THE

PRINCETON

TEXT BOOK

IN

RHETORIC.

BY

M. B. HOPE, D. D.,

PROFESSOR OF BELLES LETTRES AND POLITICAL ECONOMY;
IN THE COLLEGE OF NEW JERSEY.

PRINCETON: N. J.

PRINTED BY JOHN T. ROBINSON.

1859.

To the Students of the College of New Jersey,—and especially to the Class of 1859,—for whose instruction this treatise was first printed,—it is now respectfully dedicated, by their

Friend and Instructor,

THE AUTHOR.

PREFACE.

THE accompanying little treatise, is, purely, what its title page imports:—a TEXT-BOOK in *Rhetoric*, for the use of the author's own pupils. It is, therefore, *printed*,—but not PUBLISHED.

Indeed it ought to be said, that the first intention of the author, was to prepare a *mere syllabus*, or *comprehensive abstract* of the *principles* involved in Rhetoric; primarily with the view, of facilitating a *review* of the subject, as preparatory to the final examination of the class. This should be said, in explanation of the heading of the work. It soon, however, became apparent to him, that the form first intended, would be unsatisfactory, both to himself, and the student; and very early,—even in the treatment of the first Part,—the conception of the plan, took on the form it now wears:—not that of a SYLLABUS, but that of a TEXT BOOK;—but still, a *Text Book*, that needs the full and free development, which, as his pupils know, it constantly receives in the mental *gymnastics*, of the CLASS ROOM.

The inducement leading to its preparation

grew out of the author's experience, in the CLASS ROOM, in the use of WHATELY'S RHETORIC,—and its object, is, to facilitate the methods of instruction there in use;—1, with a view to the better attainment of the ends of mental discipline, especially, in the attempt to train the student to think, under the stimulus of *recitations* on the subject of Rhetoric; —and 2, to impart a knowledge of the principles and laws which underlie, alike, the SCIENCE, and the ART of Rhetoric. The masterly work of Whately, heretofore in use, is now *discontinued*,—for the time at least—partly for reasons growing out of its effects upon the students, in the matter of their *Belles Lettres culture*:—partly from a conviction that the ultimate grounds of the *validity* of arguments. can be set in still clearer, more forcible, and readily remembered, relations;—partly because what seemed to be a very important practical end, for students preparing for professional life—and treated in the FIRST BOOK of the THIRD PART of the present treatise,—is not embraced in Whately's plan at all;—and, still more, because the FOURTH PART of Whately,—on ELOCUTION,—is not only inferior in its *method* and *handling*, but positively, and mischievously erroneous, in its theoretic principles, and consequently in its practical precepts.

The first two parts,—and as they lie in

Whately, incomparably the abler parts—of the Book are formed substantially on the plan of Whately; though the *treatment* will be found to differ very materially, in the *details* of the exposition. The classes carried through the study of Rhetoric by the author, will recognize the book, as substantially a condensed *reproduction* of the teachings of the CLASS ROOM. The author has not hesitated, however, to use any materials or suggestion, supplied by other Books in use,—common or otherwise— ; setting them, however, invariably,—except where they may be expressly quoted,—in new relations, which seemed to be better adapted to meet the uses of the student.

Besides the masterly work of Whately, there are two others, which have rendered so much *suggestive* assistance,—though neither of them much that is express, or formal—as to deserve a somewhat *special mention*, in this connexion; viz: ELOQUENCE A VIRTUE, or OUTLINES OF A SYSTEMATIC RHETORIC, *Translated from the German of* DR. FRANCIS THEREMIN, by PROF. WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD,—now of Andover:—and ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF RHETORIC: by Prof. HENRY N. DAY: of Hudson, O.

If the student would lay his account to *master* the latter work, in its *complete* and *exhaustive classifications*,—and especially on the

subject of INVENTION,—it would prove a *highly educating Book*. For a *general* TEXT BOOK, on *the whole subject of* RHETORIC, however, it has proved so philosophic, and technical, and complex, that it has been found difficult, to induce that complete mastery of it,—at least by a considerable portion of the Class,—on which *its value*, chiefly depends. Instead, therefore, of introducing it as a Text Book, for the final study of the subject, we prefer to use it, as a text-book, only in the earlier study, of THE PART, which treats of STYLE; and then recommend it, in connexion with the work of THEREMIN, for the careful *private study* of the Class, together with the TEXT BOOK now submitted, as a preparation for the recitations of the Class room.

CONTENTS.

SYLLABUS

OF THE PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITION AND DISTINCTIONS.

1. A SCIENCE, regards the phenomena within a given domain in nature, *with a view of determining and classifying the laws, which rule in their production.*

AN ART, seeks to apply these laws, in given circumstances, *with a view of re-producing, at will, the phenomona in question, and generally with a view to some ulterior end.*

In Rhetoric we seek to lay down THE ART; by classifying and reducing to practice the scientific principles—*i. e., the laws of human nature*—which underlie, and account for, the special phenomena. Rhetoric, therefore, properly embraces both.

The phenomena which it is the object of Rhetoric to account for, and thus enable men to reproduce at will, are 1, CONVICTION, and 2, PERSUASION.

The instrument employed in every rhetorical process, is LANGUAGE. There are two senses of this word:—1, the *general sense,* in which it may be defined, *as the embodiment of thought, in sensuous forms,* in which it is synonymous with ART: 2, *the special sense,* as limited by articulate language:—viz: *the embodiment of thought, in words,* (either spoken or written.)

The art of Rhetoric differs from other arts, 1, in that it uses *articulate language*, as its proper instrument, and 2, it has, for its special object: 1, to convince, and 2. to persuade.

The fine arts, or art in the generic sense, (as the word is used in the singular number,) has for its object, to develope the æsthetic element in human nature; and so fill the soul with the joy and strength of beauty, for its own sake: and 2, to conduce to the high collateral ends, of a complete human culture, with its results in human life.

The difference between conviction and persuasion is, that the *former*, (*conviction*) is an effect upon the *understanding*,—the intellectual or logical faculties,—the *latter*, (*persuasion*,) is an effect upon *the will*, producing a change either of character, or conduct; according as the effect is either, 1, static and permanent; or 2, dynamic and transient;—having for its object an effect, only for the time being, on the will or conduct of the hearer.

§ 2. COLLATERAL AND COGNATE ARTS.

Rhetoric, (strictly speaking,) does not include literature and poetry. The usual term for the study, when these are included, is BELLES LETTRES. This, as well as other forms of the fine arts, especially painting, music and elocution, may conduce to conviction and persuasion: but they are in the nature of tributaries, and do not fall within the proper sphere of Rhetoric; any more than organic chemistry, or botany, falls within the proper sphere of agriculture. They are part of the study of a thoroughly cultivated man, and are tributary to the purposes of a complete agriculture: but the art of farming does not necessarily, or even strictly, include them.

The bearing of these collateral arts on the ultimate and highest product of Rhetoric,—viz: Eloquence,—leads the authors, however, for the sake of completeness, to include in the scope of Rhetoric, also a discussion of the properties and laws of, 1, style, and 2, elocution; as tributary to the end sought in Rhetoric.

§ 3. Rhetoric, thus enlarged, will therefore, embrace, in our treatment, (after the example of Whately,) these four parts:—

What Rhetoric comprehends.

1. CONVICTION.
2. PERSUASION.
3. STYLE.
4. ELOCUTION.

In order to construct the art of Rhetoric, with this enlargement, it is necessary to study, 1, THE LAWS OF THOUGHT, or the process by which, from the *data* given in the human reason, and the informing consciousness of the human senses, the rational or logical faculty in the human mind, passes to the certainty of unknown truth, by necessary inference, from that which is known: and 2, THE LAWS OF EXPRESSION; constituting the art by which the convictions, and mental states of one human mind, may be conveyed to another in the most effective way. In other words our object will be, *to analyse, with a view to its reproduction, the process, with its underlying laws, by which the convictions of the intellect, are not only conveyed, from the speaker to his hearers, but transferred, in the act of conveyance, from the sphere of the intellect, to that of the active powers.* The Rhetorical process involves not only *the inception of power* in the human spirit, but *its control in the required direction, and with the required degree of force to accomplish a given end.*

§ 4. The laws of thought have to do with truth for two distingnishable purposes; viz: 1, *that of investigating;* and 2, *that of proving.* The one is the work of *the philosopher*, the other that of *the ad-*

Difference between the Logical and Rhetorical Process.

vocate. The one process is, predominantly, *that of Logic:*—the other *that of Rhetoric.*

It is no part of the proper object of the Rhetorician, to find out truth. His function is 1, *to find proofs;* 2, *to arrange and express them, with a view to produce conviction.* The mental state proper to these two processes—those of Logic and Rhetoric respectively—is wholly different; and though, practically, often co-existing in the same individual; yet it is always at the hazard of truth, for the philosopher to turn advocate.

PART I. CONVICTION.

CHAPTER II.

THE RHETORICAL PROCESS. ARGUMENT.

§ 1. Supposing the truth to be definitively reached, the function of rhetoric is to convey the *conviction* of that truth, in the light of its own proper evidence, to the mind of another party.

First step to determine the proposition.

§ 2. The first step, in the natural order of discourse, with a view to this end, is, therefore, to conceive and define precisely the truth to be proved:—or in other words to determine the Proposition.

The Proposition, in Rhetoric, consists of the theme of discourse, stated in relation to the object or end of the speaker. In another aspect, *it is the conclusion which the speaker aims to establish,* in the conviction of his hearers.

The distinction between the theme and the proposition is the more important, because the unity of discourse so indispensable to its interest and effect, is due, not to unity of theme, but unity of proposition.

Form of the Proposition.

§ 3. The *form of the Proposition* will be determined by the *immediate* object of the speaker. It is that partic-

ular aspect of the theme, which he may deem it wisest to present, with a view of carrying the convictions of his hearers.

Suppose *e. g.*, the theme of an advocate to be the crime of murder, and the object to be the acquittal of his client: the advocate may attempt to disprove the fact of the killing altogether, or he may admit the fact with or without argument, and then attempt to clear his client, by proving accident, necessity, insanity, adequate provocation, or something that is not properly punishable.

Mode of Statement.

§ 4. The immediate object of the speaker, must determine not only the *form of the Proposition*, but also the *mode of stating it;* or whether it shall be formally stated at all, or left to be inferred, by way of conclusion from the argument.

Questions like these, for which a ground will be sought hereafter, give wide scope for the discretion and rhetorical skill of the orator. In either case the ulterior object of the orator, determining the *form* of the *proposition*, and the mode of statement, or, in other words, the *plan of the discourse*, is to carry the conviction of the hearers.

Conviction embraces two processes.

§ 5. CONVICTION, in the wide sense of the word, embraces two distinguishable processes; viz: 1, *Instruction*, and 2. *Conviction*, in the narrow sense of the word. These processes agree in being addressed to the understanding: the difference lying in the state of the mind addressed. Instruction contemplates the mind addressed as having *no opinion or previous judgment* on the subject; and aims at awakening and forming such a judgment, by means of the discourse. Conviction proper, supposes the mind to be in a state of either, 1, *doubt or uncertainty*, as to the proper judgment, in the case, or 2, a *belief adverse*, to that which it is the speaker's object to establish; and the aim

of the discourse is either to change, or to confirm such belief.

The essential nature of these processes is the same: differing only in the antecedent state of mind, and that chiefly growing out of the probable presence, or absence, of *prejudice*, due to a prior belief, and the presence of such evidence as that, on which that prior belief rests.

§ 6. In Instruction, the process consists, essentially, *in making such a statement of the truth, as will carry its own evidence with it*, to the unprejudiced, intuitive perception, of the human mind.

Five distinct processes for instruction.

There are five different subordinate processes, by which this may be done,* 1, Narration, which is the *reciting* or representing *events as they happened in time*: as, e. g., in history.

The chief excellence of the style, for such a purpose, is *veresimilitude*: which consists, essentially, in revealing the reasons or causes of things, simultaneously, though informally, in connexion with the events which flow from them.

2, Description: which is the representation of things, as they are related in space.

The graphic power, causing us, as it were, to see the things described, is the highest quality of style, for descriptive purposes; as, e. g., in descriptive Anatomy, leaving out every thing that is unessential, and nothing that is essential, to the graphic or pictorial conception of what is described.

3, Analysis: which is the *resolving of a complex whole, into its simple parts*; so that their relation may come within our intuitive apprehension:—

As, e. g., in geometrical reasonings. Clearness of apprehension and statement, is the main quality of the style, in analytical instruction.

4, Exemplification: which consists, essen-

* See Day's Elements of the art of Rhetoric.

tially, in the establishing of some truth, before unperceived, by citing phenomena with which we are familiar, exemplifying the truth to be proved:—as, e. g., in teaching the law of gravity, by an induction of particular facts.

§ 5. COMPARISON OR CONTRAST: by which objects or events before unknown, are conmunicated and accepted, by reason of their likeness or unlikeness, to those which are known.

The essential feature of these several processes, available for instruction, consists in making such an exposition of truth, as will bring it within the range of the intuitional or logical perceptive powers, of the human mind. The higher the order of the mind, the wider the range of these powers. Hence a clear, skilfull analytic statement of truth, in its own light, is often, especially to cultivated men, the only argument needed, to establish it, in the full acceptance of the human mind.

§ 7. CONVICTION, *in the proper sense of the word*, Conviction proper. (as distinct from instruction,) is that process which addresses itself to some judgment, already formed; and which it seeks either to change or to confirm. It supposes a change of belief, under the stress of new or additional evidence,—collectively termed arguments.

§ 8. AN ARGUMENT, is the statement of an intermediate or middle term, by which the mind passes, in the way of proof, from known to unknown truth, in virtue of a relation either existing or introduced between them. An Argument, in *its full logical form*, consists of three propositions, (in the logical sense,) so related as to form a syllogism; in which the major premiss or proposition, either formally or virtually contains the conclusion: but *in rhetoric*, argu-

ments exist, for the most part, *in the form of what is called enthymemes*, in which, with a view to condensation and force, *two of the propositions of the formal syllogism,—termed the premises,—* are merged into one; and the transition from the *known* truth to the *unknown*,—though *really* involving *the intermediate term*, as the connecting link of the chain of argument,—*is apparently immediate.*

Logic,—the process by which the mind passes from known to unknown truth, *in the way of inference*—has to do with arguments,—i. e. with the rhetorical process—only in the way of *judging of their validity. The finding of arguments* with a view to *the proof* of truth,—technically termed *invention*,—belongs to the rhetorical process; and is *the first great division of the art of Rhetoric*, viz, CONVICTION. This process, in order to be valid, must, of course, be conducted in accordance with the laws of thought, which it is the province of logic to unfold and classify. Hence the relation of Logic to Rhetoric is very intimate, viz: that of judging how far arguments are valid, or otherwise; and, if not valid, of pointing out the reason of their invalidity, by showing how they cross the laws of thought, implicated in conviction.

CHAPTER III.

CLASSIFICATINN OF ARGUMENTS.

General grounds of Classification.

§ 1. Arguments may, evidently, be classified in different ways,—according to the principle, or ground of classificatton which we adopt.

1, As regards the *logical form* of argument, they may be divided into *regular* and *irregular.*

2, As regards *their subject matter*, they may be *either moral or probable* on the one hand, *or demonstrative or necessary*, on the other.

Necessary truth, is that, of which the opposite, is absurd, or inconceivable,—as, e. g., the axioms of geometry and the reasonings grounded on them: while the opposite of a moral or probable truth, is simply an error; or if there be a moral intent in it, a falsehood. The demand sometimes made for demonstrative reasoning on moral subjects, and the attempt to represent moral reasoning as of less validity, argues a misapprehension of its nature. The moral nature of man has been essentially damaged and subjected in consequence to the warping power of passion, and prejudice; while the logical faculty has suffered far less, and only indirectly. But moral reasoning *free from passion or prejudice*, is just as conclusive, as mathematical or necessary reasoning. E. G., the duty of worshiping God, or kindly requiting a benefactor, is just as certain as that the three angles of a triangle, are equal to two right angles: and when the affections and passions are in their normal state, the argument to that conclusion, is *far more effective*.

3, Arguments may be divided on still another principle into *direct* and *indirect*. This classification depends on the convenience of the speaker. It may be difficult, or even impossible, to prove a conclusion by direct argument, because of the accidental difficulty of finding direct argumeuts: while yet it may be possible or easy, to prove or disprove a coutradictory proposition.

For example, the evidence may go strongly to implicate a person suspected of a crime. The proof of an *alibi*, may be the *readiest*, and perhaps the *only* method left, to disprove the suspicion.

The validity of indirect argument rests upon the axiomatic or intuitive conviction, that contradictory propositions cannot be both true. The proof of a proposition is, therefore of necessity, the refutation of its contradictory, in all its forms; and also of every thing which depends upon it.

It is evident, however, that these are uot dlfferent *classes of arguments*, but *only different classes of truths*, or subjects for argument. The very same argument, snbstantially, may be put into several, or all these different classes, so far as they rre compatible:—it may be regular, it may be demonstrative, and it may be indirect, all at the same

time,—(as many of Euclid's demonstrations actually are,)—showing that the difference between them, is not a thing of essence, but either of form, or of subject matter.

SECTION 2.

Classification of Arguments; as determined by their nature as arguments.

1. The only philosophical classification of arguments, is that which founds its classes, on the different principles, to which they owe their *force, as arguments.* Without something known, we cannot argue at all. In the process of argument, the truths known are called *premises;* and the truth proved from them, *the conclusion.* All argument proceeds on the assumption, or postulate, that there is a connexion, in the nature of things, between the truths known and the truth to be proved from them, such that, the one cannot be true, without inducing the conviction, in every rational mind, that the other must be true also. The *degree of conclusiveness* in argument, depends on *the degree of certainty*, with which, in the intuitive perception of the human rational or logical faculty, the known and the unknown are thus coupled together, either immediately,—i. e. by direct intuition,—or, as in the rhetorical process, by the intervention of intermediate truths, holding together the separate links of the chain of argument. All that is necessary for the validity of argument is such a certainty of connexion between the premises and the conclusion, that where one is admitted, the laws of thought, in the rational mind, compel us to believe the other also.

Distinct grounds of validity.

2. This necessary nexus between truths.—the known and the unknown, or the premises and the conclusion,—may be of different sorts,—i. e it may spring out of different relations: and hence may give us a principle, by

which we may classify the different varieties of arguments. In fact, there are only *a few relations*, in the nature of things, such, that from the one we can infer, or prove, the other, with certainty.

Value of a classification of arguments.

§ 3. The classification of arguments, on the principles of logic, becomes of value to the rhetorician, 1, because it *discloses the nature and ground* of these necessary relations; and thus enables him to judge of both the *absolute, and comparative value*, of the resulting arguments or proofs. 2, It puts before the mind, in short, defined form, all the possible sources of proof, and *so facilitates the finding of arguments*:—which constitutes one of the great divisions of this part of Rhetoric. 3, *It suggests*, by thus setting the various principles of the arguments side by side, *the most effective order of arrangement*, for the purposes of conviction. If the force of one argument would be augmented by the principle involved in another, the comparison on which the classification depends, will suggest the order most conducive to the force of each, as well as to the combined force of all.

Grounds of the classification of arguments.

§ 4. The practical value of the classification of arguments, depends chiefly upon the fact, that there are only a few relations, in the nature of things, such, that from the one we can infer or prove the other, with certainty.

Two several classes of proofs.

§ 5. The only possible sources of proof are, 1, those contained in the terms of the proposition itself. This class of proofs is termed by Aristotle. and most of the Rhetoricians who follow his system, *intrinsic proofs*—sometimes *analytical* proofs. 2. Those, whose ground of certainty lies in our knowledge, either actual or possible, *of something outside of the terms of proposition,—extrinsic proofs.*

The most familiar example of the 1st class is the ordinary reasoning in Geometry. E. G. "the square of the hypothenuse in a right angled triangle, is equal to the sum of the squares of the other sides." This proposition is proved *by a mere analysis of the terms of the proposition* itself. It depends, simply, on the intuitive perception of the proportions or properties of the right angled triangle, after the *analysis* has brought them within the reach of our intuitional powers. In other words, the proof lies in the full perception or comprehension, of what those terms mean:—hence the name intrinsic. The proposition would be intuitively true, without any analysis, if we had the compass of mind required to grasp it. The higher the order of mind, the more truths become *intuitive* to it. And, of course, therefore, to the Divine mind, *all truth is intuiiive.*

This class limited.

§ 6. This class of proofs—the intrinsic—is limited in its applications in Rhetoric. It belongs, in fact, rather to the *logical* process *of inferring* than to the *rhetorical* process of *proving*. The proof of a mathematical proposition, furnishes but little scope for eloquence. The statement of this method of proof, is, however, necessary to a complete classification. And then there are some cases, where this method *does* fall within the proper sphere of rhetoric.

Suppose e. g.* the proposition to be, "*duelling is a species of murder*," the proof lies simply in an analysis of the proper meaning of the terms: and the emotional force of the argument, will consist in the eloquent—i. e. impassioned—handling of the terms.

Extrinsic proofs.

§ 7. The other class of proofs—*the Extrinsic*—or *those not analytical*—consists of arguments, the proving force of which, lies in the relation of the subject matter of the premises, to that of the conclusion:—or, in other words, their proving force lies in there being a relation between the premiss, or truth known,—whether formally admitted, or easily susceptible of proof,—and the conclusion or truth to be proved, such, that the existence of the one, carries with it, of necessity, the

* See Day, p. 95.

certainty of the other also. This classification corresponds with that given in Whately, on the 4th principle; or "the classification of arguments, as such."

The causal relation the basis of classification.

§ 8. Practically *the only relation*, between the subject matter of the premises and that of the conclusion, and serving as a ground of classification, may be resolved, in the last analysis, into *the causal relation*:—thus giving us three forms of that relation, and consequently three sub-classes of argument, viz: 1, that *from cause to effect*—termed the A PRIORI, or antecedent probability, argument; or, which is, practically, the same thing,—from a law to the uniform result of that law:—or generally from the uniformity of an antecedent, to the uniformity of a consequent. This antecedent probability class of arguments includes equally, and for the same reason, the argument from the non-existence of a cause, to the non-existence of the effect:—which may be appropriately termed the negative form of the *a priori* principle. The one form of the principle is intuitively seen to be as obviously true, as the other. If a man charged with burglary or arson can prove "*an alibi*," the refutation of the charge is as complete, as if it could be positively shown, who did commit the crime. This principle is involved in the very definition of a cause.

2, *From the effect*, as a premiss to the *cause*, or *condition*, without which such effect could not be conceived as occurring. This gives us the class of proofs called, after Aristotle, "SIGNS."

3, EXAMPLE: founded on the relation of resemblance, growing out of the *sameness* as well as *certainty* of the causal relation. The ground of the force of this argument, is, still *the intuitive conviction, of the uniformity of nature*: or if pushed back to its last analysis, the intuitive conviction of *the*

immutability of God, in nature, in the causal relation. This conviction will be found to be at the basis of all our classifications, in this, as well as in every other sphere, in nature.

§ 9, An *a priori*, or *anterior probability argument*, may be known, to be such, by the fact, that *the premiss always contains a cause*,—*i. e.* a reason, *for the conclusion*,—as well as a reason for knowing its existence, as a matter of certainty. Wherever there is a cause for an event present, we intuitively believe the event consequent upon it in nature, will follow, provided the cause be unimpeded; and provided the conditions necessary to its operation, be also present:—because it is of the nature of a cause to produce its effect. When the cause is present, therefore, we argue to the effect, on the ground of this relation.

Rationale of the anterior probability argument.

In explaining why an event should happen,—*i. e.*, in other words, by revealing an adequate cause for it,—we are equally assigning a *proof*, *i. e.*, *a ground for belief*, that it *has* happened, or *will* happen, if the conditions for its occurrence are present. From the presence of prussic acid, *e. g.*, we infer death as an effect, or from good habits, we infer health and prosperity, or *vice versa*. And where we do not know of an efficient cause, if we know the law or order of succession, in which the result uniformly occurs, we argue to the consequent phenomenon, with equal confidence. This may easily be resolved into the same principle or ground of certainty: because the existence of a *law*, is proof of the existence of a cause, whether we know what that cause is, or not. All that is necessary to the validity of the reasoning, is the *invariable certainty*, in the connection between the antecedent and the consequent:—and the degree of force in the argument, depends on the degree of certainty in the

relation, whether it be *a cause*, in the true sense of the word, or *only a law*, revealing to us the existence of a cause, whether known or unknown, or whether it be any other condition, besides a cause, which, in the nature of the case, must precede, the effect in question.

Ground of the name.

This class of arguments is called "a priori," or "anterior probability," because the conviction induced by it, rests not on our knowledge, that the conclusion, or result in question, is actually true, but on our assurance, grounded in the nature of the case, and prior to any experience, or actual knowledge of the fact, that the result in question cannot fail to happen. The force or conclusiveness of the argument, will be in proportion to our certainty of the presence of a true and sufficient cause, if it be a cause, of the ascertained certainty of the law, by which, the result in question is determined, if it be a law:—and in proportion to our doubt, on either of these points, will the conviction be uncertain or faint. No part of that uncertainty is ever due to a doubt, in regard to the uniformity or certainty of the causal relation, resting as that does, on our intuitive belief of the divine immutability. The law of the human reason does not admit of a question in regard to that.

Negative anterior probability.

This anterior probability, or *a priori*, class of arguments, includes also, arguments *from the absence of a cause* to the *absence of the effect*. This is simply the converse of the fundamendal intuitive belief, of the *uniform or necessary connexion, of cause and effect*, in nature. An *effect without a cause* would be as truly a contradiction of our intuitional conviction, as *a cause without an effect*.

When the argument is conclusive.

The "anterior probability argument," is conclusive, where the cause is known to exist and to be fully sufficient to pro-

duce the effect in question, or, which is essentially the same thing, where no impediment exists in the way of its operation.

If not fully conclusive, the force of the argument is in proportion as it approximates to this condition.

In that event, the result, when not fully certain, constitutes that degree of *probability*, which induces a *general belief*, that the result might be true, provided we were fully satisfied, as to the actual existence and sufficiency of the alleged cause. This is all the conviction needed, to awaken an interest in a work of fiction; and constituting what we term *naturalness* in such a work. The causal agency in such a case is assumed, or invented, or imagined, and the only limits imposed on the invention of causes, in such a case, are 1, that they shall not be improbable; i. e. they shall be causes, not unlikely to occur in the circumstances supposed; and then, 2, that the consequences following from them shall be such, as those causes would produce, if they were actual. Within these limits, fiction commands our *general belief*, sufficiently to induce our human interest in the events. If the causes feigned, strike us as unlikely to occur, we condemn the fiction as *unnatural*, or *improbable*; and refuse to become interested in it accordingly. And if a color of probability or naturalness be thrown over the existence and operation of the causes, while yet they either never existed, or have ceased to exist and operate, we characterize the form of probability thence arising, as *plausible*, implying in the term, a form of conviction, not only less than absolute, but intimating *doubt*, if not *positive disbelief*, in the incidents represented as flowing from the causes in question.

Probability.

§ 10. The second form of argument dependant ultimately on the causal relation for its ground of certainty, is that by which, from a given effect,

Sign.

we infer, or argue to, that, on which it is dependant. Among the truths necessary to the existence of a given effect, are, 1, the proper or efficient *cause*; or, if that be unknown, as in the previous class, the law, or fixed antecedent, of that effect, and 2, the conditions, *sine qua non*, of that effect, even in case the cause, otherwise adequate and operative, be known to be present. Whatever is essential to a known effect,—whether as a producing cause, or a condition essential to the cause taking effect,—may be inferred or proved, with absolute certainty, from the existence of that effect, to which it is a cause, or a condition *sine qua non*. There is no intuitive conviction, clearer, or more certain, than this. The antecedent —or truth known—in this case, is the *effect*, and the conclusion or truth proved, is either the *cause* or *condition*, without which that effect could not have existed.

The sequence, therefore, in this case, is a logical sequence, and is the opposite of the physical sequence: though the relation connecting the two, is still the causal relation. The transition in the one case is from cause to effect, in the other from effect to cause or condition. The intuitive certainty in both cases is the same. Arguments of this latter class,—from an effect to its cause or condition,—are termed by Aristotle and his followers in the nomenclature of Rhetoric, "signs."

§ 11. It is obvious, again, that there are *two sub-classes of signs, viz:* 1, *causal signs*, and 2, *conditional signs*; according as the truth proved, is in the nature of *a cause*, or only *a condition*, of the effect, by which it is proved.

The sub-classes of signs.

The *ground of validity*, in either case, is that the conclusion, or truth proved,—whether a cause or a condition,—shall be indispensable to the existence of the effect, by which it is proved. And the argument is doubtful, or invalid, just to the extent to which there are different causes or different conditions, to which, the effect in question can be conceived to be due: because if there are different causes, or conditions possible, it would be uncertain, which of the *possible* causes, or conditions was *actual*, in a given case.

§ 12. *A causal sign*, is that by which, from a known or admitted *effect*, as the premiss, we infer, or argue to the existence of its cause, on the ground of our untuitive conviction, of the necessary connexion between an effect and its cause. When there is only one cause, capable of producing the effect in question, the proof of its agency, is of course conclusive: and the force of the argument will be in proportion as it approximates to that condition.

Causal signs.

If blood be found upon the dagger or the clothing of a person suspected of a murder, it is a sign—i. e. an argument or proof of guilt—more or less forcible, in proportion as other causes, may, or may not, have produced the effect in question, viz: the staining of the weapon or the clothing. The argument by which the crime is fastened on the criminal, in such a case, must seek to show the impossibility of every other causal or conditional agency, in the presence of the blood, than the commission of the crime. Or if two causes, either of them adequate to the effect, be present, as a mortal wound and a fatal poison, in a case of murder, the determination of the true cause of death, or, in other words, the conviction of the suspected party, can be effected only by other proofs:—the most natural or accessible of which, would be *anterior probability arguments*, or some form of *testimony*.—"sign"—going to discriminate the *actual*, from among the *possible* causes, or conditions, of the effect in question.

§ 13. The class of conditional signs admits of sub-division farther, into 1 TESTIMONY; and 2 AUTHORITY.

Sub-division of conditional signs.

§ 14. TESTIMONY, so important as an argument, from the variety of its applications, is a *conditional "sign."* The *premiss*, or the effect from which we argue, is the giving of the testimony, and the *conclusion*, sought to be established, is the truth of that which is testified, as the condition, *sine qua non*, of the testimony being given.

Manifesily if there are other conditions than its truth, on which a testimony might be given, its truth cannot be implicitly relied upon or proved. *The force of testimony, therefore, will vary, in proportion as*

the truth of it becomes the only possible condition, on which we can suppose it to be given.

Grounds of credibility of Testimony.

The first and fundamental ground on which our conviction of the truth of testimony rests, *is the law of veracity*, as an element of the moral constitution of man. If man were in no sense a moral being, and recognized no sense of moral obligation or responsibility, it would be impossible to invest testimony with the credibility which belongs even to the lowest forms of human testimony. But as it is matter of absolute certainty, from experience, that the moral element in man has ceased to be *a guarantee* for the truth of testimony, it has become necessary to throw conditions, around witnesses, so as to make the truth of their testimony the *only possible condition*, on which this testimony could be what it is. To ensure this, despite every question that may rest on the veracity of the witnesses, is the real object of all those collateral conditions, which go to add confirmation or conclusiveness to testimony: as e. g. 1, *the sanction of an oath.* The increased credibility of testimony, given under oath, is due to the fact, that the moral sense in man, operates with far greater certainty, under the sanctions of an oath: few men being so lost to every sense of responsibility, as to give a testimony under oath, on any other condition than its truth.

2, *Concurrence*; or agreement in the testimony of two or more witnesses.

The augmented force of concurrent testimony is not *due*, and still less *proportioned*, to the increased number of independent testimonies, or the increased chances, that the testimony is veracious and trustworthy. The validity and weight of two independent witnesses, is not simply *double* that of one witness, of equal character. It is not simply a *numerical* increase of *weight* to testimony,

Force of concurrency.

but the addition of a *new element;* which, if not vitiated by some incidental flaw, *renders it absolutely conclusive*, to the truth so witnessed. It is supposable that two or more witnesses might, each separately, and all jointly, fabricate, and falsify, in their testimony; but that two or more witnesses should concur in fabricating the *same testimony*, without collusion, is morally impossible, *except on the condition of its truth.* Hence *concurrent testimony*, is not only forcible, more or less, according to the veracity or moral character of the witnesses, but *conclusive*—beyond all question and irrespective of their character for veracity—*by reason, simply, of its concurrence, supposing only the absence of collusion.*

Effect of collusion.

Previous concert or *collusion* of the witnesses, of course obviates the force due to this feature of testimony, because it vitiates the condition, to which its peculiar weight is due; by supplying another ground or condition for the agreement, than the truth of their testimony. Under this condition—collusion—the testimony of any number of witnesses, is, really, only a single testimony: for although a character for veracity, and moral integrity, may lead the separate witnesses to give independent and truthful statements, notwithstanding their collusion, yet it is impossible to determine when this is actually done; and therefore the convincing power of the testimony, must be subject to the uncertainty whether that may not be true, in a given case, which is liable to be true, in any case, viz: *the concurrence, or agreement growing out of collusion*, instead of the *unity* or *concurrence* which is *the result and proof of the testimony being true.*

Undesigned testimony. Force explained.

3. UNDESIGNED TESTIMONY,—which often takes the form of *circumstantial evidence*,—is more convincing than direct testimony, because so far as testimony is undesigned, the alternate supposition of *fabrication* is excluded; inasmuch as fabrication, presupposes a purpose, or design.

Undesigned testimony.

Undesigned testimony, may be open to question, on the *ground of error by mistake* or *accident*: but this question is met, if, besides being *undesigned*, the testimony should be *concurrent* also; because the chances are infinite,

that the same accident will not happen to different witnesses, or the same error occur by mistake, to different persons. In other words, it is morally impossible, that this should occur, and therefore it is morally certain that the testimony is true.

4. The same principles underlie, and give convincing power, to TESTIMONY IN LITTLE THINGS, as compared with the main statements of a witness. If not wholly undesigned, we judge *intuitively*, that if a witness were intending to fabricate at all, he would not confine his fabrications to little things; the bearing of which, on his testimony, would not be likely to occur to him; or which, if it did, would seem to be of too small value, to be worth fabricating.

Testimony in little things.

The force of this form of testimony is due to its diminishing the probability, if not excluding the possibility, of the alternate supposition, of intentional fabrication.

5. A fifth class of testimonies carrying a special force, is the TESTIMONY OF ADVERSARIES. The force of this form of testimony may be resolved into the moral certainty, that an adversary would neither *volunteer, nor yield, even under pressure*, a favorable testimony, except under the constraining power of truth and conscience. It has, therefore, the double force of being *undesigned*, and *possessing that degree of clearness, and certainty, which constrain him to give the testimony, in the face of the natural reluctance, growing out of personal antagonism.*

Testimony of adversaries.

The favorable *testimony of adversaries*, is, therefore, one of the *most conclusive of all the forms of testimony, other things being equal*, in the way of inducing conviction, in impartial minds.

6. A sixth form of testimony involving essentially the same principles of force, is what is termed NEGATIVE TESTIMONY. When important testimony is allowed to remain unanswered, and unrefuted, and more especially where the parties having the power to contradict it, have also an interest in its contradiction,—combining the force of

Negative testimony.

negative with that of the testimony of *adversaries*,—it is justly regarded as implying, in the clearest and strongest form, the truth of such assumptions.

Notwithstanding the apparently remote, and negative form of such proofs, they yet constitute the evidence, on which mankind receive as true, the great body of their knowledge, aside from that.—always comparatively trifling in amount,—which falls within the range of personal observation or research. Nearly all the settled doctrines of science, in all its multiform varieties and applications, rest, in our convictions of their truth, far less on the testimony of their discoverers, or controversial advocates, than upon *the negative testimony*, of those whom we regard as competent witnesses to their truth, and who would infallibly testify against them, except *on condition of their truth*.

2. The second sub-class of signs, is termed AUTHORITY. *Authority* differs from testimony proper, in that it is *testimony to a matter of opinion*, while *testimony proper* regards *matters of fact*. The importance of the distinction, lies in the *difference of qualification*, demanded to constitute a competent witness, in the two cases. *In testimony proper*—i. e. testimony to matters of fact—the requisite qualifications on the part of the witness are, 1, *correct and trustworthy senses*; 2, *adequate opportunities of observation*; 3, *honesty and integrity in using them*, and *veracity or moral integrity in stating the result*; and 4, failing in these conditions, or any of them, such collateral circumstances as will forbid the possible suspicion of the testimony being fabricated, or given on any other condition than its truth,—as e. g. in concurrent or negative testimony. *In authority* or testimony to matters of opinion, the prime qualifications of a witness are, 1, *competency to judge* or form an intelligent and correct opinion, on the subject matter of the testimony, 2, *competent opportunities of forming such opinion*, and 3, honesty in stating it: the main point of difference being the intelligence,

Authority.

Importance of the distinction.

Qualifications of witnesses to matters of fact.

Qualifications in the case of authority.

or capability of judging on the part of the witness.

THE WEIGHT of an *authority*, depends, like other signs, on the authority in question *deciding as it does, only on condition* of the *truth or correctness of the judgment*. In so far as there are other conditions than its truth, going to account for the authority in question, deciding as it does, *the less it weighs, as an authority*.

A legal precedent, e. g. owes its authority to the condition, in which it was pronounced, "by a competent tribunal and after adequate discussion, on both sides, by able and interested parties, and under the solemnities of a judicial trial; because it is not conceivable, that such opinions, formed under such circumstances, can rest on any other foundation than truth." Ignorance, partiality, prejudice, or anything other than its truth, that will account for the precedent in question, will so far vitiate our confidence in an authority, as to justify a re-examination of the question, by a competent, intelligent, impartial judge, or even advocate. Otherwise a legal precedent, or a medical, scientific, historical, or other *authority*, may be accepted as a final and sufficient proof of truth, without other, or renewed investigation of the original question.

Object of cross examination.

§ 15. With a view of eliminating, all the possible conditions, on which testimony can be conceived to rest, *other than its truth*, it may be subject to rigid scrutiny, *in the form of cross examination*. The object of this process, is to *sift*, and as far as possible *eliminate the conditions*, which might go to invalidate its force: and to this extent, it is a perfectly fair, just, and even *indispensable* process, with a view to obtain the highest convincing power of testimony, and especially where that testimony is given reluctantly, or with any suspicious design. Sometimes the design of cross examination is to *discredit the testimony*, by involving the witness in self-contradiction, or by bringing to light some feature, incompatible with the truth or drift of the testimony. At other times, the design is to elicit testimony, which it may have been the desire or interest of the witness to conceal, because of its bearing on the interests of

the respective parties. In both these respects, there is great scope for skill, and tact, in the conduct of cross examination, without passing the legitimate limits of the process. But to press these *legitimate* objects, to the extent of badgering and baffling, and confounding a witness, with a *view of entrapping him in his speech*, and so discrediting a true testimony, by *apparent* contradictions, is *neither legitimate nor just*.

The object of the process,—which is to arrive at truth, and not victory,—should determine the rules for its conduct: and whatever is incompatible with that end, should neither be practiced, nor allowed. The same principles apply to the process of cross examination; whether the testimony regard matters of fact, or matters of opinion:—i. e. in sifting testimony proper, or authority.

Rules for its conduct.

§ 16. The *principle of concurrence*, which independently of the moral character or credibility of witnesses, may give force, and even conclusiveness, to testimony, may also be applied to other arguments, in certain cases. The concurrence of testimony, e. g. with *a priori* argument, far more than doubles the force of each. A witness in whose credibility no confidence is felt, may yet determine our conviction, where a strong degree of anterior probability is made out, independently of the testimony; and still more, if it is without even the knowledge of the witness.

Concurrent signs of other kinds, and corresponding fallacies.

Wherever a proposition is in doubt, there are always two possible suppositions, in regard to it: the one is that *it may be true*, the other that *it may be false*. The object of arguments, is to determine the belief or conviction of a rational mind, between these two alternate suppositions. That one argument should be in error, designedly or undesignedly, may not be improbable; but that two independent lines of proof, should be *both in error*, and especially *in the same way*, would be immensely more improbable; and in proportion to the difficulty of accounting for the concurrence, on any other supposition than the truth of that in which they agree, does the concurrence of any number of proofs, add force to

The alternate suppositions in all testimony.

Force of concurrence in other proofs.

their convincing power; until error, designed or undesigned, becomes morally impossible. By moral probability or certainty, is meant, that degree of either, which the rational laws of human thought, compel us to receive as such. In all such cases, therefore, there is a balance of probability between the proofs in favor of the respective suppositions, of the truth or falsehood of the conclusion. To strike this balance rationally, —i. e. for adequate reasons,—is the office of the understanding or logical faculty: as it is the office of the reason, to pronounce upon such questions intuitively,—i. e. on subjective grounds. And if any one should withhold conviction in the view of adequate grounds for such conviction, whether furnished by the understanding or the reason, (as men often do, under the force of passion or prejudice,) he is, so far forth, *irrational*, and cannot be dealt with by argument.

Moral probability.

Balance of probability—how decided.

Prejudice irrational.

It is clear, farther, that, in the settlement, on rational grounds, of this alternate hypothesis, between the truth and falsehood of a conclusion, the force of direct argument, in inducing conviction, may sometimes be determined *negatively*;—i. e. by *the absence* of counter evidence, as well as positively, by the force of direct proof.

The process is essentially one of the comparison of probabilities; not absolutely, *but as compared with each other*.

§ 17. In thus comparing probabilities, or arguments, with a view to a judgment, in regard to the truth of the conclusion, the relation of concurrence, or contradiction, existing between them, as independent probabilities, is one of the strongest incidental proofs, in determining for or against, the contingent truth of the conclusion. Of the conflicting theories, involving, respectively, the truth or falsity of the conclusion, the one which *best includes and accounts for all the facts*, is that to which the rational constitution of the human mind compels us to yield our conviction.

Probabilities—how determined.

In every question on which the human mind is called to pass, there are but two alternative hypotheses possible: viz, those of

belief, and *disbelief*. We cannot rest in a state of doubt, except temporarily, and in suspense of farther evidence, implying a readiness to form or change a belief, on such evidence, when offered; but still implying the existence of a belief. The slighter the evidence, the slighter the belief induced by it; but if there is any evidence at all,—and there must be evidence, where there is knowledge,—the constitution of the human mind, compels belief or disbelief, according to the evidence.

§ 18 Where there is no *testimony*, of any description, and no "*sign*," pointing to a *probability* touching the truth or falsehood of a given event, conviction may turn upon the calculation of chances, when the probability of the event in question, admits of such calculation.

E. G. Suppose the question to be, whether a verse of poetry might not be the product of a handful of types dashed upon the floor, or whether it were the product of some human intelligence. No man who understands the law of gravity could accept the hypothesis, that the combination of letters in question, was casual; and yet it may be argued, that the types must assume, however casually thrown, some order; and it might be that particular order, as well as any other. However puzzled to make out a logical refutation of such an argument, every one would instantly reject the conclusion, as an impossible supposition; and would refuse to yield up his conviction to it, with or without a distinct perception of the fallacy.

It is perfectly true that types must, of necessity, take some order, however casually they may have fallen into their place: and it is abstractly conceivable, perhaps, that they might fall in the order of a poem. But the real question is which form is the more *probable*, under the circumstances?—viz. that of a *poem*, or that of *pi*. Comparing the two hypotheses together, no rational mind could hesitate in the conviction, that the hypotheses of chance was not only improbable, but *morally impossible*.

But though sufficient, this refutation of the hypothesis of chance, leaves ground for pertinacious quibbling. A more conclusive refutation may be made, by taking into the account, the causal agency involved in the two hypotheses. A poem is an effect: and the question is, as to its cause. There are two hypotheses:—the one, that its cause might be the *law of gravitation*: the other that it was the *work of intelligence*. The nature of the effect, forbids us to accept the former solution, as totally inadequate. Even so far as it falls within the sphere of

natural law, there is an element (*the special or intelligent order*,) for which we find no cause whatever, in the law of gravity: while in that law we do see an insuperable counter cause: because it is a contradiction in terms,—e. g. a contradiction of our intuitive law of belief,—to suppose a *blind* law, to give an *intelligent* result. Besides the physical phenomenon, of which gravity may be the cause, the poem is an effect, within the domain of intelligence. In that domain, the hypothesis falls away from every rational or plausible solution; and leaves us with an effect, *without* a cause,—not only an insufficient and improbable, but an impossible, and, of course therefore, incredible, solution.

The analagous *fallacy of composition*—as it is termed in logic,—and which consists in inferring that what may be true of each of several distinct events, separately, may be equally true of the whole conjointly, involves the same principles. It becomes a fallacy, by mis-stating the real ground of the argument: which lies not in the signs, separately, but in the composition or concurrence of the signs conjointly. It does not follow, because a man may strike a mark *once* without design, that he may equally strike the same mark, *uniformly*, without design. The *uniformity of the result*, is the feature for which we are seeking a cause, and that effect remains unexplained, until we find a sufficient cause, in the admission of an intelligent design.

The fact that a squirrel finds a suitable nest in a hollow tree, does not refute the argument for design, furnished by the uniform and mechanical construction of the comb of a bee.

§ 19. THE ARGUMENT FROM PROGRESSIVE APPROACH, *is a species of sign* The effect constituting the premiss of the argument, is the observed fact, that the evidence of the truth of the conclusion, becomes *clearer, the more we know of its drift*. This form of argument becomes practically necessary, and may be of great value, where, from the attending circumstances, complete experimental certainty, is beyond our reach.

