and as the negro is deficient here, his place in the scale of being must be very low. As the dimensions of the brain are unalterable by education, however continued through generations, the negro never can rise beyond the capacity he attains to in this country in the second generation." And yet again he holds that the head and brain are not unalterable, and that "it is an indisputable fact that all the negro tribes in the United States, are more perfect in their physical developements and have better formed heads (as well as bodies and limbs) and are more intellectual than their African ancestors." For the inconsistency of these views we are not responsible. With inconsistency of various kinds his pages abound in a most remarkable manner.

On the subject of phrenology it is not our province authoritatively to pronounce. We leave it to men of science to do this, a great share of whom are wholly unsatisfied with its doctrines and decisions. Anatomy has not been able to find its organs, so as to see why intelligence should be seated in one part of the brain more than another. The

posterior part of the brain, the supposed place of the animal propensities, is found to diminish as you descend to the lower animals, and in the salacious ape is extremely small. Prichard, Esquirol, Foville, and Carpenter, and professors Dunglison, Harrison and Sewall, in our own country, and innumerable others, have determined against the decisions of this, as it appears to us, fallacious science.*

We see, then, no physical reason, we see no conclusive one in history, and we find none in the word of God, why the barbarous nations may not be civilized and take their stand among enlightened nations and the worshippers of the true God. It may be true that some races of men disappear from the earth, in the mysterious providence of God, as the American Indians and some of the South Sea Islanders are now doing. But we believe not the testimony of men, however deserving of our confidence in other things, who tell us that the barbarous tribes are incapable, under any possible circumstances, of civilization. Facts disprove it, facts of the present century and of the past. The results of Missionary labour disprove it, unless the whole tribe of Missionaries, some of whom are distinguished for intelligence and education, are liars and deceivers. We ourselves disprove it. In the days of Jewish, Assyrian, Egyptian, and even of Grecian and Roman civilization, our ancestors were wild, cruel, painted savages. It is true, as Dr. Nott suggests, that the prognathous skull may not have been common among them. It is not common among the barbarians of America. It is exhibited by only a portion of the natives of Africa; some, even of the black nations have an erect face, prominent forehead and fine features. There was a time, long since the era of Menes and the pyramids; when the Britons "were as degraded as the most savage nations now existing;" when the ancient Sarmatians were as wild and untameable as the Indians of America; when the Slavonians were covered with squalid filth; and generally, the Northern nations of Europe were, in many things, not above the tribes of Dahomey and Ashanti, and in many, even below them.

* See this subject treated by Morell, *History of Philosophy*, I. 497, et seq. Carpenter's *Human Physiology*. Dr. Rice's *Phrenology* and *Mesmerism*.

While these arguments, then, all fail to prove a diversity of race, religion and humanity passionately exclaim against them as a wrong done to our brethren; to men who wear the form, and bear about within them the heart of our common nature; who fell in the first Adam, from whom, they, like ourselves, have descended, and are to be saved, if at all, through the second Adam, who, for this, took on himself our common flesh, and has left us his commission to go out into *all* the world and preach the gospel to every creature.*

We have thus followed Dr. Nott through these lectures of his, and have met, if not all, yet his principal objections against revealed religion. We do not profess to have treated them in full. This within such limits were impracticable. If we have been rambling in our review, it is because we were in chase of a rambler, and it is possible that what we have said is, in this respect, like what we have attempted to answer. We should not have thought these Lectures worthy of a reply, had they been likely to be read only by persons informed on the ordinary subjects of theological learning. Among such persons, we have heard but one expression of surprise, that such common and often answered objections against the Scriptures, should be brought forward in these times, as profound discoveries. A few only of these objections assume a new importance from the new researches in antiquities and science. We are convinced that neither geology, ethnology, chronology, phrenology, physiology nor Egyptology, have any well authenticated facts which militate in the least degree against the scripture doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race. Our faith is too weak to receive the doctrine of Pre-Adamic races of men, or to adopt the idea of Mr. Burke of the *Ethnological Journal*, with which Dr. Nott seems enamoured, "that all the civilization of antiquity sprung from a mighty race that once inhabited the island of Atlantis, which disappeared beneath the waters of the Atlantic, long before the names Hebrew or Chaldean were known."† Dr. Nott may in-

* In confirmation of the views we have expressed, see Alex. Von Humboldt. *Cosmos*. I. p. 361, et seq.

* The island of Atlantis, if it ever existed, may have formed a part of the highway by which America received a portion of its population, from the

deed deplore the fact that we are so far behind the age. But when we see new and frisky sciences, now just extricating themselves from the chaotic slime, leaping about hither and thither, and butting eastward, westward, northward, and southward against the old foundations, we have been disposed to wait till they have found out their real strength, and their proper province.

It may not please Dr. Nott that we have ranked him with those infidel writers of a former age who have sought to sap the foundations of revealed religion. But we really do not see how he could have expected otherwise. Do his speculations tend to build up the word of God or to overthrow? Does he really himself believe that these Scriptures have any other inspiration than appertained to Thucydides, Homer, and Cicero? If he answers in the affirmative, what can that inspiration be worth, whose product is so confused, defective, and erroneous a book as he represents the Scriptures to be. The only theory of inspiration a true and consistent believer in Christianity *can* adopt, is that which makes God himself the real author of this book, and its words the words of God. There can be, in such a book, no mistakes, no lapses of memory, no ignorant statements. We cannot consent that the Bible should be put on the same footing with the Koran, the Institutes of Menu, or the Maxims of Confucius. It is a mad attempt to falsify the Scriptures; and we would say to Dr. Nott, almost in the memorable words of an eminent servant of God to his rash and persecuting sovereign, "Sir, the word of God is an anvil that hath broken many a hammer." His occasional expressions of respect for Christianity stand in strange contrast with the difficulties which he seems to take pleasure in accumulating around the documents of our faith. If, as we fear, he has decided to make a common cause with the skeptic, to beat his head against the eternal ramparts, and roll the stone of Sisyphus, to him be the toil, the fruitless contest, and shameful defeat.

We regret to find that these Lectures were delivered

original seat of the human race; nothing more. Schlegel thinks it much more probable that the legend of Atlantis, is a vague tradition from primeval times, of the American continents, once known, but afterwards lost from the memory of the old world.—*Phil. of Life*, p. 81.

from the chair of political economy in the University of Louisiana; that they were addressed thus to the youth of the land, far too ready to throw off the restraints of religion, and glad to find countenance in disesteeming the word of God. Sad it is, inexpressibly sad, when the fountains of learning become corrupted, and the advantage the position of an instructor gives, is used to disseminate error, and to implant its seeds in the youthful mind to spring up in an abundant but noxious harvest.

But our greatest anxiety at present is, as to the effect these denials of the Unity of the Race, in the very face of the word of God, will have upon the institution of slavery, in which the entire prosperity of the Southern States is at present bound up. In a former number of the *Review** we have endeavored to redeem the Scriptures from the perversions of Abolitionists, and to show that they recognise the relations of master and slave, and extend over it their protection. This we conceived, and do still conceive, to be the true and impregnable ground on which a Christian slaveholder may defend himself against the abolitionism of the whole world. The Bible is eminently a conservative book, and stands now, as in past ages it has often done, between us and wrong, holding its *Ægis* over our persons, property, and rights. Under it, the slave-holding patriarch, the slave-holding disciple of Moses, and the slaveholding Christian lived, protected and unrebuked. Disastrous will be the day, when we fling from us the shield which God has given us. It has been objected, though not by the author of these lectures, that the Scripture argument for slavery proves too much, for as the Hebrew slaves might be of any and every nation, their own excepted, it would authorize us to enslave men of other than African nations. But the argument from inferiority of race is open to an equal objection. The Caucasian proudly says, all others are beneath him; all others, then, may be made his slaves. And if it comes to measuring of heads, and examining the texture of hair, there are white men that should be slaves, and black men that should be freemen. The objection that the argument from Scripture proves too much, which we have elsewhere met with, is but the ar-

* Vol. I. p. 63.

gument of abolition itself. So Mr. Garrison and his coadjutors plead, and so plead, with suicidal zeal, some who would be most unwilling to be classed with these hated enemies.*

It is natural for those who occupy lofty stations in society to depreciate the native endowments of those beneath them. Kings and Princes believe that nobler blood flows in theirs than in plebeian veins, and that by necessity of nature, those whose station is below them, are of an inferior clod. We do not affirm that the endowments of all men are equal; and perhaps what is true of individuals is true of whole families, and may be presumed therefore true, to an extent, of whole varieties of mankind. Yet the outward circumstances are more influential, when you look at men in the mass, than inward organization. And we should guard against depreciating those whose social position is less exalted than ours.—Aristotle, 2200 years ago, was not free from this. "The slave," says he, "is a living instrument, just as the instrument is an inanimate slave." "To the Greeks," says he, "belong dominion over the Barbarians; because the former have the understanding requisite to rule; the latter, the body only to obey." The same views prevailed

* The latest exhibition of Garrisonism we have seen is the following resolution of the Abolitionists of Berlin Ohio.

"*Resolved*, That this Convention is full of joy at the declining state of American religion: as seen in the absence of revivals, the drooping condition of all the popular churches, and the utter extinction of many of them: the small number of candidates for the Ministry at the Theological Seminaries; and the frequency with which the Ministers escape from the sectarian pulpit into less mischievous and far more honest and laudable occupations. And we cannot but hope and pray that as it is terrible searments (?) on the hearts, the hopes and happiness of millions of slaves, whose enslavement it has so long sanctified by its fellowship, its sermons and prayers, shall end, and it shall sink to a speedy and ignominious grave, that then it shall be followed by the coming of the kingdom of righteousness and peace, when man shall no more lift up the sword or the shackle against his fellow man, when a slave or a slave holder shall no more be known; and when emphatically, every man in every face shall meet a brother and a friend."

How remarkable the coincidence between the infidel opposers of Slavery, and its infidel defenders. Truly, we may stand awe-struck at the daring impiety, and exclaim with the dying Jacob:

Simeon and Levi are brethren,
Instruments of cruelty are in their habitations;
O my soul, come not thou into their secret,
Unto their assembly, mine honor, be not thou united."

among the Romans. But who were these Barbarians who were slaves to the Greeks, especially who were they that were slaves to the Romans? A large portion doubtless came from Africa, though not of the negro variety, but they came also from Asia, from Thrace, and, to the Romans, from Greece, and from the conquered countries of the west. English slaves were carried to Rome, and the Anglo-Saxons, whom Gregory saw in the slave markets of Rome, had been conveyed there by slave dealers. The very Barbarians whom the Romans placed so low, were, to a great extent, the races which now have the sway in Europe and America. Let us not be guilty of the false reasoning of Aristotle. It is not because of inferior intellect and moral nature, that our law disfranchises the African. It disfranchises also the Indian; and both, because of the providential state in which, under the government of God, they are found in their connexion with us. They are in an actual state of servitude or inferiority, and our present law does but recognize and regulate this state in which it finds them.

We may do Dr. Nott a great injustice in supposing that he has been led into his argument against the unity of the race from a desire to find a new basis for slavery. He may have been influenced by philosophical reasons alone, which he has determined at all hazards to carry through, his mind not being rightly affected meanwhile towards the Sacred Scriptures. But, in doing so, he has attacked that citadel of our faith, in whose defence we are bound to imperil our lives. It is for this reason we have felt ourselves compelled to speak in language of plainness, and perhaps of unbecoming severity, while really desirous of according to him all the respect which is due to his private and professional character.

Our conviction strongly is, that the theory which seeks to defend this maligned institution on the supposition that our servants are of another than the Adamic race, and of an inferior and brutish rather than human nature, which *values not the countenance the Scriptures really give* to domestic slavery, but seeks to destroy their authority that it may weaken their testimony to the unity of the family of man, and which holds the declarations of the sacred writers as nothing worth,—is fraught with incalculable mischief to

the institution itself. If this is the only foot on which the argument in its favour can be made to walk, we hesitate not to say it is doomed shortly to end. It is cut off from the sympathies of the human heart, cut off from a hold on the common sense of men, cut off from the confidence of every Christian, as what he must abominate, renounce, and separate himself from, if he believes the Holy word of God, and the plan of redemption. It alienates from us the temperate and worthy citizens of other portions of our land, who, in some measure, appreciate our position, and have resisted, on their own ground, the raging tempest of abolition. It makes us despised and contemned abroad as savage barbarians, in whom humanity, morality, and religion have become utterly extinguished. It is now the policy of our enemies to "divide and conquer," to set the non-slaveholding white man against his slaveholding neighbour. It will be a policy equally suicidal to alienate the Christian. If the institution can only be maintained at the sacrifice of the historic verity and full inspiration of the Sacred Scriptures, the Christian who, in past ages, has joyfully met the spoiling of his goods, and death itself for his religion, will again do so, and divorce himself forever from a cause which fears not God nor regards man. Where will this institution be when all Christian men shall be forced to turn against it? We denounce such views, therefore, as dangerous to religion, morality, and law; and as subversive of our whole legislation touching this subject, beyond any, within our knowledge, ever presented to the people of the South. We utter, in conclusion, these words of warning, and hope they may not be disregarded.

ARTICLE VI.

*The Philosophy of Religion, By J. D. MORELL, A. M.
London. Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans.
1849. pp. 427.*

Having, in our former article, considered the work of Mr. Morell as an argument against an authoritative theology, we proceed, according to our promise, to examine the philosophy on which the argument is founded. This task we undertake with unfeigned reluctance. The questions which it involves demand a power of analysis, a patience of reflection, an intensity of thought, a depth of investigation and an amplitude of learning, to which, we are conscious, we can make no pretensions. We always return from the study of the great problems of human knowledge with a conviction of littleness, incapacity and ignorance which, though the process by which it has been produced has disclosed enough to prevent us from despairing of the ultimate possibility of philosophy, teaches us to commiserate rather than denounce the errors of others, and makes us feel that *our* position must always be that of humble and teachable inquirers. Far from dreaming of the attempt to originate an independent system of our own, or even to combine into a consistent and harmonious whole the various elements of truth, which may be elicited from existing systems, we are content, in regard to these high problems, to discharge the negative office of refuting error without presuming to establish its contrary, of saying what is *not*, without undertaking to declare what *is* truth. The work of simple destruction, though often invidious, is sometimes necessary. In the case before us, we shall feel ourselves to be the authors of an incalculable good, if we can convict Mr. Morell's philosophy of inconsistency and falsehood, though we should fail, in the progress of the argument, to make a single direct contribution to a sounder system.

This philosophy may be embraced under the three heads of Psychology, Religion and Revelation, together with the connection subsisting between them. The first inquiry of the author is in regard to the subject in which

religion inheres,—what is it that is religious? then in regard to the essence of religion itself—what is it to be religious? and finally in relation to the mode in which religion is produced—how is the given subject put in possession of the given essence? The answer to the first inquiry constitutes his *Psychology*—to the second, his analysis of religion in general and of Christianity in particular—to the last, his theories of Revelation and Inspiration. As to the connection subsisting between them—the nature of the subject determines, to some extent, the nature of religion—and the nature of religion, in its relations to the subject, determines the mode and laws of its production. Mind being given, the essential element of religion is given—mind and religion being both given, the characteristics of Revelation are settled. This is a general outline of the discussions of the book. We begin with the psychology—and that our readers may fully understand the strictures which we shall make upon some of the doctrines of our author, it may be well to give a preliminary statement of the essential differences which distinguish existing schools of philosophy.

I. Sir William Hamilton has very justly observed that* “philosophy proper is principally and primarily the *science of knowledge*; its first and most important problem being to determine—*what can we know?* that is, what are the conditions of our knowing, whether these lie in the nature of the object, or in the nature of the subject, of knowledge.” The origin, nature and extent of human knowledge, are, accordingly, the questions which have divided the schools, and the answers which have been returned to them, have determined the place which their authors have taken in the history of speculation.

It is now universally conceded that all knowledge begins in experience—but there is not the same agreement as to the conditions which are essential to experience, and under which alone it becomes available. In one class of opinions, the mind, at its first existence, is represented as a *tabula rasa* or a *sheet of blank paper*, upon which, from without, are written the characters which, contemplated by itself, constitute the sole materials of cognition. It

* Hamilton's Reid. p. 808. *Note.*

comes into the world unfurnished—an empty room—and the world furnishes it. There is, on the one hand, a capacity to receive, and on the other, a power to communicate—and the relation of the two constitutes experience. Upon the materials thus given, the mind can operate—it can combine, compare, decompose, and arrange, but it can add absolutely nothing to the stock, which has been imparted to it as a passive recipient. Experience is restricted exclusively to sensation—the mind is a machine and its various faculties the tools with which it works up the materials afforded in sensible phenomena. This low and contracted hypothesis, which sprang from a corruption of Locke's principles, at best partial and incomplete, was pushed to its legitimate consequences of atheistic materialism and the blindest chance, by the celebrated authors of the French Encyclopedia. And it is to this scheme that we would confine the distinctive title of sensationalism.

We need not say that the sensationalist stumbles at the threshold. He gives no account of *knowledge*—to receive ideas, as the canvass receives the impressions of the brush, is not to *know*. Intelligence involves judgment, belief, conviction of certainty—not merely that the thing is there, but to use a sensible analogy, *seen* to be there. No mechanical activity, however delicate and refined, is competent to explain the peculiar phenomenon involved in the feeling *I know*. Experience, therefore, must include conditions in the subject which make it *capable* of *intelligence*. There must be a *constitution* of mind, adapted to that specific activity by which it *believes* and judges; as it is only by value of such a constitution that knowledge can be extracted from experience. This preparation of the mind to know, or its adaptation to intelligence, consists in subjecting it to laws of belief under which it must necessarily act. Its energies can be exercised only under the condition that it *shall* know or believe. As it is the *necessity* of belief which distinguishes *intelligent* action from every other species of operation, and as there can be no belief without the belief of *something*, there must be certain primary truths involved in the very structure of the mind, which are admitted from the simple necessity of admitting them. As undeveloped in experience, they exist not in the form of propositions or general conceptions, but of irresistible *ten-*

dencies to certain manners of belief when the proper occasions shall be afforded. They are certain "necessities of thinking." But developed in experience and generalized into abstract statements—they are original and elementary cognitions—the foundation and criterion of all knowledge. They are the standard of evidence—the light of the mind, and without them the mind could no more be conceived to know than a blind man to see. Being in the mind—a part of its very structure—they are not the products of experience. Essential conditions of mental activity, they are not the results of it. As experience furnishes the occasions on which they are developed or become manifest in consciousness—it is obviously from experience that we know them as mere mental phenomena, in the same way that we know every other faculty of mind—but as primitive beliefs, as vouchers and guarantees for the truth of facts beyond "their own phenomenal reality,"* they are involved in the very conception of experience. "Catholic principles of all philosophy," they have been more or less distinctly recognized, in every school and by every sect, from the dawn of speculation until the present day. According to the different aspects in which they have been contemplated, they have received different titles†—innate truths—first principles—maxims—principles of common sense—general notions—categories of the understanding and ideas of pure reason—fundamental laws of belief and constituent elements of reason—but whatever names they have borne, their character remains unchanged, of original, authoritative, incomprehensible faiths.

Though the distinct recognition and articulate enunciation of these principles have played a conspicuous part in the speculations of modern philosophers, yet the admission of them can hardly be regarded as characteristic of a school. It forms a *class*, in contradistinction to the ultra sensationalists, in which two schools‡ are em-

* For a masterly dissertation on the Philosophy of Common Sense, the reader is referred to Hamilton's Reid—Appendix, Note A. We deem it just to ourselves (and we hope we shall not be suspected of vanity,) to say that the distinction indicated in the text and the corresponding distinction in regard to the possibility of doubt, illustrated by Hamilton, p. 744, had occurred to us, in our own speculations, before we had ever seen his book.

† See §5, Note A, Hamilton's Reid.

‡ "What is a school? It is a certain number of systems, more or less,

braced, discriminated from each other by the application which they make of what both equally admit. They are divided on the question of the relation which our primary cognitions sustain to the whole fabric of human knowledge.

One party represents them as wholly barren and unproductive in themselves—the forms of knowledge and indispensable to its acquisition, but not the sources from which it is derived. It is only when acting in obedience to them it comes in contact with objective realities that it truly knows. All knowledge implies the relation of subject and object—the laws of belief qualify the subject to know, but cannot give the thing to be known. Hence we are dependent on experience for all the *objects* of knowledge. The mind, however richly furnished with all the capacities of cognition and belief, however intelligent in its own nature, cannot create, by the laws of its constitution, a single material of thought. The description of our intelligent constitution is an answer to the question *how* we know, but not to the equally important question *what* we know. There must be something distinct from a faculty—something to which it is applied, or applies itself, in conformity with its nature, before the relation of knowledge can obtain. Or in one word, the laws of belief are the *conditions* of knowing, but in themselves considered, are not knowledge. They are not the matter of an argument, but the criterion of the truth of any and of every premise. According to this class of philosophers, experience not only furnishes the occasions on which our primitive cognitions are developed, but furnishes the *objects* about which our faculties are conversant. It gives us the *what* we are to know. From the importance which this school attaches to induction, it may be preeminently styled the school of experience.*

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knowledge, but as the data, the *αρχαί*, in which are implicitly contained all that is worthy of the name of science. We are dependent upon experience only to awaken them; but when once awakened and roused into action, they can conduct us to the fountain of existence, and solve all the mysteries of the universe. As reason is held to be the complement of these universal and all comprehensive principles, this class of philosophers is commonly denominated *rationalists*.

Differing as widely as they do, in regard to the matter of our knowledge, it is not to be wondered at that these two great schools of Rationalism and Experience, should differ as widely in relation to its nature and extent, or the precise province of a sound philosophy. Rationalism, in all its forms, aims at a complete science of Ontology—it pretends to be, in the language of Cousin, “the absolute intelligence, the absolute explanation of every thing,”* or in the language of Sir William Hamilton, “it boldly places itself at the very centre of absolute being, with which it is, in fact, identified; and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relations, unveils to us the nature of the Deity, and explains, from first to last, the derivation of all created things.”†

The philosophy of experience is guilty of no such extravagances. Professing to build on observation, its first and fundamental principle is, that all knowledge must be relative in its nature, and phenomenal in its objects. As speculations about abstract being transcend the province of legitimate induction, it dismisses them at once, as frivolous and absurd, and aspires to know only those qualities and attributes of things, through which they become related to our minds. What they are in themselves, or what they are to the omniscience of God, it would regard as a no less preposterous inquiry than to undertake to determine the size, number, and employments of the inhabitants of the moon. Still, phenomena, in its vocabulary, are not synonymous, as rationalists constantly assume, with phantoms or delusions. They are

* *Introduct. Histor. Philos. Sect. i. p. 24, Linberg's Trans.*

† *Edinburgh Review. Cross's Selections, vol. 3d, p. 176.* A masterly article on Cousin's Philosophy.

realities—the conditions of the objects corresponding to the conditions of the subjects of human knowledge, and consequently as truly real as those necessary principles of reason for the sake of which they are despised. “What *appears* to all,” says Aristotle, “that we affirm *to be*; and he who would subvert this belief will himself assuredly advance nothing more deserving of credit.”*

Claiming, therefore, only a relative knowledge of existence, the philosophy of experience, instead of futile and abortive attempts to construct the universe, takes its stand, in conformity with the sublime maxim of Bacon,† as the minister, not the master; the interpreter, not the legislator of nature. Professing its incompetence to pronounce beforehand what kinds of creatures the Almighty should have made, and what kinds of laws the Almighty should have established, it is content to look out upon the world, and to look in upon itself, in order to discover what God has wrought. Without presuming to determine what *must* be, it humbly and patiently inquires what *is*. From the very nature of the case, it pretends to no science of the Deity. To bring Him within the circle of science, would be to degrade Him—to make Him a general law, or a constituent element of other existences instead, of the eternal and self-existent God.

The two schools of Rationalism and Experience are, accordingly, at war in regard to the scope and province of philosophy. Agreeing in their general views as to the indispensable conditions of intelligence, they differ fundamentally in the answers which they return to the question—*what* can man know? This single consideration is enough to show the futility, or, at least, the delusiveness, of a classification like that adopted by Mr. Morell, in his former work, which brings Stewart, Reid, and Brown under the same general category with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The problems which the former undertook to solve, were the poles apart from those dis-

* Eth. Nic. Lib. x. Cap. 2; a passage repeatedly quoted by Sir William Hamilton.

† Nov. Organ. Aphor. i. In this age of transcendental speculation, the words deserve to be repeated: Homo naturae minister et interpres, tantum facit et intelligit quantum de naturae ordine re, vel mente observaverit, nec amplius scit aut potest.

cussed by the latter. The former were inductive psychologists, applying the same method to the phenomena of mind, which Newton had applied with such splendid results to the phenomena of matter—the latter were bold and rampant ontologists, unfolding the grounds of universal Being from the principles of pure reason. The former restricted their inquiries to the phenomenal and relative; the latter pushed into the region of the absolute and infinite; the former stopped at properties and attributes; the latter plunged into the essence of all things. From Locke to Hamilton, English and Scotch philosophy has been, for the most part, a confession of human ignorance; from Leibnitz to Hegel, German philosophy has been, for the most part, an aspiration to omniscience.*

After these preliminary remarks, we can have no difficulty as to the general position to which we must assign Mr. Morell. He is a rationalist, coming nearer, so far as we can collect his opinions, to the Eclecticism of France than to any other school. His method, the psychological,† is evidently that of Cousin; and there is the same unsuccessful attempt to combine the philosophy of experience with that of rationalism.

1. The treatise before us opens with an inquiry into that which constitutes the essence of the mind.

“Now, first,” says our author,‡ “whenever we speak of the mind, or use the expression, ‘*myself*,’ what is it, we would ask, that we really intend to designate? What is it in which the mind of man *essentially* consists?”

The terms in which the question is propounded would seem to indicate that Mr. Morell regarded *personality* and *mind* as synonymous expressions—that the Ego embraced the *whole subject* of all the phenomena of consciousness. And yet, in another passage, he obviously divorces intelligence from “*self*,” and restricts the *person* to individual peculiarities.

* Kant deserves to be specially excepted from this censure. The ontology of pure reason he has remorselessly demolished in his celebrated critique. See also Morell's History of Philosophy, vol. 2, pp. 81-2.

† *Fragmens Philosophique*, Pref. A translation of this Preface may be found in the first volume of Ripley's Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature. Boston, 1838. See also Morell's Hist. Mod. Philos. vol. ii. p. 484, 2d London Edit.

‡ p. 2.

"Neither, lastly," says he,* "can the real man be the complex of our thoughts, ideas, or conceptions. These indicate simply the existence of logical forms, intellectual laws, or perceptive faculties, which are essentially the same in all minds; they do not express the real, concrete individual man; they do not involve the element which makes each human being entirely distinct from the whole mass of humanity around him; in a word, they do not constitute our *personality*."

To us, we frankly confess, it is amazing that the essence of mind *as* mind should consist in something that is not common to all minds. But the difficulty does not stop here. The will, in which Mr. Morell fixes the essence of the man, as *a mere power* of spontaneous action, is just as universal and just as uniform as the operations of intelligence. *It*, therefore, "as the *capacity* of acting independently, and for ourselves," cannot be the essential principle of mind, and we are absolutely shut up by this species of logic to the idiosyncracies and oddities of individuals. It is strange that Mr. Morell, in adopting the analysis of Maine de Biran, has not admitted the limitations, of Cousin, who, it seems to us, has unanswerably proved that, upon this hypothesis, we must deny the personality of reason, at least in its spontaneous manifestations, and make "*self*" and mind expressions of different but related realities. If the Ego is the will, then intelligence is no more of it than the organs of sense. "Reason," says Cousin,† adhering rigidly to his conception of personality as involving only the individual, and voluntary, to the entire exclusion of the universal and absolute—"reason is not a property of individuals; therefore it is not our own—it does not belong to us—it is not human—for, once more, that which constitutes man, his intrinsic personality, is his voluntary and free activity; all which is not voluntary and free, is added to man, but is not an integrant part of man." This is consistent. But what shall we say, upon this hypothesis, of the veracity of consciousness, the fundamental postulate of all philosophy, which just as clearly testifies that the operations of reason are subjective—that they are, in other words, affections of what

* p. 2.

† Introduct. Hist. Phil. Lect. v. Linberg's Trans. p. 127. Lecture vi. *passim*.

we call ourselves—as that the decisions of the will are our own? The distinction betwixt reason, in its spontaneous and reflective manifestations, does not touch the point.—The “spontaneous apperception of truth,”* which Cousin boasts to have discovered “within the penetralia of consciousness, at a depth to which Kant never penetrated,” is either a subjective act—and then it is personal; or it is only another name for the intellectual intuition of Schelling, in which the distinction of subject and object disappears, and we have the miracle of knowledge without any thing known, or any one to know. If M. Cousin admits that his spontaneous apperception of truth involves a percipient, relativity and subjectivity are not only apparent, but as real as they are in reflection—if it does not involve a percipient, then we humbly submit that it is self-contradictory, and therefore, equivalent to zero. A theory which defends the impersonality of reason, by an assumption which denies the very possibility of thought, may be safely remanded to the depths from which its author extracted it, and into which it is not at all astonishing that such a thinker as Kant never penetrated. We cannot but add that as Cousin’s ontology is founded on the authority of reason, and the authority of reason founded on its impersonality, and its impersonality founded on the annihilation of thought, his speculations upon this subject end exactly where those of Hegel begin—AT NOTHING.

Mr. Morell, however, rigidly cleaves to M. de Biran, and saves the *personal* character of reason by the extraordinary hypothesis, the most extraordinary which, we venture to say, has ever been proposed in the history of philosophy—that will, spontaneity or personality—for they are all, in his vocabulary, synonymous expressions—is the SUBSTANCE of mind,—that our various faculties of intelligence sustain the same relations to the will, which, according to popular apprehension, an attribute sustains to that of which it is a property. That unknown substratum, which, under the appellations of mind, soul or spirit,

* *Fragmens Philosophiques*, Pref. Morell *His. Philos.* vol. ii. p. 495.—We take occasion to say that this account of Cousin’s Psychology is one of the clearest statements of his system that we have ever seen—apart from his own writings.

other philosophers had been accustomed to represent as the subject in which all our mental capacities and energies inhere—Mr. Morell professes to have drawn from its concealment, and to have identified with spontaneous activity, or the power of acting independently, and for ourselves. Reason or intelligence, accordingly, is a property of the will, in the same sense in which extension is a property of matter. All the operations of the mind are only so many modifications of the will—so many manifestations of activity, not as an element which they include, but as the *support* upon which they depend. “If, therefore,” says he,* in a passage which shows that we have not misrepresented him—“if, therefore, in our subsequent classification of the faculties of the mind, little appears to be said about the will, it must be remembered that we assume the activity it denotes, as the essential basis of our whole mental being, and suppose it consequently to *underlie* (the italicks are his own, and show that he means—*it is the substance of*) all our mental operations.” And again:† “Remembering then that the power of the will runs through the whole, we may regard these two classes (the intellectual and emotional) as exhausting the entire sum of our mental phenomena.” And again:

“We would also again remind them, that the activity of the *will* must be regarded as running through all these different phenomena; and that as there is involved in the spontaneous operations of the human mind, all the elements which the consciousness at all contains, it must not be imagined that these elements have to be reflectively realized before they can contribute their aid to our mental developement. It is, in fact, one of the most delicate and yet important of all psychological analyses, to show how the power of the will operates through all the region of man’s spontaneous life, and to prove that our activity is equally voluntary and equally moral, in its whole aspect, although the understanding may not have brought the principles on which we act into the clear light of reflective truth.”—*p.* 25–6.

“To talk of knowing *mind*,” he affirms in his former work,‡ “beyond the direct consciousness of its *spontaneous being*, and all the affections it can undergo, is absurd; there is nothing more to *know*.” By *spontaneous being*,

*pp. 3, 4.

† p. 4.

‡ Vol. ii. p. 53, 2d London Edition.

he evidently means the existence of mind as a spontaneity. Beyond this and the various properties it exhibits there is nothing to be known—in spontaneity we have the substance—in the “affections it can undergo” the attributes; and these, in their connection, exhaust the subject.

If, now, spontaneous activity is the substance of the soul, and intelligence and reason, with all our various capacities and powers, are only properties or modifications of this spontaneous activity, it necessarily follows that all thought and belief—all knowledge and emotion, are purely voluntary. When we cognize an external object, immediately present in consciousness, or assent to any universal or necessary truth, such as that the whole is greater than a part, we do it by an act of the will. The cognition is spontaneous—which means, if it mean any thing, that the mind is not irresistibly determined to it: and that, consequently, it might *refuse* to know, when the object is actually present before it, and refuse to believe, when the terms of the proposition were distinctly and adequately apprehended; which being interpreted, is that a man may refuse to see when he sees, and refuse to believe when he knows. This very circumstance of the independence of truth, especially of necessary and absolute truth, of the human will, is one of the principal arguments of Cousin to establish the impersonality of reason. We *cannot help* believing when the evidence of truth is clearly before us, says Cousin; we believe in every case, only because we *will* to believe, says Morell. Doctors differ.

But passing over this difficulty, and admitting the doctrine, hard as it is to reconcile with the obvious testimony of consciousness, that all knowledge and belief are the creatures of the will, the products of spontaneous activity, we find ourselves unable to detect in this activity the only criterion by which our faculties are capable of distinguishing substance from attributes. “That which is in itself, and conceived by itself,” is the compendious definition of substance given by Spinoza*—and though it expresses what every human intellect must pronounce to be impossible, and contains the elements of proof, that our only

* Spinoza, in Howe's Living Temple, Pt. ii. Chap. i.

notion of substance is a certain relation to attributes—in other words, a postulation of the mind which we are forced to make, by the very constitution of our nature, in order to explain the existence of what is felt to be dependent; yet, as Mr. Morell admits it,* we will apply its canon to the case before us. Every thing, then, is an attribute which cannot be recognized as self-subsistent and independent, and every thing is a substance which can be construed to the mind as self-subsistent—self-subsistent in the sense that it inheres in nothing as an attribute in it. Hence, whatever is conceived by the mind as having only a dependent and relative existence, or is not conceivable as having a separate and independent existence, must be an attribute—it cannot be a substance. Apply this principle to the case before us. Is activity dependent or independent? In other words, can we conceive of it abstracted from every agent, and every form of operation? Does it not just as much require a *subject* as intelligence or thought, and some definite mode of manifestation?—Can it not just as properly be asked *what* acts as *what* thinks or believes? We confess that we are no more capable of representing to the mind absolute activity, than of representing absolute intelligence or absolute motion? We can understand the proposition that the mind is active—that it performs such and such operations, but we can attach no glimmer of meaning to that other proposition that it is activity itself. Action without something to act, and some manner of action, is to us as preposterously absurd as knowledge without some one to know; and we are unable to enter into that peculiar mode of cogitation which can be content to settle down on activity as the substratum, the self-subsisting subject of all intellectual phenomena. That the mind is active in thought, and that activity thinks, are propositions the poles apart—that activity is a characteristic and all pervading quality of every species of mental affection, and accordingly the highest generalization of mental phenomena, is a very different statement from that which makes it *the mind itself*. Hence, according to the canon, activity is

* This is evident from what he says of substance, p. 37, also Hamilton's Reid, p. 895, note, 1st. col.

only an attribute. Mr. Morell, in fact, admits as much :

"We do not say, indeed," says he, "that we can comprehend the very essence of the soul itself *apart* from all its determinations ; but that by deep reflection upon our inmost consciousness, we can comprehend the essence of the soul in connection with its operations—that we can trace it through all its changes as a *power* or pure activity ; and that in this spontaneous activity alone, our real personality consists."—*p.* 3.

But it is essential to any positive idea of substance, that it should be conceived apart from attributes. It is that "which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself—or whose conception needs the conception of nothing else, whereby it ought to be formed." In saying, therefore, that activity cannot in thought be abstracted from its manifestations, Mr. Morell has conceded the impossibility of his thesis, and instead of making it the *substance*, he has only made it the universal characteristic of mental operations.

But be it substance, or accident, we venture to suggest a doubt, whether such a thing as *spontaneous* activity, in the sense of Mr. Morell, does not involve a contradiction. According to this hypothesis, man is an undetermined cause, or a cause determined by nothing but his own proper energy. How shall we account for the first act ? It either produced itself, or it came into being by chance—for all foreign influences are, *ex hypothesi*, excluded—to have produced itself it must have existed as a cause before it existed as an effect—i. e.—it must have existed before it existed, which is self-contradictory. To say that it was produced by chance, is to say that the negation of all cause is the affirmation of some cause—or that a thing can be and not be a cause in the same relation and at the same time—which is also self-contradictory. We crave from Mr. Morell and his admirers a solution of these difficulties. We are utterly unable to absolve the doctrine of *spontaneous* activity from the charge of implying the doctrine of an absolute commencement, and an absolute commencement we are as incapable of conceiving as a triangle of four sides. If Mr. Morell takes man "out of the mighty chain of cause and effect, by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time," and makes him a separate and indepen-

dent cause, receiving no causal influence from without, we should like to know how he makes a beginning? For to us it is as plain that all commencement must be relative, as that there is any such thing as a commencement at all. If an absolute commencement were possible—Atheism could not be convicted of absurdity—and we see not how they can consistently apply the principle of causation to the proof theism—how they can deny that all things might have spontaneously sprung from nothing—when they distinctly affirm that our mental acts generate themselves. Upon this subject there are obviously only three suppositions that can be made—that of the casualist who asserts an absolute commencement—that of the fatalist who asserts an infinite series of relative commencements—that of the theist who asserts a finite series of relative commencements, carried up in the ascending scale, to a necessary Being—at once Creator and Preserver—the seat of all causation, who is without beginning of days or end of life. The extremes of fatalism and casualism are not only inconceivable—for we readily grant that the power of thought is not the measure of existence—but they are palpably and grossly self-contradictory—and therefore must be false. The hypothesis of the theist is also inconceivable. We cannot represent in thought a necessary and eternal being—but, then, it is not self-contradictory, and upon the doctrine of excluded middle it must be true; a man must take his place in the “mighty chain of cause and effect, by which all the operations of nature are carried on from the commencement to the end of time.” In the calumniated doctrine of an universal providence, extending to all events and to all things—the only depository of real efficiency and power—we find the true explanation of an activity which is neither casual in its origin, nor a dependent link in an endless chain.* In God we live and move and have our being. Nature and our own minds present us with multifarious phenomena—linked together as antecedent and consequent—but all are equally effects. Neither nature nor ourselves present us with an instance of a real cause. To Him that sitteth on the throne, and

* Hence we dissent totally from the doctrine laid down by Sir Wm. Hamilton, that there is no medium between fatalism and chance. Hamilton's Reid, p. 602, Note.

to Him alone, in its just and proper sense, belongs the prerogative of power. He speaks and it is done. He commands and it stands fast.

The proof by which Mr. Morell establishes his proposition that spontaneous activity is the substance of the soul, is as remarkable as the proposition itself. His argument is what logicians call a destructive conditional, to the validity of which it is as requisite, that all the suppositions which can possibly be made in the case, should be given in the major, as that all but the one contained in the conclusion, should be destroyed in the minor—the very species of argument which we ourselves have employed in regard to the existence of a necessary being. Now, says Mr. Morell, the essence of mind *must* consist either in sensation, intelligence or will. It does *not* consist in sensation, or intelligence—therefore it *must* consist in the will. Very plausible, no doubt. But how, we ask, does it appear, that it *must* consist in one of the enumerated elements? Why may it not consist in something else—in that unknown substance denominated spirit—unknown, but yet believed by virtue of the very constitution of our nature? This supposition is, at least, one which *may* be made in the case—which *has been* made by philosophers of the highest repute—and which, we venture to predict, will *continue* to be made by the great mass of mankind as long as the world shall stand. Then, again, in his process of destruction, he removes a great deal more than he intends. He removes whatever “is essentially the same in all minds,” and of course the will considered as a mere “spontaneity or capacity of acting independently and for ourselves,” for in this sense it is unquestionably common to all mankind. Its modes of manifestation are various in different individuals, and in the same individual at different times—but as a faculty or power abstracted from its effects, “it is essentially the same in all minds.”

We have insisted, at what may seem a disproportionate length, upon this preliminary feature of Mr. Morell's psychology, because we believe that it contains the seeds of incalculable mischief. The serious proposal of the question, concerning the substance of the soul, as one that our faculties can answer, involves a complete apostacy from the fundamental principle of the experimental school.

The great masters of that philosophy would as soon have thought of gravely discussing the relations of angels to space, how they can be here and not there—or there and not here—and yet be incorporeal and unextended beings. Des Cartes, indeed, speaks of the essence of the soul—and places it in thought—as he had placed the essence of matter in extension. But he uses essence—not as synonymous with substance—for he expressly distinguishes them—but for the characteristic and discriminating quality.

If there be any principle which we regard as settled, it is that all human knowledge must be phenomenal and relative—and that science transcends its sphere when it seeks to penetrate into the region of substances, or into that of efficient causes—two things which we shall afterwards have occasion to observe, rationalists are perpetually confounding. We will not quote in confirmation of our own, the opinions of philosophers, imperfectly, or not at all acquainted with the modern speculations of continental Europe. We choose rather to refer to one who is master of them all—who in depth and acuteness is a rival to Aristotle—in immensity of learning, a match for Leibnitz, and in comprehensiveness of thought an equal to Bacon. We allude to Sir William Hamilton. His work on Reid has filled us with amazement at the prodigious extent and critical accuracy of his reading. The whole circle of the ancient classics—poets, philosophers and orators—the entire compass of Christian literature—Eastern and western, from Justin to Luther, including the angry controversies and the endless disputes of the Fathers and Schoolmen—the great works of the Reformation—and the prolific productions of England, Scotland, Germany and France, from the period of the Reformers until now—all seem to be as familiar to his mind as the alphabet to other men—and what is more remarkable, this ponderous mass of learning is no incumbrance—he has not only swallowed down but digested libraries, and while he carries—it is hardly extravagant to say, all the thoughts of all other men in his head, he has an immense multitude besides—precious as any he has collected—which none have ever had before him, and for which the world will always hold him in grateful remembrance. He is an honour to Scotland and an ornament to letters. Upon this subject

of the nature and extent of human knowledge and the legitimate province of philosophy, we are rejoiced to find that he treads in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessors of the same school. He fully recognizes the distinction betwixt faith and science.

"All we know," says he* "either of mind or matter is only a knowledge in each, of the particular, of the different, of the modified, of the phenomenal. We admit that the consequence of this doctrine is, that philosophy, if viewed as more than a science of the conditioned, is impossible. Departing from the particular, we can never in our highest generalizations, rise above the finite; that our knowledge, whether of mind or matter, can be nothing more than a knowledge of the relative manifestations of an existence, which, in itself, it is our highest wisdom to recognize as beyond the reach of philosophy."

"We know—we can know," he observes again,† "only what is relative. Our knowledge of qualities or phenomena is necessarily relative; for these exist only as they exist *in relation to our faculties*. The knowledge, or even the conception of a substance, in itself and apart from any qualities in relation to, and therefore cognizable, or conceivable by our minds, involves a contradiction. Of such we can form only a negative notion—that is—we can merely *conceive it as inconceivable*." And again,‡ "We know nothing whatever of mind and matter, considered as substances; they are only known to us as a two-fold series of phenomena, and we can only justify against the law of parcimony, the postulation of two substances, on the ground that the two series of phenomena are reciprocally so contrary and incompatible, that the one cannot be reduced to the other, nor both be supposed to combine in the same common substance." And finally,§ "We are aware of a phenomenon. That it exists only as known—only as a phenomenon—only as an absolute relative—we are unable to realize in thought; and there is necessarily suggested the notion of an unimaginable something, in which the phenomenon inheres—a subject or substance."*

These principles are so intuitively obvious to us, that we find it difficult to sympathize with men who can persuade themselves that, with our faculties, they can ever

* Edinburgh Review. Cross's Selections, p. 181. A splendid article on Cousin's Philosophy.

† Hamilton's Reid, p. 322.

‡ Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note A. §11. p. 751.

§ Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note D.**

arrive at any other conception of substance, but as the unknown and unknowable support of properties. It is not a matter of *knowledge*, but of *belief*—it is not an object which, in itself, is ever present in consciousness—it is veiled from human penetration by the multitude of attributes and qualities which intervene betwixt it and the mind. It belongs to the dominion of faith and not of science. We admit its existence, not because we know it, but because we are unable *not* to believe it. The unfounded conviction, that by some means, we can ascend from the phenomenal to the substantial—that we can apprehend existence in itself—that we can know it simply as being, without qualities, without properties, without any relative manifestations of its reality—that we can comprehend it in its naked essence, and track the progress of all its developments from its abstract *esse* to its countless forms throughout the universe, has given rise to all the abortive attempts of German and French speculation to fix the *absolute* as a positive element in knowledge. These speculations are not the visions of crack-brained enthusiasts. The reader who has judged of the German philosophers from the extravagant conclusions they have reached will find, upon opening their works, and mastering their uncouth and barbarous dialects, and what is often more difficult, their abstract and rugged formulas—that he is brought in contact with men of the highest order of mind—the severest powers of logic, and the utmost coolness of judgment. They do not *rave* but *reason*. They do not *dream*, but *think*, and that, too, with a rigour of abstraction—an intensity of attention, and a nicety of discrimination which he is obliged to respect, while he laments the perverseness of their application. The difficulty with them is that they begin wrong. Refusing to recognize the limits which the constitution of our nature and our obvious relations to existence have imposed upon the excursions of our faculties—and inattentive to the great law of our being, that in this sublunary state, we are doomed to walk by faith, much more than by sight—they undertake to bring within the circle of science, the nature and foundation of all reality. Reluctant to accept any constitutional beliefs, they seek to verify the deposition of our faculties, by gazing upon the things themselves with

the intuition of God—and grasping them in their true and essential existence. Hence their endless quest of the absolute as the unconditioned ground of *being*. They suppose that, if they can once comprehend in its inmost essence what it is TO BE, they have the data for “the absolute intelligence and absolute explanation of all things.” The consequences, too well known, which inattention, in their hands, to the necessary limits of human knowledge, has legitimately produced, show the supreme importance of accurately fixing in our minds—to use the homely language of Locke*—“how far the understanding can extend its view—how far it has faculties to attain certainty—and in what cases it can only judge and guess.” The salutary lesson of human ignorance is the last to which human pride submits—but a sound philosophy concurs with the sure word of inspiration, in pronouncing man to be a creature of yesterday, who knows comparatively nothing. It is precisely because we discover in the preliminary speculations of our author, this tendency to transcend the sphere of our faculties, which, in its last manifestation—when it has grasped the absolute—identifies man with God, that we have adverted with so much earnestness to the indispensable conditions of knowledge. In the case before us Mr. Morell has evidently made nothing of substance. After all that he has said of spontaneity, will, power, capacity of acting independently and for ourselves, the real nature of the mind is as inscrutable as it was before; and although he has confidently said that beyond what he has disclosed, there is nothing more to know, the instinctive belief of every understanding will instantaneously suggest that there *is* something more to know.

2. His classification of the powers of the mind comes next in order. He divides them into two classes or orders—“those relating to the acquisition of knowledge, on the one side, and those subserving impulse and activity, on the other.” The former he terms *intellectual*, the latter *emotional*. “Between the intellectual and emotional activity,” he observes,† “there always subsists a direct correspondency.” The successive stages of human consciousness in the order of its developement and in the corres-

* Essay on Hum. Understand. Introd. §4.

† p. 4.

pondence of the intellectual and emotional activity—he presents in the following tabular view :

MIND COMMENCING IN MERE FEELING (undeveloped Unity,) EVINCES A TWO-FOLD ACTIVITY.			
I. <i>Intellectual.</i>		II. <i>Emotional.</i>	
1st. Stage.	The Sensational, Consciousness, (to which correspond)	The Instincts,	
2d. Stage.	The Perceptive, Consciousness,	"	Animal Passions,
3d. Stage.	The Logical, Consciousness,	"	Relational Emotions.
4th. Stage.	The Intuitional, Consciousness,	"	Aesthetic, Moral and Religious emotions.
MEETING IN FAITH, (highest or developed Unity,) p. 5.			

If it is the design of this table, as it seems to be, to indicate all our means of knowledge, it is certainly chargeable with an unaccountable defect. There is no faculty which answers to the reflection of Locke, or to the consciousness of Reid, Stewart and Royer-Collard. Mind can unquestionably be made an object of thought to itself, and its own powers and operations, its emotions, passions and desires are materials of knowledge as real and important as the phenomena of sense. Mr. Morell has told us how we become acquainted with our material organism—with external objects—with beauty, goodness and God—but he has omitted to tell us how we can know ourselves. He has made no allusion to that "internal perception, or self-consciousness," which, according to Sir William Hamilton,* whose analysis, in another respect, he has followed, "is the faculty presentative or intuitive of the phenomena of the Ego or Mind."

In our author's substitution of the circumlocutory phrases, Sensational Consciousness, Perceptive Consciousness, Logical Consciousness, Intuitional Consciousness, for the more common and familiar terms, Sensation, Perception, Understanding and Reason, we have an intimation of what he distinctly avows, in his former work,† that he agrees with

* Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. B. §1. p. 809.

† Hist. Mod. Phil. Vol. II. p. 13, esq.

Sir William Hamilton,* that Consciousness is not to be considered as a distinct and co-ordinate faculty of the mind, taking cognizance of its other powers and operations to the exclusion of their objects—the opinion of Reid, Stewart, and Royer-Collard—but that it is the necessary condition of intelligence—the generic and fundamental form of all intellectual activity. We cannot, in other words, know, without knowing that we know. We cannot think, will, feel or remember—without knowing, in the exercise and by the exercise of these faculties or powers, that we are the subjects of such operations. Hence, although it is strictly true, that every form of mental activity is a form of consciousness—yet there is certainly, as Sir William Hamilton himself admits—a logical distinction betwixt a faculty *as known* and a faculty *as exerted*, and this logical distinction ought to be preserved in language. It has, indeed, been preserved in the common terminology, which assigns to the separate faculties considered in themselves, appropriate appellations, while the relation of each and all to our knowledge of them is denoted by consciousness. It is a word which precisely expresses the formula, *we know that we know*, and when employed without an epithet restricting it to some specific mode of cognition, indicates the complement of all our intellectual faculties. It is, therefore, indispensable to any adequate enumeration of the sources of human knowledge. Those who regard it as a single and distinct power, of course cannot omit it, and those who regard it as the universal condition of intelligence, should include it, because it is a compendious statement of all the faculties in detail, and in that precise relation which the classification contemplates. In the table before us Mr. Morell gives us Perception *as known*, Sensation *as known*, Understanding *as known*, Reason *as known*, and various departments of emotion *as known*, but he does not give us OURSELVES, the mind in its integrity *as known*. This omission is the more remarkable, as in his history of Modern Philosophy, he has himself suggested† the convenience of the term, *self-consciousness*, “to express the mind’s cognizance of

* Cross’s Selections. Edin. Review. Vol. III. p. 197.

† Vol. II. p. 15. Note.

its own operations." We need not say that the faculties which he has enumerated, he has illustrated, according to his own views of their connection and dependence, in a very graphic and interesting sketch of the natural history of the human mind.

3. Without detaining the reader with his accounts of Sensation and External Perception, in which he has professedly followed Sir William Hamilton, and upon this subject he could not have followed a better or a safer guide, we come to that part of his psychology which bears more immediately upon the main questions of his treatise, and in which error or mistake is likely to be productive of serious consequences—we allude to his doctrine of the Understanding and Reason.

Understanding, as a synonyme for logical consciousness, is, so far as we know, utterly without authority in our philosophical literature—for we do not regard Coleridge as authority for any thing but literary theft. It is a term employed in a wider or narrower sense—in its wider sense, it embraces all the powers which relate to the acquisition of knowledge, in contradistinction from those which are subservient to impulse and activity—it answers, in other words, precisely to the division which Mr. Morell has styled *intellectual*. Hence the common distribution of our faculties into those of the understanding and those of the will. In its narrower, and, as we think, its proper sense, it denotes those higher intellectual faculties which pre-eminently distinguish man from the brute—to the exclusion of sense, imagination, memory and fancy. But we cannot recollect a single instance in which it has ever been restricted to our lower cognitive faculties, or to the processes of ratiocination. The change which Mr. Morell has introduced, or rather followed Coleridge in introducing—is a radical departure from established usage. There is much more authority for identifying *reason* with the logical consciousness, than understanding. For although that word, in its prevailing usage, is exactly synonymous with understanding, both in its narrower and wider sense, yet it has not unfrequently been employed by writers of the highest repute, to denote precisely the Discursive Faculty. This is the first meaning which Johnson assigns to it—and the meaning

in which Reid systematically employs it in his Inquiry into the Human Mind—the meaning to which Beattie restricts it in his Essay on Truth, and which Dr. Campbell evidently attached to it, when he denied it to be the source of our moral convictions. We would not be understood as objecting, however, to Mr. Morell's employment of reason as synonymous with common sense—or, as he prefers to style it, the Intuitional Consciousness—this is justified by the highest authority. Dugald Stewart long ago suggested “whether it would not, on some occasions, be the best substitute which our language affords, for intuition in the enlarged acceptation in which it had been made equivalent to the ancient *vous* or *locus principiorum*.” But what we deny is, that understanding is ever equivalent to logical consciousness as contradistinguished from Reason in its restricted application, or is ever opposed to it in any other sense than a genus is opposed to a species.* Intelligence is one, and all our faculties, when legitimately exercised, are harmonious and consistent with each other. They all conspire in the unity of knowledge. It is not one reason which knows intuitively, and another reason which knows deductively—but it is the same reason which knows in each case, though the relations of the object to it are different, but not repugnant or contradictory. To suppose that the logical consciousness, operating in conformity with the laws of thought, shall ever be exclusive of intuitive results, is to suppose that philosophy is impossible, and that skepticism is the highest wisdom of man.

The unity of reason, and the harmony of intelligence being kept steadily in view, we have no objections to *any* form of phraseology which shall exactly designate the relations in which the objects of knowledge are contemplated by the mind. There is certainly a distinction between those faculties which are simply receptive and those which operate upon the materials received—those which furnish us with our simple and elementary ideas, and those which combine them into structures of science; and if this is the distinction which Mr. Morell designed to signalize—if he means by intuition, the complement of all our faculties of presentative, and by logical

* See Stewart's Elements, vol. ii. Prelim. Cons. and Hamilton's Reid. Appendix. Note A, § v. p 768 seq. Also p. 511, Note.

consciousness, the complement of all our faculties of representative knowledge—he has aimed at the expression of an obvious truth, but we must take the liberty to say, has been extremely unfortunate in the mode of its development.

He has, in the first place, confounded presentative and intuitive knowledge. These knowledges have not the same logical extension—one is a genus of which the other is a species. All presentative is intuitive, but all intuitive is not presentative knowledge. Intuition may be, and is, constantly applied, not only to the immediate view which the mind has of an object, in an act of presentative cognition, but to the irresistible conviction of the vicarious character of the representative, in an act of representative cognition, as well as to the instantaneous perception of the agreement of subject and predicate in self-evident propositions. To make these distinctions more obvious—knowledge, in its strict acceptation, as contradistinguished from faith, is conversant only about realities, which have been given in experience; and is either mediate or immediate—it is immediate when an object is apprehended in itself without relation to others—mediate when it is known or apprehended in and through its relations. Immediate knowledge is, again, subdivided into presentative and representative—presentative when the object itself, and not an image, conception, or notion of it, is that which is present in consciousness—representative—when it is not the object, but an image, notion, or conception of it, which is present in consciousness. Hence, although all presentative knowledge is immediate, all immediate is not presentative knowledge; and although all mediate knowledge is representative, all representative is not mediate knowledge—and both presentative and representative knowledge may be intuitive. External perception is an instance of presentative and intuitive—memory, of representative and intuitive, knowledge. In the one case, the external object is known in itself, being actually present in consciousness—in the other, the past, which *ex hypothesi*, cannot be present, is apprehended through a modification of the mind representing it. But the knowledge of memory is as strictly self-evident—as strictly independent of proofs—though it may not be as perfect in degree, as the knowledge in ex-

ternal perception. If, now, the logical consciousness embraces all our faculties of presentative, and the intuition-al, all our faculties of representative knowledge--intuition certainly may be common to both. It does not follow that because an object is intuitively known, it is therefore directly and immediately given in consciousness.

His confusion of Intuition and Presentation has led him, in the next place, into a still more remarkable error--the confusion of mediate and indirect knowledge with that which is direct and immediate. When he comes, for example, to account for our conceptions of God, though, with singular inconsistency, he uses terms expressive of presentative cognition, yet in describing the process of developement by which we ascend to the lofty stage of supersensible consciousness--he gives us nothing but evolutions of reasoning--necessary deductions from our primitive and instinctive beliefs. God is not actually present as the object of consciousness--He does not stand before us as the outward object in an act of perception--it is the finite, limited, temporary and dependent, which we immediately apprehend--and in consequence of the necessary laws of mind--these suggest the infinite, eternal, independent and absolute. God, in other words, is not known in Himself--in His separate and distinct existence, as a datum of consciousness; He is apprehended in and through his works--through relations intuitively recognized and spontaneously suggesting the reality of His being. Or we know God, as we know substance, in and through its attributes. This species of knowledge is evidently indirect and mediate. Take away the limited, finite, contingent--take away the necessary belief--that these require a cause--and you take away all Mr. Morell's consciousness of God--and hence we believe in God, not because He is seen or stands face to face with any of our faculties of cognition--but because *other things* are known which are utterly inexplicable except upon the supposition of the divine existence. The heavens declare His glory and the firmament sheweth His handiwork--the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.

We agree most fully that there is a process by which the understanding can, to a limited extent, ascend from

the known to the unknown—that we are so framed as that ourselves—our bodies, our souls and nature around us become *witnesses* for God—but the knowledge we derive in this way, we should never dream of describing as immediate, presentative or direct. Mr. Morell has been betrayed into this inconsistency by making presentation co-extensive with intuition. There is no doubt that this knowledge of God is intuitive—as it results from the indestructible categories of thought—which developed into formal statements are self-evident propositions—in the application to the objects furnished in experience. Constituted as we are, we can neither cognize ourselves nor the world without a belief of God—the belief is inseparably connected with the cognition—we can give no reason for it but that such is the constitution of our nature, that when an effect is given a cause must be admitted—and hence, while we may be said to know, intuitively, we evidently do not know the cause in itself—it is mediated by the effect. The knowledge, in other words, is intuitive, but not presentative.

It is useless to adduce passages to prove what no one, perhaps, will think of disputing, that presentation and intuition are treated as synonymous—but as it may not be so readily conceded that mediate and indirect knowledge is also treated as presentative and immediate, we appeal to the following statements in justification of our assertion.

“Let us take a third instance. The mind, after it has gazed for awhile upon the phenomena of the world around, begins to ponder within itself, such thoughts as these. What is this changing scene, which men call nature? What then is nature? Of what primary elements do all things consist? What is the power and the wisdom through which their infinite forms of beauty, spring forth, live, decay, and then become instinct with a new vitality? In these questions we again discern the activity of a higher state of consciousness than the understanding alone presents. The understanding, looking at the objects presented to us, though the agency of perception, abstracts their properties and classifies them—in a word—it separates things into their genera and species, and there leaves them. But the pure reason, instead of separating the objects of nature, and classifying them into various species, seeks rather to *unite* them, to view them all together—to find the one fundamental essence by which they are

upheld ; to discover the great presiding principle by which they are maintained in unbroken harmony. The Understanding has simply to do with separate objects, viewed in their specific or generic character—the higher reason has to do with them as forming parts of one vast totality, of which it seeks the basis, the origin and the end—with the phenomena of the human mind it is the same. The understanding merely clasifies them, the pure reason inquires into the nature of the principle from which they spring, and views the human mind as a totality, expressing the will and purpose of its great Archetype.

“These two efforts of the reason to seek the nature and origin, both of the universe and the soul, lead naturally and inevitably to the conception of some common ground, from which they are both derived. The soul is not self-created, but is consciously dependent upon some higher power. There must be a type after which it was formed—a self-existent essence from which it proceeded—a supreme *mind* which planned and created my mind. So also with regard to nature. If the universe, as a whole, shows the most perfect harmony, all the parts thereof symmetrically adapted to each other, all proceeding onwards like a machine infinitely complicate, yet never clashing in its minutest wheels and movements; there must be some mind vaster than the universe, one which can take it all in at a single glance, one which has planned its harmony and keeps the whole system from perturbation. In short, if there be *dependent* existence, there must be *absolute* existence—if there be temporal and finite beings, there must be an Eternal and an Infinite *One*. Thus the power of intuition, that highest elevation of the human consciousness, leads us at length into the world of eternal realities. The period of the mind's converse with mere phenomena being past, it rises at length to grasp the mystery of existence and the problem of destiny.”—pp. 20—22.

We beg the reader to examine carefully this passage, and to lay his hand, if he can, upon any thing, but a very awkward and mystical statement—certainly a very feeble and inadequate one, of the common a posteriori argument from effect to cause. Instead of gazing directly upon the Supreme Being and standing face to face with the absolute—we gaze outwardly upon the world, and inwardly upon ourselves, and are conducted by processes of natural and spontaneous inquiry to the admission of an adequate and all-sufficient cause of the wondrous phenomena we behold. Whether our steps be from the finite to the infinite, from the dependent to the absolute—from the

fleeting to the eternal--they are the steps of intelligence mediating a knowledge of God through relations which we intuitively recognize. We see Him only in the operation of His hands. He is mirrored in His works. The knowledge in this case is precisely analogous to that of the external world which the hypothetical realists ascribe to us. We are not directly conscious of its existence, but are conscious of effects produced in ourselves which the constitution of our nature determines us to refer to outward and independent realities.

If Mr. Morell seriously believes that our knowledge of God is presentative, he is bound, of course, that he may be consistent with himself, to postulate a faculty through which the Divine Being may be given as the immediate object of involuntary consciousness. We have the senses through which the various properties of matter are directly and spontaneously cognized; we have taste and conscience which bring us into contact with the beautiful and deformed--the right and the wrong; and to preserve the analogy, we must have some power or sense which shall be directly conversant about God--a faculty of the Divine or the absolute; sustaining the same relations to the Deity which the senses sustain to the outward world--taste to the fair, and conscience to the right. This is the only way in which the theory of presentative knowledge can be consistently carried out in its application to God. But if this be admitted, it is as absurd to talk of hunting up the Deity through the realms of matter and of mind--to be feeling, inquiring, and searching after Him in the regions of the finite, limited and dependent--as it is to represent men as *seeking* the primary qualities of matter, or the elementary distinctions betwixt beauty and deformity--a virtue and a crime. All presentative knowledge comes, in the first instance, unbidden. There is no appetite or instinct for it which leads us in quest of it. We had no conception of matter until we were made conscious of its existence--beauty was an unmeaning word; and we should never have known how to set about comprehending its meaning, until the experience of it was first felt; and if there be a separate and distinct faculty of God, He must be absolutely incognizable and inconceivable by us, until He reaches us through

the medium or instrumentality of this faculty. He must come into the mind like extension, figure, solidity---like beauty, virtue, and all our simple and elementary cognitions. He is not to be a craving of our nature---something longed for and yearned after; but an immediate datum of consciousness---something which we know to be, because he is now and here present to intelligence. But the passage which we have just quoted from our author, is directly in the teeth of any such doctrine. There is no presentation there of any objective realities in themselves but the finite, dependent, and phenomenal---these are alone present in consciousness; but being cognized as *effects*, they give us, as vouchers and witnesses---other existences beyond themselves. They *testify* of God, but do not *present* God. They develop a belief which is natural, spontaneous, and irresistible---whose object is unknown except in so far as it may be collected from their qualities and attributes in their relations to it.

Mr. Morell is equally at fault in the account which he has given of the logical consciousness. This, we have seen---he employs as a compendious expression for all our faculties of representative knowledge. It embraces those processes of the mind which relate to the combination, arrangement, and structure of the sciences---which conduct us from particular phenomena to general laws---which group individual existences into classes, and perform the functions which are commonly denominated discursive. Its first office is to turn our intuitions into notions or conceptions---to give us representatives through the acts of the intellect, of the real and independent existences which are grasped by the faculty of inward or outward perception. It *idealizes*, in other words, the matter of our direct and presentative knowledge. It then decomposes its conceptions, fixes upon one or more elements contained in them---abstracts these from the rest, and makes these abstractions the grounds of classification. To it belongs memory, the mediate knowledge of the past; imagination, the mediate knowledge of the conceivable and possible, and, if Mr. Morell admits such a thing as possible, prescience or the mediate knowledge of the future. He calls this complement of faculties, *logical*; and we think the epithet well chosen to designate representative

in contradistinction from presentative knowledge, because it is in them that the mind is specially *cogitative*—it is in them that the laws and necessary forms of thought, which it is the office of logic to investigate, are conspicuously developed. In presentation the mind *knows*—in representation the mind *thinks*. In presentation there is an immediate object apart from the mind—in representation nothing is directly given but the acts of the mind itself. In presentation the mind may be regarded as comparatively passive—in representation it is wholly and essentially active. In presentation, accordingly, the prominent matter is the object of cognition—in representation, the categories of thought. There are two points, however, in Mr. Morell's doctrine of the logical consciousness, against which we must enter a solemn and decided protest. The first is that our conceptions cannot exactly represent our intuitions—that the remote and ultimate object, as given in an act of mediate and representative cognition, is not precisely the same as the immediate object in an act of direct and presentative cognition. The other is that the understanding cannot enlarge our knowledge of numerical existences—that we can only think the precise, identical realities which have been given in experience, and can infer and prove the substantive existence of nought beyond them.

In relation to the first point we can only speak of what strikes us as the prevailing doctrine of the book—for the author is so vague, vacillating, and inconsistent in his account of conception, that we freely admit that he appears in two passages to teach the doctrine for which we contend. But as a general thing, he maintains that the understanding is exclusively conversant about attributes or properties. "It has to do," he informs us, "entirely with the *attributes* of things—separating, scrutinizing, classifying them, and adapting them, by the aid of judgment and reasoning, to all the purposes of human existence." "Thus every notion," (conception,) he tells us in another place, "we have of an external object—as a house, or a tree, or a flower—is compounded of two elements, a material and a formal. The matter is furnished by the direct sensational intuition of a concrete reality, and this is perception; the form is furnished by the logical faculty

which, separating the attributes of the object, as given in perception, from the essence, constructs a notion or idea (conception) which can be clearly defined and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge." And again :

" Of mere phenomena we can gain a very good knowledge by an intermediate or logical process. We can have the different attributes presented to us as *abstract ideas* ; we can put these attributes together one by one, and thus form a conception of the whole thing as a *phenomenon* ; but this cannot be done in regard to any elementary and essential existence. Of *substance*, for example, we can gain no conception by a logical definition ; the attempt to do so has, in fact, always ended in the denial of substance altogether, considered as an objective reality ; it becomes in this way simply the projected shadow of our own faculties. The only refuge against this logical skepticism, which has uniformly attached itself to a sensational philosophy, is in the immediacy of our higher knowledge—in the fact that we see and feel the existence of a substantial reality around us, without the aid of any logical idea or definition, by which it can be represented or conveyed."—*p.* 37.

Mr. Morell surely cannot mean that through any representative faculty, *original* ideas can be imparted of attributes and qualities which had never been *presentatively* given—that a blind man can be instructed in colours by a logical definition, or a deaf man in sounds. Every simple idea, whether of qualities or not, must, in the first instance, have been conveyed in an act of immediate cognition. What we understand Mr. Morell as teaching is, that the conceptions of the understanding do not adequately represent the cognitions of intuition—that the phenomenon does not mirror the whole reality—that there is something given in perception which cannot be mediated by an act of mind. It is true that this mysterious something is described as the essence or substance of the thing perceived ; and it is equally true that essences or substances are only matters of belief—we neither see them nor feel them—they lie beyond the boundaries of knowledge, whether presentative or otherwise. But we maintain that *whatever* can be perceived or immediately known, can be also imagined or conceived. We can frame an image or notion which shall exactly correspond

to the *whole* object of an inward or outward perception. We can represent *all the essence* that we ever knew. There is no difference between the remote and ultimate object in an act of representative, and the immediate and present object in an act of immediate and presentative cognition. Unless Mr. Morell admits what we understand him to deny, that the vicarious knowledge involved in conception answers exactly to the original knowledge given in intuition, he must maintain that the knowledge of any existence, but that which is now and here present in consciousness, is impossible. All else becomes purely ideal—our conceptions cease to be *representative*; for the very notion of representation implies a reality apart from itself which, as represented, is known. To affirm that the representative does not truly mirror the original, is to invalidate the only conceivable process by which we can pass from the ideal to the actual. It is to deny the fidelity of our faculties, in the irresistible conviction which we have of the reality of the original, though mediated idea, and thus to lay the foundation of universal skepticism. To illustrate by an example, memory is the mediate knowledge of the past. The house, or man, or flower, which we saw yesterday, and remember to have seen to-day, has no longer a present existence in consciousness—what we now contemplate, and immediately cognize, is not the thing itself, but a conception which we feel to be its representative. According to our author, however, this conception is partial and inadequate—it does not embrace *all* that we saw—the most important part—the only part, indeed, which was real, has been omitted. But consciousness assures us that we distinctly and adequately recollect our perception of yesterday—the whole perception precisely as it was experienced—that, to accommodate the language of Mr. Hume, the present idea is an exact transcript of the former impression. If, now, consciousness deceives us in this case—if it lies in pronouncing that to be an adequate representative which is partial, maimed, and defective—what guarantee have we for its veracity in any case? and how, especially, shall we prove that memory and all our powers of mediate knowledge are not faculties of mere delusion? Mr. Morell, it seems to us, must deny all objective existences

apart from the mind, or he must admit that the understanding can frame conceptions exactly commensurate with original intuitions. This we conceive to be the fundamental condition of the certainty of all representative knowledge. We see no alternative between pure idealism and this theory of the understanding. When it abstracts and fixes its attention upon one or more attributes--performing what Mr. Morell regards as its characteristic functions---these attributes are not absolutely conceived, but relatively, as the attributes of real things.

The other point, that the understanding cannot enlarge the boundaries of knowledge, Mr. Morell seems uniformly to treat as well nigh self-evident.

“And yet this logical consciousness, although it is the great instrument of practical life, is entirely subjective and formal — The material with which it has to do is wholly given in sensation and perception; all that it furnishes in addition to this are forms of thought, general notions, categories, and internal processes, which have an abstract or logical value, but which, when viewed alone, are absolutely void of all “content.”—*p.* 16.

If Mr. Morell means nothing more than that the understanding can furnish no original ideas beyond the contents of intuition, the proposition, though unquestionably true, is far from being new. It is universally conceded that no powers of conception, imagination, memory, or reasoning---no processes of definition, analysis, or judgment, can supply the elementary notions of the senses to one who was destitute of the material organism. But if he means, what the tenor of his argument demands, and what we, accordingly, understand him to assert, that all our simple ideas being given, the understanding or the laws of thought cannot conduct us to the full conviction of existences, lying beyond the range of present intuition, the proposition is just as unquestionably false. What transcends the limits of momentary experience can either not be known at all, or it must be known through the medium of the logical consciousness. If it cannot be known at all, then human knowledge, in regard to external things, is limited to what is in immediate contact with the organs of sense—in regard to internal things, to the fleeting consciousness of the moment. We can know nothing of the past---we can know nothing of the distant---

we can predict nothing of the future. In other words, all science is a rank delusion. Even our knowledge of the material world, as embracing a wide range of existence, is an inference of the understanding, and not the result of a direct perception of its amplitude and variety. Upon the theory of external perception, which Mr. Morell has adopted, it is intuitively obvious that we can perceive nothing, or have a presentative cognition of nothing, but that which is in contact with our material organism. The sun, moon, and stars are not objects of perception, but of inference—they are not directly, but representatively known. We can immediately know only what is now and here present in consciousness.

"In the third place," says Sir William Hamilton, "to this head we may refer Reid's inaccuracy in regard to the precise object of perception. This object is not, as he seems frequently to assert, any distant reality; for we are percipient of nothing but what is in proximate contact, in immediate relation, with our organs of sense. Distant realities we reach, not by perception, but by a subsequent process of inference, founded thereon; and so far, as he somewhere says, from all men who look upon the sun perceiving the same object, in reality, every individual, in this instance, perceives a different object, nay, a different object in each several eye. The doctrine of Natural Realism requires no such untenable assumption for its basis. It is sufficient to establish the simple fact, that we are competent, as consciousness assures us, immediately to apprehend through sense the non-ego in certain limited relations; and it is of no consequence whatever, either to our certainty of the reality of a material world, or to our ultimate knowledge of its properties, whether, by this primary apprehension, we lay hold, in the first instance, on a larger or a lesser portion of its contents." And in another place: "A thing to be known *in itself*, must be known as *actually existing*, and it cannot be known as actually existing unless it be known as existing in its *when* and its *where*. But the when and where of an object are *immediately* cognizable by the subject, only if the when be now, (*i. e.* at the same moment with the cognitive act,) and the where be *here*, (*i. e.* within the sphere of the cognitive faculty;) therefore a presentative or intuitive knowledge is only competent of an object *present* to the mind both in *time* and *space*. E converso, whatever is known, but not as *actually existing now and here*, is known not in itself, as the presentative object of an intuitive, but only as the remote object of a representative cognition."

Upon the hypothesis of Mr. Morell, accordingly, which restricts the operations of the understanding to the specific contents which have been given in actual intuitions, the worlds which astronomy discloses to our faith are merely subjective forms and logical processes, and not realities at all. All the deductions of pure mathematics are sheer delusions, inasmuch as they are the products of the understanding operating upon the primary qualities of matter, which alone are furnished in perception. That the results which the Chemist has obtained to-day, shall, under the same circumstances, be verified to-morrow---that like antecedents shall be attended with like consequents in all the departments of philosophy, cannot, with confidence be predicted, since that would be a present knowledge of a future event, and involve a fact numerically different from any which had ever been given in experience. To say that the understanding cannot compass other realities, beside the precise identical ones which have been or are present in consciousness, is to pull down the entire fabrick of human science---to leave us nothing of nature, but the small fragment of its objects within the immediate sphere of our faculties---to make us, without a figure, the creatures of the passing moment. All that can be maintained is, that the understanding cannot conduct us to the knowledge of existences involving elements which have not been derived from some objects of actual intuition. But it may infer and prove the existence of realities involving these elements in different degrees, and different modes of combination, from any that have actually fallen within the sphere of consciousness. We can prove the existence of the Sun, and yet we have never seen him. But without a specific presentation of his substantive reality, we can frame the conception of him by a combination of attributes which have been repeatedly given in other instances of intuition. We ascribe to him nothing but what we know from experience to be properties of matter---and what we know *he* must possess in order to produce the effects which he does. We believe in the existence of animals that we never saw---of lands that we are never likely to visit---of changes and convulsions that shook our globe centuries before its present inhabitants were

born ; and though we have no experience of the future, we can frame images of coming events, all of which may and some of which, as the decay and dissolution of our bodies, most assuredly will take place. Were there not a law of our nature by which we are determined to judge of the future by the past, and a uniformity of events which exactly answers to it, the physical sciences would be impossible, and prudential rules for the regulation of conduct utterly absurd.

So far, indeed, is it from being true, that the understanding does not enlarge our knowledge of real existences, that it is precisely the faculty, or complement of faculties, which gives us the principal part of that knowledge. Intuition supplies us with very few objects—it is limited to a very narrow sphere—but in the materials which it *does* embrace, it gives us the constituents of all beings that we are capable of conceiving. The understanding, impelled to action in the first instance by the presentation of realities, goes forward in obedience to the laws of thought, and infers a multitude of beings lying beyond the range of our presentation, some like those that have been given—others possessed of the same elementary qualities in different degrees and proportions. It is impossible to say how much our knowledge is extended—our knowledge, we mean, of veritable, objective realities, by the processes involved in general reasoning. We can form some conception of the immense importance of abstraction and generalization as subservient to intellectual improvement, by imagining what our condition would be, if we were deprived of the benefits of language. How much better, apart from speech, would be our knowledge than the crude apprehension of the brute? He has, no doubt, all the intuitions of the primary qualities of matter which we possess, but he knows them only as in this or that object—he has never been able to abstract, generalize, classify and name—and, therefore, his knowledge must always be limited to the particular things now and here present in consciousness. He can have no science.

To us, it is almost intuitively obvious that the understanding, as the organ of science, is pre-eminently the faculty of knowledge. Intuition gives us the alphabet—the understanding combines and arranges the letters, in con-

formity with the necessary forms of thought, into the words which utter the great realities of nature, whether material, moral or intellectual. Intuition is the germ---the bud. Understanding, the tree, in full and majestic proportions, spreading its branches and scattering its fruits on all sides. Intuition is the insect's eye---contracted to a small portion of space and a smaller fragment of things. Understanding, the telescope, which embraces within its scope the limitless expanse of worlds---"of planets, suns and adamantine spheres, wheeling unshaken through the void immense."

Mr. Morell has been betrayed into his inadequate representations of the understanding as an instrument of knowledge, by adhering too closely to the Kantian theory of its nature as subjective and formal, without a reference to the circumstances by which the theory, though essentially just, must be limited and modified. We believe most fully that there are and must be laws or categories of thought---that there must be conditions in the subject adapting it to know, as well as conditions in the object adapting it to be known. Thinking is not an arbitrary process---our faculties of representation do not operate at random---there are forms of cogitation which cannot be separated from intelligence without destroying its nature. We care not by what names they are called---they certainly exist---and it is the special function of logic to investigate and analyze them. But one thing is set over against another. These laws of the understanding are designed to qualify it to be an instrument of knowledge. They are the conditions by which a limited and finite creature can stretch its intelligence beyond the points of space and time in which its existence is fixed. The laws of thought are so adjusted to the laws of existence, that whatever is true of our conceptions, will always be true of the *things* which our conceptions *represent*. The operations of the understanding, though primarily and immediately about its own acts, are remotely and mediately about other objects. Its acts are *representative*---and hence it deals with realities through their symbols. If Mr. Morell had kept steadily in view the *representative* character of our logical conceptions---he would have seen that they *must* have respect to something beyond them-

selves, which is not subjective and formal. He would have seen that every operation of mind *must* be cognitive—must involve a judgment. Every conception implies the belief that it is the image of something real, that has been given in experience—every fancy implies a *judgment* that it is the image of something possible, that *might* be given in experience. Attention to this circumstance of the cognitive character of all the operations of mind, would have saved him from the error of supposing that the acts of the understanding were exclusively formal. Kant knew nothing of the distinction betwixt presentative and representative knowledge. His conceptions, therefore, involved no judgment—they were not the images of a reality, as given in intuition—they were purely the products of the mind, and corresponded to nothing beyond the domain of consciousness. Had he recognized the truth, that every intellectual act is *cognitive*, and every act of the understanding *representative*, he would have “saved the main pillars of human belief”—and while he still might have taught, what we believe he has unanswerably demonstrated, that space and time are native notions of the mind and not generalizations from experience—he would have seen that, as native notions, they were the indispensable conditions of its apprehending the time and space properties of matter, and have accorded, consequently, an objective reality to extension, solidity and figure, which his theory, in its present form, denies—he would have seen that the understanding is as truly conversant about *things* as intuition—that the only difference betwixt them in this respect is, that the one deals with them and apprehends them directly—the other, through means of representatives—and that, consequently, the conclusions of the understanding, legitimately reached, must have a counterpart in objective reality as truly as the cognitions of sense. We are sorry to say that Mr. Morell, though professing to adopt the distinctions to which we have adverted, falls again and again into the peculiarities of the Kantian hypothesis, against which they are a protest. Take the following passage:

“Perception, viewed alone, indicates simply the *momentary consciousness* of an external reality, standing before us face to

face; but it gives us no *notion* which we can define and express by a term. To do this, is the office of the understanding—the logical or constructive faculty, which seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception, moulds it into an idea—expresses the idea by a word or sign, and then lays it up in the memory, as it were a hewn stone, all shaped and prepared for use, whenever it may be required, either for ordinary life, or for constructing a scientific system. Thus every notion we have of an external object—as a house, a tree, or a flower—is compounded of two elements, a material and a formal. The matter is furnished by the direct sensational intuition of a concrete reality—and this is perception: the form is furnished by the logical faculty, which separating the attributes of the object as given in perception from the essence, constructs a notion or idea, which can be clearly defined and employed as a fixed term in the region of our reflective knowledge.” p. 45.

This passage, upon any theory but that of Kant, and even upon that theory it requires modification, is absolutely unintelligible. Upon the theory which Mr. Morell professes to adopt, it is pure gibberish. “*The understanding seizes upon the concrete material that is given immediately in perception.*” Now this “concrete material” was the “*external reality standing before us face to face.*” Are we then to understand that the understanding captures the outward object *itself*? If so, it surely has matter as well as form. But then it *moulds* the concrete material into an *idea*, dubs it with a name, and lays it away in the memory. What does he mean, what can he mean, by moulding an external reality into an idea? But it seems that, in this moulding process, though the understanding had originally seized the concrete reality, yet by some means or other, the *essence* slipped between its fingers, and the notion or idea lodged away in the memory, retains nothing but the qualities. Now what is the real process of the mind which all this nonsense is designed to represent? Perception gives us the external reality in those qualities which our faculties are capable of apprehending. We know it in itself, and as now and here existing. Conception, or rather imagination, is an act of the understanding, producing an *image* or *representative* of the object—it seizes upon no *material* given from without—the *immediate* matter of its knowledge is its own act—and that act, from its very con-

stitution, vicarious of something beyond itself. "A representation," says Sir William Hamilton,* "considered as an *object*, is logically, not really, different from a representation considered as an *act*. Here, object and act are the same indivisible mode of mind viewed in two different relations. Considered by reference to a mediate object represented, it is a representative object—considered by reference to the mind representing and contemplating the representation—it is a representative act." Hence, in every operation of the logical consciousness, what we *immediately* know is not the external reality, but a modification of the mind itself, and through that modification we know the external object. The form and immediate matter, therefore, cannot be separated even in thought.

Mr. Morell indeed speaks of forms and categories of thought in such terms as to imply that the mind *creates* the qualities which it represents in its conceptions. This, of course, is to deny that its acts are properly representative, to shut us up within the prison of hopeless idealism. The laws of thought enable the mind, not *to create*, but to image, figure or represent—they enable it to *think* a thing which is not before it. But they do not enable it to invest it with a single property which it does not possess—and they are violated whenever a thing is thought otherwise than as it actually exists. The mind as intelligent, and things as intelligible, are adapted to each other.

We may now condense into a short compass what we conceive to be the truth in contradistinction from Mr. Morell's doctrine of the understanding, in the points to which we have adverted. We believe then that this faculty, or rather complement of faculties, possesses the power of representing, and of completely and adequately representing, every individual thing, whether a concrete whole, or a single attribute, which ever has been presented in intuition. "It stamps," in the language of Aristotle, "a kind of impression of the *total process* of perception, after the manner of one who applies a signet to wax." This is the fundamental condition of the certainty of its results. For, as Sir William Hamilton expresses it, "it is only deserving of the name of knowledge in so far as it is conformable to the intuitions it represents." There is no separation of the essence from the

* Hamilton's Reid, p. 809.

attributes in an act of recollective imagination—what was given in intuition, and *all* that was given, is pictured in the image. As representative, we believe in the next place, that the understanding is ultimately conversant about *things*—realities—and not fictions or empty forms. What it proves of its conceptions legitimately framed will hold good of the objects which they represent—its ideas are, if we may so speak, the *language* of reality. In the next place, it is not confined to the numerical particulars which have been actually given in intuition. It is dependent upon presentation for all the elements it employs in its representations—it can originate no new simple idea—but testimony and the evidence of facts—induction and deduction, may lead it—may compel it—to acknowledge the existence of beings—which in their concrete realities have never been matters of direct experience. It frames a conception of them from the combination of the elements given in intuition in such proportions as the evidence before it seems to warrant. Thus the geologist describes the animals which perished amid what he believes to be the ruins of a former world—thus we believe in the monsters of other climes—the facts of history and the calculations of science.

After what has already been said, it is hardly necessary to devote much space to the detailed and articulate account of the distinction betwixt the logical and intuitional consciousness, upon which Mr. Morell has evidently bestowed much labour, and to which he attaches no small degree of importance, in consequence of the part which it is destined to play in his subsequent speculations. His first observation is that “the knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *representative* and *indirect*; while that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is *presentative* and *immediate*.” This is the fundamental difference of the two complements of faculties. Intuition, or as in consequence of the ambiguity and vagueness of that term, we should prefer to call it, Presentation, embraces all our powers of original knowledge. Through it we are furnished with whatsoever simple ideas we possess—it is the *beginning* of our intellectual strength—the logical consciousness, on the other hand—embraces all our powers of representative knowledge—it builds the fabric of science

from the materials presentatively given---it comprehends all the processes of thought which the mind is led to carry on in consequence of the impulse received in presentation. If Mr. Morell had consistently adhered to this fundamental distinction, and admitted no differences but what might naturally be referred to it, he would have been saved from much needless confusion, perplexity and self-contradiction.

His second observation is that, "the knowledge we obtain by the logical consciousness is *reflective*; that which we obtain by the intuitional consciousness is spontaneous." This distinction, we confess, has struck us with amazement. In the first place, upon Mr. Morell's theory of the soul---*spontaneity* is the indispensable condition of all intelligence---it is of the very essence---substance---substratum of mind. Reflection, therefore, is not something *distinct from*, it is only a *form*, of spontaneity. "The power of the will," he tells us, "operates through all the region of man's spontaneous life;" "our activity is equally voluntary and equally moral in its whole aspect." In the next place, upon any just view of the subject, what we are authorized to affirm is, that all reflective knowledge is representative, but not, that all representative knowledge is reflective. The two propositions are by no means convertible. Reflection is nothing but attention to the phenomena of mind. It is the observation---if you please---the study, of what passes within. "The peculiar phenomena of philosophy," says one* who has insisted most largely upon the spontaneous and reflective aspects of reason---"are those of the other world, which every man bears within himself, and which he perceives by the aid of the inward light which is called consciousness, as he perceives the former by the senses. The phenomena of the inward world appear and disappear so rapidly, that consciousness perceives them and loses sight of them almost at the same time. It is not then sufficient to observe them transiently, and while they are passing over that changing scene; *we must retain them as long as possible by attention*. We may do even still more. We may call up a phenomenon from the bosom of the night into which it has vanished, summon it again to memory, and reproduce it in our minds for the sake of contemplating it at our ease; we

* Cousin. Frag. Phil. Pref.

may recall one part of it rather than another, leave the latter in the shade, so as to bring the former into view, vary the aspects in order to go through them all and to embrace every side of the object; *this is the office of reflection.*" Reflection is to psychology what observation and experiment are to physics. Now to say that all our representative knowledge depends upon attention to the processes of our own minds---that we know only as we take cognizance of the laws and operations of our faculties, is too ridiculous for serious refutation. Even Mr. Morell starts back from the bouncing absurdity---and with what consistency we leave it to our readers to determine---reluctantly admits that, "there is evidently a sense in which all the faculties, even the logical consciousness itself, may be regarded as having a spontaneous movement, such as we have described---a sense in which we cast our knowledge spontaneously and unreflectively, into a logical mould." In order to extricate himself, however, from the contradiction in which he is involved, he invents another meaning for reflective, in which he makes it synonymous with *scientific*. But we do not see that this subterfuge relieves him. All representative knowledge is surely not scientific---nor attained upon scientific principles. The elements of science must exist and be known representatively, before science itself can be constructed, and reflection always presupposes spontaneous processes as the objects of its attention. Without spontaneity there could be no reflectively. There would be nothing to reflect upon. Reflection, therefore, is simply an instrument, or faculty of one species of representative knowledge---the organon through which science is constructed from spontaneous data---whether those data be the spontaneous facts of presentation or the spontaneous processes of representation. All the faculties and operations of mind can be made the objects of cotemplation and of study. If Mr. Morell, therefore, had said that our faculties of presentation include no power of reflection---that this belonged to the logical consciousness---he would have announced a truism---but a truism about as important in reference to the object he had in view, as if he had said that memory and imagination belong to the understanding and not to intuition.