Rationale. If, so far as the proofs are within our reach, they reveal, as the law of their force, a growing tendency to confirm the conclusion in question, the rational laws of the human mind compel us to believe, that our conviction would go on to keep pace with our knowledge, until *the certainty* of the conclusion should be reached. If the proofs point

towards the truth of a conclusion, as far as we have proofs, it is a *sign*, to us, that, if continued far enough, they would terminate in *establishing* the conclusion. In other words, the truth of the conclusion, is *the only condition*, on which all the lines of proof would be found to converge towards that conclusion :—which is the very description of *the argument from progressive approach.*

A sign.

For example, in the domain of physics, if a ball be set in motion, it continues to move on, in a straight line, farther and farther, in proportion as the retarding element of friction, is diminished ;—as e. g. on a level plain, on ice, and in a vacuum, in proportion to its completeness. Hence we intuitively infer, that if all friction or resistance were withdrawn, the ball would never cease its motion. Or,—to take an instance falling in the sphere of moral truth ;—we find that the longevity of men is proportioned to the absence of disturbing or morbific causes, in their personal and hereditary habits, or exposure : and that disease and death are due to some departure from the true theory of life. Are we, therefore, authorized to conclude, that the perfect conformity to a true regimen, physical and moral, would ensure an earthly immortality? The very limitation of its question suggests the necessary limitation to applicability. protect us from a fallacy in the argument. Perfect conformity to a perfect law of life, if that were possible, would ensure a perfect result, *within the limits determined by the author of our life.* But there may, of course, be *other* grounds, going to set defined limits to longevity, besides transgressions of the dietetic regimen, prescribed by the Creator. The argument holds good, therefore, *only so far as it regards the particular cause of mortality* in question. The same principle applies to the previous argument as well. If there were any other cause for the stoppage of the ball, than the resistance due to friction,—if, for example, it were of the nature of force to exhaust itself, and cease by its own limitation,—the argument from progressive approach would owe its whole force, to its tendency to prove that such was not the nature of force, because so far as experience goes, we find no such tendency revealed ; and are therefore entitled to conclude, that no such tendency exists.

A case in moral reasoning.

This reveals to us the fact that *the argument from progressive approach* is *not a pure sign* ; but partakes of *the nature of induction also ;*—because its conclusiveness depends on their being no other cause or law, bearing on the conclusion, than those in-

cluded in the argument. *Without a true induction, therefore, the argument will either be invalid or fallacious.*

§ 20. The second sub-division of the second general class of arguments, on the principle of classification we are elucidating,—viz. those founded on the intuitive certainty of the causal relation,—and in which that relation is traced, from a given effect, to some truth which necessarily follows from it, as a consequent or conclusion,—is *the* ARGUMENT FROM EXAMPLE. This form of argument, though essentially the same in principle as sign, differs from it in this;—that the truth of "*a sign*" depends on the *certainty* of the connexion between cause and effect, while that of *example* turns rather on the *sameness* of that connexion. A cause not only produces its *effect* infallibly, but it infallibly produces the *same effect*, whenever the cause and the conditions are the same. *In sign*, in other words, we argue from an effect by means of the *certainty* of the causal relation to the conclusion:—being either a cause or a condition; while *in example* we argue from an effect, to *the sameness* of the causal relation, the conclusion being either the existence of an analogous effect, wherever the cause and the conditions are the same;—or simply the existence of a cause or law of nature, which will certainly produce such an effect, wherever the conditions, necessary to that effect, are present.

The former of these gives us the class of arguments known by the several names of "*Experience*," "*Analogy*," "*Parity of reasoning*," &c. The latter constitutes what is termed "*Induction*,"—the great instrument of modern science.

§ 21. EXPERIENCE, includes all those forms of argument, in which the premiss is some known effect, from which we argue on the ground of our intuitive conviction of its *necessary certainty*, to the conclusion, that the same phenomenon will

Experience.

take place in future, whenever, and to the extent in which, the same causes, and the same conditions, are present. Strictly speaking,—as the very word itself imports,—experience refers only to the past; and its office is, therefore, merely to supply the premises for argument: and the process consists in the intuitive judgment, (having for its object the uniformity of nature,) by which we pass to the conclusion, that the same phenomenon will invariably occur, in the same conditions. Now it is obvious that this is essentially, in its last analysis, an "anterior probability argument," in which experience merely furnishes the premises. We learn experimentally, or emperically, what has been, and from that infer, or argue, on the anterior probability principle, that the same thing will be.

Rationale of the argument from experience.

In this whole class of proofs,—*arguments from example*—not only is the ground principle of their proving force, laid in our intuitive conviction of the uniformity of the causal relation, but in each separate instance, the relation between the cause and the effect is traced both ways—viz: starting with the effect, as *the premiss*,—that being the known member of the argument:—we pass first to the knowledge of the cause, or law, ruling in the production of that effect, and then from that cause or law, down again through our conviction of the uniform certainty of the causal relation, to infer or prove another effect, similar to the first; whenever the conditions are the same.

The most important part of the argument from experience, is that by which we reach the existence of the cause or law, from the effect or phenomenon supplied in experience: and as the remaining process, by which we argue *to a like effect in the future*, is a direct intuitive judgment, the whole argument takes its name—*Experience*—from that circumstance; because it furnishes the premiss or ground of that judgment.

By the term *experience*—which furnishes the premiss of the argument so called—we mean, the knowledge we get of any phenomenon, through the senses.

The term experience.

§ 22. But there is a very great degree of vague-

Vagueness of the term.

ness, as to what is popularly comprehended in the term. What is commonly regarded as a simple sense perception, often really implies a judgment and sometimes a short process of reasoning on the matter furnished in sensation.

In looking at a cube, e. g. we see, strictly speaking, only lines, surfaces and color: and yet we do not hesitate to say we see a cube; though our conviction that the object is a cube is, strictly speaking, a judgment, or perhaps an inference, from the sense perception.

* "Different men who have all had equal, or even the very same experience: i. e. have been witnesses or agents in the same transactions, will often be found to resemble so many different men, looking at the same book: one, perhaps, though he distinctly sees black marks on white paper, has never learned his letters; another can read, but is a stranger to the language in which the book is written; another is familiar with the language, but is a stranger to the subject of the book, or wants instruction to take in the author's drift, while another, again, perfectly comprehends the whole. The object is the same to all: the difference is due to their several states of mind. And this explains the fact, that we find so much discrepancy in what are called experience and common sense, as distinguished from theory. In former times men knew by experience that the earth stands still and the sun rises and sets. Experience taught the King of Bantam that water could not become solid. And the experien e of Tacitus convinced him that for a mixed government to be so framed, as to combine the elements of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy, must be next to impossible; and that if such a one could be framed, it must be very speedily dissolved."

Experience often involves judgment.

With this vagueness and uncertainty resting on the real meaning of "*experience*," as involving often an act of judgment, and sometimes a virtual process of reasoning on the phenomena found in sensation, and as this experience supplies the minor premiss of the argument,—the intuitive conviction of the uniformity of the causal relation, in nature, supplying the major premiss,—it is of prime importance to the validity of the argument, to deter-

* Whately, p. 71.

mine definitively the essential value or form, of a given experience, in order to infer with certainty from the past, what may lie in the future. And as a large part of human knowledge is due to this source, it is all the more important to apprehend precisely, and fully, the grounds and limits of the certainty, of our so termed experiences.

Rationale of the argument from example.

§ 23. The essential nature of the process, in reasoning from example, consists in taking some one known thing, or result, as an example of every other thing, belonging to the same class, and then inferring that what is true of the individual known, will be equally true of every other individual belonging to the same class. This principle is seen, *intuitively*, to be true and necessary. The only ground on which a doubt can rest, in a given case, is whether the individuals in question do certainly belong to the same class, in regard to the essential point involved in the argument. If they do, then the argument is demonstrative: and, on the contrary, whatever doubt may rest upon that question, will, to that extent, invalidate the force of the argument.

Ground of uncertainty in example.

Different forms of resemblance.

§ 24. In determining this question, so fundamental to the validity of the argument, from experience, viz: whether the individuals involved—the known and the unknown—belong to the same class, there are two forms of resemblance or likeness, to be looked to—viz: 1, *sameness of appearance*, or sameness of external properties or forms; and 2, sameness of relations, or ratios;—the latter constituting what is termed analogy.

Ground of validity.

As the essential ground of all argument from example, is *real resemblance* or *identity of class*, not similarity of appearance, it is clear that the argument is forcible or valid, *only so far as this identity holds*. And as this is determined mostly by inherent organic causes, and not mere external sameness of properties or forms, or appearance, the argument from one individual to another invidual of

the same class, most commonly takes on the form of *analogy*.

§ 25. The argument from analogy differs from the argument from example, in that the terms of the argument—the premiss and the conclusion,—are *apparently* more remotely related: i. e. the relation is not that of external form, or resemblance, but one of vital organic sameness,—i. e. sameness of law.

Argument from analogy.

A piece of marble may be cut into a resemblance to an egg; and only so far as the resemblance holds, one may argue from the one to the other, but no farther. An egg, on the contrary, may be very unlike a grain of corn: and yet in virtue of *the analogy*, one may argue from the one to the other, in regard to the points in which the analogy between them holds; and in which the argument would be wholly invalid, notwithstanding the far closer resemblance, of the marble and the egg. It is not, therefore, similarity of appearance, but sameness of class, as determined by sameness of law, which constitutes the ground of valid argument, whether from *experience, example, analogy, or parity of reasoning*.

Analogy, sameness of law.

As many things are *analogous*, where there is yet no proper resemblance* between them, the class of arguments *from analogy* is much larger, and more comprehensive and more frequently available, both for inference and proof, than the arguments from *experience*, and *example*, in the strict sense of the words. It frequently happens that two things, which have no resemblance, have yet a common relation to some third thing, thus bringing them within the scope of the argument from analogy.

Analogy how different from resemblance.

§ 26. The third form of the second sub-division of empirical proofs—i. e. arguments from an effect, and included in the general term "*example*," is INDUCTION,—comprehending the forms of process constituting the great instrument of modern science.

Induction.

The essential nature of that process, is determined by the intuitive law of belief, in the human mind, that

* Resemblance consists in sameness of form: analogy in sameness of relations or proportions. A man resembles his portrait; but a seed is analogous to an egg.

every effect must have a cause; coupled with the inherent prompting of our rational nature, to investigate and determine, what that cause is, or at least to make out *the law of its operation.*

As we are inhabitants of a living world, we are surrounded by phenomena, of which the active and rational constitution of our minds, is ever prompting us to explain the causes; or if the causes lie deeper than our power of penetration, then to determine the law of their recurrence. In consequence of the difficulty of comprehending, even metaphysically, the nature of causal agency, the latter, viz: the determination and classification of the laws of phenomena satisfies the requirements of *positive science.*

§ 27. *Induction* embraces several distinct processes viz: 1. The *careful and full collection of the phenomena*, referable to a single cause or law.

Steps in an induction.

2. The careful scrutiny, and *elimination of all false phenomena*,—i. e. such as may be due to any mixed agency, or complication of laws,—and thus *reducing the facts, and our conceptions of them, to exactness and definiteness.*

The ordinary method by which this end is attained, is that of repeated observation, under varying and diversified circumstances, under the general name of experiment. E. G. Newton's first generalization of the law of gravity, was in conflict with even the philosophical belief of the age, viz: that a body four times as heavy as another, would fall four times as fast. In the conduct of experiment there is scope for great ingenuity, in devising tests, which cannot fail to eliminate any suspicion of error, due to common popular impressions, and destitute of the accuracy of scientific observation. For example, as a feather does not fall as fast as a stone,—as it should do according to the law of gravity,—it required ingenious arrangements for experiment, to show that this apparent contradiction to the law of gravity, was due to the supporting power of the atmosphere, and that when this support was withdrawn, a feather did actually fall as fast as a stone.

3. *Combining these phenomena, thus sifted, under*

one comprehensive statement or formula : or in other words, the formation and statement of the law, which governs them :

E. G., in the case of our illustration, the law is, that all bodies attract each other with a force, varying directly as their mass, and inversely as the square of their distance.

The entire completeness of this step in the inductive process, supposes the ability to explain all apparent exceptions to the law, which is generally reached only at a later stage of investigation. Thus e. g. the winds, the very proverb of variability, are already reducible to 3 classes, viz: 1, trade winds; 2, monsoons, and 3, three belts of calms.* This gives us an exact statement of the phenomena, as involving the order of their recurrence, and all distinctly traceable to this law of gravity.

4. *The fourth and final step of a complete induction is the reference of the law or order of classified phenomena, to some physical conception of their causal agency ;* which may be either 1 *some simple property of matter*, like its elasticity or hardness, e. g. ; or *some more elementary law, of dynamics*, as e. g. the law of the action and reaction of forces. *In other words this final step of an induction, is the discovery of the cause of the phenomena, as well as the law or order of their recurrence.*

This last step is essential to the completeness of an *induction*. For example : the phenomenon of suction was first generalized, and explained, by saying,—"nature abhors a vacuum." This was a true statement of a well known fact, or series of facts, in nature. Pascal completed the induction, which the law of gravity had given, by showing that the phenomenon of suction was a simple and necessary result of the elasticity of the air; thus giving us the *true theory* of the phenomenon, instead of a vague and fanciful hypothesis. This step is always one of the highest marks of true genius.

A hypothesis differs from *a theory* in this ; that the one is a *statement of the order or law of recurrence*, of classified phenomena; the other is *a statement of the law with the cause or mode of recurrence*, as due to some more elementary force, or property of matter. The mental faculty which is employed in this final step in science, is *the imagination* : sometimes termed the *philosophic*

Difference between hypothesis and theory.

* See Earth and Man, by Prof. Guyot.

imagination. One of the widest strides in the history of the human mind, was that by which Newton, gave us, in the law of gravitation, the true theory of the universe.

Philosophic imagination.

§ 28. Among the most essential characters, in the philosophic use of this faculty, *is the predominant love of truth*, and the consequent readiness to abandon a hypothesis which will not include all the phenomena. Kepler is said to have tried 16 different hypotheses, before establishing the path of Mars to be an ellipse. Science is the discovery and classification of laws: and the true philoso-

The true philosopher.

pher is ready to give up his *hypothesis*, however plausible, the moment it is shown that it falls away from undoubted facts. Newton found, e. g., that his hypothesis required the moon to fall from the tangent to her orbit, i. e. to vary from a straight line to the sun, 16 feet in a second, while, in fact, observation showed that she fell only 13 feet, Like a true philosopher, he gave up his theory, for that trifling discrepancy; till he had found the cause of it, in the perturbations due to the attractive power of the other bodies of the solar system.

Value of a hypothesis.

It does not follow, however, that an unconfirmed hypothesis is useless, even though it may prove ultimately to be false, because 1, it contains the phenomena classified for farther study: and 2 it leads, tentatively, to the discovery of the true theory.

The best test of the truth of a theory, is that it enables us to predict what will happen in new contingencies; or which is practically the same thing, when new facts, discovered afterwards, fall into it. If a theory were false, as e. g. Newton's law of gravity, the discovery of the very first new planet, would probably reveal the error.

From the observed facts, or phenomena, science argues *a posteriori* to causes or laws, as conditions, of those phenomena: and then assuming or starting from such laws, it deduces, *a priori*, by analytic reasoning, —some of the necessary consequences of those laws, viz: some new phenomenon, which, if the law be true, must follow from it.

Thus e. g. from the law of gravity, science deduces the elliptical form of the planetary orbits, and the times of their revolutions; and then, conversely, taking for its starting point, or premiss, the observed form of the orbits, and the masses of the sun and planets, it rises to the general law, that the motion must be due, to a force which varies directly as the mass, and inversely as the square of the distance. If the one be true, then, by necessary consequence, the other must be true also: and on the other hand, unless the one be true, the other cannot be, because they stand in the mutual relation of antecedent and consequent, or cause and effect, in the present constitution of nature: and the rational faculty of man can pass with intuitive certainty, from the one to the other, either way.

Whichever member of the argument, happens to be known, is the premiss: and then the other follows from it as a conclusion. In the case of *induction*, observation, or experience, supplies the knowledge of the phenomena, which furnish, in that case, the *premiss:* and the existence of the law, is the *conclusion*. And then conversely,—assuming the existence of the law, and deducing from it *a priori*, some new phenomenon, as a necessary sequence of its truth, if that, in turn, should prove to be in accordance with observation, or experience, we have a conclusive test, of the truth of the induction. If, on the other hand, the induction be false, its falsity will be disclosed by a discrepancy between the phenomena found in experience, and the theoretic results of the law, as predicted.

Real and fanciful analogues.

§ 29. As the ground principle, or the connecting link between the premises and conclusion, in arguments from example, analogy, authority, &c., is *the relation of resemblance*,—it is clearly essential to determine what form and degree of resemblance, is necessary to give validity to an *argument from analogy*.

While any degree of resemblance, however remote, or even playful,—provided it be obvious and striking,—may be employed for *illustration*, the analogy which

is to serve for *argument*, must always be *real*, as distinguished from *fanciful*: and the ground of real resemblance, lies in the similarity or identity of the laws ruling in the production of the analogous phenomena. If the example argued from,—i. e. the premiss of the argument,—be *hypothetical*, we can of course only argue to the hypothetical or conditional truth of the conclusion. If, on the other hand, the premiss,—i. e. the example argued from,—be an *actual* case, we can argue to the conclusion as actual, so far as there is a real analogy between the cases, irrespective of any question growing out of the probability, or improbability of the example. If the example is *real*, it is thereby proved to fall within the scope of the causal relation, in the actual constitution of nature; and whether we can penetrate to the cause or not, we are intuitively certain, that there is a cause, because of the uniformity of the effect:—and on the strength of that conviction, we do not hesitate to anticipate the same effect again, wherever the circumstances are the same.

E. G.—to take the common instance to illustrate this point—the naturalist does not hesitate to class a newly discovered animal, having horns and a cleft hoof, among the *ruminants*; even though he may be wholly unable to perceive any causal relation between horns and a cleft hoof and the habit of *rumination*. Inasmuch as the two things are invariably found united, in the actual constitution of nature, and however incompetent one may be to explain the relation, and however improbable,* consequently, such a relation would seem to be, he cannot hesitate to believe that a causal relation exists between them; and it is this which gives the required certainty and uniformity, to constitute the basis of a valid argument from example.

Invented examples.

We can even *imagine*, or *invent*, examples to argue from, in proof of our conclusion: but, of course, the proving *force* of such examples, will be in proportion to the intrinsic *probability* of the example so invented. It is, in reality, an *a priori*

* It has been already stated, that the probability of any thing is determined by our ability to see a cause or reason for it.

or anterior probability argument, simply invested with the interest and clearness of an imaginary case. *The example* is,—strictly speaking,—in the nature of *an illustration*, rather than an *argument from example*. It is far easier for most minds, to see the force of an *a priori* principle, *under the form* of a well invented, and probable narrative, than in its naked, or abstract form.

Thus e. g. when Socrates argues against the extreme democratic policy of choosing magistrates by lot, from the invented example of shipwreck, in case sailors should select their captain by lot, it is clear, 1, that the argument has far greater force than the naked statement of the consequent liability of the government, to fall into the hands of ignorant and incompetent men: —2, that it would be no refutation of the argument to deny that sailors ever had selected their commander by lot; 3, that the force of the argument lies in the strong, *a priori probability*, not to say *certainty*, that such a result would follow, contingently upon such a procedure: and without such probability, the argument would be destitute of force. Hence it is equally clear, 1, that the argument owes its real force to its *a priori* or anterior probability character; 2, that its *a priori* force, is more readily seen, and more fully apprehended, from being clothed in the example of a hypothetical, analogous case, in which the result of the same principle, or law of procedure, is even more apparent than in the real case; 3, that the real force of the invented examples is not that of *argument from example*, but of an *illustration* of the *a priori* principle, stated under a form of greater clearness and perhaps beauty, as well as force, than the abstract principle itself could have put on. It is not, therefore, in reality a case of *argument from example*, so much as an *a priori argument*, under the form of an example. Besides its illustrative and aesthetic force, the invented example, may give effect to argument, by reason of the human interest, inspired by the incident of the tale, into which the invented example may be woven. This goes, largely, to explain the persuasive power of fiction, over the moral character and conduct of men. This mode of influence is well known to have especial potency, in the case of those, whose sensuous and imaginative faculty is relatively greater, than their power of generalization and abstraction. Hence the well known fascination and moulding influence of *fiction*, over the character and acts of the young. Nations have an analogous period in the earlier ages of their national

life: when *instruction* equally, and even more characteristically than *conviction*, is conveyed in parabolic or allegoric forms: when the poetic imagination is developed out of proportion to the power of abstraction and generalization. The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the fables of Aesop, the Pilgrim's Progress, and Holy War of Bunyan, are instances; each characteristic of the *nation*, and the *age* of the nation, which gave them birth.*

CHAPTER IV.

Different ends or uses of Argument.

§ 1. It has been already stated, that there are two dis-
The different ends of discourse. tinguishable processes, included under the general objects of conviction; both of which involve the use of argument, either formal or virtual, viz:—1 *Instruction* and 2 *Conviction*. It has been also stated, that the one—conviction—supposes a previous judgment touching the proposition or conclusion, constituting the subject of discourse, the other—instruction—does not.

§ 2. In employing arguments for accomplishing these different ends, there is a difference in the process, of due to the *existence*, or at least the *liability* to prejudice, in the former case, affecting 1 the class of arguments most proper to be selected;—and 2 the whole conduct of the reasoning, in the two cases.

§ 3. *In instruction*, the mind is supposed to be en-
Process for instruction. tirely open to conviction, and willing to accept the reason—*the why*—of the conclusion. The candid mind, in instruction, is ready and even anxious, to believe, if it can see a ground for belief. This it is the object of *instruction* to impart; and hence the *a priori class of arguments*, wherever

* For a specimen of this mixture of argumentative poetic allegory, see 2 Kings XIV: 8, 9, 10, the force of which is palpably due, far less, —if it can be said to be due at all—to any proper argument, than to the illustration of the grounds of conviction in the poetic drapery of the living imagery.

they are applicable to the case, are the most effective to instruct; because it is of the very nature of *a priori argument*, to bring into view the causes or reasons of the phenomena included in instruction. This, of course, is equally true, wherever one has to do with *a candid mind*, even though it may have before it a prior judgment;—as, e. g. in that form of conviction, which has for its object to *confirm* a judgment already reached.

Process for confirmation.

§ 4. *In conviction proper*,—which supposes the mind to have already reached a judgment, which the speaker aims to refute or change,—the *a priori class* is not likely to be so effective.

Process for conviction.

In reaching an adverse judgment, the mind is supposed to have *some* reason for that judgment, and is therefore pre-occupied with different premises, justifying that different judgment,—which is the very definition of prbjudice, viz: a *pre-judgment*:—and hence the *a priori* form of argument is no longer of force. Conviction, in that case, is possible only by a *refutation* of the premises or grounds of the corresponding process, leading to the false judgment in question:—

E. G. when the missionaries first went to the South Pacific Islands, they found the natives liable to be precipitated into superstitious terror, on the occasion of an eclipse of the moon,—believing it to be due to a great serpent swallowing the moon. To explain the true cause of an eclipse, i. e. in other words, to use the *a priori* argument, to disprove the hypothesis, would not be likely to convince them, or cure their superstitious terror; because they already had a hypothesis of their own, which *if it were true*, would explain the phenomenon as well. To effect conviction, that hypothesis must be first disproved;—and the appropriate means of such disproof, must be looked for in one or other of the extrinsic or empirical classes of proof:—viz. either testimony, or authority on the one hand, or experience, analogy, or induction, on the other.

§ 5. Besides *the class of arguments*, the question of the candor or prejudice, of the mind addressed in

conviction, will affect the whole tenor and spirit of the reasoning designed for conviction.

Force of arguments relative, and partly subjective.

The strength or conclusiveness of arguments is not absolute, but *relative to the grounds of belief or of action in the mind addressed.* Arguments absolutely conclusive, by every rule of logic, go for nothing, against an appetite, or a ruling passion, or even against a blind prejudice.

The intellectual and active powers, are coupled so closely together, that they act and react conclusively on each other. A man devoted to his appetites, cannot be argued out of his evil habits, by any appeal grounded on reason;—simply because, neither his convictions nor his habits, are determined by his reason. The same thing is true of his *passions*, when they assume the form of blind ruling principles. When the active principles of our nature usurp the control of our rational grounds of conviction, it becomes necessary to ply them with something which will reach the springs of belief, or action, so as to weaken the one; or else to implant or exalt a new and *more potent* principle over them. If it is an *appetite*, you must first drug and disgust it, or else seek to awaken a new and more controlling principle,—like conscience or religion e. g.—to hold it under bonds

Grounds of conviction.

§ 6. Conviction, besides its clear *objective* ground, in logical argument, involves a *subjective* element, determined by the inward mental state of the mind to be convinced. Hence there is wide scope for skill, in the general conduct of the process, in avoiding prejudice on the one hand, and finding the ground of readiest susceptibility to impression, on the other. It often happens, that the arguments best fitted to give satisfaction to a candid mind, are *not* those, which are most efficient to force conviction on a mind already pre-occupied with a contrary belief. As Whately forcibly remarks, the *internal* evidences of religion, are by far the most satisfying to an experienced christian, while the *external*, furnish the great thesaurus of argument *for the confu-*

tation of the sceptic. Wherever there is a *prior judgment*,—as in conviction proper there always is—it is always necessary to refute it, by some other form of argument, before a different judgment can be substituted for it, by an a priori argument.

Farther difficulties in conviction.

Besides, we cannot always convey to another either the *real* reason—or even *any satisfactory* reason, at all, for our judgments. The more simple, direct and intuitive our perception of truth is, the more satisfactory it is *to us*,—but if it is not equally intuitive to other minds, the more difficult it is, by reason of its very simplicity, to make the ground of our conviction apparent to another. Impressions, deep enough to determine our own convictions, are often made by reasons too etherial, for our clumsy logic to frame into arguments at all: just as a painter or a sculptor finds it impossible to realise his own ideals. And yet we cannot hesitate to accept convictions, and act upon them, even in the gravest events of life, which rest on no more tangible grounds than these. It is in fact the *tact* and *discrimination*, springing out of grounds like these, which make the difference between a good physician or lawyer, and an ordinary one, and between a great, and a common mind, in any walk of life. And yet it may be difficult or even impossible, to translate such grounds for our belief, into arguments, that would force conviction on a mind in a different subjective state.

CHAPTER V.

Presumption and Burden of proof.

§ 1. When argument is about to be joined on any question, the first step to be determined, is, which party shall take the initiative,—or in other words, on

which party the burden of proof rests, in the discussion. The most obvious and common answer,—viz: the party sustaining the affirmative of the question,—is really no answer at all. The question at once returns, with scarcely less uncertainty, which is the affirmative of the question. The affirmative of a question may be expressed in negative form, without, thereby, shifting the burden of proof from the party making such negative affirmation. In an ordinary libel,—e. g. charging a man with fraud,—the initiative of the argument, belongs to the party denying to his honesty, and not on the party *affirming* the integrity of the accused. The English common law maxim, applicable to this question, is that he who puts anything in affirmation, must prove it;—i. e. has the responsibility of making it true;—and if he fails it is at his peril.

The presumption and burden of proof.

§ 2. The same principle—the question of the initiative of argument, or *the burden of proof* is virtually involved in the question,—often more readily determined,—viz. on which side of a question, *the presumption* lies:—the burden of proof being always on the *opposite* side.

In every question that can be put in argument, there is, anterior to the discussion of its merits, a presumption of truth on one side or the other, growing out of the very nature of the question and on the ground of abstract probability; aside from the particular circumstances of the case. A presumption, in this sense, does not imply *a probability* of truth, one way or the other, in a particular case; but the side on which the presumption lies, has such an abstract presumption in its favor, in the nature of the case, that a verdict of "*not proven*," is equivalent to a verdict of *acquittal*. The failure to establish the affirmative, leaves the negative of the question, presumptively established. "The great advantage of

such a presumption practically, is, that it has all the benefit of the doubtful result"—and to raise a doubt, —always easier than to establish an opposite conviction,—is to achieve a triumph.

Ground of presumption.

§ 3. The rational ground for this presumption is laid, ultimately, in the intuitive conviction that there is a uniform and settled constitution and order in nature: and whoever puts in affirmation any departure from that normal constitution and order, thereby *obligates himself to prove it.* Meantime the presumption is against the truth of such affirmation, *because of its abnormal character.* As there are but two possible hypotheses, viz. its truth, or untruth, and as the presumption is against its truth, and *the burden of proof* consequently rests upon the party making the affirmation, it follows, that if such affirmation should fail to be supported, by clear proofs, the mind must fall back on the conviction of the *alternate hypothesis*, as the normal order; whether the belief of that order, be founded on *a priori* or *experimental* grounds. This intuitive conviction of a uniform and settled order in nature, springing out of,—if not identical with,—our intuitive belief of the *uniformity of nature*,—and that resolvable, again, into our intuitive conviction, of the *immutability of its author*,—such conviction lying in the profoundest depths of our reason and making part of our simplest idea of the divine nature,—will give us grounds for determining, in most cases, the side on which the presumption lies; and, by consequence, the side,—always opposite to it,—on which *the burden of proof*, falls. *There is always, accordingly, a presumption in favor of that, which is the normal constitution of nature, and the burden of proof will fall upon every allegation of a departure from it.* As a necessary consequence, and by way of illustration, of this general principle, it may be remarked:

1. *The presumption is in favor of what already ex-*

Special grounds for a presumption.

ists, whether in the nature of *an institution*, a *prevalent opinion*, a *question of truth or error*, of *right or wrong*, of *expediency or inexpediency*. It is incumbent always on the proposer of a change, to make good the grounds for the change proposed: and if he fails to do so, the verdict should be against the change proposed.

There are two subordinate grounds for this presumption, clear to our reason, viz:

(1.) It may be presumed that what exists would not have existed, *except on the condition* of its being true, right, expedient, or whatever the question, raised upon it, may be.

(2.) All change, of whatever nature, is, *in itself, an evil*; and should not, therefore, be adventured on, *tentatively*, until a case is made out in its favor.

It is true that a change *may* be *for the better*, as well as *for the worse*: but if change be urged on that ground, it is incumbent on the proposer to make good his reasons first; and if he fails to do so, the presumption will, rationally, decide the case against him.

It is important farther to notice, that when argument is once joined, the presumption ceases, or is shifted to the other side, until the argument is answered;—when it returns again in its full force.

So true is this second ground for the presumption, that even when the wisdom of the change is fully made out, the *change* is, in itself, an evil, still; and it may even be a question—to be determined by a balance of probabilities,—between the evils of the change proposed, and the evils of persisting without a change.

It is important, also, to add, that to refuse to hear argument on the merits of the main question, on the ground of the presumption, is to be guilty of the fallacy of turning the presumption into a conclusive argument.

2. The presumption is in favor of a man, in every case involving confidence in his moral character, till he is first proved to be unworthy of such confidence.

The rational ground of this presumption is, not the greater probability that men, taken at random, are worthy of such confidence; but, simply, that man is a moral being, and therefore his normal state is that of trust-worthiness. Whatever experience

may go to render probable, on a mere naked calculation of chances as determined by experience, yet in any question of justice, and especially involving penalties, we may not *presume* that any man is actually in an abnormal state,—i. e. a state contrary to his moral nature,—till it is proved upon him. This principle lies at the foundation of the common law in every civilized nation, which always presumes innocence, till guilt is proved. The same principle is taken up, and embodied in the law of the gospel, throughout the christian world, even in the ordinary personal intercourse of man with man.

This clear rational christian principle cannot, of course, however, set aside, in the conduct of life, the recognition of the actual vices—that is, the abnormal state—of human nature, which is forced upon us, *as a matter of fact*, in our daily experience. The clear law of self defence,—the highest law of our nature, next to the moral law of love,—requires us to exercise due prudence against imposition, on our confidence: but we have no right to set aside this presumption in any case, where the lack of confidence would infer a *penalty*, social or legal, except on evidence clear and strong enough, to acquit us at the bar of eternal justice, of causeless injury. *Charity*, is, therefore, the *deepest law of reason*, as well as the *highest law of the gospel*.

3. The same rational ground underlies, "*the presumption*" expressed in the maxim—popular, perhaps, rather than legal,—"possession is nine points of the law." The presumption is clear and strong, that occupancy would not be permitted, except *on the condition* of title. Allowed, and still more undisputed, occupancy, for a certian time, therefore, not only creates *a presumption* of title, but may be construed as a "sign," under the form of *negative testimony* of real and valid title. If a claimant should subsequently appear, the "burden of proof" would rest upon him, and failing to make good his rival claim, the title would clearly remain in the occupant, in default of any other evidence than the "*presumption*." The same principle applies, as in both the previous cases, that the presumption is in favor of what *actually exists*, and the "burden of proof" must therefore rest on the proposer of change: no matter whether the question

be regarded as one of fact, of opinion, of right, of justice, or of expediency.

The advantage of the *presumption*, in disputed cases, is very analogous to that of holding a fort, over that of taking it by storm. It may, indeed, be taken, but it requires vastly heavier metal to batter down strong walls, than to conquer men on equal terms.

Value of a presumption.

§ 4. The evil of overlooking the advantage of the presumption, is that it may expose one to the disadvantage of attempting to prove a negative;—always a difficult and often an impossible thing. To prove one's innocence, e. g. in case of a criminal charge, except in the way of proving *an alibi*,—which is not proving a negative,—infers scarcely less than omniscience and omnipresence; and the result may be a very weak argument, instead of a triumphant defence.

SEC. II. *Shifting the presumption and burden of proof.*

§ 1. It should be borne in mind that when argument is once joined on the merits of a question, all presumption ceases to be of force or value, till the argument is concluded, or it is shifted to the other side, until such argument is refuted. If the argument has failed to establish any positive conclusion, counter to the original presumption, then the presumption returns in its full force, and determines the question as in the first instance.

A presumption not a probability.

§ 2. It should be borne in mind, farther, that a *presumption* does not necessarily infer a *probability*, in regard to the merits of the question. To treat it as such is to turn it to fallacious account. So far as the grounds of a presumption are in the nature of an argument at all, they cease to carry that force, when the argument comes to be joined on the merits of the question. A mere

presumption,—we repeat,—never involves a probability of the truth or falsehood of a conclusion, so far as the merits of the original question are concerned; and it is always a fallacy, so to represent it.

For instance, the presumption is always, as we have seen, against a paradoxical opinion and in favor of an established institution. To suppose that this creates a *probability* against the truth of the one, or the wisdom of a change, in the other case, is to lay an arrest upon human progress. Improvement implies change as well as deterioration; and to propose change, is simply to open the question as to the wisdom of the change proposed;—which is the very subject matter in debate. In the case of paradox, it is well known that the world is full of it. Paradox has been said to be the highest form of truth: and certain it is, that the higher the truth the more likely it is to fall into the form of paradox to us. The union of mind and matter,—the telegraph,—force acting where there is no evidence of its presence,—and above all, in the sphere of moral and spiritual truth, christianity is made up of paradoxes:—God angry with sin, yet loving the sinner,—infinitely just, yet justifying the guilty,—God in human form the greatest paradox conceivable by man,—one or all together, not only form no real argument against the truth of christianity, but do not even constitute a *difficulty* in the way of its reception. In the nature of the case we could not expect it to be otherwise.

Examples of paradox.

§ 3. The presumption, so far as it rests on, or is in the nature of, an argument, may be refuted, like any other argument; in which case it ceases to carry a presumption any longer. For example: in the great argument, on the truth of the christian doctrines, the presumption, on their first publication, lay *against them*, on the ground of their *paradoxical character*. This presumption might have been refuted, so as to weaken or destroy its force,—on the ground of analogy: i. e. by quoting other paradoxes of the same character, and, in the circumstances, equally great, which yet proved to be true. 2. The anterior probability argument, may also avail for the same purpose; so far as the nature of the truth, in high contrast with the low and limited char-

Presumption how rebutted.

acter of the human faculties, would lead one to expect paradoxes, in such a sphere of argument.

Counter presumption.

§ 4. The presumption may often be *shifted* to the other side of the question, by establishing a counter presumption, in the nature of a still higher paradox, or even an impossibility. For example,—since christianity has established itself in the convictions of the civilized and cultivated world, over the prejudices and to the satisfaction of the deepest necessities of the human spirit, the presumption has been shifted to the other side of the argument. Though once a stumbling block to the Jew, and folly to the Greek, it is now become the faith of the cultivated world, by its power and effects; and has thus ceased to be a paradox. And even to those to whom it is still a paradox, the presumption against it, *on this ground*, is *overbalanced* by the *still higher presumption in its favor*, on the ground that it could not have produced such effects, if its power and truth had not been divine.* To refute and neutralize this presumption in its favor, it will be necessary for the opponent of christianity to show that its truth is not the only condition upon which that effect, viz. its general spread and influence, could take place:—not necessarily to show how it actually did take place, but how it *might* have taken place. If a house *might* have taken fire *accidentally*, there is no longer a presumption, on that ground, that a servant set it on fire: though a presumption of that sort would instantly spring up, if there were no conceivable way by which such an accident could occur.

Conflicting presumptions.

§ 5. If there be, as there often are, conflicting presumptions, i. e. a presumption on both sides,—the presumption which shall finally prevail, may be arrived at, as in other doubtful cases, by a balance of probabilities, or a calculation of chances.

* A striking instance of this shifting of the presumption, may be seen in the argument of Paul at Ephesus. See Acts 19: 13, 20.

For example, in the case last supposed, there may be a presumption of intention and malice growing out of the difficulty of accounting for the fire: and there may be a presumption on the other side grounded on the good character of the servant; and between these counter presumptions, it may be impossible to decide absolutely; or otherwise than by weighing the comparative probabilities of the two cases, and making up a judgment, subject, of course, to responsible review, at the bar of justice. In the case of the christian argument, since its prevalence in the world, its acceptance, on the supposition of fraud or falsehood,—when compared with the alternate hypothesis, of its prevalence by reason of its divine truth and power,—would be far more of a paradox, than the greatest miracle conceivable on the christian hypothesis. Faith in such a result, would be infinitely more credulous, than faith in the divine origin and spiritual power of the gospel. The presumption is, therefore, rationally, shifted to the side of the christian argument.

Or suppose a church established by law, as in England, should claim the presumption on the ground of its being an existing institution, the presumption on this ground may be neutralized, 1, by showing cause for its establishment, other than its truth:—and 2, by putting forward the evils (whether incidental or inherent) in the institution in question;—as e. g. the natural and unavoidable infringement, on the rights of individual consciences, in the social penalties resulting from their free exercise. If these latter rights be conceded to be a fundamental divine gift, equally to every individual, simply as a man, then *the presumption*,—always, and everywhere in favor of the divine constitution, or normal order of things—is clearly against any established institution, in church or state, which militates against such fundamental right;—and unless a positive order or permit to infringe upon that right, sacred to God and the human spirit, can be shown; any established institution at war with it, may be held as treason to both; and sooner or later it will and must be resisted, accordingly. Clearly, therefore, the presumption is against it.

The presumption not necessarily an advantage.

§ 6. To complete the subject, it should be stated, farther, that it is not necessarily or always *an advantage*, to have the presumption on one's side in a debate. It may lead one to presume too far, or to take his premises for granted, without fully understanding their grounds, or being able to defend them well.

In the great christian argument, e. g. with the pre-

sumption on our side, we take for granted that the faith, in which we have been educated, and which furnishes the grounds of our argument, is well founded;—and when a wily opponent calls them into question, and starts sharp objections, we are liable to be the victim of his wily sophistry; and our ignorance of the real and full grounds on which our premises rest, exposes us to assault from unexpected quarters;—and then defeat on these, is liable to be construed as evidence of weakness. on *other* grounds as well.

Advantages of the presumption.

But this occasional and incidental disadvantage, is far more than made up, by the calm and quiet presumption on which we rest secure; while such partial breaches in our ramparts reveal weaknesses, which stimulate us to reconstruct and fortify, anew. It by no means follows, that a fortress is *worthless*, because a chance shot has told on some unprotected spot,—even though it should shatter a wall or dismount a gun. This is the worst. The attempt to turn the presumption against christianity on the ground that it meets the argument in the form of *objections*, and is therefore by implication the *weaker party*, is purely and wholly fallacious. The fact that christianity meets the argument in *the form of objections*, is the simple result of its being now the established opinion; and the opponent has, therefore, of necessity, the *burden* of *proof*. That it stands on the defensive, no more implies a presumption that it is the weaker party, than that a man is so, who is *defendant* in a law suit.

Apparent disadvantage of the presumption.

There is one other apparent disadvantage in standing purely on the defensive, and subject to attack from every quarter, without the liberty of assault in return. Controversialists well know, that "a fool may ask a question, which ten wise men cannot answer." A

man who is necessarily and exclusively on the defensive may easily be thrust into the position of holding opinions, involving not only difficulties, but difficulties which the farthest reach of the human intellect cannot fully resolve;—opinions against which unanswerable objections rest.

It may be a perfectly rational procedure, to hold fast to opinions against which even unanswerable difficulties lie; because, great as such difficulties may be, there may be far greater difficulties still, against the opposite, or contradictory opinions. And however false and apparently inconsistent it may be, to hold opinions against which unanswerable objections lie, we cannot rationally abandon such opinions, except where there are fewer difficulties on the other side of the question.

The difficulty of comprehending and reconciling the *paradoxes* of christianity is almost infinite: but it is more rational to believe, notwithstanding these difficulties, because the contradictory hypothesis,—requiring us to account for the effects of christianity, supposing it to be false,—is incomparably more incredible still. The one is incomprehensible to our intellectual capacity, the other is self-contradictory, and therefore wholly incredible to any intellectual capacity whatever. Before yielding to the pressure of objections we cannot answer, we should first inquire whether there are fewer difficulties on the opposite hypothesis. However apparently feeble our position may be, we should consent to hold it, until we find another, against which there lie fewer or less formidable difficulties. This course is the more rational, where there are but two possible hypotheses or grounds of belief or of action,—where one of two things must be true:—and however great the difficulties in the way of one of them may be, the difficulties in the way of the other are still greater, so as to be *insuperable*, and therefore the hypothesis involved, is wholly incredible.

CHAPTER VI.

Arrangement of Arguments.

§ 1. It was stated, when treating of the difference between the process in *instruction* and *conviction*,—due to the presence or absence of *prejudice*, in the mind addressed,—that the convincing power of argu-

ment, is not *absolute*, but *relative to the mind addressed*: and that this relation, renders certain kinds of proofs, or classes or arguments, especially appropriate, to the proof of certa n conclusions. This, again, determines, not only the class of arguments most effective for conviction, in those cases, but also, and for that reason, determines equally the most effective *order of arrangement*. for those arguments.

Comparative weight of arguments.

§ 2. To a mind entirely candid, a d open to conviction, not only do proofs and arguments come with greater weight on that account, but if addressed to a mind pre-occupied with a previous judgment, they often fail to supply any ground for conviction at all. Conviction, in such cases, is founded in reasons which owe their force, to the state of the mind addressed. Minds open to conviction, i. e.—without prejudice—wait only to see reasons for a judgment in order to be convinced. In that ca-e the two great sources of conviction, are 1, t e discovery of a cause for the event or phenomeno: in question; rendering the *a priori*, or antecedent probabili y class of arguments, the most effective to induce conviction:—and 2, *the authority* of parties in whose judgment we confide, as sufficient ground for belief;—in the absence of reasons for that belief, falling within our own cognizance. From the limited reach of our personal means of knowledge, the convictions accepted *on authority*, constitute, practically, by far the largest class of our beliefs, in all matters of opinion: and in regard to matters of fact, falling outside of the sphere of our own, necessarily limited, experience, the most obvious and available recourse left us, is to call in testimony, having cognizance of such facts.

In cases where the subject matter of conviction, lies beyond the reach of positive proof on either of these grounds,—a priori, authority, or testimony,—

the argument from example, more especially, if the example be familiar or admitted, will often suffice, to turn the scale of a doubtful conviction—and that in cases where the "example" is intended to illustrate or make clear an *a priori* principle, as in parables, fables, or fictitious examples, as well as in real examples; having proving force, by reason of their parallelism to some case already admitted.

Three questions about arrangement.

§ 3. In determining the order, or plan of an argumentative discourse, there are really three questions, which should come under consideration, viz: the question whether the argument as a whole, should precede the proposition, or the proposition precede the argument.

2. The second concerns the order of arranging the arguments, relatively to each other: and—

3. The third regards the place for the most effective disposition of whatever arguments may be demanded, in the *way of refutation.*

4. All these questions, however, involve essentially the same principles of arrangement; depending, 1 on the state of the mind addressed; and 2 on the nature of the arguments;—and especially as implicating the question of their mutual relations, and dependance on each other.

Order of the proposition and the proof.

§ 5. In regard to the *first* of the three questions, involved in the *arrangement* or plan of the discourse, viz. the question of the relative order of the proposition and the proof, the state of the mind addressed, will furnish such guiding principles as these. viz:

Natural order.

1. The natural order of discourse, i. e. the order most conducive to clearness, where there is no special objection to its adoption, is to state the proposition, or truth to be proved, *in advance*, and then proceed, in regular order, to investigate and array *the proofs.* When the mind addressed is

candid, and open to conviction, as,—e. g. in mathematical reasoning,—this order is not only natural and clear, but also the order most commonly pursued and most conducive to conviction. If, on the other hand, there is a liability to prejudice, or disturbing, blinding, passion, a different order may be better; with a view of securing a calmer and more impartial judgment.

§ 6. Prejudice may be excited 1. simply on the ground of novelty. We have seen before, that there is a ground in reason, for a presumption against a conclusion, merely on the score of paradox. It may therefore be unwise, in doubtful cases, to provoke even the slight *prejudice invoked* in a *presumption*.

Grounds of prejudice.