His third observation is that, "the knowledge we ob-

tain by the intuitional consciousness is *material*, that which we gain by the logical consciousness is *formal*." Now formal, as opposed to material, amounts in our judgment to about the same thing as *nothing* in contrast to *something*. That the understanding is a complement of *formal* faculties, is a proposition which we not only are able to comprehend, but fully believe—that the *knowledge* we obtain by means of these faculties is *formal*, is a proposition which we frankly confess transcends our powers of thought—a *form* without *something* to which it is attached, passes our comprehension. The matter of knowledge means, if it means any thing, the *object* known. Now in intuition there is but a single object, which is apprehended in itself and as really existing—in the logical consciousness, there is a double object—the act of the mind representing what is immediately and presentatively known—and the thing represented, which is mediately and remotely known. The *matter*, therefore, both in intuition and the logical consciousness, is ultimately the same—it is only differently related to the mind—in the one case it stands before us face to face—in the other case, it stands before us through the forms of the understanding. Hence it is sheer nonsense to speak of the logical consciousness as *matterless*, which is equivalent to saying that it *knows*, but knows *nothing*. Mr. Morell, though expressing great admiration of Sir William Hamilton's theory, in which we heartily unite with him, departs from it precisely in the points in which it is absolutely fatal to idealism.

His fourth observation is that "the logical consciousness tends to *separation* (analysis,) the intuitional consciousness tends to *unity* (synthesis)." Analysis and synthesis, in the proper acceptation of the terms, are both expressive of purely logical processes—the one being the reverse of the other. The idea of a *whole* is a logical conception, implying the relation of parts, and presupposing both analysis and synthesis, as the condition of its being framed. The induction of Aristotle, for example, is a synthesis—the deduction, an analysis. Presentation may give us things in the *lump* or *mass*—a dead unity; but the separation and subsequent recomposition of parts are offices which belong exclusively* to the understanding. Mr. Morell has admitted as much—"knowing," says he—"as we do too

* p. 59.

well, that the intuitions we obtain of truth in its concrete unity are not perfect, we seek to restore and verify that truth by *analysis*, i. e. by separating it into parts, viewing each of those parts abstractedly by itself, and finding out their relative consistency, so as to put them together by a logical and reflective construction, into a systematic and formal *whole*. Hence the impulse to know truth *aright* gives perpetual vitality and activity to the law by which our spontaneous and intuitional life passes over into the logical and reflective. Logical reasoning is the result of human imperfection struggling after restoration." This is well and sensibly said—and as it is a clear concession that the logical consciousness *tends to unity*—that the very end of its analysis is an adequate synthesis—we cannot but marvel that either of these functions should have been ascribed to intuition. Kant's reason, accordingly, which aimed at an all-comprehensive unity of existence—is simply the understanding moving in a higher sphere—and its regulative ideas nothing but the categories under a new name and translated to a different province. There is no distinction according to him between the powers themselves or the *modes* of their operation—they were conversant about different objects—Reason being to the conceptions of the understanding, what the understanding was to the intuitions of sense. Kant, too, made his reason seek after its darling unity or totality of being, through the same processes of generalization, by which the understanding reaches its lower unities and separate totalities in the various departments of science.

The synthetick judgments of Kant, upon which Mr. Morell seems to have shaped his conceptions of synthesis, are not instances of synthesis at all. They are amplifications or extensions of our knowledge—they are new materials added to the existing stock, and are either presentative or mediate according to the circumstances under which they are made. The discovery of new qualities in substances is, of course, presentative, but what he denominates synthetic judgments *a priori*, involve only simple beliefs—the object of the belief being unknown—as in the case of substance—or an indirect and representative knowledge of the object as given in its relations to the things which spontaneously suggest it. In all cases in

which the ultimate object *known* is mediated and represented, in virtue of the essential constitution of the mind, upon occasions in which other objects are the immediate data of consciousness, the process belongs, according to the fundamental distinction of our author, to the logical and not the intuitional consciousness; in these cases there is a law of belief, necessary and indestructible, which authenticates the premises of a syllogism, conducting us logically, not presentatively, from what is given in experience, to what experience is incapable of compassing---and which, therefore, cannot be immediately known. We grant that such judgments are *intuitive*---the grounds of belief are in the very structure of the soul---they involve primary and incomprehensible cognitions---but the objective realities apprehended in virtue of these beliefs, are not themselves directly given in consciousness. They are conceptions of the mind *necessitated* as vicarious of real existence. The conclusion of such a syllogism is not the simple assertory judgment of presentative intuition, *something is*, but the imperative and necessary declaration of representative intuition---something *must* be; it is not expressed by the formula something is, because it is actually apprehended in itself and as existing---but something is, because the mind is incapable of conceiving that it is *not*. The mind does not so much affirm the reality of existence as deny the impossibility of non-existence. This is the nature of the synthesis in that class of judgments to which Mr. Morell has referred---and how it differs from what all the world has been accustomed to regard as the logical process involved in *a posteriori* reasoning, we leave it to the rationalists to determine.

Mr. Morell's fifth note of distinction is that, "the logical consciousness is *individual*; the intuitional consciousness is *generic*." That is, if we understand our author, the truths about which the logical consciousness is conversant depend, in no degree, for the confirmation of their certainty, upon the common consent of mankind, while the truths about which the intuitional consciousness is conversant are to be received in consequence of the universal testimony of the race.

"We feel conscious," says he, "that *there are* certain points of

truth respecting which we can appeal to our own individual understanding with unerring certainty. No amount of contradiction, for example, no weight of opposing testimony from others, could ever shake our belief in the definitions and deductions of mathematical science or the conclusions of a purely logical syllogism. On the other hand, we are equally conscious, upon due consideration, that there are truths respecting which we *distrust* our individual judgments and gain certainty in admitting them, only from the concurring testimony of other minds, (of this nature, for example, are the main points of moral and religious truth.) Hence it appears evident that there is within us both an individual and a generic element; and that answering to them there are truths for which we may appeal to the individual reason, and truths for which we must appeal to the testimony of mankind as a whole."—p. 52—3.

He then goes on to observe that "the ground of this two-fold element in our constitution, and the reconciliation of the respective claims of the individual reason and the *common sense* of humanity, is easily explained, when we take into account the distinction which we have been developing between the logical and the intuitional consciousness. It will be readily seen, upon a little consideration, that the logical consciousness is stamped with a perfect individualism, the intuitional consciousness with an equally universal or generic character. The logical consciousness, as we have shown, is *formal*; and it is in those branches of knowledge which turn upon formal definitions, distinctions and deductions, (such as Mathematicks or logic,) that we feel the most perfect trust in the certainty of our individual conclusions. The understanding, in fact, is framed so as to act on certain principles, which we may term *laws of thought*, and whatever knowledge depends upon the simple application of these laws, is as certain and infallible as human nature can possibly make it. The laws of thought, (or in other words, the logical understanding) present a *fixed element* in every individual man; so that the testimony of one sound mind, in this respect, is as good as a thousand. Were not the forms of reasoning, indeed, alike for all, there could no longer be any certain communication between man and man. The intuitional consciousness, on the other hand, is not formal but material; and in gazing upon the actual elements of knowledge, our perception of their truth just depends upon the extent to which the intuitive faculty is awakened and matured. The *science* of music, for example, is absolutely the same for every *human understanding*; but the real perception of harmony, upon which the science depends as its material basis,

turns entirely upon the extent to which the direct sensibility for harmony is awakened. And so it is with regard to every other subject which involves a direct element of supersensual truth. The intensity with which we realize it depends upon the state of our *intuitional consciousness*, so far at least as the subject in question is concerned. Here there are no fixed and uniform laws of intellection, as in the logical region, but a progressive intensity from the weakest up to the strongest power of spiritual vision, or of intellectual sensibility.—pp. 53—4.

We shall need no apology to our readers for these long extracts, when they reflect that the distinction in question plays a very prominent part in the author's subsequent speculations, especially in relation to the origin and developement of the religious life, and the foundations and criterion of religious certitude. The whole force of the argument for that species of modern realism, which is involved in the modern doctrine of progress, and which Le Roux has so eloquently expounded and the socialists so coarsely practised, is here presented. The individual is nothing—humanity is every thing. The genus man is not a logical abstraction—not a second intention—but a real, substantive entity; and mankind is not the collection of all the individuals of the human race, but something which, though inseparable, is yet distinct, and to which each is indebted for his human character. Something of this sort seems to be implied in making intuition a generic element, in contradistinction from understanding as personal and individual, and depending for its perfection, not upon the culture of the individual, but upon the developement of the race. Something very like it is directly affirmed, when our author teaches that

“Intuition being a thing not formal, but material—not uniform, but varying—not subject to rigid laws, but exposed to all the variations of association and temperament, being in fact the *function of humanity*, and not of the individual mind—the only means of getting at the essential elements of primary intuitional truth, is to grasp that which rests on the common sympathies of mankind in its historical developement, after all individual impurities and idiosyncracies have been entirely stripped away.”—p. 55.

But, bating the vein of Realism which pervades this and the other passages we have quoted, the proposition

of the author, so far as it has sense, is that the operations of the understanding are as perfect in each individual as in the whole race collectively, and that its deliverances cannot be affected by an appeal to the testimony of mankind—that what it pronounces to be true must be true to *us*, though all the race should unite in contradicting it. We can never be assured of the certainty of intuitional truth, however, without comparing the deliverances of *our* consciousness with the consciousness of other men—the touchstone of certainty is universal consent. The understanding, in other words, vindicates to itself the absolute right of private judgment—the intuition appeals to the authority of Catholic tradition. This is the thesis. The arguments are: 1st. That, in point of fact, the most certain truths, those about which we feel it impossible to doubt, are the truths of the understanding—he instances, mathematicks and logick. The example of logick is unfortunate. That science is not even yet perfect.—There are sundry points upon which logicians are not agreed, and others intimately connected with the subject, to which hardly any attention has been paid. The Apodictic Syllogism has been thoroughly investigated—but will Mr. Morell venture to say the same of the Inductive? Will he pretend that any writer upon logick has kept steadily and consistently in view its distinctive character as a science of forms, and never interpolated or corrupted it with considerations of matter? As to mathematicks, its conclusions are certain, and certain precisely because it deals with hypotheses and not with realities. But, then, it is a prodigious leap from the proposition that *some* truths are certain within the circle of the understanding, to the proposition that *all* truths peculiar to it are certain—that because it admits of demonstration at all, therefore it admits of nothing *but* demonstration. The same process of argument would establish the same result in regard to intuition. What can be more indubitable to us than our own personality—our indiscerptible identity—the existence of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions? “no amount of contradiction, no weight of opposing testimony from others, could ever shake our belief” in the reality of the being which every man calls *himself*, or those processes of intellect which consciousness distinctly af-

firms. What human understanding can withhold its assent from the great laws of causality, substance, contradiction, and excluded middle? These are all intuitive truths—we receive them on the naked deliverance of consciousness; and we can no more deny them than we can annihilate ourselves. Certainty, therefore, is not *peculiar* to the understanding, as contradistinguished from intuition. But, says the author, *some* intuitional truths—those, for example, of morals and religion—are *uncertain*; in so far as we depend upon the single testimony of our own minds. But are not some logical truths uncertain also? Is every thing demonstrative, reduced to apodictic certainty in the *sciences* of morals, government, politics, chemistry, botany, and history? Is it not a characteristic of the evidence upon which the ordinary business of life is conducted, that it admits of every variety of degrees from the lowest presumption to the highest certainty? Is there no such thing as a calculation of chances? and no such thing as being deceived by logical deductions?—The author somewhere tells us that the “purely logical mind, though displaying great acuteness, yet is oftentimes involved in a mere empty play upon words, forms, and definitions; making endless divisions, and setting up the finest distinctions, while the real matter of truth itself either escapes out of these abstract moulds, or, perchance, was never in them.”*

One would think, therefore, that it was not so infallible after all. As then certainty is not restricted to the understanding, nor the understanding to it, the same ground of appeal, from private judgment to the verdict of the race, exists in reference to *its* deliverances which the author postulates from the testimony of intuition. The argument is valid for both or neither. 2d. His next position is, that the intuitional consciousness is susceptible of improvement, of education, developement. The logical consciousness is fixed and unchanging. If we admit the fact, it is not so easy to discover its pertinency as an argument, so far as intuition is concerned. We may grant that if the *understanding* is the *same* in all minds, the testimony of one is as good as the testimony of a thousand—but it does not appear that because the degrees of intuition are different in different minds, therefore each

* pp. 16--7.

mind must appeal to all others before it can be certain of its own intuitions. One man may see *less* than another, but it does not follow that he is dependent upon the testimony of that other for the assurance that he sees the little that he *does* see. We cannot comprehend why *he* should not *know* that he sees what he sees, however little it may be, as well as others know that they see their more. But it is positively false that the understanding is not susceptible of progress and improvement. The powers of reasoning and of representative thought can be developed and educated—have their germ, expansion, and maturity, as well as the powers of intuition. The laws of thought may be fixed, but the capacity of applying or acting in obedience to these laws, is by no means fixed. It is a capacity which requires *culture*; and the multiplied instances of bad reasoning in the world, to which our author has contributed his full proportion, are so many proofs that man must be taught to reason and to think, as well as to *know*. There is an immense difference betwixt the logical consciousness of a Newton and of a Hottentot; betwixt the logical consciousness of Newton at twelve and Newton at fifty. These *laws* of thought are the same to all men, and to the same men at all times; but the men themselves are not the same. If these laws were always faithfully observed, error might be avoided; but the amount of truth that should be discovered, would depend upon the degree to which the faculties were developed, and not upon the laws which preserve them from deceit. But unfortunately there is a proneness to intellectual guilt in transgressing the laws of thought, which is as fruitful a source of error as defect of capacity is of ignorance; and each is to be remedied by a proper course of intellectual culture. But if the argument from fixed laws proves the understanding to be fixed and unchanging, it may be retorted with equal force against the progressiveness of intuition. It is true that Mr. Morell affirms that this form of intellection “has no fixed and uniform laws;” but this is an error arising from the relation in which he apprehends that the laws or forms of thought stand to representative cognitions. They are the *conditions*, not the *matter*, of this species of intelligence. They are not the *things* known, but the *means* of knowing. They solve the problem of the possibility of medi-

ate knowledge. Now corresponding to them, there are, in all instances of representative cognition, *conditions* in the thing known, which render it capable of being apprehended by the mind. The qualities, phenomena—properties which make it cognizable—make it capable of coming within the sphere of consciousness—are laws of intuition as certain and fixed as the relations of things to the mind. In other words, the adaptations of things to our faculties are as truly laws of intuition, as the adaptations of our faculties to *think* them are laws of the logical consciousness. Hence, if the argument from the reality of laws cuts off the understanding from an appeal to universal consent, it cuts off intuition also, and we are shut up to private judgment in the one case, by the same process which shut us up to it in the other. It is no distinction, consequently, betwixt the understanding and intuition, to say that the one is individual and the other generic. They are both equally individual—both equally generic; both belong to *every* man, and therefore to all men; both may subsist in different degrees, in different men, and in the same men at different times, and both are consequently susceptible of education and improvement.

The truth is, Mr. Morell has entirely mistaken the purpose for which philosophers are accustomed to appeal from private judgment to the general voice of mankind. It is not to authenticate the deliverances of intuition—not to certify us that we see when we see or know that we know—our own consciousness is the only voucher which we can have in the case. Every faculty is its own witness. In the case of the understanding, others may point out fallacies and guard against errors, but our *own minds* must perform the process, before there is any *logical truth* to us. In the case of intuition, the voice of mankind cannot help us, if we are destitute of the power, or if it is unawakened, nor add a particle to the degree of clearness with which we apprehend existences, nor to the degree of certainty with which we repose upon the data of consciousness. Others may suggest the occasions upon which the intuitions shall arise or indicate the hinderances which prevent them; but the intuitions themselves are and must be the immediate grounds of belief. From the very nature of the case all truth must be individually

apprehended, though all truth is not necessarily apprehended as individual. Private judgment is always and on all subjects the last appeal. Nothing is truth to *us*, whatever it may be in itself, until it is brought in relation to our own faculties, and the extent to which they grasp it, is the sole measure of our knowledge. But there is a question upon which an appeal to common consent is an indispensable means of guarding against error, misapprehension, and mistake; and of rectifying inadequate, false or perverted judgments; but that question happens to be one which concerns directly the operations of the logical understanding. It is simply whether reflection exactly represents the spontaneous movements of the soul. The distinction betwixt reflection and spontaneity has been ably and happily illustrated by Cousin:

"To know without giving an account of our knowledge to ourselves; to know and to give an account of our knowledge to ourselves—this is the only possible difference between man and man; between the people and the philosopher. In the one, reason is altogether spontaneous; it seizes at first upon its objects; but without returning upon itself and demanding an account of its procedure; in the other, reflection is added to reason; but this reflection, in its most profound investigations, cannot add to natural reason a single element which it does not already possess; it can add to it nothing but the knowledge of itself. Again, I say reflection well-directed—for if it be ill-directed it does not comprehend natural reason in all its parts; it leaves out some element, and repairs its mutilations only by arbitrary inventions. First to omit, then to invent—this is the common vice of almost all systems of philosophy. The office of philosophy is to reproduce in its scientific formulas the pure faith of the human race—nothing less than this faith—nothing more than this faith; this faith alone, but this faith in all its parts."*

This is justly and beautifully said. It is assumed that all minds are essentially the same—and when the question is what are the phenomena of consciousness—what are the laws, faculties, and constitution of the soul—this question can only be answered by unfolding the nature of its spontaneous movements. In these the constitution of the intellect is seen. But from the fleeting, delicate, and intangible nature of the phenomena, it is extremely difficult to reproduce them in reflection, and make them the

* Phil. Frag. Pref.

objects of scientific study. It is no easy thing to reconstitute the intellectual life—"to re-enter," in the language of the distinguished philosopher just quoted—"to re-enter consciousness, and there, weaned from a systematic and exclusive spirit, to analyze thought into its elements, and all its elements, and to seek out in it the characters, and all the characters, under which it is at present manifested to the eye of consciousness." This is the office of reflection. As the phenomena which it proposes to describe are essentially the same in all minds, every man becomes a witness of the truth or falsehood of the description. Common consent is a criterion of certainty, because there is little possibility that all mankind should concur in a false statement of their own intellectual operations. It is particularly in regard to our original and primitive cognitions that this appeal to the race is accustomed to be made. One of the acknowledged peculiarities which distinguish them, is the *necessity* of believing, and of this necessity universal agreement is an infallible proof. We wish to know whether any given principle is a primary and necessary datum of consciousness—whether it belongs essentially to intelligence; and this question is answered by showing that it is a characteristic of all minds. But in all cases in which reflection appeals to the testimony of the race, that testimony is not regarded as the immediate ground of faith, but as a corroborative proof that we have not fallen into error. It is the deliverance of consciousness which determines belief; and when it is found that every other consciousness gives the same deliverance, we are satisfied that our reflection has not been partial or defective. But if the voice of mankind is against us, we feel that we have erred somewhere, and consequently retrace our steps—analyze thought with greater minuteness and attention; and thus make the verdict of the race the occasion of reflection being led to correct itself. This is the true nature of the appeal which a sound philosophy makes to the testimony of mankind.—The question is, what are the phenomena of spontaneity? Reflection undertakes to answer, and the answer is certified to be correct when all in whom these phenomena are found, concur in pronouncing it to be true. Each man answers for himself from his own consciousness, and the

philosopher feels that there is no further occasion to review his analysis. He has been led, for example, to announce the existence of the external world as an original datum of consciousness. He thinks he finds in his belief of it that criterion of necessity which distinguishes primitive cognitions, but it is so hard to seize upon the spontaneous phenomena of the mind with certainty and precision—that he may mistake prejudice, association, or an early judgment, for an original belief. He appeals to other minds—he finds the belief to be universal—he is confirmed consequently in regarding it as necessary, and therefore natural; and hence he is satisfied that reflection has, in this case, exactly described spontaneity. It would appear, therefore, that instead of saying the intuitional consciousness is generic, and the logical, individual, it would be much nearer the truth to assert that the *spontaneous* consciousness, in all its operations, whether intuitional or logical, is generic, or essentially the same in all minds; and the *reflective*, individual, or modified by personal and accidental peculiarities. And this is precisely the distinction which Cousin makes. Reason, which, with him, is synonymous with intelligence, without regard to our author's distinction of a twofold form—in its spontaneous movements is impersonal—it is not mine nor yours—it belongs not even to humanity itself—it is identical with God; and upon the ground that “humanity as a mass, is spontaneous and not reflective,” he declares that “humanity is inspired.” Reason, on the other hand, in its reflective movements—when its deliverances are made the object of attention, analysis, and study—is subjective and personal, or rather appears to be so from its relations to reflection, while its general relations to the Ego, in which it has entered, renders it liable, though in itself infallible and absolute, to aberrations and mistakes. “Reflection, doubt, and skepticism, appertain to some men,” such is his language, “pure apperception and spontaneous faith appertain to all; spontaneity is the genius of humanity, as philosophy is the genius of some men. In spontaneity there is scarcely any difference between man and man. Doubtless there are some natures more or less happily endowed, in whom thought clears its way more easily, and inspiration manifests itself with more

brightness ; but, in the end, though with more or less energy, thought develops itself spontaneously in all thinking beings ; and it is this identity of spontaneity, together with the identity of absolute faith it engenders, which constitutes the identity of human kind." The distinction here indicated is just and natural, but it is very far from the distinction signalized by our author.

His sixth and final observation that "the logical consciousness is fixed through all ages, the intuitional consciousness *progressive*," is but a consequence of his positions which we have just been discussing. We need only detain the reader to remark that the author has evidently confounded the progress or education of the *faculties* with the progress and improvement of society. The probability is, that among any cultivated people the degree to which mind is developed is not essentially different in one age from what it is in another. The thinkers of the present generation, for example, have no *greater* capacity of thought than the Greek philosophers, the schoolmen, or philosophers and Divines of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The present age may *know* more, in consequence of the labours of those that have preceded ; but as its greater amount of knowledge, under the circumstances of the case, involves no greater amount of effort ; and as it is healthful exercise, and not the number or variety of objects that elicit it, which develops the mind, Society may be in advance in point of knowledge—the standard of general intelligence may be higher, while yet the standard of intellectual vigour and maturity may be essentially the same. The tyro now begins where Newton left off—but it does not follow that because he begins there, he has the capacities or intellectual strength of Newton—all generations, mentally considered, are very much upon a level. Every man has to pass through the same periods of infancy, childhood, and youth—but in reference to the *objects* which occupy attention, each successive age may profit by the labours of its predecessors, and thus make superior attainments in knowledge, without a corresponding superiority of mental intensity or power. The progress of society, therefore, is not due, as Mr. Morell seems to intimate, to the progress of intuition—it is not that we have *better faculties* than our fathers, but that we

employ them under better advantages. Their eyes were as good as ours, but we stand upon a mountain. We need not add that we have no sympathy in the mystic realism which dreams of a destiny of humanity apart from the destiny of the individuals who compose the race—a destiny to which every generation is working up, and which is yet to be enjoyed only by the last, or by those in the last stage of developement—we can hardly comprehend how that can be a destiny of *humanity*, in which immense multitudes, to whom that humanity belongs, have no immediate share, and to which they stand in no other relation than that of precursors and contributors. Least of all do we believe that any progressive developement of human nature *as it is*, will ever conduct any individual to that condition of excellence in which the “whole sensibilities of his nature” are brought “into harmony with the Divine—with *the life of God*.” This consummation requires a transformation as well as education—renovation as well as progress. We must be new creatures in Christ Jesus, before we can be partakers of a Divine nature.

Having explained the distinctions betwixt the logical and intuitional consciousness, Mr. Morell proceeds to expound their connection and dependence. He represents “logical reasoning as the result of human imperfection struggling after intellectual restoration.” The case is this: The harmony of our nature with moral, intellectual, and religious truth has been disturbed and deranged, and the consequence is “that the power of intuition is at once diminished and rendered uncertain. The reality of things, instead of picturing itself, as it were, upon the calm surface of the soul, casts its reflection upon a mind disturbed by evil, by passion, by prejudice, by a thousand other influences which distort the image, and tend to efface it altogether.” To correct our defective and imperfect intuitions, we resort to the double processes of analysis and synthesis. We separate the parts, compare them with each other, and from the perception of their consistencies and adaptations, re-construct our knowledge into a logical whole, which shall more faithfully correspond to reality than the original intuitions themselves. Upon this remarkable statement we hope to be indulged in a few observations.

As logical or representative truth is based upon and necessarily presupposes presentative, it never can be more certain than intuition. Demonstration is strictly an intuitive process. In the pure Mathematicks, the conceptions involved in the definitions, which are the subject matter of the reasoning, are not regarded as *representative*—they are the *things* and the only *things* to which reference is had—and every step in every demonstration is a direct gazing upon some property or content of these conceptions. As the logical consciousness only reproduces the elementary cognitions of intuition, it can add nothing to them—it can neither increase their intensity, remove their obscurity, nor directly reduce them to consistency. It must faithfully represent them just as they are. Inconsistencies in our reflective exhibitions of truth may indeed send us back to our original intuitions and make us repeat the occasions on which they are produced, so that we may question them with more minuteness and attention—but it is not the *intuitions* which we suppose to be defective, but our *accounts* of them. We seek to correct the inadequacies of memory by the completeness of consciousness. If a man's powers of intuition, therefore, are deranged upon any subject, no processes of ratiocination will cure him. Logic is neither eyes to the blind, nor ears to the deaf. And if a man is destitute of the moral faculty, reasoning will be utterly incompetent to put him in possession of the notions of right, duty and obligation—or if his intuitional faculties are defective and disordered—he can only reason upon the defective and distorted conceptions which faithfully represent them. He can never have clearer notions till he is furnished with sounder faculties. It is true that logical exposition may be the means of awakening, developing and maturing intuitions—but then the logical expositions must come from others who have actually had the intuitions described—or from the God that made us. They cannot come from the man to be awakened. So that *his* logical consciousness cannot stand to *his* intuitional in this relation of a help. We cannot comprehend how Mr. Morell, without departing from every principle which he has previously laid down, and upon which as occasion requires he is not backward to insist, should represent the logical understanding as a remedy.

for dimness of vision. Did Adam have no understanding before the fall? Are the angels without it? and shall we drop it at death? Is it an endowment vouchsafed to the race only in consequence of the moral confusion and disorder which have supervened from sin, and are we to look to it as the Holy Spirit by which we are to be renovated and saved?

The true view of the subject we apprehend to be, that the understanding is designed not to cure the disorders and remedy the imperfections but to *supplement the* defects of the intuitional faculties. It is the complement of intuition. Finite and limited as we are, presentative knowledge can extend but a little way—and the office of the understanding is to stretch our knowledge beyond the circle of our vision. We are so constituted that what we see shall be made the means of revealing more than we see. Presentation and Representation—Intuition—Induction and Inference—are all instruments of *knowing*—and by virtue of the constitution they describe, man is able to penetrate beyond the limits of time and space to which consciousness is evidently restricted. It is, therefore, distinctly to add to his knowledge, to complete his constitution as an intelligent creature that God has given him understanding. It is true the necessity of an understanding implies defect—intuition is the highest form of knowledge—but it is a defect which attaches to all finite creatures. They must either supplement intuition by inference—or their knowledge must be limited in time and space to the sphere of their personality. It belongs to the Omnipresent God alone, as He is uncircumscribed in His being—to embrace all things in a single glance of unerring intuition. Creatures, however glorious and exalted, from the very limitation implied in being creatures, can never dispense with the faculties of mediate and representative cognition—this is the law of their condition—and a fundamental error which pervades Mr. Morell's whole account of the understanding is that it is *not* a faculty of knowledge. Had he, in this point, risen above the philosophy of Kant, many of the paradoxes and inconsistencies of his treatise might have been obviously avoided. He professes to be a natural realist—and as such contends, and very properly contends, that we have faculties by which we

can immediately apprehend existencies—but his theory of the understanding, instead of being constructed in harmony with this hypothesis, instead of making it that complement of powers by which the mind can represent to itself the properties and qualities of absent objects—instead of treating its categories and forms as the conditions in conformity to which its representations shall be adequate and just—has made it the organ of the rankest delusions—of the most contemptible and puerile trifling.

Our author takes occasion to caution his readers, “in the outset, against the supposition that the distinction” which he has elaborately expanded between the intuition-al and logical consciousness, “is any thing at all novel in the history of mental philosophy. So far from it,” he affirms, “that it is almost as universal as philosophy itself, lying alike patent both in ancient and modern speculation.”* This we cannot but regard as a mistake. Our acquaintance with the history of philosophy is small, but we know of no writer previously to Kant, who took precisely the same views of the nature, office and operations of the understanding—and we know of no writer but Mr. Morell who has restricted reason or intuition exclusively to the faculties of presentative cognition. It would require more space than we can, at present, devote to the subject, to discuss his ancient authorities, but we cannot forbear a word upon his modern examples. To begin with Kant, we very frankly confess, that in his *Critical Philosophy*, we never could distinguish betwixt the operations or *modes* of action which he ascribes to reason and those which he attributes to the understanding. They seem to us to be exactly the same faculty, or complement of faculties, employed about different objects; and in this opinion we are confirmed by an authority which it is seldom safe to contradict. “In the Kantian philosophy”—says Sir William Hamilton—“both faculties perform the same function—both seek the one in the many—the idea (*idee*) is only the conception (*begriffe*) sublimated into the inconceivable—reason only the understanding which has overleaped itself.” Intellect directed to the objects beyond the domain of experience, is the Kantian reason, within the domain of experience, the Kantian understanding. Intellect in search of scientific unity is understanding—

* p. 27.

in search of absolute unity---the reason. Employed about the finite, limited, contingent it is understanding---employed about the correlatives, the absolute, infinite, necessary, it is reason. Or in one word, as the faculty of the *conditioned* it is understanding---as the faculty of the *unconditioned*, it is reason. But if the science of contraries be one, the faculty in each case, as an intellectual power, must be the same. There is, accordingly, a much closer correspondence between Mr. Morell's logical consciousness and Kant's speculative reason---than between Kant's reason and Mr. Morell's intuition, and Mr. Morell's intuition, in turn, is much more analogous to Kant's sensibility than to his reason. Mr. Morell's intuition is the presentative knowledge of supersensible realities. Kant pronounced all such knowledge to be a sheer delusion. Mr. Morell's intuition is exclusive of analysis. Kant's reason reached its highest unity through processes of generalization. Mr. Morell's intuition has no fixed and permanent laws. Kant's reason had its *ideas* as his understanding its categories. Between Kant's *practical* reason and Mr. Morell's intuition, there are some striking points of correspondence, but they are points in which Mr. Morell is inconsistent with himself. Both attribute our firm conviction of the divine existence and of a future life to our spiritual cravings and the authoritative nature of conscience---but in thus representing them as a *want* on the one hand, and an *implication* on the other, our author abandons his fundamental principle that in intuition, the object reveals itself.

Neither is Mr. Morell's intuition precisely the same with the principles of common sense or the fundamental laws of belief of the Scottish school. These were not faculties *presentative* of their objects, but vouchers of the reality of knowledge; and as to the Eclecticks, they make no such distinction between reason and understanding as that signalized by Kant, Coleridge and our author---but treat the categories and ideas promiscuously as laws of reason or intelligence. "The one catholic and perennial philosophy---notwithstanding many schismatic aberrations" is not that all objective certainty depends upon the actual presentation of its realities, and that the understanding cannot conduct us beyond the circle of sensibility---but that all knowledge is ultimately founded on faith,

and "the objective certainty of science upon the subjective necessity of believing." If Mr. Morell had meant by intuition nothing more than "the complement of those cognitions or principles which we receive from nature--which all men, therefore, possess in common, and by which they test the truth of knowledge and the morality of actions," or if he had defined it simply as the faculty of such principles, we should have regarded him in this matter beyond the reach of any just exceptions. But this is not his doctrine.

The importance of the points upon which we have been insisting, will appear from their application to the great problems of Religion. What is God? What vouchers have we for the objective certainty of His being, and what kind of intercourse can be maintained betwixt Him and His creatures, are questions which will be variously answered according to varying views of the nature and extent of human knowledge, and the offices and operations of the human faculties. We have already seen that, in describing the developements of the higher stages of the intuitional consciousness, Mr. Morell has confounded the intuition of a principle with the presentation of an object—representing our *inference* in relation to the Divine existence, authenticated by the necessary law of causation, as a direct perception of the Deity Himself.—His language in many places will bear the interpretation that our knowledge of God is intuitive only in so far as it rests upon original principles of belief—but there are other passages in which he unquestionably teaches that God reveals Himself as an immediate datum of consciousness, and that we know Him in Himself precisely as we know the phenomena of matter, or the operations of mind. These two sets of statements are really inconsistent—an unjustifiable confusion of intuition and presentation—but it is easy to see how they have arisen in the rationalistic school. The law of substance has been marvellously confounded with the law of causality, and an *inference* from an effect to its cause has, accordingly, been treated as a perception of the relation of a quality to a substance. The proof of a cause has, in other words, been taken for the presentation of a substance, on the ground that the effect is a phenomenon which, as it can-

not *exist*, cannot be *perceived*, apart from its substratum or "fundamental essence." To affirm, therefore, in consistency with these principles, that the external world and ourselves are a series of effects, is simply to affirm that they are a series of phenomena which must inhere in some common substance, and of which they are to be regarded as the manifestations. "In my opinion," says Cousin, "all the laws of thought may be reduced to two, namely, the law of causality, and that of substance.—These are the two essential and fundamental laws, of which all others are only derivatives, developed in an order by no means arbitrary." Having shown that these two fundamental laws of thought are absolute, he proceeds to reduce them to identity: "An absolute cause, and an absolute substance, are identical in essence, since every absolute cause must be substance in so far as it is absolute, and every absolute substance must be cause, in order to be able to manifest itself." To reduce causality to substantive being, and effects to phenomenal manifestations, is to deny the possibility of a real creation.—Substances *as such* cannot be relative and contingent—to make them *effects* is to make them phenomena. There can, therefore, be but one *substance* in the universe; and all that we have been accustomed to regard as the *works* of God, are only developments to consciousness of the Divine Being Himself. The world stands to Him in the same relation in which thought and volition stand to our own minds. This is the necessary result of confounding causation with substance, and yet this is what Mr. Morell has done, and what his psychology absolutely demanded to save it from self-contradiction. At one time we find him ascending, by virtue of the law of causality, from the finite, contingent, and dependent to the infinite, necessary, self-existent—from effects to their causes, in the very track of the argument which he affects to despise.—He finds God, not in Himself, but in His creatures. At another time, "in loftier moments of contemplation," he seems to stand upon the verge of infinity, and to gaze upon "Being (substance) in its essence, its unity, its self-existent eternity." At one time the great problem of reason is to discover the power and wisdom which gave the world its being, and impressed upon nature its laws; at

another "to find THE ONE FUNDAMENTAL ESSENCE by which" all things are upheld. At one time, in a single word, God is contemplated and known as the *cause*—at another, as the *substance* of all that exists. This confusion pervades the book, and is constantly obtruded upon us in that offensive form which makes the Deity nothing but the bond of union or the principle of co-existence to his creatures. This is the plain meaning of all that eternal cant about "totality and absolute unity"—about the tendency of reason to *synthesis*, which is echoed and re-echoed in various forms, without any apparent consciousness of its wickedness, blasphemy, and contradiction.—The whole doctrine of the *absolute*, which has played so conspicuous a part in German speculations, turns upon this blunder. To get at the *cause* of all things, is only to get at the *substance* in which all inhere and co-exist—to get at *Being* in its necessary and fundamental laws—which, of course, would give all its manifestations.

Those who wish to see what this philosophy has achieved in other hands, will do well to consult the pages of Mr. Morell on the systems of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel; and those who would appreciate its pretensions to truth and consistency, would do well to study the masterly article of Sir William Hamilton, upon the Eclectic Scheme of Cousin. We shall add here only a few reflections, that the reader may distinctly see where Mr. Morell's principles would conduct him.

In the first place Deity, as absolute substance, is necessarily *impersonal*. The idea of individuality, or of separate and distinct existence, is indispensable to our conception of a Person. But *absolute Being* has no distinct existence—to distinguish is to condition it—to make it *a* being and a being of such and such qualities, which is to destroy its absoluteness. In the next place, it obviously follows that every thing is God, and God is every thing. As absolute being, he is the generative principle of being in all that exists. He is their *essence*—that upon which their *esse* depends, and without which they would be mere shadows and illusions. Just as far as any thing really exists, just so far it is God. He is the formal and distinguishing ingredient of its nature as an entity or existence.

Hence, it deserves further to be remarked, that there can be no such thing as real causation. The law of substance is made to abrogate the law of causality. The absolute is not a *productive*, but a *constitutive* principle—a fundamental element or condition, but not an *efficient* of existence. It is no more a cause in the sense in which the constitution of our nature determines us to apprehend the relation, than body is the cause of extension—mind the cause of thought—or the sun the cause of light. Absolute beauty, for example, is not the Creator, but the essential element of all particular beauties—absolute right is not the producer, but an indispensable constituent of all particular rectitude—and absolute Being is not the maker, but the necessary ingredient or characteristic principle of every particular being. There is then no creation—no maker of Heaven and earth—no father of the spirits, nor former of the bodies of men. There is simply *ens reale*, from which what we call creatures emanate, as its properties and adjuncts. This doctrine is unblushingly avowed by the great master of the Eclectic School; and it is deeply embedded in every thing that Mr. Morell has said of the relations of the Deity to the world. We need not say that a philosophy which contradicts a fundamental principle of belief—which denies the law of causality, or what is the same, absorbs it in another and a different law, is self-condemned.

We affirm finally that every form in which the philosophy of the absolute ever has been, and we venture to say, ever can be proposed, necessarily leads to nihilism—the absolute annihilation of the possibility of knowledge. The very notion of the absolute is inconsistent with the conditions of knowledge—merging all difference in identity, and all variety in unity, it is evidently incompatible with the nature of consciousness, which evidently implies, as Cousin has lucidly explained, plurality and difference. The only consistent hypothesis is the intellectual intuition of Schelling, “in which there exists no distinction of subject and object—no contrast of knowledge and existence; all difference is lost in absolute indifference—all plurality in absolute unity. The intuition itself, reason and the absolute are identical.” But consistency is here evidently maintained at the sacrifice of the possibility of

thought. Fichte, though his confidence in his system was so strong that he staked his everlasting salvation on the truth of even its subordinate features, yet confesses that it was after all a mere tissue of delusions.

"The sum total," says he, "is this: there is absolutely nothing permanent, either without me or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even my own. I, myself, know nothing, and am nothing.—Images there are—they constitute all that apparently exists, and what they know of themselves is after the manner of images; images that pass and vanish without there being aught to witness their transition; that consist in fact of the images of images—without significance and without an aim. I, myself, am one of these images; nay I am not even thus much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, and without a mind to dream—into a dream made up only of a dream of itself. Perception is a dream—thought, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, of my power, of my destination, is the dream of that dream."

Melancholy confession! God grant that it may serve as an awful warning to those who, with presumptuous confidence, would plunge into the fathomless abyss of the absolute!

The certainty of God's existence rests upon no such flimsy speculations. Through the indestructible principles which are not merely, as Kant supposed, regulative laws of thought, but guarantees for the objective realities to which they conduct us—we have an assurance for the Divine existence which cannot be gainsayed without making our nature a lie. Reason conducts us to God—its laws vouch for His existence; but it is in the way of inference from what passes around us, and within us.—He has so constituted the human mind that all nature shall be a witness for Himself. Every thing is inexplicable until He is acknowledged. But we know Him, and can know Him only *mediately*. We spell out the syllables which record His name as they are found in earth, in Heaven, and in ourselves. What is *presentatively* given is not the Almighty, but His works—but reason, from the very nature of its laws, cannot apprehend His works without the irresistible conviction that He is. The

principles are intuitive by which we ascend from nature to its author, but the substance of the Godhead never stands before us face to face as an object of vision, though these deductions of reason are felt to have an objective validity independent of the subjective necessity of believing.

Let it be granted that our knowledge of God is mediate, and that the understanding is a faculty of cognition, and the whole ground-work of Mr. Morell's system is swept away. All that remains to prove that the logical consciousness may be an adequate medium of revelation, and a competent instrument of religion, is to indicate the fact that through its representative conceptions it can reproduce every emotion which the original intuitions could excite. The copy can awaken all the feelings of the original. Vivid description may produce the effects of vision. The peculiar emotions of religion, consequently, are not dependent upon the power of gazing upon its actual realities. If they can be embodied so as to produce what Lord Kames denominates ideal presence, the result may be the same as if the presence were real. To this principle painting, poetry, and oratory owe their power to stir the depths of the human soul—to rule like a wizard the world of the heart—to call up its sunshine, or draw down its showers.

The remaining portions of the book we must reserve for another opportunity.

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *The Life of* ASHBEL GREEN, V. D. M. *Begun to be written by himself in his 82d year, and continued to his 84th. Prepared for the Press, at the Author's request, by* JOSEPH H. JONES, *Pastor of the 6th Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia.* 628 pp. octavo. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York.

This is in full the title of a book which will probably find its way into the hands of most Ministers in the Presbyterian Church of this country. The prominent position which the venerable subject and author, for so many years, held in the Church—the strength and decision of his character—the agency which he had in forming the present constitution of the Presbyterian Church—the many various and important offices which he filled during a long and laborious life—and above all, the constancy and firmness with which he fought in the last great battle for truth, during the controversies which ended in the violent disruption of 1837–8—all invest this venerable father with an interest which can never be shared by any of those who survive him.

This volume has the peculiar interest which always attaches to anti-biography: a species of writing, difficult of execution, but which such memoirs, as those of Halyburton show, can be produced without offensive egotism, and much to the edification of the pious. Where we repose substantial confidence in the piety and judgment of the writer, it is no less instructive than pleasant to see in what light a Godly man views his own actions, and contemplates his own character. Dr. Green writes these memorials of himself, at an advanced age to which few attain, when he had ceased to be an actor among men, and had long been standing on the threshold of Eternity; a period, therefore, eminently favourable to calm review, and to a historic judgment. The reader is also put in possession of facts enough to be the basis of an independent opinion, which he is able to compare with that formed by the historian himself.

To this it must be added, this book has all the charm of easy gossip; it is pervaded by an artless simplicity, in which an old man, conscious of his own integrity, and confident of the regards of his fellow men, details with a sort of fire side freedom, the incidents of a chequered career.

We should have been pleased with fuller reminiscences of the formation of the existing constitution of the Church. But as in the perusal of the book we resigned ourselves to feelings of veneration and regard, so these now indispose us to the work of special criticism. The reader will scarcely close the life of Dr. Green without a sentiment of profound gratitude to God, who, in the past history of the Church, has always raised up men equal to all her emergencies, and without a prayer that the same good Providence may watch over all her future struggles.

2. *The present position of the Medical Profession in Society, an introductory Lecture, delivered in the Medical College of Georgia, Nov. 5th, 1849. By PAUL F. EVE, M. D. Professor of Surgery, Editor of Southern Medical and Surgical Journal, and one of the Vice Presidents American Medical Association. (Published by the Class.) Augusta, 1849.*

This interesting Address aims to account for the disparagement in which the Medical Profession is held in the estimation of the public. Dr. Eve succeeds in showing the claims of the ancient and honourable science of Medicine to a much higher consideration than in this country it enjoys; and to a much surer protection than the partial legislation of most of the States now affords. The sentiments of the Address deserve to be well pondered by those who are out of the Medical Profession, no less than by those who are members of the same.

We think that to the reasons suggested by Dr. Eve, for the disrespect to the Medical Profession, might be added another, to which the schools and faculties of Medicine would do well to ap-

ply a remedy. We allude to the deficiency in general scholarship, and the extreme youthfulness of the majority of candidates for Medical degrees. No profession can maintain an honourable position which does not require of its members a general acquaintance with science and letters, as well as a special knowledge of the art which is to be practised.