1 Paradox

2. A second subjective ground, which might prove damaging, if the proposition were put forward in advance, is the liability to provoke *indifference, on the ground of its insignificance*: and thus fail to elicit sufficient interest to ensure attention. This, for obvious reasons, is still more prejudicial to the effect of oratory in conviction, than the presumption against the truth of *paradox*. Indeed the tendency of paradox *to startle the attention*, may so far outweigh the presumption against its truth, as to render it wise, for an orator to avail himself of the novelty of a paradox, in awaking and stimulating the curiosity of the mind, addressed, rather than encounter the apathy and listlessness, consequent upon *indifference*, to an *insignificant* conclusion. Indeed *the advantage* of the paradox, as a stimulus to curiosity, may more than counter balance the disadvantage of *a prejudice*, even stronger than that due to a mere presumption against the truth of a paradox. It may even be best for an orator, to spice his discourse with something of the antagonism of hostile argument, or passion, rather than risk

Indifference.

Benefit of paradox.

an insipid dose of conviction, administered to the palate of indifference or disgust. No absolute rule can be laid down, for determining between such questions. It is the province of *skill*, *good sense*, and *experience*, on the part of the orator, to weigh the advantages of the one against the disadvantages of the other, and judge of their relative preponderance.

Arrangement with a view to clearness.

§ 7. In cases, therefore, where *mere clearness* is the great end sought, and there is no prejudice or passion to impede conviction, that end will be best secured by a direct enunciation of the proposition or truth to be proved, and then proceeding to array the arguments in their order. But where the enunciation of the proposition in advance, would tend to rouse prejudice or passion, a different order may be preferable, and even necessary, to induce conviction.

SECTION II.—*Order of the Proposition and the Proof —Three Methods of stating the proposition.*

§ 1. There are three several methods of stating the proposition, with a view of obviating the prejudice, liable to be excited by an obnoxious proposition, viz :

1. By producing the proofs first, and then deducing the proposition from them, inferentially, by way of conclusion, as flowing, necessarily, out of the argument. The speaker, by this means, obviates the prejudice of an unwelcome proposition, by assuming the character of an investigator. He thus disarms the prejudice of the mind addressed, by revealing the grounds of his conviction, and claiming nothing as proved, except in the immediate light of its own necessary proofs.

2. By the gradual statement of the proposition, only so far forth, as it is first proved :—instead of putting the entire proposition forward, in its full objectionable force, in advance of all argument. The

efficacy of this device, supposes the readiness of the mind addressed, to receive the conclusion, provided sufficient grounds for it, are first produced: and supposes, also, that the prejudice in question arises from the existence of a presumption against it, grounded on other than the proofs, which really underlie the true conclusion.

This is a common device in popular eloquence, where the proposition is commonly divided, into a series of resolutions; putting forth the principles involved in the conclusion, in divided form, and presenting the argument for each principle, *apart*, until the entire proposition becomes irresistable, as a *conclusion* or summing up of the series;—the ultimate bearing of the argument, not being fully seen, till its force has first become resistless.

3. The prejudice due to a counter presumption, or passion, may sometimes be happily circumvented, by stating the proposition clearly in advance, but waiving any expression of opinion on it, till the argument shall have been fairly canvassed.

It should be noted, however, that a debator may seem to be *replying fairly* to an argument, when he is only *stating* that argument *fairly*. Waiving the question of a reply, for the present, he proceeds to *assume*, that the argument is fairly disposed of; and then adroitly *forgets* to resume the refutation.

On the other hand, a sophistical device is sometime plausibly attempted, in refutation of this mode of argument, by representing the mere waiving of a question, as a giving up of the proposition, as if it were incapable of proof.

To avoid abuses of this description, the best remedy, is a clear, explicit statement of the real design of the orator, with a caution, or a protest if necessary, against any such abuse in the interest of sophistry.

Importance of the mode of statement.

The importance of a well considered mode of statement of the proposition, involving as it does the plan, or order of the discussion, is scarcely less influential, than the selection and marshalling of the arguments themselves,—and

indeed involves the latter,—in ensuring the conviction of the mind addressed.

Take, for example, the argument from miracles, in support of the evidences of christianity.

A miracle is defined to be a suspension of some law of nature.

Definition of a miracle.

The very definition raises a presumption against the belief of a miracle, making it not only improbable, but unnatural, and thus tending to raise the strongest possible presumption, against a conviction of the truth of christianity, instead of an argument in its favor. The clearer the miracle, the stronger the prejudice and the more difficult of credibility. It is impossible to conceive anything more *improbable*, and therefore more *incredible*, than the raising of a dead man to life without an object. If now we introduce a new element of belief, and define a miracle to be a suspension of some law of nature, *with the view of authenticating a divine revelation*; we shift the ground of our argument and now have only to establish *the necessity of such a revelation*, in order to rebut the presumption against miracles, and refute the prejudice against them on the score of their improbability, or unnaturalness. However improbable or incredible the raising of a dead man to life *without an object*, might be, yet to prove a divine revelation, it becomes highly probable; because it is the best, if not the only way to authenticate a divine mission. Till such a necessity is first made out, scarcely any argument can avail, against the *improbability* of a miracle: but when it is made out, and the presumption is thus rebutted, it becomes a simple question, for testimony to decide.

True and false miracles.

The question between a genuine and a false miracle,—between the raising of Lazarus, and the turning or tipping of tables.—resolves itself into a question touching the *form of the proposition*, as determined by *their respective objects*. The object of the one is insignificant and frivolous, and often attended by contradictory indications. It is impossible to yield up our convictions, to the truth of what is objectless and contradictory, or absurd, as well as a ai st universal experience. It would be irrational to do so. The object of the other, on the contrary, is to achieve the highest, and most commanding of all human results, and the most beneficent and necessary of all human objects.

On the other hand, it is easy to see how an opponent who has the choice of his proposition, and plan of argument, may argue fallaciously, mainly by the employment of a different order of argument like the following:

Fallacy due to arrangement.

1. Miracles are, confessedly, abstractly considered,—*improbable*.

2. The necessity of a divine revelation, is not sufficient to prove that such a one has been given.

3. Miracles being the most unnatural thing conceivable, are also the most incredible. In the light of all human experience, it is far more probable that testimony should be false, than that a miracle should be true. And besides it is, at the best, a case of testimony against testimony:—the testimony of universal human experience, against the testimony of a few selected, well intentioned, but enthusiastic devotees of the system, on behalf of which the highest of all conceivable human interests are staked.

SECTION III.—*Order of Arguments, relatively to each other.*

Two principles of arrangement.

There are two principles, or grounds, as we have seen, for the arrangement of arguments relatively to each other, viz: 1, the state of the mind addressed,—especially in reference to the question of its openness to conviction on the one hand, or the existence of prejudice on the other: and 2, the nature of the arguments, as implicating the question of their mutual dependence:—the combined force of a chain of argument, requiring us to give the priority to those, which are, in any way, *tributary* to the force of others, or are presupposed by them.

We have before seen, that the question of the presence or absence of prejudice in the mind addressed, will materially affect the class of arguments, most effective for conviction; and also the whole conduct and spirit, as well as the order of the arguments, most likely to induce conviction. The farther principle to which we now refer, regards, mainly, the comparative strength of the several arguments.

Climactic order.

If we regard this principle exclusively, the order most conducive to the conclusiveness of arguments, would be the climactic;—beginning with the weaker, and advancing constantly to the

stronger. The order, in this case, symbolizes the law of increasing force, and suggests the probability of the ulterior conclusiveness of the argument, in the aggregate, as a natural result of the law.

If the mind addressed, however, be preoccupied with prejudices, or if the first necessity be, to overcome a prejudice, and secure an impartial hearing, to put forward a feeble argument at the first, would be to foment prejudice, if not provoke contempt. And as it is essential to conviction, to secure a respectful, attentive, and as far as possible, a candid hearing, it is better to put forward *first* an argument of sufficient force, to command attention and respect; and then, if there are weaker arguments in confirmation, they will receive a juster consideration, and carry with them a truer force.

Disadvantage.

If the effect of this order should be, to exhaust the stronger arguments in support of a conclusion, and thus necessitate *an anti-climax*, in the arrangement,—naturally suggestive of a declining force in the array of arguments, and so leaving a prejudicial impression on the mind addressed,—it has been plausibly suggested that such impression might be avoided by a recapitulation of the arguments in the inverse order: the effect of which, of course, would be, to secure the double force of the strongest arguments, both first and last.

§ 2. But the order of arguments, determined by their *relative force*, is quite subordinate to the considerations of arrangement, springing out of the nature and dependance of the several classes, in relation to each other.

Order of dependance.

The following are the rules determined by a regard to this principle of arrangement, viz:

Rules for arrangement.

1. ***Intrinsic or analytic proofs, should take precedence of all others.***

It is in the nature of this method of proof, that it

contains an analysis and exposition of the terms of the proposition. Whatever may be the nature and class of the subsequent arguments, such an analysis and exposition cannot fail to be tributary, as well as introductory, to their augmented force.

2. A PRIORI *arguments, should take precedence of signs and examples.*

The ground of this rule, is also plain; viz.—that a priori arguments, in their nature, *tend to account for the conclusion*, and so tend to make it probable,—i. e, they assign a reason for the existence of the event in question, as well as a ground for our believing its existence. After we have thus seen the anterior probability of the event in question, other arguments going to prove its actual existence, as a matter of fact, come with far greater proving force. We believe intuitively,—i. e. by a law of our reason,—whatever is in accordance with nature. When we speak of anything as being unnatural, we mean that it is against nature; i. e. either 1 without any obvious causal agency;—or 2 *against* the settled law of the causal relation; and then the fundamental law of human thought, forbids us to believe it. So also, if we do not perceive a cause, or any evidence of the existence of a cause we call a thing *improbable*;—and while we may not absolutely refuse to believe, it yet requires far stronger evidence to ensure conviction, than if, in the *light of an a priori argument*, the event in question had been previously rendered probable.

Effect of a priori argument.

Even the most positive forms of proof, receive a great augmentation of force, by this means. In the case of a man charged with bribery or falsehood, e. g. one witness, after "an *a priori argument*, going to establish bad character, would be more convincing than many witnesses before,—and especially if there were evidences of previous good character. It meets the suspicion of mistake, always theoretically possible, by first calling into question the character of the criminal, and thus giving the full force of *unquestioned* testimony, *in confirmation* of the anterior probability of a bad man taking a bribe, or uttering a falsehood.

However positive the *sign*, in proof of an event, there is

always an advantage in *accounting for a thing* which is in evidence; because it *excludes the suspicion of mistake*,—and this, it is the nature of the *a priori* argument, to do. That argument, of itself, does not establish a conclusion, especially if the subject matter of the conclusion is only moral or probable truth: but it commands attention to the other forms of proof: and these, coming after, are in the nature of *concurrent proof*, and hence their force is greatly augmented.

Arrangement of argument from example.

§ 3. In the case of argument from example, there are three possible sources of doubt: 1 as to the truth of the example as a matter of fact. 2, as to the truth of the analogy between the two cases:—or in other words *if true*, might not the case argued from, be the *exception*, and not *the law*; and 3, if the cause or law be ascertained, is it certainly *unimpeded*, and in force, in the case argued to. The value of the argument from example, lies in proving that the cause or law *is actual* and *operative*, as well as *in the nature of a true cause*. Hence the augmented force in conviction, of blending an "a priori" argument, with an example in illustration and proof of these several questions.

Difference between explaining and proving.

At the same time it is important to state clearly the purpose, for which the analogy or example is employed, in such a case: because a very *sufficient explanation*, if the event were admitted, is often a very weak argument, where the fact is yet unproved. Men sometimes fallaciously, and sometimes ignorantly, suppose themselves to be proving a conclusion, when they are only *explaining* that conclusion, supposing it to be already sufficiently in evidence.

Arrangement of testimony and example.

§ 4. If, besides "a priori" argument, there should be testimony and example both, the natural order of *the example*, would be *after both* the other forms of argument; because it is only in the nature of concurrent confirmation. As such, it has often great and even conclusive force;

but without the other proofs preceding, it has little or none.

At the trial of a woman on the charge of having murdered her husband, the attorney-general for the commonwealth, asked the jury for her conviction,—among other grounds—1, because she had an interest in his death as the legal heir to his estate, under the allegation set up, that she was his widow, as the result of a clandestine marriage. 2. On the ground of circumstantial and negative testimony, going to convict her of *complicity* with another party, having with her, a *joint interest* in his death. 3. The attempt was made to show that she had poisoned her former husband, for a consideration, less than one sixth part as great as the pecuniary interest at stake, in the present case. For reasons implied in what has been already said, the most forcible arrangement of these arguments would place, *first*, the *a priori argument*, going to prove a sufficient interest in the death of the victim: 2, whatever *testimony* was available, in confirmation of the murder as a matter of fact, and the complicity of parties having a joint interest in the murder; and 3 the *example*, of a previous murder for similar, but far less inducement;—as going to show that the cause alleged in the a priori argument was a true, sufficient and unimpeded cause, from which, by a settled law of intuitive belief, we cannot but expect a similar result, *a fortiori*, from the operation of similar but stronger causes.

The value of the concurrent confirmation of "*the example*," lies in resolving any doubt as to the reality, and efficiency, of the *cause*, and especially in proving that the ordinary impediments of conscience, and the fear of consequences, were not sufficient to hinder the natural effect from flowing, from the causes tending to produce them. This was proved by the effect actually following from the cause, in the former case.

CHAPTER VII.

Refutation.

§ 1. The remaining question, under the head of arrangement, regards the most effective disposition of arguments *designed for refutation*.

§ 2. The necessity for *refutation* grows out of that law of the rational mind, which forbids the simultaneous acceptance of contradictory propositions. So long, therefore, as one judgment holds possession of the mind, it is impossible to induce a contradictory or incompatible one: and hence, in such a case, the necessity of *refutation*, prior to conviction. As the necessity of refutation supposes an adverse judgment, and that, again, supposes adverse arguments or proofs, the natural place for the refutation of such arguments, would seem to be, at the commencement of the opposing argument.

Necessity of refutation.

But as we have seen before,—in the question of the arrangement of the proposition with reference to the argument, as well as in the question of the arrangement of the arguments with reference to each other—there is a *subjective* ground, which goes to modify the question of the order most effective for the purpose. And this is even more true in the case of refutation, than we have found it, in the case of direct *argument*.

§ 3. We have seen before, that there may be not only plausible, but *valid* arguments, on both sides of a question. It is not, therefore, every *plausible*, nor even every *valid* argument, that demands a refutation. It is only such arguments as are in the nature of objections—i. e. such as are incompatible with,—the acceptance of the conclusion, which the speaker is aiming to establish, which it is worth while to refute, at all. If the opposing argument is not incompatible with the conviction of the mind addressed; or, if the speaker can rely upon his own argument to carry conviction to the mind addressed, despite the force of the opposing argument, it is unnecessary, and may be unwise, to call attention, or give consequence, to that argument, by any formal refutation, and especially at the

Refutation when unnecessary.

commencement of the discourse. It often happens that the result of such formal refutation, is to augment, by its seeming inadequacy, in the judgment of the mind addressed, the force of the objections sought to be refuted: and which would otherwise, perhaps, have yielded, to the greater force of the direct argument alone.

Place for refutation.

§ 4. But supposing a formal refutation to be deemed advisable or even necessary, it may still be inexpedient to give it so much *prominence*, as to place it in the forefront of the direct argument. The general principle in the arrangement of the refutation, is to place it where it will be most *efficient* in allaying prejudice, and getting a candid hearing for your argument; and at the same time, give it the least apparent consequence. This may sometimes require it to be placed at the beginning, by way of anticipation; sometimes at the end, by way of confirmation.

Too earnest refutation.

The earnestness of refutation, especially if it betrays a want of candor in the handling, may have something of the effect of the negative testimony of adversaries, and is liable to be construed, as an unwilling expression of opinion, that the argument in opposition is so formidable, as to demand a desperate, or even a dishonest resort, in order to its refutation. And besides, there is nothing more unfriendly to conviction or persuasion, than an appearance, or even a suspicion, of unfairness.

Advantage of early refutation.

But on the other hand, where you can anticipate an opponent's arguments, it often has an annihilating effect, to refute them beforehand. It is like taking bread out a hungry man's mouth, and filling it with stones. An argument which might have seemed imposing, makes a sorry figure, when it comes halting along, after you have fairly cut his sinews. And besides, especially

where the objections lie outside of your contemplated course of argument, and are liable to prejudice the hearing of it, they should be answered at the commencement; taking merely the precaution, to reserve if possible, a conclusive view of your case for the close; or else to recapitulate the direct argument already put.

When to be postponed.

If, however, the direct argument runs parallel with, or crosses the track of the argument in opposition, it may be best to postpone the refutation, and to meet the objections as they come up for direct discussion; unless the effect of the delay is deemed too prejudicial. The settlement of such questions must be left largely to the skill and discretion of the orator; depending, as they do, on circumstances, which vary indefinitely in experience; and for which, therefore, no absolute, or invariable rules can be given.

Section II.—*Methods of Refutation.*

Two modes of refutation.

§ 1. There are two methods of refutation:—the *direct*, and the *indirect*.

Rationale of direct refutation.

§ 2. Direct refutation, consists in answering the arguments on which a conclusion rests. As the validity of all argument rests on 1, the truth of both the premises, and 2, the correctness of the logic involved in its construction, it is obvious that an argument may also be directly refuted in two ways:—viz. 1 by disproving either of the premises, or 2—granting the truth of the premises,—by exposing the unsoundness of its logic: or,—in other words,—granting the truth of the premises, and then showing that from some logical fault, in the argument, the conclusion does not follow. As the premises of argument rest ultimately, upon either self evident or intuitive truths,

Two modes of refutation.

Two methods of direct refutation.

or facts in evidence, it is clear that they may be called in question, in reference to either of these grounds: and farther, that this may be done either by direct, or indirect reasoning:—i. e. either, by showing *directly*, that one or other of the premises is at fault, in either of these ways; or, *indirectly*, by proving its contradictory. This may be done by showing that, if true, it would lead to a conclusion that is either absurd, or one not admitted by the opposing party. No matter what the mode of argument adopted may be, if its object is to call in question either of the premises, it classes with direct refutation.

It should be noted that if one premiss of an argument be false, the conclusion is necessarily invalid; while if both premises be false, the conclusion may yet be true: because it is conceivable that the fault of one premiss may be corrected by a corresponding fault of the other, so that while the argument is faulty, the conclusion may, nevertheless, be true.

Second method of direct refutation.

§ 3. But 2, besides the direct refutation of an argument, *by the overthrow of one of its premises*,—whether by direct or indirect reasoning,—an argument may also be refuted, *directly*, by denying the logical character of the reasoning: i. e. by denying its conformity with the rational laws of the human mind in thought.

It deserves to be remarked, however, than an opponent is sometimes, really, objecting to the premiss of an argument, when he seems to be finding fault with its logic. If, for example, an opponent says,—I admit your *principle*, but deny that your conclusion follows,—it will commonly be found, that he is objecting, —not as it might seem to the logic of the argument,—but either to the minor premiss; or to the suppressed premiss of an enthymeme. The word *principle*, is popularly used to denote the major premiss of a syllogism.

Indirect refutation.

§ 4. The second method of refutation—the indirect—consists *in establishing the contradictory* to the conclusion to be refuted. There are cases where one cannot impeach either the prem-

ises or the logic of an argument, directly, because he has no counter proof, directly to the point. If, however, he should have it in his power to make out some other conclusion, which is contradictory or incompatible with the conclusion in question, the refutation is equally complete; because contradictory propositions cannot both be true.

Its rationale.

The proof of an *alibi*,—e. g. as we have already had occasion to say,—may be as complete a refutation, as the most direct testimony could make it.

§ 5. The value of this mode of refutation lies in the fact that it subserves its purpose, where from ignorance, or accidental difficulty in obtaining proof, no other form of refutation is practicable.

Its value.

The indirect mode of reasoning,—consisting in the proof of a contradictory proposition,—may, as we have seen already,—be used to overthrow a premiss:—thus rendering it, however, a case of *direct refutation*, by means of *indirect reasoning*. It is only when it is applied to the overthrow of *the conclusion*, that it constitutes *indirect refutation*. When applied to the premiss of an argument, this form of refutation consists,—in common, parlance,—in showing that *the argument proves too much*:—i. e. it proves that the refuted premiss, would, if true, prove something else, which is either absurd, or not admitted by the other party, to the debate.

§ 6. There are also, however, *two forms* of *indirect refutation*,—refutation of the conclusion by proving its contradictory—which are very different in their effects;—according as the refutation is *serious*, or *ironical:* each of these forms having advantages and disadvantages peculiar to itself.

Two modes of indirect refutation.

§ 7. In the first place, *a conclusion*, as well as *a premiss*,—as we have already seen—may be refuted:

by showing that if true, it would lead, equally and by the same logic, to some analogous conclusion, directly in conflict with the known convictions of the opponent, or the audience. There is no kind of argument which so confounds a man, as that which the logicians call, the argument "*ad hominem.*" It is not only a refutation, but a refutation *out of his own mouth*. It makes him either ignorant, or dishonest.

Advantages of indirect refutation when serious.

The chief advantages of this method are 1, that the falsity of the conclusion is made more palpable; especially to *illogical* minds. It requires some culture to enable an audience to apprehend the logical fallacy of false reasoning: but every one, even without such training, may be led to reject a conclusion as absurd, or contradictory to his own convictions, even though he may not see the *faults of its logic.*

2. It damages the opponent, as well as refutes, the argument; by showing him to be unworthy of *confidence, as a logician*, although the audience may not have logical knowledge enough, to detect the ground of the fallacy.

Dangers.

The chief danger, in the use of this mode of refutation, is, that it may induce a suspicion of unfairness, just because of its damaging force. An audience may *suspect* unfairness, even though they may not be able to *detect* it. The danger is all the greater, in proportion to their regard for, and confidence in, the refuted party. What is made to seem absurd to them, they cannot believe can be fair, to a respectable opponent.

Indirect refutation when ironical.

§ 8. But, in the second place, this mode of refutation, may be rendered *ironical*, if, instead of holding the analogous conclusion, which the same principles would establish to be absurd, and seriously rejecting it, an orator or author, should professes to *accept* the *absurd conclusion*, and, on the strength of it, go on to prove the

facts of history or the phenomena of nature, to be other than they are.

§ 9. The peculiar advantages of this form of refutation, are 1, that it turns the refuted argument into a jest,—a piece of sophistry got up, seemingly, in sport. 2. It makes the refuted argument not only absurd, but ridiculous: and thus confounds the opponent, as well as refutes his arguments.

Advantrges of ironical refutation.

§ 10. But on the other hand, the dangers are, 1, that the refutation is liable to be regarded, as a mere "*jeu d'esprit*," or a joke; instead of a conclusive refutation. 2. If it should be very complete, it may even be accepted and believed as serious, instead of being regarded as bald and grotesque absurdity.* 3. The conclusions, if thus accepted as true, may be turned to the account of effective argument in favor, instead of redounding, as ridicule, to the discredit, of the refuted party.

Disadvantages and dangers of irony.

The names of parties, e. g.—whether in the political or religious world, have, nearly all of them originated, in this sort of ironical sarcasm: and have been first accepted as descriptive and characteristic of the party, and then, afterwards, they become arguments for the faith and adhesion of its members. It cannot be doubted that the words "democrat," "whig," "liberal," "conservative," "unitarian," "methodist," &c., have been mighty arguments in determining the convictions of millions; though originally given in sarcastic scorn, as a species of *reductio ad absurdum*. In order to adhere at all, nick-names must always be descriptive:† and then these descriptive nick-names, growing out of the very peculiarities which gave them birth and power in society, become

The philosophy of nick-names.

* Perhaps one of the most ingenious specimens of this form of refutation, ever constructed, is a pamphlet, by Archbishop Whately, professing to disprove the historical existence of Napoleon, on the principles employed by the Deists, to disprove the life and miracles of Christ. It is said, that the author was often congratulated on his success, in ridding the world of the extraordinary hallucination, growing out of a mere mythical personage.

† Hence College nick-names,—commonly descriptive of some salient point of character,—are apt, like an apothecary's label, to adhere as long as the jar lasts, to which they are affixed.

arguments for the vital adhesion of others, as well as the original members of the party.

4. This form of refutation applied to sacred things, is liable to hurt the feelings of serious people, by its merciless,—however just,—exposure of the absurdity of the conclusions held up to ridicule; while yet they may be held by persons deserving of respect for their goodness. This is sometimes a serious grievance, and scandal; because, unfortunately, "good men are not always wise."

Dangers of irony.

§ 11. Indirect refutation—the proof of the contradictory,—is the most conclusive form of refutation; though the direct,—consisting in a refutation of a conclusion by refuting the arguments,—is by far the most common, and is popularly regarded as the normal, if not the *only* legitimate refutation.

Conclusiveness of indirect refutation.

Section III—*Fallacious Refutation.*

§ 1. Perhaps the most common form of fallacious refutation, consists in assuming one or other of two things to have been necessary, and refuting the argument against one, by setting it in favorable contrast with the other.

Fallacies in refutation.

A Frenchman, e. g. meets the argument against the election of Louis Napoleon, and even glories in the absolutism of the empire, by reason of the resulting peace and order, so necessary to the material and industrial prosperity of France. A man assailed for a vice of character, in his person or his country, refutes the charge, with all complacency, by claiming credit for a corresponding and overruling virtue. The reply to such fallacious refutation may be put into the language of the Savior—"These ought ye to have done, and not have left the other undone."

2. Another fallacy, to be guarded against, in the use of refutation, lies in the assumption, that a refutation of the arguments supporting a conclusion, is necessarily a refutation of the conclusion.

The true force of a refutation consists in setting aside the *arguments refuted:* except so far as there is fair ground for the pre-

True force of a refutation.

sumption, that the conclusion itself has no other ground than the arguments alleged in its support:—an implication seldom warranted in fact, and never valid in theory.

The refutation e. g. of the "a priori argument" in proof of the probable occurrence of an equinoctial storm, does not disprove the probable occurrence of a storm at that period, *grounded on the ordinary experience of men*:—nor does the refutation of the maxim that "honesty is the best policy," set aside the true argument in behalf of honesty, in the view of a man of high religious principles. At the same time it may be fairly presumed, in all ordinary cases, that a man's convictions rest on the true, as well as the strongest existing arguments: and the refutation of those arguments, would, in that case, rationally carry with it a refutation of the conclusion also.

Most satisfactory refutation.

§ 14. A refutation is most complete, when you are able, not only to prove that the opposing argument is erroneous, but also to show how the error originated. There is a peculiar satisfaction in this; because it clears away every ground for lurking suspicion, that after all there may be some mistake. It is like not only finding stolen goods upon the person of a thief, but tracking him in every step, from the spot where he stole them.

PART II.—PERSUASION.

CHAPTER I.

Analysis of the Process.

§ 1. We have already defined the distinction between conviction and persuasion*:—the former being an effect upon the understanding, the latter an effect upon the will. We have also seen that persuasion may contemplate two distinct results: the first, a *per-*

* See ch. I, § 1, p. 2.

manent effect on the will or character: and the second only a *temporary* influence, in determining the acts or conduct of the parties addressed. In either case, and in all its applications, *persuasion* is, *the art of influencing the will.*

Persuasion ethical.

We thus find ourselves in the domain of ethics†: both because the process contemplated is designed to effect a change of character or conduct, and because the agents of that change are *the active principles and powers*, involving of necessity, questions of the affections and the will;—i. e. questions of right and wrong. Besides its ethical or moral character, persuasion differs from philosophy and literature in having an outward end, viz:—an effect upon the character or conduct of men;—and which, therefore, for that reason also, gives moral character to its processes.

While persuasion is thus clearly distinguishable from conviction, in theory, it is not less distinct in experience and fact.

Relation of conviction to persuasion.

§ 2. While the understanding in conviction, holds an intimate relation to the will in persuasion, it is yet notorious, that men often fail, or refuse to act, when convinced: and, on the other hand, *do* act, *without*, and even *against* their convictions. It is true, however, notwithstanding, that men are *moral*, as well as rational beings, and though damaged in his moral nature, and so rendered abnormal in his grounds of action, man possesses still, a *moral* constitution, and acts on moral grounds. It is not meant of course that he always acts *right*:—that would suppose him to be not only a *moral*, but a *holy*, being. Men are moral beings in the sense of *acting freely*, and *of choice*, and in *view of motives*, springing out of

Persuasion in what sense moral.

† See Eloquence a Virtue: or Outlines of a Systematic Rhetoric, by Dr. Francis Theremin, translated by W. G. T. Shedd.

their moral nature, and subject therefore to influence, from the moral character of men. The will of men is, therefore, under the dominion of their moral sentiments: and is good or bad according as those sentiments,—i. e. their character,—is good or bad. To control the will, is one end of conviction: and so far as conviction has control of the will either as regards its temporary or permanent —its transient or static—condition, it falls within the domain of rhetoric, to determine, 1, *the laws* which rule in the process of persuasion; and 2, to determine the *art*;—i. e. principles,—*or rules*, applicable, in given circumstances, to the art of rhetoric, in persuasion.

Rhetoric a moral art.

§ 3. In the psychological analysis of persuasion, there are two conditions presupposed in the control of the will: viz 1, that the end proposed as the ground or motive of the action, should be *desirable*:—and 2 that the *means* proposed for its attainment, should seem to be *conducive to the end.*

Conditions necessary to persuasion.

In the exposition of the moral power of motives, it is not unusual to say that the first requisite, is, that the end must seem to be a "*good*," in order to become a *motive*. But in the abnormal state of human nature, it is notorious, that it is not the quality of *goodness*, even as determined by the perverted judgments of the *depraved moral nature*, that moves the will to its attainment, but some aspect of it *simply as desirable*,—i. e. the stimulus of *pleasure*, in some shape, even though fleeting, and brief, and sensual, sways the will, despite of, and even counter to, the clearest convictions of the judgment, as to the ulterior or real character and value of the object as "a good."

Nature and power of motives.

Pleasure a motive.

If, therefore, we adopt the idea of *goodness* as entering into the constitution of a motive to the will, in persuasion, we must

at once define the term to mean,—*not* that which even in the judgment of the mind itself, is really and in the end a *good*; but a good, relatively to the state of the party at the time:—i. e. *an object of desire*,—for whatever reason,—at the moment of the action. And the impulse which prompts to such desire, is commonly, some aspect of the thing, as *pleasurable:* or else some *passion* that transports the soul out of its own ordinary grounds of action,—called for that reason a *rapture*.

In what senses a motive is a good.

§ 4. The good,—in this defined sense, and in its relations, as a motive to the will,—may take on three distinct forms viz. 1, the sense of *expedient*,—i. e. desirable or pleasant:—2 *right*,—i. e. *something more than expedient* as a motive, and the contrary of which would be wrong:—3, obligatory. To these three grounds of action or of conduct, correspond the three departments of the moral sentiments, constituting three ascending grades, or spheres of the moral life of men:—viz 1, happiness, 2, virtue, 3, duty. A farther relation,—not perhaps rigorously accurate, but near enough to help our conceptions in defining to ourselves, the nature and process of persuasion,— may be found in the threefold sphere of oratory, as dealing with men, 1, in the sphere of their individual activity;—2, in their domestic or social life;—3, in their civil or ecclesiastical relations. The ultimate and distinctive appeal in each of these three cases would be, 1, the determination or conviction of truth, by argument or demonstration:—2, authority i. e. the subjective law of reason or conscience; as interpreted by either self, or others:—and 3, divine authority, extant for us, in the way of ultimate appeal, only in the form of a written revelation,—in the scriptures.

The threefold sphere of eloquence.

Three grounds of appeal in eloquence.

In this complex constitution of a motive,—as comprising 1, a sentiment or desire, and 2, a conviction of the feasibility of its at-

Constitution of a motive.

tainment by the course of action sought to be initiated by it,—the latter being matter of conviction, depends essentially on argument: the former is due to a process, comprehensively denominated *exhortation*.

§ 5. This explains to us, the precise grounds and nature, of the relation of conviction to persuasion; viz. that of showing, to the conviction of the mind addressed, that the means recommended in *persuasion* lead to the *attainment of the end*.

Truth not a motive.

The object of argument, in conviction, is truth: but however firm the conviction of truth, it is manifestly not in the nature of a *motive*, until it has first stirred some emotion, or active principle, in the mind of the hearers, and then set it into relation with the object, in *persuasion*.

Emotion a motive.

§ 6. The common popular impression that a wise man should be governed by his convictions, and not his passions, is true in the sense intended by it, and is therefore not so much an error, as a misuse or confusion of terms. The passions in the generic sense of the word,—i. e. as descriptive of the emotional and active principles of our nature,—are the normal motors of the will. To raise a question about using them, is like raising a question about using one's limbs. To decry the use of them, because it is sometimes done wrongly, is like decrying the legitimate use of the limbs; because they are sometimes used to run away from duty. To induce action—i. e. to move the will—the orator must bring some end into view, adapted to secure attention. The end of an action, *apprehended, as desirable*, is its only motive. And the motive itself, is always some element of our *active being, in the nature of a power*, in relation to the will;—an appetite, emotion, passion, or desire.

The use of the passions a necessity.

To suppose an action *without an end*,—in the actual constitu-

tion of a free, rational, human being,—is to suppose an effect without a cause. In other words, to suppose a man to act without a motive, is to suppose him to act irrationally. To suppose him to act without a good motive, or not to act when there is a good and sufficient motive, is to suppose him to be a bad man; or at least, morally, a *blind* man,—i. e. incapable of perceiving the force of a good motive or end. And to suppose a man to act towards an evil, or *injurious* end, *knowingly*, is to suppose him to be *a fool*. Accordingly, the bible invariably calls wicked men, *fools;* and sin, is, in the scriptures,—and rightly so,—synonomous with folly: because all sin is injurious, and is therefore an act to a bad end.

§ 7. Among the conditions necessary to give power to an end, as a motive to action, as we have already seen, is the conviction, that it is attainable, by the course of action, to which it is a motive. And this, as we have also seen, is the contribution made by *argument*, to the result sought to be attained *in persuasion*. However desirable, in theory, the end might be, it fails to reach the will, as a motive to action, so long as the end is felt to be beyond our reach.

Argument how tributary to persuasion.

However desirable it might seem to be, to fly, instead of walking, *the desire* is not in the nature of a motive, unless by apparatus, suitable and safe, a man is first convinced, that it is feasible. However strong the desire, which might prompt a man to a course of conduct, whether in morals or religion, its power as a *motive*, is destroyed, and the sinews of the will are effectually cut, in proportion as the conviction of hopeless impotence practically holds sway. It is precisely on this ground, that the activity of a true spiritual religious life, even to a man deeply convinced of its value and necessity, invariably comes to nothing; until the promise and gift of a divine power, supervenes, upon the deep consciousness of utter human impotence; transforming the *wish*, into a *will*. And while the lofty and renewed character of the spiritual life, is the greatest ground of discouragement, in the way of its attainment: yet, that grace which supplies a *divine* power, equal to its exigencies, and always in his offer, is yet the final and only ground, on which the *human will*, is ever led to take the gracious step. Conviction is therefore the first step towards persuasion.

§ 8. But farther, it is clear that the desire for an

end, however sincere, added to the conviction of its feasibility, will not necessarily lead to action:—1, because it may not be *strong enough* to overcome *the obstacles* in the way of the effort required to attain the end, even though it may be attainable:—2, because the desire for the end, notwithstanding the conviction of its feasibility, may conflict with some stronger desire:—which is, rather, perhaps, the *same thing*, in *another point of view*. A thing may *cost too much*, without being wholly beyond our means.

Inadequacy of motives.

This condition is very often verified in experience. Brutus, in his defence against the argument of Antony, says: "Not that I loved Cæsar less, but that I loved Rome more." So in the gravest features of human life, the great impediment in the way of right action is, not so much, *the lack of right convictions*, and desires, as *the power of conflicting* motives. The instincts of the human spirit, lead men to desire *eternal life*: but the counter tendencies arising from "the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eyes, and the pride of life, which is not of the father, but is of the world," are too strong to allow any motive in persuasion, to carry the will, except to temporary and superficial ends in the spiritual life: and always stopping short of that permanent, radical, and static *change of character and will*, necessary to constitute the source of a true spiritual life, until the affections and active powers of the soul, have been transformed in a renewed nature, described as a new spiritual birth, and effected by a divine spiritual power.

Grounds of inadequacy in religion.

§ 9. To meet a case like that, the appropriate and only resort, is the rhetorical process, vaguely, but sufficiently described, by the term *exhortation:*—an appeal, in some form, to the passions.

Exhortation.

This process, in its essential nature, consists in bringing clearly into view, the object or end, adapted to excite the requisite emotion.

What it consists in.

The human passions rise instinctively, and only, in the view of their appropriate objects: or by filling the mind with thoughts

and conceptions of those objects. Any form of exhortation is powerless to excite the passions, which does not bring a justifying object into view. The attempt to stir the emotions, by appeals, to the understanding, designed to prove, by argument, the propriety of such emotions,—the employment of the formulas of exhortation, and still more a querulous, objurgatory, censorious, or reproachful tone, are not only ineffectual to excite emotion, but have no tendency in that direction. The emotions either continue in their wonted slumbers, or rouse themselves only to laugh to scorn, the attempt to storm them into passions.

In effective exhortation.

But lift up before them an *object*, or an end, adapted by the instinctive laws of the human passions to excite them, and the result will be proportionate to the clearness, vividness and continuance, with which the orator succeeds in filling the mind with thoughts of the exciting object.

Rationale of exhortation.

The speech of Mark Anthony in Shakspear's Julius Cæsar, (act iii, scene 2) from its opening words,—

"Friends, Romans, countrymen, lend me your ears,"

to the closing passage,

"Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue
"In every wound of Cæsar, that should move
"The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny."—

would better repay the student of the art of eloquence, for making it a study, than any analysis, or psychological exposition of the laws of thought, and expression, in the rise, control, and culmination, of excitation, exhortation, or persuasion.

§ 10. We have seen before, that the popular distrust, with which the emotional or impassioned character of true eloquence is instinct, is founded in confused notions, of the psychology of eloquence. The distrust, it must be admitted, however, is so general, as to raise a fair presumption, that it is, practically, well founded: or, at least demands a satisfactory explanation of its general prevalence. That the distrust, of impassioned discourse, is *a prejudice*, and the employment of it, in proper ways, and at proper times, *a necessity*, to

Popular distrust of impassioned appeals.

the higher ends of eloquence, especially in persuasion, appears in any just or adequate apprehension of its psychology.

Grounds of this distrust.

The grounds of the distrust, may perhaps be found sufficiently; 1, in the indirect and often covert, nature, of the approaches, by which emotion gains its access to the will. Formal appeals to the passions, or even the avowal, in advance, of such a purpose, tends only to defeat that purpose. The march which is to effect a successful lodgment, especially in a hostile camp, must be a stolen march. To give notice of an approach is to provoke defence, if not active resistance.

Excited passions a weakness.

2. The emotional nature of man, is guarded with very great jealousy, and any imputation of weakness on that ground, is more resented, than an imputation directed against his understanding. The one invades the sphere of intellect only, the other, that of morals also. And in proportion to our estimate of the value of the treasure, will be the vigilance and jealousy of the watch kept over it. Any tampering with the passions will, therefore, be guarded against, with suspicion, if not resentment.

3. Approaches to the passions, are held to be *suspicious*, because of the *difficulty of their control*. Emotional excitement is proverbially liable to run into excess. The normal and healthful flow of the pulse, is, in our experience, always liable to rise in such a case, to an abnormal and fevered heat. We dread the wholesome or even necessary, *tonics*, and still more *the stimulants* of the moral life, lest they should produce the uncontrolable excesses of disease.

Liability to wrong excitement.

4. We distrust appeals to our passions because experience assures us of the danger not only of *excitement in excess*, but also of false and groundless passions, carrying us to wrong and dangerous extremes. Men know, by bitter knowledge, that they cannot trust themselves, for the wisdom of their acts, under mere excitement; and still less, under the misguided passions and promptings of false motives. Moreover they know, that they cannot trust themselves, while under passion, to determine the wisdom of their means or weigh the real worth of their motives. This lack of confidence in themselves during their heated moments, throws its distrust, over actions proceeding from motives, of other than the lowest forms of excitement, or emotion: and even then, unless the intuitive convictions of the reason and the conscience, are in calm and full mastery of the mind.

§ 11. The only question, under this psychological analysis of motives, which really admits of debate, is whether the orator may stir *bad passions*, or seize upon them when excited, to accomplish *good ends*. Does the end, in persuasion, in so far as it is a good end, supply a law for its own conduct, ruled by the single consideration, of *the means most likely to attain the end*, irrespective of the degree and nature of the passions which may serve as motives to that end? May an advocate, e. g. persuade a jury to acquit a criminal, *from pity*, a sense of *hardship to his helpless family*, or in a case where it might seem really *better even for the public*, that he should be acquitted?

May bad passions be stirred for good ends.

The enlistment of essentially wicked passions, even to secure a good end, is too palpably a wrong procedure, to be likely to find deliberate abettors; but where the affections serving as *motives*, are good, as well as the *end*, the propriety of persuasion grounded on them, may admit a more plausible defence.

Suppose the passion as well as the end, good.

In neither case, however, can the procedure be justified until it shall be right to do evil that good may come. In the one case the bad passions enlisted will do more harm, even on the low ground of expediency, than the good end can cure. And even in the other case, to induce a man to do violence to his moral sense to attain an end however desirable, is to demoralize society, so far as such a procedure can reach, and however beneficent the result may be, in a specific case, it is,—to say the least,—taking *a wrong way to do it;* and in the end will breed, in the disorganization of individual and social morality, evils inconceivably disastrous. Great and beneficent as the power of eloquence may be, it is so, *only when it recognizes and defers implicitly, to the higher law of religion and charity.* It is the departure from this high, ruling moral principle, for the sake of power, and especially for bad ends, that has raised a question, touching the wisdom of its culture, with a view to the augmented power of eloquence.

The end will not justify the means.

It might be well to keep in mind, as a means of

checking these abuses, that undue, or artificial excitement,—and still more excitement effected by wrong means—will soon and certainly detect itself, by the mere subsidence, which is sure to follow all unhealthy excitement. Fallacious arguments and false convictions may hold their dominion over the understanding indefinitely: but unduly or wrongly excited emotion, like the flood-tide of the ocean exaggerated by the coincidence of a gale setting in the same direction, will subside by its own laws, and the higher the flood, the more complete will be the ebb; as well as the greater the desolation to mark its receding pathway.

Wrong excitement soon detected.

Fallacious arguments not always detected.

Undue or false excitement is not only sure of detection,—and of frustration, when detected,—but is liable to recoil upon the party employing it, with damaging, if not disastrous effects. The detection of the attempted fraud, provokes a resentment, proportioned to our sense of the abuse of confidence, and the material injury liable to accrue to us, as the result of such false or undue excitement.

False excitement damaging.

§ 12. The emotion, or passion, or other active principle, which lends its force to motives, in determining the human will, is subject to control, when adverse, by a process, in all respects the counterpart, of that by which, as we have seen, it is to be excited:—viz. 1, by withdrawing the object,—depreciating the value of the end,—or throwing doubt or disproof upon the feasibility, of the means, recommended in the argument, with a view to its attainment; and 2, by the expulsive power of a new affection:—i. e. by inducing a new affection or desire, stronger, or more controlling, than that which gives its power to the motive, sought to be counteracted. This latter process,—often the

Means of allaying passions.

most available, and equally effective,—is analogous in the sphere of the active principles, to what we have described as the indirect mode of refutation, in the sphere of the intellect:—the inducing of a counter motive, either stronger, or for some other reason *incompatible* with the sway of that, which we seek to overrule.

The motive springing out of a covetous love of money, e. g. may be met, in its bearings on the character or conduct of a man, either 1, by the *withdrawal* or by a depreciation of the *worth*, of money, by some exhibition of its *low value*. either comparatively or absolutely:—or 2 by insinuating, in its stead, the love of fame, or pleasure, or some other and more dominant affection of the soul:—or 3, by disproving the probability of its attainment, by the means in question.

In all cases of conflicting passions, or motives, the strongest, for the time being,—i. e. that which, in the state of mind prevailing at the moment,—is the strongest,—will determine the will.

CHAPTER II.

THE ACTIVE PRINCIPLES, TRIBUTARY TO PERSUASION.

Conditions in persuasion.

§ 1. We have now seen sufficiently, that the psychological conditions in persuasion,—including in the term, every effect, upon the *free acts and character* of men,—are 1, the presence of some motive principle, in the active constitution of the human spirit,—and which reaches the will, by kindling some *desire*, for the attainment of its object;—and 2, the conviction of the understanding, that the means proposed in persuasion, *promise to attain the end*. The resultant of these two conditions constitutes a MOTIVE:—it being the characteristic prerogative of man, to be governed by *motives*, or in other words to be a free, self-moved,—i. e. a *moral being*. In

so far as man is not under the actual control of this species of self-activity,—i. e. acting under the influence of *motives*,—his proper manhood is invaded. He cannot be dealt with, by argument, and is not, therefore, a proper subject of persuasion, or of eloquence.

Eloquence supposes moral freedom.

§ 2. The motive principles to human action, implied in moral freedom, may be classified for convenient study, somewhat as follows: viz.

Classification of active principles.

1. *Appetites*:—which find their distinctive definition, in that they have their seat *in the body*,—or in what in the bible is termed "the flesh."

2. *Instincts*:—though usually defined as belonging exclusively to animal nature, they yet seem to have a place, as active principles in man, sufficiently distinct;—and in inverse proportion to the force of intellect.

3. *Desires*:—of which "the world,"—viz. general and *impersonal nature*, constitute the proper object;—or in general whatever in it can move the will to action in order to secure possession.

4. *Affections*:—distinctively defined, as having always a *personal object*;—either literally a fellow human being, or a living being or other object, transformed in imagination, into such a being, or conceived as such.

5. *Self interest*:—which might be included under the class of affections; but yet is so peculiar,—or rather opposite—in its nature, and important in its applications, as to justify a distinct place, in the class of motive principles. The distinctive character is, that they are limited by the condition, and owe their force as *motives* to the fact, of their bearing on the interests of self.

6. *Conscience, or moral sense*:—which has for its object, *the conviction of right or wrong*; and implies

a *sense of obligation*, one way or another,—to act, or to abstain from action.

7.—If indeed distinct from that last mentioned,—*spiritual appetencies*, and standing to the spiritual constitution of man, under the gospel, in close analogy to the appetites of the body,—over which, also, they are almost the only principle, capable of exercising any direct or decisive control.

§ 3. Each of these classes of active principles, is capable of becoming a ground of action; and is, therefore, available, in its way and measure, as a means of persuasion. A complete mastery over the human will, supposes a full acquaintance with these springs of action, and the possession of skill and power to touch them, with the discrimination and precision, with which a master musician will draw music or discords, at will, from the instrument on which he plays.

Relation of the active principles to persuasion.

§ 4. It deserves to be stated, that the first condition of a successful play, upon the key board of the will, is an adequate knowledge of the nature and capabilities of these respective potentialities; and skill in bringing out the full effect in the complex organism of the human passions. And farther, it should be known that to counteract the influence of motives, in one sphere of human nature, it is, in ordinary cases, necessary to ply them with treatment adapted to that same sphere.

Conditions of power in persuasion.

Counteracting motives.

E. G. If the real ground of action, in a given case, is an appetite, or an instinct, or a habit grounded on either, it will be futile for the most part, to address to it in the way of control or prevention, a motive drawn from some other sphere. This is the real import of the couplet of the satirical poet—

"A man convinced against his will,
Is of the same opinion still."

A motive, or an act, springing out of an appetite, e. g. can ordinarily be met only by a remedy, addressed to the same:—un-

less indeed the motive drawn from a different sphere, should be *stronger*;—or, involve in its nature, a reduction of the relative force of the former: as e. g. the implanting of a new and more controlling principle, like conscience, or religion. And even in such a case, it should be borne in mind, that it is always the severest possible test of the *genuineness* of the principle or power, thus set in antagonism with a motive, which is stronger than itself; *except on the single condition of its being a genuine, spiritual, and therefore all ruling power.*

Conditions of efficiency.

§ 5. In giving effect to persuasion, whether in virtue of a divine power, supervening and energising motives, or calling into play new spiritual forces, and so transforming the character,—i. e. the permanent state of the affections, and the will,—the result will be, *a conflict of motives*, each in turn seeking for the mastery;—the ultimate decision turning, of course, in favor of that which is the stronger of the two, in a practical regard.

Conflict of motives.

§ 6. In settling which of these conflicting principles of action,—motives, so called—shall prevail,—whether in one's own experience, or in the control of other minds, by the power of eloquence—we are required to find some ground of classification, which shall set the various motives in the order of their strength.

Relative power of motives.

In the *primitive constitution of human nature*, the relative power of motives, would be determined, by the comparative elevation of those principles, or elements of our nature, out of which they spring: taking rank in the ascending scale,—as they would,—somewhat as follows,—viz. 1, animal or physical instincts, 2, intellectual convictions,—including habits,—and whatever incentive to action may spring out of such convictions: 3, aesthetic emotions, with their peculiar attractions for the will, 4, moral convictions, including their peculiar and commanding *sense of right*, and *obligation* and 5, spiritual appentencies and desires.

Relative classification of motives.

Relatives power of motives abnormal.

No fact in human nature, however, is more glaringly apparent, than that this primitive and normal order of dignity and controlling power, in the active elements of our human nature, has been thrown into disorder; and that what were the *stronger*, in the true primitive *design of the Creator*, have been made to serve what were and should be *the weaker*, with a subjection well nigh the reverse of the primal order.

Persuasion regards men in their actual state.

§ 7. As persuasion is addressed to man in his *actual condition*, it is necessary to construct the art, with constant reference to this *abnormal* or *disordered* relation of the active principles, which actually supply the motives to the human will: and, whoever trusts to the power of eloquence, as if the active principles of human nature were still normal, will soon find himself amiss. To be effective, the treatment of the human will, *in Persuasion*, must *now* be founded on its *pathology*, rather than its *physiology*. We must seek to persuade men, as they now are,—not as they were originally created.

Rationale of Persuasion.

A motive that owes its power to control the will to a *love of pleasure*, e. g., can no more be overruled by a sense of *right or obligation*, enfeebled as we now find it in experience, than an argument to show that one man is *taller* than another, can be refuted by an argument going to prove, that he is *heavier*. The two things are not in co-relation; and cannot therefore be compared or contrasted. The inducement to drink wine—to take another ease—for the *pleasure of the stimulus*, cannot be set aside by the conviction of *its wrong*, or its *injurious consequences* to the health: and the persuasion can be effected *now*, only by *diminishing* the *force of the motive*; i. e. by diminishing the amount of pleasure,—or what is practically the same thing,—setting over against it, a greater amount of pain; or else, by implanting an entirely *new motive*, of *greater power*, drawn from the more controlling sphere, of conscience or religion.*

* Gal. 4: 3—16 supplies a fine study, in exemplifying the play of conflicting motives drawn from different spheres of human nature.

The great store house of instruction, in revealing the *nature* and *relative power* of the different sources, from which motives may be drawn, in any attempt at Persuasion,—and especially in the commanding sphere of pulpit eloquence, in its relations to the human spirit, and in connection with the highest themes,—is the NEW TESTAMENT :—and especially may the student of eloquence, profitably study the speeches and writings of the apostle Paul, as supplying *models* of discourse, in the way of persuasion.

Eloquence of the apostle Paul.

CHAPTER III.

THE LAWS OF IMPASSIONED DISCOURSE.

§ 1. It is at this point,—the relation of motives to the *free will* of man,—that Rhetoric rises to its own proper elevation ; and becomes not only a power in society, but an *ethical power*, ruling over the free spirit of man, in compatibility with its own laws of life,* and carrying its ends, not only without destroying, but by means of, the lofty prerogative of man as a moral agent, made in God's own likeness,—i. e. endowed with the power of self-control ; until, in judgment, God takes away that power, in the over mastering penalty for its abuse.

Eloquence a virtue.

§ 2. There are various methods by which, the end of Discourse in Persuasion, is set in its normal and influential relation, with the human will by the intervention of motives.

1. The most obvious and ordinary instrument employed in Persuasion—as before seen in conviction also—is *Language*, as organized into Discourse.

Different instruments of Persuasion.

2. There are also the various methods of expression, by which the orator makes over his own mental states,—still however substantially by the medium

* See again Theremin's " Eloquence a Virtue."

of Discourse—in what is comprised under the term *elocution*, comprising the expressive power of *the countenance, the eye, the gesture, the attitude*, and *the various physical symbols*, by which thought and emotion are expressed, or revealed.

3. We have the potent, largely inexplicable, but familiar methods, by which spirit communicates with spirit, and especially one human spirit, conveys its thoughts and emotions,—often even in their nicer and more delicate colors and hues,—to another human spirit, without seeming to employ, and perhaps without really employing, the clumsy vehicle of spoken language at all.

The power of presence as a motive.

We are all familiar with the fact, e. g., that the mere personal presence, of a man of decided character often serves to brace the flaccid muscles of a feeble will. Gifted teachers, e. g., find means to propagate their character, in ways not referrable to the dogmatic communications passing between them, and their pupils, with a certainty and truth, admirable for good, but *formidable*, if not *fatal*, for evil;—and, in either case, marvellous, and, seemingly, almost miraculous. The well known power of a *smile*, or a *tear*, however extraordinary, is not what we now mean. It is a sort of "*aura*," which we call *presence*,—something far more penetrating, and subtle, in the interaction of spirits on each other :—but however real and potent, it is, notwithstanding, too *ethereal*, or *electric*,—and in proper eloquence, it is of too restricted application, to do more than indicate it here : and perhaps even that, may only provoke scepticism, especially in the case of a man of dull, and leaden nerves.

Discourse an instrument of persuasion.

We have to do with this topic, *chiefly*, in discussing the moral relations, which it is important to establish between the orator and the audience, in order to effective persuasion.

Section II. Conduct of discourse, in Persuasion.

§ 1. The end sought to be accomplished in Persuasion, is,—as we have now seen in its analysis,—an influence on the will, in the most comprehensive sense

of that word—leading it *to take the course of action proposed* by the orator, under *the impulse of adequate motives.* We have also seen, that *a motive*, is the *resultant*, of an appetite, instinct, desire, affection, passion or other *motive principle*, in human nature, combined with the conviction of the feasibility of attaing to the end sought, by the employment of the means proposed in Persuasion. In effecting Persuasion, under this analysis of its nature, there are obviously *laws*, regulating and determining the most efficient processes, for the attainment of the end proposed; especially in the employment of the emotional, or motive principle, involved in every successful process in persuasion.

Laws tributary to persuasion.

Skill in the art of reaching and rousing the feelings, supposes a *knowledge of the laws which govern them, and tact in their address.* We must therefore seek to inform ourselves, on both these points, if we would achieve success as orators.

§ 2. We have seen already, also, that men are instinctively suspicious, and jealous, of every approach to their passions, as springs of character and conduct,—and at the same time that it is absolutely necessary, to use this avenue to the will;—1, because, in any true psychology of man, there is no other; and 2, while the passions are proverbially irregular, fitful, and difficult of wise control, they are yet liable to be, and in point of fact they generally are, *below*, rather than *above* their *normal tension.* *To persuade* is therefore generally to *stimulate some motive*, or active principle, as well as, and even more than, to guide it to the attainment of its end. What then are the laws which regulate, and determine the origin, impulse, and control of the passions, as powers in relation to the will, whether transient or permanent,—whether in the sphere of the *statics* or *dynamics* of human character and conduct.

Emotion, the Dynamic principle of man.

Necessary to stimulate the passions.

Aswell as guide it to the end.

§ 3. The first and most fundamental law, ruling in

Emotion involuntary. regard to this motive principle in human nature, is, that it is instinctive and involuntary ;—i. e., it is not the product of a distinct act of deliberate volition. The presence of the appropriate object,—either actually or in imagination,—rouses the emotion, passion, appetite,—or whatever the active principle may be:—and when the proper object is set in relation to the human passions, and the emotion fails to rise, no attempt at whipping up the languid passion, into a foam, will be effectual ;—or if effectual for the moment, by filling the mind with thoughts of the object, in every variety of form, it will, like foam, subside, and become flatter than ever, as soon as the whipping process is suspended. Meantime if a temporary effect has been produced, in leading the will to take action in the premises, with the subsidence of the excitement, comes a *reaction* of the purpose, and a *resentment* against the agent of the false excitement, far more damaging, as well as permanent, than any positive, partial, or temporary benefit, can possibly compensate.

Due to an object.

Emotion cannot be forced.

After false excitement reaction and resentment.

§ 4. From the quiet, involuntary, almost unconscious law, ruling in the rise of emotion, it is an obvious practical inference, that appeals to these motive principles, should never be advertised, or even avowed, and still less *paraded.* To do this, is to arouse in the fullest force, the *prejudice* against impassioned appeals ; and put an audience on their guard, against what is a legitimate and even necessary process, as tributary to Persuasion.

Appeals not to be paraded.

The importance of this precaution, rests on the fact, that it calls the attention off from the object, in the view of which the appropriate emotion tends to rise, by the constitutional law of the emotions. For this reason, ***self-consciousness*** is death to *passion.* Either *the character,* or the *genuineness* of the passion, is com-

Self-consciousnness fatal to passion.

promised, by whatever cuts off the supply of its life, in the view of the object. The emotional nature differs from the rational in this; that *self-consciousness* is *essential* to the one and *fatal* to the other.

This holds true, to a great extent, of both right and wrong passions. If wrong—either, as to their ground, nature, or degree.—the error is liable to be seen, and resisted, if not resented. If well founded, it still carries the offensive implication of *inadequate sensibility*, requiring some farther stimulus, than its proper object. An address to the understanding does not imply a claim of moral superiority, on the part of the orator; but seeking to rouse *stronger* or *more intense feeling*, by an impassioned appeal, does.

What should we think of a lawyer, e. g. who, after having proved a prisoner guilty of crime, should proceed to exhort the jury to convict him?

Passion requires specific or graphic details.

Style, suitable for argument and passion respectively.

§ 5. A second law ruling in the rise, swell, and propagation, of passion, is, that specific details, or graphic narration, —if at all prolonged—in setting forth the object of emotion or passion, is far more efficient, than generic or grouped descriptions. *In argument*, the main qualities of style, should be *clearness and force*, as applied to the exhibition of the connexion or relation between the truth known, and the truth to be proved, —between the premises and the conclusion. This quality of style is quite compatible with the greatest *brevity*, if it does not absolutely demand it. *Emotional composition*, on the contrary, requires the *holding* of the mind *to the object* of the passion, *steadily*, and with *some degree of continuousness*.*

* "The following extract from Sheridan's Invective, against Warren Hastings, will serve to exemplify this principle. The orator, instead of going through an orderly detail of the sufferings of the oppressed nations of India, merely presents one or two of the most prominent features in the scene of desolation and horror." "When we hear the description of the paroxism, fever, and delirium, into which despair had thrown the natives, when on the banks of the polluted Ganges, panting for death, they tore more widely open, the lips of their gaping wounds, to accelerate their dissolution, and, while their blood was issuing, presented their ghastly eyes to heaven, breathing their last and fervent prayer, that the dry earth might not be suffered to drink their blood, but that it might rise up to the throne of God, and rouse the

§ 6. For reasons now apparent, *copiousness of sty'e*, in the way of details, especially of the most graphic and characteristic features of the object of emotion, —whether in description or narration,—is favorable to impressions on the feelings.

The power of circumstances to augment emotion in narration or description, are arranged by Campbell* in the following order:—viz:

(1.) Proximity of time:—time *future* being more impressive, than the time *past*. Possibly this may be referable to the fact, that the *one* is ever coming *nearer*; while the *other* is steadily *receding*. There may, however, on the other hand, be something due to the fact that the past is certain while the future, unless specially ensured, may be more or less uncertain, and to that extent less *impassioned*.

(2.) Local connexion. Every one is aware, how much more engrossing in interest is an event at home than one abroad,—one in our immediate vicinity, than one at a distance,—and one in our own family, than one among strangers.

(3.) Personal relation. Perhaps this may be regarded rather as the explanation of the last, than the addition of a really new phenomenon, in impassioned discourse. *Self interest* brings the object which excites us into direct contact with us: and then this personal relation, may awaken an interest not only *more intense*, but even *different in kind*, from that which the passion would take on, in the person of another. So true is this, that it even gives rise to *different words*, to express the difference of the emotional element of the human consciousness. We *resent* an injury, intended for our ourselves:—we are *indignant* at the injury offered to another. A favor shown to us personally, elicits *gratitude*, a favor to another, merely *thanks*:—while we may seek to *revenge* the wrongs and *requite* the benefits of either.

Sensuous objects more impassioned than abstractions.

§ 7. In impassioned discourse, sensuous or visible objects, excite far more than *abstract descriptions*, or *conceptions* of an object.

Shakspeare; in Julius Cæsar, makes Antony take advantage of this law to propagate and intensify, the excited passions of the populace, by an exhibition of the gashed *mantle* of Cæsar, and

Eternal Providence to avenge the wrongs of their country, will it be said, that this was brought about by the incantations of these Begums, in their secluded Zenana."—See Day's Rhetoric, p. 144.

* See Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric.

by representing them as begging the very hairs of his head, and then beqneathing them as *heir looms*, destined to be willed to succeeding ages, as mementoes of their relation to the martyred victim,—as he represents him,—of his devotion to the interests of the Roman people.

A still more ingenious and effective application of an analogous principle, is exemplified in the allusions, in the same speech, to the will of Cæsar, as an instrument to propagate excitement among the people.

Masterly as the speech of Antony is, in its knowledge of the laws of human passion; and complete as was the effect, in its influence on the populace, a large part of that effect was due to the devices, by which the objects adapted to stir the blood of the audience, were brought before the senses, and made to tell upon the pulsing heart of that popular assemblage; till it was crazed with frenzy and fury, against the authors of what so lately seemed the consummation of desire, in the riddance of a tyrant:—but which is now regarded as a foul and bloody murder, the intensified abhorrence of every citizen of Rome.

The same principle of excitement was seized upon, by the orators of the French Revolution and turned to the account of propagating the infuriate passion of resistance; in causing handkerchiefs, dipped in the blood of the martyred victims of the guillotine,—as they represented them,—to be circulated among the excited rabble;—a duty, by the way, in which women did most essential service, by a device not demanding

"wit, nor words, nor worth,
"Action nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
"To stir men's blood,"

but the mere passing from hand to hand, of these bloody symbols of the despotism, against which they sought to rouse the fury of the mob. It is, largely, in the force of this human principle, that the proverb has proved so uniformly true, to the confounding of the advocates of despotic persecution in religion, that "The blood of the martyrs, is the seed of the Church."

Power of the Imagination in impassioned composition.

§ 8. The law of impassioned appeal, by which the highest effects are sought to be attained, is that, by which *the aid of the Imagination* is invoked, to augment, by

mysterious allusions,—dim, vague, but stimulating suggestions of the benefits to be conferred upon the people, by the very "*death by traitors*," of a loving benefactor; whose *life* of *deathless* devotion had been so foully repaid by assassination, as to draw tears of blood, from the lifeless statue, of Rome's proudest benefactor,—great Pompey.*

The play of the imagination, aided by the intimation of supernatural agencies, elicited to testify "against the deep damnation of his taking off," is the final and consummate *artifice*—using that word purely in its good sense—by which the orator evokes the furies of the populace, to cry out for vengeance against the very parties, whom that same populace, at the commencement of the speech, were ready to canonize as demi-gods, for tne same act; and against whom, nothing short of the consummate art and eloquence of the most gifted orator, would have been allowed to whisper the slightest question, at the outset.

§ 9. As subordinate to the law of expression which seeks its highest effect, *in enlisting the imagination*,—whose prerogative it is, to exalt *the actual* in nature, into *the ideal in art*,—the style of impassioned address, will be intensified, by a terse and telling selection of the more prominent and striking features, of a scene, rather than an attempt at continuous or complete description. The Imagination working on a few details of an exciting kind, with little of specification, and nothing defined, will produce far more effect, than the most elaborate and complete, detailed description. *Vagueness*, is tributary to *vastness* of effect, in the sphere of the emotions: very much as a moat dimly seen, swells into a mass, by the force of imagined distance.

Selection of striking features.

Rather than complete description.

Vagueness tributary to effect.

In this respect, terseness and condensation in the style of impassioned address, even to the point of obscurity,

Style, terse and condensed, and even obscure, emotional.

* No better contribution could be rendered to the student of eloquence, than to make an elaborate analysis, of this great speech by one who, it has been well said, "would have been the greatest of orators, if he had not been the greatest of dramatists."

is tributary to its effect; somewhat as a mote in the twilight is magnified by the imagination, until it is mistaken for a massive object in the distance.

When Nelson led his fleet into the battle of the Nile, under the incentive,—"England expects every man to do his duty," and Napoleon, entrusted the critical fortunes of the Battle of the Pyramids, to the stimulus of the admonition, "Soldiers, 40 centuries look down upon you from those monuments," they both proved how truly, and profoundly, they understood the laws of impassioned appeal, to the motive power of the human heart.

Vague and *suggestive*, rather than *clear* and *exhaustive*, description, and that addressed, not to the cool, calculating, critical, careful understanding, but to the creative, credulous, wonder working power of the imagination, is the law of effective, impassioned power, in discourse.

§ 10. The same impassioned effect, is produced,—and for the same reason—viz: that it is one mode of enlisting and stimulating the power of the imagination, and so transcending the sober verities of critical narration,—by describing an object, *by means of its sensuous effects.*

Description of an object by its effects.

Thus Shakspeare makes Edgar work Gloster up to a pitch of excitement, which the sympathetic pathos of our pity for the fearful anticipations of the eyeless Gloster, can hardly save us from feeling to be *farcical*, by a description of the Cliff of Dover by means of an *imaginary description* of *the effects* of the dizzy height of the cliff, upon the objects on its face, and at its foot,

"How fearful,
"And dizzy 'tis, to cast one's eyes so low!
"The crows and choughs, that wing the midway air,
"Show scarce so gross as beetles: half way down,
"Hangs one that gathers samphire; dreadful trade!
"Methinks he seems no bigger than his head:
"The fishermen, that walk upon the beach,
"Appear like mice; and yon tall anchoring bark,
"Diminished to her cock; her cock, a buoy
"Almost too small for sight; the murmuring surge

"Cannot be heard so high :—I'll look no more;
"Lest my brain turn, and the deficient sight
"Topple down headlong."

The woman who sought to arouse the indignant interposition of the King of Israel in the famine of Samaria, gives us by this indirect method of describing the dire extremities of the seige by its denaturalizing effects on the deepest and tenderest of all human feelings, a far more vivid impression of its extremities, than by any detailed description of its horrors.*

Other cases.

The following passage, quoted by Dayf, from Burke's description of the effects of the irruption of Hyder Ali, into the Carnatic, is a fine study on this point of impassioned narrative. "When," says he, "the British armies traversed the Carnatic, —as they did for hundreds of miles in all directions—through the whole line of their march, they did not see one man, not one woman, not one child, not one four footed beast, of any description whatever."

This marvellously effective passage, embodies, and avails itself of a variety, of the principles already stated, as contributing to effective eloquence, i. e., to the rise and swell of passion. The imagination is effectually evoked, and stimulated to conceive the desolation suggestively hinted, rather than described in detail. The strongest and most graphic features of that desolation are seized, described by their effects, admitting of sensuous display ;—and even the very abnormal character of the style, the monotonous repetitions, and pleonasms, are turned to the account of augmenting our sense of the fearful havoc, whose boundaries,—indefinitely stated at hundreds of miles, —lead us to fancy an almost limitless extent of absolute, utter, lifeless, desolation.

§ 11. In the higher moods of the imagination, and when the passions are already excited, literal exactness of statement is liable to prove, practically,—i. e. in effect—untrue, or

Literal exactness, false in effect.

* See II Kings, 6 : 26.

† See Day, p. 145.

false. Hence in impassioned moods of mind on the part of an audience, a degree of extravagance or exaggeration, is not only allowable, but *demanded*, in order to secure *truth of effect*: very much as a painter must lay on exaggerated contrasts of light and shade, to give the true and full effect of form, to the flat surface of his canvass. This is the principle,—as we shall see hereafter—which justifies the use of *hyperbole*, in oral discourse. Not only is the *effect* of a hyperbole true, provided it be properly employed; but it would be impossible to get the true effect, without it. This is true, in the least impassioned forms of narration or description; but still more is it true, where the speaker's object is to intensify and propagate *excitement*. To use the language of calm narration, when one is bursting with passion, would be as unnatural, as to admire the guilding of the stiletto, by which the heart's blood of a victim has been drawn from his bosom. Unreal pictures, by a gifted imagination, often give a *truer impression* in effect, than a literal description.

Power of Hyperbole.

Calm language unnatural under excitement.

It has been said, not less justly, than wittily, that "nothing lies like figures except facts." Falstaff is not the only man, whose excited imagination has multiplied a single imaginary highwayman, *by forty*; nor yet the only one, who has sought to propagate his own excitement by impassioned *hyperbole*.

Exaggeration the law of the passions.

§ 12. Another principle of impassioned discourse, is, that *the rise of emotion is gradual*. This law rules fundamentally, in all discourse. Unless the mind addressed *has time* to feel the full force of the grounds of excitement in a given case, that excitement will not only fail to propagate itself, with full effect, but the impassioned expression, however genuine, will seem, in such a case, an extra-

Rise of Passion gradual.

vagance, and affectation. Hence the *law of climax*, is essential to the full effect of impassioned appeal. The mind cannot be roused, except by *gradual*, and often *slow* degrees. Where the heart of an audience is already beating high, with visible emotion, this law may be disregarded; but that experiment is always made at hazzard.

Hence the law of climax.

Cicero displays his perfect mastery of the human passions in the two diverse circumstances,—employing in his treatment of Verres, the climactic method, with consumate skill and power; while in that of Cataline, he breaks out in the extremest violence, in the very first sentence, without a word of introduction or preparation. The justification of these respective methods, is found in *the obvious temper of the audience in each.*

§ 13. In impassioned discourse, the rise of emotion, is liable to be hindered by subjective reasons;—i. e., reasons originating in the reflex bearing of the passion upon the audience themselves. To obviate this impediment as far as possible, the orator may often avail himself of some case so far parallel as to involve the same principle, and lying outside of such personal reference. By this means he may procure a judgment on the naked principle, with whatever of earnestness or passion the case may warrant; and then it is comparatively easy, to transfer such impassioned judgment, in its full force, against whatever object or person, can be shown to be comprehended in its condemnation, even though it be oneself.

Excitement and transfer of passion.

An illustration of this principle, is furnished in the familiar instance of the prophet Nathan, sent to the guilty king of Judah, to elicit condign self-condemnation; and bring him to repentance, in the matter of Bathsheba.* Not only was the right judgment of the king evoked, by the parable of the poor man and his "one little ewe lamb," but a just and impassioned decree of self-condemnation was secured; and then brought home to the self-convicted monarch, as well by the award of conscience, as by the direct decree of a divine tribunal, in the explicit sentence, "Thou art the man."

Case of David and Nathan.

* 2 Sam. 12: 1—6.

A principle analogous, but of much wider application, is exemplified in the history of the difficulty into which the apostle Paul fell, in a popular assembly at Ephesus, under the adroit conduct of Demetrius, with the workmen whose craft was endangered by the preaching of the cross. The excitement stirred by appeals to the self-interest of the mob, on grounds where any mob is accessible to excitement, was easily turned against the person of the accused party; when the passions of the populace, in no mood to make a careful examination of its justice, were in the flood of their excitement, and ready to find an *object* as well as a *justification* of their violence, with or without sufficient reason. In the speech of Demetrius, this cardinal principle of impassioned appeal, receives a conclusive illustration; to the effect that in an excited popular assembly, it is easy, first, to play upon the passions of a mob, and to rouse them to a phrensy of excitement; and then turn their blind, deaf, fury, against some victim, without caring to determine how far the vengeance so exacted, is righteous or otherwise.*

Case of Demetrius and Paul.

§ 14. The speech with which the people were appeased by the town clerk, might also furnish a study to the disciple of eloquence, in regard to the methods of allaying excited passions, when raging most furiously, and with the blindest violence.

Method of allaying passions.

§ 15. But a discourse however masterly in its impassioned conduct,—regarded as a discourse,—is not complete, until it is delivered. There are signs and instruments of passion, and therefore of power, *in the elocution* of discourse, as well as in its structure, and equally essential to its highest possible effect, and among these means of impassioned expression, are some of very high potency, the laws of which, it is essential for the consummate orator, to understand. The tension of a muscle, the flash of an eye, or the falling of a tear, as well as the more usual and familiar means of impassioned expression,—by quality of voice, articulation, accent, emphasis, pause, melody, gesture, and other applian-

Elocution tributary to passion.

* See Acts, 19: 23—41.

ces in elocution,—enter largely into our idea of a discourse, as the instrument of power in eloquence: but they will be best understood and appreciated when we shall have made a study *of elocution, as a means of expressing thought and passion*, in eloquence. We pass therefore, to consider finally, the laws of power, as involved in the various methods of expression, by which the orator finds means of controlling the thoughts and passions of an audience,—other than the primary and main organ,—viz: the discourse, including elocution,—in eloquence.

CHAPTER IV.

SYMPATHY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POWER, IN ELOQUENCE.

Sympathy a vehicle of power.

§ 1. Besides language,—organized into discourse, as the vehicle of conveying *emotion*,—i. e. power—from an orator to his audience, there are means, by which he establishes a relation with his audience, embracing what we term, collectively, SYMPATHY; and by which, the will of an audience is controlled, through their passions, without the logical apprehension of any other ground for such control, than its felt *presence, in the orator*. This is a law of human nature, recognized in the psychology of persuasion, ever since men began to observe, and philosophize on the subject:—

"Si vis me flere, dolendum est
"Primum ipsi tibi."

Grounds for the power of sympathy.

§ 2. A rational ground for this familiar law, may be found, no doubt, in the obvious consideration, that whatever grounds for emotion an orator may profess to furnish, *by means of his discourse*, they are fatally discredited, by the *absence* of the *natural signs* of emotion in himself.

However well founded the reasons justifying emotion, in the hearer, may seem to be, they cannot be accepted with the full faith, necessary to produce emotion, in the audience; but will be set aside, as *artificial* and *unfounded* for the audience, if they have failed to produce their proper effect, upon the speaker. Human nature is constructed with checks against the palming off of *counterfeit*, as well as *false*, emotion:—and no matter how complete the imitation, it will not *often*,—and *never long*,—impose upon the instinctive feeling of kindred human hearts, for more than its worth;—and will seldom fail to be accepted, on the other hand, for *less* than its real value.

Checks on spurious emotion.

> "Passion, I see, is catching, for mine eyes,
> "Seeing those beads of sorrow stand in thine,
> "Began to water."

Emotion, not only propagates emotion, by a law of nature, but it propagates it in the *same form* and as nearly *to the same extent*, as does the law of propagation the case of the outward forms of nature. Even idiosyncrasies of passion, are to a great extent reproduced.* Hence the orator can seldom *speak*, better than he *is*.†

Emotion self-propagated, in kind and degree.

§ 3. This great principle or law, ruling in the propagation of passion,—i. e. *the power of eloquence*,—is the true foundation for the requisition, laid down by rhetoricians,—ever since rhetoric became a science,—and practically acted on by orators, with or without a perception of its grounds in nature; viz: that in order to the fullest effect of an orator upon his audi-

* The extent to which this law of *sameness of kind and degree*, holds in the propagation of passions, is but imperfectly understood. It underlies and explains the morbid forms of passion or emotion, which are often found characterizing even religious excitements;—like the Shakers or the phenomena in the early history of New England,—then known as "the jerks," and sometimes attributed to Satanic influence.

† This principle or law of eloquence, supplies a farther important illustration of the great truth of Theremin;—"Eloquence, a Virtue."

Character of an orator, with his audience.

ence, he must possess their unqualified confidence, as regards at least three elements of character :—viz : 1, good will : —2, good principles :—and 3, good sense.

Ability, in the line of eloquence, under the guidance of sound principles, and devoted to the support of what we hold to be right, or true, or good, furnishes the highest guarantee an audience can have, in resigning themselves up to the power of an orator, and accepting his unqualified lead, in whatever direction he desires to carry them.

§ 4. The *confidence* of an audience, that the orator possesses these elements of character, is, of course, the thing essential to his power ; but, for reasons lately mentioned, character has so many, and often subtle, ways, of revealing itself,—and in point of fact does so certainly and fully reveal itself, especially in a public man,—that it would be safe to insist on the requirement, that the orator should *actually possess*, and therefore in his training should *assiduously cultivate*, these elements of character, in order to set him in a commanding relation over the will of an audience. As we have said before, the influence of one human spirit upon another, is so subtle and pervading that it is difficult,—perhaps impossible—to trace all the avenues, by which passion can be propagated from a speaker to an audience, who are truly *in sympathy* with him.

Importance of possessing such qualities.

§ 5. Besides the more obvious physical signs of character, there is a pervading power, which, for want of a more definite term, we call *presence*,—indefinite in its constituents, but *well known* and *positive*, in *its actual force*,—which has much to do with the effect in eloquence, and much with the native endowments and capabilities of an orator. Some what of this composite force of charac-

Power of "Presence."

Constituents of "Presence." ter, no doubt, is due to *intellectual force*, somewhat to *native sensibility*, or *refinement* of gifts—aesthetic or otherwise,—somewhat to *strength of will* or purpose, or character, somewhat, to the *spiritual qualities* of the man, but either, or all of these together, leaves a large residuum of power in an orator, still unaccounted for, if not absolutely unaccountable; but which we all know by familiar experience, and the *aggregate of which* constitutes the *specific power of an individual orator.*

§ 6. There are two generically different methods,—

Two methods of expressing Passion. aside from the means of expression, termed *elocution*,—by which, in the use of discourse, the orator may reveal the nature and power of the passion, which it is his object to infuse into his audience, with a view to persuasion;—which have been expressively termed, respectively, *the exaggerating*, and *extenuating methods.* These diverse

Fundamentally the same. methods do not imply the expression of diverse mental states, or passions; but only different methods of giving effective expression to the same passion:—both of which are in accordance with the psychological laws of expression, in the human constitution.

§ 7. The *direct or exaggerating method*, of propa-

The direct or exaggerating method. gating passion in an audience, scarcely needs description. It consists in giving expression, subject to the laws already described,* to the objects, or incidents adapted to excite emotion; relying upon direct, impassioned, narration or description, to stir its appropriate passion, without the aid of artifice or art. The process is well described by Antony, in Julius Cæsar,† though few orators, as we

Examples of the direct methods. shall see, ever better understood, or practiced more effectively, the indirect or extenuating method.

* See Ch. III, Section II, §1—14.

† Act III, Scene 2.

"I am no orator as Brutus is:
"But, as you know me all, a plain blunt man,
"That love my friend; and that they know full well,
"That gave me public leave to speak of him,
"For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
"Action nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
"To stir men's blood: I only speak right on;—
"I tell you that which you yourselves do know;
"Show you sweet Cæsar's wounds, poor, poor, dumb mouths,
"And bid them speak for me: But were I Brutus,
"And Brutus Antony, there were an Antony,
"Would ruffle up your spirits, and put a tongue,
"In every wound of Cæsar, that should move
"The stones of Rome to rise and mutiny."

Model of the direct method.

The speech of Brutus, instructing the conspirators, how best to rouse the passions of the populace is also an example, of the direct method, in the use of the most stimulating appliance of sensuous objects:

"Stoop, Romans, stoop,
"And let us bathe our hands in Cæsar's blood,
"Up to our elbows, and besmear our swords:
"Then walk we forth, even to the market place,
"And waving our red weapons o'er our heads,
"Let's all cry Peace! Freedom! and Liberty!

Extenuating method.

§ 8. The extenuating or indirect method, on the contrary, is *artful* in the highest degree, and when effective, far the more impassioned of the two. We shall find our best example, in this same consummate speech of Antony. The speech of Brutus,—preceding,—may be studied as a model of the *direct* method, in which the cause is ably argued, and the conclusion set in the most favorable, impassioned, and successful light. Brutus,—in complete possession of the sympathy and holding absolute sway over the assemblage,—introduces Antony to the excited crowd in the forum, and stakes his own influence to secure a hearing for him, as the friend of Cæsar, commissioned by the conspirators themselves, to pronounce his funeral eulogy. Stimula-

ted by the speech of Brutus to hope,—they knew not what of benefit and glory from the death of Cæsar—it was with great difficulty, and only by the influence of Brutus, that Antony could even get a hearing. Under all this disadvantage, Antony mounts the rostrum in the presence of the corpse of Cæsar. The speech with its impassioned and stimulating interruptions, follows,—too long to quote in this connexion—but most consummate in all the arts of eloquence, and completely triumphant in its end. The plan of the discourse, is essentially that of the extenuating method.

Analysis of impassioned power.

He abstains not only from direct assault on the character and treachery of Brutus, and also from direct laudation of Cæsar, but reverts with studied repetition, in a form almost suspicious as to its honesty, and seeming more than half sarcastic to the and high honorable character of Brutus, as a guarantee of something in the way of a justification of the assassination, quoting in the same indirect and suspicious way, the naked authority of Brutus, in support of the allegation of *ambition*, as a justifying cause of murder. Against this allegation, he argues *only indirectly*, by citing facts of well known history, leaving his hearers to draw their own inferences. Not venturing to affirm his own opinion, he simply asks:

"He hath brought many captives home to Rome,
"Whose ransom, did the general coffers fill,
"Did this in Cæsar seem ambitious?
"When that the poor have cried, Cæsar hath wept,
"Ambition should be made of sterner stuff:
"Yet Brutus says he was ambitious;
"And Brutus is an honorable man,
"You all did see, that on the Lupercal,
"I thrice presented him a kingly crown,
"Which he did thrice refuse. Was this ambition?
"Yet Brutus says, he was ambitious.
"And, sure, he is an honorable man.
"I speak not to disprove what Brutus spoke,
"But here I am, to speak what I do know.
"You all did love him once, not without cause,
"What cause withholds you then to mourn for him?
"O judgment, thou art fled to brutish beasts,
"And men have lost their reason!—Bear with me;

" My heart is in the coffin there with Cæsar,
" And I must pause, till it come back to me."

The very *pause*, is in the extenuating method, and most effective. The impassioned interlocutory exclamations, show the expectations of the great dramatist, as to the *effect* of the speech on the populace. And when the orator resumes, it is to whip into still higher foam, the excitement now begun: but still in the use of the same suppressed extenuating method:—

" O masters if I were disposed to stir,
" Your hearts and minds to mutiny and rage,
" I should do Brutus wrong, and Cassius wrong:
" Who, you all know, are honorable men:
" I will not do them wrong; I rather choose
" To wrong the dead, to wrong myself, and you,
" Than I will wrong such honorable men."

He then proceeds in the same strain, to ply the imagination of his audience, with allusions to a parchment—the will of Cæsar—which he professes unwillingness to read, for fear of its effect making too strongly, and,—in the excitement it would rouse,—*unjustly*, against

" The honorable men,
" Whose daggers have stabbed Cæsar,

The imagination stimulated to the highest pitch by these allusions, the audience—as he intended they should—raise a hue and cry, and seek to *enforce* the reading of the will. Well knowing that their expectations of its contents, already transcended by far, any possible reality, the orator lets himself down from his lofty pitch of passion, by proposing to come down, and recite the story of the murder, over the corpse of the victim. And then he seeks to restrain their outburst of fury, rage and revenge, by deprecating " the sudden flood of mutiny," so artfully and irresistably, and *intentionally* stirred by himself, by assuring them, with seeming composure and self-command:

" They that have done this deed, are honorable;
" What private griefs they have, alas, I know not,
" That made them do it: they are wise and honorable,
" And will, no doubt, with reasons answer you."

He then proceeds to deprecate, farther, the idea that the excitement,—now breaking over all bounds;—was due to the arts of the orator, affirming a perfect contrast, in that respect, between himself and Brutus; and intimating that if the arts of the orator,—as in the case of Brutus,—had been superadded to the force of his cause, the very " stones of Rome, would rise and mutiny." The key note thus given, is at once accepted by the excited populace; and the very result seemingly deprecated by the

orator, is suggested and provoked and ensured, *by the very means, seemingly* designed, to produce the opposite effect. This is the *extenuating* method of excitation.

Grounds of the power in art.

It must be now, abundantly certain, that we are dealing with *the art* of eloquence:—whatever the seeming design of the orator may be, it is clear that the *actual effect*, is the enkindling of the passions,—and to a higher degree, than any direct description of *the grounds* of excitement in the case, could possibly have done. The difference in the effect, is just the difference between the *actual*, and *the ideal;* and as under the power of the imagination, the one exceeds the other, so in equal measure do their effects. This is the very principle,—despite the ingenious special pleading of Mr. Ruskin,* to the contrary—which distinguishes true art and especially high art, from being,—as he labors to prove it,—a *literal* and *slavish copy* of the very *forms of nature:*—and renders it on the contrary, a *genuine human product*,—instinct with that highest power, which we call *Genius*. This endowment, directed by the laws of impassioned expression, it is, which makes the difference between a *great orator*, like Demosthenes or Pitt, or Patrick Henry and an equally *great man*, in other respects than eloquence, like Nelson, or Napoleon, or Washington.

Art transcends nature.

Power of Genius.

§ 9. We have now seen, sufficiently that the difference between the direct or exaggerating, and the indirect or extenuating method is,—not that the one is impassioned and the other calm,—but it is simply and purely a question in regard to the most effective *method of expressing*, and so *exciting*, a given degree of passion: and the ground of preference for the indirect, in any given case, is, that in that case, it promises to be the *more efficient* of the two.

Both methods impassioned.

Rationale of the extenuating method.

§ 10. It must be borne in mind, that this whole

* See Modern Painters by John Ruskin.

question both of the method of exciting passion, and the degree of vehemence proper to an orator, as well as necessary to effective eloquence, in a given case, must be determined by a reference to the state of mind of the audience at the time. Any discourse pitched upon a widely different key, from that of the mental state, of the audience, will grate harshly on their nerves; and instead of carrying its point persuasively, will be more likely to cause them to stop their ears in self-defence.

Degree of passion proper.

Evils of a wrong key.

§ 11. It must not be forgotten, that the great principle by which emotion is to be propagated between human hearts, is that of *sympathy:* and to break sympathy with an audience is to detach *the locomotive,* from its connexion with the moral train, in the bosom of the audience.

Sympathy indispensable.

Of course the orator,—the normal *agent* in this excitation,—is supposed to be *in advance,* of his audience, but *to get beyond the reach of their sympathy,* is to destroy the connecting link, by which, alone, he can hope to carry his audience, with him, in Persuasion.

PART III.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

§ 1. We have thus sought to set the principles and laws of Rhetoric, into relation with its two fold end;—*Conviction* and *Persuasion*. In doing this, we have found ourselves put upon the philosophic study of the principles or laws, 1, of *Thought*,—including its *Emotional* accompaniment or sequence:—and 2, of *Expression*,—so far as they are tributary to these two ulterior ends. The investigation of these principles and laws constitutes *the science* of Rhetoric.

Rhetoric as a science.

§ 2. For the construction of *the art*,—more especially,—we are to make,—as in all the practical arts—an analysis of *the organism*, employed in Rhetoric,—viz: DISCOURSE,—in the best models supplied in nature; with a view of mastering its construction farther, and discovering, if we may, the sources and conditions of its life and power:—and that, both in its *normal*, and *abnormal* forms;—or to use the analogous language of anatomy, both *physiologically* and *pathologically*.

Rhetoric as an art.

§ 3. The instrument employed in Rhetoric; as we have before seen, is *language*.

We have already distinguished, between the general and specific sense of the term, as limited, in the latter case, by the articulate character of human speech.*

§ 4. We have now, farther, to distinguish, the treat-

* Part I, Chap. I, § 1.

ment of language,—as thus limited by *articulate discourse*—into *two subdivisions*:—viz: 1, *constructive Rhetoric*,—or the *construction of discourse*, as *an organic whole*: and which is made up of the several parts, more or less essential to a discourse; and pertaining exclusively to oratory: the part of Rhetoric,—very nearly at least,—described by the earlier Rhetoricians, under the term INVENTION;—and by the Latin and mediæval and still later writers,—as e. g. Blair,—treated under the name of ELOQUENCE;—which is the ulterior and highest concrete form of Rhetoric, as applied in real life:—

Subdivided into Discourse.

2. The *laws of expression* as implicated in the construction of articulate language into speech, regarded simply as the medium of externalizing *thought*,—including, as always, of course, *emotion*:—the part of Rhetoric comprehended under the term *Style*.

Style.

§ 5. And then, finally,—in exposition of the art,—as discourse does not assume its complete form, or clothe itself in its full power, and majesty as ELOQUENCE, until it is delivered, our analysis and reconstruction of Rhetoric entire, is not complete, until we shall have studied the *laws of expression in elocution*; which, therefore, forms the *Fourth* and final part of Rhetoric.

BOOK I.—CONSTRUCTIVE RHETORIC:—DISCOURSE.

CHAPTER I.—CULTURE OF ELOQUENCE.

§ 1. The life and power of a discourse, reside, as we have already seen, in its emotional or impassioned character: and are beyond the reach of any logical analysis. And yet it by no means

Analytic study of Discourse.

follows, that the analytic study of a discourse is useless. We may not be able to trace the animal life to any particular gland, and yet, for the purposes of art, it may be absolutely necessary, to master the organic forms, and functions of the body. Discourse, also, has its body, and its life,—normally found in conjunction;—and yet admitting, if not requiring separation, if we would master the laws of either.

§ 2. The artificial separation or rending assunder of these elements of living eloquence, in the construction of the discourse, works a two fold mischief. It renders argument dry and dull, and then converts the pathetic or impassioned, into rant. Great orators inspire their arguments with emotion; and their pathos springs and flowers from the ground work of their argument. The two should be blended together, like the light and heat of the solar beam. Like them they are not identical. They can be separated: but their separation is the work of art not of nature; and done only with a view to facilitate their study. It is when re-combined, that they constitute eloquence.

Evils of artificial analysis.

Blending of the different elements.

Analyzed only for study.

§ 3. At this point we encounter two practical questions, deserving our attention, viz: 1, can eloquence be cultivated? or is it purely a native gift, setting at defiance all attempts at improvement by analytic study?

Can eloquence be cultivated.

To this fundamental question we reply, 1, that there is nothing in eloquence which cannot be analyzed and referred to intelligle laws of expression.

In the mythologic ages this question might have been debated: —when the effective powers of eloquence both in composition and delivery, were regarded, mythologically, as ethereal qualities, imparted only to a few, by some favoring genius.

Mythological view of eloquence.

But now. 2, the analytic study of the highest specimens of the art, presents us nothing which it is not in the power of well directed labor, to imitate, attain to, or even improve.

Within reach of imitation.

The qualities required in eloquence are natural gifts,—such as reason, taste, emotion, voice, &c.,—and without these gifts, no culture can be successful: and that culture will avail in proportion to their excellence. The object of culture is to develop and to improve,—not to create. There are undoubtedly great diversities, in the original gifts which form the orator, in different men; and hence the same amount of culture in different men, will yield very different results.

Native gifts presupposed.

Object of culture.

Perhaps, moreover, there are men so deficient in these requisite gifts, that they can never become effective orators at all: just as there are men so deficient in voice and ear for music, that they could never become practical musicians. Experience shows, however, that such cases are,—especially under timely and skillful culture,—*rare*. So in eloquence. There is no reason why the art of art of speaking, may not be improved into "*the art of speaking well*,"—Quintilian's definition of eloquence,—within the limits of the natural powers on the one hand, and the intellectual culture and acquirements, on the other, of any individual.

Any man may learn to speak well.