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3. *Expository Lectures on the epistle to the Ephesians.* By the Rev. ROBERT J. MCGHEE, A. M. M. R. I. A. *Late Minister of Harold's Cross Church, Dublin. Rector of Holywell cum Needingworth, Hunts.* New York. Robert Carter and Brothers. 1849. 640 pp. 8vo.

These Lectures are the popular expositions of a minister of the established Church, on the epistle to the Ephesians, delivered in the Infant School House at Bray, at a season when he was withdrawn from pastoral labours by ill health. They were so much valued by the congregation to which they were delivered, that they were taken down by a stenographer employed by them for the purpose. They bear all the marks, therefore, of free extemporaneous discourse, but they are rich in doctrinal truth as well as practical remark. The true Calvinistic doctrines of the early Reformers and of the Articles of the English Church, are brought forth in their full strength in these Lectures. They are a good specimen of expository preaching, a kind of preaching offering some singular advantages to both speaker and hearer, but at the same time not easy to perform in a proper manner.

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4. *The Works of LEONARD WOODS, D. D. Lately Professor of Christian Theology, in the Theological Seminary, Andover.* In five volumes. Vol. I. New York. M. W. Dodd, 1849.

This is the first volume of the works of one who has long been regarded as the Nestor of New England Divines. It is dedicated to his numerous pupils now scattered throughout this country, and

to no small extent over the whole world. To them it will be a truly acceptable memorial both of the person of a beloved and revered teacher, and of the methods adopted by him in the presentation of truth. The words of dedication are well suited to speak to their hearts. After various preparatory Lectures, the subjects of Inspiration, of the Being and Attributes of God, of the Humanity, Deity and Sonship of Christ, of the Divinity and Personality of the Spirit, of the Trinity, and of the Divine Purposes, are treated with more or less amplitude. Those subjects are the most fully handled which have been brought under controversy in that portion of our country during the period over which the active days of Dr. Woods have extended. As Dr. Woods himself suggests, these Lectures will serve as a historical document showing what theology was taught under the eye of the founders of the Seminary at Andover. It will also enable others to determine the type of doctrine entertained by the more staid and sober of our Eastern brethren. We regret that we are unable at this time to give this volume that more extended notice, which the high position of the author and its own intrinsic merits would seem to demand. Dr. Woods has always been distinguished as a man of strong and practical mind, as a clear reasoner, and as one willing and able to stop within those limits which the adventurous and self-confident are so sure to pass. May his long and useful life yet be spared, to complete these contributions to theological learning, which he has so auspiciously commenced.

5. *Howard and the Prison-World of Europe. From original and authentic documents, by* HEPWORTH DIXON. *With an introductory Essay, by* R. W. DICKINSON, D. D. 401 pp. 8vo. Robert Carter & Brothers. New York.

History present few characters so truly great as that of John Howard. As his biographer aptly says, he is as striking in repose as in action. Every action of his private life was as much

regulated by religious principle as his public labours. As the reader follows his footsteps with breathless interest, he is equally an object of admiration in the retirement of his family, in his benefactions to his tenants, and in his apostolic mission through the prisons of Europe; morally great, when voluntarily subjecting himself to the miseries and dangers of the Lazaretto at Venice or confronting with fearless frankness the haughty Emperor of Germany; or refusing the statue which a grateful public sought to raise to his honour. Mr. Dixon delineates with enthusiasm both his character and labours, sustaining the interest of the book to its close.

Over and above the personal interest which the reader feels in the adventures of the great philanthropist, this book lays bare the new science of prison discipline, for his study. The different methods pursued in different countries of dealing with culprits who have forfeited the protection of human laws, are unfolded; and the amazing defects of all are exposed. A science this, which as yet is but too imperfectly comprehended, and will more and more force itself upon the attention of our statesmen.

Mr. Dixon writes with vigour and occasionally lets fall a profound reflection forcing the reader to pause and ponder. We are sorry that he has marred the style of his book with such affected phrases as "an undemonstrative temperament;" a "family of celebrities;" "an initiative mind;" and still more by the coinage of barbarous words which are scattered profusely over his pages. The patience gives way at the frequent occurrence of such words as "unmodern," "custodianship," "missionaryship," "deaconized," "utilizing," "misdemeanant," "sighted," &c. A writer may use freely the language in which he was born, as freely as the air he breathes; but he has no more right to corrupt the one than the other.—With the exception of these blemishes, Mr. Dixon has performed a worthy service in giving to the world these memorials of a good and great man.

6. *Philosophic Theology; or ultimate grounds of all religious belief based in reason.* By JAMES W. MILES. Charleston: John Russell, 256 King-street. New York. Geo. Putnam, 155 Broadway. 1849. pp. 234. 12mo.

This book is divided into two parts—the first, consisting of a series of letters between a sceptic and his friend—the other, of a discussion of sundry points pertaining to theology. As the author occupies substantially the same ground with Mr. Morell, an articulate examination of his system is superseded by the attention which we have given to the “Philosophy of Religion.” All that we propose to do is to present a summary, with occasional remarks, of the contents of the book. It opens with a letter from a sceptic who seems to be in a deplorable condition of distress, because he happens to be a man, and not God. His despondency is pitiable, on account of the limitation which is imposed upon our faculties, and he is upon the eve of resolving to know nothing, because he is not able to know every thing. This is very much the spirit of rationalism—*aut Cæsar aut nullus*—we will be Gods or nothing. When we first read this letter we were in hopes, that Mr. Miles had intended it as a satire upon the eternal whining and cant which characterize the profound and mediative striplings, who have just begun to babble in the dialects of Kant, Fichte and Schliermacher. They find themselves all at once enveloped in darkness—and while they are pouring forth their dolorous cries for light, they never seem to be conscious that there is light enough, and that the only difficulty is that they have put out their eyes. In many cases, this oppressive sense of despondency in regard to the possibility of any knowledge, is *sheer affectation*. It is all assumed to create the impression that the young saven is amazingly deep. It is the grimace without the inspiration of the sybil. The man who can be seriously distressed with the question whether he is a phenomenon or a substance—or whether all things are shadows or realities, or whether there be any thing at all or not, has as much sensibility as the girl whose heart was almost broken, at the contemplation of the bare possibility, that in coming years, she might be the mother of a child, and that this child might be roasted in an oven.

The second letter, designed to comfort the mourning inquirer, gives a general view of the nature and limits of human knowledge, "drawn from an analysis of human consciousness and the operation of the intellectual faculties." The author's psychology is essentially the same as Mr. Morell's. He adopts Reid's theory of External Perception and Kant's theory of the Understanding, and seems to be utterly unconscious that the two theories devour each other. In the application of his principles, he denies to reason, independently of the Christian Revelation, any certainty as to the existence of God, and indicates the grounds upon which the Christian Revelation is to be received.

The third letter is from the sceptic, who is hugely delighted with "the gleam of light" which the epistle of his friend had imparted, and very frankly confesses that much of the scepticism—to which he might have added *all* the distress—which he previously professed, was pure sham. It seems that he was not in the least concerned about the foundations of human knowledge—but he was only afraid that if he did not fall back upon universal scepticism, he might in consistency with the admission of any thing, be required to believe certain dogmas of Divines, for which he had no manner of relish. He is accordingly prepared to believe *something*, and to be content with his human condition, finite and limited, though it be, if his friend will only show him how to reject the Divine authority of the Scriptures upon *any* grounds, that shall not be fatal to all truth. The fourth letter is exactly to his mind. It points out the grounds upon which a man may say all sorts of laudatory things of the Scriptures, and yet not believe a word of their contents, except so far as it suits his humour. It is represented as great ignorance of metaphysics to suppose, for a moment, that the Bible was ever intended to be a standard of faith—it is only a stimulus to certain kinds of emotion—and as Christianity is a life and not a philosophy, it matters very little *what* a man believes, provided he *feels* right. This letter, of course, had a very happy effect—and the sceptic, in his next, manifests a strong leaning to Christianity, since it left his understanding without check or restraint—its reasonableness, indeed, is so obvious that he only needs a little more awakening to make him fully and cordially acquiesce in it.

The sixth letter is a virtual concession of every thing that an infidel could ask. It repudiates the ancient apologies of Christianity as untenable—and assigns their worthlessness—though they convinced such minds as those of Bacon, Newton and Locke—as the reason of the subsequent discussion. The second part accordingly comes before us with high pretensions. It is a bulwark against modern infidelity—an argument which shall be able to stand its ground when the puny speculations of Cudworth, Clarke, Butler and Paley shall have sunk into merited oblivion. The topics discussed—we copy the table of contents—are “the possibility and nature of theology—the idea of God as a necessary conception of reason, and the necessity of man’s theological and religious conceptions. Basis in the necessary conceptions of reason for belief in incarnation—the grounds of the probability of miracles, and the suggestive basis in reason for belief in plurality in Divine Personality—analysis of life and character of Christ—adaptedness of Christianity to the religious wants of man—the organ of religious faith—the Scriptures.”

The book is constructed upon the principle of every rationalistic defence of Christianity, that the truth of the doctrine is the criterion of the reality of revelation, and not that the revelation is the criterion of the truth of the doctrine. The first inquiry with the apologists of this school is, are the doctrines intrinsically credible? Can they be authenticated by reason? Can they be embraced within the circle of philosophy and deduced from the facts and phenomena of consciousness? If so, they may be admitted as Divine, upon the general principle that *all* truth is from God; or upon the ground of special agencies, among those who recognise the possibility of miracles; that have brought these particular truths within the compass of reason. But the question of the reality of revelation never can be entertained until the question of the *truth* of the doctrine is settled. The old apologists, on the other hand, proceeded on the assumption that the fact of a Divine testimony might be as conclusively proved as any other fact. And that the proof of a revelation was, in every case, the proof of the doctrine. They thought, that if it could be shown that the Almighty had spoken, that was a sufficient ground for

believing whatever was affirmed, though we might not be able to understand it in itself. The rationalists maintain that the only way in which God can reveal any doctrine to his creatures is either to bring the objective reality in immediate relation to consciousness, or to put them in a position to excogitate it for themselves. It is and can be Divine—only as *known*, or *demonstrated*. The old theory was that God might converse with His creatures as a friend with his friend—and through the medium of testimony present an adequate ground of faith, where there could be neither knowledge nor demonstration. Hence the old apologists began by proving that the mouth of the Lord had spoken. They appealed to reason in behalf of the proposition, that such and such documents were the word of God. . The truth of these doctrines they were content to rest upon the absolute authority of the Revealer. The Rationalists begin by proving that the doctrines are just what they ought to be—that they are or may be realized in consciousness—that they are a sound philosophy, and therefore, the word of God.

In conformity with this principle, Mr. Miles undertakes to prove that there is a basis in reason for all the mysteries of Christianity. He disclaims the reception of them upon the ground of *authority*—or of blind belief in the testimony of any one, though the witness should be God Himself. Indeed he denies that there can be any personal communication from God to His creatures, except in the methods indicated by the Rationalists. As a specimen of his success we may allude to his speculations on the Incarnation and the Trinity. He maintains that “if God as a person would come down into the moral history of humanity to unite it with himself, and this in a way which should make the synthesis an objective fact, capable, as a part in man’s history, of legitimate testimony, and as a link in that history of an influence for all ages, then he could only do so, as far as we can conceive, by incarnation.”* It is hard to say precisely what Mr. Miles means by such phrases as “bringing the Divine personality into connection with the moral history of humanity.” If it is, that God can become a part of the history of man—only by being a man—or, in other words, that God can be human only in so far as he is a man—one would think that it required no ghost from Germany—certainly

* p. 113.

no elaborate processes of Kantian metaphysics, to establish a truism so bald, though it might demand no small share of transcendental boldness flatly to announce it. But if he means that God can only be known and recognized, as an object of worship, love and adoration—that his moral relations to us as a Ruler and a Judge can only be apprehended—and moral influences from Him, determining, modifying, controlling human conduct, can only be imparted by virtue of a phenomenal manifestation in human nature—if this is what he means, his proposition involves the subversion, not only of the possibility of Natural Religion, but of any religion at all, until the incarnation actually took place. Until then, God was to us as though He were not.

But surely the primitive Religion of man demands no incarnate Deity. If Adam had never sinned, Jesus had never been born—and yet God—Father, Son and Spirit, would have been known—loved and obeyed—and humanity would have enjoyed everlasting communications of Divine favour. The design of the incarnation was not to *reveal* the Deity nor to render the infinite and unconditioned comprehensible—but to *propitiate* the Deity. Christ is a revelation of God only in so far as the *work* of Christ illustrates the Divine perfections. What is *human* in Jesus is conceivable—what is Divine is no more comprehensible in Him than in the Father or the Spirit. To suppose that the unconditioned can be known by becoming conditioned, is to suppose that it becomes known by annihilating itself. The moment it submits to conditions, it ceases to be unconditioned.

The Trinity is shown to be reasonable from the necessary conditions of consciousness, which are plurality and difference. It is inferred that the same conditions extend to the Almighty—and that, therefore, in order to be self-conscious, there must be a foundation in His nature for the distinction of subject and object. This is ingenious. But why not suppose that the distinction in the case of the Deity is analogous to that which obtains among us in reference to representative cognitions? Why not suppose that the objects of the Divine contemplations are representative acts which constitute the ideas or patterns after which things are made? Or rather why not admit, in modesty and meekness, that none by searching can find out God?

We give these as specimens of those grounds of faith which are to "satisfy the intellect and heart of thinking and free spirited men, and upon which the Church and Christian doctrine and inspired Scripture stand impregnable." The author is treading in the tracks of the Boston Pantheists. He has already cut loose from the Bible as an authoritative rule of faith. He cannot remain where he is. His next book will probably be a defence of Popery—(extremes meet)—or a defence of Spinozism—unless God, in mercy, should reveal to him the truth as it is in Jesus.

We have only to add that the work is beautifully printed—and to express our gratification that there exist among us the enterprise and skill which the mechanical execution of this volume exhibits.

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7. *A Pattern of Mercy and Holiness, exhibited in the conversion and subsequent character of Col. WILLIAM YEADON, Ruling Elder in the Second Presbyterian Church, Charleston, S. C. A Discourse by the Rev. THOMAS SMYTH, D. D. Charleston: John Russell, King-street. 1850. pp. 37.*

The text of this Discourse is 1 Tim. i. xvi—and hardly a finer illustration could be found, in all the Bible, of the freeness, fullness and sovereignty of Divine grace. The preacher has very successfully shown that the elements of spiritual life are not only essentially the same in all men—but that they are produced in all men by essentially the same process. The religious history of Col. Yeadon is fraught with intense interest—and Dr. Smyth has made a very valuable contribution to the records of Christian experience, in presenting it before us in the form, which it assumes in the present Discourse. It is a practical commentary upon the doctrines of grace—and with a slight change this Sermon might be converted into a tract of permanent and abiding interest. It has evidently been the purpose of the author simply to glorify God. The style and structure of the Sermon—its illustrations and exam-

ples all show a mind intent upon the salvation of souls, and the honour and commendation of the great Redeemer.

8. *The Complaint ; or Night-Thoughts on Life, Death, and Immortality.* By EDWARD YOUNG, L. L. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.
9. *The Provincial Letters of Blaise Pascal.* A new translation, with historical introduction and notes, by the Rev. THOMAS MCCRIE. Edinburg. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1850.
10. *Domestic Portraiture ; or the successful application of religious principle in the education of a family, exemplified in the memoirs of three of the deceased children of the Rev. Leigh Richmond.* With introductory remarks on Christian education, by Rev. E. BICKERSTETH, Rector of Watton, Herts. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1849.

These volumes we notice not as new books, but as new editions of old and well known publications. With the Night Thoughts, by which the fame of Dr. Young, as a poet, is now almost wholly known, with its faults and its redeeming merits, every one is acquainted. There are but few books more popular, and few of English literature more extensively read. The edition of the Carters combines the recommendations of good paper, clear type, and a beautiful page, and is worthy the attention of purchasers.

The Provincial Letters are acknowledged to be among the highest efforts of genius the world has produced. They have immortalized the name of Blaise Pascal, one of the most extraordinary men of his age and country, and one of the most guileless and sincere Christians, that ever has remained in connection with an apostate and persecuting Church. Whoever is ignorant of the Provincial Letters, should read them, and they will bear a re-perusal by those already acquainted with them. Especially

timely is the present edition, when the company of Jesuits, a society which never dies, is extending itself in our own country. If any one wishes to see their principles of morality exposed by the hand of a master, he will have his wishes gratified by the perusal of this volume. Pascal was a Jansenist, a believer, with St. Augustine, in the doctrines known as Calvinistic among the Protestants. To the Pelagianism of the Jesuits, which is also that of the Church of Rome, he was an uncompromising foe. He assailed their principles with the most playful, and at the same time the most merciless wit, and made them for a season the laughing-stock of France. Some of our off-hand and indolent writers will be surprised to learn, that Pascal often spent twenty whole days on a single letter, and that the eighteenth in the series was written over no less than thirteen times. Whoever desires to read these famous productions of a great scholar, whom Bayle pronounces "one of the sublimest geniuses that the world ever produced," will find them presented in an acceptable form in this new translation by McCrie, and introduced by a valuable historical essay.

The "Domestic Portraiture," introduces the Rev. Leigh Richmond to the Christian parent as the educator of his family. From the methods adopted by that lovely character and eminent Christian, the anxious and intelligent parent may borrow many useful hints for the training up of his children in the ways of virtue and usefulness.

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11. *Reasons for Public Thanksgiving. A Discourse delivered before the Legislature of Georgia, in the Representative Chamber, Milledgeville, on Thanksgiving day, Novr. 29, 1849. By the Rev. SAMUEL K. TALLMAGE, D. D., President of Oglethorpe University.*

The Preacher happily alludes to "the striking and eloquent scene when this mighty nation was moved to lie low before the throne of Jehovah," a few months ago, in a "solemn and heart af-

fecting fast," in consequence of the ravages of pestilence in our borders. — Scarcely less affecting were the circumstances under which this Thanksgiving Sermon was delivered. Sixteen of our States had been moved to appoint the same day as a season of Thanksgiving to God for his abounding mercies. The preacher enjoyed the rare privilege of addressing the assembled government of our sister State on this interesting occasion. Though his sermon is less elaborate than others he has published, which indeed could not be otherwise from the brief season for preparation allowed him, it is manly, appropriate, and patriotic, and marked by that good sense and piety which give value to all his efforts.

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ARTICLE I.

CHURCH AND STATE.

In a preceding number of this periodical a statement was given of the leading theories by which many seek to justify the union of the State with the Church. These theories have been drawn only from writers who profess to recognise the two organizations as distinct from each other, however inaccurately they may have defined the boundaries of either. It is scarcely necessary to apprise the reader, that on the one and on the other side of this intermediate school, are to be found two opposite poles of doctrine. The first may be said to find its ablest representative in the philosopher of Malmesbury; though as there is nothing new in error, Hobbes simply revived and modified the exploded dogmas of Democritus, which were propagated still later by the Epicureans. Regarding human law as the only source of moral distinctions, he consistently enough considered the Church the mere creature of the State, spoken into existence only as an instrument to accomplish the ends of civil policy. The second extreme is that held by the Romanists, who make the Church, on the contrary, engulph the State; as may be seen from the writings of Bellarmine, and others of the same communion. The extravagance of both these opinions is the best guarantee that they will never prevail. The former, we may hope, is already abandoned to the

corruption and worms which must at last feed upon the wretched carcass of infidelity. The latter will scarcely disturb the American reader, unless he has the mischance of falling in with the angelical doctor of Romanism in this country, the neophyte Brownson; who, in his next metempsychosis, may perchance turn up in the person of a Mohammedan Mufti. Dreaming theorizers may fling their speculations from their lattices upon the busy world; but the strong and practical sense of mankind will scarcely consent that the State shall swallow the Church, or the Church engulph the State. Those writers who admit these two institutions to be distinct in their origin, and yet contend that they both aim at a common end, are more likely to influence public opinion; and with these the whole controversy must in our day be waged.

The design of the present article will be to follow the path of investigation already opened in a former number of this Review, and to examine the principles which were at that time sprung from cover.

I. We are first brought into contact with the extravagant doctrine of Mr. Gladstone: that the State is strictly a moral person, having a conscience, and bound to profess a religion, and to sanctify its acts by a worship of its own. That we do not misrepresent this author will appear from his own language:

"In the government and laws of a country we find not a mere aggregation of individual acts, but a composite agency, the general result yielded by a multitude of efforts, each of which in part modifies, in part is absorbed amid the rest. This composite agency represents the personality of the nation; and as a great distinct moral reality demands a worship of its own, namely the worship of the State, represented in its living and governing members, and therefore, a public and joint worship."*

This conclusion he reiterates as follows:

"I return then to the position that as the nation fulfils the great conditions of a person—a real unity of being, of deliberating, of acting, and of suffering; and these in a definite manner and upon an extended scale, and with immense moral functions to discharge and influences to exercise, both upon its members and extrinsically; therefore it has that kind of clear, large and conscious responsibility which can alone be met by its specifical-

* Church and State, vol. I. p. 93.

ly professing a religion, and offering, through its organ the State, that worship which shall publicly sanctify its acts. That which by its governing organ it professes specially, it must encourage and maintain throughout its inferior members, as a part of such profession itself."*

This language cannot be misunderstood. The State in its corporate character is just as truly capable of religion, which it is just as fully bound to profess, as are the individuals which compose it. It is obvious that if this opinion holds, all further argument is superseded. The advocates of the Union need be at no pains to prove the insufficiency of voluntaryism, nor to defend their favorite scheme from the charge of corrupting the Church. The union of Church and State is simply a necessity, and nothing more can be said to purpose. If the State has a conscience and is under obligation to perform acts of worship, then an established Church is required, as the visible embodiment of the State's religion and the recognized organ of the State's worship. Nor are we left in doubt as to the exclusiveness of this National Church, since as a part of its profession itself the State must maintain through its inferior members what its own organ may happen to dictate. If the most iron spiritual despotism is not erected upon this foundation, it must be from softening influences which come from without, and not from any checks in the system itself.

It is not difficult to point out the fundamental fallacy of so monstrous an error: it arises simply from the ambiguity of the term person as applied to designate the State; and consists in employing this word in its secondary and metaphorical use, with a meaning, however, which attaches to it only in its primary and proper signification. A person properly implies an individual; an entity separate from every other, having its own consciousness and will. It is thus defined by Mr. Locke:

"To find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it."†

*Church and State, vol. I. p. 105.

† Essay on the Human Understanding, book 2d, ch. 27, sect. 9.

In like manner Archdeacon Paley :

"That which can contrive, which can design, must be a person. These capacities constitute personality, for they imply consciousness and thought. They require a centre in which perceptions unite, and from which volitions flow; which is mind—and in whatever mind resides is a person."*

Every etymology of the word—whether we derive it from "personuit," the issuing of sound through the mouth piece of a mask, first applied to the mask itself and then to the conception of an individual character; or from the combination of the words *per se una*—impresses upon us this idea of individuality of being. Now when the word person is transferred from the individual to designate a society, it must be employed in a figurative sense, and because of some analogy discovered between the two. As all the individuals of a society are bound by some common tie, and thus in a certain sense become one, the analogy between this unity of the society and the individuality of a single being, warrants the figurative use of the word person to indicate this resemblance. Again, as individuals linked together in society concentrate their minds upon a given point and agree in a common conclusion, which is carried out in a joint action, this agreement of many minds so resembles the unity of a single mind, that it may be expressed by the metaphorical use of the word person. It is manifest, however, that this transfer of the word is justifiable only so far as the resemblance shall hold. It is precisely here that Mr. Gladstone commits his first capital blunder. His definition of the social person is just enough; a society, says he, is a person "so soon as it assumes the determinate form of incorporation and becomes subject internally to a deliberative regulating principle."† His error consists in employing the term person in a sense which is not included within his own definition. Incorporation gives to a society a unity resembling the individuality of a single being; and "the deliberative regulating principle" can only mean that power in many minds to debate and to concur, which is analogous to the power of thought and of will residing in a single mind. So far the analogy holds—and upon the

* Natural Theology. Ch. 23.

† Church and State, vol. I. p. 63.

ground of this analogy we consent to speak of the social person. Now, reasons Mr. Gladstone, if "the nation fulfils the great conditions of a person," then "its clear, large and conscious responsibility can only be met by its specifically professing a religion." But what are these great conditions of a person which the State fulfils, as Mr. Gladstone himself establishes them? Manifestly the above definition includes but two, incorporation and deliberation; as in this very connexion he specifies, "a real unity of being, of deliberating, of acting, of suffering." Yet his conclusion embraces a third condition, in regard to which he has traced no analogy whatever between a society and a person. He is guilty of the gross paralogism of reasoning from two conditions in his premises, to a third and entirely distinct condition in his conclusion. The State is a person, because, like an individual, it is one and can deliberate; the individual person is bound to be religious and to worship God; therefore, the State is bound to profess religion and to worship God—that is, because the State is like the individual in two particulars, it must bear all the responsibilities of the individual in a third particular, in regard to which, for aught that appears, there is no affinity between them. He was bound to show that the analogy holds just as truly between the religious capacities of the State and of the individual, as between the other two characteristics; and then, if it pleased him, he might have applied the term person to the State on this ground also. Instead of which, he has exactly reversed this process: he argues from the figured use of the word person in analogies that do hold, to a resemblance on a third point in which the analogy fails entirely.

Mr. Gladstone seems himself to become alarmed at the swiftness of the current which is sweeping him on to most portentous conclusions. He has the sagacity to perceive that the same mode of reasoning will establish the same conclusion in regard to all associations to which the term person in its metaphorical sense may be applied. He feels that his readers will be startled at a doctrine which renders it imperative upon Banking and Canal Companies to profess a joint religion; and seeks relief from this absurdity by inventing a distinction of degrees of personality. In the case of those associations the

personality is intermittent, occasional, conventional, and conversant only with material interests; while that of the State is general, permanent, natural, and moral in its ends.* Upon this alleged difference he affirms a collective religion to be necessary to the latter, though not predicable of the former. This distinction without a difference, purely fictitious as it is, betrays the decrepitude of the theory, of which it was an after thought. Personality, where it exists, is entire, and does not admit of degrees. A Rail Road Company, for example, is as truly a person, quoad its purposes, as ever the State can be, quoad its purposes. Nor does the fact that it is conventional, and looks only to physical results, in the least degree affect the integrity of its personality. As far as it is a person at all, it is a person entire. The State may comprehend wider interests; but cannot be more perfect as a person than other associations within the scope of their interests. His theory remains still under the pressure of the difficulty, of which this awkward explanation is an humble confession; and his logic will force us to ascribe consciousness and conscience to a Fire Company just as necessarily as to the State.

As though but half persuaded himself, Mr. Gladstone introduces another limitation. He says, "the State is properly, and according to its nature, moral; conversant with moral subject matter, and fruitful of moral influences." The inference is, that as a moral institute, religion becomes essential to it; while it may not be necessary to conventional associations "conversant only with material interests." That is, if we understand the distinction here made, the State deals with the relations of men *among themselves*, while these conventional societies deal only with the relations of men *to things*. But would not a profounder reflection have taught that our relation to things at last resolves itself into a relation to persons; and so a moral basis must underlie every association of whatever character? This truth seems to be recognised by Dr. Lieber in his Political Ethics, when he says: "Property, a relation between an individual and a thing, becomes a matter of right, a jural relation, only inasmuch as others are excluded from that property: it signifies, therefore,

* Church and State, vol. 1, pp. 71, 94.

again a relation between two individuals."* The State deals with "moral subject matter," because it defines and guards the rights of men relatively to each other. So with every other association upon earth, though perhaps in a less degree than with the State. Where, then, is the ground for so wide a distinction as is made the basis of Mr. Gladstone's argument? Both have respect to rights—to rights at last between individuals, and both alike must have a moral basis, because neither of them could exist but for the moral relations of men to one another. So this second limitation fails equally with the other; leaving these "conventional societies," by virtue of their personality, under the same imperative necessity with that "great moral reality, the State" to profess religion, and to engage in a joint and public worship.

But Mr. Gladstone has committed a second blunder not less pervading nor less fatal than this. He has wholly confounded the term moral with the term religious. After proving that the State is a moral person, he considers that he has succeeded in proving it also religious. Yet the two terms are far from being identical. A writer whom we have already quoted, distinguishes between them thus:

"If religion means all that appertains to man's relation to God, it is evident that as it is not an individual relation to any other human individual, it cannot in its very essence ever become a matter of the State; because the State has to do with jural relations only, and these must exist between man and man."†

This distinction we regard as eminently just: religion is exclusively an individual matter, because it simply considers man in his relations to God and the Divine law.—However it may define and regulate the *social* duties of men, its jurisdiction extends over these only as in neglecting them men transgress the commandment of God, and are responsible for their trespass upon his authority.—In no part of his book, more than in this, is Mr. Gladstone obnoxious to the severe but just censure of Mr. Macaulay in using "language grave and majestic, but of vague and uncertain import;" and which, with his singular felicity of illustration, he compares to that "trans-

* Vol. 1, p. 216.

† Dr. Lieber's Political Ethics, vol. 1, p. 216.

parent haze through which the sailor sees capes and mountains of false sizes and in false bearings, and which is more dangerous than utter darkness." That we may not be suspected of exaggeration, let the evidence of this author's extravagance be furnished in his own language :

" Religion is applicable to the State, because it is the office of the State in its personality, to evolve the social life of man, which social life is essentially moral in the ends it contemplates ; and which can only be effectually moral when it is religious. Or, religion is directly necessary to the right employment of the energies of the State as a State."*

It is impossible to estimate the harm which is done in the world by what Mr. Macaulay terms this "obscure sanctity" of style. Unhappily serious minds, the most likely to be captivated by its solemn and sepulchral tones, are too unsuspicious to distinguish always between religion and cant. There is a religious jargon afloat among men, found frequently upon the lips of the most flippant, which passes for the true language of Canaan, while it is only a dialect of Babylon. A few of the catch-words of Christianity, profusely employed, serve as countersigns which gain admission for spies into the camp of Israel.— If Mr. Gladstone means simply that the nature of God is the ultimate source of moral distinctions, and that the Divine law is, therefore, the authoritative standard of duty—if he aims only to say that men who refuse to govern their conduct and to regulate their opinions by the teachings of Revelation, are, in so far, disqualified for the duties of legislation ; and that rulers are as certainly accountable to God for their public as for their private acts—we cordially and fully agree with him. But he evidently intends no such common-places as these. He is at special pains to distinguish between the State *as State*, and all the individuals which compose it ; between the public duties of the one, and the private and personal responsibilities of the other. He speaks freely of "the Statesman laying aside in his public function a part of his individuality ;" and of "his acts as being done without an agent, unless the nation, the moral person of the State, be that agent."† He infers from this that "the responsibilities of the nation are not satisfied by the indi-

* Church and State, vol. 1, p. 93.

† Ibid, p. 92.

vidual piety of its members."* He terms the State "a reflective agency conversant with moral subject matter, involving of necessity a conscience, which is *ex vi termini* the regulator of moral offices;"† by which—though in what sense it is hard to discover—it is invested with the attributes of mind and of conscience, capable of weighing reasons, and of feeling the pressure of obligation.—With unshrinking steadfastness to his theory, he does not stagger to endow it, in a very undefinable way, even with a soul; and to attach a strictly retributive character to public calamities, by which they become to the State a substitute for the sanctions of a future judgment.‡ Within its own limits the State has a mission to perform in propagating religion, as strictly obligatory as the mission of the individual Christian, to extend the Gospel to all mankind.¶ As a moral unit, it must worship God with a devotion separate from the homage which is rendered by all the individuals which compose it.§ Now all this is preposterous, unless Mr. Gladstone will advance a step further and maintain that the State is a living entity, and has a conscious existence; which will bring it within the category of an individual—and we may then agree with him that it has "the same specific obligations which attach to an individual conscience, owning the law of Divine obedience."¶¶ If, with his characteristic hardihood, he had openly carried his speculations to this conclusion, his argument would have passed harmlessly into the number of those singular hallucinations, which the most gifted minds, over-ridden by a single idea, sometimes put forth in the form of overwhelming paradoxes. We will not trifle with the reader's understanding by attempting to show that the State has no substantive existence; but is only a name given to define a relation in which a body of men stand to one another. It is an outrage upon language, to speak of a national conscience as separate and distinct from the consciences of the Ruler and his subjects.

That the individual alone can be the subject of religion, would seem to be almost intuitively evident. We

* Church and State, vol. 1, pp. 91-128. † Ibid, p. 89. ‡ Ibid, pp. 105, 107.
 ¶ Ibid, pp. 111, 112, § Ibid, pp. 93-110-128-129. ¶¶ Ibid, p. 110.

cannot predicate religion of any who have not a soul in the most strict and proper sense of that word; a soul capable of receiving communications from God, comprehending duty, and conscious of its subjection to the Divine law. This reasonable being we find further to be endowed with an immortal life which the law brings under mortgage: "the soul that sinneth, it shall die." He accounts to God for all his purposes and acts, and as a responsible agent receives in a future world those rewards or punishments which he may deserve. He is capable of becoming depraved, and also of renewal and of sanctification, if God is pleased to manifest his Grace in so doing. All these things enter into the idea of religion, as that idea is realized to us in the government of God; and not one of them—neither capacity for obedience and for transgression, nor accountability, nor the power of being depraved and of being redeemed and regenerated, nor capacity for endless bliss or eternal sorrow—can be affirmed of any but an individual being. Unless, then, the State, in its corporate character as State, has a soul—is immortal—can fall from holiness into sin—can be the subject of a spiritual birth—can stand at the bar of judgment—and suffer eternal damnation—it is not a subject of religion. Mr. Gladstone cannot be permitted to slur over these issues in a single paragraph. He must distinctly assume them as necessary parts of his theory, or it disappears like "the baseless fabric of a dream."

The source of this whole error, pervading the writings of others besides Mr. Gladstone, is the constant merging of individuals into that great abstraction, the State, and confounding things that differ. If for example the nation sins—say, in the violation of solemn treaties or in waging an unjust war—who is the party to be charged with guilt? The State, as State, replies Mr. Gladstone; which is accordingly visited with just retribution by public calamities. But will it be maintained that the individual rulers who perpetrate these wrongs are not immediately and personally responsible to God for the same? Are these not personal sins which call for individual repentance, without which they will be surely punished in the day of final account? But upon Mr. Gladstone's hypothesis, that these are "acts done without an agent, if the

moral person of the State be not that agent," it is hard to see how this private responsibility can be maintained. As for the public calamities, which may come in the form of famine, or pestilence, or in the defeat of armies; these are not visited upon that abstraction, the State, but upon individuals throughout the length of the land; who as represented in their rulers, are regarded "*participes criminis*," and answerable also for the wrong. If we attend carefully to the manner in which God administers his government among men, we shall find that those sins committed more directly against himself, he mainly reserves for punishment in a future state of being; but those vices and sins which tend to the destruction of human society, he checks and avenges also by immediate and kindred punishments. Drunkenness and uncleanness, for instance, are personal offences; but as their prevalence would soon bring society to an end, he holds them under a measure of restraint by early and visible penalties. These penalties are not designed as a substitute for the retributions of another world; but, in addition to them, they constitute a part of his providential arrangements, by which he holds society in being, for the accomplishment of his other and higher purposes. Among these providential checks and restraints are we disposed to class those calamities which fall upon communities of men. They are not a substitute for the strict retributions which will fall upon rulers and legislators for their public sins committed as functionaries; but are designed to indicate God's providential control over communities, and to preserve them from premature and utter extinction. If, too, as in our national Congress, the divine blessing is invoked, through a Chaplain, upon its deliberations, it is not, as Mr. Gladstone supposes, the nation, which as a moral unit offers a State-worship to God; but these functionaries, as individual men, recognise their individual dependence upon God, and confess their personal responsibility to him. As statesmen, engaged in the discharge of difficult duties, they acknowledge their need of divine direction, precisely as they should do in their own more private affairs. They by no means "merge their individuality" into the moral person of the State; but as individuals they recognise the truth taught by all history,

that counsellors, who break away from the divine law, become Ahithophels whom God "appoints to defeat." In like manner, when governments appoint chaplaincies in the army or in the navy, it is not because as missionaries they are employed in the propagation of religious truth; but because the public service has removed men from the situations in which they could seek religious offices for themselves. The State has no right to extinguish the religious nature of those whom it employs, nor to wrest their religious principles from them. Yet as the public service necessarily removes men from their homes and their sanctuaries, it simply seeks to alleviate the sacrifice by the compensation of a chaplaincy. So too, when the chief magistrate recommends a public fast or public thanksgiving, he does not, as the High Priest of the nation, offer a national worship; but simply as the representative of a Christian people, and merely as their voice, he gives utterance to the general sentiment pervading the hearts of all, which calls for the recognition of God in his providence. The worship at last is that of individuals who are brought into concert.

We forbear to follow Mr. Gladstone into the practical consequences of his theory; partly because that theory is original only upon the points which we have already discussed; and partly because those consequences have been portrayed by Mr. Macaulay, with that piquancy and power of illustration, which are the peculiar attributes of his pen. The reader will agree with us that the ethical argument drawn from an analysis of the nature of the State, is a stupendous failure; and that the support, which it was designed to bring to the doctrine of an established Church, fails with it.

II. The second and far more common defence of the union is based upon the assumption that the State has in charge the whole well-being of men, and may lawfully use all the agencies which can contribute to this result. Of course, as religion is the most important of these agencies, it is inferred that the State must have control over it, and must endow a Church as the instrument for applying it. By writers of this class the definition of the State given by Aristotle is eagerly adopted; *πολις γινομενη μεν του ζην ενεκεν, ουσα δε του ευ ζην*—a breadth of definition which leaves

margin enough to draw along the most magnificent conclusions. Hooker, for example, in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, teaches that "the Church and the Commonwealth are personally one society; termed a Commonwealth, as it liveth under whatsoever form of secular law or regiment—a Church, as it hath the spiritual law of Jesus Christ." Dr. Arnold, as we have already seen, makes the State and the Church mutually interpenetrate each other—so seeking the same end as to become really identical. "Wherever," says he, "the nation or government is avowedly Christian, the State or the nation is virtually the Church." Burke, too, in his splendid language, describes the State as "a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection; a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living and those who are dead, and those who are to be born."* Coleridge likewise recognises this as at the base of his singular theory. His conception of the State is that of the union of three great estates; the first is that of the land-owners, or possessors of fixed property, whose conservative influence brings permanency to the nation; the second is made up of merchants, artizans, &c. whose influence secures progressiveness and personal freedom; while in the king or executive, as the beam of these scales, "the cohesion by interdependence and the unity of the country are established." The third estate, made up of those whose business it is to "secure a continuing and progressive civilization," is supported from land which he assumes historically to have been reserved, in the original distribution of territory, for national use; and which he therefore terms "the Nationalty." This third estate is divided into two sections: the first of which remains at the Universities, the fountain heads of learning, and is employed in enlarging the knowledge already possessed; the second and much larger division is distributed throughout the nation as the guides and instructors of the people. This third estate he terms the National Clerisy or Clergy, and in its idea is wholly secular, and distinct from the Church of Christ. Christianity comes in, however, as "a blessed accident, a providential boon," "a most

* Reflections on the Revolution in France,

awful Godsend." As theology is the *prima scientia*, the Church may well undertake the functions of this National Clerisy; "two functions not requiring nor necessarily implying two functionaries." The two are therefore in fact identified; and the National Reserve is devoted to the support of Christianity, upon the condition that the Church shall discharge the office of the National Clerisy. Yet though their functions are thus consolidated, the two institutions are separate in idea, and may become so in fact. The National Clerisy may be destroyed by the impropriation of the Nationalty, and still the Church of Christ remain intact. This striking theory, characterized by that originality which marks it as the speculation of a profound thinker, we have not subjected to critical examination, for an obvious reason. A perfect autocrat in his use of language, Coleridge makes the national Church a very different thing from that against which we are now arguing. It is, in his conception, a wholly secular matter, and identified with the Christian Church by a sort of accident, only because those who constitute the latter are particularly available for the uses of the former. It is obvious, however, that, with the other writers with whom we have classed him, he distinctly assumes the object of the State to be the very indefinite one of promoting, in every conceivable way, the highest happiness of men; the *eu ζην* of Aristotle. It remains to show that this happiness cannot be promoted while man's religious interests are neglected, and the argument in favour of an establishment is supposed to be complete. The State cannot compass its ultimate end until it brings religion home to every subject; and for this purpose it endows and commissions the Church. We shall inquire directly into the legitimacy of this inference, even admitting the premises, which we are scarcely prepared to do.

The analogy which is employed to justify this conclusion, is the control of the State over the education of the people. The State exercises this control, because education is necessary to man's highest developement and happiness; and as religion is necessary in a far higher degree, *ex fortiori*, the State may and should control it. It has the same sort of right to endow a Church which it has to found a University. The reader does not need to

be informed that there are many who insist that the whole business of education should be remitted to individual enterprise and to voluntary combinations formed for this end—who resist as much the State's prerogative of directing the education as the religion of the country. To such, of course, this analogy will fail to carry conviction. We do not propose, however, to embarrass our present investigation with any discussion of this point. We would simply remark incidentally that a line of proof may be opened in favour of the State's undertaking, to a certain extent, the work of education, independent of the broad principle upon which it is ordinarily grounded. No one hesitates to admit the propriety of naval and of military schools, as necessary parts of the national defence. They are obviously just as necessary as a line of battle ships, or a series of military posts. Indeed these latter would be useless without competent officers who shall employ them for the purposes of their construction. Upon substantially the same principles may National Universities be justified. The State has as much need of jurists and legislators as of seamen and soldiers—of judges on the bench and statesmen in the council chamber, as of generals in the field and commanders in the fleet. As careful and elaborate training, too, is required for civil as for military functions. If it be replied, that but few of those who obtain a University education actually fill these public stations, so but few who pass through severe military discipline ever become generals. In either case, opportunities for knowledge must be afforded to a large class, in order to insure the selection of a few competent to occupy public trusts. We may go a step further. As every free government is of necessity self-government, there must be a modicum of intelligence pervading the masses of society, before the nation is fit to be intrusted with its own liberty. History affords no more melancholy lesson than the folly of committing the power of self-government to a people wholly unfit to exercise it. In order, then, to its own preservation, the State may be compelled to carry instruction down through all grades, even to the lowest—to teach the masses at least so much that they may understand and appreciate the charter by which all their privileges and rights are held, and form an intelligent

judgment upon all the great issues brought before the country. In obedience to the fundamental law of self-protection, it may perhaps be the duty of the State to furnish a scheme of education sifting down from the highest to the lowest strata in society, and ranging from the extensive curriculum of a University to the elementary teaching of a primary school. But the argument will here be retorted, that if education is necessary to fit a people for the exercise and preservation of freedom, is not religion of transcendently greater necessity? We grant freely that it is. We admit that without the influence of religion, men can never be brought into subjection to any government—that without it, rulers will always be tyrants, and subjects always rebellious. But it is one thing to admit that religion is necessary to the existence and perpetuation of the State, and a far different thing to admit that the State should furnish and control it. It is here that we begin to discover a wide distinction between education and religion, as they relatively affect the State. If education, in a wider or narrower sense, is necessary to the State, it may be the State's duty to supply it, because there is no organization framed expressly for this office. But if religion is necessary to the State—as we assuredly believe it is—it is *not* the State's province to provide it, simply because another organization exists by divine appointment, whose sole vocation is to exert and to diffuse this influence. Taking then the widest definition of the State—making its object as indefinite as the loosest disclaimer may desire—and granting that one of its peculiar functions is to conduct the whole business of education—it does not follow that it has the same control over religion. The simple fact that the Church is a divine institution, appointed expressly for this end, bars the inference which is so confidently drawn. Here, then, we take our stand. Religion being necessary to the State, if it were left without provision, would fall from necessity under the care of the State. But if the State were competent to this trust—or if it were the design of God that it should assume it—we do not see the call for another and separate organization, which either must lie idle or do a work of supererogation. All those views which make the State the instrument of promoting man's highest welfare

in every way, assigning to it no definite functions, tend to make it the *το παν*—the universal society engulfing every other. The Church may cease to exist, or becomes henceforth a part of the State's machinery. The argument drifts by a strong logical current upon the breakers of Hobbes' infidel doctrine, that the Church is but an engine of the State, having no authority of her own, and commissioned to no work by her divine head.