§ 4. It is the property of all the endowments of the orator, to be *improveable;* and so far as appears,—*improveable indefinitely*. If this were otherwise, all education would be a cheat. The intellect, the reason, the taste, the sensibilities *can* be developed. And the improved exercise of these qualities, in accordance with the laws of human culture, cannot but secure more effective eloquence.

Native powers improveable.

§ 5. Not only are the intellectual gifts of the orator capable of indefinite improvement, but the affections, the passions, the emotional and moral nature,—forming the soul of eloquence—these also are *improveable*.

Emotional power improveable.

We do not mean the wretched art of *deceiving* men, by *feigning* emotions which we do not feel: but the honest, hearty exercise of genuine emotion, can be *cultivated*. If this were not so, education would only make men *monsters*, by developing the intellect, out of all proportion to the affections or the will. These

also can be refined, chastened, strengthened, just like the memory or taste or reason.

§ 6. Not only are the intellectual, emotional and moral nature improveable, in quality and power, but in the fourth place, the acquisitions of both, constituting *the material of effective eloquence*, may be increased indefinitely. Without these materials,—the treasures of the intellect, the taste, and the affections,—gleaned from all the fields of science, literature and art, for argument, illustration, and appeal, the orator must fail; whatever be his native gifts.

Material of eloquence may increase.

§ 7. It is just here, that so many men of fine gifts, actually *do* fail. Regarding eloquence, as a power divinely given to a few, and having no dependence on the acquisitions of dull and plodding industry, they despise the toil and drudgery, which are the conditions of all success; as if the materials with which the accomplished orator entrances his audience, and gains his points in argument, illustration, or impassioned appeal, were like the jewels of a lady, capable of being paraded again and again, on all public occasions, by merely shifting their position: instead of being,—as they are,—like the treasures of a mine, yielding gems in exhaustless richness and profusion, but only in return for laborious and tireless digging.

Labor necessary to success.

Causes of failure.

§ 8. *The ready use* of the mental and moral, and æsthetic faculties, and their acquisitions, admits of great improvement by culture.

There are men who seem to have both the faculties and furniture required in eloquence, but lose the command of both, just when they are most needed. Hence some men can write with great readiness and power *in their closet*, while the merest upstart of a demagogue can beat them, to their mortification, before a jury, or a popular assembly.

Self-command may be acquired.

Practice as well as training, is the panacea for this evil. The power of thinking rapidly and correctly, and reasoning tersely, connectedly and powerfully, is capable of surprising improvement. Even *invention*,—an attribute of native genius,—may be cultivated and acquired, in a

Practice necessary.

good degree. The art of handling the passions, is also, eminently an improvable art: and supposes,—like any other art,—a knowledge of the laws, ruling in the domain of the emotions, and active principles of men.

§9. *The command of words*, is still another compensative advantage, of the training of the orator.

Command of Language.

No man uses any considerable proportion of the wealth of language, with which our noble tongue supplies him. Those who have taken pains to inquire into this matter, tell us that even well cultured men, seldom use more than from *one third*, to *one fifth*, even of our good vocabulary: and *uneducated men* do all their business, on a still much smaller capital than this.

Every man, often unnoticed by himself,—has sets of words, which he impresses into service, on all occasions; partly from imperfect education, but mainly from mere habit. An acquaintance can often distinguish a man's style, by the complexion of his words, just as a friend is known by the color of his coat.

This poverty of words resembles, and—what is worse—generally begets, poverty of thought.

Poverty of Style.

Besides the agreeable effect, arising from a suitable variety of words, there are a thousand of the nicer shades of thought, which can be expressed fully and perfectly, only,—if at all—by a wide command of words. Words are to the orator what colors are to the artist. A few of the most glaring kind, are sufficient to execute the daub of the apprentice, but the nicest tints of the art are required to give the flesh touches which distinguish the productions of the master.

In the common judgment of men, language abounds with synonyms—in the strict sense of the word.—In the cultivated eye of a master of that language, scarcely any two words are precisely alike; and

Few words synonymous.

he constantly lays the wealth of the language under contribu-
Power of a master. tion, in order to express the blending lights and shades of thought.

§ 10. Finally, not only the wealth of words, but the
Skill in style attainable. skill of their construction in discourse—everything comprehended in the term *style*, in its largest meaning—is susceptible of culture. Familiarity with the higher specimens of eloquence,
Means of culture. and judicious practice on them, for ourselves, supply us with the necessary means of training. Any man,—not deficient in mental and moral endowments,—can learn to speak with good effect. And in point of fact even in the case of those for whom nature has done most, *art and culture*, have done still more.

§ 11. The impression that some of the greatest orators the world has ever seen, were purely natural orators, grows largely out of our ignorance of their early life. Pitt was accustomed, from his boyhood, to match himself, in fancy, against the ablest debators of the House of Commons; and then compare his private answers, with those given on the floor of the house. Larned, one of the most gifted orators this country has produced, would take his little brothers out, when he was still a child, and lay wagers that he could make them cry.

The natural gifts we may covet, and the results of their culture, we may admire: but *the labor* of their development, we either purposely undervalue, or shrink from enduring, under the impression of its being *hopeless*, and therefore *useless*.

§ 12. But there is a second question:—admitting
Is eloquence worth cultivating. that eloquence can be acquired, is it worth the labor? The argument against its culture, drawn from its abuse, is not worthy of an answer. It is, in fact, a concession of its power; and therefor an argument for its attainment. That *power* under the control of *bad principles* is evil, is a mere truism. To use it as an
The argument from its abuse futile. argument against the culture and the use of power for *right purposes*,

would be as absurd, as to put out all the fire in the world, lest a stray spark should fall in the wrong place, and burn up a few houses. The fact, that armed assassins are prowling about, is the strongest reason, why honest men should carry weapons.

§ 13. And then it is important to remember, that in every fair conflict, truth is stronger than error. It is treason, therefore, to allow error to triumph, merely because its apostles are clothed in better armor, and carry keener blades, and wield, them with better skill, than the friends of truth.

Inducements to its culture.

§ 14. In some parts of the world, it is true, eloquence is of no great use, because men are controlled by force; and freedom even of speech, is not allowed. Of what use, e. g., is eloquence in Italy, where no man dare advocate any other opinions than those of the dominant authorities; and *they* need not *eloquence* for their support. In Austria, also, eloquence is not allowed to exert its power, even in behalf of the oppressed? The very pleadings at law, are required to done in writing.

Eloquence useless in some nations.

The fires of freedom must be, not only *guarded*, but *prohibited*, like fire in a powder mill, lest some spark, struck out by eloquence should blow up the old edifice, of intellectual, spiritual and social despotism; and so bury the owners in the ruins.

§ 15. In our own country, however, it is far otherwise. But even here, we are far from being free from danger, of another sort. The foe, which threatens us, is that monstrous caricature of liberty,—*licentiousness*,—of opinion and of speech. The protean spawn of this monster, is seen in the *radicalism*, upon every subject—sacred and social,—in politics, morals and religion, which characterizes this era of free intellectual life;—and more especially this country, where that life grows with such irrepressible vigor, and more especially still, in those wide frontier regions of this great country, where all restraints are removed, and the inherent power of error, springs, and riots, in unrestrained excess.

Danger of licentiousness at home.

Need of Eloquence.

The social and political, and moral conflict of the world, seems preparing to be fought, upon our great western battle field. It is to be a conflict of opinion, —i. e. a conflict of mind. The enemies of truth and freedom,

Conflict preparing.

are mustering in force, under banners of every hue; and lying mottoes of every device, written, not only like the accusation which Pilate upon the cross,—in Hebrew and Greek and Latin,—but in almost every tongue upon the face of the earth.

As yet, there has been merely a skirmishing of outposts. But the onset approaches. The destiny of the human race, is the prize of the struggle. It is a conflict of *mind*,—a strife of opinion. It is, therefore the battle of eloquence. The arbiter of its mighty issues, is not Mars, but Mercury.

The battle of eloquence.

CHAPTER II.

Methods of Preparation.

Advantages and Disadvantages of Each.

§ It is well known that there is great diversisy among public speakers, in this respect. The various methods, may, however be reduced, for the purposes of study, to *Four*—each having its advantages and disadvantages.

§ 2. The first is the method of *writing out* the discourse, and then *reading* it. This is a device of modern refinement.

Writing and reading.

It is only by courtesy, that it can be called public *speaking* at all. As yet it is confined chiefly to the pulpit; though it begins to make inroads upon the eloquence of deliberative bodies.

§ 3. The chief advantages of this method, are the following;—1. It ensures a thorough study of the subject.

1. Advantage secures study.

A man may talk at random, and even talk *nonsense;*—nothing is more common among public speakers,—but he cannot write nonsense, or even write superficially; without paying a penalty in the shape of self-mortification, which few men are willing to endure. And then if a man will take the time to write, it affords an opportunity, and furnishes a guarantee, that he will investigate, and study.

2. Writing secures fullness and completeness, in the preparation.

2. Secures complete preparation.

Perhaps there is no one whose memory will supply, on the spur of the moment, all that is important to a discussion, even supposing him to be master of his subject. The calmness and deliberation of composition in the closet, and the opportunity of revisal, supply all that is material. Even the very *fervor and passion*, of extempore speech, are unfriendly to the completeness which is indispensable, to effective eloquence.

Advantage for a cultivated audience.

In addressing a highly cultivated audience this is a capital advantage; and no doubt is the true reason, why this method has gained ground so rapidly of late, especially in the pulpit. Notwithstanding the many and great disadvantages, under which it labors, it is not uncommon, for persons of cultivated taste, to prefer a *written discourse*, with its *conciseness*, *fullness* and *finish*, to the warmth and freshness of *extempore* speech, with its *diffuseness* and other *faults of style*.

3. Accurate and elegant style.

3. Writing secures not only fulness, but *accuracy* and *elegance* of thought and expression.

There are very few men, who can speak with the same accuracy, with which they write: because there are very few, who can write with elegance, as fast as they are compelled to speak. The creations of thought, like those of matter, are commonly dark and chaotic at the first. They require to be lighted up, and brought into form and proportion, and relation, by the plastic hand of after labor. This is the work of the study,—not of the pulpit, or the platform. Every composer knows, that he is often compelled to recast a whole sentence to escape some rhetorical inelegance, or blunder, to which the first form of the thought, would have compelled him. As this is impracticable, at the moment of delivery, there is nothing left him but to correct himself, by *repeating* substantially his thought, in a manner more elegant or forcible. Hence *extempore* orators, are generally wordy, diffuse, and *given to repetition*.

Condensation, conjoined with clearness, force, and beauty,—i.e. excellence of style,—is the strong inducement to prepare in writing.

4. Complete arrangement.

4. A fourth advantage of this method, is that it allows the most complete arrangement of the parts of a discourse, so as to bring out the whole strength of an argument.

The heat of extempore address is as unfriendly to the *logic*, as to the *rhetoric* of oratory. In argumentative oratory, or in nar-

ration, or wherever the effect depends upon the clearness and coolness of the speaker, *writing* has greatly the advantage.

5. Writing is sometimes rendered important, where one has wily and able opponents, ready to trip him up, if he should make a slip,—as men are always liable to do, in the hot haste of extempore discourse.

5. Prevents misrepresentation.

When we are expounding obnoxious truths, or advocating unpopular measures, or opinions and especially in the midst of enemies; or wherever it is important, to weigh carefully the very words we utter, it is well to commit them to writing:—1st, because we can then say just what we mean to say; and 2d, because, if our words are tortured out of their proper meaning, we can establish by a simple reference to the MS., precisely what we did say.

6. The last specification of the advantages of writing, is the *mental culture attending the process.*

6. Secures mental culture.

If we were compelled to make an unconditional defence of this method, we should plant our strongest battery, upon this very ground.

The abandonment of the pen; or exclusive and habitual extemporizing, is incompatible with high mental culture, and profound and thorough scholarship. There is truth, as well as pungency in Macauley's remark, that "we should sooner expect a great original work on political science, from an apothecary in a country town; or from a minister in the Hebrides, than from a Statesman, who, ever since he was one-and-twenty, had been a distinguised debater in the House of Commons."

The well known saying of Lord Bacon, that "reading makes a full man, conversation a ready man, and writing an exact man," contains a vast deal of truth: and two thirds of that truth, is in favor of writing; because no man will *write* much, without *reading* much too.

§ 4. The leading disadvantages of the method of writing and reading speeches, are the following:

Disadvantages.

1. It is often *impracticable* to prepare before hand, from the want of time and convenience, and then the preparation which is made, is often inappropriate to the circumstances. It is always difficult to anticipate precisely the character of an audience, and the state of

1. Want of time to write.

feeling which may happen to prevail. And besides, there is frequently a change in the current of discussion or emotion, which renders that wholly *inappropriate*, at one stage of an assembly, which would have been entirely suitable at another. The speaker who is exclusively shut up to written preparation, gets many a sweat, as he sees the current of thought and feeling, drifting away from his speech. There are few states of feeling less enviable than that of an orator who comes to his post, all loaded and primed; and then *finds*, to his consternation, that the mark has been carried far out of the range of his shot.

2. Change of feeling in an audience.

And then the difficulty is, that your writers cannot throw away the written preparation, and get up something new, on the spur of the moment. They cannot even *modify* it so as to accommodate a slight change of circumstances. They are like a heavy piece of ordinance, well shotted and then built into the solid wall of a fortress. It may do good execution, upon whatever may chance to come within its range; but is incapable of being shifted out of the single line of direction, in which it may happen to have been originally placed.

3. Difficulty of adaptation.

§ 5. The second class of difficulties relates to the the delivery or rather the *reading* of written speeches.

The soul of eloquence is emotion. Paper is a sad hindrance to this. It serves very much like a non-conductor in the line of an electrical discharge. The current of sympathy is seriously obstructed in its flow to an audience, by the intervention of a MS. But may not this difficulty be obviated by a man *reading* just as he would *speak*? This is easier said than done, it is *impossible* to read as one would speak—and for the most part, it is better not to *try*. Elocution is the *expression* of emotion. Now the emotion of the closet, is *one* thing:—that of the public assembly is *another*, and a *very different* thing. The language of the written discourse is the expression of the emotion of the closet. It is that which gave the precise coloring to the words selected: and those words will not express any other emotion, without doing violence either to the one, or the other, or both.

4. Reading less impassioned.

Reading emotionally different from speaking.

If one should give expression to the appropriate emotion of the excited popular assembly, either his emotion would not suit his language, or his language would not suit his emotion. Hence the apparent inconsistency of weeping over paper.

This difference is insuperable, as far it goes. The proprieties

of the case *demand* that written discourse should be pronounced differently from those which are *extempore*. And not only propriety, but *nature*, demands it; and one cannot do otherwise if he would. But in conforming to propriety and nature, he must sacrifice much of the power of eloquence, so far as it depends upon elocution. It is like two strains of music on different keys. This is a serious disadvantage: and more so, became it is incurable. The cultivation of the age demands the correctness and elegance of style, which can be secured only by previous writing; and this amounts to a complete prohibition, upon that wild and sublime eloquence, which expresses passion in the fresh and powerful language of nature; regardless of the correctness of educated criticism.

Difference between reading and speaking.

Correctness incompatible with freedom.

§ 6. The third disadvantage, of writing and reading, is, that the speaker loses the benefit of the stimulus afforded by an audience.

Stimulus of an audience lost in reading.

We have said the emotion of the closet is one thing that of the popular assembly is another. The same thing is still more true of the intellectual states of the speaker. The mental stimulus of an assembly is always great—often excessive. We have seen that in many cases it is so unfriendly to calm clear, logical thought, as to form a prominent advantage in favor of writing in the study; but on the other hand, it sometimes contributes greatly to the vigor and power of a speaker's thought; if he can keep complete control of himself.

Always great.

Sometimes excessive.

There are men, whose style in the study is tame, and even loose; but who, under the stimulus of an audience, speak with an energy, condensation, and power, which nothing can resist.

§ 7. Another disadvantage in reading discourses, relates to the speaker's elocution, especially his action.

Loss of power in elocution.

The countenance and eye are busy in holding converse with his *notes;* instead of his *audience*. That magic instrument, so potent in transmitting the power of sympathy, from the soul of the speaker, to the hearer, and from the hearer back again with redoubled power, to the speaker, is subordinated to the poor office, of conveying thoughts from the paper to the brain, of the orator, which,

Loss of power in elocution.

Office of the eye in elocution.

for effective eloquence, ought to be already fired with emotion; and its great office should be, to set on fire the passions of the audience.

And even when the eyes are lifted from that menial service, and exposed to the audience, it is only with an unmeaning gaze, as destitute of life,—emotion,—soul—i. e. eloquence—as were the eyes of "Banquo's ghost, in Shakspeare, where Macbeth exclaims:

"Thou hast no *speculation*, in those eyes,
"Which thou dost glare with."

Action fettered.

The hands and arms, too, are fettered unavoidably. How can a man gesture with freedom or power,—to his manuscript.

§ 8. The SECOND METHOD of preparation, is that of writing as before, but committing the discourse to memory; and then delivering it *memoriter*. It will be seen that this method differs, only in a few particulars, from that just described: and much of what was said in reference to that, applies,—mutatis mutandis,—to this.

Second method memoriter delivery.

Of course it has all the advantages specified as arising from the habit of writing, while it avoids, in some measure, the following disadvantages.

1. The memoriter speaker has the use of his hands and arms for gesture, and his countenance and eye for expression. This, however, is apt to be more in *appearance*, than in reality:—for the eye still busy reading,—if not what is written on real the pages of the MS. at least what is written on *the ideal pages* of the memory. There is an apparent absence of mind, in the whole manner of the memoriter speaker, which shows that he is *reciting without the book*, and not speaking with the freshness of spontaneous utterance. His elocution is substantially that of *the reader*, and not that of the speaker; and then he is always fettered somewhat by the danger, and embarrassing apprehension, of a slip of the memory.

1. Allows action in elocution.

Apparent more than real.

Allows the stimulus of the audience.

2. This method secures *partially* the benefits of the audience, reacting upon the speaker.

But this, of course, is confined to the mere *delivery*. Whatever stimulus comes from this source, comes *too late* to affect the character of the discourse itself. It may improve—though for the reason mentioned,—never fully cure, *the elocution*, but not the *rhetoric* of his eloquence.

3. The chief advantages of delivering a discourse *memoriter*, above reading the same, may be summed up in the remark, that the speaker has more command both of his person, and his subject. If he is fully possessed of his discourse, he has the benefit of knowing precisely, the whole chain of thought or reasoning; so as to adjust his delivery to which is to come, as well as, to what he is uttering at the moment. This blindness of what follows in reading, the necessary concentration of the attention upon a single sentence, or part of a sentence at a time, hampers the delivery exceedingly, and in fact constitutes *one of the great disadvantages of reading*.

Command of himself and his subject.

§ 9. Between the two methods, there can be no doubt that the preference is altogether due to the latter, so far as *the effect*, is concerned.

Effect greater.

The great difficulty which stands in the way of its general adoption is, the *time* and *labor* it requires, to commit a discourse to memory. In many cases it is far more difficult than the original composition of the discourse; and where one's profession requires much speaking, it is nearly or wholly out of the question.

Difficulty.

This difficulty is the more serious, because the time and labor of memorizing, is so unprofitable. The improvement of the memory is worth something, but not in all cases, worth what it would cost.

It ought to be remarked, however, that *practice* gives wonderful *facility*, in the matter. Many persons not remarkable for their memory, can deliver a discourse, recently written, by one or two readings. And probably there are very few who could not acquire the ability, to commit a speech of reasonable length, by reading it; carefully, five or six times. With a memory of high order, an orator, may acquire the power of composing a discourse *verbatim*, and delivering it, *without* writing it at all. This is a gift worth having. But wo to the memoriter speaker, if he happens to lose the thread of his discourse. The dread of this is perhaps one chief reason, why so few are willing to trust themselves, without their notes. The bewilderment of mind in groping after the lost clew, unfits one for the thought necessary to go on *extempore*. If he should make the attempt, he is apt to flounder desperately in the mire, and unless he can soon regain the solid path of his

Improvement by practice.

Danger of losing the clew.

written discourse, he is no small danger of sinking entirely in the slough.

This difficulty may, however, be obviated in some degree, by making an abstract—or brief, as the lawyers call it—of the discourse, and lay it before you. This will quiet the nervous dread of losing oneself; and if a part of the discourse should happen to escape, he can begin again, at the next principal thought, and so go forward unembarrassed.

Benefit of a brief.

§ 10. The THIRD METHOD of preparation is not to write at all, but *to study the subject thoroughly*, arrange in the mind the the whole train of argument and even illustration; and then trust to the occasion, to furnish the language and supply the form, and emotion, appropriate to the circumstances.

3d method

The advantages of this method are these:—1, It is the only way of securing perfect freedom and naturalness of expression and manner in voice, countenance and gesture.

1 Advantage naturalness.

If a man understands and feels his subject fully, and speaks without fear, he will speek naturally and forcibly.

2. The freshness of the thoughts, or at least the language, wakes up his own feelings, and thus stimulates his mind for the effort of speaking.

2 Fresh and vivid.

Every body must have noticed that the emotions attending the first conception and utterance of thought, are far more vivid, than on recurring to it a second, or third, or fifth time. The charm which novelty and freshness give, is always lost, in written discourses, and is very apt to give place to dissatisfaction, if not disgust. To preserve some portion of the fresh emotion, a distinguished orator, now living, advises those who read, or commit their speeches, never to read them over *aloud*, or to allow their feelings to get at all excited, in conning them over, *even in silence*. This advice is well founded. Extempore address, alone, given us the full benefit of the reaction of what we are saying upon our own mental activity.

3. Another grand advantage of extempore speech, after full and careful preparation, is the excitement of the audience, and the occasion.

3. Stimulus of the occasion.

It is well known, that the mind acts most vigorously, under excitement:—and that no excitement is so stimulating as that of an attentive and excited audience.

We say an *attentive* audience,—because the want of attention, so far from warming up the speaker, pours cold water, upon him, and puts out, what fire he would otherwise have had.

And then, of course, it kills the interest of the speaker, and makes it impossible *to speak well.* Who could speak *earnestly* with feeling and force, to men asleep?

It may not be quite useless in this connexion to advice those who speak in public, instead of allowing their eye to roam vacantly and at random, over an audience, to *look* strongly and *steadily* into their faces,—and try to establish a sympathy of soul between themselves, and one or more of their hearers.

Without this, much of the benefit of *extempore* address will be lost to the speaker, and of course, therefore, lost to the hearers also.

§ 11. 1, The first great and obvious *disadvantage,* of speaking without writing, is the difficulty of making sufficiently full, exact, and finished preparation.

1. Disadvantage inadequate preparation.

This is a difficulty, which experienc and labor will do much to mitigate, and surmount. One may acquire the power, to an astonishing degree, of laying up in his mind, the precise train of thought, with all its divisions, and illustrations, which he may wish to use. He may even revise, and enlarge or compress it, without ever committing it to writing. Robert Hall, it is well known prepared his discourses in this manner, and then if they were intended for publication he wrote them out, after their delivery. If a man has the power and industry of Hall, this is, the best method of preparation. It secures the exactness and completeness of writing, along with the freedom and life, of *extempore* address.

How obviated.

Habit of Robert Hall.

2. The second disadvantage of this method, is the temptation it furnishes, to slight the preparation, and trust to the impulse of the moment, for the matter, as well as the manner,—the *thought* as well as the *language.*

Dangers of this method.

§ 12. THE FOURTH, and last, method of speaking, is *the absolute extempore;*—i. e. speaking without careful preparation at all.

Absolute extempore method.

This is the worst method of all, and yet, in popular assemblies it is by no means unusual. It is strongly recommended by two things;—1, the aversion to hard study,—or in oth-
Temptations. er words indolence of men. 2, the *hurry* and *bustle*, which is the common condition of popular assemblies.

Men in public life are very often *compelled*, to
Inducements. speak without preparation, or else not speak at all.

And it is surprising what a facility may be acquired by long
Power. practice in the art; and by men of no extraordinary talents or attainments. Many men will make an effective and brilliant speech, on almost any subject, and on almost any side of any subject, who are yet incapable of discerning between truth and error; because they are incapable of conducting a close and searching analysis. When one comes to sit down by the side of one of our great popular orators, and discuss the fundamental principles of any subject;—or tax the minutiæ of his knowledge, he will be surprised to find him as weak and ignorant as a child. For philosophical processes, his mind may be so feeble, as scarcely, to command respect; while on the floor of an assembly, he has the power of swaying the passions and convictions, even of intelligent audiences.

§ 13. This one sided development of mind, is the more certain
Habit of taking the wrong side. to occur, but is none the less deplorable, from the fact, that such men are generally given to exerting this power, on the wrong, as well as the right side, of questions. It is commonly thought that it requires uncommon ability, to argue the wrong side of a question: and under this impression, young orators are fond of choosing the wrong side, both to cultivate and display their powers. This is a mistake. A superficial man can support the
Evils of the habit. wrong side better, than a profound one. He must not only *devise arguments*, which a man can use, who does *not* see their fallacy, better than one who does, but he must *seem* to *believe* them. To do this (if he is a profound and logical man) he must *do violence* both to his *intellect*, and his *moral feelings*;—while the ingenious shallow man, does neither. It is a far higher mark of abilty, to decide rightly be-
Highest mark of ability. tween truth and error, than to devise plausible arguments in support of either. Many a man has ingenuity enough to plead eloquently for error, who has not the clearness and force of mind, necessary to see that it is error. The very fact that so many men are the dupes

of error, proves that men can easily construct fallacies, which they cannot themselves detect or expose.

§ 14. It is precisely this danger of being caught in one's own snares, that makes this practice so dangerous. The powerful principles of self esteem—and partiality for one's own offspring, makes the danger all the greater. Many a man has converted *himself* to error, by arguing for it, when he has convinced nobody else. There is no proposition, however monstrous, that a man may not bring himself to believe, by this process, if he attempts to support it in hearty earnest, and feigns to believe it himself. The very fact that *others* will not believe, makes *him* believe the more resolutely *himself*; in order to bolster up his self esteem.

Danger.

The habit is *most injurious* both to the intellect, and the moral sense: and therefore operates strongly to the disadvantage of eloquence, in its highest forms. It supposes the culture either of bad logic, or moral insincerity, or both:—and the infusion of either of these elements into eloquence, is like making an amalgum of gold and clay. It is *discreditable*, as well as *injurious*; because it does not *argue*, but rather *disproves* the presence, of the higher forms of intellectual ability.

The habit demoralizing.

§ 15. This subject,—the mode of preparation for public speaking,—is one of chief importance. A man's habits in this matter, often determine his whole future career, Men who have the powers, to become original, clear, profound and powerful thinkers,—discoverers in the fields of unknown truth—become superficial, wordy, and even slovenly, *declaimers*;—and incapable of writing any thing worthy of outliving their own life time, merely by adopting bad habits of preparation. They find that they can carry their point by unstudied *extempore* effusions: and why should they go to the trouble of laborious thought and research, only to be coughed down for their pains. If a cheap, spurious coin will pass current in the world, why should a man be at the expense of providing the pure gold? The temptation is too strong for most men to resist. The consequence is, that they do a great business upon very little capital, and even that little counterfeit: but then, such men, commonly die poor at last.

Importance of the subject.

§ 15. It is scarcely necessary to say,—what is so obvious—that the merits of the different methods of preparation for speaking, are *comparative*.

Advantages comparative.

One is better for one person, and another for another. Cir-

cumstances, may alter cases. What circumstances give the preference to each of the several methods, may be deduced from the advantages, and disadvantages of each.

Difficult to combine different methods.

§ 17. If we attempt to combine writing and extempore speech,—as some advise,—we shall embarrass *both*, and perhaps do *neither well.*

The mental state necessary to compose well, is very different from that which exists in the mere reading or reciting of a written speech. The speaker who attempts to break away from his MS. every few sentences, will be very much like a horse in harness, with one foot out of the traces.

Slavery to the pen.

§ 18. On the other hand, one who confines himself wholly to his pen, becomes a *slave* to it; and cannot even *think*, without a pen in hand.

The orator who always writes and reads, can no more speak without, than a bird reared in a cage, can soar with the pinion of the mountain eagle.

CHAPTER III.

Invention.

Invention defined.

§ 1. The orator is supposed to have his theme furnished, by the circumstances which demand *the Discourse.* Invention—in the sense in which we use the term at present,—refers, rather to the subordinate topics, by means of which the orator proposes to himself, to reach the ulterior special *object*, of the Discourse, than to the finding of the theme itself. *Invention* has for its object, rather to supply the *intermediate thoughts*, whether in *argument*,* or *persuasion*, which go to form the special parts of the Discourse, by which, the theme is set into relation with its object. The *Process of Invention* is ruled, therefore, 1, by the *general laws of thought* in the human mind, and *con-*

* See Part I, Ch. 2.

ditioned,—2, by its *special, or intermediate objects*, viz:

Laws ruling in Invention.

argument, or exhortation. Having already discussed the laws ruling in both these spheres of eloquence in the proper place†, it only remains to define the several subordinate processes, which Invention has for its object to develope, in its progress towards these ulterior ends.

§ 2. Without one or the other of these ends, guiding the construction of Discourse, Oratory, proper, cannot exist. The processes tributary to these two ulterior ends, admit of farther subdivision,—each into two.* In the first place there are two sub-processes, in the sphere of the intellect;—the one having for its immediate object an effect, or change, upon, the idea or *simple conception* of the subject, lying in the mind addressed. This, as we have seen already, is the object sought, in the special process termed *Instruction*:†—the other has for its object, an effect or change of *judgment*, or *belief*;—giving us the process of conviction proper;—and embracing the process of argument.‡ There are also two *sub-processes* in the sphere of persuasion:§—the one contemplating a transient impression on the will, by the intervention of the emotional nature, and constituting what has sometimes been termed *excitation*:—the other, a *permanent effect*, upon the *character or the will*, by the intervention mainly of the affections, or the passions. Invention, therefore, must proceed, in the recognition of the special processes or laws, tributary to these several ends, by which the great *ulterior end* of oratory, is sought to be effected.

Processes tributary to the ends of discourse.

Two intellectual.

Two moral.

Each of these subordinate processes in Rhetoric, has already found a sufficient definition, and exposi-

* See Parts I and II.
† Part I, Ch. II, § 5, 6, 7.
‡ Part I, Ch. II, § 7 and 8.
§ Part II, Ch. I, § 1.

tion, to determine the laws of thought, as modified by each; and subject to which, the general process of Invention must proceed.

Invention flows out into the parts of discourse.

§ 3. As the *organism*, by which Invention seeks to attain its ulterior end, in conviction or Persuasion, is THE DISCOURSE, it is unavoidable that the mould into which *Invention* will flow forth, in the form of Discourse, must be determined by a practical study of *the Parts of a Discourse*, in their essential nature, their uses, and their forms.

CHAPTER IV.

ORGANIC RHETORIC.

The Several Parts of a Discourse.

Analysis of Discourse.

§ 1. There are some who deem this whole work of analysing the mechanism of eloquence useless, if not injurious; because there are men who can produce the complicated result, without knowing anything about the parts of a discourse, or seeming to think that it has parts at all. *Genius*, is the only law, they recognize.

It is not to be supposed, however, that any man's genius, would enable him to produce, without analytical study, any thing so complete as the experience of 10,000 men of equal genius, has produced, by each one improving on the skill of his predecessor. There are many men perfectly capable of learning the complex and curious mechanism of eloquence, with all its hidden springs of power, who yet have not *the genius* to penetrate its nature at a glance, and much less to re-produce the like, by mere intuition, without minute and analytic study of the parts of a Discourse. And it may be doubted whether there is any man, however gifted, who cannot learn much, from such analysis, coupled with skillful practice on it.

§ 2. In describing the parts, into which a discourse

Different analysis.

may be divided, it is obvious that the distribution must be arbitrary; and that the number of parts may be made greater or smaller, as the judgment, or fancy, may dictate. Aristotle makes four,—Quintilian five, and Cicero six. Among modern authors, there is very much the same diversity.

This, however, is rather an apparent, than a real difference; because one author treats under a single head, what another finds it convenient to divide into two.

A Discourse, then, may be divided for the purpose of study, into six parts.

Classification of Parts.

1 *Introduction*,
2 *Proposition*,
3 *Division*,
4 *Narration*,
5 *Argument* and
6 *Conclusion*.

§ 3. It is to be presumed that no man speaks, without having something to say. That *something*, is the *Proposition*:—it is made up, as we have seen, of the *theme* of the discourse, stated in relation with the *special object or end of* the Discourse.

The Proposition.

§ 4. Again. It would be useless for a speaker merely to announce a proposition. It would answer none of the purposes of eloquence. It would not be a speech, but *a dictum*. If he wishes to make any use of his proposition, he must first explain it:—show what its bearings are, and what uses he proposes to make of it. This is the *division or distribution*.

Division.

§ 5. But farther, the whole force of what he has to say, turns upon whether his proposition, thus explained, is true or not. This, therefore, he is bound to make good. Hence *argument or proof*, is also an indispensable part of every discourse. If

Argument.

there were no need of this, there would generally be no need of the Discourse itself.

§ 6. Some times, it is true, the audience may be in possession of all the evidence necessary to prove the proposition; and then it is only necessary for the speaker *to arrange the proofs*; and show their bearing upon the proposition. At other times, his object is not to produce conviction about a doubtful point, but to give information about that which is before unknown. In either case it requires a process entirely different from that of logical argumentation. This process is termed *narration*.

Navigation.

§ 7. And finally, having established his point, the speaker endeavors to bring his hearers into complete sympathy with himself, and to make what he has said, bear upon the great purposes, for which he said it. This is the main object of the *conclusion, or peroration*. In addition to this there, is the same need for a conclusion, that there is for an Introduction,—viz: to avoid the effect of abruptness on the mind of the hearer: and to prevent, a breach of sympathy.

Conclusion.

§ 8. Thus there is a foundation in nature, for all the parts of a Discourse, enumerated. No speech can be complete, at least none which aims at any of the great ends of eloquence,—which does not embrace them all;—either formally, or virtually.

It is not intended to assert that they are all distinct from each other, or in separate parts of the Discourse:—and much less that they must follow one another, in any fixed order. They may not even be distinctly before the mind of the orator. But it is true, nevertheless, that in every complete speech, these elements can all be found: and commonly the more clearly they lie in the mind of the speaker, the more conclusive will be their effect upon the mind of the hearer.

The student of eloquence would do well to imitate the student of painting, by selecting some of the *finest specimens* of the *ablest* masters of the art, and making them *studies*. Analyze them,—study their elements, in each of their several parts,—not merely with a view to *the style*, but *mainly to the mechanism*, of

Discourse. Disengage the proposition; and then trace it, as it is woven like a thread of gold, with consummate art and effect throughout the various divisions of the argument. See how he ingratiates himself into the good will of his hearers, wins their sympathy, disarms their prejudices, carries their convictions, and sways their will, either by gradual approaches, or by storm; according to his relative force over theirs. Then see how, in the calm, dignity of a conqueror, he takes possession of the very citadel of the opposing mind; and gives law to the captive powers of his hearers, with a mastery which makes them forget, that he is their victor, in their admiration and love of his qualities, as the master and controller of their mental destinies.

CHAPTER V.

Introduction.

§ 1. **That there is a rational ground in nature, for an *introduction*, more or less formal and prolonged, is evinced in the universal usage of mankind. Even the slight passing intercourse of friends, exemplifies the usage. The weather, or some equally obvious and trivial *small talk*, about some common place topic, must furnish an introduction, even to the most casual intercourse of friends. And if nothing more formal should occur, some unmeaning sentence, is interpolated—"by the way,"—to prevent the sharpness of the concussion, between minds thrown together casually, like cars on a rail road. The ultimate ground of this universal habit, is laid in the fact,—before noticed,—that the effect of the intercourse of mind with mind, involves a subjective element of power. Besides the medium of words, there is a play of influences, more subtle, etherial, and yet mightily effective, for good or ill, between the speaker and the audience, which goes far to determine the influence of discourse, both in conviction and persuasion.** Necessity.

In the casual meeting of mind with mind, on the field of oratory, it cannot be presumed, that the sympathy, which is the secret of this power, will spring into instant activity. To establish it, before proceeding to the main object of discourse,—whether it be conviction or persuasion,—is the *precise object and function of the Introduction.*

Introduction;—when not needed.

§ 2. When the circumstances can be relied upon to establish this sympathy of feeling and object,—when the emotions of the speaker and the hearers, are struggling to meet in one common gush of mutual outflow, not only may a *formal* introduction be dispensed with, but to employ one, in such a case, would be to throw cold water on metal, already heated for the plastic hammer. This principle explains the apparent exceptions to a habit, elsewhere universal;—as in the well known cases of Cicero against Cataline; and Burke before the house of commons on the affairs of India.

Threefold object.

§ 3. Such cases, however, are rare and accidental exceptions, to a necessity otherwise imperative and uniform. This necessity respects three things:—1, the person and circumstances of the orator;—2, those of the audience;—and 3, the subject matter and occasion of the discourse.

Threefold character of an orator.

§ 4. In the analysis of what is necessary for the orator, Aristotle, and all the Rhetoricians after him, enumerate three things:—viz: 1, good sense; 2, good principles; and 3, good will; confidence, in these three constituents of character, being necessary to any complete command, of an audience, on the part of an orator.

§ 5. In the first place, *confidence in the good sense of the orator*, is the foundation of ready access, whether to the mind or the heart of an audience:—in other words, whether in conviction, or persuasion. The

Value of good sense. opinions of an orator, who enjoys the confidence of an audience, in this respect, come with the weight of *an authority:* and even the *suspicion* of a lack of this quality, works a forfeiture of confidence and influence, proportioned to its degree.

In proportion as men respect themselves, they cannot but withdraw their sympathy, from a fool, or from whatever approaches to folly. *Sympathy* and *conviction* are, the twin offspring of confidence, in the good sense and competency of an orator, and a *fictitious confidence*, can give birth to no other, than a bastard progeny.

To possess such confidence, it is necessary to deserve it: and to deserve it, it is necessary to possess and exhibit, the requisite grounds for its existence. This is partly an intellectual and partly a moral quality. If the speaker feels a contempt for his audience, he cannot fail to reveal it: and such contempt is sure to breed reciprocal *scorn;* or if the feeling does not rise high enough for scorn, at least *ill will.* And to provoke such feelings, or others kindred to them, on *either side*, and especially on both, is to interpose a high barrier in the way of *conviction*, and an *insuperable one*, in the way of *persuasion.*

Confidence in the *good sense* of the orator is, therefore, the *first* requisite to his power: and the introduction can scarcely fail to give an audience,—keenly on the alert, and sensitive to impression,—an opinion more or less favorable or the reverse, of the character for good sense, of an orator.

§ 6. *Confidence in the good principles* of an orator, is the *second requisite* to his power over an audience. This element of character appertains predominantly to the *moral* power of the speaker; as the former does to the *intellectual.*

Good principles.

It is always to be presumed, unless the contrary is known, that the ruling judgment of an audience, will be on the side of good principles: and *any distrust of an orator*, in this regard, will necessarily awaken suspicion, if not positive *prejudice, or even repugnance*, towards his person and his cause. On the other hand, an orator of unquestioned integrity, speaks, on *matters of fact* almost with the deference due to a *witness*, and in *matters of opinion*, he has often the weight of a

Effect of distrust.

definitive *authority*. In proportion to our confidence in his principles, it is taken for granted, that we may safely resign ourselves to his lead. To attain to this position before the public, is a large part of the battle, in any dubious case; and for swaying the popular mind, a character for integrity is *better* than argument, because it involves a power over the sympathetic *will* of an audience, while argument reaches only the *convictions;* and is subject to the possible drawback, of intellectual *prejudices* as well as *hostile passions*. Great as the power of oratory is, it is yet no match for obstacles like these.

Effect of confidence.

§ 7. The remaining condition, essential to the fullest power of an orator, is the confidence of the audience in his *good will*. Mere ability, or even ability joined with good principles, is a two edged sword: it is always a question of vital moment to an audience, to be assured farther that it is in the hands of *a friend*, and not of *a foe*. Power wielded by an enemy, is purely formidable; and the greater the *power* the more *formidable* it is.

Value of good will.

Hence not only, the assurance of good principles. And their just and equitable application, in *argument or persuasion*, but confidence in their *kind and friendly use*, are necessary to induce an audience to surrender themselves to the control of an orator. The *prosecutor* and the *advocate*, of a man on trial for his life, may equally possess his confidence, for the ability, thoroughness, and justice, with which they plead respectively, for his conviction or acquittal; but who does not feel the difference in the plea, inevitably due to the single consideration, of antagonism on the one part, and good will on the other, of the respective orators.

The difference due to lack of good will.

The same principles, precisely, apply, where the audience is, directly or indirectly, the party interested in the speech. Not only would the same degree of ability and integrity in the two cases, however beyond question they might be, receive a different color in passing through minds differently affected, in the respect in question, but the very same individual, would see the evidence and catch the spirit of opposition, or good will, with very different eyes and animus, as prosecutor or defendant.

The difference *might*, of course, be greatly culpable, but it might also be very great, without being culpable: i. e. it might be great, by virtue of the force of circumstances, above and beyond the force of the will, even though sustained by sound principles, to bear up against.

Not always culpable.

In these three essential respects, confidence on the part of the audience, is determined partly by whole manner, spirit, and bearing of the speaker; and that judgment will be determined, farther, in every human probability,—and probably unchangably,—if not finally,—*by the introduction* of the discourse, and its effect upon the audience, will be well nigh settled, in their conjectural convictions, before they have even heard it.

Confidence secured in the Introduction.

§ 8. Such is the possible influence of the Introduction, as affecting the person and circumstances of the orator;—that arising from the persons and circumstances of the audience, is scarcely less controlling; and indeed involves so many of the same elements of power, as scarcely to need a separate treatment.

Bearing on the audience.

The case suggests the physical analogy, of the law of action and reaction. Every thing that affects the mind of the orator, reacts upon the mind of the audience: but the mind of the audience, however likely to react on the mind of the orator is yet of vast importance beyond that, in determining the effect of a discourse for reasons purely subjective to itself. There are often personal prejudices and misapprehensions to be removed; and sympathy to be established, partly for assignable cause, and partly without, which the introduction furnishes time and opportunity to grapple with,—and which yet make no part of the proper body of the discourse. In so doing, they prepare the way for the establishment of a mutual understanding and confidence, which, in their turn, may be largely tributary to the proper ends of the discourse.

Importance for subjective reasons.

§ 9. The third important service rended in the Introduction, arises from the subject matter and circumstances of the discourse; either or all of which may furnish occasion, for what

Importance to the subject matter.

is the proper and highest end of the Introduction,—viz: the drawing of the audience into the full sympathy and confidence of the orator;—thus placing them in the most favorable circumstances, for conviction or persuasion.

It is scarcely supposable that there should not be points in the subject matter or the circumstances of a discourse, which will not furnish topics of common interest, to bring the mind of the speaker and his hearers into the sympathy and mutual confidence, necessary to the attainment of its ends. The *character of the theme*, or of the *topics generally*, or the *peculiar nature of the circumstances* of the discourse,—each severally, or all jointly, are capable of supplying special Introductions; in so far as the speaker may seek to excite an interest in common with himself;—and which may conduct the two parties to the discourse, to a common and mutually interesting ground, out of which the avenues of discourse may lead naturally to the end sought to be attained.

Several forms of Introduction.

§ 10. The authors enumerate several forms of Introduction, available for the purposes specified;—e. g.

Explanatory Introduction.

1. The EXPLANATORY INTRODUCTION. This is proper, and *demanded*, where there is an *impediment* in the way of the prompt and cordial *sympathy* of the speaker and the audience; growing out of *some misapprehension* of the parties in *their relation to each other;* or of *either of them*, in relation to the *subject or circumstances*, of the discussion. All the minds looking to the same object, from the same point of view,—and under common circumstances and feelings,—may be expected to harmonize, in their views and judgments. To effect this as far as possible, is the object of this form of Introduction. If there is any peculiarity in the object, or point of view, liable to bar the sympathy of the speaker with his hearers, *the explanatory introduction* supplies an opportunity to place themselves on common grounds to start from. This is the first object of an Introduction with reference to the sub-

ject matter of a discourse, viz: *to awaken attention to an uninteresting subject.*

Paradoxical Introduction. §11. *A second form of Introduction;*—meeting the same indications, is that sometimes called the PARADOXICAL INTRODUCTION.

Usefulness. One of the most ingenious specimens of that form, is the Introduction to Paley's Moral Philosophy, Book III, Ch. 1. Its utility depends on the fact, that many truths which excite little attention, because of their apparent common place character, really contain paradoxes, which would startle the attention, if skilfully drawn out. There is of course danger of exciting *prejudice*, or awakening a *presumption against* the truth, merely from the extravagance of its paradox. This, it is well known actually happened, in the case of Dr. Paley, who was familiarly surnamed from this very Introduction, PIGEON PALEY, by the wits of the court of George the III. The effect of ridicule in such a case is, of course, to defeat the very object of an introduction, and to *alienate;* instead of *conciliating confidence.*

Historical Introduction. §12. Still another form of Introduction, applicable to the same purpose, is the HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

Its rationale consists in stirring the hearers' curiosity, by giving some curious information, bearing on the subject; and serving to show that there is something connected with it, worthy of farther research and discussion. Thus, e. g. a well known preacher introduces a sermon on Providence, by giving a short sketch of the natural history of the Lion.* The information was new and highly curious and interesting to the audience; and was perfectly effectual, in waking up their attention.

Another instance of the effect of this form of Introduction, well known to the public, is the case of a living minister, who introduced his sermon by a historical introduction on the habits of the eagle, drawn from the text, Deut. 32; 11: "As an eagle stirreth up her nest, fluttereth over her young, spreadeth abroad her wings, taketh them, beareth them on her wings: so the Lord alone did lead him, and there was no strange God with him."

"If there be anything really *odd*, in forms of introduction like these, there is always some danger, that the ludicrous aspect of

* The justification of an Introduction apparently so remote, was the allusion in the text to the habits of the Lion:—"The young lions may lack and suffer hunger, but they that wait upon the Lord shall not want any good thing"

the subject, may be seized on, and made to bear *against* the serious import and intent of the Introduction;—as in the case of the *paradoxical introduction*: and as there, it may even serve the purpose of ridicule, to parties hostile to the subject or the orator.

Conciliatory Introduction.

§ 18. A *fourth* form of Introduction, springing out of the same necessities, and answering the same ends, is the CONCILIATORY INTRODUCTION. Besides the ignorance, error, misapprehension, or cross purposes, to which the explanatory introduction is appropriate, the *Conciliatory Introduction* contemplates the possibility of some flaw, or jar between the parties to a discussion; or between either party and the subject matter of the discussion, which it is its object to remove, or mitigate. The object of such an introduction, accordingly, is to *conciliate good will*, to an *unwelcome* subject, or *relieve prejudice* against an *obnoxious* party, or proposition.

Its object.

Of course there is every degree in the repulsiveness of a subject, or an advocate, from that which awakens simple *indifference*, to that which provokes the most strong and settled aversion.

Degree of conciliation.

Where the orator encounters mere indifference, it may suffice, especially if he should possess the confidence of his audience, to promise that the discussion will repay their attention. Such a promise may secure attention,—not indeed through a long dull discourse,—but long enough, to enable him to *redeem* the promise so given. And unless he is fully sure of his ability to redeem such a promise, it is always unwise to make it. It is better to encounter the indifference and weariness, of an *uninterested* audience; than the *grudge* of *a disappointed one.*

If the proposition of the discourse, or the person of the orator, should labor under *positive prejudice*, the attempt to *conciliate*, will require him to *understand and appreciate*, of *the ground of that prejudice.*

Method of dealing with prejudice.

In dealing with prejudice the great point for the orator is to understand, not only *how* the audience *feels*; but *why* they feel as

Necessity of understanding it.

they do. A full mutual understanding of the grounds of men's moral convictions, and the emotions that spring from them, is the first and most important condition of their successful treatment. We must be able to *appreciate* in order to *remove* them.

Sincerity in treating it.

We speak of real, not affected emotions. At some unguarded moment the cloven foot of hypocrisy will peep out from under the covering of *feigned emotion;* and instead of sympathizing with the deceitful owner of it, the audience will instinctively shudder away from it, as from the father of lies. The affectation even of humility is odious. Hypocrisy is the homage which vice pays to virtue: but it alters neither the character, nor our opinion of the character, of the vice which pays it, except to make us *despise* it the more.

Hypocritical professions.

Mock humility.

For the same reason, claiming credit for humility or making a parade of it, with a view to conciliation, is offensive. True modesty waits to be *discovered;* and then blushes to find that it has been.

§ 14. Another method of conciliating the good will of an audience, is the *confession of conscious inferiority*, to an able opponent,—*provided it be sincere.* The sympathies of an audience will naturally accompany the weaker party: and besides, the confession of personal weakness by an orator, is virtually a claim of strength for his cause.

Real modesty.

Rationale.

Cicero furnishes a good example, of this species of moral power with an audience, in his speech against Verres.

§ 15. *Another moral ground of conciliation*, is *confidence* manifested in the *candor, right feeling*, and *intelligence*, of an audience. A too labored effort to awaken their sympathies, in the Introduction, betrays a secret distrust of an audience, which is justly offensive; at the same time that it puts them on their guard against his approaches.

Confidence in an audience.

Flattery, however, though a very common resort of orators, is

Effect of flattery. unworthy of an honest man: and it is as dangerous as it is unworthy. Sycophancy never produced true eloquence, and is a dangerous weapon to meddle with. Like an unready blade, it often causes defeat to him who uses it.

If resorted to by an opponent, it is generally easy and efficient, to expose its *emptiness*, and *dishonesty*. When betrayed or exposed, it never fails to disgust and damage.

§ 16. We have said thus much about conciliating the good will and sympathy of an audience, in the Introduction, not because it is important *exclusively* there, but because the opinions of an audience are commonly made up in regard to the *speaker*, if not *his cause*, before the introduction is finished: and because it is really one of the very objects of the Introduction, to establish a sympathy with the audience, with reference to the succeeding discourse.

§ 17. From this view of the nature and uses of an Introduction, we may draw some characters to guide us in framing it; and

Rules for an Introduction

1, Natural. 1, *It should be natural.* By this is meant that it should spring from something which is in harmony with the present mental state of the speaker and the audience. Otherwise it is no introduction at all: and, indeed, needs an introduction itself. It is like one stranger introduced by another stranger, equally unknown.

The more natural an introduction is, i. e. the more it springs from passing circumstances, and accords with present feelings, the better.

Impassioned Introductions. If an audience is in an excited state—as e. g. in criminal trials where the people feel strongly for or against the accused, or his venerated and respected friends,—as e. g. in the Irish Rebellion defended by Curran,—it is easy for the orator to throw himself into instant and powerful sympathy, with the audible throbbing of the popular heart. Sometimes an orator may throw himself into the current of feeling, or take up the train of

remark from a previous speaker. Introductions of this sort, have a great advantage, in giving the speech an *impromtu* air; as if coming fresh and warm from the heart, without the cooling process of the closet.

Introductions in deliberative assemblies.

In deliberative assemblies, like the House of Commons, or Representatives, speeches are often thus introduced, while they have really no connexion with the previous discussion, and may have been all cut and dry for the occasion, *except the introduction.*

Appropriate.

2. The second rule for the Introduction is that *it should be appropriate.*

The previous rule regards its relation to the *audience:* this one to the *subject* of the discourse itself. The introduction which does not introduce the discourse, is, for that purpose, no introduction at all. The old rhetoricians were said to keep a stock of introductions on hand *ready made*, like coffins in a warehouse. This might be allowable, on the supposition, that, like coffins their use, and the feelings attending their use, were well known, and uniform.

Ready made introductions.

This practise may not be common, but the fault is by no means rare, in written discourses: for the Introduction to be too remote and general. A discourse on a particular vice, e. g. is introduced by a dissertation on depravity: or a sermon on a text by a eulogy on the Sacred Scriptures or a biography of the sacred writer. When the theme of the discourse, has some specific relation to these general topics, the Introduction may be happy: but commonly they are separate disquisitions, and would be equally appropriate to any other discourse.

An Introduction should be so appropriate that it would suit no other subject or discourse. To secure this, more perfectly, Cicero advises the orator to compose the Introduction, *after* the body of the discourse.

Modest sincere, and frank.

3. As one main end of the Introduction is to win the confidence and kind feelings of the audience, the third rule is, *that it should*

be modest, sincere and frank. Having spoken to this point while discussing the objects of the Introduction, it only remains to add, that these impressions of the speaker, must be due to what the audience see and hear;—and not the speaker's own opinion of himself, thrust upon them. An *inflated, pretending* introduction, *spoils all.* So does *mock humility.*

4. The fourth rule regards the style:—which should be *simple, clear and forcible.*

Style simple, clear and forcible.

An *ornamental style,* is *out of place*—because it supposes a heated imagination, which *should not* exist, on the part of the speaker, and *cannot* exist on the part of the hearers, at so early a stage of the discourse. It has, therefore, the effect of *abruptness,* and seems unnatural.

Ornament out of place.

It is not uncommon, especially in College efforts, for the speaker to burst forth in his first sentence, with a brilliant or impassioned figure, like the premature explosion of a rocket on the ground. It might have been a very beautiful affair, if it had waited to ascend in the air before it burst.

The ornaments of style appropriate to an Introduction are *purity, clearness* and *force.* And these are specially important in the Introduction; because the audience are yet so cool, as to be critical. *A blunder* here, is a great disadvantage. It is *like an ungainly person* or *manner* on first acquaintance. It may beget insuperable prejudice, then, when it would not have been noticed at all, at a later stage; when warmth of heart, and intrinsic worth, render the outer man of little account.

Appropriate ornaments of the Introduction.

5. A fifth rule, is, *not to anticipate in the Introduction, what belongs to the body of the discourse.* 1, because a main topic is unsuited to an Introduction, and 2, because it is impossible to divide a discussion without endangering its vitality. The attention cannot be twice con-

Should not anticipate.

centrated on the same subject, with all its orginal freshness of interest.

Not tedious. 6. The last rule is, that the Introduction *should not be tedious.*

No precise limit can be prescribed. This depends on circumstances; as the size and sort of the portico, depend on those of the house. Sometimes—though rarely—it may be omitted altogether. Where the subject and sentiment, have been already introduced by a previous speaker, a formal introduction would be *useless*, and *consequently tedious.*

The promise of brevity. It is sometimes desirable not only to be brief in the Introduction, but to *promise brevity* in discussing the subject. But when such a promise is given, it should be sacredly kept. If a speaker means to be long, it is better to let the audience know it frankly, beforehand. Very long speeches are like very long roads,—fatiguing enough at best,—but far less so, when you know what to expect, and have made up your mind to it, than when you have been told to the contrary, and are looking for the end at every turn.

§ 18. The most common FAULTS of Introductions,

Faults of introductions. are, 1, *tameness.* This often results from their being composed before the mind has warmed up to the true importance of the subject.

Tameness. Hence what a man writes first, is seldom worth keeping. It is true that the Introduction is not the place to display much emotion: but as Quinctilian beautifully says, it should contain *the germs* of the emotion, which are to bloom into full fragrance, in the succeeding discourse.

Common place. 2. A second fault is their *remote* and *common place character.* This is generally due to the same causes. It is a very *great*, as well as a very *common* fault, and leads frequently to the

Tediousness. third and worst fault of all, viz. *tediousness*. This is worse than no Introduction at all. It not only fails to conciliate good will; but excites positive prejudice. An audience very naturally conclude, if a man's Introduction is *tedious*, that his speech will be *intolerable*.

Brevity. The shorter an Introduction is, the better; provided it has done its proper work. To keep beating round the bush, when every thing is ready to spring upon the game, is not only useless and wearisome, but sometimes allows the game itself to escape.

Evil of apprehended tediousness. It is also *bad policy*, to divulge in the Introduction, an extended plot for the discourse. The attention of the audience may not yet be sufficiently awake and interested, to receive it, without something like a shudder: whereas a deeper interest may be awakened, in the audience, as the orator advances,—and they may even be sorry, when he stops.

CHAPTER VI.

The Proposition.

Definition and importance. § 1. This is an indispensable part of a discourse. It contains the statement of what the orator proposes to do. It is commonly *very short*; but its *importance* is in the inverse proportion to its *length*. Both Cicero and Quinctilian include the statement of the Proposition under the argument: because it stands in immediate relation with it. This is merely a question of convenience: and we have, ourselves, treated a portion of the subject, under the head of *arrangement* and in connexion with the general subject of conviction.* But there are

* See Part I, Ch. VI, Sec. 2.

some important principles, which it may be convenient to treat, under a separate head: and in the form of rules.

§ 2. The orator should have a distinct and complete conception, in advance, of what his proposition really is.

Rules.

Obvious as this is, it is far from being useless. No one who is conversant with the popular eloquence of any of the leading professions, can fail to observe that public speakers constantly come before the public, without knowing precisely what they mean to establish. They declaim upon general subjects; but speak to no defined *proposition*. Hence the vague generalities, loose reasoning, and inconclusive force, of so many speeches.

To seize upon the precise point of a subject, which will make for a given cause, and to present that, *clearly*, *succinctly*, and *pointedly*, is one of the highest, as well as rarest, attributes, of a really great orator. Now this is precisely the province of the part of discourse, which we are considering,—"*the statement of the Proposition.*"

Supposes a high order of power.

To select the ground, and then to make the best disposition of the forces at command, is a chief part of the battle. If this is done at random, or without skill, no force of arms and no brilliancy of achievement, can carry the day.

This, of course, is only another way of saying, that to conceive distinctly the precise point to be established, or refuted, as the case may be, so as to make the whole discourse bear upon that point, is of the very first importance, in successful eloquence.

Importance of a defined proposition.

§ 3. Supposing the orator to be thus master of his subject, including the form of his Proposition, the second question regards the several modes of statement, and the grounds, advantages and disadvantages of each. As these points involve the primary questions of the class of arguments, and the principles of arrangement, most tributary to conviction, they have been already treated, under the subject of conviction.*

Modes of statement.

* See Part I, Ch. IV and VI.

§ 4. Whatever method may be adopted to bring the subject of the discourse forward, the great objects to be secured, are 1, that the hearers shall be made to understand it clearly and precisely, either first or last :—and 2, that this should be done in the form least obnoxious to the views and feelings of the audience.

Objects to be secured.

The first of these objects, requires two conditions, to secure it ; 1, That it should be clearly and precisely conceived by the speaker ; and 2, that it should be expressed in the plainest and clearest terms which can be found.

Two conditions.

§ 5. It follows, therefore, that *the style* appropriate to this part of a discourse, should be characterized by perspicuity and precision. An ambiguous or involved style, is inadmissible, unless you wish to hide a falacy in its folds. Even ornament is out of place, except that which constitutes the beauty of a crystal,—*its perfect transparency.*

Style of the Proposition.

§ 6. The only remaining remark about the Proposition, is, that it should be in such form, as can be most readily *remembered.*

Readily remembered.

To secure this, it should be stated with 1, clearness, 2, brevity, 3, point or force, and 4, it should be repeated—if it can be judiciously done,—occasionally, in nearly the same words, until the very *formula*, is transferred to the memory of the hearers. To do all this requires careful thought.

§ 8. If quaintness, antithesis, or epigrammatic point, is ever allowable, it is in stating a proposition. The appearance of labor is less objectionable than in any other part. Indeed it is offensive for a speaker to undertake to state his proposition in a loose unstudied way. Though the orator is not supposed to have the emotional parts of his speech cut and dry ; yet it *is* supposed, that he has carefully considered and settled the proposition which he is to discuss. The *very terms*, as well the general form, may therefore wear the appearance of being studied, without giving offence.

Devices allowable.

Careless statement inexcusable.

CHAPTER VII.

Division.

§ 1. The third part of a discourse in the classification adopted, is that called Division, or *Distribution*. This is nothing more than a statement of the method which the speaker is to follow, in discussing his subject.

Definition.

Of course every one has some method, either expressed or tacit: and there is therefore always a foundation, for this part of a discourse in nature.

§ 2. And not only must there be a method of some sort; but the effectiveness of the discourse will depend largely upon the sort of method adopted. It is therefore not only an essential, but a very important part of a discourse.

Importance of the method.

An argument is conclusive or the reverse, very much in proportion as it is *well*, or *ill* arranged.

§ 3. There may be a question about announcing formally the Division or method of a discourse: but still the orator must have a plan in his own mind,—whether announced or not. It is not a question about planning the divisions beforehand;—this should always be done;—but simply a question about stating beforehand what the plan is.

Question about the plan.

§ 4. That the speaker must not only follow, some method or arrangement, but one previously settled in his own mind, is clear from the fact, that the order of the topics in speaking, is often precisely the reverse of that in which they occur to his own mind, in first arriving at his conclusion.

Order of proof the reverse of discovery.

The process by which we *reach* a conclusion at first, is commonly that of generalizing,—i. e. of passing from particular truths, to general ones. On

Discovery inductive.

Proof generally deductive.

the other hand the process by which we *prove* our conclusions to other men, is very often the reverse of this—i. e. by stating such general truths as our hearers admit, and then showing that they contain the particular truth, which we wish to establish.

This is the process in all syllogistic, or logical reasoning. It consists in showing that the truth admitted, contains the truth to be proved:—or in the language of logic, the *major* premiss always contains *the conclusion*.

§ 5. It follows therefore that the *Division* or plan of treatment, should commonly be made, after the subject has been studied out: and when the orator is in full possession, not only of *his conclusion*, but of the steps by which it is to be established.

Evil of a bad Division.

§ 6. There is, and must ever be, an order,—a plan,—*a division*: but it may be a bad one; and, therefore, would be worse than none at all. It confuses the minds of intelligent hearers; and gives them a bad impression of the speakers judgment and ability, especially in regard to the *clearness*, and *logical character* of his mind: and producing either lack of *confidence*, or positive *distrust*.

Question of announcing the Division.

§ 7. It has been already said that there may be, as indeed there has always been, a question about the expediency of announcing in a formal manner, at an early period of the discourse, what the speakers division is.

The Greek orators seldom did it. The Romans more frequently, but not uniformly; and though Quinctilian advocates the method he lays down no principles, that would determine the propriety of the practice in any given case.

It is not necessary to argue the question farther, than to refer to what has been already said in connexion with the analogous question, about *announcing the Proposition*, in advance of the argument. The principles are the same, in both cases.* Where the great desideratum is simple *clearness* in the arrangement of the arguments, with a view to facility in their apprehension, and their recollection by the hearers, and especially where the orator is conscious of the power to make out all his points fully, it is generally best to announce, distinctly, the plan of the discourse.

This is the more important, because many hearers are not

* See Part I, Ch. VI, Sec. 2 and 3.

sharp, in discerning the heads of argument;—unless they are distinctly pointed out.

There is danger of some hearers, getting entangled, if not entirely lost, in the mazes of the argument, and consequently ceasing to pay attention to it. In this case, it is a great relief to have the distinct breaks and new starting points, furnished by the formal statement of the several heads of the speech.

Importance.

§ 8. In view of this principle, it is obvious that the more complex and puzzling a subject is, the more a *clear arrangement* or *division* is needed; and the more beneficial it will be.

There are many subjects so difficult, and requiring so many discriminations, that it is almost impossible to discuss them, to the satisfaction even of the most intelligent minds, without the divisions being *distinctly stated*.

We must all have felt the unspeakable relief, arising from having a gifted orator take hold of a *confused* and difficult subject, and give us the whole gist of it, in a few clear, compact, and simple propositions;*—which again, make up a single general conclusion.

Assists the memory.

§ 9. The next great recommendation of this method, is, that *it aids the memory*. How it does so, will easly be seen.

Reasons against formal division.

§ 10. But, on the other hand, when one has prejudices to encounter,—when the points of argument, or the heads of division are more objectionable than the conclusion,—where the proof of *one* point, does not tend to prepare the way, for the reception of a succeeding one, or wherever you can count upon carrying the convictions and feelings of the audience at last, by concealing the line of argument till the conclusion becomes inevitable, it is obviously best not to announce in advance the division you propose to adopt.

Disadvantages.

§ 11. Again: if a man is not master of his subject, and cannot fill up his divisions satisfactorily, it is best not to make them. To make an arrangement or plan, and not be able to carry it out, is only to advertise more effectually your own deficiencies.

§ 12. The following summary embraces all the ma-

* So far from breaking the unity of a Discourse, it is the very means of preserving it.

terial principles, ruling in the construction of this part of discourse.

1. The parts of the division should be distinct: one should not include another, as a genus, e. g. a species. This produces confusion, instead of distinctness. A bad division is worse than none.

The divisions should be distinct.

2. The division should be natural, as *to the order*, in which the parts follow one another. The order of *nature*, is the order of *dependence*. Put that first on which the following parts depend.

Natural.

3. The division adopted, should exhaust the subject. Invention, in order to be effective, must embrace the whole subject, in all the aspects of the Proposition, which enter into the object of the Discourse. They should occur, moreover, in the order most efficient for the attainment of the end proposed ;—without,—at the same time,—allowing the divisions to *conflict*, or *duplicate each other*.

Exhaustive.

4. Avoid multiplying heads too much. This increases the confusion of a subject, wearies the patience, and oppresses the memory. In other words it defeats every important end of having divisions at all.

Simple.

The divisions and subdivisions of some of the old divines, all told, amount to more than a hundred, in a single discourse.

5. The divisions should be clearly defined and well expressed. The terms should be, 1, perspicuous, 2, neat, and 3, brief.

Well expressed.

6. Same orators state their points with a fullness, that amounts to a particular discussion of them. This is a fault.

Not too full.

CHAPTER VIII.

Narration.

Narration. § 1. *Narration*, is the fourth part of a discourse.

All argument rests upon postulates of some sort. There must always be something known,—either self-evident, or put in evidence,—and conceded on both sides, or we could not argue at all. In moral reasoning these postulates are, either first truths;—so called because they are ultimate and self evident,—or admitted truths,—i. e. such as are sufficiently in evidence to be fairly assumed as proved. In judicial reasonings they are mostly *facts in evidence*.

The statement of these preliminaries to argument, whatever they ma be, constitutes *narration*. Sometimes it is very short:—and formal narration may even be omitted entirely, by a sort of tacit consent of parties; but it is either present, or implied in every complete discourse.

Short or implied.

§ 2. It is always important as the kind of foundation is important in the building. Sometimes it is the main part; because the *facts* really determine the whole question. Indeed a skilful narration is often a conclusive argument in itself.

Important.

§ 3. As the facts which form the basis of narration, are, of course, supposed to be familiar, to the speaker, and therefore require no invention on his part, it might seem to be a perfectly simple and easy thing to conduct. This is a great mistake. In nothing do men differ more, than in telling the same story. This is owing to two different causes. In the first place the very same facts scarcely appear in the same light, to any two men.

Seems easy.

Really difficult

When Sir Walter Raleigh was engaged upon his History of the World, while a prisoner in the Tower at London, there occurred one day, a fracas, in the yard below his window. Raleigh undertook to settle it, by adjudciating between the parties; and on calling upon the by-standers for their testimony about the facts, he found no two of them to agree. It is said the historian went back to his cell saying that it was absurd to think of making History authentic, when he could not make out the truth of what had happened beneath his own eyes; and in the presence of twenty spectators.

Grounds for diversity.

Raleigh's observation was correct; but his inference was wrong. The incident, however, is good for our purpose to show that in narrating facts, there is room for great diversity, in the details, without departing from the substantial truths in evidence.

Power of Narration

§ 4. But in the second place, besides this difference in regard to the facts themselves, there is surprising difference in the power of stating the facts, so as to awaken attention, and to tell upon a given end in conviction or persuasion. In both these respects there is great room for the display of genius and skill, in narration,—especially at the bar.

The evidence is often confused, contradictory, and sometimes unintelligible. To arrange, reconcile and account for everything requires a mind of high order,—a mind capable of analysing the the tangled mass of facts, generalising, so far as to seize upon the true principles involved in the whole, and then explain by those principles all the apparent contradictions, and unintelligible facts which are clearly in evidence.

High penetration required.

§ 5. To do all this, requires also a powerful, and almost instinctive penetration, into the secret springs of human nature,—a deep knowledge of the dark and crooked windings of the human heart.

Indeed one is seldom more impressed with the compass and power, and penetration of the human mind, than when listening to the summing up of evidence,—or in other words the narration of an able lawyer, or judge, in a very perplexed case. The product, when contrasted with the materials, in the shape of evidence, seems almost like a new creation. The dark, confused mass, reminding one of very chaos, takes on, beneath his plastic hand, the forms of light, and order,—if not beauty.

§ 6. In another respects, also, it resembles an act of creative power. He seems to shape it almost at will. He evokes at pleasure from "the vasty deep," the very beings and events, he seems to need, for the sake of his argument.

High plastic power.

§ 7. Besides serving as a basis for the following discussion, *the narration* is used for two distinct purposes.

Narration serves two other purposes.

First that of argument to prove a thing, by showing its consistency or inconsistency, with other things, which are either admitted, or in evidence.

Thus e. g. Cicero's argument, in his defence of Milo,* goes to show that while he killed Clodius, he did it, not with malice, but in self-defence. And the whole argument consists in an artful narration, of the facts, and circumstances, under which the deed was done.

1. Conviction.

Another case where the narration serves the purposes of argument, is where the attempt is made to show that men accused of high crimes — murder for instance, — were insane, and therefore not responsible, when the act charged was committed. This conviction is produced by a skilful narration of the conduct of the accused.

Methods of argument.

Sometimes the same object is sought to be accomplished by a vivid narration of the circumstances which provoked the deed charged. This however is more frequently done with a view to the other object of the narration.

Another method.

§ 8. The second object to which narration is subservient, is that of *exciting the passions*,— either the sympathy or odium of the hearers,—by depicting in strong and vivid colors, circumstances adapted to produce their emotion. This object is totally distinct from the former, because it proves nothing, It is addressed not to the understanding, but the passions. It aims not to convince,—this is done already,—but to *excite*.

2. Excitation.

How different.

15 * See besides the oration, Blair's Rhetoric, p. 151, 2.

It has been already said,—in discussing the nature of eloquence,—that the will is under the exclusive control of the passions. Whoever would sway *the will* must first *move the passions*. And farther, that the passions are excited, by the mere view of their objects, either as present to the senses, or the imagination.

Proves nothing.

This will explain the high use and power, of narration, which we are now considering. Its object is to bring befor the imagination with all the vividness and power of reality, scenes adapted to excite the passions, and thus sway the minds of men.

Rationale of excitation.

Some of the finest specimens of narration in our language may be found in the reports of the trial of Warren Hastings, especially in the speeches of Burke and Sherridan. The speech of Antony, in Julius Cæsar, before cited,* is also a fine study in *excitation*.

Narration for excitation.

In that high and effective eloquence of Antony, there is no argument, no proof of a single fact, no disproof of any statement of Brutus. The whole effect is due to a skilful *narration* of facts, before well known by all his hearers. The graphic narration of the orator has made them instinct with power to *move the passions*—"to stir the blood"—of the people.

Narration becomes power

§ 9. This high quality of the narration, depends upon the power of selecting the chief and *most sensuous* features of a scene, and sketching on the canvass of the fancy, a vivid picture, like the rapid, dashing touches of a master painter. It requires far more genius than to paint respectably a detailed and finished picture. But still it is an art, just like foreshortening or perspective, and can, like them, be studied and acquired. It supposes a penetrating insight especially into the *causal relation of* the facts.

The process of narration.

Requires genius.

But is an art.

§ 10. All the writers on rhetoric from Quinctilian down, agree, in prescribing the three following qualities, as essential to the character of good narration, viz:

Qualities of style.

* See Part II, Ch. IV.

1. Clearness. This is all important, because it is the very design of the narration, to make the case clear, either for argument,—or impassioned impression. If it does not do this, it fails of its grand use.

1. Clearness.

In order to be lucid, the speaker must be master of his whole subject. He must study the particulars of person, time, and place.

Conditions of clearness.

The orator may rest assured, that he cannot make his narration clearer to his hearers, than it is to his own mind. Hence the necessity of making out every point distinctly in relation to its causes and effects. In that respect there is a great difference among men. A careless, slovenly, or unskilful *investigator*, will never make a clear, neat or graphic, narrator.

Implies a clear apprehension of facts.

The advocate should make it a point, moreover, to study and comprehend every circumstance which bears upon his case. Hence he should understand every branch of knowledge. The life of a client may hang upon the knowledge of his advocate about the application of the various chemical tests of arsenic. Thousands of money may depend upon his knowlege about the sea worthiness of a ship. He should possess all sorts of knowldge. Or failing in this, he should make it a point to study accurately the bearings of every thing, that has any possible connexion with his cause. He may call up witnesses, who do understand all these points; but he cannot avail himself of *their* knowlege, unless he has knowledge of his own: and he cannot use their testimony to advantage, unless he fully comprehends it. This he should satisfy himself about, before he goes to trial.

Needs all knowledge.

Requires knowledge to use testimony.

§ 11. The second quality of good narration is *brevity*. Nothing is more tedious than a long story, especially where a large part of it has no connexion with the point in hand. On the one hand, it should not be so brief, as to be obscure. On the other hand, narrate nothing that has not a bearing upon the question before you. Mark out distinctly the straightest path,

2. Brevity.

Rule of Brevity.

to the point you wish to gain; and then describe nothing that does not lie on your way.

How to obviate tediousness.

If your narration is unavoidably long, it may serve a good purpose to break it into epochs or stages. Even a drama would be tedious, if it were not divided into acts and scenes.

3. Veresimilitude.

§ 12. The third property of good narration is *veresimilitude* or credibility.

Truth is often stranger than fiction. Everybody repeats this maxim: but there are few, who are not staggered by the strangeness of truth, where the maxim is fulfilled.

Incredulity, kills any cause. Of what avail is it to state a case triumphantly, if nobody believes it? If your story is improbable, you must first prepare your hearers for it.

Events foreseen.

A skilful narrator, will so develope his plot, that the strangest part of the narration will be *expected* by his hearers. This art is well understood by the writers of fiction: for although the narration be fictitious, it must be *probable* to awaken a human interest.

By unfolding their causes.

§ 13. The method by which this is generally best done, is by unfolding skilfully, the true causal relations, of the facts implicated. If this be done skilfully, the audience can anticipate the events, as they arise, simply by a statement of the new circumstances of the parties.

Strangeness of narration.

§ 14. There are cases however where the strangeness depends upon coincidences, rather than conduct,—as e. g. in circumstantial evidence.

This may be as strong as positive testimony, or even stronger; and yet there have been cases, of men convicted on circumstantial evidence,—comprising the most remarkable coincidences,—who were yet afterwards proved to be innocent.

The best defence.

If you should ever be called to defend a man, who is endangered by this kind of evidence, your best defence may be, to cite simi-

lar cases, equally strong, where the evidence was yet subsequently proved to be erroneous.

CHAPTER VIII.

ARGUMENT.

Definition and relations.

§ 1. The fifth part of discourse is the ARGUMENT; —and, of course, *in* one or the other of its forms, it is not only *essential*, but the *main* part of the discourse. It is for this,—if the ulterior end of the discourse involves conviction at all—that the other parts exist; and to this they are all tributary. The nature and conduct of argument, is the proper subject of that part of Rhetoric, termed conviction;* and has been so fully treated, that it will require but little farther notice, in this connexion. We have also seen, that besides conviction, in the strict and proper sense, *the argument* of a discourse, may have for its object merely *to instruct*. The conduct of discourse having this subordinate object in view, *coincides*, or at least *is closely allied, with narration*. And when the argument is set into relation with the great ulterior end of eloquence, by the intervention of *impassioned discourse*, the analysis, and treatment of the laws involved in that process may be referred to, as a sufficient discussion of that subject.†

3 Things essential.

§ 2. In the conduct of argument as a part of discourse, there are three things worthy of special attention. 1. A distinct apprehension and clear statement of the precise point to be established. This is *the proposition*,—already sufficiently discussed. 2. A clear, well defined use of terms, in the statement of the arguments. Most of

* See Part I.

† See Part II, Ch. II, III and IV.

Necessity of exact use of terms. the honest differences of opinion among men, arise from the *use of terms* in argument, in *different senses*.

This is true, not only of the popular *lauguage*,—largely used, of necessity in *popular* eloquence;—but, as any one familiar with the disputes of mankind will see, the language of the learned. Even the language of men of science, is far from being free from this fault. Especially is this true, in the case of the moral sciences; like metaphysics and theology. The arena of debate is at once largely narrowed, by exact definitions, rigidly adhered to.

§ 3. Definitions should be, 1, accurate;—conveying the precise meaning intended; and excluding every possibility of double meaning:—and 2, they should make the the idea clearer than the popular term.

Character of a good definition.

The standing illustration of the violation of this rule, as regards the last requirement, is Dr. Johnson's definition of the term "net-work:" viz. "any thing reticulated. or decussated at equal distances, with interstices between the intersections."

If any one thinks it easy to define sharply, and well, let him try.

Difficulty.

3. The third point, after the proposition has been determined, and the terms defined, is the conduct of the argument.

Conduct of argument.

§ 4. This point resolves itself into three: viz. 1, *The invention* of arguments,—2, their *arrangement*,—and 3, *the style* proper for argument. In the invention of arguments we are put,—as we have seen already,—on an analysis of the subject matter, in accordance with the laws of thought. The three most fruitful lines of inquiry are,—1, *What the facts are*, in a given domain of thought:—2, *why* they are so, or in other words what are the *first and final causes* of things being as they are: and 3, *what are the results*, or effects which flow from them. Whatever is involved in the matter of an argument, or tributary to the proof of a con-

Involves three points.

Invention of arguments.

Three questions.

clusion, will pass before the mind, and furnish its contribution to the *invention* of arguments, as well as their *impassioned handling*, by simply raising, in succession, these three exhaustive queries, touching the subject matter of the discourse.

§ 5. As the ultimate basis of all argument is either (1.) self evident truths or (2.) matters of fact, there are, thence, two sources of fallacy, viz. 1, assuming as self evident, or facts in evidence, what is really not so:—i. e. in other words, assuming false premises:—and 2, reasoning illogically on the premises so assumed. At this point, the subject of *argument*, runs into that of *refutation*, already sufficiently discussed.*

Basis of Argument.

§ 6. In determining upon arguments, resting on *self evident truths*, our only appeal is to the prevailing consciousness of men. It is a question to be taken without debate: and if any one should deny that to be self evident, which really is so, it is impossible to argue the case farther. That which is really self evident, cannot be made plainer by argument.

Self evident truth as ground of argument.

§ 7. But when the argument rests on matters of fact, the case is otherwise. These depend on testimony. And this opens the whole question of the *nature, validity and authority* of testimony.

Grounded on matters of fact.

In determining this, the ultimate question, of course, is,—do the senses ever deceive us? If we can not rely upon the testimony of the senses, all certainty is out of the question. This question belongs, however, to *mental philosophy*, and not to *rhetoric* to discuss. We assume, that the testimony of the senses fairly given, in their proper sphere is trustworthy. No man can *help relying on his senses in fact*, whatever his philosophy may be.

Are our senses trustworthy.

§ 8. It is important, however, to make *two discriminations*, at this point, viz. 1, between the testimony of the senses, and the infer-

Discriminations in testimony.

* See Part I, Ch. VII.

ences, men draw from that testimony. The one may be infallibly *true;* and the other wholly *erroneous.*

Hearsay testimony.

The second discrimination is between the facts, falling within the personal cognizance, of the witness and those not so: the former, only, being *testimony*, in the proper sense of the word: the other nothing but *rumor*, and subject to all its proverbial uncertainty.

Proper style in argument.

§ 9. The style proper to argumentative composition is not materially different from the style of ordinary good writing,—the qualities ranging in *relative importance*, in the same order; —viz: 1, *clearness*, 2, *strength*, and 3, *beauty*. Argument is powerless, *as argument*, whatever other purposes it may serve, so far as it is *unintelligible* or *obscure*.

Clearness.

An orator may make an audience *stare* and *possibly admire*, by profound obscurity, but he cannot *convince* them. By *strength* as tributary to argument, is not meant *strong language*, and still less *fierce, dogmatic asseveration*, and least of all *abusive* or *approbrious language* and harsh or *offensive epithets*. This sort of language may sometimes be victorious; but victories of this sort are always of questionable value. Little better can be said of them, than that they entitle the victors to take rank with those animals, which conquer their superiors, by means of the unsavory odors, which nature has empowered them to emit. The power of argument lies in the *emotional character* transfused through it. If any one donbts this, let him study the specimens which Demosthenes, or any other world-renowned orator, has transmitted to immortality.

Strength, what?

Elegance or *beauty* of style is the *least necessary*, of the three fundamental qualities of style. Style may be rough, inelegant, uncultured, and yet, may carry an audience, by reason of its

Æsthetic power in argument.

clearness, and *force*. At the same time, to do full justice to argument, it should be clothed in a style, not merely free from offences against good taste, but involving as far as possible the conciliating, if not persuasive, force of the æsthetic emotions. Error,—some times *pernicious*,—often receives power to do hurt, by reason of its æsthetic, form ; and much more, of course, should truth put on its own proper robes of light and beauty, to achieve its end, whether *in conviction* or *persuasion*.

CHAPTER X.

Conclusion or Peroration.

Value of a conclusion.

§ 1. For the same reason that the Introduction is important, as supplying the key note which determines the pitch and character of the *melody*, in the Discourse succeeding, so the *cadence*, supplied in the Conclusion or Peroration, is important to the effect, which lingers on the ear, and memory of the mind, when the discourse is finished.

How determined.

§ 2. And, as in other parts of the discourse, so here, invention is modified by the special object of the orator, in the subordinate end of the discourse,—according as that end is either *Conviction*, or *Persuasion*. As the Introduction has its properties and laws suggested, and determined, by *the Proposition*, to which it is introductory, so the conclusion, should also receive its *form* and *all its features*,—with the *laws which determine both*–from the proposition also: which,—it will be remembered—is *the theme* of the discourse, *stated in relation with its object*.

The process of invention as applied to the *conclusion*, will be determined by the theme or subject mat-

ter, guided by the judgment of the orator, as to what still remains to be effected, in the way of *its application*, to consumate the special object of the orator, in his discourse. Sometimes it will take the form of *explanation*, some times of *confirmation*, sometimes of *conciliation*, and sometimes of *farther excitation*.

§ 3. There is a peculiar *propriety*, as well as *power*, in a peroration, in which, after the analysis, the narration, the argument, and the detailed treatment of the subject matter the whole *intelligent*, *accumulated interest* of the discourse, is gathered up, and concentrated, in a conclusion;—and the heated, metal of *the passions* of an audience, skillfully excited by the oratorical *appliances* of *high eloquence*, is drawn out, and made to flow into the mould prepared for it, by the art of eloquence,—receiving its completest finish, in the peroration of the discourse.

Recapitulation as a Conclusion.

§ 4. Sometimes the most efficient form for the conclusion, is a *condensed recapitulation*, of the *several processes employed* in the discourse. But whatever be its special *form*, its object is to drive home to its proper chamber, *the charge* on which the orator relies, for the capture of the opposing fortress, which it was the whole purpose of the discourse to effect.

BOOK II. STYLE.

CHAPTER I.

THE NATURE AND STANDARD OF GOOD STYLE.

The nature of style.

Art has been defined to be the expression of thought, in sensuous forms. As the science of rhetoric has for its object, to guide

the faculty, and unfold the laws, which rule in the construction of Discourse,* with a view to the attainment of its two-fold end,—viz: Conviction and Persuasion,—it is obvious, that the expression of thought by means of *articulate language*, conforms to the definition;—and is, therefore, *a form of art*.

Relations to Discourse.

§ 2. We have also seen in the preceding Book, of this THIRD PART, that the construction of Discourse—which is the organ employed in Rhetoric for the attainment of its ends,—supposes, 1, a subject, 2, an end:—the statement of the two, the former in relation to the latter,—constituting THE PROPOSITION of the Discourse,†—and 3, a mode of treatment, including the emotional or impassioned element,—or active principles involved,—as well as the *intellectual processes*, of instruction, argument, excitation and persuasion.

Relation to Invention.

To supply the intermediate thoughts, tributary to these ends of eloquence, we have also seen to be the proper province of *Invention;*—which seeks the attainment of its end in eloquence, by the construction of the several parts implied in a *complete Discourse*;—and we have already treated these topics sufficiently, in the previous Book, on *organic Rhetoric*.‡

Laws of articulate expression.

§ 3. It still remains for us to study *the laws of expression* by means of *articulate language*, regarded simply as the means of *embodying*, or rendering objective, thought;—including its appropriate emotion—with a view to its effect in composition.

A study, not of processes.

§ 4. In determining the laws of thought and expression which underlie, and give their power to, the first two parts of Rhetoric, we have found ourselves bent upon the study of *the processes*, by which the ends of rhetoric are to be attained, in conformity to the laws of human nature ruling in

* See also Day's Rhetoric, Introduction, p. 1.
† See Part I. Ch. II.
‡ See Part III, Ch. IV.

the domain both of thought and impassioned expression. In passing to the consideration of the finished product, in the art of eloquence, we are put upon the study, *of properties*,—not processes:—or at the most, processes, with a view to their *properties*.

But properties.

§ 5. It is the peculiarity of the fine arts as distinguished from the useful arts, that they have, properly, *no exterior*, or *utilitarian end*, out side of themselves; and as rhetoric,—as we have seen,—has a defined and most important end, viz.: conviction, and persuasion,—terminating in an effect, respectively, upon *the understanding* and *the will*,—it would seem to follow that RHETORIC, or its finished product, *eloquence*, should take rank as art, mid-way between the fine and useful arts; partaking partly of the nature of *each*; and yet appertaining wholly to *neither*.

Distinction of fine and useful arts.

Relations of Rhetoric to the Arts.

§ 6. The fact that rhetoric has an ulterior end, cannot fail to supply us with principles, going to determine the forms it shall assume; and hence going to modify the working of *Invention*, in the construction of Discourse; and to supply, also the principles of criticism: each having for its object, to determine—one for the purpose of *judging* the other of *executing*,—in the highest attainable degree, the *properties of style, best fitted, to secure the end sought to be attained in discourse*.

The ends rule the forms in Rhetoric.

The ends are, 1, criticism, 2, execution.

§ 7. We have seen already,* what organic forms, are most likely to secure these ends, in discourse,—regarded as the finished product of the art of Rhetoric;—it now ouly remains for us to study the laws *of expression*, as tributary to the end of Rhetoric, *so far as they are involved in the simple utterance of thought, aside from its construction, into discourse. This*,—as we have seen before,—*constitutes the subject of style.*

Style in Rhetoric the articulate utterance of thought.

§ 8. It is obvious that there are two methods of

* Part III, Book I, Ch. IV.

Two methods of study. studying and acquiring the necessary knowledge of the *laws of expression* and *the properties of style*: viz.

1. By the method of *analytical study*; constituting the basis of intelligent and competent CRITICISM;—and

1 Analysis.

2. By well directed and critical PRACTICE, under the guidance, if possible, of competent, and critical *instruction*.

2 Execution.

There are therefore two distinguishable arts, falling in the domain of *style*; and for which a philosophic ground should be furnished, by a study of the subject;—viz. 1, *the art of* CRITICISM;—and 2, *the art of* EXECUTION.

§ 9. The art of Criticism,—if intelligent and adequate,—treats of 1, *the merits*,—and 2, *the faults*, of style, in composition;—pointing out the philosophy of both,—i. e. the grounds and nature of both, as they lie in the laws of human nature, especially in reference to the effect sought to be produced, upon the audience or reader.

Art of Criticism analytic.

Coupled with this, in order to render it practically available, must be a *training in the art of execution*:—with a view of giving, not only a just and discriminating *knowledge* of the *properties* of style *objectively regarded* but also an *ability* as well as a *facility* in wielding style, as the instrument of expressing thought,—and expressing it with the power implied in eloquence.

Art of Execution

§ 10. Style being a *living* product of mind, giving *dynamic expression* to thought,—with a view of producing an effect on other minds,—it must be susceptible to two distinguishable sets of properties:—viz. 1, *essential properties*; or properties springing out of the necessary *laws of thought and feeling*,—with a view of giving the *fullest*, and most *effective* expression to them, as they

Essential properties.

lie in the human bosom :—and 2, *personal* or *individual* properties, which take their character from the personal peculiarities of the producing mind.

Personal properties.

It is well known, that personal *idiosyncracies of mind, or character*, lend their *form* and *color* to the *thought*, which passes through them. By these a skilled critic will recognize *the style* of a familiar author, just as he will recognize his *person*, by the *color* or cut of his coat.

These personal properties of style are, of course, open equally to *criticism*, so far as they do, or do not employ, or violate, the *essential properties*;—viz. those which are employed, in giving the *fullest and most effective* expression, to the thought.

Personal properties subject to criticism.

§ 11. So far as Rhetoric—or style—has for its object to attain external or ulterior ends, it follows that it must be judged—whether in the way of *criticism or execution*,—in the light of its adaptation to attain, its proper ends. We must, therefore, settle in our minds, precisely, 1, what those ends are; and 2, what properties of style are most likely to forward them; and then pass our *critical judgments*, and guide our *own practice*, accordingly.

Ground of judgment.

§ 12. It may safely be inferred, from the very nature of thought, in its relations with the end sought, that there are *three* ESSENTIAL *properties*, which should characterise its expression, with a view to the attainment of its normal ends;—viz:

Three essential properties.

1. CLEARNESS,
2. FORCE,
3. BEAUTY.

These qualities, and in this relative order of importance, should characterize *all style*, above and beyond all the *personal* or individual properties, which may lend their distinctive character or coloring to the style of any given individual.

13. In the practice, of which we have spoken, as essential to any complete training in eloquence, with a view to the attainment of a good practical

Criticism necessary

mastery of style, it is very necessary, that it should take place, under the *judicious criticism* of a master;—who rightly apprehends not only the *true vital* nature of *style itself*, in its relations to the mind and thoughts of the composer, but also the *nature* and *sources of the power*, it is competent to wield over the *mind addressed*.

The prejudice against the popular conception of the training process, in this regard, springs from the fact, that it sometimes falls short of a just or true apprehension, on one or both these points, in our treatises for education.

Ground of prejudice against Education.

§ 14. Style—from the latin *stylus*, the instrument employed in the expression of thought in words—is *not* simply the *manner*, as sometimes defined,—in which a man expresses his thoughts in language. It includes language regarded as the *living instrument of expression*, as well as the mere manner of using it.

Style not mannerism.

§ 15. Style in Rhetoric, therefore, is the *verbal*, but *living form*, adopted by the individuality of the writer,—or speaker, —in the expression or utterance of his thoughts. It includes the *matter* as well as *manner* of his thinking. A definition less profound,—like Blair's, e. g.—is superficial:—a definition of the *shell*, without the kernel of the thing. The danger of accepting it as *adequate*, is, that it may put the student—especially in the training portion of his course—on aiming at the superficial characteristics of *the manner of expression*,—instead of leading him down to value and study, and cultivate the *living power of language* as *the vehicle of thought*; and as being, in reality, *far more important* than the *manner* of its expression.

Definition of Style.

Evils of superficial definition.

The result of such a training is apt to be a certain *hollow* emptiness, of *expression*, instead of the *true, solid metal of thought*,—merely run into the æsthetic moulds of style:—a superficial product, efflorescing into artificial forms, *destitute* of true *pow-*

Result

er:—and requiring to be *laboriously abandoned*, the moment he comes in contact with the actual, earnest, *realities* of life. If a lawyer should defend his client, or a minister deliver the solemn messages of life and death,—of time and eternity,—in the style so cultivated; it would be simply ridiculous, if it were not too *pitiable*, or *revolting*, to be *laughable*.