So far we have reasoned upon the concession that the broad definition of the State given above is the true one—if definition that can be called, which assigns to it no functions that are at all distinctive. We have chosen to take the outposts of the argument, before putting the fortress itself in siege. Admitting the State's prerogative to regulate the whole education and refinement of the people, we simply deny it an equal right to control religion; because this is made the vocation of the Church—an institution co-ordinate with the State, and equally the ordinance of God. Our position, however, becomes stronger, when we recall this concession, and insist that the State exists *with defined powers and for a specified end*. We frankly acknowledge our preference of the clear, well-marked theory of Warburton, above all the misty speculations we have been considering. We agree with him that the State has for its object the conservation of life and property; taking this phrase in the wider sense in which Warburton himself intended it—and not in the close and technical meaning which his commentators have forced upon it. The State is instituted for civil and temporal ends. It protects the person of the citizen, secures the avails of his industry and talent, throwing its shield over all his relations and rights so far as they pertain to this lower world—and in this way becomes the *conditio sine qua non* to his full development, individually and socially, as an active, intelligent, yet dependent being.

The State is doubtless a far more interesting object of contemplation, reposing in dim magnificence, its gigantic outline scarcely seen in the shadow of its great but undefined attributes. But as a working instrument, it needs to be realized to us with its prerogatives accurately bounded and its contour sharply defined. Indeed these vague representations seem to us to tend to a political Fourier-

ism more injurious, because projected on a larger scale, than the socialism which breaks up the domestic circle. Communism, with results which could easily be foretold and need not be described, seeks to destroy the family economy and to melt mankind down into one huge mass. What better result can attend the effort to merge all political and religious associations into one, and to make the State one great commune, in which men shall rather herd than live together? This question finds its answer in the national workshops of France; in that anomalous state of things, where artizans with weapons in their hands thunder at the door of the State, demanding employment, or at least support. The well-being of society is best promoted, not by consolidating all interests and confounding all distinctions, but by an accurate division of labour and of responsibility. Men will sooner reach the perfection of their nature, where the State and the Church shall respectively define, and conscientiously discharge, their separate functions.

Nor do we concede the position assumed by Warburton, that although distinct in their origin and separate in their aims, the State and the Church become more efficient by an alliance. The Church effects her spiritual ends by spiritual, not carnal, means. Her armour is truth; and her appeal is to conscience. She takes cognizance of sins, and her penalties operate only upon the religious nature of men. Christianity with its holy instructions, the godly example of its subjects, and its gracious control over the heart, seeks to make men better *as men*; and, therefore, better in all their social relations—better in the family, in the neighborhood, in the State. But the moment the Church seeks alliance with the State, and borrows civil pains and penalties, she simply loses, on her part, that spiritual control which her peculiar mission gives over the conscience; and the State, on its part, becomes more complex in its construction, and impeded in its action—while the virtue of both becomes gradually sapped by a connection which is as unnatural as it is unholy. Believing sincerely that these institutions are not identical in their aims, but are two distinct and co-ordinate societies looking to wholly different results—believing further, that the Church, the body and spouse of Christ, is “in a separate precinct” from the State—we do not hesi-

tate to conclude in the strong language of another, that by "logical consequence the connexion between them is adulterous and accursed."

III. We pass now from these general defences of the Union to one more particular and practical. It is alleged that the voluntary principle—to which every disestablished Church must be remanded—is wholly inadequate to supply a nation with the ordinances of religion. The alternative lies, of course, between drawing upon the State's resources on the one hand, and a distressing destitution of Gospel privileges on the other. This assertion, however, is a direct impeachment of that wisdom which has framed the Church. That an institution should be created by God for the most important of all ends, should be surrounded by the most solemn of all sanctions, should be called to discharge the most pressing of all obligations—and yet that it should be constitutionally incompetent to the work assigned, seems to us a monstrous proposition. Yet it has been hazarded; and that by persons, who if not restrained by the antecedent improbability of the allegation itself, should have been rendered cautious by reverence for the Church of God.

"Of all the parts of this subject," says Mr. Gladstone, "probably none have been so thoroughly wrought out as the insufficiency of the voluntary principle."*

"Its general law," he slanderously affirms, "is to provide for those who can pay for the provision, and does not contemplate or tend towards supplying on a large scale the wants of the really poor."†

And still again,

"I believe it is beyond dispute that it was not until the State had become the auxiliary of the Church, in the period of the Roman empire, that she was able to strike her roots throughout the remote and rural districts, as well as those of dense population, and to give universality to her sway by draining off the whole of the votaries that so long continued to crowd the rival worship of the temples."‡

For the application of this fact, if not for the fact itself, he was probably indebted to Dr. Chalmers, who employs it in a similar connection in his work on Church and College establishments,§ in which he seems very much in

* Church and State, vol. I. p. 207. † Ibid. p. 209. ‡ Ibid. 214. § p. 234.

earnest to prove the incompetence of the voluntary principle. It is painful to accuse so good and great a man as Dr. Chalmers, of want of fairness and candour; yet we have rarely read an argument more destitute than his of these noble qualities. This heavy charge against the Church of Christ, of being efficient only while leaning upon the State's protection, he sustains by alleging that while the population of Scotland had increased from one million to two millions and a half, yet the voluntaries had not overtaken more than one-third of this increase, leaving still a gross population of a million unsupplied with the gospel.* To say nothing of the want of frankness in overlooking the burdens laid upon Dissenters in supporting the Establishment, as well as in sustaining their own Churches, why should *they* be held alone responsible for this vast destitution, when by the very terms of the union it devolved upon the established Church to supply it? With what righteousness "was it left, till within these four years, to the energies and efforts of internal voluntaryism to meet and make provision for this enormous deficiency?"† Has Dr. Chalmers made it appear that the Dissenters did not their full share in reclaiming these moral wastes, by reaching that half million of souls whom he admits to have been supplied upon the voluntary principle? And while rebuking the voluntaries for the partiality of their efforts, had he no censures for the Church of the State, in almost wholly neglecting the trust *committed particularly to it*, and leaving the religious supply of the country just where it was in the days of John Knox? It certainly is strange that he should employ an argument which cuts both ways, and has a keener edge against the Establishment, than it can have against voluntaryism. It seems a just retribution, that while his argument ungenerously seeks to weaken the confidence reposed in the voluntary principle, it should put shame and confusion of face upon the Establishment forever.

In another particular, Dr. Chalmers stands more seriously convicted of injustice. The voluntaryism against which his book is directed, is not that for which the opponents of an established Church chiefly contend. He

* Church Establishments, p. 272. † Ibid.

makes a wide and just distinction between voluntarism *internal* and *external*. The former is identical with the free trade principle, which leaves, in religion as in commerce, the supply to be regulated by the demand. For this theory we have no sympathy; we abandon it to the tender mercies of Dr. Chalmers, and stand by, consenting, while he hews it to pieces. Christianity is essentially aggressive in its character. It does not remain at rest; but attacks every form of religious error, rejecting all compromise, until it shall subdue the world. The people of God are required not only to supply themselves with religious ordinances, but also to furnish the same to those who are destitute. The commission of the Church binds this duty upon her in the following terms—"go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature." Teachers of Christianity must be sent—Churches must be erected—and the whole apparatus for evangelizing men, must be afforded to the poor and guilty everywhere. In a word, what Dr. Chalmers scholastically terms voluntarism *ab extra*, against which he says not a word in his whole book, is precisely that voluntarism for which all Dissenters plead; with the exception of those who have imbibed the doctrines of a certain school in political economy. He has indeed written down the free trade principle, which insists that those destitute of the gospel shall be left in their destitution until their own sense of want shall drive them to create religious privileges; while the voluntary principle asserts the duty as well as the power of the Church, by free will contributions, to maintain and propagate religion. What fairness there is in confounding the two the reader can judge for himself. We are willing to give up the argument against Establishments, so soon as it shall be proved that the Church is constitutionally incompetent to this work, or so soon as it shall be shown by fair history that she has failed to do it. Upon what principle, we ask, "did the word of the Lord," in the days even of Paul, "sound forth not only in Macedonia and Achaia, but also in every place,"* so that the gospel in the apostolic age was conveyed throughout and beyond the borders of the Roman empire? Upon what principle were the

* 1 Thes. 1: 8.

conquests of Christianity achieved during the first three centuries, and that too in the face of violent persecution, so that in the days of Constantine it had outgrown Paganism, and was chosen in preference to it as the religion of the State? We dismiss without remark the gratuitous assertion of Mr. Gladstone that

“Christianity found its way up to thrones, incorporated itself in systems of law, and arrived at the summits of society by the miraculous impulses of its original propagation; whose vibrations had been measured no doubt with reference to the space they were to traverse.”†

When he shall substantiate by historical testimony the continuance of a miraculous power in the Church beyond the apostolic age and its perpetuation to the fourth century, we will stop to consider his deductions from so potent a fact. But no positiveness of assertion will stamp upon an unsupported conjecture the impress of historic truth. Upon what principle did Dr. Chalmers disprove his own allegations, when after a century of torpor, Christian people in Scotland waking up to this awful destitution, he succeeded in building nearly 200 Churches, and presented them to the Establishment? Upon what principle was the endowment of the Free Church achieved, whose glorious results entitle Dr. Chalmers and his coadjutors to be ranked with the Hendersons and Melvilles who fought, in earlier days, for Christ's covenant and crown? By the magic of what principle were 800 Free Churches built almost in a day, with hundreds of manses and schoolhouses—to say nothing of a college with its appropriate furniture? What spring was touched when “from their deep poverty” a Christian people raised a sustentation fund sufficient to endow anew their exiled and persecuted Church? Surely there was a providence in selecting that man to demonstrate most fully the efficiency of voluntaryism, who had most belied it as a thing powerless and weak! It was the crowning glory of Chalmers's life, that his last and sublimest acts should erase the words he did not wisely write.

But the issue now joined as to the practical efficiency of the two systems, admits of being decided by statistical

† *Church and State*, vol. I. p. 238.

facts. Let us see what supply the established Church of England has furnished for the growing religious wants of that country : and this Establishment, we may remark, unites all the conditions necessary to make the test a fair one. The English people are earnest, persevering, and full of enterprise ; the State has boundless resources from which to draw ; and the English Church is, by no means, deficient in the *esprit de corps*, requisite to carry forward a great extension scheme. The facts we shall present are taken from Mr. Noel's recent work on the union of Church and State ; and which, so far as we know, have been received without contradiction where, if untrue, they could be most easily disproved. As our object is to ascertain how far the English Establishment addresses itself to overtake with the Gospel the *increasing* population of the country, we select the two manufacturing districts of Lancashire and Yorkshire ; in which, from the nature of their employment, the population doubles itself in less than forty years.

In the district of Lancashire, embracing 1,224,708 souls, the State has built, since the year 1800, 25 Churches with 34,985 sittings : which, with 83 Churches having 93,918 sittings, built before 1800, make a total of 108 Churches with 128,903 sittings—the entire supply which is furnished by the State, and which brings the Gospel within reach of only one tenth of the population. In the same district, however, there have been built, since 1800, by voluntary contributions, 92 Episcopal Churches with 92,345 sittings ; also 472 Dissenting Chapels with 243,339 sittings ; making a total of 564 Churches and Chapels with 335,684 sittings, built, since 1800, upon the voluntary principle. Add to them 96 Dissenting Chapels with 59,445 sittings, built before 1800, and we have the supply furnished by voluntarism to be 660 Churches and Chapels, with 394,629 sittings ; which would bring the Gospel within reach of one out of every three and a half of the whole population. The comparison then will stand thus : the State furnishes 108 Churches, accommodating 128,903 persons ; voluntarism furnishes 660 Churches, accommodating 394,629 persons : being an excess of the latter over the former of 552 Churches, seating 265,726 hearers. Setting over, however, to the credit of the Es-

tablishment, the 92 Episcopal Churches, the fruits of the voluntary principle within its pale, and balancing the Churches against the Chapels, there will still be an excess in favour of the latter of 368 Chapels with 81,536 sittings.

A similar result will attend an examination of the relative supply afforded by the two systems in the woollen district of Yorkshire, with a population of 844,563. For these souls the State has built, since the year 1800, 29 Churches, seating 31,526 persons; which added to 87 Churches with 72,784 sittings, built before 1800, make the supply, afforded by the State, to be 116 Churches with 104,310 sittings; according to which, the State gives the Gospel to one-eighth of the whole gross population. Upon the voluntary principle, there have been built, since 1800, 51 Episcopal Churches, accomodating 32,426 sitters, and 501 Dissenting Chapels with 216,448 sittings. The 116 Dissenting Chapels with 136,736 sittings, built before 1800, make the entire supply, furnished by individual zeal, to be 668 Churches, with 385,610 sittings—affording the Gospel to one out of every two and one fifth of the gross population. That is to say, the State furnishes 116 Churches, reaching 104,310 of the people; voluntaryism furnishes 668 Churches, reaching 385,610 of the population—being an excess of the latter over the former of 552 Churches with 281,300 sittings. Setting over again to the credit of the Establishment, what the voluntary principle has achieved within its pale, and balancing the Churches against the Chapels, the excess in favour of the latter will still be 450 Chapels with 146,615 sittings.—Taking the two districts together there will be an excess of 818 Chapels with 228,181 sittings, to be credited to the voluntary principle, over what is furnished by the established Church; and this result obtains, though we have not substracted, as in strict justice should be done, the fruits of individual zeal within the pale of the establishment. Mr. Noel sums up the final result in the following language:

“If, by any sudden catastrophe, all the ministers and schools of the Establishment, in these manufacturing districts, were to vanish, nearly two-thirds of the evangelical instruction, now given to the people, would remain.”*

* Union of Church and State, p. 268.

There is another light in which these facts should be viewed. It is a common argument in support of the Union, that an established Church can equalize the religious supply of the country, which cannot be done upon the opposite system. The State having a paternal oversight of the whole country, can appoint Ministers and erect Churches just where these are most needed, and where the people are the least able and willing to supply themselves; who must, in the nature of things, be neglected upon the voluntary principle, "whose general law," Mr. Gladstone affirms, "is to provide for those who can pay for the provision." Let us see how far actual facts bear out this *a priori* reasoning. In the three agricultural counties of Norfolk, Rutland, and Suffolk, with a gross population in 1831 of 705,756, the established Church stationed 1250 of her clergy; the Dissenters placed 352: while in the three manufacturing and civic counties of London and Middlesex, Lancashire and Yorkshire, with a gross population of 4,066,513, the established Church stationed 1298 ministers, and the Dissenters 1934. Thus it will appear that the State afforded to these divisions, respectively, about the same measure of supply, the difference between them being only 48; and this, notwithstanding the population in the manufacturing counties is nearly six times as large as in the agricultural. A Pastor is provided for each 564 persons in the one district, and for each 3132 in the other. The distribution of the Dissenting clergy is found to be far more equitable. The population of the manufacturing region is nearly six times that in the rural; and the Dissenting ministers are also nearly six times more numerous in the former than in the latter—the proportion in each case being about the same.

The conclusion to which we are brought by this survey of the achievements of voluntaryism, both in England and Scotland, as compared with those of the National Church, is so far from being unfavourable to the former, that if we were called upon to select a field in which the voluntary principle had more fully demonstrated its efficiency than in another, we would point to Britain, and be willing to stake the issue upon its triumphs there.—However great its efficiency in this country may be—and we shall presently turn to this topic—it has been fettered

there by restrictions, and has laboured under burdens, which can never be imposed upon any single class here. It will tend further to vindicate the voluntary principle from this charge so inconsiderately preferred, to ponder what it has accomplished in these United States of America; where, in Dr. Arnold's judgment, "the evil spirit of Sectarianism has wrought his perfect work."* This country, moreover, presents, on many accounts, as fair a test to the capacities of voluntaryism as any other upon the globe. Its action is here unimpeded by the counter-efforts of any opponent; it works upon a vast scale, having a continent to traverse; and a sufficient period of time has elapsed to develop somewhat largely its results.—On the other hand, it has had obstacles of a peculiar nature to surmount. A sparse population stretching over an almost unlimited territory—its attention distracted by the multifarious objects which, in a new country, call for consideration—the partial resources which it can command among a people whose wealth has had no time to accumulate, and among whom it is constantly shifting hands—the multitude of sects which too often expend their strength in ungenerous rivalry among themselves, instead of concerting together to cover the land with the institutions of religion—the constant influx of foreigners, whose strange habits and jarring languages throw great impediments in the way of evangelical labours—the almost incredible rapidity with which the population is increasing, as well by the fecundity of the natives as by the immigration of strangers—the new territories thrown daily open, constantly enlarging the field of exertion, and carrying off the frontier when it has scarcely been reached—and the perpetual flow and change of the population, never "remaining in one stay," but unsettling what has just been established—these are among the difficulties which press upon the Churches of Christ in this country, in their efforts to evangelize it. Yet, in the face of all these obstacles, an amount of supply has been furnished to its religious necessities, which, viewed in the aggregate, almost staggers belief. It is unnecessary to enter much into detail, since the facts lie around us, open to the in-

* Principles of Church Reform, Miscel. Works, p. 270.

spection of every observer. A mere outline, which could be much more fully drawn, must suffice.

In 1844, when the population of these United States was estimated at eighteen and a half millions, there were no fewer than 16,682 ministers in the various Evangelical Churches alone, to supply it; not including the local preachers in the Methodist, nor the licentiates in the Presbyterian and Baptist Churches. This will afford an average of one minister to each 1100 souls; and under the instructions of this ministry it is estimated fifteen of the eighteen millions of the population were actually brought.* Dr. Baird, from whom these statements are borrowed, estimates that not fewer than 950 Church edifices are annually erected by Protestant Evangelical denominations; which number will swell to 1100 annually, if the sanctuaries of Unitarians, Universalists, Romanists and others be included.† He further computes the annual expenditure for the support of ministers at more than five millions of dollars; and the annual outlay for Church building and incidental expenses, at more than two millions of dollars. If now we take into view the arrangements in each of these denominations, to raise up an educated ministry—to support Evangelists in frontier and destitute settlements—to disseminate, by presses and colporteurs, a religious and denominational literature—and to propagate religion in foreign parts, (for which last object a half million of dollars is annually raised,) we carry over another large item to the credit of the voluntary principle. Let it be remembered that three fourths of the one hundred Colleges in the land, all the existing Theological Seminaries, and a vast multitude of schools, have, during the last half century, been endowed mainly by free-will contributions; and in view of all this the final estimate of Dr. Baird will not appear extravagant, that upon the voluntary principle eleven millions of dollars are annually realized to promote religion at home and abroad. It adds significance to these facts, too, to remember that those persons who freely contribute these sums to religious purposes, are also engaged in vast civil and commer-

* Religion in America, by Dr. Baird, Book 6, ch. 17.

† Ibid, Concluding Summary.

cial schemes, in order to develop the resources of a new country, and to build up to maturity and strength an infant nation. We confess to but little taste for statistics, and believe that at best they only approximate the truth. But leaving a wide margin for error in the many items which swell this aggregate, a general impression of power rests upon our minds; we begin to form some idea of that mighty principle, concealed from view, which moves so many arms over so large a circle of duty and enterprise. We are willing to commit this meagre synopsis of facts without comment to the reader. It does not require to be enforced by argument. However much we may deplore the shortcomings of voluntarism, if the only hope of a lost world is in a Church which is pensioned by the State, that hope is truly forlorn.

IV. The next defence of the union of Church and State, more frequently suggested than elaborated, is its universality among all nations and through all periods of time. This universality is supposed to be the voice of nature, indicating the general sentiment of mankind in its favour; and the argument shelters itself under that famous aphorism of Aristotle's: *ο γαρ πασι δοκει, τουτο ειναι φαιμεν ο δ' αναίρων ταυτην την πιστιν, ου πανυ πιστοτερα ερει*. The argument is, however, more specious than solid. This general consent is a strong presumption of truth, when it is shown to proceed from the unbiassed judgment of men. If no extraneous influence has been at work, and each mind has been left to its free action, then a spontaneous agreement in any conclusion can only be explained upon the supposition that it is intuitively true. Obviously, however, the doctrine of an established Church cannot be ranked among the propositions that are self-evident; since it is not only denied, but as we have shown in the preceding section, most extensive operations are founded upon this denial. It has been maintained by Archæologists, that the early founders of governments sought to draw respect to their authority and to perpetuate their power, by imbedding their polity in the religious feelings and associations of their subjects. They claimed, for example, to be inspired of the national Deities—to be commissioned to the special work they undertook—and sought in this way to fence their institutions around with divine sanctions. For this

end, they united the highest religious, with the highest civil, functions; the chief magistrate held in one hand the imperial sword, and in the other the sacrificial knife; and the whole worship of the nation was taken under the care of the State, which appropriated its revenues to the propagation of the national religion. We have, then, in the interposition of civil rulers, an extraneous influence to account for the origin of an Establishment—the State strives to make the religious nature of men the foundation upon which it shall build its power—and the National Church is but a part of the machinery by which it rules. Let it be remembered now, how much one government fashions itself after another, and it is easy to see how the first should become the mould into which succeeding ones should be cast—and how upon the principle of association alone, the union of Church and State, once gaining foothold among nations, should be handed down in unbroken succession from the earliest times even to our own day.

From the most remote antiquity, governments have been chiefly despotic, and the governed have lived in abject submission: would it be wise to infer that the general sentiment of mankind declares for a state of bondage and repudiates freedom? Would it be conclusive in this case to reason from the imperfections of society, from grievances tolerated only because they cannot be abated, to a moral approbation of the same? Wherever, too, religion is involved, the presumption arising from general concurrence becomes materially impaired, if indeed it is not more frequently *prima facie* evidence of falsehood rather than of truth. The overwhelming majority of men in all past time have been “wholly given to idolatry,” rejoicing in the fictions of their own mythology more than in the truths of God; yet most certainly, there is but one God, who hath made the heavens and the earth. All men instinctively oppose the truth as it is in Jesus, the stupid Hottentot, and the subtle Hindoo, as well as the trained sceptic; does this universal opposition to the gospel create such a presumption of its falsehood, that it should at once be discredited? Ever since the fall, “the understanding is darkened,” and men do not receive or obey the truth. Because of our depravity, religion is always prone to lose its spirituality, and become a thing of forms, a

moral institute, to be classed among, and compared with, the devices of men. When its true province is forgotten, it may be perverted to any degree whatever. Our conviction is that men have declared with such unanimity for an Established Church, because they have been ignorant, not more of the true nature of religion than of the true ends of government. This has ceased to be the soul's commerce with God, and has become a mere bargain with priests; it has been robbed of its control over the conscience and affections, and addresses itself to the imagination, or still more sordidly, to the interests of man. It has exchanged its spiritual power over men's hearts, and has sunk into a mere matter of human authority. Mr. Gladstone decides rightly, not to pursue the inductive argument for our conviction, since "the appeal is entered to a different tribunal." A question of this magnitude must be decided, not by the doubtful history of past generations, but in accordance with the great principles it involves. If there be no teaching in God's word which is authoritative, we must reason from the true nature of the two institutions, and from the ends they seek to compass. This ground we have already covered: from their nature, they can never coalesce; and their ends are such as each can attain alone in its proper sphere. To this presumptuous appeal, which would bind forever upon the world the errors of the past, we make a twofold answer: that we can find a first cause for the amalgamation of Church and State in the desire of the latter to build itself into the religious nature of man; and this union once established has been perpetuated by prescription and association. So that the alleged uniformity of action establishes no presumption of its propriety, nor can we interpret it as the voice of nature uttering only what is true. Again, we reply, that since mankind have conspired always to corrupt the true religion, the general favour manifested to a National Church originates the suspicion that this is only a device by which Christianity, through a treacherous alliance, is to be rendered powerless.

V. The advocates of the union draw an argument from the Scriptures, which divides itself into two branches; the first is the example of the Hebrew Commonwealth, which is supposed to afford a justifying precedent; the

second is an appeal to the prophecies relating to the millennial period.

We will dismiss this topic with but one or two cursory observations; both because we do not wish to overstep the limits of the reader's patience, and because the field which it introduces is almost illimitable, as soon as we enter into details. In regard to the Jewish Theocracy, it could be easily shown that essential differences exist between it and any Church Establishment since known among men. The whole power, both civil and religious, vested exclusively in Jehovah—not merely in the general sense in which all power belongs to Him, but growing out of the peculiar relation in which He was pleased to assume that people to Himself. The State was simply the husk or shell thrown around the Church, singularly constituted as that was; and the deduction from this economy is far more powerful in the hands of those who advocate the supremacy of the Church over the State, than in the hands of those who exalt the State to complete superintendency over the Church. It can be shown that the Jewish Kings had no jurisdiction over the Church—did not appropriate the revenues of the State to the support of the Priesthood—did not employ their power in exacting the tithes which Jehovah had made the peculium of the Levitical order—and had no agency either in appointing to, or in deposing from, religious functions.—But omitting all considerations of this kind, it is a sufficient reply that this Dispensation was wholly extraordinary, appointed to fulfil a temporary office, and was distinctly abrogated by the Messiah at the period of His advent. The principle of an Ecclesiastico-political organization, if ever it was incorporated in the Jewish Economy, was then expressly cancelled. He declares his kingdom to be henceforth not of this world—distinguishes between the things which are to be rendered unto Cæsar, and the things to be rendered unto God—warns his servants to put the sword into its sheath—and teaches that the weapons of their warfare are not carnal, but spiritual. This unequivocal withdrawal of the Jewish Establishment, and this clear separation of his Church as entirely spiritual in its aims, revoke the grant, if indeed

the Church ever possessed it, to ally itself with the civil power.

In relation to the Millennial Prophecies, it cannot be overlooked that the argument founded upon them assumes an exposition which is obstinately contended. The declarations that "Kings shall be nursing fathers, and Queens nursing mothers to the Church"—that she "shall suck the milk of the Gentiles"—and that "Kings shall minister unto her"—may mean simply that these persons shall become the subjects of Divine Grace, and bring the influence which station gives them in forwarding the cause of the Redeemer. Before they can establish any connection between civil governments and the Church of Christ, it must first be shown that this spiritual interpretation is void, and that these terms must be understood in their most full and literal extension. The argument drawn from the Saviour's personal advent and reign cannot be admitted, till this doctrine is itself incontrovertibly established. We say nothing now upon any of these points, sufficiently difficult and perplexing of themselves, without being entangled with the vexed question we are now discussing. It is enough for our purpose to say that an argument drawn from disputed premises, is rarely convincing: and there can be no end of disputation, when the discussion is only removed from the inference, and warmly renewed upon the premises from which it is deduced. Granting, however, the prediction that "the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ" to be literally accomplished in the personal reign of the Saviour, in which he will assume temporal as well as ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the nations—that will be confessedly an extraordinary Dispensation, of which we can at present form no adequate conceptions. To Christ belong rightfully the kingdom and the glory; and if in His own person He shall visibly unite temporal sovereignty with Headship over the Church, we assuredly say Amen: but we can scarcely allow our opponents to reason backwards from a future and extraordinary Dispensation, to times and circumstances so essentially varying, as they are with us.

We bring to a close our discussion of this really complex and difficult subject. We have no new theory to

project upon the relations of the State to the Church. Indeed all speculation is precluded by the very simplicity of our creed ; which is that the two institutions should work on harmoniously, each in its own sphere doing its own work, and without thwarting the plans of either. The State protects her citizens in the enjoyment of their religious privileges ; and the Church enjoins upon her members the Christian duty of reverence to "the powers that be." It is rather from those who seek to amalgamate these societies, than from us, that ingenuity must be expected. It is for them to frame theories on which to reconcile discordant materials—so to mingle the iron and the clay that the product shall not be "partly strong and partly weak." The object which we proposed to ourselves was limited to a review of the schemes which have been invented for this end, and an analysis of the principles upon which these are constructed. There are some special objections urged against the voluntary scheme which we would be glad to examine in detail : but the limits of a review will not suffer the notice of more than two ; and these we select, not so much for the purpose of refutation, as for salutary caution to those who boldly advocate the voluntary principle.

It has been said that the separation of the Church from the State tends to make the latter Atheistical. Lawgivers and magistrates inducted into office without religious tests will cast off all restraint, and the affairs of the nation be conducted upon the most infidel principles. The distinction is again overlooked between the nation and the State. The latter, as a unit, is incapable of religion, as we have endeavoured to show ; the former, as embracing individuals, may and should be Christian. Legislators and governors are under the same individual responsibility with other men ; and in their public functions, as well as in their private relations, are bound to make God's word a lamp to their feet and a light to their path. If laws unfriendly to religion are enacted, or if wise laws be unjustly administered, the guilt will be laid where it justly belongs. And if the people, from whom in free governments power flows, suffer their representatives to abuse a public trust—to employ the influence of their high station to demoralize the nation—they become accessaries

after the fact. It requires to be shown whether the absence of religious tests tends so much to make the State Atheistical, as the requisition of them from unqualified persons, to make the State a hypocrite—and whether the results are not equally pernicious. It is certainly far more easy to debauch the consciences of men, and make them familiar with perjury and blasphemy, than to erase the fundamental ideas of religion from their minds. We deny, however, that it is the State's province to be the organ or exponent of the religious convictions of the nation. We for example, are a Christian people, a Christian nation; the laws framed for our government respect us as such; and our rulers represent to some extent this religious element: not indeed by formal, public, official acts, carrying out the religious opinions of their constituents, but in refraining from any legislation or government which shall compromise their religious character. Yet since the charge has been laid against the voluntary scheme, that without a National Church, the State tends to open disregard of all religion, let those who wish well to voluntarism see that the charge may not be sustained. Let the effort be to leaven the whole mass of society with religious principles, for the obtaining a sound religious public opinion—which, more than tests and sacraments, will constrain public officers at least into a decent demeanour to the religion of Christ, and to the hearty recognition of it as the greatest of all the elements which go into the character of the nation.

Again, it has been urged as the opprobrium of voluntarism, that it secures no adequate support to the ministry. There is room, however, for the inquiry whether an Established Church does better. Taking the English Establishment for the comparison, we should say not; although it must be admitted that the Scotch Establishment, from the simplicity of its worship and the parity of the clergy, would present a more favourable case. The total nett income of the English Establishment, according to Mr. Noel, was in 1836, £3,439,767: which, if equally distributed among the 12,923 clergy, would yield the very fair average of £266. But when it is remembered that the incomes of Bishops and Archbishops range from £4,000 to £15,000, that a large sum goes to the Ca-

thedrals, and that the benefices vary exceedingly in value, the statement of Mr. Noel is not surprising :

"1619 Clergymen receive £1,319,650 ; 10,112 Clergymen receive £1,155,030 : that is, 1619 Clergymen receive more from the State than 10,112, who do nearly all the work. 1619 Clergymen who have got the prizes of the Establishment, have an average of £808 ; and 10,112 of the working Clergy have an average of £114. The 1619 have salaries seven times larger than their more laborious brethren."*

If the voluntary principle does not ensure equality of support, or even a fair distribution, surely it is not for Establishments to throw the stone. In our own country, many causes conspire to render ministerial support generally too inadequate. We are certainly far from censuring those laborious and self-sacrificing men who, yielding to a controlling necessity, "labour with their own hands that they may not be chargeable upon any ;" yet it is a reproach to the Church, when her ministers are laid under such necessity ; and a grievous loss to her when their thoughts and time and strength must be directed from their holy vocation to be occupied with tables. It becomes us, when boasting of the fruits of voluntaryism, to remember this scandal yet resting against it. May the time soon come when it shall be manifested that no better treasury exists than the hearts of God's people, and no richer endowment for the Church than the Grace to consecrate her substance to Him who hath purchased her with His own blood !

Finally, the controversy now pending between Free and Established Churches, we conscientiously believe, is remitted to Christian denominations in this country for ultimate decision ; but it must be closed not by words or arguments, but with the higher demonstration of incontestible facts. Never, since Apostolic times, was a wider territory afforded for the trial of the energies of voluntaryism ; and never a period in which it was put to a severer test than the present. It must not only fill the interstices still occurring in the older settlements ; but it must penetrate on the South the fields which a few years have opened to the very borders of Mexico—it must tra-

* Union of Church and State, p. 287.

verse the Northwestern territories, rapidly filling with a hardy population, and destined shortly to become an integral portion of this confederacy—it must follow the shoals of emigrants into the new regions of California, where an empire has sprung up almost literally in a night. All this it must do, and that at once. The Evangelist with his roving commission, the colporteur with his printed message, and the Christian Pastor with his Church, must be apace with the most forward of the pioneers, who shall fell the primeval forest in the most remote sections of this land. If not, the advocates of a National Church will be furnished a triumph by our supineness which their own achievements have failed to win. It were a fatal mistake to suppose that the voluntary principle has already accomplished such results amongst us as shall forever vindicate it from the charge of incompetency. This problem is yet only in the course of demonstration: we are but in the midst of the high argument. Should the various Evangelical denominations relax at this point their exertions—should they hereafter fail to overtake our growing population, and extending territory, with Gospel privileges, barbarism and irreligion will sooner or later flow back upon us from the frontiers of our land, and with its fearful tide sweep away the institutions which seem to be firmly established. If indeed in the Providence of God we have been appointed the guardians of the voluntary scheme, we can only discharge our sacred trust by energetic efforts to cover this continent, even to its extremities, with the ordinances of religion. Upon this career, we are happy to know the Church of Christ has already entered. We cherish with delight the conviction that the largeness of spirit with which she has entered upon these Evangelical labours, is but the earnest of still more liberal endeavours; and that the success already attained is only the pledge of the final triumph of voluntaryism.

ARTICLE II.

THOUGHTS UPON THE PRIESTHOOD OF CHRIST.

The mediation of Christ is represented in the Scriptures, as consisting in the discharge of three principal offices—those of a prophet, a priest, and a king. That God should instruct and govern us through the agency and instrumentality of another, is so perfectly in keeping with the whole analogy of nature, that none who pretend to any reverence for the Scriptures—who even admit the historical reality of Jesus, are disposed to deny that he is, in some preeminent sense, the moral teacher and moral ruler of mankind. All who acknowledge any revelation acknowledge that, through Jesus Christ, God has communicated discoveries of His will, which are of the last importance to the improvement and happiness of the race. Too many, indeed, reduce his prophetick functions to the mere publication of truth, and his kingly office to the proclamation of the laws which men are required to obey; thus divesting him as a teacher, of the dispensation of the Spirit, and merging his royal prerogative into that of a messenger of the king. But though there has been a disposition to strip these offices of some of the peculiarities which distinguish them, as exercised by Christ, and which give them indeed their value and efficacy to us, yet no peculiar presumption has been felt to lie against the general fact, that his mediation embraces the elements of instruction and rule. Widely different is the case in regard to his priesthood. This has ever been the stone of stumbling and the rock of offence in the Christian scheme. Every artifice of learning and criticism has been tried to expunge from the Scriptures their plain and obvious teachings upon the subject. The word of God has been twisted, distorted, mutilated—the simplest rules of grammar set at defiance and the established usages of language disregarded and despised, in order to give some colour of plausibility to the shameless denial of the sacerdotal mediation of the Saviour. What renders this conduct the more remarkable is, that the New Testament gives a prominence to the priesthood, which it no where concedes

to the kingly or prophetick offices of Christ. It was the very end of his incarnation that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest. There was obviously no necessity for such a miracle as the assumption of human nature by His Divine person, if the only result to be achieved were the discovery of truths, inaccessible to the efforts of reason—and the promulgation of laws, resting upon the authority of God. Prophets and Apostles were abundantly competent to offices of this sort. They could teach—they did teach—The New Testament itself—the very oracles of God—is the labour of their hands directed by the Spirit of God.

The incongruity is so palpable and monstrous betwixt the pomp of preparation involved in the common doctrine of the incarnation and the end to be accomplished—betwixt the opulence of means and the poverty of result, that those who deny the priesthood do not scruple to deny the Deity of the Son—and with a painful consistency of error, reduce Him who is over all God blessed forever, to the level of our poor, dependent humanity. The doctrines of a proper Sonship and a proper priesthood are, in the Christian economy, inseparably linked together. And it is a happy circumstance for the faith of the Church, that the enemies of the cross can never hope to prevail without a double work of destruction. Their argument against Priesthood is felt to be incomplete until they have demolished the Deity, and their arguments against the Deity unsatisfactory until they have demolished the priesthood of Christ. They must show that He has never been addressed in the language, in its strict and proper acceptation, Thou art my Son, to day have I begotten thee, before they can show that it has never been said to Him, Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek. But while the Scriptures insist with peculiar emphasis upon the priesthood of Christ, and represent the functions which are discharged in it as essential to salvation, it is not sufficiently considered that these functions themselves are not necessarily sacerdotal—that they might have been discharged by one who was not a priest in the common acceptation of the term. All that seems to be indispensable to salvation is the obedience of a substitute voluntarily assuming our guilt, and able to endure the curse of the

law. The imputation of an adequate righteousness, upon the ground of federal relations, is the principle into which the apostle resolves our justification, in the Epistle to the Romans. The government of God demands that sin should be punished, and that life should be the reward of perfect obedience—and the salvation of a sinner turns upon the possibility of vicarious righteousness and vicarious punishment. These are the doctrines which Paul enounces and vindicates in that great epistle which has ever been the bulwark of the Evangelical scheme as contradistinguished from the dreams of formalists, pharisees and mysticks. He says nothing there specifically of priesthood. It is Christ a substitute—Christ the federal representative of sinners—Christ obeying and Christ dying in the place of the guilty—these are the topics of discussion—these are the doctrines which lie at the foundation of our hope, and make the gospel emphatically tidings of great joy. But these doctrines do not necessarily include priesthood. We can manifestly conceive of a mediation by substitution which shall not, at the same time, be sacerdotal. The Son of God, for aught that appears, might have become incarnate—assumed our legal responsibilities and brought in an everlasting righteousness—he might have been a sponsor, paying our debt and slain by the sword of divine justice in our stead—he might have fulfilled all the requisitions of the law, or of natural religion, and have pledged the faithfulness and truth of God to our redemption, and yet not have performed any of these duties in the character of a priest. It becomes, therefore, an extremely interesting question, why the mediation of Christ has been made to assume the peculiar form of priesthood. If atonement is all that can be proved to be essential to pardon and acceptance—and vicarious obedience and vicarious punishment all that are essential to atonement—if substitution is the fundamental principle of redemption, why is it that the substitute has been ordained a priest, that his death is a sacrifice as well as a satisfaction to justice—and that with the blood of this offering he has passed into the holiest of all to make constant intercessions for his people? If we could have been saved by a substitute who was not a priest, and redeemed by a death which was not a sacrifice, why have a priest and a sacri-

fice been the chosen means of accomplishing the work? These are not questions of idle curiosity. They have been suggested to my own mind by an attentive study of the Epistles to the Romans and Hebrews. The first—the Epistle to the Romans, discusses the principles of the gospel in their general relations to the moral government of God, and demonstrates, as well as asserts upon authority, the absolute necessity of legal substitution in order to life. But if the disclosures of revelation stopped here, we might look upon the death of the Redeemer as the result simply of the operation of justice—a death inflicted by the law—exclusively penal in its nature and relations—exact of him in the same sense in which it would otherwise have been exacted of the sinner. We might regard pardon as resulting from faith in that death as a satisfaction to justice—and access to God as immediate and direct in consequence of this historical fact as a past reality. The principles here discussed would resolve the security of our state into the covenant-faithfulness of God, without the least insight into the manner in which it is actually made available to the saints. All that we could say would be that our debt has been paid—that justice no longer demands our lives—that God has promised in consequence of the Redeemer's death to receive us into favour—and upon the ground of that death we might approach Him ourselves and sue for mercy. This is all that could be certainly collected from the general discussion of this Epistle. But when we turn to that to the Hebrews, we find a substitute indeed, and the substitute demanded by the Epistle to the Romans—but that substitute is embodied in a priest—we find a death—a penal death—a death which is commensurate with the curse of the law—but it is a death which is also a sacrifice—at once the result of the operation of justice and of a free-will offering to God. We find justification and pardon resolved ultimately into the obedience and death of Christ as past, historical facts, but immediately due to relations sustained to Him as a living person and Redeemer—and access to God ascribed—not so much to faith in His past achievements—as to His present appearance for us in the holiest of all, and the covenant-faithfulness of God is seen to be maintained through the agency of Him who ever liveth to make intercessions for us.

The Epistle to the Hebrews may be regarded as a detailed account of the method, in which the great law of substitution has been actually applied, in the redemption of our race. While the one to the Romans shows what must needs be done in order to our salvation—the one to the Hebrews shows how it has been done—and where the arrangements have gone beyond the strict requisitions of necessity, they are demonstrated to be the dictates at once of mercy and wisdom. Priesthood is the perfection of mediation. There is not a single circumstance which distinguishes a priest from a general substitute which is not significant—a proof of goodness—a fresh illustration of the adaptation of redemption to the condition of its objects—not a single circumstance which distinguishes a sacrifice from the ordinary forms of death, that does not enhance the preciousness of the Saviour's work. The full effect of this truth is lost upon most Christian minds, through inattention to the distinctions in question. They admire the goodness and adore the wisdom of God in providing a substitute for the guilty, able to reconcile the conflicting claims of justice and of grace—but apart from the adaptation of His person to the mighty work, they see nothing upon which they are accustomed to dwell as peculiarly indicative of the divine goodness. They overlook the adaptation of His office—they forget that the manner in which He has accomplished the work is as glorious as the matter—the how as sublime as the what. The work as done, the person by whom—exhaust their topics of admiration and of praise, and they fail to enter into those other motives of faith, devotion and thanksgiving which are derived from the contemplation of the office in its essential and distinguishing features. They use the terms Priest and High Priest, and have a habitual reference to the appearance of the Saviour in the presence of God—but their High Priest is, after all, but little more than an all-sufficient sponsor, and His intercessions are regarded rather as acts of royalty than sacerdotal pleas. It is amazing how little and seldom we enter into those views of the death of the Redeemer, which spring from the consideration of it as a real and proper sacrifice—how little we discriminate betwixt a legal representative and a consecrated Priest—

betwixt Christ glorious in His kingdom and equally glorious in the Holiest of all—betwixt even his triumphant ascension as a king and his passage as intercessor, not without blood, into the presence of God. As these distinctions are evidently important—and the benefits of that peculiar form of mediation to which the Saviour was appointed are clearly explained by the apostle, it may be well to show how much we have gained and how pre-eminently God is glorified by this whole arrangement. Let us, then, contemplate Jesus, not simply as the apostle, but the High Priest, of our profession, and let us endeavor to collect from the Scriptures the excellency and glory of this species of mediation.

I. It deserves first to be remarked that those conceptions of the origin of salvation which are suggested by substitution in its nakedest form, are rendered clearer and more impressive by the fact, that the substitute is also a Priest. The appointment of any representative is an act of grace—redemption, no matter how achieved, is the offspring of mercy. The justice which connects punishment with guilt attaches the penalty to the person of the offender—and though it is capable of being satisfied by vicarious sufferings, it is the prerogative of the law-giver to say, whether he will accept a substitute and transfer his vengeance from the original transgressor to an innocent but adequate sponsor. But this grace is more conspicuously displayed in the constitution of a Priest than the designation of a simple surety. While, in either case, the whole proceeding is of grace, there are, in the consecration of a Priest, a solemnity of purpose and an absolute sovereignty of will, which arrest attention and compel the most thoughtless to acknowledge that it is the finger of God. In considering the claims of a surety, all that would seem to be important is his ability to pay the debt he assumes. But in the case of a Priest this ability must concur with other qualifications—the anxiety to secure which is an additional proof of the mercy which pities the condition of the lost. It is always an act of sovereign condescension to admit a substitute—but there is nothing inconceivable in the supposition that the proposition to redeem the guilty might proceed from himself and not from God—that he might volunteer his services—and

so become the author of the scheme which dispenses salvation to men. But the honour of Priesthood no man can take to himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron. Hence the apostle insists upon it that Christ glorified not himself to be made an High Priest, but he that said unto him—Thou art my Son, to day have I begotten thee. A Priest is a solemn minister of religion—the channel through which all worship is conducted—the organ of all communications betwixt God and the people. This august agency none can assume without the authority of God. So awful and momentous is this office—which really collects the prayers and praises and thanksgivings of a world into a single person—which centres the hopes of mankind upon the conduct of a single individual throughout all ages; so tremendous is this responsibility and so sublime the honour, that it would be the climax of presumption, on the part of any one, to propose that it should be conceded to him. It belongs to God and to God alone to designate a Priest. The idea of a mediatorial worship, conducted by a permanent and glorious minister, and so conducted as to strengthen the ties of personal obligation, is an idea which could only originate in the mind of the Deity—and there were an evident fitness and propriety in the solemnity and grandeur attached to the appointment of Jesus to this office, when he was consecrated not without an oath. A scheme which contemplates an arrangement of this sort bears stamped upon it the strongest impress of grace. It sprang from the bosom of God—it was mercy which conceived the purpose of salvation—mercy which accepted the substitute, and mercy upon mercy, the exuberance of grace, which made that substitute a Priest. This last feature makes it little less than blasphemy to imagine that redemption could have any other source but the bosom of the Almighty. It is a Divine plan.