§ 16. Surely the formation of such a style is not the true and legitimate effect of a rhetorical education. If this were so, it would indeed be true,—as some contend,—that education is not only *useless*, but *injurious* to eloquence. Such education is *a deception and a cheat*. It takes in a *boy*, who, if let alone, might, possibly have grown to be a man, and turns him into an artificial, worthless product, whose training is *from the teeth out*.

Such education a cheat.

The professed educators have drawn this rebuke upon themselves, by their *empiricism*. It belongs, however, not to *true education* but to the *charlatanism*, which has too often usurped the name, and place of education.

Charlatanism.

§ 17. The kind of culture which is really *needed*, and even *indispensable*, to the highest improvement of style, is 1, *Intellectual Culture*,—from *the centre*,—*comprehensive* and *symmetrical*:—that which goes to make a complete man: and

True culture.

1 Intellectual.

2. *Moral culture and power*:—the kind of culture, which gives *increased sensibilities*, and the power to *discriminate between truth and falsehood*, and *right and wrong*.

2 Moral.

There is no instance in the history of literature, of a man wielding a true, powerful, and lasting influence, without *right moral culture*. Byron was a pre-eminently gifted man, and by his social and genial qualities, wielded a formidable influence in his day; but even Byron, is no longer a *true power* in society. He won distinguished *eclat*, but lost a true *immortality*; by a vicious moral culture.

Byron.

§ 18. The great enduring power and excellence of style depend upon its perfect *truth of expression*, both as to *matter* and *manner*. Nothing wields a true and *lasting* power over mind, that is not true.

Truth of expression.

If, in thus coupling the matter and the form, as together constituting *the true essential nature of style*, a question should arise, as to the benefit or even possibility, of studying the *properties* of style,—apart from its substance,—it is sufficient to reply, that style belongs to the highest class of *forms*, and is therefore as worthy to be studied as the artistic forms of *Raphael* or *Michael Angelo*. It cultivates the taste. It uncovers the sources of the power which art wields over the mind: and thus points us to the direction which *practice* and *criticism* should take in the study of eloquence.

Value of the study of style.

Practical benefits.

§ 19. These "*essential properties*" of style, are all *conditioned*, and *determined*, by the general laws of *the intellect*, and *the taste*, and hence are universal; because these laws are universal.

Conditioned by the laws of thought, including taste.

This classification of the properties of style, therefore, rests upon the *postulate*, that in the normal constitution of the human mind, there is *a faculty*, or—more strictly speaking—an *intuitive sense*, which has to do with the *acceptance of thought*,—admitting or repelling it, and admitting it with or without emotion, and consequent effect,—in proportion as it conforms to, or offends, in its mode of presentation, *the intuitive laws* of the human mind, sometimes termed the *faculty of taste*, and sometimes,—more generically—the ÆSTHETIC SENSE.

Properties of style presuppose taste.

It assumes, moreover, that there is a tendency to *uniformity*, both in the *Constitution*, and *the laws* of the *human taste*;—from which we infer a *substantial uniformity* both of *judgment*, and *emotional effect*, on which we count with implicit confidence, as the *ultimate*, and *approximately uniform*, STANDARD, by which all questions of style and criticism are to be tried and adjudicated on.

Standard of taste.

CHAPTER II.

CLEARNESS.

§ 1. In order to the attainment of either of the true normal ends of Rhetoric, it is, of course, *necessary*, that thought,—which is the *instrument*, employed for this purpose,—should be *conveyed to the mind addressed*, in language more or less fitted for the purpose. It is the properties of the language so employed, and the character of the method,—considered with reference to the completeness of its adaptation to the end in question,—we repeat, that constitutes the subject matter of that part of Rhetoric termed STYLE.

Clearness, why important.

As the primary object of style—like the character of the drawing, and the selection of the colors by an artist,—is to *convey the thought effectively*, it is obvious that the *first property* of a good style, is *its clearness*;—for the reason, that the legitimate *effect* of *thought expressed*, will be in proportion to the *completeness of its expression*. Or, in other words, *thought* will fall short of its full effect, in proportion as its expression is defective, in the elements of completeness or power. Whatever other qualities, therefore, style may possess or lack, it must lack both completeness and power,—i. e. the very ends for which it exists,—if it lacks clearness.

Clearness the first property.

Effect of thought depends on clearness.

§ 2. Style,—like every other form of art—presupposes, 1, a subject, and 2, a mode of treatment:—both which it is the province *of Invention* to supply; and both of which—as we have seen*—are guided and modified by the special *ends* of the discourse,—viz. 1, *Conviction*, and 2, *Persuasion*.

Relation to Invention.

Eloquence implies, therefore, both *knowledge and skill* not

* Part III, Book I, Ch. III, and Book II, Ch. I.

only in reference to the great outlines of constructive Rhetoric,—or Discourse,—but also the laws of construction with a view to the effective, articulate, or verbal expression of thought;—like painting, sculpture or music. On every account, therefore,—in the *legitimate* uses of Rhetoric,—whether with reference to *execution*, or to *criticism*, *clearness* is a fundamental property of style.

Analogous to other arts.

§ 3. Clearness, like all the essential properties of style, is not however, always *equally important* or essential. Rhetoric,—like most arts—has *false* ends, as well as *true*. And though, in their attainment, *clearness* of style,—or that which simulates it—is generally necessary to secure and hold the attention especially of *intelligent* minds, even,—and we might even add *pre-eminently*,—in the case of nonsense.

Clearness not always equally necessary.

Important to good nonsense.

However easy and common it may be, to utter nonsense *unintentionally*, yet to get up good nonsense *knowingly*, for any of the spurious ends of false Rhetoric, is neither easy nor common. And to accomplish such a feat, *clearness*, though not, perhaps, the first property of style, is yet,—*ordinarily* at least,—an important property, if one would command any degree of respect.

§ 4. But farther, a part of the *power of style*,—as of art in general—is subjective; i. e. due to the state of the mind addressed. Articulate sounds thus become—as we shall see in elocution—symbols of *emotion*, and thus of power,—as well as of *intellections*. Hence there may be power residing in style, that is not characterized by its *clearness*.

Emotional power of style.

Profound nonsense,—and sometimes nonsense that is not very profound,—may thus, come to command a passing attention, and even *wield* a temporary *power* over men, by reason of the character of the style. We have heard of a natural orator, who was accustomed to take his little brothers out, while yet a child, and lay wagers that he could make them cry by uttering the word "*Nebuchadnezzar*."* But art of this kind—if it can be called

Profound nonsense, why powerful.

* It is the power originating in a subjective state like this, that explains the well-known phenomena, produced by the mystic readings, the late Edward Irving and his prophets, "whom we heard interrupting his majestic readings of the thirty-ninth of Exodus, by crying out, "O ye people, ye people, ye people of the Lord! Ye have not the ouches, ye have not the ouches! Ye must have them, ye must have them."—See Princeton Review, April, 1859.

art—is of course no part of the legitimate art of Rhetoric. This therefore, which is probably, the farthest real reach of this *abnormal form of style*, and which may owe its effect to,—or at least is not wholly incompatible with—*a lack of clearness*, or even sense, does not, of course, belong to the *proper* treatment of *style*, as we use the term.

Not rhetorical style.

§ 5. Still farther:—*Clearness*,—like all other properties of style—is not *absolute*, but *relative*, even in its *legitimate* applications. It is relative, 1, to the mind addressed,—and 2, to the subject treated.

Clearness relative.

In other words we mean, that *clearness*, though first both in the order of nature, and importance in style, is not always *equally*, and to *the same extent necessary* to its *excellence*. Occasionally—especially where the *power* of style, is the great desideratum—some degree of clearness may be subordinated, with good effect, to a *higher* degree of some other, of the essential properties.

Clearness sometimes subordinate to force

In this,—as in other questions that arise, in reference to the excellence of style,—there is implied the guidance of *common sense* to determine the most *effective forms* of style: and, of course, the more clear sighted and penetrating the insight, the truer and more effective the style will be. Genius without instruction, may supply a truer law, than instruction without genius: but the *highest* effects, may reasonably be looked for, by *combining* the two.

It requires, therefore, the *judgment*, and *tact*, and *culture*, which are developed best under *judicious training*,—both critical and practical—to settle questions which, in their nature, are necessarily indefinite, and for which, therefore, no definite rules can be laid down.

Questions of style, how settled.

Genius blended with good taste, and executing under the laws of the taste, is generally,—and often of necessity must be,—*a law to itself*. So far from genius and culture being *incompatible*, it is on this very ground, that the analytic study of the laws and properties, of the best specimens, of the highest forms of the art,—supplied by the most gifted models, extant

in the sphere of eloquence,—rests its completest justification.

§ 6. The *degree of clearness* implied, to constitute excellence of style in any given case, is one of these indefinite questions to be determined—so far as it is susceptible of explicit determination—by the *readiness* and *ease* and *completeness* with which the thought,—relied upon for the effect—is apprehended by the mind addressed. There should be that degree of clearness, that would ensure the *full effective transfer of the thought*, without requiring study or reflexion. The thought,—including the appropriate emotion,—should enter the mind addressed, as the light of the sun enters the eye of day; without effort or pain, and with the fullest capacity of vision:—as Cicero expresses it, so that he "not only *can* understand it, if *he tries*, but so that he *cannot but* understand it, *whether he tries or not*."

Degree of clearness in good style.

Test of clearness

The *degree* of clearness necessary to ensure this result, depends,—as we have seen—partly on the nature and culture of the *mind addressed*; and partly on the *nature* and *intrinsic difficulty of the subject*.

Depends on, 1, culture, 2, nature of the subject.

§ 7. In the expression of thought, *clearness* depends on

1. THE PROPER CHOICE OF WORDS;
2. THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF SENTENCES.

Conditions of clearness.

The properties of words which should guide us in the choice of language, with a view to *clearness*, are 1, PURITY;—2, PROPRIETY;—3, PRECISION.

§ 8. By *Purity*, as a property of a style, is meant, the predominant use of *pure English* words and idioms:—i. e. such words as have been fairly *adopted*, *assimilated*, and *authorized*, as determined, by *good English usage*.

Purity defined.

Faults opposed to purity.

§ 9. *The faults* which stand opposed to *purity* of language, are 1, BARBARISMS; and 2, SOLECISMS.

Barbarisms, what?

§ 9 BARBARISMS may arise from three sources :—

Wrong etymology.

1. *By the use of words not sanctioned by the etymology*, of the language.

As examples of this class of faults, may be mentioned, such words as "reluctate,"—"repetitious,"—"jeopardise,"—"obligate,"—"memorise;" &c., &c.

Wrong inflections.

2. *Erroneous inflections of words*, which are themselves pure English words :—

Such, e. g. as "pled" for "pleaded,"—"lit" for "lighted,"—"have began" for "have begun,"—"had'nt ought," for "ought not;"—and still lower, because provincial, "het," for "heated,"—and "lit" for "lighted."

Unauthorized derivations.

3. *Unauthorized derivations :*

Such as "deputize" for "depute,"—"firstly" for "first:"—and innumerable words in *common*, but not *legitimate* use;—such as "betrayal,"—"happyfy,"—"illy," &c.

Wrong combinations.

4. *Unauthorized combinations*, of elements,—themselves pure English roots; as, e. g.,

"Sundown" for "sunset,"—"fellow countryman,"—"self same," &c.

Solecisms, what?

§ 10. SOLECISMS,—the second class of violations of purity—are offences against the *syntax* of a language; as Barbarisms are offenses against its *lexicography* and *etymology*. This fault may arise in connexion with any of the words, *or parts of speech*, which compose the language;—*nouns*;—both *substantive*, and *adjective*,—*pronouns*,—*verbs*,—*adverbs* and *particles*. These faults are so familiar and well known, that *specification* would be *endless*, and therefore, *useless*.

§ 11. The minuter exposition of the nature and various forms of these two leading *classes of faults*,—which stand opposed to *purity* of style,—would lead us too far into the exposition of the nature of language, and the contents of words, as well as too

far into the logical structure—*or grammar*—of language,—to be in place, in a *practical* treatise on the laws of expression, which it is the object of the art of Rhetoric to unfold.*

Standard of purity. Usage.

§ 12. The ultimate standard to which all these properties of style,—whether faults, or excellencies—are to be referred for judgment, is the *authorized usage* of a given language, as settled by the *concurrent authority* of the intelligent *cultivated taste* of the nation using it; and especially after the adequate discussion of the nature and history of the language as a whole, and the etymological history of the words composing it, shall have furnished grounds, for an authoritative judgment, in the premises.

Settled by cultivated taste.

The characters of the GOOD USAGE, are, 1, that it should be *national*:—i. e. *universal*, as opposed to *provincial* and *technical*; —2, *reputable*, as opposed to *common* or *vulgar*;—3, *recent*, as opposed to *obsolete*.

Forms of faults against Purity.

§ 13. The offences against purity,—whether in the nature of barbarisms or solecisms—may take either of several forms;—viz: 1, *Archaisms*;—2, *Provincialisms*;—3, *Vulgarisms*; —4, *Technicalities*; and 5, Unauthorized or new coined words.

Archaisms

§ 14. *Archaisms*, are words or expressions,—whether in the legicography, etymology or syntax, of a language—once legitimate, i. e. accepted by the settled usage of the language,—but superseded, by a *different* and *later* usage.

Effect of archaism.

The prevalent use of archaisms gives style an antique and venerable air, tributary, in some sort, to the force due to the authority of age, but not allowable *except* to a *limited extent*, and for a *specific purpose*;—and *never allowable* to a degree that will *obscure the thought* on which the passage

How far allowable.

* A minuter exposition of the subject in its essential principles and applications is presumed to have been mastered in the earlier portions of the course, in the use of Day's "Art of Rhetoric," and Trench, "On the Study of Words," in connexion with a treatment, in the form of oral Lectures, on the *origin, nature and History* of Language; and of *the English Language* in particular.

may depend for *its effect*. When the thought is either *obscured*, or *marred*, or *rendered less potent*, it becomes *a fault*, and if already extant, should be redressed or substituted, by a new translation into some form of greater *living power*. Of course therefore any recent composition, is *not allowed* to avail itself of any *archaic forms*, that would seriously compromise the *clearness of the style*.

Feebleness not allowable.

Nor obscurity.

§ 15. Provincialisms—as the word sufficiently explains—are those forms of expression,—whether words, idioms, or grammatic forms—employed in a restricted sphere of a given language, but are not sanctioned by the test of accepted and general usage of the best authorities in any language.

Provincialisms defined.

Every considerable locality in the United States has its own provincial standard, both of style and pronunciation.* And, even more than here, each small local subdivision in England, even to the counties, and sometimes to *the towns*, has its marked provincialisms, in both respects.

§ 16. Vulgarisms, imply not simply local usages, but usages,—generally local—pushed into forms not fully accordant with the true, grammatical analogies of the language;—i. e. as represented by refined or cultivated people.

Vulgarisms defined

Forms of speech—whether in the use of words, idioms, or grammar so broadly at fault, are of course ruled entirely out of the legitimate characters of style, even in colloquial language. And yet approximations to this property of style, are sometimes met with, for the sake *of the force*,—especially in proverbial expressions or allusions,—in the popular eloquence of professional men before popular assemblies, and even, though still but rarely, in the pulpit.

Not allowable.

§ 17. Technical words—or technicalities—are such as usage not only *allows*,—but consults both *clearness*, and *force* in using, in the expression of the special ideas, relating to the subject or art,—"techne,"—to which they appertain, and where they are at home.

Technical words.

* It is even said that the provincial tendencies among us have so far received the sanction of some one or two of our lexicographers, as to entitle our national tongue to the epithet of the American language.

The *restriction* on their employment, is the clear and obvious one, which *forbids* their use, except when speaking to the members of the art or profession, where they are at home; or where the presumption fairly lies, in favor of their *complete* and *full comprehension*, by the party addressed. As specimens of the faulty use of technical language take the following:*

Restriction on their use.

Examples.

"Tack to the larboard, stand off to sea,
"Veer starboard sea and land."—Dryden's Æneid.

However clear this couplet might be to a sailor, it certainly conveys no idea to an ordinary reader of poetry.

Or this: "* God begins his cure by caustics, by incisions and instruments of vxation, to try if the disease that will not yield to the allectives of cordials and perfumes, frictions and baths, may be forced out by deleterics, scarifications, and more salutary, but less pleasing physic."—Jeremy Taylor's Sermons.

Abuse of technical words.

Such language might be entirely clear and very forcible addressed to a congregation of *surgeons*,—but, certainly, nowhere else. A style largely imbued with the use of technical terms, and modes of expression, is, in effect, the worst form of the fault defined by the word *barbarism*. It is a violation alike, both of clearness and force.

§ 18. With a view to the more effectual exclusion of barbarisms, it has not been *unusual*, for authors to advise the *prevalent*, and even *exclusive* use,—at least as far as practicable,—of the Anglo-Saxon element of our complex tongue, if not *rigidly* to *forbid* the sonorous element, which has come in, through the classic, and especially the latin tongue, through the medium, chiefly, of the *norman*. It certainly is true, that the Anglo-Saxon has supplied our noble English, with the great mass, of what have been well called the "*bosom words*,"—full of domestic, social, emotional, or impassioned power;—the words in which men think and feel, love and hate, praise and blame, —in which men—as Macauley has it—"make love drive bargains and quarrel," are of Saxon origin. It is also true, that the latin element of the English language, moves on a more majestic key of sound; and supplies

False restrictions.

Power of the Anglo-Saxon.

The Latin and Norman elements.

* Day's Art of Rhetoric, p. 245.

the *lofty*, *ambitious*, *stilted*, *buskined* vocables, of English. But it is notwithstanding true, that the requirements of good style, not only allow, but *enjoin* the free use of whatever words have vindicated for themselves a place, around the hearthstone of our English home; and now demand of us to admit them to their place and allow them to minister to our service, in enriching the word-stores, of our noble composite,—*the* ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

Neither element wholly forbidden.

§ 19. So far, therefore, as our *necessities* in giving *effective expression* to our thoughts, allow us a choice, it may contribute to the *clearness*,—and still more to the *force*,—of style, to regard the peculiar nature of the words employed, having reference, for this purpose, to their *origin*, and *character* in the respects now in question. But to *restrict* oneself *rigidly*, by this class of of considerations, and still more *to forbid* the use of words fairly belonging to the language, by the established usage of that language, purely, or even mainly, because of their etymological origin or history; is to press a rule founded in *theoretic* truth, to *an extreme*, that makes it *practically vicious*; and voluntarily to forego what is really the chief advantage and glory, of the English language—its *surpassing wealth of words*.

The principle of choice between Saxon and Norman words.

Evils of excessive purism.

Propriety.

§ 20. The SECOND property of words, tributary to the *clearness* of the style, is PROPRIETY.

Defined.

Propriety consist in the use of *the fittest words*, —not merely those which are pure English,— but, the words which are *best fitted* to *express the thought*.

Faults opposed.

The *violations of propriety*, in the use of words commonly fall into the following classes: viz: 1. low, undignified expressions.

1 Low words.

E. g., "I exposed myself so much among the people, that I had like to have gotten one or two broken heads."

2. The use of *high flown* or *poetic* words, in *ordinary prose*. This form of impropriety in words impairs the manly *force* as well as,—and even *more* than,—the *clearness* of the style.

2 High flown or poetic words.

Sentimental persons, with some approach to the poetic temperament, are most likely to exemplify this tendency. The use of such words, as "morn," "eve," "lone," for "lonely,"—may exemplify sufficiently the form of dialect alluded to.

3. The *untimely* or *undue use of technical words*; or words employed in a sense not quite familiar.*

§ 21. In the selection of words with a view to their propriety, a clear and constant reference must be had, to the *subjective* or emotional state of the party using them;—and even more especially still, to that the party addressed. Intentionally or unintentionally, *the proprieties* of style may be determined by the *color*,—i. e. *emotional tone*—of the words selected. The following extracts will exemplify this power of words in style:†—viz:

Propriety in emotional expression.

Examples.

"The saffron morn with early blushes spread,
"Now rose refulgent from Tithonus' bed,
"With new-born day to gladden mortal sight,
"And gild the course of heaven with sacred light."

The same thought—intellectually speaking—is expressed in Hudibras with vastly different effect:

"The sun had, long since, in the lap
"Of thetis, taken out his nap;
"And, like a lobster boiled, the moin
"From black to red began to turn."

Or, take this example,—more nearly in the sphere of eloquence,—where the object is to *disparage*.

"But we shall be told, that the continent of North America contains three millions, not of men merely but of whigs; whigs fierce for liberty, and disdainful of dominion; and that *they multiply with the fecundity of their own rattle snakes;* so that every quarter of a century, doubles their number."—Dr. Johnson's "Taxation no Tyranny."

Propriety is specially important in reference to the emotional life of words.

* See above § 17. † See Day's Elements of Rhetoric, p. 238.

A highly questionable instance of the *propriety* of a word, occurs in the translation of the word *Beast*, in the Revelation, to describe a class of spiritual worshippers in Heaven.

Questionable emotional power.

§ 22. The THIRD and *last* of the properties of words, tributary to the *clearness* of the style, is PRECISION: which is the use of such words, as to express the thought intended, with *accuracy*, as well as force,—and to discriminate, with sharp distinctions, from all the differing shades, of the same general thought.

Precision defined.

The want of Precision is an offence against the *lexicography* of a language, as determined by the *best usage*. In reference to this quality of words the treatment of style, runs into the "*study of words*;"* and *synonyms*—already sufficiently discussed.

§ 23. The wealth of a language,—lying largely in the domain of *synonyms*,—comes chiefly from two sources:—

Origin of synonyms.

1. The development of intellectual and scientific culture, in the progress of a people:—

2,—still *more largely*—from the mixture of two or more languages,†—and the lines of development due to them, respectively, in whatever constitutes the mental progress of each.

§ 24. The first effect of such admixture, is, of course, to furnish *duplicate words*—one from each language, so far as their respective civilizations have covered the same field of culture. Under the stimulus of such admixture, the duplicate words are subjected

Admixture of Languages.

* See further on this subject Trench, on "The Study of Words."

† The reason that synonyms are due more largely to this source in point of fact, than to the progress of individuals or nations, in the line of self culture, is that language is not only the *vehicle*, or the instrument for *expressing* thought, but the *pabulum*, or developing principle of thought, in whatever direction the genius of an individual, or nation, may take. A competent language—developing by self generation, like all living beings,—requires the stimulus or *food* supplied chiefly by the materials of *other languages*, to develope either a science or a literature. *Language* can only keep pace with *thought*,—never except *tentatively*, and for the moment,—*outrun it*.

Language is necessary to thought.

to a sifting process, and the better word of the two is retained, for the fundamental idea; and the other, either 1, *discarded*,—which is seldom done,—or 2, submitted to *a desynonomysing process*,—as Trench calls it—by which each vindicates some distinction of the generic meaning;—thus constituting, "*synonyms*," in the proper definition of the word;—viz: words generically the same, and individually different.

Interaction of languages.

§ 25. It is only by studying subjects in the light of their *generic sameness*, and *specific differences* or varieties, that either science or literature, or human knowledge or progress in any direction, can occur. In this prolific harvest process, the development both of mind and language,—the one stimulating, and being stimulated by the other,—is very rapid:—the resultant of the two forces being HUMAN PROGRESS.

Precision both cause and effect

It is certain, therefore, that *precision in the use of words*, is both *cause* and *effect* of that intellectual culture, which is immediately related to the *clearness* and *power* both of *thought* and *style;* which is the great instrument, employed by eloquence in the progressive civilization and established institutions of the race.

Looseness of language a ground of controversy.

It is the *loose* use of words,—which is the precise *opposite* of *precision*—as we have already found in the study of argument,* which is the prolific parent of controversy especially in the sphere of moral truth: and a large part of the disputes,—even in the highest region of that truth,—metaphysics and theology—are resolved at once by the precise use of words.

Synonyms in argument.

For instance, the words "*sorrow*," and "*regret*," are *synonyms;* and both so closely related, as to be interchanged with the word "*Repentance*,"—implying also *a form* of sorrow. The word sorrow, seems to be derived from an Anglo-Saxon root,—probably nearly related with the word "sore,"—which connects itself with the idea of pain, or distress, *due to a malady*, which again carries with it, the *implication* of something which befalls the patient, without *any*

* See Part III, Book I, Ch. VIII, and Part I, Ch. IV.

power to prevent it, and therefore *without any personal responsibility*. Transferring this same generic idea to the word "repentance," which implies not only sorrow, but *remorse* in view of consciousness of *voluntary* wrong doing, a flippant attempt has been made to disprove the serious theological dogma of *original sin*, because it would be *absurd*, if not impossible, for any man to repent of a thing, for which he had no *personal responsibility*.

Fallacy from the use of synonyms.

The *fallacy*—not to say *folly*—of the refutation, will appear in its transparency, if we remember that the *suffering* which falls upon us *without responsibilty* or fault of ours, is mitigated and rendered *tolerable*, in proportion as no responsibility of our own is coupled with it; and the suffering which comes in consequence of personal responsibility and guilt, owes its *poignancy*, to that very consideration, which *relieves* the other. To attempt to refute the doctrine of original sin, because one cannot *repent* of it, i. e. *suffer* in the *same way*, that he does for his *own guilt*, is like denying that a colored child, can regret her dark skin, because it came to her, by natural descent from a colored father. To constitute hereditary guilt a *penalty*, it is not necessary that it should admit of *remorse* any more than it disproves the *divine or penal* character of the *yellow fever*, that the victim of it, cannot, in the proper sense of the word, *repent* of it. However we may be stumbled, in *our philosophy*, men constantly accept,—and cannot but accept—the conscious truth, that there may be *penalties*, and even *judgments*, in the course of Providence; of which, remorse—in the proper sense of the word—forms no necessary part. If the uniform result is *actual transgression*, then *remorse*, in *addition to regret* will enter at *that* point, along with the consciousness of responsibility, in the *unmitigated sense of guilt*.

Controversy in the use of synonyms.

Since writing the foregoing passage, we have chanced to light upon an illustration of the principle now stated, in a discussion between a distinguished physicist, and an able metaphysician, on the question whether there could be such a thing as a *sound*, which no ear ever heard. The debate—managed with equal ability, earnestness, and confidence of truth, and conclusiveness on either side, left both disputants—as usual in such cases—*unconvinced*; or rather *each*, if possible, more clear in the conviction of the truth of his *own proposition*. It was all the time apparent to the spectators of the intellectual *tournament*, and at last became apparent to themselves, that the whole dispute turned on the definition of "*sound*;"—the one conceiv-

ing sound to be *vibrations of the sounding body*, and the other, *the interaction between those vibrations and the ear*. Granting the definitions,—as usual in the case of really clear sighted, able men, who differ,—*both* were *right*:—and as usual also, in such cases, the *definitions* were *determined* in the case of each, by their *professional and mental habits*:—the conception of the one, fixing upon the *physical properties* and *laws of sound*, and the other, conceiving it more transcendentally, as hearing. The means for settling such disputes, is *not argument, but definition*.

Ground of the debate.

§ 26. Precision may be violated in either of *four* ways: viz:

Equivocal words.

1. By the use of ambiguous or equivocal words or phrases: e. g.

"I cannot find but one of my books." Strictly interpreted agreeably to the English idiom, the double negative in this passage, is equivalent to an affirmative. But the confused sense, in that case, renders it obscure, simply because it is doubtful which meaning is intended.

Inadequate words.

2. Words may lack precision,—and therefore both clearness and force,—from their *inadequacy* to express the full meaning intended.

This habit so commonly runs into the fault last defined—the loose employment of synonyms,—that we may dismiss the subject without farther illustration.

Exaggerated words

3. The same fault may arise from the use of exaggerated or extravagant terms:—words which express the idea, and something more. There is the more danger of this, because there is a natural tendency to substitute *exaggerations* for *strength*,—especially on the part of *common*, and still more of *feeble* minds.

Tendency of common minds.

With some men it never rains, but it *pours*;—it is never warm but it is *roasting*;—it is never cold, but is "like Greenland" or "the North Pole." These, of course, are very cheap and nearly vulgar: but the habit of dealing in *strong language*, and putting it in the *superlative* degree, is a violation of precision, which a cultivated taste,—if no higher reason—should render much more rare than it is.

4. The last of the common forms of violating the precision of language, proper to an educated man, is the *loose selection of synonyms*,—and especially in the way of *epithets*—to give expression to his thoughts in composition. *Fortitude*, e. g. is spoken of, when what is really meant, is *courage*:—*equivocal* is interchanged with *ambiguous*, or *pride* with *vanity*.

Benefit of desynonomising

The habit of looking into the precise import of words,—of "desynonomising" *syno-*

mising synonyms. *nyms*—until that *habit* is become *habitual*, is one of the valuable results of classic training, as tributary to the formation of a good English style.

Here again,—as we have seen before—the standard of judgment, to which the ultimate appeal is always open, is *the cultivated taste of a people*, in the form of what has already been defined, as constituting GOOD USAGE.*

Standard of judgment.

The power of saying precisely what we mean—neither more nor less—and saying it in consistency with, and consequently in the use of, the whole power of the sensuous image involved in the synonyms at command, often makes *the difference*, between a loose and feeble *style*, or a strong and effective one;—or in other words between a great *orator*—who is always also a great *man*, and a common or feeble one.

Value of Precision.

SECTION II.

Relation of Clearness, to the Construction of Sentences.

§ 1. As the employment of *articulate language*, is the characteristic function of *human speech*, and the *expression of thought* by means of articulate speech, is the distinctive function of that part of the *art of Rhetoric, termed style*,—it is obvious, that excellence of style implies the expression of thought, in accordance with the native laws, 1, of *thought* itself;—and 2, of language;—which we have farther defined to be "the expression of thought; by the *organizing* of words,—i. e. articulate sounds—intuitively expressive of, or associa-

Language.

Excellence of Style.

Expression of thought.

* See § 13 of this Chapter.

ted with, individual ideas,–together with the appropriate emotion,—and these separate thoughts, again *connected together*, agreeably with the *laws of grammar*, —which is the logic of language — *into sentences.*

Organized in sentences.

§ 2. It is obvious, therefore, that *clearness* of expression, however fully the style may conform to the fundamental laws of expression, as regards the properties of the words selected to express the *separate* thoughts, supposes farther that these words, shall be so *organized*, 1, into *sentences*, and 2, into *the several parts* of the Discourse, that the thought, in *the entireness* of its living form, shall find effective expression, to the mind addressed. The laws ruling in the structure of Discourse,—in its several parts, as supplied in invention,—have been already treated :—and it only remains to study the laws of expression, as implicated in the structure, 1, of sentences and then of continuous passages of thought :—or, in other words, as constituting the properties and laws *of style.*

Clearness implies, 1, right words.

2 proper construction.

Structure of sentences.

Laws of Style.

§ 3. We may give condensed expression to these principles and laws, in the form of *canons of expression ;* by which *Invention* must be guided, *in construction.*

§ 4. In the first place, style implies an observance of the *laws of grammar*, in construction.

Grammar implied.

As the study of grammar is pre-supposed, and does not come within the study of rhetoric, we do not dwell farther on this point. We, therefore, proceed to say :

§ 5. In the second place, *clearness* may be impaired by that *excessive length of sentences;* without any other fault in the construction.

Evils of excessive length.

The mind is like the lungs,—more fatigued by one *very long breath*, than by many *ordinary* ones.

And still farther, it is far harder to construct a long sentence *well*, than a short one. It is commonly in the deep folds of long sentences, that obscurity or ignorance or even fallacy lurks. Short sentences furnish fewer hiding places, and if a brief and simple statement is either obscure or unmeaning, it is easily seen. But both obscurity and nonsense often lurk, undiscovered,—even by the writer—in long and mazy sentences.*

Advantages of short sentences.

Evils of parenthesis.

§ 6. Avoid as far as possible the habit of using *parentheses*, in the structure of sentences.

If the parenthesis is really essential to the completeness of the thought, it had better, commonly, have a distinct place in the sentence, where its relations will be clearly seen; instead of being boxed up in a parenthesis, and pitched at random into the middle of a sentence. An author who abounds in parentheses, can never be a *model* of style, and very rarely a clear writer. A parenthesis is generally to a sentence, what a patch is to a garment:—it may be necessary to stop a rent, but, however necessary, or however brilliant in coloring, it still argues a defect;—it is still *a patch*.

§ 7. Most commonly, however, parenthetical ideas, have really no proper connexion with the subject, and could not be introduced at all, except in this way. When this is the case, in ninety-nine cases, in a hundred, they had better be omitted. Sometimes the dread of poverty, —more frequently a flash of thought, which seems *too good to lose*, is the apologetic ground, of their admission. It may require some *courage* as well as *severity of taste* to sacrifice a fine thought. But however *fine*, or *witty* or *brilliant* the

Commonly irrelevant.

Apology for.

* The short, lucid, and stinging sentences of SYDNEY SMITH, contrasted with the wiredrawn periods of SIR JAMES MCINTOSH, may be taken as examples of the effect due to so simple a principle, as the habitual length of the sentences.

thought may seem, it is better to apply the knife without pity. Cut out every thing,—however striking,—which does not contribute, either to the clearness or force of the style. It is a good practical rule —especially for the young composer—to go over his composition after it is completed, and strike out every *word*, and *clause*, and *image*, that does not add to the clearness or force of the thought.

Strike out all that is irrelevant.

§ 8. This principle, introduces the fourth canon, viz: Remove every thing from the sentence, that is not material to the thought sought to be expressed.

"Quicquid non adjuvat obstat. (Quinctilian.)

In an essay before us occurs this clause, "There is scarcely a person who ever swelled the annals of human existence, &c." Besides the pleonasm, the plain idea is wrapped up, and almost lost in the mass of drapery in which it is enfolded. The *thought* is almost lost in the *image* of "*swelling the annals of human existence.*"

Relation of ornament to style.

It is, of course, no justification of the thing, to say that this is *ornamental*. It may be so: but *it is out of place*. It is not *ornament* but *thought*, that gives its value to style: and mere *ornament* should therefore never be allowed to *usurp the place*, and still less to *mar the clearness* of the thought. It should be a settled principle in style, that ornament is never to be used, *merely as* ornament: but *always, and only*, to embody or illustrate, or give force to *thought*. The moment it comes to be employed primarily as *ornament*, and still more to adorn obscure, trite, or common place thought, it becomes,—in the language of Solomon, on a very different occasion—"like a jewel of gold in a swine's snout." It is out of place *there*, however beautiful it may be in itself.

Natural order of the clauses.

§ 9. The next canon relating to the construction of sentences, with a view to clearness, is to arrange the members—whether words or clauses—in the *most natural order*.

The order of nature, is the order of relation and

Liable to be overlooked.

dependence. This is a very important canon; both because it is vital to the clearness of the style, and because it is liable to be neglected, through carelessness, even by very able men.

§ 10. The result, is what is termed an *involved style*. It renders the thought obscure to another, even when it is clear enough to the writer. This effect—an involved style—is sometimes produced by the misplacing of single words: e. g. an adverb,—or pronoun or qualifying, or representative, or substituted words.

Involved style.

Examples

"Those provinces, unhappily, once united, are now rent into factions."

"By doing the same thing, it often becomes habitual."

"We do those things, frequently, which we repent of afterwards."

"Lysias promised his father, never to forsake his friends."

"Men look with an evil eye upon the good that is in others, and think that their reputation obscures them, and that their commendable qualities stand in their light; and therefore they do what they can, to cast a cloud over them, that the bright shining of their virtues may not obscure them."

§ 11. Adverbs and pronouns should be placed as near as possible to the words to which they relate. This is the only method we have, in English, to express relation. There is always, therefore, of necessity, some degree of vagueness or obscurity, where it is doubtful, to which word they relate. The only advantage in favor of pronouns, is that they have person, and sometimes inflected cases, —which *may* serve to indicate the reference. Sometimes there are different nouns or pronouns of the same case or person; and then the only guide to determine the relation, is the *position*,—always, of necessity, uncertain.

The principle of involved style.

§ 12. These are very common errors,—especially as they often pass unnoticed by the author, because he knows, of course, what he means, and does not see or think that the words *may* express, some *other* idea, to one not already possessed of the meaning.

Wrong construction unobserved.

Scarcely a page,—especially in the training stage of composition of an ordinary student,—will fail to furnish specimens.

The same fault often creeps into members and clauses of a sentence.

Looseness in clauses.

E. g., "the next day he came up with the enemy, and being wearied by a forced march of many hours, the rout was easy and complete."

This sentence, merely in consequence of the mis-

Cause of obscurity. placing of the clause "and being wearied by a forced march," is not only *obscure*, but *wholly unintelligible;* and yet the fault probably entirely escaped the notice of the author.

Unobserved. The simple multiplication of relative pronounds,—as in a preceding example,—is, itself, a fault, against both *clearness and strength*, of style. Sometimes the unconscious blunder is extremely awkward, and even ludicrous.

E. g., "This work, in its full extent, being now afflicted with an asthma, and finding the power of life gradually declining, he had no longer courage to undertake."

The liability to an *involved* style is much greater in the use of long sentences, than short ones. But, on the one hand, a complete master of the art, may use long sentences, and yet express himself with both clearness and force, by the help of a skilful construction of his sentences;—i. e. by placing each clause, so as to show the precise relations, in which each thought stands to every other. Burke's political writings,—e. g. his history of the French Revolution,—exemplify this fact in a remarkable degree. But inexperienced writers had better *avoid* the danger, by *keeping clear of its cause.*

Danger in long sentences.

Obviated by skill.

Burke.

§ 14. On the other hand, it is quite possible to have an involved style, even when the sentences are short, by arranging them in an involved order, in the paragraph. This however is due to a confusion or incomplete elaboration of the thought; and no rules touching style, beyond what we have given,—except, perhaps, the generic canon, to elaborate the thought carefully and fully, before commencing to write,—will cure the evil.

Involved style with short sentences.

Due to confusion of thought.

§ 15. The *closing* principle, ruling in construction, is, that clearness is always *endangered*, and sometimes *sacrificed*, by elliptical modes of expression.

Danger of ellipses.

It is not always necessary to state the steps by which we have reached our conclusions. We may not have taken the

Ground of ellipses.

most direct methods, in our inquiries, and it is neither *necessary*, nor even *proper*, to carry our hearers, by the round about track, which we ourselves may have taken. But, on the other hand, there is always danger of leaving chasms in the thought, which the audience, may not be able, either to *bridge over*, or to *leap across*. This danger is all the greater, if we are very familiar with the train of thought. It seems so clear to us, that we forget that it is not equally so to others, and was not always so, even to us.

Danger of their use.

§ 16. The great mass of people, are so little accustomed to continuous, *thinking*, or even *following*, a chain of reasoning, that if one should leave out, a single link of the chain, they are lost,—and perhaps unable to regain the clew. The more difficult, and complicated, and technical, the subject; the greater the danger, that the reasoning may become, not only obscure, but wholly unintelligible. Babbage's Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, or La Place's Mechanique Celeste, may be taken as extreme examples, of the danger of elliptical constructions, even in the case of moral reasonings.

Among the uneducated.

Increased danger.

Examples

CHAPTER III.

Force, as a Property of Style.

§ 1. By Force, is meant that property of style which gives a full, vivid, and *effective* expression of the thought. In analysing the elements which make up the force of style, we must consider, 1, *the terms* selected to express the separate thoughts, and 2, their combination in the *construction* of the passage.

Force defined.

Section I.

The Selection of Terms tributary to Force.

§ 1. All that has been said under the head of *clearness*, is, of course, applicable here; because if a thought is presented *obscurely*, it cannot—except for subjective reasons before noticed*—be forcible. But on the other hand it may be *clear*, without being *forcible*.

Implies clearness

§ 2. The first canon, or law, tributary to the *force* of style, as regards the choice of words, is that the terms selected should be, as far as possible *specific*,—not *general* or *abstract*.

Forms should be specific.

The ground of this rule seems to be, that terms which are,—as far as possible,—*picturesque*, and which speak to the *sensuous nature* of man, through *imagery*, addressed to the imagination, are far more *effective and emotional*, than *abstract* or *intellectual* conceptions. The meaning and importance of this principle will be best seen by an example. Let us take for the purpose, that exquisite passage in a discourse of Him who "spake, as never man spake:"—

Ground of the Rule.

Its importance.

"Behold the lilies; how they grow: they toil not, neither do they spin, and yet I say unto you that Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these, &c.—Luke, 12: 27 and 28.

Example.

The following is Dr. Campbell's paraphrase:—"Consider the flowers, how they gradually increase in their size, they do no sort of work, and yet I declare that no king whatever, in his most splendid regalia, is dressed up in such fine clothes, &c."

Here are the same truths, but how tame and flat! And yet the essential principle of the change, is merely the substitution of general and vague, for specific, and picturesque terms. The one suggests a vague intellectual notion, the other paints a vivid, sensuous picture, on the screen of the fancy. The one is *emotional—living*: and the other is *dead*, and *powerless*. If one would talk to a child, he must discard *generalities*, and deal in *fancied*,—perhaps—but *real personalities*. In this respect men are but grown up children. The principles of power, in the two cases are the same.

Tameness.

Reasons of the difference.

* See Part III, Book II, Ch. II, Sec. I, § 14 and note.

Every one must have noticed the difference between men, in telling the same story. One will convulse an audience with laughter, or—if the story be tragical,—hold them in horrible suspense. Another in attempting the same thing, will flounder like a fish in the mire. There may be other grounds of difference, but it will commonly be found, that one describes in vague, unappreciative terms,—the other paints the scene before your eyes. The interest of the scene,—and especially the sense of the ludicrous,—is due to *special* touches, which *general* terms are unequal to express.

Ground of interest.

Often the use of a single term,—and not necessarily of a refined or elevated sort—like the sketches of a man of genius with a piece of *charcoal*, will make a whole picture start up on the canvass of the Imagination, full of life and power, as e. g.

No groans shall mingle with the songs,
Which *warble* from immortal tongues.

Here a single *graphic* term, gives us the conception of a whole grove, full of the peaceful melody of feathered songsters Campbell—to whom we owe the canon—gives instances of this vivid, graphic power of style, due to every part of speech. Thus by the use of a *noun* Milton paints Satan in Eden:

"There on the tree of life,
"Sat, like *a Cormorant*."

Again,—by a participle and *noun* conjoined;—

"Him there they found,
"*Squat* like a *toad*, close to the ear of Eve."

Again, Thompson gets the same graphic effect, by the skilful use of a *verb* and *adjective*:

"The kiss *snatched* hasty from a *sidelong* maid,
"On purpose guardless."—*Seasons*.

Again by an *adverb*:

"Some say he bid his angels turn *askance*,
"The poles of earth twice ten degrees and more
"From the sun's axle."

§ 3. The second principle, or law of *force*, is suggested by this last example. A still more emphatic form of it, is found in the couplet, of the sacred poet:

"The guilt of *twice ten thousand sins*,
"*One* offering takes away."

The principle which the poet here avails himself of, is that if naming a number quite *as large* and emphatic as the imagination can well handle, and then getting a *farther large augmentation* of effect, by *doubling* that number. Every one must feel that the form "*twice*

ten," or "*twice ten thousand,*" is greatly more forceful, than "*twenty,*" or "*twenty thousand.*"

Etymological history of words.

§ 4. The third law of emphatic expression, grows out of the etymological history or source of the different elements of our language.

As we have already settled the principles involved in this effect, in discussing clearness of style, it is not necessary to enlarge farther :* although the applications are more numerous and important to *force* than *clearness* of style.

Power of Saxon words as vocables.

§ 5. But besides the increase of force due to the increase of clearness, and that again to the fact that the Saxon is the real root of our mother tongue, and furnishes the *effective, impassioned, bosom-words* of the English language, there is a reason for the preference of words of Saxon origin, from the character of the words themselves, considered merely as *vocables.*

Case of Hall.

When Robert Hall was dictating his celebrated sermon ON INFIDELITY, for the press, to his friend Dr. Gregory, when he came to the powerful apostrophe, "Eternal God, on what are thine enemies intent! What are those enterprises of guilt and horror that, for the safety of their performers, require to be enveloped in a darkness which the eye of heaven may not penetrate!" He suddenly and abrubtly turned, and asked, "Did I say *penetrate,* Sir, when I preached it? and do you think I might alter the word? For no man who knows the force of the English language, would put a word of three syllables there, but from absolute necessity." "Doubtless you may do as you like," said his friend. "Then be so good as to write *pierce* for *penetrate.* Pierce is the word, Sir, and the *only* word to be used there."†

* See Part III, Book II, Ch. II, Sec. I, § 18.

† This incident in the literary life of Rev. Robert Hall—of Bristol, Eng.,—shows strikingly to what a degree of nicety *the taste* of a man, may be cultivated, by long study of good models,—and especially of THE CLASSICS. The works of Hall,—so far as they were really prepared for the press by himself—are a most improving study, for the young scholar, not only for their profound, and yet always clear, and powerful thinking, but also as one of the best models extant, of modern *English style.* And it may be added that no man without the finest classic culture, could ever have attained the power of Hall.

Vocal character of Saxon words.

The English language, more than any modern language known to us, is characterised by the predominance of *short, terse,* pointed words, on which the whole stress of the voice admits of be ng thrown, with *emphatic power,* instead of *long, stra gling* words, sprouting into growth, in one's very hands,—as in the inflected languages of Europe. The difference reminds one of that between the quick, short, sharp report of a rifle, and the rattling sound of a shot gun,—and in this case, the sound is suggestive of the effect. The *force* of the words, is like the *contents* respectively discharged from the two. The *penetrative power* of each is *inversely*, as its *mass*.

Long Saxon words expressive.