The acceptance of any substitute on the part of the Deity, contains an implied pledge that he was adequate to the task. We can scarcely conceive without horror, that a Being of infinite benevolence should subject the innocent, however willing he might be to undergo the torture, to unspeakable sufferings, when it was known beforehand that they would be incompetent to redeem the

guilty. God, we may rest assured, would never take a surety who was unable to pay. But the guarantee arising from the Divine character, that an accepted mediation shall be sufficient, is immensely strengthened when the substitute is considered as not only accepted but *proposed* by God—and set apart to his work with a solemnity of installation, which would seem to throw the most awful imputation upon the Divine veracity, if the sacrifice should fail to be adequate. Can we, for a moment, indulge the suspicion that Jesus shall not infallibly save every sinner who applies to Him—when He has been solemnly appointed to this office by the oath of God? Was that oath an idle flourish—a mere mockery of our woe—or was it not rather a proclamation to all the intelligent universe, that the scheme of redemption should be as stable as the eternal throne—the Priesthood of Jesus as incapable of disappointing our hopes as God of ceasing to be? This designation of Jesus to the Priesthood was the sole ground of security to the ancient saints. The great work was only in prospect—it stood in the counsel of God—and as the strength of Israel was not a man that He should lie, nor the Son of man that He should repent, the Patriarchs and Prophets looked with steadfast hearts to the great events which are matters of history to us. And these all, having obtained a good report through faith, received not the promise, God having provided some better thing for us, that they without us should not be made perfect. Such is the strong consolation which the oath of God is suited to impart to the heirs of His Grace—that if nothing more were known of the economy of Redemption than that it depended upon a Priesthood appointed by Himself, and consecrated with the solemnity of this awful sanction, this would be sufficient to establish their hearts. They would feel that the scheme could not fail—that the Glory of God was so deeply concerned in its success that Heaven and earth might sooner pass away, than a single sinner fall short of Salvation who had fled for refuge to the hope set before him. Such impressiveness could not be imparted to the acceptance of a substitute—or even the selection of a mere representative. The forms of inauguration—the awful rites of consecration—the proofs of love and of confidence im-

plied in the delegation of so imposing a trust, these must all be wanting, and strip the transaction of whatever attractions they are fitted to give it upon a sinner's regard. No form of mediation could beforehand so deeply pledge the Deity to its success, as that which turns upon an office to which God alone is competent to call. In making it His prerogative to glorify him who shall be clothed with the Priesthood, we make it absolutely certain that he who is so honoured shall glorify God in the wisdom of the choice.

As in every instance of substitution, the free and cordial acquiescence of the substitute is indispensable to the success of the arrangement, it is a favourable circumstance when the form of mediation can be made conspicuously to display it. His consent should not only be presumed, but known. It should be patent and manifest in the whole transaction. There would be an appearance of hardship, if not of injustice, in a proceeding which should doom the innocent to suffer in the place of the guilty, without the concurrence of their own wills. If arbitrarily done, it would be flagrant and intolerable tyranny—if done from high and solemn considerations of public policy, it would impeach the wisdom of an administration, which had been so imperfectly digested as to demand an occasional departure from distributive justice, an occasional disregard of personal worth or delinquency, in order to answer its proper ends. If the scheme of Redemption, however, proposed Jesus to His people as only a legal substitute, though His consent might be easily collected from the circumstances of the case, yet it would not be conspicuous from the nature and progress of the work. Still less could it be seen, that His consent was the spontaneous movement of His own heart, rather than a pious submission to the will of God, with whom the scheme must originate. But when he is announced as a Priest all difficulty vanishes. He must delight in the work—the offering which he brings must be a free-will offering, or it could be no offering at all. If the victim laid upon the altar were not fully and cordially surrendered to God, the external act were hypocrisy, and the whole service a mockery. Wherefore when he cometh into the world, he saith, sacrifice and offering thou didst

not desire; mine ears hast thou opened—burnt-offering and sin-offering hast thou not required. Then said I, lo I come—in the volume of the book it is written of me—I delight to do thy will, oh my God.

Among the qualifications indispensable to a Priest, next to his having somewhat to offer, nothing is more earnestly insisted on by the Apostle than a sympathizing nature. He must feel a real solicitude in the objects of his care. He must be one that can have compassion on the ignorant, and on them that are out of the way. He is not to bring his sacrifice with a cold and repulsive sense of duty—nor from abstract regards to the dignity or glory of the deed—but he must be governed by a real *philanthropy*—he must have love and pity in his heart—he must weep for the transgressor while he makes atonement for the guilt. As he is a mediator betwixt God and men, he must combine in his person the apparently incompatible elements of zeal for the Divine glory and affection for the souls of men. He must love the Lord his God, and maintain the integrity of His throne—while He commiserates the condition of the lost, and would rescue them from their melancholy doom. He must have a brother's heart while he vindicates the decree of eternal justice. It is this zeal for God and man—this admirable blending of piety and philanthropy, which renders it certain that a Priest must always rejoice in his work. This is a qualification which he must have—it is of the essence of the office—and if at any period in the progress of his work, he should fail to possess or evince it, his acts cease to be sacerdotal—they become sacrilegious—the offering of strange fire upon the altar. This consideration puts it beyond doubt—beyond the possibility even of suspicion, that the substitution of the Saviour was the result of “a momentary enthusiasm, a sudden impulse of heroick feeling, which prompted him in the ardour of the moment, to make a sacrifice of which, on cool deliberation, he repented.” The very nature of the Priesthood demands that the spirit of sublime devotion to God, and heroick self-sacrifice for man, which first secured his consent to the enterprize, should animate him at every step in his history, and sanctify every function of his office.—He is not to be the passive recipient of ill. As a Priest

he *must act*—there are things to be done even in the endurance of the curse—and his whole heart must burn with piety and compassion, while he bears the sins of the world in his own body on the tree. The lofty and god-like motives which induced the Redeemer, in the counsels of eternity, before the morning stars had yet sung together, or the sons of God shouted for joy, to become the lamb to be slain, must have continued to operate with undiminished intensity, or the prerogatives and glory of his office had been forfeited. The Priestly spirit must have continued to dwell and to reign in his heart, or the Priestly robes would have been taken from his shoulders. He must have been as free, as cordial, as delighted, when he uttered the cry of lamentation and woe upon the cross, which shook the earth and startled the dead, as when at the glorious suggestion of the scheme, he uttered the language, Lo, I come. As the work of a Priest, it is stamped upon the whole process of Redemption that the substitute gave his consent—that his self-devotion was spontaneous and free—the execution of a settled purpose, to which he was impelled by no constraining influence of the Divine will—by no transitory fervours of enthusiasm—no martyr impulse of the moment—that he delighted in the work—it was his meat and drink—he felt it to be an honour and not a hardship—its successful achievement a crown of glory, and not a triumph over cruelty. This single consideration, that it displays so conspicuously the freeness of the Saviour's mediation, is itself a sufficient vindication of the wisdom and fitness of a Priesthood. It shows that our felicity has not been purchased at the expense of the rights of another—and though there was an immense cost of suffering and of blood, it was never for a moment begrudged—never for a moment sustained with reluctance. We have no occasion for regrets that the blessings which we enjoy have been put into our hands by cruelty, injustice, or even harshness and severity to others. They are the free gifts of that sublimest of all spirits—the spirit of a Priest.

It is obvious from the preceding train of remark, that all those views of the origin and success of the scheme of Redemption, which the general idea of substitution naturally suggests, are rendered more striking and im-

pressive by the peculiarities of Priesthood. If legal substitution involves a dispensation with the primary requisition of the law---which attaches punishment to the person of the offender---which proves that the substitute must be appointed by God---the necessity of this inference is immensely enhanced, when that substitute sustains an office which absolutely demands a vocation from above. The proposition to suffer might originate from a competent sponsor—the proposition to be a Priest could not be made without blasphemy—and any scheme which comprehends the functions of a real and proper Priesthood, can spring from no other source but the bosom of God. If the acceptance of a substitute carries a presumption that his proffered mediation must be successful, this presumption is magnified into certainty, when the substitute is not only accepted but appointed by God, and invested with an office which requires a formal and solemn inauguration. The presumption in the one case arises from the general principle that whatever means are appointed of God must be efficacious---but the certainty in the latter arises from the awful sanctity of the oath with which the Son was declared to be a Priest forever after the order of Melchizedek.

If the consent of the substitute must, in every instance, be presumed—the righteousness of the procedure depending upon his concurrence—it is obviously important that it should be open and palpable; and this result is effectually attained by an arrangement, which could not subsist a moment longer than the consent of the substitute is given. The Priestly spirit, which is essential to the Priestly office, exacts delight in the work—and all sacerdotal functions would behove to be suspended when the Priest failed in the spirit of his vocation. The joy of the Mediator in the work, therefore, and the vindication of God from all suspicion of cruelty, injustice, or severity, is complete and triumphant when the Saviour's death is made a sacrifice—a free-will offering to God. But though these considerations are not without their value in illustrating the Divine wisdom and goodness, yet we are far from supposing that they constitute the peculiar advantages of sacerdotal mediation. The pre-eminent importance of the office is rather to be sought in the light which it

throws upon Redemption as a work achieved—and in the arrangements which it makes for the successful application of its blessings to the heirs of the promise. It is precisely the scheme in which the provisions of the Gospel most conspicuously display the glory of God, and are best adapted to conciliate regard, and to inspire confidence and hope. Grace is here seen to be a remedy without the disgust which remedies usually create—it is rendered attractive to all who know their disease and appreciate their danger, and administers strong consolation under circumstances in which no other arrangement could save from the encroachments of despair.

II. When we contemplate the death of Christ as simply the death of a substitute, we see in it nothing more than a full satisfaction to the claims of justice. The sponsor pays the debt, and pays it cheerfully—the legal representative endures the curse which others had incurred, and falls beneath the sword which the guilt of others had drawn from its scabbard. It is a transaction of law and government—the infliction of a judicial sentence.—Though it is implied that the substitute approves the equity of the law under which he suffers—and is prepared to vindicate the Divine conduct from the charge of unreasonable rigour; though the justice of the whole transaction is assumed—yet when it is represented as simply the operation of justice, much of its moral grandeur and impressiveness is lost. We see in the substitute a victim to his own generosity—and considered exclusively in this light, there are probably few men who have not had occasion to fortify their minds against a momentary impression of unrelenting severity, by appealing to those awful attributes of God, which make atonement the exclusive channel of mercy to the guilty. We must go beyond the event to its principle and causes before we can be at ease, when we survey the sufferings of Jesus of Nazareth. He is felt to be a passive victim of Divine wrath—he bares his bosom to the stroke—he receives the storm which beats in violence and fury—he simply, in other words, stands and endures—while God, and God in His most terrible forms of manifestation, is the sole agent in the case.

Widely different is the impression which is made when the transaction is contemplated in its true light. There

is no room for the remotest suspicion of inexorable rigour---when Jesus is seen to be a Priest---His death a sacrifice---and the whole transaction an august and glorious act of worship. The position of Jesus is sublime when standing before the altar---He confesses the guilt of His brethren---adores the justice which dooms them to woe---and almost exacts from God as the condition of His own love---that justice should not slacken nor abate. That prayer of confession---that assumption of guilt---that clear acknowledgment of what truth and righteousness demand, makes us feel that God *must* strike---that the edict must go forth---awake, oh sword, against my shepherd and the man that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts. Still sublimer is His position, when with profound adoration of the Divine character, by His own proper act---his own spontaneous movement---he lays his life upon the altar, virtually saying: take it---it ought to be taken---let the fire of justice consume it---better, ten thousand times better that this should be than that the throne of the eternal should be tarnished by an effeminate pity. We feel that death is not so much a penalty inflicted as an offering accepted. We feel that God is glorious, that the law is glorious in the whole transaction, because Christ glorifies them. He lays down His life of Himself---it is His own choice to die rather than that man should perish, or the Divine government be insulted with impunity---and though when the offering was accepted, justice inflicted upon Him the full penalty of the law---though the fire which consumed the victim was the curse in its whole extent, yet as it was an act of worship to provide it, and especially as that victim was Himself, every groan and pang---every exclamation of agony, amazement, and horror, was a homage to God which, in itself considered, the Priest felt it glorious to render. And if Jesus in all the extremity of His passion, proclaimed to the universe what from the nature of Priesthood He must have proclaimed---that the whole transaction was a ground on which God was adored by Him --that His Father was never dearer---never more truly God in His sight than when he accepted the sacrifice of Himself---and ought to be adored by all, the sublimity of the principles involved, and the interest of Jesus in them, are a perfect vindication from every illiberal suspicion. There is something to our

minds inexpressibly sublime when we contemplate the scheme of Redemption as accomplished by an act of worship---when we look upon Jesus not as a passive recipient of woes---the unresisting victim of law---but as a minister of religion, conducting its services in the presence of angels and men, upon an emergency which seemed to cover the earth with darkness. Our world becomes the outer Court of a sanctuary---where a sacrifice is to be offered in which the Priest and the victim are alike the wonder of the universe---in which the worship which is rendered leaves it doubtful whether the Deity is more glorious in his justice or his grace. In this aspect, the satisfaction of Jesus is not merely the ground upon which others are at liberty to approach and adore the Divine perfections, it is itself a prayer uttered by the lips of one whose deeds were words---a hymn of praise chanted by Him whose songs were the inspiration of holiness and truth. Every proud imagination is rebuked---every insinuation against the character of God is felt to be a shame to us---every disposition to cavil or condemn is consigned to infamy, when we remember that the whole work of Jesus was a solemn service of religion, as well that by which He descended into the grave, as that by which He passed through the Heavens into the holiest of all. He was a Priest in His death---a Priest in His Resurrection---a Priest in His ascension. He worshipped God in laying His life upon the altar---He worshipped Him in taking it again---and it was an act of worship by which He entered with His blood in the very presence of the highest to intercede for the saints. It was religion in Jesus to die---to rise---to reign, as it is religion in us to believe in these great events of His history.

Here, then, is an incalculable advantage of Priesthood ; while it makes the passion of the Redeemer a full and perfect satisfaction of Divine justice, and so lays an adequate foundation of pardon, it vindicates the Divine glory in every step of the proceeding, by making every step an act of adoration and praise. It makes the Saviour adore the Father in His death---makes that very death an offering of praise---redemption itself a mighty prayer, and throws the sanctities and solemnities of worship---and worship on the part of one who knew what was the

proper ground of worship---around all the stages in the developement of the economy of grace. This seems to us to be the very climax of wisdom. It was glorious to have provided a substitute who should be able to bear our sins in his own body upon the tree---to have devised a scheme by which the conflicting claims of mercy and justice should be adjusted and harmonized, by which God could be just, and, at the same time, the justifier of those who believe in Jesus---but it was the very perfection of wisdom to have executed this scheme so that the intensest sufferings should have produced only a deeper impression of the Divine glory and of the excellence and value of the Divine law. Surely in this arrangement the law is magnified and made honourable.

2. Another circumstance which illustrates the importance of sacerdotal mediation, is the provision which it makes for the application of redemption to the heirs of the promise. The discussion has often been agitated, which precedes, faith or regeneration. On the one hand it has been maintained, and successfully maintained, that faith is a holy exercise, and necessarily supposes a change of heart---and on the other, with equal truth, that a spiritual nature is the work of the Holy Ghost, and He is vouchsafed in His saving operations only to those who are entitled to the favour of God. They must be in Christ in order to be recipients of saving grace---they must have received that grace in order to be in Christ. There are but two hypotheses by which this difficulty can be met upon the scheme of simple substitution, and both of them liable to insuperable objections. The one is the Antinomian theory of eternal justification, which, as it makes acceptance with God compatible with a state of sin, is destructive of the interests of holiness; the other is, the theory of a change in the Divine mind, in relation to a sinner, at a particular period of His history, which takes place without any particular reason why it should be affected then rather than at any other time. It is supposed that the covenant of redemption included a promise to the mediator, that at a given time in the history of each, the heirs of the promise should be renewed by the Spirit and enabled to believe on the Saviour. The actual communication of the Spirit is solely in virtue of

that promise. Now if the sinner were not justified in the justification of Christ, if, before the critical period arrives, he is the object of Divine reprobation, what is to make him less so after it has come? If there was that in his character and relations to God which made it inconsistent with the Divine perfections to impart to him tokens of favour, the original promise has neither changed that character nor those relations, and has, consequently, not removed the inconsistency. The change towards him in the Divine mind is purely arbitrary. If it should be said that the work of Christ has laid the foundations of that change, the reply is obvious, that at the given time, the sinner's relations to that work are no nearer than they were before--and if that be the cause of it, the change must have occurred when Christ himself was justified. These difficulties seem to be insuperable upon the hypothesis of simple substitution. We must fall back upon Antinomian principles, or confess that the conversion of a sinner is utterly inexplicable.

But when we take in the idea of Priesthood, the whole difficulty vanishes. There is no need for asserting what the scriptures every where deny, an eternal justification--or an actual justification in the resurrection of Christ, or an arbitrary change in the feelings and sentiments of the changeless God. The Spirit, in his first operations is imparted, not as a token of God's favour to the sinner, but as a token of His regard to the great High Priest who pleads before the throne. It is not that the sinner is accepted, but that Jesus is accepted. God looks only on the great intercessor, and gives him power to give eternal life to all whose names are on his breast-plate, and when, in answer to these Divine intercessions, the Spirit is given to Christ that Christ may give him to us--when in consequence of that gift he decends, not from the father, but from Christ to us, and unites us to Jesus---then God looks upon us in the Redeemer and justifies us in consequence of that union. Here there is perfect harmony in the whole plan.

3. Another immense advantage of a Priesthood is, that it quickens and stimulates the devotion of the Church by the assurance it inspires, that all true worship, however imperfect or inadequate, shall infallibly be accepted and

rewarded. Upon the scheme of simple substitution, the approaches of a sinner to God would be immediate and personal—he would go in his own name, depending for acceptance upon a work which had already been performed—he would plead the promises which were suspended upon it, and cast himself upon the unfailing faithfulness of God. We are far from saying that this would not be a sufficient ground of confidence and hope—but no man that knows the deceitfulness of his heart, the depths of iniquity within him—no man who feels his own vileness and pollution, and appreciates, at the same time, the transcendent holiness of God, could venture, without fear and trembling, however supported by a covenant which guarantees his acceptance, to come into the presence of Him in whose sight the heavens are not clean, and who charges the angels with folly. To talk of confidence and boldness under such circumstances, would be sheer madness. However we might be authorized to feel it, we could not feel it. The awful holiness of God would be like a consuming fire—an oppressive sense of unworthiness and of immeasurable distance and separation from the High and Holy One that inhabiteth eternity, would arrest the prayer as it arose in the heart, and check the confidence which atonement, as a past historical fact, was suited to inspire. We should say with the Israelites, that we cannot speak with God. There must be a mediator of prayer and praise, of all the exercises of religious worship, as well as a mediator to purchase our pardon. This is accomplished by a Priesthood. There is no direct and immediate approach to God. We come before him only in the name of our Priest who attracts us by community of nature, and who presents all our worship for us before the Eternal throne. Our prayers are not heard and received as *ours*, but as the prayers of Jesus—our praises are not accepted as *ours*, but as the praises of Jesus. The imperfection which attaches to our performances, our pollution and weakness and unbelief, stop with the High Priest—His intercession and atonement cover all defects, and we are faultless and complete in Him. The prayer which reaches the ear of the Almighty is from Him, and not from us, and must be as prevalent as His worth. Here is our confidence, not

that Jesus died, but that Jesus lives—that he is our intercessor in the heavenly sanctuary, and there presents, enforces, and sanctifies the religious worship of earth—here is our confidence, that in the whole process of salvation, God regards the Redeemer and not us, and deals out blessings according to his estimate of Christ—here is our confidence, that if any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous. What an encouragement to prayer and praise! And what thanks shall we render unto God for adapting the marvellous scheme of His grace, with such consummate wisdom, to the wants and weaknesses of men. Seeing, then, that we have a great High Priest that is passed into the heavens, Jesus, the son of God, let us hold fast our profession. For we have not an High Priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities: but was, in all points, tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us, therefore, come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy and find grace to help in time of need. Having, therefore, brethren, boldness to enter into the holiest by the blood of Jesus, by a new and living way which he hath consecrated for us, through the vail, that is to say, his flesh, and having an High Priest over the House of God, let us draw near with a true heart, in full assurance of faith. This approach to God, through the mediation of a Priest, is one of the highest privileges of the Gospel, and meets so completely a prime necessity of nature, that where it is imperfectly understood, we are disposed to make arrangements of our own which shall answer the same end. All corrupt religions have an order of Priests. They could maintain no hold upon the people—they could not enlist the sympathies of the heart, without some provision of the sort. It is the glory of the Gospel that it has a Priest who can save to the uttermost all that come unto God through him, who can sanctify the meanest worshipper and consecrate the humblest offering. None need be afraid or ashamed, it is not they, but he, who is accepted in the house of God. It was an ancient reproach of Christianity, both among Jews and Gentiles, that it was a spiritual and personal worship, without the intervention of either altar, temple or sacrifice. It had, indeed, no imposing ritual, no pomp of cere-

mony, no gorgeous solemnities---all was simple and unpretending—its institutions were addressed to intelligence and not to taste—to the heart instead of the fancy. Still there was a temple in the Christian scheme, more august and glorious than any which could be reared by hands---it had an altar, a Priest, a victim, and a sacrifice, which should forever abolish, through their transcendent efficacy, all other altars, all other Priests, all other victims, however costly or imposing---it possessed, in perfection, all those advantages of sacerdotal mediation which Judaism and Paganism faintly adumbrated---and instead, like them, of making its Priesthood subservient only, to a vicarious religion, it secured the real worship of the heart.

4. It deserves finally to be added that a mediation of Priesthood is the form in which consolation is most effectually administered to the children of men. It is necessary to any substitute that he should be a kinsman of our race—bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh. But beside the possession of our nature free from the stain and impurities of sin—nothing more is required for the purposes of vicarious righteousness and penal expiation than the consent of the substitute to undertake the task. If he *can* die the death to which we are doomed, and is willing to suffer in our stead—he is a competent Redeemer. But though this is all which is absolutely essential to legal substitution, it is not all which the state and condition of men evince to be desirable. We want a redeemer with a brother's heart as well as a brother's nature. Though not indispensable to our safety, it is indispensable to our comfort, that our substitute should be touched with a feeling of our infirmities—that he should be able to bear our sorrows and carry our griefs. Now this exquisite sympathy, which is one of the most powerful incentives to faith and love, is essential to a Priest. Every High Priest ordained for men must not only be a participant of their nature, but must have compassion on the ignorant and on them that are out of the way. He must enter with sympathetic tenderness into all their temptations and calamities—their fears and apprehensions—their cares and sorrows. He must be prepared to pity and encourage the weak—to comfort the weeper in the house of mourn-

ing---to wipe the widow's tears---to hear the orphan's cries---to lie down with the beggar upon his pallet of straw and to watch with those to whom wearisome nights are appointed. He must be a friend in all those emergencies in which friendship is our richest boon.

This qualification is found preeminently in Jesus. Holy, harmless, undefiled and separate from sinners, he possesses that absolute purity of nature in which the sensibilities have lost none of their delicacy from the petrifying influence of sin. Trained, too, by a protracted discipline in the school of affliction, he knows the temptations of our race, he knows what it is to weep---he knows the burden of a heavy heart. It was, perhaps, one design of the varied scenes of trial through which he passed, to give him that experience of our state, which should call into the liveliest exercise the exquisite sympathy of his soul. In generous natures common troubles and afflictions have a tendency to knit them together---it is only where the heart has been seared by sin and immersed in selfishness, that it can look with indifference upon struggles of others similar to those through which it has passed. The apostle assures us that Jesus was tempted in all points as we are, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest. And those who have felt his presence in their trials can appreciate the priceless value of his sympathy. He has gone before us through every path of sorrow and we cannot utter a groan nor heave a sigh which does not go to his heart. His pity for the guilty is as tender as his sympathy with the saints. No language can express the intensity of his compassion for those who in ignorance and folly disregard the day of their merciful visitation and are heaping up wrath against the day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God. He has no pleasure in their death---Oh Jerusalem---Jerusalem---thou that stonest the prophets and killest them that are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, but ye would not. Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children. The sublimest example of compassion which the world has ever beheld was furnished by the Saviour in that memorable prayer---when "the clouds of wrath from heaven

and from earth, pregnant with materials which nothing but a Divine hand could have collected, were about to discharge themselves on him in a deluge of agony and blood," when insulted by men, abandoned by his friends, mocked by his enemies—jeered by devils and deserted by God, he was about to expire in solitude and darkness—he could still for a moment, in the plenitude of his pity—forget these unspeakable calamities and pray for the forgiveness of the remorseless agents of his death. This was compassion like a God, And what an exquisite spectacle of tenderness was that—when Jesus, on the cross, just before the consummation of the last event that should fulfil the predictions of ancient prophecy, consigned his mother to the care of the beloved disciple. Surely such an High Priest became us. In our waywardness and folly, in our sins and temptations—in our murmurs and impatience, we should alienate any other friend but one like him, that sticketh closer than a brother.

ARTICLE III.

ON THE ORIGIN OF THE NAME ASSYRIA.*—GEN. x: 10. 11.

The rendering of this passage in the common English version, which makes Asshur the builder of Nineveh, Rehoboth, Calah, and Resen, is objected to for the following reasons :

1. That it introduces Asshur, the son of Shem, before his birth is mentioned, in verse 22d ; and, among the sons of Ham.

2. That it gives "the beginning," of the kingdom of Nimrod, and, without telling us of the completion of it, as we should naturally expect, turns off our minds to another person. The course of thought is interrupted. The four cities mentioned in verses 11 and 12, would seem naturally to form the completion of Nimrod's kingdom ; and the counterpart of the four built in the land of Shinar.

* This article presents an ingenious theory respecting the name, Assyria, though we are not prepared to accede to its correctness.

3. In the prophecy of Micah, v: 6, Assyria is called "the land of Nimrod."

Hence the marginal rendering "he went out into Assyria," referring to Nimrod, is adopted by many of the critics and learned men, such as Bochart, Faber, Hyde, Marshman, Wells, the authors of the *Universal History*, Hales, Rosenmueller, Gesenius, and others.* But it is thought there are difficulties in the way of this, and others are found to defend the text of the English version, which is believed by them to follow the most obvious grammatical construction. This latter class will derive the name from Asshur, because he founded those cities mentioned in verses 11 and 12, in that country; the former, because he had previously gone there and settled, and it was peopled mostly by his descendants. Now we see no necessity that the name of this country should be connected with the son of Shem, of the same name. Every man, even in the origin of nations, need not have a country or or nation named after him. And if it be admitted that Asshur did not found those cities, which the text of our Bibles ascribes to him, we see no evidence that he settled in that land, or had any interest in it.†

We think we can show sufficient reasons for assigning the name, from a different cause.—The following is probably the true idea; that Nimrod, intending to set up an extensive, if not an universal empire, began to build cities in the plain, low country of Shinar, about Babylon. Babel, Erach, Accad and Calneh, were the beginning of his kingdom. But this was not sufficient for his purpose; He would have both the mountains, and the plains, under his sway. Accordingly, he went into the high mountainous country, which is reached only by a considerable ascent; and strongly contrasted with the one where he first began his magnificent schemes of building; and there he also founded Nineveh, &c. He had forecast of policy to know that he must secure the strong holds of the mountains.

This is the way the name Assyria first came into use.

* Robinson's *Calmet*, Art. Assyria, p. 112.

† It would appear that Ham was to have Africa, but that many of his descendants usurped a large part of W. Asia.

And let us see how a country might be so called from its great geographical features, and physical aspect.

The word is from the root *ashar*, kindred with *yashar*, to be straight, right; then spoken of what is upright, erect, from this comes the noun *ash-shur*, which literally means a step; and may be a step forward in space, or upward, like a stair, as in English. Hence too the Chaldee *ushsharna*, Ezra v: 3, for a wall, as being upright, erect, and requiring steps like stairs to ascend it.*

It might then very easily and naturally be applied to a country highly elevated; the ascent to which was precipitous, like a wall, or high step. And let us remember that ancient proper names either of persons or of places, were not arbitrary, but given to mark some quality or circumstance of the person or place. This is the case even when the name previously given to a person, is assigned to a place in which he settles. Ham means, hot, and black, according with the Southern regions, and those in Africa where he and his posterity were located. So *Aram* the son of Shem, meaning high, gave name to Syria, Highland, as opposed to Canaan the Lowland. In the same way the names given to other countries indicate their geographical position, or something pertaining to them; as that of Mesopotamia, lying between the Tigris and the Euphrates, is *Aram-aharaim*, Syria of the two rivers. So Arabia is so called from being arid and sterile. And why should not Assyria likewise receive its appellation from something peculiar to it? And what is the fact in regard to other countries since of similar physical features? There are the Highlands and Lowlands of Scotland.

And how is it with the elevated table lands of Northern Asia? Those vast plains that stretch from the wall of China to the banks of the Dneister, possessing so many singular characteristics? They are terminated by mountains, or, as on the borders of the Black Sea, by an abrupt terrace, rising to a great height above the water. And it is, we presume, from this circumstance, that they are so commonly called "*Steppes*."† And the same was the

* May it not be connected also with *shur*, a wall.—Gen. xlix: 22.

† Steppes of Southern Russia, American Eclectic, March 1842, pp. 230, 241.

case undoubtedly with Assyria; to which men went by an ascent. Hos. viii: 9. "For they are *gone up* to Assyria." Now modern discoveries in geography have thrown great light on many passages of Scripture; and they will doubtless continue to do so. How then will the facts in this case, thus brought to light, suit the idea we have advanced? It is well known what kind of a country is that about Babylon; low, flat, and in many places marshy. But if we leave there, and proceed by the very route that the great founder of empires, and "mighty hunter before the Lord," must have gone to reach the sight of Nineveh, or the region of it, how shall we do it?

A traveller in that country describes the pass through the Hamrine Hills, that consist of several ridges of sandstone rocks, extending far in the south-east, and in a north-west direction. "From the Southern side, the country to Bagdat is entirely alluvial, and very fertile, comprising the districts of Khalis and Khorasan, the richest perhaps in the pachalic."

Then we have a description of the pass of the Sugramah, from Solymaneah into Lower Assyria, and the country around Babylon. This is, at the present day, one of the most travelled routes between the upper and the lower country. "The pass is very striking. The *mountains forming the boundary between Kurdistan and the plain of Assyria*, which extends to the Tigris, here *form a line* running about south-east and north-west; and are composed of many strata of limestone, and calcareous conglomerate, with intervening beds of gravel and indurated sandstone: one of these strata of enormous size and great height, rises on their north-east face; and *running straight as a line* for forty or fifty miles, perhaps, separates them from the irregular valley in which we had been travelling. Its crest rises thin and sharp; and the *angle of its dip is so near a right angle*, and its face so free from soil, that at a little distance you would take it for an *unbroken precipice of sheer hard rock*. Yet continuous as it appears, the ledge is not unbroken. There are gaps in several places, made by the streams that rise in the range, and which have forced outlets for their waters. Before one of these we now stood, collecting our forces, watering our horses, and tightening the bands of our loads preparatory to grappling with the ascent which

awaited us. The ledge or stratum I have mentioned, narrowed to an apparent thickness of not many yards, *and shooting up at once, like a gigantic flag stone* on end, from the broken ground at its foot, had been shattered and severed to an extent which above might be 100 yards: but beneath was only sufficient for the passage of the stream. A bridge, under which the waters find their way, and which affords to travellers the means of *crossing the boundary*, unites the dissevered stratum, the wounded sides of which rise in the most grotesque and rugged forms to the height of several hundred feet. Just beyond, other strata, divided in the same manner, but with less prominent edges, rise in forms to the full as picturesque.*

"The ascent occupied an hour and a half; and at length we stood on the top, looking back on the one hand, to the wild mountainous country we had passed; on the other, *over the low lands* we had yet to traverse before we could reach the celebrated capital of the Caliphs."

Again this writer, speaking of the upper country, says "from Jezirah westward to near Nisibin there are felspathic plutonic rocks with a mean elevation of 1550 feet, and which form a stoney wilderness, with little or no cultivation. * * * The great plains of Northern Mesopotamia, from Orfa to Nisibin, and thence to the plain east of Mosul, the site of the ancient Nineveh, have an elevation of about 1300 feet, and are nearly of a uniform level."†

Now these great prominent physical features of a country in general, remain the same from age to age; and probably the traveller now finds them the same as when Nimrod 4000 years ago erected his cities, and fortresses, and laid the foundations of great empires, that have risen, flourished and passed away. There are the same mountains, rivers, passes, valleys and plains. By these too, the location and direction of the roads are determined. And with such a population as has hitherto occupied that country, they must remain the same. There is there no enterprise to lay down rail roads, to level the hills, or to tunnel

* Fraser's Mesopotamia and Assyria, Family Library, vol. 157, pp. 212, 213. † Ibid. p. 294.

the mountains. The habits of the people are fixed and changeless as the laws of the Medes and Persians. A vehicle of any description is scarcely ever seen; but all the travelling and transportation is upon the backs of beasts of burden. The most frequented roads are mere paths or tracks from pass to pass in the mountains; from ford to ford on the streams; from fountain to fountain in the deserts.

So Gen. 11: i. when the first people journeyed from the vicinity of Mt. Ararat, they are said to come from the east to the land of Shinar, while a direct course would be almost exactly south. But a knowledge of the face of the country and the direction of the mountain ranges explains this. The intervening territory is so rugged, such a mass of mountains, and so difficult to cross, that just as the caravans of the present day are wont to do, they must keep east, and then south, till they come right against Babylon, on the same parallel with it, and then turn at almost a right angle west. A part of the region thus gone around is Adiabene, that is, impossible to pass through. "Such is now the daily route of caravans going from Tabreez to Bagdat. They go south as far as Kermanshah; and then making almost a right angle, take a western direction to Bagdat: thus making their journey 10 or 12 days longer than it would be were they to take the more mountainous and difficult road by Solymaneah."* Here then we see that men take the same route now as when they left the Ark, and for the same reason, that exists permanently. And to show further, the fixedness of roads in that part of the world, we will mention another remarkable case from Dr. Robinson's *Biblical Researches in Palestine*.† It was with him a great object of enquiry when in that region, to find the site of the ancient Shiloh, where the tabernacle was set up from the time of Joshua to that of Samuel, about 300 years. He took the Bible for his "guide book;" and he found the place still called Seilun, by following the definite direction given in Judges xxi: 19, a place which is on the north side of Bethel, on the east side of the highway that goeth up from Bethel to Shechem, and on the south side of Lebonah."

* Robinson's *Calmet*, Art. Ararat.

† Vol. III. p. 87.

And how did Nimrod "go forth out of that land of Babylon" into Assyria? He must go directly north, back towards Ararat. And we have seen what kind of mountains he must cross, and what defiles he must pass through to *issue*, *yatsa*, into that elevated table land of western Asia, and with sufficient force and preparation to construct four cities in quick succession. And we may well suppose that to go on with all these works, would require no little transportation, and frequent passing back and forth from the cities built below. He would almost, of course, ascend somewhere in the vicinity of the Tigris on which Nineveh stood. And an inspection of the maps, and a knowledge of the routes now taken, which are certainly no worse nor fewer in number than then, will show us where he must have crossed the mountains, that the traveller describes as a wall between the level country below, and the highlands above. They run straight as a line 40 or 50 miles, and continue on northwest, flanking the Euphrates; with very few roads crossing them. Most of the routes from about Babylon ascend near the Tigris; the best passes will, of course, be selected; and it seems that they are found only where some water course has forced a way through, making a narrow, rocky defile, steep and difficult to pass.

It might well be said of that bold adventurer and enterprising builder, when he went to entrench himself in the mountains, and passed such defiles as these, that he mounted the steep; ascended the steppe; issued through the wall. In fact the word Asshur, is not so foreign in sense to the geological term *Trap*, derived from a Swedish word meaning a step or stair. It is applied to rocks that rise by strata, in the form of steps or a series of stairs. They are found intersecting other rocks, *like vertical walls*, which sometimes rise to a great height, and extend many miles.*

That "gigantic flag stone set on end;" that stratum "that rises thin and sharp to a great height;" and nearly at a right angle with the horizon, like "an unbroken precipice of sheer hard rock," extending 40 or 50 miles, along the Hamrine Hills, may either be, or may rest upon a

* Bakewell's Geology, Ed. 1833, pp. 127, 128, 133, 134.

wall or dyke of Trap rock. And we know that there are in that region volcanic ridges, basaltic, and other rocks of igneous origin. The writer, above quoted, speaks of "ranges of hills composed of chalk and *capped with basalt*."* If this should prove to be the case, the application of the name will appear more striking.

We shall also better understand the meaning of Gen. ii. 14: "that is it, (Hiddekel,) which goeth toward the east of Assyria." For the upper part of the Tigris lies northeast of this dividing wall, and, after breaking through it, that river runs eastwardly from it. The application of the name Assyria, was at first to a region of limited extent, lying between Media, Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Babylonia: and afterwards, it comprehended the latter two countries, and perhaps more. In Isa. vii. 20, and viii. 7, it is considered as extending to the Euphrates. In Gen. xxv. 18, it seems to stand for the north country, or highlands generally.

ARTICLE IV.

MISSIONARY ZEAL.

Twelfth Annual Report of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, presented to the General Assembly, May, 1849.

Report of Executive Committee on Foreign Missions to the Synod of South Carolina, Oct. 1849.

The term Missions expresses a sending forth, and Foreign Missions a sending forth into foreign lands. This is the general idea involved in these general terms. But, as we employ these terms, they refer to a very special and peculiar forth-putting—to the buddings forth of Christian love, that heavenly exotic in this earthly clime. Our theme is the spirit of Evangelical Propagandism;—we intend to write on Christian Missions to the Heathen.

* Page 296, and quere whether the name Hamrine be Heb. or kindred: *Ham*, hot, and *ri*, rain, from *ravah*, to water, indicating volcanic agency.

In bringing this theme once more to the notice of our readers, we lay it down as an obvious principle that what is *sent forth* must first *be*. The waters which flow in any stream will commonly be those which exist at the fountain head. Evangelical propagandism implies the existence and possession of what is evangelical. God is love, and accordingly God manifested his love by sending his Son into the world. God is light, and accordingly Christ, is come a light into the world. And why was life manifested so that we have seen and bear witness of it, except because that Eternal Life was with the Father, and was accordingly manifested unto us? In like manner it is because all the sons of God are children of life, of light and of love, that they are moved to communicate these blessings to others. Faith must exist in the heart before it can work by love in the outward conduct. And love must shed its genial glow throughout the soul, before there can be any acts of real piety towards God, or of true and pure benevolence towards man. And immortal hope must throw its radiance over all the darkness, and misery, and weakness, of the present; must make the promise of a divine blessing on every effort, and the anticipations of rest and reward hereafter, stimulate continually to new undertakings and sweeten faith's work and love's labour, before any man or any Church can begin the work of propagating the gospel in heathen lands, or beginning, prosecute it to a successful issue.

We distinguish therefore at the outset, by *its fountain head*, that stream whose gentle and delightful flow we have undertaken to trace out. True Missionary zeal is in every case heaven-born. It is in every case the effect of the life of God in the soul of man. For, whatever in us is to redound to *his glory*, must be the production of *his sovereign grace* (ii. Corinthians, iv. 15;) whatever brings man *to God* must come *from God*. For us, Christ is Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, the author and the finisher. The river on whose swelling floods we float and are impelled onwards, and whose full, strong current is to bear us with all the saved, upwards into the very haven of eternal rest and bliss, is one that first proceeds out of the throne of God and of the Lamb—one that comes down from heaven, and *therefore* can rise

back again and find its own level among the celestial heights.

It follows obviously from this view of the nature of true Missionary zeal, that it cannot belong to any but the true children of God. The gospel never can, in the full and perfect sense of the expression, be sent forth from any Church, or by any individual, who has not the gospel; as that spring cannot pour out water which has no water. This important statement may indeed very much reduce our estimate of the value of Missionary subscriptions or donations, where the individual gives money without prayers, or gives more money than he pours forth earnest and believing prayer. It may indeed diminish the satisfaction with which we reckon up the Foreign Missionaries of all the various Protestant Churches as being in number about *two thousand*, (rather more than all the Ministers of our own Church in the United States) and the annual Foreign Missionary contribution of the Protestant Churches as being *two millions* of dollars. But, on the other hand it will help us to account for the slow progress of the world's conversion. When the Son of man cometh, *shall he* find faith on the earth?

We are bound therefore to maintain that no man and no community can have any true Missionary zeal, unless the truth of God, in its fundamental doctrines at least, exists in power and purity among them. Where else does there exist any Foreign Missionary zeal, worthy of the name? The commercial world is all alive with a zeal for *sending forth*, but only where there is a full equivalent to be returned. Take, then, the votaries of human philosophy, falsely so called—the disciples of the various schools of skepticism which successively arise and vainly make their feeble onset upon the Bible, as the waves of ocean idly dash themselves against a mountain of rock. Where is *their* Missionary spirit? Why do they never go and seek to penetrate with their flickering torches the darkness of paganism? Miserable men! They know their light never could dissipate that darkness; it is for the gospel alone to accomplish the task. School after school of unbelievers rises up and boasts and babbles wherever Christianity has quickened the common intellect, but no one school lives long enough to convert a single nation;

and never, since the world began, did any set of infidels organize themselves and go on laboriously and perseveringly to propagate their opinions among the ignorant and savage heathen. And who would undertake to speculate about the probable results of such Missionary labours, supposing them undertaken and persevered in? How long would infidelity take to civilize and enlighten such a group of barbarous islands in the South seas as Christianity has regenerated in about thirty years? Nay rather let us ask, what kind of a monster would be produced by crossing Paganism with Infidelity?

But leave open infidelity and take the concealed infidelity of what is called liberal Christianity—a liberalism which we rightly call infidel, just because while it professes to believe the Bible, it yet explains away or rejects whatever its own reason does not approve. Now, where do we find liberal Christianity sending forth its Missionaries to the heathen or to our own remote settlements? And how comes it that Unitarianism, for example, is so much like the vain skeptical philosophy just mentioned, in confining itself to the broad green meadows, cleared and made fertile by the gospel? Why does it follow Christianity every where about, like a dim shadow? The simple answer is that this modified infidelity is a mere shadow without substance—a mere negation, that could not elbow its way any where by itself. It is a cold frigid system. It is like a dying man's heart which cannot send any blood to the extremities—and can hardly keep up even the central pulsations.

But what shall we say of the Missionary zeal of that system which is the very Antipodes of liberal Christianity? Popery is no frigid system. She is full of pulse and passion; has a large heart, and sends the warm blood out to the remotest extremities of her mighty body. She has her Missionaries and her converts in every part of the world, and alone of all those boastful Churches, which claim a visible universality—vindicates in some degree her assumption of the title Catholic. But, though the Church of Rome is full of zeal,* she has none of the *true*

* The Annals of the Propagation of the Faith, published at Lyons in France, abound with Missionary reports. We subjoin some specimens which well illustrate the zeal of Rome.

Missionary spirit. And the reason is that she has not *the truth*. Her mission is a mission of error and delusion. Her propagandism is as different from that which we are bound to cultivate, as darkness is from light. Her Missionary spirit takes its rise in no operation of the grace of God, and accordingly, however large its fruits, they have no direct tendency to promote the glory of God.

How far these remarks would apply to the Foreign Missions of any of the Protestant Churches, must of course depend on the degrees of purity or impurity in which they hold the truths of God. We can conceive of a superstitious regard for the mode and an unscriptural view of the subjects of Baptism, so engrossing the powers of

Father Esteve, writing to his superior from Shanghai, thus shows the manner in which he secures the conversion of the Chinese.

Although, says he, conversions are not very numerous, they are daily of more frequent occurrence. Since the commencement of this year, I have baptized about one hundred and thirty adults. The month of Saint Joseph, (the month of March,) has been most favorable to me; there were but few days in the month that I did not perform some baptism. On the eve of this great feast of this great patron of China I had the happiness of offering to him nine new clients. I desired to have added at least a dozen to present to him upon the day itself of his feast. In the Christian district, where I celebrated the holy mass, eight catechumens seemed to me worthy of admission into the bosom of the church; and in the district subsequently visited I found three others well prepared; thus making eleven in all.—One flower was still requisite for my boquet. Where was I to go seek for it? I did not know, but St. Joseph well knew. There was in an obscure cabin, a poor pagan child attacked with some unknown contagious disease; he lay almost reduced to agony. This was the unfortunate creature upon whom St. Joseph had deigned to cast a benevolent glance; he further wished to open the gate of heaven for this little leper. I was thrilled with joy when information concerning him was conveyed to me. I found him in a truly deplorable situation; his body exhaled a fetid odor, and was encrusted all over from head to foot.

This child had never heard our holy religion spoken of. I inquired of him if he wished to believe in God. He immediately made an effort in order to reply to me:—"Yes; I wish it." "And do you wish to love him?" "Yes, I wish it." St. Joseph had already prepared him for the great grace which he was about to receive. I instructed him and excited him to contrition, by presenting to him the crucifix, which he wished to keep constantly pressed against his lips. At the moment of pouring the blessed water I was obliged to pause for a short time, experiencing a difficulty in distinguishing the skin from the ulcer. At length, having found upon the top of the head a small spot which I was sure of, I baptized him, and gave him the name of Joseph. The next day my little angel went to heaven to rejoin his good patron; how he must have thanked him!

My dozen was completed, but I wished for a thirteenth; St. Joseph further deigned to grant him to me. Having proceeded in another direction to a sick Christian, I inquired whether there was any other pagan in danger of

one man as to vitiate entirely his Missionary zeal, and convert him into a mere apostle of delusion ; or of an equally superstitious notion of Ordination and both the Sacraments, reducing to a mere retailer of old wives' fables, another man who should have lifted upon high the gospel and carried it before him like a blazing torch to guide the poor Eastern Christians walking in dim twilight. We can conceive of Pelagian or Arminian errors being transplanted into some heathen soil along with the true gospel seed, to bring forth there the same dead fruit which they have always produced in Christian lands ; and a Protestant Mission may thus be actually employing part of her strength in sowing, as it were, the fabled val-

death. I presently ascertained that there was in the vicinity a pagan, eighty years old, confined to her bed. I was informed that it was useless to go near her ; for this very reason I hurried thither instantly. On my way I met a little boy who was coming from the sick woman ; he assured me that I had no hope, because her son, who usually went off to sell vegetables at market, remained at home to obstruct my crossing the threshold. In order to win him over completely, I paid him some pretty compliments, and asked very humbly permission to see his mother. He not only allowed me, but aided me, to instruct her, and when she could not well understand, he repeated my words, vociferating with all his strength. This was necessary, for the sick woman was rather deaf of hearing, and there was no slight noise created around us. The poor bamboo hut was rent in several places ; the inquisitive bystanders enlarged the door in order to enter ; the little children everywhere the same, pushed aside the bamboos, in order to slip their heads through the partition and view me at their ease. In vain did the old woman cry out to them that she would go and beat them ; they laughed at her impotent threats. I exhorted her as well as I could, to have patience, and, after sufficiently instructing her, I baptized her, and conveyed to her the sacred viaticum in presence of the pagans, who kept silence pretty well, thanks to the reiterated injunctions of some good Christians.

The "Rev. Dr. Tituad, Apostolic-Missioner in Eastern Tonquin," says :—

In the parish which I had just administered, the chief of the canton, a man of information and great fervor, undertook to evangelize the pagans and he converted a considerable number. When we were in his village at *Khienk-he*, he saw with me a small statue of the Blessed Virgin, which I had conveyed from France ; he was so much pleased with it that he wished to have it at any cost. Afraid of displeasing him by a refusal, and, on the other hand, not wishing to yield up my little statue, to which I was much attached, I promised it to him on condition that he converted ten pagan houses, from the head of the family to the smallest child. I thought he could never compass it. Now, only one month and a half has elapsed since my conditions were tendered and accepted ; and he, instead of ten families, has converted twelve. You must therefore hasten to send me out another statue ; happy if I can part with it at the same value !

"The Reverend Father Clavelin, of the Society of Jesus," writing from Tsong-ming, thus reports :—

ley of the Bohon Upas with henbane and nightshade. But doubtless a more becoming and profitable employment of our powers of conception would be, to try and discover what can be the reason why we, who hold the truth on all these points in greater purity than other Churches, should fall behind some of those very Churches, or at least should not exceed them, in point of zeal for propagating every where our purer doctrines. We shall perhaps be compelled to allow, that if we understand some truths better than they do, on the other hand they understand some other truths better than we do; that if we hold in more scriptural simplicity some of the great doctrines of Christ, they have better apprehended at least one of his precepts. But on this subject we shall have more to say afterwards.

That the truth as it is in Jesus,—the knowledge and love of our Lord Jesus Christ,—constitutes the founda-

In order to affect more the heart of God, I only admit into its ranks pure, innocent souls, still clad in their baptismal robe, and to whom our Lord could not refuse anything. I have already completed the first company; it is composed of pagans baptized at the article of death. The majority of these poor creatures had been abandoned by their parents and collected by our Christians.

The faithful, being aware that if they would gratify the Father they should announce to him that they have baptized pagan children upon the point of death, commence actively engaging in such a good work. They are equally aware that it is an infallible means to have medals, and the value which they attach to these pious objects, together with the indulgences which the Holy See has very recently granted to those who procure the grace of baptism for these little dying creatures, powerfully stimulate their zeal.

To day I baptized one whose father was fully determined to get rid of him; the mother was a little more humane, and gave notice to a Christian who proceeded in search of him. By to-morrow he will be in heaven. In the peninsula of Kremen you sometimes see men hawking a certain number of these little children, whom they sell to the highest bidder, but always at a cheap rate. A good virgin purchased three of them, and succeeded in baptizing three others who were dying. Those whom she purchased cost her one hundred and fifty sapees, that is to say about seven pence. After the expiration of two or three days, there were six additional angels in heaven. You can easily understand that I issued instruction to purchase all those who might be found similarly circumstanced.

At the commencement of this fine month of May I had promised the Blessed Virgin to offer her, at the end of the month, a bouquet of spiritual flowers of a new species, and which, I hope, will have been agreeable to her. It was to be composed of thirty of these young innocents who go straight to heaven. I was not deceived in my expectation; not a single flower was deficient. I even was enabled to present them to our mother by the hands of adults, also regenerated during the course of this month. Five of these children died after their baptism."

tion of the real missionary spirit, let us see brightly illustrated in Robert Murray McCheyne, a minister of the Free Church of Scotland, who died about four years since.—He entered the ministry at twenty-one and laboured only nine years. But his faith in the truth of the Gospel was strong, and his heart beat high with love to the Saviour. His ruling passion was this love, and as seeing the invisible and the eternal things close at hand, he was continually about his Master's business. He used to seal his letters with a Sun going down behind the mountains, and over it this motto, "The night cometh." Every day he gave to Christ and the souls of men. To pray and to search the word of God, and to plead with dying men like a dying man, these were the employments in which his inward experience naturally led him to engage. It was purely and simply out of the abundance of his heart that he spake and acted. And he neither prayed nor preached in vain. Not a communion season was held in his Church in Dundee, without some new trophies to the truth and grace of Christ, as McCheyne faithfully and fervidly proclaimed it. And yet with all his zeal there mingled no bitterness. That malign element which converts the enthusiast into a fanatic has no necessary connection with true and pure zeal for the truth of Christ.—Because love, as well as faith, is at the fountain-head of the true Missionary Spirit, McCheyne's manner was always affectionate; and when a brother-minister once told him that he had that day been preaching from the awful passage, "The wicked shall be turned into Hell," his loving soul melted within him, and he enquired with emotion, "were you able to preach it *with tenderness*?" Oh yes! true missionary zeal is no stranger at Gethsemane or Calvary! It fixes its eye habitually on the meek Saviour who there agonized and died for sinners, and derives its inspiration from the tender and subduing associations which surround the Man of Sorrows and his work of Redeeming Grace.

The second characteristic, by which we would distinguish the true Missionary Spirit, is *constant aggressiveness*. If it be true that a Church must needs be Evangelical, in order to be truly Evangelistic, the converse of

the proposition is equally true, and a Church must be Evangelistic in order to be Evangelical. The true Church *must* aim at being universal; not, of course, that *she* may reign, but *her King*; and that all mankind may share her joys and blessings. As the living Spring cannot repress, but must send forth its waters, so the Missionary Spirit will have egress. In every tree that hath life, the sap must shoot upwards and outwards; and whenever the sap ceases to shoot either in a whole tree, or in one particular branch, or in one little twig, then we know that to be a dead tree, or branch, or twig. So the Church, or the individual that has the life of God in his soul, must be earnest and aggressive in his warfare with the Kingdom of the Devil. There is a fire in his bones. The Spirit that is in him gives him no rest, except when he is in action. He is one of that sort of men who, a converted Chinese said, are needed to tell sinners of the love of Christ, viz: "men of *hot* hearts."

The unprofitable servant was condemned for hiding his talent, because then it became almost the same as a talent destroyed. What he had received was to be communicated to others; it was to be used; it was to be *sent forth*. That servant was to play a missionary part with the means entrusted to his charge—but he pursued the contrary course. He shut it up and sent it not forth.—He buried it safe in the earth, as some professed Christians would bury the Gospel in their own hearts. He might almost as well have cast it into the fire, or into the sea!

A chief excellency, then, of missionary zeal is that it enlarges the Christian's soul, and sends his thoughts abroad; that it sets before the Church the *whole* of that work she has to do, and then stirs up her desires to aim at the doing of it. Because this zeal is of faith, it believes that the world shall be filled with the knowledge of the Lord; and therefore it expects and it works for this delightful consummation. It feels a sympathy with that love of Christ which the Redeemer has even now for the far off Heathen that are to be given Him for His inheritance, and those uttermost parts of the earth which He is to receive for His possession. But in its going thus outwards, it slights and neglects not one of the many ob-

jects of distress which lie between its starting point and the remotest terminus towards which it darts. The poor and wretched all around us, the ignorant and debased whom we call our Domestic Heathen, are not forgotten or neglected by the Missionary Spirit, even when it overleaps oceans and continents to reach unto distant pagan tribes. A moral electricity, it goes out from its centre, is conducted every where along the chords of a common humanity, and reaches the remotest members of the family of man, and yet makes its influence equally felt at every intermediate point as it passes along.

How much the Scriptures speak of the *enlarging* of the Church ! How often they compare the Church to an army waging not a defensive but an aggressive war !—The world is a rebellious province which our Emmanuel is subduing ; or, it is Satan's Empire which our Prince is overthrowing.

In what a spirit of aggressiveness was the Church of Christ set up in the world !—when it boldly threw down the gauntlet of defiance to every other system of religion ; denounced them all as delusive and damnable ; offered no compromise to any one of them ; sought none of their aid, but went forth to aggressive attacks upon them all, throwing away its scabbard, and neither asking nor giving any quarter.

How impressively did our Lord inculcate on His disciples the most enlarged desires, when out of the six petitions which He taught them to pray, He made three, and those the first and foremost, to refer to the universal hallowing of God's name, and the universal establishment of His Kingdom, and the universal and complete accomplishment on earth of all His will !

And what an aggressive energy of holy enterprise that was, which prompted Paul to seek that he might "preach in regions beyond, and not where Christ was named, so that they should see to whom Jesus was not spoken of, and they who had not heard should understand !"—(Rom. xv. 20, 21, and 2 Cor. x. 16.) And that Minister is no true successor of the Apostle Paul who seeks to lounge at his ease among the cleared lands and cultivated fields and green meadows of the Gospel, not having missionary zeal enough to build except upon another man's founda-

tion, nor heart enough to labour except in another man's line of things made ready at his hand. Neither can that Church be a true successor of early Christian Churches, whose motto is to do nothing for strangers until all is done which needs to be done among themselves. That is surely a *dead* body which sends no warm blood out out from the centre of pulsation! True Christian zeal is aggressive. It goes forth not only where it finds easy vent, but if needful it forces a passage. It waits not for sinners, at home or abroad, to come and ask for the Gospel, but it goes and carries them the Gospel.

The only other characteristic of the true Missionary Spirit, which we shall mention, is *humble and patient perseverance*.

It is a spirit of humble perseverance, which values the object sought at a very high price, but estimates its own labour and toil at a very low one; and which, therefore, counts no pains which it can take too great to gain the glorious end.

Dr. Chalmers well says,

"Any great moral change in the state of a country is the achievement, not of one single arm, but the achievement of many; and though one man walking in the loftiness of his heart, might like to engross all the fame of it, it will remain an impotent speculation, unless thousands come forward to share the fatigue of it among them all."

And he describes the ambitious man, as clouded and misled by the bewildering glare which his fancy throws around his own undertakings; and as anxious to be the sole creator of a magnificent erection, rather than an humble contributor to it, among a thousand more as necessary and important as himself.

Now with all the earnestness and enlargedness and aggressiveness of the real Missionary Spirit, there enters into it nothing of what Chalmers here describes. That selfish desire of greatness belongs naturally, in a greater or less degree, to every man; but does not, like true missionary zeal, descend from above. It is earthly, sensual, devilish, and into whatever operations it enters, it always introduces with it "bitter envying and strife, confusion and every evil work." The real spirit of missions makes a man willing to be "lost to observation in the growing

magnitude of the operations which surround him," and causes him to "rejoice even in his very insignificance, as the fitting condition for one to occupy, among the many millions of the species to which he belongs." This spirit makes him, who is called abroad, say thankfully, "unto me, who am less than the least of all saints, is this grace given, that I should preach among the Gentiles, the unsearchable riches of Christ." This spirit makes him that is not called to such a high honor, cheerful in doing the humblest work at home; nay happy, like his Master before him, in publishing salvation even when hungry and thirsty and weary to one poor woman by a well side.

A pleasing instance of this humility of real missionary zeal is recorded in a late number of the Southern Methodist Quarterly, of that venerable man of God, Bishop Asbury, of the Methodist Church in this country.

"On one of the Bishop's tours of visitation in 1788, on his way to Charleston, he was passing through All-Saints Parish, and found at a creek on his road a negro engaged in fishing.—While his horse was drinking, the Bishop entered into conversation with the fisherman. 'What is your name, my friend?'—'Punch sir.' 'Do you ever pray?' 'No sir,' said Punch. With this the Bishop alighted, fastened his horse, took his seat by the side of Punch, and entered into conversation with him on the subject of religion, explaining to him, in terms suited to his understanding, the main peculiarities of the Christian system. Punch was sufficiently astonished at all this, but listened attentively; and as the good Bishop sung the hymn,

'Plunged in a gulf of dark despair,'

and closed it with a short but fervent prayer, the poor negro's tears came fast and free. This interview over, the Bishop bade him an affectionate farewell, and resumed his journey, never expecting to see his face again.

"After the lapse of twenty years, however, when on one of his latest visits to Charleston, Bishop Asbury was waited on by Punch, who had obtained permission from his master to do so, and had travelled seventy miles on foot for the purpose. How touching must have been their second interview! What a harvest had sprung from the handful of bread-seed cast upon the waters! It appeared that the Bishop had no sooner left Punch than he hastened homewards with

'The thoughts that wake,
To perish never'

stirring within his soul. He began to practice upon the instructions of that memorable conversation. He found 'the knowledge of salvation by the remission of sins,' after several days of distress and earnest prayer. The change was too remarkable to escape notice. His fellow-servants began to enquire into the matter. Those were strange things which Punch had to tell them. One and another resorted to his cabin to hear further about these things. The interest spread, and many were brought to the knowledge of God."

But real missionary zeal is *patient* and *persevering* as well as humble. And this feature of it is the hardest of all to be counterfeited. Men may claim to love God and man, and to have their zeal roused by these motives; they may exhibit an enlarged and earnest and aggressive zeal; and we may not be able to show that in either of these two points, their zeal differs from that which is real and genuine. But by their fruits ye shall know them. Years will speak. If their missionary spirit be false, it cannot humbly and patiently persevere. If it springs from mere bewildering excitement, instead of sober reflection and the love of Christ, a speedy paralysis will be its shameful termination. If it be the offspring of sense, instead of the child of faith, it will *die out* because it gets no immediate results. If it have not its source in the warmest love and the deepest veneration for the truth, and in the most implicit confidence in that truth as the power of God and the wisdom of God, "the old familiar forms of daily duty will soon become tiresome and disgusting, and every glittering novelty will be greeted with delight." The old paths and the old means which God has ordained, will soon be abandoned; and new schemes, "brilliant amendments of God's plan, mushroom institutions set up to regenerate the world" will spring up on every hand, and "frantic crowds will encircle each in its turn, exclaiming, lo! here, lo! there, is the kingdom of Heaven." But these will all prove (what a late writer* terms them) "mere avenues of human impatience—so many outlets of drainage from the great current of Christian enterprise." Or, to use another figure of the same writer, "they will all prove the mere froth and scum produced by the fermenting leaven of se-

* In the Watchman and Observer.

cret infidelity, which effervesces forth on the surface of society." And when all human power and plans fade as the flower, and wither as the grass, the only lasting and truly efficacious means of advancing the welfare of our race will be found to be the patient teaching and preaching of *the word of our God which standeth forever*. And the beauty of the Lord our God will be upon us, and He will establish the work of our hands upon us only when we are led by the real missionary spirit, the spirit of humble and patient persevering in the use of His own appointed means; every man finding his proper post, and keeping at it, willing to spend all the time that is necessary in clearing the ground and ploughing it, in sowing the seed and harrowing it, before we expect to reap any harvest; discharging our daily duties amidst our daily distractions and discouragements, and always doing God's work in God's way, and in reliance on His all needful aid and blessing.

If such be the leading features of real missionary zeal, that is of course an entirely false view of the subject, which would limit the possession of it either to class or to climate. This spirit depends not on place, but flourishes at home as well as abroad. It is peculiar to no order of Christian Ministers or of Christian men. It is a zeal without which no one can fill becomingly or usefully any station whatever in the Christian Church, or indeed without some degree of it, be a Christian at all.

As to the question of the state of Foreign missionary zeal in this Synod, (a question of great importance to all our Churches, if there be any truth in the preceding pages of this article,) the documents, named by us at the outset, afford considerable information. We notice as points of special interest the *Juvenile contributions*, and those of the *colored people*. The former (chiefly, however, from one Church) amount to \$296 24, a sum which we hold to be prospectively of great magnitude and importance.—Every little donor or collector of this sum we deem an enlisted soldier in the good cause of the Foreign propagation of our faith, and in fact of every other benevolent or useful undertaking. They may not all continue to be interested in these things; they may abuse these and other privileges and means of grace. But it is a good begin-

ning for them. Would that every child of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina, were being similarly trained up in the way in which we all ought to go, and in which doubtless at their maturity they will by the still louder calls of Divine Providence be called to walk.

The contributions of the coloured people amount to about *forty-four dollars*. These are the voluntary offerings, for the most part, of *slaves* in South Carolina, in behalf of the heathen; and one-half of it is from one little congregation of blacks in Charleston, where the opportunity of throwing in their mite is regularly afforded. We know that pastors, generally, do not take any pains to gather up these fragments; should they do so, many baskets would surely be filled. The gifts now referred to, are a small specimen of the ability and cheerful readiness of this people to communicate the rich blessings of the gospel to their pagan brethren, whom God has not so highly favoured. We repeat, *whom God has not so highly favoured*; for, in the face of all the bitter and scornful denunciations of slavery by the religious press of the North, we maintain that this people have reason to thank God that ever they were brought into this land of bondage. Slavery has been, to all this population, a door to civilization and christianity. Only those whose minds have been thrown into a state of *monomania* can deny it. No christian negro at the South, walking by faith instead of sight, but acknowledges it. And hence, as they generally are able, (notwithstanding the dreadful stories about slavery, told and believed at the North,) so they are generally *willing*, to aid in supporting the gospel at home and propagating it abroad. We personally know of one female slave who, out of the fruits of her own industry, brought, in the most private and modest manner, to her minister, on two occasions, four silver half dollars, and on another occasion, sent him a five dollar bill; because, as she expressed it, she "felt anxious to do something for those many thousands who are going to perdition with no one to point to them Jesus, as you faithfully and kindly point him to us." And when this minister, fearful lest it might be wrong for him thus to receive three foreign missionary contributions, amounting to nine dollars, from one "poor

down-trodden slave," waited on her mistress and stated the circumstances, he was told it was all right—that she was, especially since her experience of religion, both a faithful servant in doing her mistress's work, and also industrious in improving her own hours of time, so that by tailoring and mantua-making, and baking of cakes for sale, she accumulated, honestly and fairly, the means of being charitable. And to this anecdote we will just add another, concerning the same female slave, as illustrating the effects of sound religious instruction on the negro mind. When applying for admission to the church, she told, with great christian simplicity, as one reason of the hope that was in her, how, formerly, she sometimes slighted her work; but that now, whenever, in sweeping her mistress's bed-chamber, she left one chair unmoved, she found herself compelled to go back and move the chair and sweep under it, because the eye of God, she knew, was always upon her. Thus does the gospel always put away "eye-service." Such is always the effect of a lively sense of the presence of God, so truly does true faith always lead to good works.

In the report of the executive committee to the Synod of South Carolina, we think there must be some mistake. The committee "announce to the Synod, to the Churches and to the world," that in South Carolina, "a far less amount has been collected for Foreign Missions, during this year, (ending Nov. 1849,) than the last, there being a diminution of \$655 46." "At a meeting of the Synod in October, 1848, your committee reported as having been collected, from within the bounds of this Synod, from October 1, 1847, till the same time in 1848, the sum of \$2525 10. During the same period, from October 1, 1848, till October, 1849, there is reported from the Treasury in New York, as received from all sources within this State, the sum of \$1869 64." But we find in the twelfth annual report of the Board itself, in the combined view of receipts from the different Synods, (p. 60 and 61) that for the year ending May, 1848, South Carolina is credited with \$2280 55; but for the year ending May, 1849, with \$2301 30, so that there probably has been, instead of a great diminution, some little increase in the Foreign Missionary contribution of our Synod.

Indeed, we find that in the report of the Synod's Treasurer, which is appended by the committee to their report, there is acknowledged as received by him, from October, 1848, to May, 1849, the sum of \$1423 75, and from May, 1849, to Nov. 10, 1849, the sum of \$1022 21, making, together, the total of \$2445 96, against a total of \$2169 74 acknowledged in the Treasurer's preceding report. Now, it is true, as the committee state in a note, that the last account of the Treasurer embraces a period of about thirteen months and a half, but surely \$2445 for thirteen months and a half, instead of being far less, is rather more than \$2169 for one year.

We have little confidence in statistics generally, yet as we have our hand in, we will add, that we see no reason to blush for our Synod in comparing her Foreign Missionary and her general benevolent contributions with those of other Synods in this country. Taking, as the basis of our calculations, the statistical reports of the Presbyteries to the last General Assembly, and also the synopsis of the Foreign Missionary Board's annual report of receipts, found on pages 60 and 61 of their report named at the head of this article, we find, that in point of the *number of their communicants, their Foreign Missionary contributions, and the sum total of all their benevolent contributions together*, the following table presents a just comparison of the Synods of Albany, New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Kentucky, and S. Carolina.

	Com.	F. M.	General.
Albany,	8344	\$ 2681	\$16895
New York,	13305	13772	76313
New Jersey,	18707	5968	36101
Philadelphia,	27344	13746	50201
Cincinnati,	9213	3330	15831
Kentucky,	9292	3506	21680
S. Carolina,	8171	2381	12040

But it is to be observed here, that one of the largest Presbyteries in South Carolina made no report to the last General Assembly, of any of her contributions whatever. Her Foreign Missionary contribution we derive from the Board's synopsis, and it is included in the \$2381 above credited, but the \$12040 in the other column, comes entirely from the other three Presbyteries of this Synod,

which have, together, only 5722 communicants. It thus appears, that while South Carolina is below all the other Synods in her Foreign Missionary contribution, she is above several of them in her benevolent contributions, taken together.

The following table will shew the relative position of these Synods, and also the average individual contribution of their communicants.

		F. M. Contribution.
Synod of New York,		\$1 00
" Philadelphia,		50
" Kentucky,		37
" Cincinnati,		36
" New Jersey,		32
" Albany,		32
" South Carolina,		28
		Total Contribution.
Synod of New York,		\$5 63
" Kentucky,		2 33
" Albany,		2 00
" South Carolina,		2 00
" New Jersey,		1 93
" Philadelphia,		1 78
" Cincinnati,		1 66

If, however, we leave out of the account the 1st Presbytery of the great and rich Metropolis of New York, and let the comparison refer to the remaining Presbyteries of that State, the average individual contribution of communicants in that Synod for the last year, will be found to stand thus—to Foreign Missions, 53 cents; to all objects together, \$1 37½.

Thus far, then, we of South Carolina seem not to suffer much by a comparison of our zeal in giving, with that of our Northern Presbyterian brethren. Nor, if we may take the estimates of a very able and zealous friend of the A. B. C. F. M. (in an article which appeared in the Biblical Repository a year or two since,) do we suffer anything by comparison with the churches which that Board represents. Indeed, considering the scattered and sparse population of our State, the immense home destitutions of our field, our greater removal from all the sources of information and means of animation and excitement, and the circumstance, that on our lists are to be found a con-

siderable number of coloured members* from whom little ought to be expected—considering these things, our Northern friends may be fairly said to have come short of our standard.

But the Apostle tells us, “they are not wise who compare themselves among themselves.” The only proper standard by which to measure our zeal is the standard God hath appointed—our resources and the present calls of his providence. Very small, indeed, is the difference in favour of, or against, any of the parties we have been comparing together—but alas! how far they all alike fall short, when, for a moment, measured by the right rule. The Foreign Missionary Board present, on p. 62 of their report, a classified view of the synopsis before referred to, which is as follows:

CHURCHES.	No. OF CHURCHES.	No. OF COMMUNICANTS.	WHOLE AMOUNT CONTRIBUTED.	AMOUNT PER COMMUNICANT.
The contributions from which have not exceeded \$10	327	20929	1549 30	07½
Over \$10 and not exceed- ing \$20	201	17635	2951 27	16½
Over \$20 and not exceed- ing \$50	275	32883	8836 14	27
Over \$50 and not exceed- ing \$100	136	23390	9723 07	41½
Over \$100 and not exceed- ing \$300	126	24719	21374 30	86½
Over \$300 and not exceed- ing \$500	17	4979	6113 85	1 23
Over \$500	16	5537	16279 75	2 94

* The 3 Presbyteries in South Carolina above referred to report 1718 colored members. Take 1718 from 5722 and we have 4004 *white* communicants, to whom is to be credited the sum of \$12040 as the total of their benevolent contributions. This gives an average individual contribution of \$3, which is more than that of any of the other Synods named, New York alone excepted. So too, dividing among these 4004 *white* communicants the sums contributed for Foreign Missions in these three Presbyteries of our Synod, gives an average individual contribution of 47 cents, which puts South Carolina third on the list.

Thus it appears, that of the 2512 Old School Presbyterian Churches in this country, only 1098 give anything at all! There are 1414 Presbyterian Churches in America which give nothing to save the Heathen! And of those which do contribute something, there are 327 Churches which give not more than \$10 in a year, and this divided among their members makes an average contribution of but $7\frac{1}{4}$ cents! While only 159 of all our Churches give in a whole year upwards of \$100 to this object.

It also appears from the Board's synopsis, that the Presbytery of South Carolina in this Synod had only 5 Churches out of 43 which gave any thing last year to this cause! So, Bethel Presbytery has 22 Churches, of which only 9 contributed last year! So too, Harmony has 25 Churches, of which only 12 gave any thing! Such is the melancholy account of our last year's zeal for Foreign Missions, as manifested by our pecuniary contributions. As to zeal on the part of our young men for giving themselves to this work, alas! we are at a still lower point. There is indeed an alarming deficiency, throughout the whole country, of candidates for the gospel ministry. The counting house, the plantation, the professions of law and medicine, and any and every other pursuit, appear to have stronger attractions for the pious young men of this day, than the office of Christ's ambassadors. And all who love the gospel and the souls of men ought to be earnest in praying the Lord of the harvest to thrust out laborers into His harvest. In all the foreign field we have only two representatives of this Synod—Mr. Wilson, in Africa, and Mr. Way, in China! And as for the candidates for Foreign Mission service, we really do not know of one at present in South Carolina.

These humiliating statements speak for themselves; we leave them to their own operation on the reader's mind, and proceed to enquire what excuse we have to offer for our indifference to the claims of this subject. Is there so much to do at home, and are we doing so much at home, that we *cannot do* any thing more abroad? Are the *heathen at home* our excuse? What! are we really doing so much for them? Would it were true that these ignorant and perishing souls were absorbing our time and our means! So far from our small and faint efforts on their

behalf, standing in the way of our Foreign Missionary zeal, the truth is, that all we do for them—their very presence among us, and their crying need of more provision for their souls—all these things should be the means of *increasing our zeal in behalf of the foreign heathen*. For, if any class of Christians in America ought to be, and might be, zealous in sending the gospel to the foreign heathen, it is we, slaveholding Christians, to whom divine providence has committed them to us, that we may teach them the gospel, and so their souls be saved, which otherwise had perished; committed them to us, that we may see for ourselves what modified heathenism is, and that seeing it, handling it, touching it every day, we may become not indifferent to it by familiarity, but on the contrary distressed about it, and willing, nay anxious, to propagate the blessed gospel to the utmost of our abilities every where among men.

One of the chief reasons of our want of Missionary zeal, doubtless is the prevalence of a certain skepticism among us, respecting the actual state and the certain prospects of the heathen world. It is acknowledged by all, that the Pagan nations are socially, intellectually and morally degraded. But it is not so generally felt that their degradation is the result of their own wilful apostacy from God; that they are responsible and guilty beings, under the condemnation of the law of God, and in danger of eternal misery. Many look upon the heathen as comparatively safe; as indeed better off without than they would be with the gospel. For they affirm that a benevolent God would not condemn such ignorant and helpless creatures in the day of final retribution.

“Such views and feelings are at least latent in the minds of many Christians. They are to be traced partly to a defective view of the nature of human depravity, and partly to a morbid state of the sensibilities, leading to superficial ideas of the benevolence of God.”

But Presbyterians of the Old School are in the highest degree inconsistent, if they doubt the accountability and condemnation of the heathen. We believe they sinned in Adam and fell with him; and that they have added to this original sin many actual transgressions of the law of God written in their hearts. It ill becomes any of us,

therefore, even secretly to indulge this skepticism, which *looks benevolent* indeed, but whose actual operation is to palsy the right arm of Christian exertion on behalf of men exposed to everlasting misery. We may tax our ingenuity to invent excuses for a want of becoming zeal in this cause, and there is a fallen seraph standing close by to aid us; but that one plain text will bring us in guilty—that one simple and sublime command—“Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature; he that believeth shall be saved, and he that believeth not shall be damned.”

Ah! we stand in need of the reviving and quickening influences of the Holy Spirit! The grand difficulty with the Church is the want of more love and more faith, and more heaven-born zeal! When the Son of man cometh *shall he* find faith on the earth? Are there any of us who really do believe in heaven and in hell, in the cross and in the crown? Are there any of us who really do believe that He whose eyes are as a flame of fire will search for the blood of lost souls in our skirts at the great day of accounts?

ARTICLE V.

THE PRIMITIVE REVELATION OF A DIVINE AND INCARNATE SAVIOUR, TRACED IN THE HISTORY AND RITES OF BACCHUS.

The attention of the learned world is now very extensively directed to the hidden recesses and deeply imbedded contents of our globe, in the hope of discovering mysteries of our world's history which have, until now, been hidden from man. The same insatiable curiosity is found giving energy to the most persevering efforts to recover the knowledge which has been concealed for thousands of years under the veil of hieroglyphical and other ancient forms of writing, painting, and engraving.

These monumental witnesses have been reserved by God, that “in these last times” He might make the very

stones of the earth and the everlasting hills cry out against the pantheistic atheism and scoffing incredulity of the age. So far they have been made nobly to assert eternal Providence, and vindicate the ways of God to man; and as discoveries advance, such floods of light will, we doubt not, be poured upon the Sacred volume as to make it evident to the most blinded sceptic that it is far easier for Heaven and earth to pass away, than for one jot or tittle of all that God has said to remain unfulfilled.

There is still another storehouse of stratified facts which still remains in chaotic darkness, and from which new and independent evidence will, we believe, be derived to substantiate the claims of the Bible as being "all Scripture"—all "written by holy men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost"—and all therefore given by inspiration. This treasury is the yet hidden and undisclosed mysteries of Pagan mythology, as it has existed in every age and region of the earth. We feel assured that in the deep strata of these mythological fables, and rites, and sacrifices, there are remaining fossil truths which, when dug out from their hard and slimy beds, and cleaned and cleared of all surrounding incrustations, will bring to light the great truths of primitive Revelation,—the doctrines, the faith, the hopes, and the consolations which lived in the hearts of the original fathers of mankind, as they received them fresh and pure from the Revelation of Heaven.

A specimen of such fossil remains we will now produce, and the real nature and amount of its evidence we will attempt to unfold. This is none other than the rites and worship of Bacchus, known as the son of Jupiter, and whose festivals, called Orgies, Bacchanalia, or Dionysia, were introduced from Egypt into Greece. These rites, and the whole mythology of this riotous Deity, involving as they do every species of revelry, indecency and debauchery, might seem to be essentially contradictory to anything pure, sacred, or Divine; and yet our object is nothing less than to trace through them the elements of the early prophecies concerning our Lord Jesus Christ.

There are many prophetic passages in the Old Testament, which all bear upon one grand point, and that is the appearance of a mighty deliverer who should come to

overthrow the kingdom of darkness, recover men from moral and physical evil, and restore the age of primitive peace and holiness. These vaticinations extend chronologically from the garden of Eden, through the patriarchal and levitical dispensations, to the advent of Him of whom they speak, and now extend to the second advent of the same glorious Being, at the final dissolution of all things by a fearful deluge of fire. To reveal and make known this coming Redeemer, as the foundation of human hopes and expectations, was the great end and object of the patriarchal dispensation. The knowledge of the Divine unity, the inculcation of morality, the illustration of the Divine attributes, or any truths of natural theology, which were already known, were wholly insufficient to meet the wants of man's fallen condition. Men must have understood the obvious and no doubt clearly explained meaning of the original promise concerning the seed of the woman. This was made evident to them by the visible manifestation of this voice of Jehovah—the word or name of the Lord in the garden. This character—the man Jehovah who spake with Abraham, wrestled with Jacob, and frequently appeared to the ancient patriarchs—always manifested Himself in the outward fashion as a man, and is ordinarily styled the angel or messenger of Jehovah.* By Him the institution of sacrifices was given to our first parents, and the language of Eve makes it plain that she understood the promised seed to be the Divine word or voice manifested in human form;† and the universal prevalence of sacrifices, as expiatory and vicarious, proves also that the doctrine of atonement, in its grand outlines, must have been made known to our first parents.

The apostacy of Cain consisted in the rejection of this atonement, and soon led among his descendants to open and absolute infidelity, while the doctrine of the Divine Redeemer was gradually merged into the astronomical hero-worship. Every child would thus become in hope and expectation, the incarnate Deity; and every man who had been remarkable in life, be honoured as Divine

* See Faber's *Horae Mosaicae*, B. ii. sec. 1, ch. 2, &c. and *Treatise on Dispensations*, vol. 1, p. 189, &c.

† Faber, *do.* p. 200.

in death, and be considered as having been translated to Heaven. The sun, the moon, the planets, and the stars were thus considered as the abodes of deities of which they were represented as the bodies, and hence the common language in which these heavenly orbs are described as incorruptible and immortal souls instinct with life.—Hero-worship and the worship of celestial bodies, which has prevailed in India, Egypt, Greece, Italy, Britain, Scythia, America, every where, must therefore have been blended into one system previous to the dispersion at Babel.

Hero-worship was grafted on the original promise of an incarnate Redeemer, and as every remarkable man—Adam, Noah, and other eminent personages—had been so regarded, the doctrine was established that the Divine Word had repeatedly manifested Himself in a human figure, had been born an infant, and had permanently dwelt among men for purposes of vengeance or reformation. The doctrine of an incarnate anthropomorphic Deity, under the express title of “the Son of God,” prevailed in the Babylonish empire down to the time of Nebuchadnezzar, (see Dan. ii. 25;) and to this day the principal God of China, Thibet, Siam, and other large Asiatic districts, is devoutly believed to be born incarnate as an infant in the person of the Dalai Lama. In Egypt the same doctrine prevailed, only that a bull was substituted for an infant. There are, however, recorded instances, even among the Egyptians, of human incarnations. The claims of Alexander, of Antony and Cleopatra, and of the Roman Emperors generally, even before their imagined apotheosis, are illustrations of the same doctrine.—Similar also are the Avatars of Hindostan, in which a God—who is sometimes depicted treading on a serpent, while the serpent is in the act of biting his heel,—successively descends to earth in a human or semi-human form. Thus also we find Paul and Barnabas, at Lystra, taken for incarnate manifestations of Mercury and Jupiter.

But still further, this primeval promise is found preserved more wonderfully in the belief that these incarnations of the Deity should be, and had been, Virgin-born. A Virgin-birth is ascribed to the oriental Buddha, to the Chinese Fo-hi, to the Egyptian Phtha, to the Aztack Mex-

tili in Mexico, to the classical Mars and Perseus, and even recently to the Tartar Zenghis. This idea prevails generally throughout the east, where the source of this idea is traced up to a prophecy delivered thousands of years ago.

"The followers of Buddha," says the *Asiatic Researches*,* "unanimously declare that his incarnation in the womb of a Virgin was foretold several thousand years, though some say one thousand only, before it came to pass. Divines in India declare that the surest proof of the Divine mission of an Avatar is his coming being foretold; that prophecies concerning a Saviour are often repeated, some very plain, and others rather obscure; that they are, in short, one of the fundamental supports of their religion. It is declared in the *Vicrama-Charitra*, that the birth of a Divine child from a Virgin had been foretold one thousand years before it happened, nay some say two thousand. The time of his birth is thus ascertained from the *Cumarica-Chanda*, a portion of the *Scanda-Purana*. When three thousand and one hundred years of the *Cali Yuja* are elapsed, then Saca will appear and remove wretchedness and misery from the world. Saca is the title of the Virgin-born Buddha. Whenever, it is added, the Deity condescends to be born of woman, the person is one, but there are two natures. To this distinction we must carefully attend, in order to reconcile many seeming contradictions in the *Puranas*; and more particularly so with respect to *Vaivaswata* and *Satyavrata*, who are acknowledged to be but one person. The Divine nature is an emanation of Vishnou in his character of the sun; and *Satyavrata* is the human nature.—These two natures often act independently of each other, and may exist at the same time in different places."

We might pursue the subject by showing how even the part of this early prophecy relating to the atoning sufferings and death of this great incarnate Redeemer has been as strikingly preserved,† as in the fable of Prometheus and Hercules, but we pass on to illustrate even in the fabulous legends of Bacchus the preservation, amid the most grievous perversion, of primeval Messianic predictions.

Passing from the original promise and prediction of Christ, we find Abraham assured that the incarnate deliverer should come in his posterity, and that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. (Gen. xxii. 18.)

* Vol. 10, p. 27

† See Faber's *Three Dispensations*, vol. I. p. 312, and p. 342.

The next recorded prophecy respecting the Mesiah was given by the patriarch Jacob immediately before his death, which has been thus rendered :*

“ The sceptre shall not depart from Judah,
Nor a lawgiver from between his feet,
Until he come, SHILOH.
And to him the expectation of nations.
Binding to the vine his colt,
And to the ivy-vine the foal of his ass,
He washes in wine his garment,
And in the blood of grapes his raiment.
Darker *his* eyes than wine,
And whiter *his* teeth than milk.”

The next prophecy of Christ is that of Balaam, found in Numb. xxiv. 17-19, and which has been thus rendered.†

“ I shall see him but not now,
I shall behold him but not soon ;
He cometh, a star out of Jacob,
And riseth, a sceptre out of Israel
And trampleth the regions of Moab,
And overthroweth all the children of Seth.
And Edom is a possession,
And Seir is a possession of his enemies ;
And Israel doeth valiently,
And he ruleth (a star) out of Jacob ;
And he destroyeth the remnant of the city.”

Now it would appear as if the personages and rites of the classical God Bacchus had reference to the traditional perversion of these prophecies.

The name Bacchus is from a word signifying a star, and the festivities of Bacchus were probably called the festivities of the Star.‡ Bacchus, therefore, was the personification of the prophetic seed and star. And as it is said “ there shall come a star out of Jacob,” so Bacchus was said to be born from his father’s thigh, and is therefore in the Orphic hymns styled “ the child of the thigh.”|| Bacchus was always represented with a star on his forehead and a sceptre in his hand. “ The Egyptians,” says Macrobius, “ draw on a sceptre a sort of eye, and by this

* See Lamb’s Hebrew Hieroglyphics, Appendix p. 150. † Ibid. p. 151.

‡ Ibid. p. 151. || Ibid. p. 152.

picture represent Osiris," who is the same as Bacchus. In Grecian mythology he sits upon a celestial globe bespangled with stars. The whole history of Bacchus is full of allusions to the symbol of the bull, the Egyptian representation of the incarnate Deity, and to the serpent. And thus the author of the Orphic hymns* styles him the Deity with two horns, having the head of a bull, revered in a double form and adored in conjunction with a beautiful star. Among the Arabs, Bacchus was worshipped under the title of Deis-Ares "the divine Sun."

Now a star or sun in the hieroglyphical system of all pagan nations denoted a God, according to the established doctrine that each star was animated by the soul of a hero who had dwelt incarnate upon earth.†

Bacchus is pictured as the most beautiful and lovely of Gods or men, as enjoying everlasting youth, and yet a venerable father. Ovid, borrowing his description from some Orphic hymn, says,

" tibi enim incorrupta juvena est
Tu puer æternus, tu formosissimus alto
Conspiceris cœlo."

He is described coming from the East as a mighty conqueror, riding in a triumphant car drawn by lynxes or tigers, the most savage of beasts, subdued and tamed by him to his yoke.

Qualis odoratis descendens Liber ab Indis
Egit pampineos fraenata tigride currus.

He is then represented as extending his conquests to the West, and subduing every part of the habitable globe; and these conquests are not the fruit of his martial prowess, but of his divine influence and persuasive eloquence. He then went on civilizing the whole earth, not indeed by employing arms, but by bringing into subjection the greater part of mankind, captivated by his persuasive reasoning, accompanied with poetry and music. He was not warlike nor addicted to battles and dangers, but to peace and to the general good of mankind. For these benefits he is esteemed as a God among all nations.

* Faber's *Mysteries of the Cabiri*, vol. I. p. 133, where the original is given.

† See quotations from Horapollus and Plutarch, in Faber's *Eight Dissertations*, vol. I. pp. 301, 302.

The Greek hymns transmitted to us under the name of Orpheus, are many of them translations from some older language, and were sung at the sacred feasts to the gods. Among these hymns there are nine or ten addressed to Bacchus. One of these hymns is equally curious from its contents and title. It is addressed to him under his title of *Baccapoor*, and is as follows :

“Come blessed Dionysus, dispenser of light, with the forehead of a Bull ;
Bessarus, and Bacchus, of many names, almighty ;
Who exultest with swords, and with blood, and with inspired priestesses,
Shouting down Olympus, loud thundering, furious Bacchus.
Smiting with thy sceptre, terrible in thine anger, revered by all the gods,
And mortal men, whosoever inhabit the earth ;
Come, blessed, leaping in triumph, bringing great gladness to all people.”

Among the names given to Bacchus in the Orphic hymns occur the following :*

“The first born.” “Good counsellor.” “Indescribable, mysterious.” “Father of Gods, and also Son.” “Immortal Deity.” “King Bacchus.” “Sacred cion. Sacred branch.” “The holy one.” “The medicine.” “Mysterious plant of Jove.” “The Son.” “The child,” were common titles of Bacchus.

“The mysteries of Bacchus consisted in part,” says Faber,† “of a scenical exhibition of his dilaceration by the Titans, and of his subsequent restoration to life by Rhea.”

“The whole indeed of the mystic rites of Osiris were the same as those of Bacchus. Hence we find that he also was supposed to have been torn by the Titans, and to have been restored to life again.”

“The mysteries of Adonis were of precisely the same nature, and referred to the very same event. He was first bewailed as dead ; but, in a short time, his votaries forgot their former grief, and with loud acclamations celebrated his supposed revivification.”

“The mysteries, indeed, by the name of whatever god they might be called, were invariably of a mixed nature, beginning in sorrow and ending in joy. They described the allegorical death and subsequent revivification of the principal arkite deity.”

* Lamb's Hebrew Hieroglyphics, Appendix pp. 157, 158.

† Mysteries of the Cabiri, vol. II. pp. 331, 334, 335, 337.

There is always connected with the history of Bacchus an account of his descending into Hades, and returning thence triumphant over the powers of darkness ; to this Horace alludes :

“ With golden horn supremely bright
You darted round the bending light,
Far beaming through the gloom of Hell :
When Cerberus, with fear amazed,
Forgot his rage, and fawning gazed,
And at thy feet adoring fell.”

Bacchus is termed in the Orphic hymns *τριφύης* and *τριγώνος*, “ of three natures,” “ thrice born.”

Bacchus was always represented as attended by a crowd of followers, singing triumphant songs ; and of these the most conspicuous character was Silenus, an aged individual, riding upon an ass, surrounded by nymphs and fawns bearing bowls, in which they crushed bunches of grapes, and with the juice of which his face and garments were sprinkled. He and his attendants were crowned with garlands composed of ivy and vine leaves. As the chief personage, BACCHUS, in these mysteries was a personification of Balaam's prophecy, so SILENUS was the personification of Jacob's prophecy, and the name itself is derived from SHILOH.

“ The sceptre shall not depart from Judah,
Nor a lawgiver from between his feet,
Until he come, SHILOH.
And to him the expectation of nations.
Binding to the vine his colt,
And to the ivy-vine the foal of his ass,
He washes in wine his garments,
And in the blood of grapes his raiment ;
Darker his eyes than wine,
And whiter his teeth than milk.”

Another part of these ceremonies consisted in a Phallic procession. Was not this a memorial of the covenant of circumcision given unto Abraham and originally a scenic representation of that rite ; “ This is my covenant which ye shall keep between me and you and your seed after thee ; every man child among you shall be circumcised—In THY SEED shall all the nations of the earth be blessed.”

This was followed by a troop of females bearing baskets of flowers and fruits, in which were live serpents, and

part of the mysteries consisted in putting them into the bosom, and letting them pass through between the body and garments. In an Orphic fragment, among other symbols of the mysteries of Bacchus are given, "beautiful golden apples from the harmonious Hesperides." Here I consider we have a representation of the first promise given unto Eve in Paradise, that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head.

Thus it appears that every ceremony and symbol used at these mysteries can be traced to some prophecy respecting the promised seed, and there cannot surely remain a doubt of their having been instituted to keep alive a memorial of this great event; although the Greeks and Romans so perverted them, as to obliterate all traces of their original meaning.

Those who were rightly initiated into these mysteries were considered as secure of prosperity in this world, and of happiness in another state of existence; but perfect faith was required to entitle an individual to these high privileges, and hence the ancient proverb:

"Many are called but few are chosen."

These sacred mysteries were probably retained and observed in their true character in the East until the Christian æra. The Magi who came to worship our Saviour, had seen a remarkable STAR in their own country, which they considered a proof of the advent of the promised king. They immediately, knowing "the star must come out of Jacob," journeyed to Jerusalem, the royal city of the Jews, looking there for him who was born King of Israel. They were thence directed to Bethlehem. And the STAR again appearing pointed out to them the spot where the infant Saviour lay, thus confirming their opinion that now the ancient prophecy was accomplished, and an end was put to those mysteries which were instituted and observed to keep alive among mankind the expectation of the promised seed.

In drawing this analogical proof to a close, we would observe that the mysteries of Bacchus were performed in Palestine among the Canaanites,* and that on one of the

* See Encyclopedia Britannica, 7th ed. vol. xv. pp. 659, 664, 663, and Gales Court of the Gentiles, vol. I.

sculptured Sarcophagi of the early Christians, a bacchanalian scene, as typifying Christian truth, is represented.*

It has therefore been well said that mythology is full of the exploits of the Son of God.

FORTH comes Socinus, pranked in learning's pride,
 Prepared the ways of God supreme to scan,—
 Saying the SAVIOUR, whom men crucified,
 Was but a "creature-prophet," but a man—
 And lo! a voice from Egypt's pyramids
 Sounds forth the name of dead Osiris, slain
 By evil Typhon, and aloud forbids
 To call him less than God. From Syrian plain
 Is heard the voice of Tyros' dark-haired daughters,
 Wailing in vain for him, their Saviour God,
 Their lost, slain Thammuz, o'er the deep blue waters.
 And Greece from all her isles, replies aloud
 Of murdered Orpheus, Bacchus, Hercules—
 DIVINE, though slain; Saviours and DEITIES.

From this subject we may learn many lessons.

It teaches us a lesson of deep humility. Man is wise only as he is enlightened by the wisdom that cometh from above. Left to himself, his wisdom becomes foolishness, and all his science "philosophy, falsely so called"—Romans, ch. i. 21—26.

So it was very speedily with the race of Cain. So it was ultimately even with the race of believing Abel and Enoch. So it was also in the post-diluvian world. Man did not like to retain God in his knowledge, because God wars against his wicked ways and his evil imaginations, and therefore man loved the darkness of superstition and idolatry, rather than the light of the knowledge of the glory of God—because his deeds were evil. Thus we find the pure, spiritual and divine revelation concerning a coming Redeemer transferred to weak, erring and corrupt mortals, and transformed into the rites and orgies of one of the most obscene and demoralizing of pagan Deities, even as we now see the purity and simplicity of the gospel changed into the sensualism of an idolatrous superstition, which changes the truth of God into a lie, that it may subject man to the ordinances and commandments of men,

* See the Church in the Catacombs, p. 183.

and under the terrors of hierarchical penances enslave while it ensnares and corrupts its victims.

There is also found in this subject a striking confirmation of our faith in the inspiration and truth of scripture,—in the divine nature of the incarnate Son of God—"God manifest in the flesh,"—in the doctrine of atonement and redemption,—and in the future triumph and universal establishment of the gospel of Christ.

In his prophecy Balaam seems—to use the words of Mr. Faber:

"As it were, to be suddenly rapt into future times, and to behold with open eyes as visibly present before him the august personage whose manifestation he is about to announce. Gazing with strained orbs upon empty air, as to Balak and the surrounding attendants he would appear to do, he vehemently exclaims: *I see him, but not now; I behold him, but not nigh.* He then proceeds more calmly to describe the dignity and origin and exploits of the apparition which had presented itself to him: an apparition, unless I greatly mistake, the very same as that which, on his journey, he had already beheld, under the name of *the Angel* or *the Messenger of Jehovah*; that Messenger, who is ever celebrated as being no other than the man-Jehovah himself. A star that should have dominion, is to come out of Jacob; and a sceptre is to rise out of Israel. The person thus hieroglyphically exhibited, is to smite the corners of Moab and to destroy all the children of Seth. Edom is to be his possession: and Seir is to become subject to him. For Israel is to do valiantly: and this remarkable descendant of Jacob is to destroy him that remaineth of the city."

Mr. Faber, in a very ingenious and learned investigation into this passage as found in the original, has shown that by the words translated "the corners of Moab" we are to understand the idolatrous Magi, Brahmins and Druids—the idolatrous priests who once extended from Hindostan in the East to Britain in the West, and who, it was here foretold, should be smitten or eradicated by the victorious star of Jacob. He has also shewn that by the words rendered "all the children of Seth," we are to understand the votaries of Seth, Baal-Peor, or Adonis, that is, the chief God of Paganism, by whatever different names he might be distinguished in different ages and countries, and whom He, this star, should also smite by turning them graciously to himself.

Such is the prophecy, and has it not, to use Mr. Faber's language, already been in good part accomplished? The Druids of the Celts, the Priesthood of the Goths and the Greeks and the Romans, the Patim or Grove-Prophets of Canaan, and the Petahs of Egypt, have long since been smitten by the victorious star; and the idolatrous system, which they advocated, has long since been eradicated. The same fate has attended the Teopixquis of Mexico: and their spurious virgin-born god has been hurled from the sacred ark within which he was enthroned. Nor have the solar priests of Peru been able to save themselves from the widely stretched-forth arm of Messiah: their theology, substantially the same as that of Mexico and the old world, has vanished from off the face of the earth. Even in our own days, we have witnessed the mild triumphs of the Prince of Peace in the principal islands of the great Pacific ocean: and the result there also has been the abolition of the kindred priesthood and idolatry of ancient Babel.

Much, however, yet remains to be done throughout the ample regions of the East and in the hitherto well nigh impenetrable recesses of Africa.

We have often heard of the invincible prejudices of the Brahmins: and we have been assured that the conversion of the Hindoos to Christianity is a perfectly hopeless task. We are aware likewise of the jealous vigilance of China: nor are we ignorant of the resolute antipathy to the Gospel, which has long been evinced by the inhabitants of Japan. Yet, after all that has been said and written on the subject, it is difficult to conceive that the haughty prejudices of the Brahmins, whether of the Sainic or Vaishnavic or Samanean School, can have surpassed the no less haughty prejudices of their western brethren, the Druids; and it is equally difficult to imagine that the jealousy of China, and the antipathy of Japan, can have exceeded the political suspicion of Rome, and the philosophical contempt of Greece.

Neither can it, with truth, be said that a division into hereditary castes, which some have too hastily deemed peculiar to Hindostan, presents an insurmountable barrier to the introduction of Christianity. The Egyptians and the Celts, the Mexicans and the Peruvians, were divided into castes exactly similar to those of the Hindoos in point

of arrangement and dignity: nor is the modern deprivation of caste, as pronounced by a Brahmin, at all more formidable than the ancient excommunicatory interdict, as fulminated by the whole College of Druids, with their Archimage at their head.

And when the allotted times of the Gentiles shall have been fulfilled, and when the missionary converts of the House of Judah shall commence their predetermined labour of love: it shall come to pass in that day, saith the Lord of hosts, that I will cut off the names of the idols out of the earth, and they shall be no more remembered; and I will cause the prophets and the unclean spirit, the Patim and the fatidical Seth or Python, to pass away out of the earth.

Then shall the Maghas of the Parsees, whether scattered through the regions of Balk and Bokhara, or sojourning in the southern empire of Hindostan, exchange their mediatorial Mithras or Mahabad, for the real mediator Christ: then shall the Brahmins of the Gentoos renounce their serpenticidal Chrishna: and then shall the Lamas of the Samaneans, whether presiding in Boutan, or Tartary, or China, or Japan, or Siam, or Ceylon, reject as abominable the worship of their Virgin-born Deity, and uncorruptedly submit themselves to the Sceptre of the mystic Star of Jacob.

ARTICLE VI.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A History of Colonization on the Western coasts of Africa.*
By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, D. D. 2d edition. Philadelphia:
Wm. S. Martien, 1849.

We are glad to find that a second edition of this interesting work has been called for by the public, which we heartily commend to the perusal of all who feel an interest in the amelioration of our free people of colour, and in the evangelization of Africa.

The command "to replenish the earth and subdue it," is still in force. And to what people does it equally belong to possess and cultivate the extensive and fertile regions of Africa, as to the sons of Africa in this country, who need a home where they may enjoy equal privileges with others, and where they may be the instruments of diffusing among the barbarous natives the light of Christianity and civilization? If ever the negro race are raised from their degraded state of ignorance and vice in Africa, it will probably be by the return of the descendants of that race, spread over so large a part of this western continent and over the West India Islands. If the wise and benevolent plan of civilizing Africa, and putting an end to the slave trade, devised by Sir Folsom Buxton, and which was attempted to be carried into effect at so great expense of life and money, had adopted the principle of sending back the emancipated negroes from the British colonies in the West India Islands, instead of attempting to settle colonies of white Europeans in the deleterious climate of Africa, the object sought, so important and desirable, would, in all probability, have been accomplished. And if the colony of Sierra Leone should need to be recruited, it will be found expedient to invite the most enterprising and best educated of the negroes of the West Indies, to emigrate to that country.

Liberia may be considered as a star of promise, which twinkles in the dense darkness which overshadows the African continent.

This community may be said, without exaggeration, to be the most extraordinary upon earth, when all the circumstances of its origin and progress are taken into view. Providence has evidently and remarkably smiled upon the enterprise, and, we trust with confidence, will defend it against all who may attempt its destruction. Let those, then, who oppose the scheme of African colonization, beware, lest they be found resisting what God approves. As for himself, the writer is as fully persuaded that the plan of colonizing the free people of colour in Africa, is wise and benevolent, as he ever was of the wisdom and benevolence of any human enterprise. The history of Liberia is, in this edition, brought down to the period of its complete independence.

2. *Sketches of Virginia, Historical and Biographical.* By the Rev. WILLIAM HENRY FOOTE, D. D., Pastor of Presbyterian Church, Romney, Va. Philadelphia: Wm. S. Martien, 1850.

The continuation of Mr. Foote's valuable labours will meet, we trust, with that welcome and encouragement which it deserves. Its interest and value will be evident from its contents, which are as follows:

Introductory chapter.—Virginia in 1688.—Rev. Francis Makemie and his Associates.—The confinement and trial of Rev'd. Francis Makemie for preaching in New York, 1707.—The Scotch Irish.—Siege of Londonderry.—Presbyterian Colonies in Virginia.—Rise of the Presbyterian Church in Hanover county; and Rev. William Robinson.—Ministers visiting Hanover after Mr. Robinson, and previous to Rev. Samuel Davies.—Virginia in 1743; Commissary Blair; William and Mary College.—Rev'd. Samuel Davies from his birth to his voyage to England.—The mission of Messrs. Davies and Tennent to Great Britain.—Journal of the Rev. Samuel Davies, from July 2d, 1753, to February 13th, 1755.—Rev. Samuel Davies.—From his mission to Great Britain to his death.—Three auxiliaries to the cause of liberty of

conscience.—Progress of freedom of conscience during the times of the Revolution, and the aid given by Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison.—James Waddell, D. D. and the Churches of the Northern Neck.—Log Colleges.—Hampden Sydney College.—Rev'd. John Blair Smith and the revival of 1787–8.—Rev'd. William Graham.—Liberty Hall and Washington College.—Rev. Drury Lacy.—Mary Moore.—The commission of Synod, with sketches of Legrand Marshall and Lyle.—Moses Hoge, D. D.

The author says, "it was in contemplation that the sketches in this volume should be continued to a later period. Materials were procured in abundance; and a number of sketches prepared, viz: James Turner—Cary Allen—The old Churches, and Church yards in the valley—List of all the members of Hanover Presbytery, from its formation to the year 1786, with short notices of many of the brethren—and Cornstalk, the Shawanee chief. But the size of the volume forbids their insertion. The appearance of a second volume will depend upon the reception the present volume may meet with from an indulgent public." We call upon our Ministers and our brethren generally to secure the fulfilment of this promise by the purchase of the present volume, of which we will hope to give a fuller notice in future.

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3. *Thoughts on Public Prayer.* By SAMUEL MILLER, D. D., L. L. D. Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton, N. Jersey. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1849.

This is the last gift of the good and lamented author, to whom, while living, prayer was his vital breath, and of whom it may be said that prayer was .

His watchword at the gates of death—
He entered Heaven by prayer.

This work supplies a vacuum. To students for the ministry it is of eminent importance, nor is it less valuable to all who wish to

take part in social or family worship in a manner at once edifying to themselves and others. Like all the author's works it is characterized by plainness, instruction, refinement of taste, and dignity of sentiment. The work is both historical, didactic, and practical. Its contents are:

Introductory Remarks.—History of Public Prayer.—Praying towards the East.—Prayers for the Dead.—Prayers to the Saint, and to the Virgin Mary.—Prayers in an Unknown Tongue.—Responses in Public Prayers.—Posture in Public Prayer.—The claims of Liturgies.—Frequent faults of Public Prayer.—Characteristics of a good Public Prayer.—The best means of attaining excellence in conducting Public Prayer.

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4. *The Footsteps of Messiah. A Review of Passages in the History of Jesus Christ. By the Rev. W. LEASK, author of Our Era.—The Evidences of Grace, &c. 2d edition. Philadelphia; William S. Martien, 1850.*

"It is unnecessary," says the author, "to state the nature and design of this work. It is not a life of Christ, nor is it the substance of sermons or lectures; although, probably, those who are in the habit of listening to the author's discourses may find in it passages which they have heard from his lips. I have been of opinion, for a considerable period, that the facts of the Saviour's history involve important principles, connected both with the Christian dispensation, and the intellectual condition of men; that that history is more than the record of a wonderful life—more than biography; that it is, in short, inspired didactic narrative. The present volume is the result of this idea. It is a review of certain passages in the Redeemer's history, as given by the Evangelists; and an effort to indicate those principles which the respective passages appeared to me to contain. Thus, for instance the lowly circumstances of the Saviour's birth suggested the subject of the first chapter: "Greatness, independent of earthly

splendour; and the conduct of the eastern Magi presented the thought of "Philosophy kneeling to Christianity." The headings of the chapters refer to the place where, or the circumstances under which, the events written about took place. The principal title of the book was selected for its simplicity, as conveying the idea of progress, without raising expectations regarding the character of the work, which I might not be able to satisfy. There are many other passages in the Evangelic narrative which I had selected and arranged for remark, but the apprehension that to increase the size of the volume, would be to defeat my desire for its usefulness, by preventing its circulation, led me to omit them. The order followed will be found in harmony with the usual chronology. As to the style in which the volume is written, it is not my province to say much; but as I wish to transcribe the impressions made upon my own mind to that of the reader, I have studied clearness, and I hope I shall be perfectly understood."

Mr. Leask has a high character abroad as a sound, evangelical, and interesting writer. The graphic manner in which he carries out his plan in this work, will be evident from his chapters, which are: Preface.—The Manger.—Greatness independent of Earthly Splendour.—The Layes.—Philosophy kneeling to Christianity.—The Midnight Flight.—Tyranny Frustrated.—The Temple.—The Power of Sinless Intellect.—The Jordan.—The Heavenly Attestation.—The Wilderness.—The Tempter Foiled.—The Passover.—The House of God Purified.—Samaria.—Acceptable Worship Defined.—Capernaum.—The Dispossession.—"The Mount of Beatitudes."—The Messiah as a Preacher.—Jerusalem.—The Sabbath Cure.—Nain.—Life Restored.—The Sea of Tiberias.—The Storm Hushed.—Cesarea Philippi.—The Claim to Messiahship.—"The Holy Mount."—The Transfiguration.—The Feast of Tabernacles.—Principles Enunciated.—The Samaritan Village. Ignorant Zeal Rebuked.—The Sanhedrim.—The Conspiracy.—Gethsemane.—The Redeemer's Agony.—Calvary.—The Crucifixion.—The Burial.—Melancholy Thoughts.—The First Day of the Week.—The Resurrection.—Galilee.—The Evidence Complete.—Mount Olivet.—The Ascension.

5. *A Treatise on Justification.* By Rev. GEORGE JUNKIN, D. D. Second edition, revised and enlarged. Philadelphia: William S. Martien.

This is a very able and valuable work, revised and enlarged, and possessing what we consider essential to all didactic works, a full index. Every question bearing on the moral character and government of God, the primitive and present condition of man, the nature, plan, and method of justification; the necessity, character, and extent of atonement; original sin; the utter inability of man to restore himself to the favour of God; the intercession of Christ; saving faith; good works and sanctification—will be found treated of, in this volume, in that clear, logical and connected manner by which the author is distinguished. The title of the work is selected as brief and comprehensive, because “justification is the central doctrine of Christianity, around which all others revolve, and with which all revolve round the central sun of eternal truth. It is, therefore, not thought necessary that the title should even now be changed, although a short chapter on Sanctification has been added.

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6. *Thoughts on Sacramental Occasions, extracted from the diary of the Rev PHILIP DODDRIDGE, D. D. with an introduction by JAS. W. ALEXANDER, D. D.* Philadelphia: William S. Martien, 1846.

With this work we have been for some years acquainted, and have regarded it as fully entitled to the commendation bestowed upon it by Dr. Alexander, who has performed a good part in bringing it before the Christian public of the United States.

“It was the custom of Dr. Doddridge to make serious preparation for the solemnities of sacramental days. As an instance passages might be cited from a meditation bearing date October, 1730. From this it appears that by devotional reading and prayer,

accompanied with fasting, he endeavoured to bring his mind into a frame suitable to the engagements of so tender an occasion."

The subsequent pages show, that as he advanced in life, Dr. Doddridge was led to feel a sympathy more and more warm, in sacramental exercises, with those who were under his pastoral charge. For the sake of young ministers, who may read these sentences, it may not be unprofitable to add, that such communion with one's flock tends very much towards faithfulness and comfort in parochial labour. Late in life our author's retrospection of these services was humble and edifying.

The remark is frequently made, that sacramental occasions have not the same interest which they had in former years. It is believed by the writer that the complaint is not unfounded. In ridding the ordinance of that burdensome extent of service, which was justly chargeable on the old Scottish method, the fast, the repeated preparatory services, the discourses on successive days, and the tedious serving of table after table, we have, on the other hand, lost much that was comely, and glowing and delightful.—How many of us recall, with a pensive satisfaction, the impressions made even on our infant minds by the solemnities of a sacrament, as dispensed in our earlier days, and particularly in those parts of the country where Scottish Presbyterianism most prevailed. Such occasions were infrequent in rural parishes, from the necessity of the case. They were sought, as they still are in Scotland, and in a measure among Scottish people here, by multitudes, from all the country side. Ministers of the Gospel came together in large numbers, and amidst circumstances the best fitted to awaken high emotions, and cultivate kindly affections. There was a part for every one in the days of continued service, and in the addresses delivered, where the method of sitting around a proper table was observed. Aged Christians who may read these lines, will acknowledge that memory can recall no seasons in which there was so much of the manifestation of God in his sanctuary, as in these great sacramental gatherings. Whole assemblies were often bathed in tears, and moved as the trees of the wood are moved by the wind. The holy sympathy could not but extend itself to the speakers on these occasions. The reper-

cussive influence from a profoundly touched assembly, is more productive of eloquence than all the canons of rhetorical school; and the unpremeditated gush, over the sacramental emblems, has been worth more than the elaborate lucubration of weeks, which the preacher had brought in his manuscript. These were times of revivals; and it is by means of the extraordinary assemblages and penetrating influence of such communions, that the chief advances of our Church were made. These were days of gladness, when the beauty of Zion was admired of her sons, and when thousands were brought to acknowledge Christ. And whatever may be thought of the admission, I hesitate not to own, that we have gained nothing as a Church by magnifying the convenience and the decorum of ordinances at the expense of fervour and joyfulness and life.

It is not intended, by these remarks, to reproduce the obsolete forms. We have forms enough already; and the era of careful, decorous, liturgical enactments, is usually that of coldness, worldliness, and decay.

It would ensure no good end to restore four-days-meetings, fasts, successive tables, numerous addresses, or any measures or ceremonies, however proper, without the spirit which informed them.—But it is meant, and that very distinctly, to express a desire for a more careful, earnest, and affectionate observance of the Lord's Supper. There are many who feel, though delicacy has somewhat repressed remark on this point, that there is danger lest, in certain quarters, the proper and genuine import of this sacrament should be altogether lost sight of. Many who read these lines will call to mind occasions, in which the Lord Jesus Christ, in his priestly character, has scarcely been mentioned at His own table. Every thing, in such cases, may be true, orthodox, instructive, solemn, nay even edifying—yet not sacramental, evangelical, tending to the cross. The very solemnity of these occasions may be harsh and legal. The grand, characteristic idea of the ordinance, *a suffering Messiah*, may be superseded by another, which, however valuable, is not the appropriate one. Has it not become, in certain Churches, a common thing for the Minister to leave the Atonement, that is to say the principal subject of this memorial,

to be gathered out of the words of institution, while he spends his whole strength upon the important but secondary topics of vow, covenant, engagement, obligation to the Church, solemn professions, and the like. Let it not be suspected that we would silence the latter ; but we would earnestly desire that the appropriate and cardinal doctrine of this ordinance should have its due place.

It is a very serious consideration for us who minister, that the tone and character of sacramental assemblies, will bear a general proportion to the nature of the instructions which fall from our lips at such seasons.

The "Action Sermon" of the days of our fathers may have been a formal, unwieldy, even a superstitious thing ; but then it was seen to contain the principal thing, Christ. Although we can all testify, with satisfaction, that it is far otherwise with the majority of our Churches, yet it is lamentably true that in some congregations the people have come to expect no particular reference to the work of expiation, in the sermon before the communion. And then what a change in the addresses at the sacrament itself ! Time was, when the chief outbursts of affectionate, holy eloquence took place at these times ; and when the assembled worshippers were lifted up in sympathy with the varied emotions of their leaders. Such addresses to the people were remembered and talked of for a life-time. But they pre-supposed a work of ardent piety in the speaker. It is this thought which connects our train of remark with the little book before us ; and its republication, it is believed, will prove useful to young Ministers.

7. *The Blood of the Cross.* By the Rev. HORATIUS BONAR, KELSO.
"The precious blood of Christ as of a lamb without blemish and without spot," 1 Peter i. 19. Philadelphia : William S. Martien, No. 142, Chesnut-st. 1849.

This is a most attractive and interesting little volume, by one of the most devoted and pungent writers of the warm hearted and evangelical Ministers of the Free Church of Scotland. Neither

saint nor sinner can read it without profit and pleasure, and while it may lead the sinner to Salvation, it will, by the blessing of God, build up the believer in his most holy faith, and in the full assurance of faith and hope and joy.

"That blood," says the author, "has been shed upon the earth, and that this blood was no other than the 'blood of God,' all admit who own the Bible. But admitting this, the question arises, how far is each one of us implicated in this blood shedding? Does not God take it for granted that we are guilty? Nay further, that this guilt is the heaviest that can weigh a sinner down?"

"If so, then is it not a question for the saint, how far have I understood and confessed my participation in this guilt, incurred by my long rejection of the slain one? How far have I learned to prize that blood which, though once my accuser, is now my advocate? How far am I now seeing and rejoicing in the complete substitution of life for life,—the Divine life for the human,—which that blood-shedding implies?"

"Is it not also a serious question for the ungodly, is this blood-shedding, really and legally chargeable against me? Is God serious in saying that he means to reckon with me for this? Is this blood, at this present moment, resting over me as a cloud of wrath ready to burst upon my head as soon as my day of grace runs out? Is it on account of my treatment of this blood that I am to be dealt with at the seat of judgement? Is my eternity really to hinge on this?"

"If so, what course can I pursue? Can I, like Pilate, take water and wash my hands, saying, I am innocent of the 'blood of this just man?' No! that is hopeless. My long rejection of it must involve at least something of the guilt; how much, remains yet to be seen. If I cannot clear myself, and if I cannot extenuate my crime, then I must either brave the trial and the sentence, or make haste to enter my protest against the deed, as the only course now remaining for me.

"In such a matter, there is room neither for delay nor uncertainty. Let the matter at once be inquired into, and put beyond the reach of doubt. Is it possible that any one can rest with less than a certainty of forgiveness, so long as such a charge is hang-

ing over him? Either he does not understand its meaning, or he is resolved to set it at naught.

"Reader! rest not till you have got matters thoroughly settled between God and your soul. This settlement must be on solid and immovable grounds. But these grounds God is presenting to you in the blood of His only begotten Son. Consider them well. They are your all for eternity! You need not fear risking your soul upon them. Oh! well for you, if you were but settled there. There would follow a lifetime of peace in this world, and an eternity of glory in the world to come."

8. *The Present Earth, the Remains of a Former World. A Lecture delivered before the South Carolina Institute, Sept. 6, 1849. By ROBERT W. GIBBES, M. D. member of the American Association for the advancement of Science, &c. &c. Columbia, S. C. 1849.*
9. *An Address on the Sphere, Interest, and Importance of Geology; delivered December 8, 1849, in the Hall of the House of Representatives, by R. T. BRUMBY, M. A. Professor of Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Geology, in the South Carolina College. Published by the Trustees. Columbia, S. C. 1849.*

In the pamphlets, whose titles appear above, we have evidence that Geology is about to assume among ourselves a degree of importance which it has not possessed in the minds of our fellow-citizens hitherto. There is no intelligent man who is wholly ignorant of its facts and its theories, and yet, comparatively few have made it a subject of protracted and thorough study. For some years past no systematic instructions have been given in this department in the State College of South Carolina; a defect which is now remedied by the zeal and industry of the present Professor of Chemistry, Mineralogy, and Geology. Under the incumbency of a former Professor, some years since, the study was made the occasion of ministering to skeptical views as to the Sacred Scrip-

tures. The State is fortunate in having one to preside over this department now, who would sooner abjure the study itself than do aught to impugn the veracity of the Divine word.

The Lecture of Dr. Gibbes is mainly an attempt to show the compatibility with revealed religion, of the theory that the present earth was constructed out of the remains of a former world. To this end he adduces the testimony of those many theologians and pledged defenders of the Scriptures, who have given in their adherence to this theory, and have admitted that the creative power was put forth upon our earth through the almost infinite cycles which are supposed to have preceded the refitting our globe for the abode of man.

Prof. Brumby's Address is an able and well written discussion of the subject he handles. In the close he thus sums up the topics of his discourse:

"I have endeavoured, this evening, to illustrate the necessity of renouncing the influence of prejudice and preconceived opinions, when we engage in the study of physical science; and to show that, instead of discrepancy, there is real harmony between Geology and Revelation.

"I have attempted, also, to explain succinctly the nature of geology, by defining its object, ascertaining the sphere of its investigations, tracing its scientific relations and dependencies, and evincing its claim to a high rank among the branches of physics.

"Lastly, I have aimed to prove its importance, by showing that as, for near half a century, it has engrossed the attention of governments, communities, and philosophers, more than any other part of human learning, constituting the great, peculiar scientific characteristic of the age, no one wholly ignorant of it can fully perceive the spirit of his times, and his own true position; that geological writings embrace a large portion of European and American literature; that as geology is full of poetry and romance, it gratifies the desire of young and old for the marvellous, without vitiating the taste, or corrupting the heart; that it affords fields of research adapted to every capacity; that its pursuit, far from being incompatible with professional success, is essential to the discovery and comprehension of all the causes of diversity of cli-

mate, and the local prevalence of peculiar diseases ; that it affords important aid to painters, sculptors, architects, and other lovers of the fine arts ; that it forms an indispensable element in the education of skilful engineers, miners, and intelligent agriculturists ; that it is eminently useful to historians, jurists, and civilians ; that it has developed principles, which must form the basis of all future attempts to remodel and improve the systems of classification in Natural History ; that it enlivens the imagination, strengthens the understanding, calms turbulent emotions, and refines and humanizes the soul ; that it brings with it its own peculiar rich reward, placing us in delightful communication with nature in all her retreats, whether in rugged mountains, desert wastes, or fertile plains ; that it has yielded most forcible illustrations of natural theology ; that it has confounded infidelity, and strengthened the Christian's faith, by supplying wonderful coincidences between scientific and revealed truth ;—above all, that it has proved conclusively, by incontrovertible arguments, drawn from the everlasting hills, the inspiration of the first verses in the word of God !”

There is no science in all the circle of human research which can stand in opposition to Divine Revelation. Science is but a knowledge of the works of God, and a perception of that all-wise plan which reigns throughout them all. It is a learner before it can be a teacher. It always will be found, when it has reached its ultimate results, compatible with the word which God has spoken. One cannot gainsay the other. The Geology or the Astronomy, which contradicts the Scriptures, is no true Geology, and no true Astronomy. It is a theory of short sighted man who is comparatively of yesterday and knoweth nothing. When the facts which the industrious student of nature gathers up are sufficiently ample, and his deductions reach the exactness of a science, we have no fear that they will stand opposed, in any degree, to the declarations of Moses.

Notwithstanding the considerable names among theological men who have declared for the great antiquity of our globe, there still remain others, neither weak, ignorant, nor superstitious, who think all those formations in which animal exuviae are found, were deposited since the six days work of creation. Great are the

difficulties on either hand. The demands of modern Geology are not free from them. And he who strives to bring the same facts within the period during which man has resided upon the earth, acknowledges them to be great. Both the one and the other require the intervention of a Divine hand; the one to supply in their needed place the materials for the formations as they are supposed to occur; the other to quicken the operation of the powers of nature beyond their present ordinary action, and to furnish what was wanting in them to the end attained. We see not why the one of these is entitled to the name geologist more than the other, or why the latter should be regarded as opposing science and injuring the cause of truth which he is aiming to subserve.—Neither the one nor the other denies the facts, however much their theories may differ. No man has a right to exclude a creating and disposing hand, nor a special providence and concurrence of Deity in the changes of nature. Thankfully will we receive all that Geology has to bestow. Her facts we value, the labours of her learned students we duly appreciate. If she offers us a *theory*, we shall not leave behind us the lamp of Revelation as we examine its claims. The Creator, whose hand was employed in these things, has spoken. It is the height of reason, as it is of piety, to hearken to His voice.

10. *Cardiphonia, or the utterance of the Heart, in the course of a real Correspondence, by the Rev. JOHN NEWTON, Rector of St. Mary, Woolnoth, London. With an introductory Essay, by DAVID RUSSELL, D. D. Dundee. Presbyterian Board of Publication: Philadelphia. 12 mo. pp. 494.*

Some one has compared the experimental works of Baxter to Sandal wood, which continues to give forth its fragrance for ages: the comparison will as happily illustrate the peculiar excellence of Mr. Newton's epistolary writings. Few names are more cherished than his in the Church of God; partly because he was so strik-

ing an example of the sovereignty and power of Divine grace; and partly because of the refreshing character of his compositions. The *Cardiphonia* needs no eulogy from us: it has already received the highest commendation it could receive, that of being received into the hearts of God's people; of occupying a place, not on the bookshelf of the student, but among the devotional guides of the pious. It is matter of joy to us, that a new and pleasing edition has been put out by the Board of Publication, and that it will be diffused among thousands who will welcome it as they do the face of an old friend. The introduction, written in the form of an Essay, by Rev. Dr. Russell, gives a discriminating analysis of the main topics handled in the letters which follow: affording to the reader, who is not already familiar with him, a most favourable introduction of the devoted author.

11. *The Christian's Daily Walk in Holy Security and Peace.*
By HENRY SCUDDER, late Minister of Collingborn-Ducis,
Wiltshire. Recommended by Dr. Owen and Mr. Baxter.
Presbyterian Board of Publication; Philadelphia. 12 mo.
pp. 342.

This is another contribution to the religious literature of the present day, drawn from the forgotten treasures of past generations. We know not of any better work for our Board of Publication, than that of recovering from oblivion the writings which were known and valued two hundred years ago. The title of this book will indicate its character. It defines the nature of walking with God—urges the duty and obligation of it—gives minute counsels for beginning, continuing, and ending the day with God. It discusses the duty of special humiliation and fasting, the proper observance of the Sabbath, and the nature of the sacraments. It contemplates the Christian in solitude and in society, in prosperity and adversity—distinguishes between his lawful and his unlawful cares—enlarges upon the peace of the believer—the imped-

iments to it, the false fears which disturb it, and the true means of its preservation. Like most of the writers of his day, Mr. Scudder abounds in quotations from Scripture; which, though to the superficial reader they interrupt the flow of his style, more than compensate to the serious and devout reader in the weight and dignity imparted to his sentiments. There are few topics arising in the Christian's daily experience which are not touched in this volume; many of them indeed of the highest importance, as the nature of assurance, the nature and properties of saving faith, &c.—and all handled in a searching and practical way far removed from controversial disquisition. To a class of Christians, we fear too small a class, this work will be very acceptable—the serious and earnest Christian will hail it for the assistance it renders in searching into the depths of his own heart. We earnestly hope it may do its part in recovering our generation from the flip-pant religious reading of the present day, to the more nutritious but severer devotional reading of our fathers.

12. *Converse with God in Desertion and Solitude.* By Rev'd. RICHARD BAXTER. Revised for the Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia: 18 mo. pp. 143.

A plain and profitable discourse from the prophecy recorded in John xvi. 32, of Christ's desertion by His followers at His Crucifixion: in which Mr. Baxter describes the comfort and support flowing from God's presence with the believer when left in solitude by the desertion or death of friends. A little book, full of consolation, is often of great value at those seasons when the burdened soul has strength to take up only the crumbs, and would loathe a fuller repast.

13. *Is Christianity from God? or a Manual of Christian Evidence.* By the Rev. JOHN CUMMING, D. D. Presbyterian Board of Publication: Philadelphia: 18 mo. pp. 330.

The author tells us in his preface this work is not meant for

learned theologians, but for Scripture readers, City Missionaries, Parochial and Sunday School Teachers, &c. The work is, therefore, simple and exceedingly well adapted to the end in view.—The topics discussed are: the immortality of the soul—the proof of God's existence—the necessity and antecedent probability of a Revelation—genuineness, authenticity, and Inspiration of the Scriptures—general characteristics of the Bible—the charges against the Bible of contradiction and inconsistency—doctrinal difficulties—particular texts cavilled at. The more laboured treatises on the evidences are beyond the reach of uncultivated minds, and presuppose a patience of research, and an amount of leisure which but few enjoy. Yet it is important that all classes should possess the means of obtaining at least an elementary knowledge of these subjects. To these, this little manual will be highly useful.

14. *Plain Thoughts about Great and Good Things.—The Saint and the Sinner.—The Providence of God displayed in a series of interesting facts.* Board of Publication: Philadelphia.

The first two of these little books are from the pen of W. S. Plumer, D. D. and are excellent specimens of a simple but dignified style, in which Divine truth may be brought, without difficulty, within the comprehension of very young persons. The third is a collection of interesting and very pertinent facts, illustrating the doctrine of a particular Providence.

15. *Conversations of a Father with his Children.* Series first, pp. 180. Series second, pp. 174. 18 mo. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Philadelphia.

These are two entertaining little books, conveying a good deal of information to youth, and affording a valuable hint to parents

as to the possibility of amusing and instructing their children at the same time. Each conversation closes with a spiritual application, adapted to fasten good impressions upon the conscience.

16. *Madagascar and its Martyrs.* 18 mo. pp. 156.—*Scenes in the New Hebrides*, pp. 72.—*Moravian Missionaries—Africaner or Missionary Trials.*—*Mr. Moffat and the Bechuana.*—*Terror by Night.*—*Bechuana Girl.*—*Jejana, or the Converted Hottentot.*—*Heathen Sacrifices.*—*History of Mary and Lucy Gutzlaff.*—*The Pilgrim of Monghyr.*

We group together these little works of the Presbyterian Board of Publication, because they all relate to one subject, and are designed to interest the children of the Church in the work of Christian missions. The persecution in Madagascar, the conversion of Africaner, and the labours of Mr. Moffat, told in the simple style of these little books, are well suited to awaken the interest of the young in the Heathen; and afford also a practical argument, level to their understanding, of the worth of the Gospel. There can be no objection to see our Sabbath School Libraries filled with books of this character; which would as greatly interest the young as the purely fictitious illustrations of truth.

17. *The Little Italian Boy.*—*The Little Jewess.*—*Story of the Samaritans.*—*Scripture Lessons in Verse.* 18 mo. Board of Publication: Philadelphia.

These are stories also for children: the first designed to give them some knowledge of the fundamental errors of the Papists; the second aims to interest them in the condition of the Jews.—The stories are all short, and likely to engage the attention of youthful readers.

18. *The Bedfordshire Tinker.* 18 mo. pp. 85.—*The African Preacher.* 18 mo. pp. 139. *Presbyterian Board of Publication: Philadelphia.*

The first of these books contains a brief and simple account of John Bunyan: a writer whom every reading child is bound soon to know in his entertaining and instructive allegories of the Pilgrim's Progress and the Holy War. The second, written by the Rev. W. S. White, of Lexington, Va. gives a truly interesting history of an old African negro in the State of Virginia, who being made the subject of renewing grace, was long and familiarly known as the African Preacher. We have been much edified in the perusal of this simple memoir, and could wish it an extensive circulation. There are few at the South who cannot call to mind instances almost as remarkable of deep and ardent piety amongst coloured persons embraced within the circle of their acquaintance. Perhaps the example of Mr. White may stimulate others to give to the world memorials of some of these, similar to those furnished in this volume. It is peculiarly gratifying to trace in actual life the elevating influence which the Gospel exerts upon human character; elevating, too, without pushing beyond the sphere which Providence has allotted. No persons can be found, perhaps, who so perfectly exemplify this influence, as the pious slaves of the South: as some of the purest instances of unaffected piety are found among them—and in every such instance, the character is refined and exalted, without detriment to that subordination of feeling and conduct which their relation involves—in every such instance, this relation itself is sanctified in their sight, by the clear recognition which they are led to take of God's Providence in disposing their lot, as well as of the particular agency which their bondage has had in their conversion to God.

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19. *The Doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race examined on the Principles of Science.* By JOHN BACHMAN, D. D. *C. Canning: Charleston.*—8 vo. pp. 312.

We have read this important book of Dr. Bachman's with un-

mingled satisfaction. The few first pages we had seen, through the author's kindness, as they were issuing from the press, but not till too late an hour for us to do justice to the work in our present number, do we obtain it complete. The discussion of the fertility of Hybrids shows the hand of a master. That theory is completely demolished. From this, Dr. Bachman proceeds to those various topics which are involved in the scientific treatment of the argument for the Unity of the Race. The book increases in interest as we advance in its perusal, abounding in instructive facts and reasonings, which reveal at every step the practised student of nature. We see no escape from the conclusions to which the discussion leads. And we think that those to whom the word of God is of no authority, will find it hard to set aside the conclusions of science. We shall indeed expect to find the Scriptural view of the Unity of the Human Race still the object of attack: The race of skeptics is not extinct. It will not die out till the Son of man cometh. Every department of Philosophy, Archaeology, and Science is made in these days to contribute its share of opposition to the plain teachings of the Divine word. But their argument is destined to be overthrown. We most heartily commend this Essay of Dr. Bachman's to the perusal of our readers. It is a work of originality and true merit, and the most satisfactory discussion we have met with, of several of the most important points involved in this extensive subject. We would be glad to say more, and to bring forward its principal results and reasonings to the notice of our readers. But we trust they will resort to the book itself, and obtain them undiluted and fresh from the pen of the distinguished author.

ERRATA.

Page 286, line 19, read *life* for *mind*.

" 292, " 23, " *process* for *proofs*.

" 296, " 12, dele *then*.

" 300, " 13, read *holiness* for *holeni*.

" " 17, " *according* for *accordingly*.

" 301, " 12 and 13, from bottom, read *of the works* for or
their works.

" 303, line 12, from bottom, read *the matter* for *it*.

" 304, " 4, " " " *as* for *being*.

" 311, " 7, " " insert *at* before all.

" 316, " 9, read *strata* for *shape*.

" 318, " 6, from bottom, read *simple* for *single*.

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