And then, even the long words of Saxon origin, are made up of component elements, still retaining the *significance* of their roots—sometimes *homely* but always *forcible;*—and that again is largely due, to the *sensuous image* embodied in them. For example,—the latin derivative, "*paternal*" is more sonorous, but the Saxon "*fatherly*," is the word for power. And *awkward* as the compound, —"home sickness,"—is, it is yet far more *forcible*, than the musical Greek derivative "Nostalgia."

Saxon and Latin derivations.

Reaction in favor of Saxon English.

It is, beyond a question, a *good omen* that there, is, at last, a decided reaction against the enamored prevalence of the *grandiloquent* latin derivatives of the language,—introduced by Dr. Johnson, and his court ;*—and due largely—as that reaction is—to the ruling influence of a few coteries of literary gentlemen ;—among whom the conductors and writers of the Edinburgh Review, deserve a large share of the honor, and the credit.

Figures tributary to Force.

§ 6. The fourth principle tributary to *force*, in the use of words, relates to the proper use of *figurative* lunguage.

* It is a curious fact, that even the cotemporaries of Dr. Johnson felt, as we do, the *turgidness* of his style : and yet many of them fiel under its power. "If," said Goldsmith to him, "you should write a fable about little fishes, Doctor, you would make the little fishes talk like great whales." Though Johnson never did write fables about little fishes,—his thoughts being as consistently *grandiloquent* as his diction, yet he called about him a shoal of admirers, who realized as far as they were able, Goldsmith's *witticism*.

As this topic, in its applications, involves—as we have seen—the *clearness* of style, and as we shall find in the next chapter, has still more emphatic applications to the third of the essential properties,—viz: Beauty—we shall only say, in this connexion, that the first canon, in the use of figurative language, is, negatively,—that the *imagery* employed to represent the thought, should never be allowed to take the place of *a principal;* or be employed for its own sake,—i. e. for the sake of its beauty—and so to *overload*, and *damage* the *clearness* or *force* of the style.

Imagery always subordinate to clearness.

E. g., * "But what can one do? How dispense with those darker disquisitions, and moonlight voyages, when we have to deal with a sort of moon-blind wits, who, though very acute and able in their kind, may be said to renounce day-light, and extinguish, in a manner, the bright, visible, outward world, by allowing us nothing but what we can prove, by strict formal demonstration."—Lord Shaftsbury.

Example.

This sentence proves that even in the case of experienced writers, there is danger that the *substance* of a passage may *effloresce* into vacant *form*. Of course, however, it is still more common, for *young* writers and speakers,—especially those of an ardent temperament, and lively fancy, to become so enamored of a fine *figure*, as to forget the necessity of *sense*.

Danger of too much attention to form.

§ 7. There is one figure,—or device, employed in style— termed EUPHEMISM,—so *peculiar*, and *valuable* in its place, as to deserve some exposition of its laws, in this connexion. A Euphemism is a *figure*—so called—or *device* by which a harsh or painful idea, is expressed in language, purposely chosen to *avoid fullness* or *force*, so as to *insinuate* rather than *express* the thought,—or, at the worst, to express the idea, in some phase or relation, that is as *little painful*,—or as *positively pleasant*,—as possible.

Euphemism.

Ground and value.

To express the idea of "*death*," e.g. under the image or figure of *sleep*, is to clothe a harsh or repulsive thing, under an image as little repulsive, and to surround it with as many agreeable associations, as the nature of

When appropriate.

* See farther, Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 240.

the subject will admit. Of course *Euphemism*, — in this sense,— is proper; and, if we may so say, *forcible*, in its way; when the *direct* and *full* expression of the thought, would be *harsh*, or in danger of arousing *prejudice*, against the acceptance of the truth.

When evil.

The effect of the device, is practically well known, despite the maxim,—"a rose by any other name would smell as sweet."

E. g., the standing of a man in the community would be seriously compromised, if he were published as having "*failed in business*;" but it is hardly more than a *piquant* relish for a merchant's toast and tea, to learn from the morning paper, that a brother merchant had "stopped payment."—Or again, the announcement that the *boiler* of a steam-boat, had *exploded*, would strike horror through a whole community, and *might damage travel;* but the fact, that ten men were scalded to death, and ten others blown up into the air, or down into the water, will not move either boat-owners, or travelers to take the necessary precautions for safety, because the boat only "*collapsed a flue*."

Examples of its power.

It may not alter the *morality* of the thing, to call "*vice*," "*frailty*," or a "*drunken debauch*," merely "*a spree*," or *disgraceful ignorance* of what a man ought to know at examination, a "*fizzle*," but it does alter the *rhetoric* of the case,—i. e. *the force of the style*, where that is the property,—as it generally is—to which its *power* is due.

The school of poetry founded, respectively, by BURNS, and COWPER, and the LAKE POETS, has taught us, that even the somewhat rugged, but strong, manly, Saxon words of our noble native tongue,—when presided over by good taste,—are good enough to entertain even the angels of poesy.

Common words may be poetic.

SECTION II.

Construction as tributary to Force.

§ 1. The principle which comes first, both in the view of its *importance*, and the *frequency of its violation*, is, that force

Construction simple and concise.

demands *simplicity*, *conciseness*, and *directness* in the construction of the sentences. It is true, universally, that "brevity is the soul of wit." A sword may be hung with trappings, for *show*; but *for use*, the very scabbard must be thrown away. It is the keen, naked, *blade*, not *its ornaments*, that are in the question. A *laconic style*, whatever faults it may have, is commonly *forcible*.

Laconic style forcible.

There are two common forms, of *mock-forcible* style. The *one* is the use of *epithets*, *adjectives* and *adverbs*—and all in the superlative degree:—the *other* is the free use of interjections, exclamations, apostrophes, and other signs of *dead* passion, instead of the employment of true, profound, *living passion*. The result is not only *inefficient*, but *frigid*; and even *ridiculous*, beyond most forms of bad rhetoric.

Mock-forcible style.

Frigidness.

§ 2. But, in the second place, while style may escape this fault,—and there may be *no exaggerations*,—there may yet be *diffuseness* and *wordiness*. Such a style may possibly be clear enough,—though it is not likely to be so,—but it can *never* be *forcible*, except *comparatively*. It is like a *concave lens*, which transmits the light, but *scatters* it.

Diffuse and wordy style.

To obtain power,—whether of *heat* or *light*—one must *condense*. The smaller the focus, the greater the power. The force of a sentence,—other things being equal—is commonly *inversely* as its *bulk*. The same weight of matter, is susceptible of a much greater degree of force,—and especially of penetrative power, in the form of a rifle ball, than a load of shot.

Force is inversely as the bulk.

§ 3. We have said, however, that persons addicted to long and wordy sentences, *may* be *comparatively* forcible. But there is only way, by which this can be done. The *thoughts* of such men must be like the shot of a *seventy-two pounder*,—made of *solid metal*.

Long sentences how forcible.

Chalmers is a remarkable example of a wordy, repetitious, yet most forcible, writer. This is due, chiefly, to two causes,—1, the intense *earnestness* of his style;—

Dr. Chalmers

and 2, the *massiveness* of his thoughts. They will bear a load of words, and repetitions that would *crush* the thoughts of common men.

Threefold form of this fault.

The overloading of sentences may occur in *three ways*;—viz:

1. *By* TAUTOLOGY,
2. *By* PLEONASM,
3. *By* VERBOSITY.

§ 4. By *tautology* is meant the repetition of the same sentiment two or more times, in substantially, the *same form*. *The effect* of the repetition, however,—it should be said,—depends upon the character of the thought repeated. Strongly impassioned discourse, not only *tolerates*, but *demands* a repetition, of the causes which produced it. When the very *object* of the repetition, is to *fix attention* upon its *causes*, with a view of *justifying or heightening the emotion*, it cannot be condemned as *tautology*;—which is the *unnecessary* repetition, of a thought.

Tautology.

Its effect.

Exceptions.

It is this which makes the compiete vindication of the seeming tautology of Dr. Chalmers' style.

§ 5. So Shakspeare makes Hamlet,—Act. I, Sec. III,—give vent to his indignation, at the hasty marriage of his mother, with his father's brother; thus:

Repetition not tautology.

"That it should come to this!
"But two month's dead! Nay not so much as two:
"Must I remember? Why she would hang on him
"As if increase of appetite had grown
"By what it fed on: and yet within a month,
"Let me not think on't;—frailty thy name is woman,—
"A little month; or ere those shoes were old,
"With which she followed my poor father's body,
"Like Niobe all tears; why she, even she—
"O heaven a beast, that wants discourse of reason,
"Would have mourned longer—married with my uncle,
"My father's brother; but no more like my father,
"Than I to Hercules: within a month;
"Ere yet the salt of most unrighteous tears
"Had left the flushing in her galled eyes,
"She married: O most wicked speed, to post,
"With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!
"It is not, nor it cannot come to good;
"But break my *heart*; for I must hold my tongue."

The bitter, burning, galling recurrence, to the *one idea*, in every variety of *phrase and image* by a bursting heart, is not only *not* tautology, but is obviously *demanded*, by the *pitch of passion*, of the crazed subject of such grief.

§ 6. *Pleonasm* is the use of a term, or terms, the meaning of which is fully *implied*, in what is *already* said, though not *strictly* a *repetition;* or it is the use of terms which add nothing to the sense:—like the "damp mists," or "blue heavens," or "silvery moon," of Ossian.

Pleonasm.

And not only so, but every word that could be dispensed with, without impairing the fullness of the thought—even by recasting the sentence—is *a pleonasm*. No one knows how much lighter and more effectively, a sentence will move, after all this useless lumber has been taken out of it. It might be a good rule, to strike out every *word*, or *clause* or *image*, that does not forward the object of the sentence.

As we saw before, that it was not the *repetition* of a thought, but its *useless* repetition, that constituted tautology, so here, it is not the previously *implied expression* of an idea, but such expression in a form that adds *no significance* or *force* to the expression, that makes a *pleonasm*. There are qualifying words which add,—if not a *new idea*, at least a new *emphasis* to the old idea; and are, therefore, justifiable, if not *demanded*, and *indispensable*, to express the shade or fullness of the thought.

Words for emphasis not pleonasm.

§ 7. Words of this class, are known as *epithets*:—viz: words which define the *sense, or degree*, in which a given property may be predicated of a subject to which it is related, either characteristically, or in very different degrees. *Cold* moon-beams, though moon-beams are always *cold*, in their nature,—as reflected light,—is yet an *epithet*, so *characteristic* of moonlight, as to describe a real and invariable property. *Qualifying* words like this,—which might easily be multiplied to a large extent,—are *epithets*, not *pleonasms;* and as such contribute to the

Epithets what?

How different from Pleonasm.

discrimination or *clearness*, or *emphasis*, of thought, and consequently to the *force of style*.

Verbosity, nature of.

§ 8. *Verbosity*, implies the *crowding in* of *words* and *clauses*, which yet add nothing, either to the clearness or force of style. They may not be, *tautological*, or *pleonastic*;—i. e. they

How different from tautology and pleonasm.

may not be either a *repetition*, nor yet wholly *destitute of meaning*; but their meaning may be either *trifling*, or *irrelevant*. Of course the effect of such words, must be, to lum-

Evils.

ber the sentence, and distract the attention; or, in other words, to mar both the *clearness* and *force* of style.*

Climax.

§ 9. The *second* general principle bearing on the *construction* of sentences with a view to *force*, is that the clauses should follow one another *in the order of their importance*. This order is what the Rhetoricians call CLIMAX.

The law of *Climax*, is laid in the constitution of the human mind. It is impossible to carry the mind

Reason of the law of climax.

addressed to the highest point of force, by a sudden transition; or in any other way than by degrees.† In Cicero's oration against Verres, this principle is well seen.

* The following illustration, taken from the traditional report of one of my predecessor's unwritten lectures, will define the nature and fault of which we speak, better than any formal definition.

Example of Verbosity.

"A gentleman in the South, accompanied by his servant.—both on horse-back,—finding his saddle uncomfortable, drew up, and addressing the latter,—"Jack,"—said he—"do you take the saddle off this here horse, and lay it down on the ground,—then take the saddle off your horse and put it on this horse, and then take up the saddle from the ground there, and put it on your horse." When the real nature of the process at last broke through this cloud of words, upon the wondering mind of Jack, his laconic reply, was, "La, massa, why did'nt you say *change the saddles!*" It was *partly* this same fault,—of course on a very different scale—that laid Dr. Johnson—as reported by Boswell,—open to the amusing sarcasms of Macauley.

It is, by no means, *an uncommon* fault of style, in men whose classical training is still so *self conscious*, as to crowd their style with what the common people call "*big words*."

† The applications of *Climax*, in appeals to the passions in eloquence have been already studied. See Part II, Ch. III, § 12.

fig 99.

It is an *outrage*, to *bind* a Roman citizen,—to *scourge* him is an *atrocious crime*,—to *put him to death*, is *paricide*, but to *crucify* him, what shall we call it?

Anti-Climax

§ 10. The *force* of this principle is best, seen, in the effect of the *inverse* order,—termed *anti-climax*.

The *anti-climax*, is so excessively enfeebling, as to be a most potent instrument in *belittleing a thing* so to make it ludicrous.

"And thou, Dalhousie, the great God of war,
"Lieutenant Colonel to the Earl of Mar. —*Pope.*

Polished *ridicule* is indeed the true application of the anti-climax in Rhetoric.

Again: Pope, uses it for a satirical *lash* laid on the back of a well known personage, in the line signalizing his liberality:—

"Die and endow a *College*,—or a *cat*."

Dramatic quality.

§ 11. The third principle, in construction, bearing on the *Force* of style, is due to its *dramatic* character.

Defined.

By this is meant the introduction of persons and things as *acting*, and *speaking* for *themselves;* instead of representing them in *the third person*, and then telling what they said and did. This quality of style—especially in narration—will be found to add greatly to its *force*, and vivacity.

Effect in Fiction and History.

It is this character of style,—largely,—which lends its fascination to Fiction: while the want of it, does so much to render History dry and dull. Literal history is often *stranger* than fiction; but its life and interest are liable to be evaporated to *dryness*, by the mode of narration.

Periodic structure.

§ 12. A *fourth* canon of construction, tributary to the *force* of sentences, requires that the closing member should bring the thought to a perfect *period*, and forbids the drawing out,—like the additional joints of a spy-glass,—of superadded clauses, after the main idea of the sentence. An instance of

Instance of antiperiodic structure.

the enfeebling effect of this form of construction, is supplied in the following sentence:

Neither is any mode of life, more honorable in the sight of God than another; otherwise he would be a respecter of persons, *which he assures us he is not.*

Force of antitheses.

§ 13. The *fifth* principle of *construction*—bearing on the *force* of the sentence—is that which seeks to suggest the antagonism of *contrasted thoughts*, by the *antithetic form of the structure*,

E. g., "In their *prosperity*, my friends shall *never* hear of me, in their *adversity*, *always*."

Reduplicated structure.

§ 14. The *sixth* form of construction, available for giving *force* to the form of the sentence, is that, by which a *full, extended statement* of the thought is *first* made, with a view to *clearness;* and then given, in *condensed reduplication*, with a *view to force*. Take this example from Burke:

Example of.

"When the old feudal and chivalrous spirit of *fealty*, which by freeing kings from *fear*, freed both kings and subjects from the *precaution of tyranny*, shall be extinct, in the minds of men, plots and assassination, will be anticipated by preventive murder, and preventive confiscation, and that long roll of grim and bloody maxims, which form the political code of all power, not standing on its own honor, and the honor of those that obey it. *Kings will be tyrants from policy, when subjects are rebels from principle.*"

Danger of excess

The *condensed antitheses* of the final clause, like the *crack* of the *whip*, is what gives the *sting* to the blow. The danger te be guarded against, in all these cases, is the appearance of *labor* and *conscious* effort, giving an air of offensive *mannerism*, to the style. This constant straining after effect—next after the pompous formalism and frigidness of high sounding words—is the great fault of the otherwise powerful style, of Dr. Johnson.

Interrogary construction

§ 15. A *seventh* form of construction tributary to the force of sentences, is the *interrogatory*.

Natural and figurative interrogation.

Though interrogation is the natural expression of doubt, seeking relief by asking a question, yet where there is really no *doubt* in the case, and where the object of the speaker, is not,

therefore, to *resolve a doubt;* but to secure an *emphatic affirmation*, of a truth which is *beyond all doubt*, it is not unnatural, to raise a question for the sake of *eliciting* the unanimous *affirmation* and so securing a *pronounced judgment*, instead of a *quiescent assent*, to the truth in question :—e. g.,

I ask, gentlemen, is such a thing possible? Is it even conceivable? Can any man, in his senses, accept a conclusion so unnatural, so absurd, and so revolting?

Whoever attempts it, will find it impossible to make any other form of affirmation, so *emphatic*, and *impassioned* as this interrogatory form.

Force.

§ 16. An *eighth* principle,—somewhat related to the last,—and like it tributary to the *force* of a sentiment, lies in the use of *Irony*. It is not simply a *doubt*,—prompting a question—but the seeming *decisive* and even strenuous *affirmation* of a *sentiment;* while it is intended to convey *the very opposite conviction*.

Use and Power of Irony.

A device like this, is only applicable of course, where there is no danger of the ironical form being understood *seriously*.

Irony is employed not only to *controvert* error, but to *draw ridicule* upon it, by setting it into relations where its error becomes so *palpable* as to be *ridiculous*. The most effective and valuable application of irony consists in its power to *pour ridicule* upon a sentiment intended to be refuted. Take this example quoted by Day :

Applications and conditions.

Its effect.

"But," Mr. Speaker, "we have a *right* to tax America." Oh wonderful transcendent right! The assertion of which has cost us thirteen provinces, six islands, one hundred thousand lives, and seventy millions of money. Oh invaluable right! for the sake of which, we have sacrificed our rank among nations, our importance abroad, and our happiness at home."

§ 17. The *ninth* principle, lending *force* to the construction, of a sentence, is the *inversion* of the *natural order* of the sentence for the sake of greater emphasis.

Inversion.

According to the idiom of the English language, the normal logical order of the construction, for simple *unimpassioned* narration, is, to place the subject *first*, the copula, *next*, and the predicate *last*. In proportion as the sentiment becomes impassioned, there is a tendency to alter the form of the construction, with a view of giving more emphatic force, to the emotion struggling

Rationale of Inversion.

Emphasis.

for utterance. When the passion gets complete control of the logic of the sentence, it thrusts out first, the word, which is burdened with the greatest weight of forceful thought. The excited, popular assembly which drowned the defence of Paul in the Amphitheatre at Ephesus, takes—despite of our English idiom, in the translation,—the impassioned form.

Why emphatic.

"Great is Diana of the Ephesians."
Not "Diana of the Ephesians is great."

§ 18. Still another method, in which *impassioned feeling* seeks *forceful* expression, lies in the use of language, *purposely exaggerated beyond the literal truth* of description: or in other words in the use of the figure—so called—of HYPERBOLE, e. g.,

Force of exaggeration.

I saw their chief, *tall* as a *rock of ice*; his *spear* the *fir*; his *shield* the *rising morn*.

So far from producing the effect of falsehood, such exaggerated forms of description are not only *allowed* but *demanded*, by the over wrought excitement, which prompts their use. Instead of making the impression of literal falsehood, the Hyperbole,—in its legitimate applications—is *true* in *effect*: because the required abatement is instinctively allowed for;—while the absence of *the Hyperbole* would discredit the genuineness of the passion which failed to employ it.

Justification of exaggeration.

§ 19. The last principle we shall stop to mention as controlling the construction with a view to augmented,—because impassioned—expression, is where the reigning excitement of the speaker, overbears his control of the logical construction, and leaves the sentence, either disturbed in structure, or *incomplete in form*:—as e. g., in the sentence before quoted from Cicero.

Aposiopesis.

Force of.

It is an *outrage*, to *bind* a Roman citizen,—to *scourge* him is an *atrocious crime*,—to *put him to death*, is *paricide*, but to *crucify* him, what shall we call it?

The force of this form of construction depends on the fact, that no epithet that is within the range of rhetorical propriety, could equal in force, what the heaving in-

Rationale

dignation of the Imagination of the excited assembly, would be sure to supply.

§ 20. But, after all, the great condition necessary to a *forcible style* is *forcible thoughts*: i. e. thoughts instinct with clear and strong *emotion*. *Feebleness* of *conception*, and *confusion* of *thought*, are the prolific parents of the feeble, rickety constitution, of *powerless style*. All the rules for attaining a forcible style, might be summed up in this one:—to express *forcible thoughts*, in the most *natural way*.

Necessity of Force of thought.

And generally, the condition of *thinking* either *clearly* or forcibly, isto think *patiently* and *long*. The creations of thought—like those of matter at the beginning—do not rise in full and complete form *at once*. It commonly requires the patient, plastic hand, of *after* thought, to mould them into the fittest forms;—and especially so far as those forms owe their life and power to the last of the essential properties of style—viz: *their* BEAUTY.

Conditions of this force.

CHAPTER III.

BEAUTY AS A PROPERTY OF STYLE.

§ 1. BEAUTY—or elegance,—is placed *last*, in the order of the *essential properties* of style, because it is *least* in importance. And yet some writers, especially in the forming stages of their style—reversing this normal order—spend their time in coquetting with beauty, to the neglect of *force* and *clearness*.

Order of beauty.

It often happens, moreover, that the beauty which captivates them, is, after all, of a *tawdry* sort,—the result of *finery* and *paint*,—instead of the simplicity and beauty of nature.

§ 2. One of the first principles in regard to *beauty*, —the world over—is, that a studied display of it, or even the apparent consciousness of its existnence, displeases. It must steal

Self-consciousness destroys beauty.

upon us unawares, to make its full impression. This is true even of *real* beauty. But when that which is of *questionable character*, undertakes to parade itself, we repel repel it with disgust.

So does display.

§ 3. It should be a settled principle, therefore, that beauty is not to be *studied* and much less *displayed*, for *its own sake*. It is always an attribute, and must never be thrust into the place of a *Principal*. Beauty of style should exist with a view to the sense, and not the sense merely to support and show off the beauty of the style or imagery.

The value of Beauty in style.

§ 4. At the same time, it is very far from being true, that *beauty of style* is of *no* value, or even of *little* value, in rhetoric. This would contradict the settled experience of men; and it is not difficult to see why it should be so.

Relation to taste.

§ 5. As discourse is addressed to the mind, not only by the channel of the *intellect*, but also through the *sensibilities*,—i. e. *the æsthetic nature;* it should seek, 1, not to offend against the laws of the *taste*:—and 2, to avail itself of the fascination, and power, of good taste, in order to *mediate truth* to the *acceptance* of the mind addressed. This is the true characteristic function of *poetry* and the explanation of its power in literature. But the same element of power exists in forms, appropriate also

Necessity of its employment.

to prose. And it is little less than treason to the cause of truth, to allow error or vice to triumph, by means of the unnatural alliance which it will be sure to form, in order to avail itself of the captivating power, which *beauty* wields over the *human heart*.

Power in conviction.

Even in the process of *conviction*, logic supplies *only the skeleton* of effective *argument*. Truth may be proved to be true; but mere truth —as such awakens no *emotion*, and has, therefore, no proper *power*. It

Power in persuasion.

is not till *rhetoric* sends the warm, red, "life-blood of *beauty*," to mantle on the cold cheek of *logic*, and clothe its ungainly, muscular forms, in the drapery of *taste*, that we begin to *admire*,—and then it is, that we feel the *living*, and life-giving pulses of ELOQUENCE,

as a *power*, over the individual *soul*, or as a power in *society at large*.

Sources of Beauty.

§ 6. In studying the sources of *Beauty*, as a property of style, we shall find it to reside, 1, in the MATTER, and 2, in the FORM *of thought*.

SECTION I.

The Material Elements of Beauty.

Truth essential to Beauty.

§. 1. The *first* constituent *element of beauty*—available in style—resides in its *matter*, of which the main *essential quality* is ITS TRUTH.

Power of Fancy.

Fancy may elicit *wonder*, in view of the fantastic forms, and unexpected plausibilities of error, or even vice:—but,—as we have seen before,*—no *form* or *degree* of *power*, ever *has* wielded, or ever *can* wield, any true and permanent control over the human spirit, that is not *true* to the intuitive *sensibilities*, and *wants* of that spirit. It is the "WORD," which is, also the "TRUTH," which "*only hath immortality.*"

Immortality of Truth.

Two Sources of Beauty.

§ 2. Mens *thoughts* like their *persons*, have two distinct, but closely related elements of this source of beauty: 1, *natural*, or that due to its own proper form;—and 2, *moral*, due to its *association*, in human thought, with *moral qualities*.

Natural and Moral.

Natural Beauty of Form.

Moral Beauty.

A flower is beautiful for its own form and colour, before we come to look upon it as the emblem of moral qualities,—i. e., before we see its *moral beauty*. But we must not forget that beauty may be due to the *association* with *moral qualities*, as truly as to *natural* forms:—from the beauty of holiness—which is "the perfection of beauty,"—down to the natural qual-

* See Ch. I, of this Book.

ites of the lamb or the dove; into which the consciousness of human character, has breathed a spirit of beauty assimilated to its own.

The highest form of beauty,—due to the mate-
The highest Form of Beauty. rial element of the thought, and supply-
ing, consequently, the highest emotional *power* to *style*,—is that which blends the two, in substantial union, and then vivifies them both, with the pervading element of *truth*;—truth to the intellect, and truth to the human spirit.

Section II.

Beauty as residing in the Form.

§ 1. The second constituent element of beauty,—
Beauty due to Form. available in style—is that residing in the Form *of thought*. Of this general class, there are *several subdivisions*.

§ 2. In the first place, there is that form of beauty
Adaptation a source of beauty. which resides in the adaptation of means to ends:—as we speak familiarly of a *beautiful piece of machinery*;—or the *beauty* of a *crystal*,—meaning its perfect transparency.

The beauty due to *excellence* in the essential pro-
Excellence of style a source of beauty. perties of style—clearness and force —though in reality appertaining to the class residing in the *forms*, of thought, are yet so *ruling*, as to seem to belong to the *matter* of the
What a beautiful thought means. thought itself. We speak of a "*beautiful thought*," when it is really the *form* of the thought, that strikes us,—or the *image* under which it is *expressed*:—e. g. "*minutes* are the *gold dust* of time." It is not the *thought*, that the smallest portions of time are valuable, but the beautiful *form* or *image* under which that thought is expressed, that gives us the sense of *beauty*.

§ 3. This introduces the *second* principle, tributary to the beauty, residing in the form of *thought*, viz. its *æsthetic character.*

Æsthetic character

We have already seen that the *force* or *power* in style, is due to its *emotional character ;** and no form of emotion stands in so near a relation to the conciliatory, *captivating* power of style,—in producing the effect sought in eloquence,—as the æsthetic emotions.

Emotional character.

§ 4. The æsthetic characters of style, may be farther subdivided, into, 1, those *peculiarly*, if not *exclusively*, appropriate *in poetry :*—and 2, those *equally available in prose.*

Two æsthetic forms

There are several points of difference, between poetry and prose : some of which are essential and characteristic, and others secondary and less distinctive. Coleridge "desynonymises" the words *poesy and poetry*, employing the former to designate the *essential nature* and spirit of *poetry ;* and *the latter* that which possesses only *the form* of poetry. The same difference lies in the words poetry and poetic, or "*poetry*" and "*a poem:*"—the one describing that which *breathes* the essential *spirit and life* of poetry ;—and the other, that which *wears the form :*—more or or less perfect, in its characteristic life,—but always having a defined and unvarying form.

Difference between poetry and prose.

Poesy and Poetry.

Poetry and poetic.

Poetry and a form.

In the latter of these senses, "poetry" has æsthetic characters, peculiar and distinctive; and in the other, it employs æsthetic principles and powers, which it has, *in common with prose.*

Resemblance and difference.

§ 5. The *distinctive* character of *poetry*,—in the sense of *a poem*—lies in its combining *thought* with the æsthetic power

Destinction of poetry.

* See Ch. II and Ch. III.

of *music;* in such forms, and in so far as *language*–i. e. *articulate* sound, expressing thought—can avail itself of the *æsthetic* properties of music,—i. e. *inarticulate* sound, — with a view of meditating more effectively that truth, to the acceptance of the human mind, by reason of *the æsthetic form*, in which it is thus clothed.

Essential character.

§ 6. There are two forms—peculiar to poetry—under which language can thus link itself with the æsthetic power of music, in order to the fuller attainment of its end,—as tributary to the *beauty* of style—by means of verse: viz: 1, *rhyme*, and 2, *blank verse.*

Two Æsthetic Forms in Poetry.

§ 7. As poetry properly belongs to rhetoric—as we have defined its scope—only *incidentally*, as involving some of the forms of æsthetic power available in rhetoric, we pass to the consideration of those forms of æsthetic power, appertaining properly to *prose style*, either *exclusively*, or in *common with poetry.*

Poetry not Rhetoric.

Æsthetic Forms in Prose.

§ 8. The point of the closest *likeness*,—in æsthetic character,–of *poetry* and *prose*, is in their common possession of that quality of style, called *rhythm*:—which consists in the musical arrangement, and the *succession* in due *proportion*, of accented or unaccented syllables. The melody of *poetry* depends upon the length of the syllables, or, in other words, on the well proportioned succession of *poetic feet* — so called:— the melody of *prose*, on the well proportioned succession of the *accented* and *unaccented syllables.*

Power of Rhythm.

Definitions of Rhythm.

Melody in Poetry and Prose.

So far from this being a difference without a distinction, or even an *unimportant* difference, the tendency of a prose style to assume the measured character of poetic

Difference of the two.

numbers, is a *real*, and,—if carried to excess,—constitutes a very *great* fault in style. It is apt to lead one to sacrifice, or at least, subordinate, the sense to the sound. Words are selected, not because they express the sense most simply and forcibly, but because they contain, just so many syllables, and of just such a quantity.*

Poetic Melody a Fault in Prose.

§ 9. Another *æsthetic form*, available in poetry, and prose alike, is the method of *alliteration*:—implying *sameness of the initial consonants*, of successive words,—as *rhime* implies the *sameness* of the *closing vowels*. Take, as an instance of alliteration, the following line from a poem, which owes its *life*, in the unwritten history of the College—now nearly a half a century old,—purely to tradition;—

Alliteration.

An Instance.

"*And slander slavers with his slippery tongue.*"

Though *alliteration* is more characteristically at home in *poetry*, it is also equally capable, of lending its peculiar *power*,—if kept within legitimate limits—to *prose*.†

* "We know," says one of the purest critics in America, "a popular sermon writer, with whom the melody of a sentence, is the criterion of its perfection. His style lies, therefore, between blank verse, and Mc Pherson's Ossian. A friend of ours once scanned for us twelve successive lines of regular decasyllables, from one of his published discources. SUCH MELLOWNESS IS AKIN TO DECAY."—*Princeton Review.* Even Cicero, notwithstanding his constitutional fondness for full and sounding sentences, banishes such a style to "Caria and Phrygia and Mysia," "quod minime politæ et minime elegantes sunt," and assures us further that the Athenians, "vero, funditus repudiaverunt." And so must every one who does not wish to sacrifice the power of thought, to the mere jingle of words.

† Perhaps we may get a truer apprehension of the *nature* and peculiar *effect* of the device, if we take a specimen, in a dead language where the whole effect is due to the alliteration. and none at all, to the matter of the thought. For this purpose we extract from a small volume of *Macaronic Poetry*, in Latin, the following lines, with their caption:—

Alliteration in Latin.

PUGNA PORCORUM
PER P. PORCIUM, POETAM.
Plaudite, porcelli, Porcorum pigra propago.
Progreditur, plures Porci pinguedine pleni
Pugnantes pergunt, pecudum pars prodigiosa,

§ 10. It should be remembered, however, its very effectiveness is a temptation to its abuse; and like the analogous and tributary arts, of both of *rhime* and *rhythm*, the only condition of its effective employment, as an allowable *auxiliary*, in æsthetic effect, is that it shall be *rigidly confined* to a *subsidiary* and *secondary* place: and never allowed, for a moment, to overbear a pure regard to the simple, clear, and forcible expression of thought. Like every other element of power, it is able to do *harm*, when it is found out of its *true place*. The keener the edge, the more dangerous to play with.

Dangerous of using in excesss.

§ 11. The third form of æsthetic power,—tributary to style—is the *imitative* or suggestive property of *sound*.

Suggestive Propery of Sound.

As a large part of language wears every appearance of having *originated* in the instinctive propensity to frame a word, more or less in *imitation*,—either actual or fanciful—of the idea, which it is designed to express, one of the sources of expressive power, will naturally lie in such imitation.*

Words due to Imitation.

Suggestive Power of Words.

There are three properties in which words—i. e., articulate sounds—which may *imitate*, or *suggest* the character of things:—viz: 1, *sounds in nature*;—2, properties analagous to, and capable of suggestion, by means of sounds;—such, e. g. as the *qualities of motion*,—3, *mental states*, capable of such suggestion.

Applicable to What.

§ 12. In the *first* place, there are *words* evidently resulting from an *imitation* of that which they express:

Imitative words.

Such e. g., as the natural cries of animals—"hiss" "gabble" "gobble," "squeak," "squeal,"—and also other sounds in nature,—such as "clap," "splash," &c. So also we speak of the

Perturbat pede petrosas plerumque plateas,
Pars portentose populorum prata profanat,
Pars pungit populando potens, pars plurima plagis
Prætendit punire pares, prosternere parvos, &c.

* See Day's Elements of Rhetoric, Style, Part I, Ch. VII.

"*booming*" of artillery, the "*roar*" of cannon, and the "*clash*" of arms.

§ 13. *Quickness* or *slowness* of *motion* may be imitated, or, the idea suggested, or heightened by this same means: e. g. *rapid, joyous motion:*

Qualities of motion.

"When the merry bells ring round,
"And the jocund rebecks sound,
"To many a youth and many a maid,
"Dancing in the checkered shade."

Slowness and sadness, or labor and difficulty:

"And ten low words oft creep in one dull line."

Or, "A needless Alexandrine ends the song,
"That, like a wounded snake, drags its slow length along."

The effect is obviously due, in such cases, to the analogy between the ease and rapidity of the utterance,—and that again is due to the character of the syllables,—in such passages, and the cheerfulness, and joyousness, which naturally inspire that quality of motion.

Reason of the effect.

It would be simply *impossible*, to dance to tune of Old Hundred. So, on the other hand, the idea of *difficulty*, or *laboriousness*, is capable of expression,—or at least *suggestion*, —by analogous devices; especially by such combinations of letters and syllables, as to be *difficult of utterance;* suggesting, inferentially, difficulty of execution: e. g.,

Labor and difficulty.

"Up the high hill, he heaves a huge round stone;
"The huge round stone resulting with a bound,
"Thunders impetuous down, and smokes along the ground."

Or, "And strains, from hard bound brains, six lines a year."

The possible expressive power, due to this imitative property in style, which,—for want of a better place—we class with the æsthetic properties, available for heightening the beauty of style, is exemplified with extraordinary effect in the transition from a thunder storm to a calm, May morning,—metaphorically speaking—in that remarkable extract, from Pope's Essay on Criticism:

Æsthetic power of imitation.

"What! like Sir Richard rumbling, rough and fierce,
"With arms, and George and Brunswick crowd the verse,
"Rend with tremendous sounds your ears asunder,
"With gun, drum, trumpet, blunderbuss and thunder?
"Then, all your muse's softer arts display,
"Let Carolina smooth the tuneful lay,
"Lull with Amelia's liquid name the nine,
"And sweetly flow through all the royal line."

While there are here, doubtless, some *real principles* of expression, capable of lending *beauty and force* to style, the subject would yet seem to fall, largely, within the *domain of fancy;* and

to be largely in the nature of a *play upon words;* rather than a serious or valuable source of true *power*, in the culture of style.

Section III.

Principles ruling in the use of Imagery.

§ 1. The last form of *æsthetic power*, available to increase the *Beauty*, as well as *force* of style,—and common equally to prose and poetry—is the employment of *imagery*, in *lieu* of the *intellectual* or *abstract* forms of thought, embodied in *a word*. Though mentioned *last*, this is by far the most *important* and *effective* source of the contributions, made both to the *beauty* and the *force* of style.

Power of Imagery.

§ 2. There are two laws of human nature, which go to explain the well known power of truth expressed in the form of an image over that expressed in *abstract language :* viz : 1, the *sensuous form* and *emotional power*, of the image :—and 2, its *æsthetic* or *beautiful character*,—appealing, as it does, to the sensuous element in human nature ;—which is also *largely* the *emotional* element. It is a familiar principle in human nature, and one which has its most important applications, in the *emotional and active* sphere of life—that men are *more affected* by truths and motives coming through the *senses*, than through purely *intellectual*, or—still more—*abstract channels*.

Ground of power in imagery.

Emotional and active power.

Now it is the special *function* of the *Imagination*,—or *image creating* faculty, to *reproduce sensuous truth ;* and to *transform intellectual* or *abstract* truth, into *imagery*, or sensuous conceptions, taking their character from some image, *resembling*, in some respect, the truth to be embodied, either in actual or fancied likeness. It is the peculiar function of the Imagination, and the fancy, to substitute, on the

Due to the Imagination.

Function of Imagination.

ground of some resemblance, an *image* for an *abstract* conception of *truth*.

§ 3. It is this character of mind which explains to us the *emotional power* of sensuous imagery, over that of the *intellectual or abstract* form of the correspond-

Sensuous and emotional power of Rhetoric.

ing *thought*. It is because man is *not a pure spirit*, nor yet *a pure intellect;* but so far as his *emotional and active life* are concerned, under the ruling influence of *his senses*,—or the reproduction of their *sensuous forms*, in the *Imagination*,—that the power of RHETORIC, as well as POETRY, rests so largely in the use of imagery.

Take, for instance, the powerful, if not revolting image employed in the following passage :*

Example of power in mere imagery.

"For it had been better for them, not to have known the way of righteousness, than after they have known it, to turn from the holy commandment delivered unto them. But it is happened unto them according to the true proverb, The dog is turned to his own vomit again, and the sow that was washed, to her wallowing in the mire." Or the language of Rahab to the Spies, "Our hearts *did melt*,—neither did there remain any more *courage*, in any man, because of you."†

§ 4. Besides this merely *sensuous power* of *an image*

Power of its æsthetic character.

—even a *revolting* one—over any purely *intellectual form* of statement; there is a capacity of farther æsthetic power, where the image, besides its *sensuous*, possesses also an *æsthetic* character ; and thus, avails itself also, of the pe-

Power to mediate truth to the mind.

culiar captivating *sense of beauty*, to mediate the truth embodied, to our *emotional*, and even to our *intellectual acceptance*.

Take,—in illustration of this power,—the majestically beautiful instance of the truth, embodied in the lyric stanza :

"Then sorrow, touched by thee, *grows bright*,
"With more than raptures ray,
"As *darkness* shows us *worlds of light*,
"We never saw by day."

How magnificently fine, is the *image* projected on

Rationale of the effect.

the screen of the *imagination;* besides the tendency, coming out of the mere *beauty* of the image, to prepossess us with

*2 Peter, 2 : 22. †Joshua 2 : 11.

the conviction of its intuitive *truth* :—i. e. in other words—the exquisite *beauty* of the *image*, predisposes us to accept it as *true*, as well as *beautiful*:—possibly from the quick logic of the law of feeling, inferring that what is so *beautiful*, in the domain of an all-perfect God, must be *true* also.

§ 5. But whether this is the true analysis of our tendency to accept truth, on æsthetic grounds, or not; it is certain,—and that is the important truth for us now—

The power of form to perpetuate.

that the æsthetic character of the *form* of thought gives a high power of *probability*, in the mediating of that truth to our acceptance.

Byron. Pope.

The exquisite beauty of much of Byron, e. g., is what renders his morbid, irreligious, and almost—in itself—*revolting* forms of *passion*, so *formidable* and *depraving* ;—and the perfect *melody* of Pope's *versification*, has perpetuated,—and almost *embalmed*—the forms of his *atheistic pantheism*, even in the literature of christian nations ; who would have repelled with horror, the naked statement of the underlying error.

Error due to its æsthetic garb.

And yet—as we have said before—even the highest form of æsthetic excellence in style, after all, comes short of achieving a *true immortality* for error :—and the lesson for us to learn *is the value* to style,—*on the behalf of truth*,—of those properties which show their *power*,—like Satan transformed into an angel of light—in deceiving, "if it were possible, the very elect" of truth.

§ 6. The account we have now given of the origin and power of the use of imagery in language, will explain certain familiar *phenomena*, otherwise inexplicable.

Cause of the free use of imagery.

It is well known, e. g., that the freest and most effective use is made of imagery, in the lower stages of *intellectual* culture. The language of the great *orators*, and statesmen—as we may venture to call them—of the aboriginal tribes of North America, as developed in every period of collision, between the red and white races on this continent, goes to show a power on the side of the former, strikingly in contrast with the all-subduing

Indian eloquence.

Power of Imagery.

forces, of the civilization of the latter: and investing them with a power, not only *formidable*, but in some sense *irresistable*; except by means of undermining processes, of which we have little cause to be proud, in the comparison.

§ 7. On the other hand it has always been noticed that in proportion as the exact, abstract, intellectual, culture, of a race advances,—e. g. *in pure science* or *literature*,—in that same proportion does the boldness of imagery *decline*, to the tamer and less impassioned prevalence of a language, which speaks constantly less and less to the Imagination, the fancy, and the feelings; and which employs more and more of the *generic*, and *abstract*, and *unimpassioned* language of exact, general, and scientific statement.

Declines under exact culture.

It is not the *poverty of language*,—as such men as Blair contend—but the necessity of speaking to the *senses*, and the *imagination, in order* to *impress the feelings* or *command* the *will*, that explains the predominant use of *imagery* in rude, uncultured languages.

True origin of imagery.

§ 8. The principles now stated, touching the *origin, nature and power* of *imagery*,—as tributary to the beauty and force of style,—may be summed up in the following classification of the uses, and effects, resulting—practically—from the proper employment of such imagery, viz:

Classification of its uses.

1. To give *vivacity and beauty to style*. This—as we have seen—depends chiefly on two properties of images,—viz: 1, that by which they set before us a *living image*, instead of a dead or abstract quality.

1 To give beauty to style

Thus Grotius,*—in his commentary on John, says:

"The attachment of John was to *Jesus*,—that of Peter, to the *Messiah*. Accordingly their master gave the *one* the charge of his *Church*,—the *other* that of his *family*.

And 2, on the *beauty of the image* so employed. E.g., Shakspeare represents Capulet, while gazing on the corpse of Juliet, as soliloquizing,—

"Death lies on her like an untimely frost,
"Upon the sweetest flower of all the field."

§ 9. The *second* effective application of an *image*,

* See also Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, p. 298.

2 To illustrate. is to *illustrate* an *idea*, by presenting it under a *familiar, or clearer form.*

The book of Proverbs is a constant illustration of the *beauty* and *force* of this principle, e. g.,

"Where there is no wood the fire goeth out; so where there is no tale-bearer the strife ceaseth."

There is, of course, a peculiar force in such imagery, when it is borrowed from the profession or occupation of the speaker: —and, if possible, still, more when taken from that of the hearer.*

Technical illustration.

§ 10. A *third* legitimate use of such imagery, is to *give emotional power*,—over the passions or the will,—to the thought so presented.

3 To emphasize.

This may be due to *three different reasons.* 1. the *use* of a *term* so *specific* as to *emphasize* that special part of a complex thing, on which *the force* of a term depends: as, e.g., *synecdoche* employs,—for its greater *force*,—the term *blade* instead of *sword*, as we have seen before.† 2, instead of the *whole object*, some *one quality* of that object, is singled out for its *appellative*, in order to *concentrate attention*, and so *emphasize* it. E. g. the phrase "God is love," is far more emphatic and emotional, that the same general idea; that love is one of the attributes of God.

Rationale of emphasis.

1st method.

2d method of emphasis.

This is the principle which underlies the figure—rather the whole class of figures—termed *synecdoche.*

3. The third method, by which the same result is achieved, is that by which an image is introduced, in the place of something else, like it; because it possesses the quality intended to be emphasized, in a *much higher*—or if possible a *proverbial degree.*

3d method of emphasis.

* We are tempted to give farther illustrations of this important point:—e. g., Shakspeare with his usual skill, represents the gardener, —in his Richard II,—as illustrating the higher wisdom of a different course of state policy, by his own familiar experience and practice:

O what a pity is it,
That he had not so trimmed and dressed his land
As we the garden: We at time of year
Do wound the bark, the skin of our fruit trees,
Lest being over proud with sap and blood,
With too much riches, it confound itself:
Had he done so with great and growing men,
They might have lived to bear, and he to taste
Their fruits of duty.

†See Part III, Book II, Chap. I, Sec. I.

Thus if one man is characterized as a *fox*, another as a *tiger*, a third as a *lamb*, and a fourth as a *lion*, these respective characters are far *more emphatic*,—as well as *picturesque*,—than if the first were spoken of, as *cunning*,—the second *fierce* and *treacherous*,—the third *harmless*,—and the fourth *strong*.

§11. Still a fourth method by which the use of imagery gives emotional emphasis to thought, is in the use of the figure known as *Personification*:—a figure "by which inanimate objects, or even abstract qualities, are represented as living beings:—e. g.,*

4th method of emphasis.

"But look the morn in russet mantle clad,
Walk's o'er the dew of yon high eastward hill." *Shakspeare.*

"With such delay
"Well pleased, they slack their course, and many a league,
"Cheered with the grateful smell, *old Ocean smiles*." *Milton.*

The effect of this figure is due to a two-fold cause:—1, there is projected before the Imagination, an image, sometimes simply beautiful,—at other times grand and even sublime,—in lieu of an abstract thought;—and 2, consisting as personification does of a human personal image, it tends to stir the emotional feeling of the human heart, and thus enlist a sort of *personal sympathy*, with the fortunes of the human image thus evoked.

Rationale

§12. The *fifth* use of an *image*, in style, is to *subserve* the purpose *of conviction*.

While this is a real and most important end, growing out of the use of an image, especially one founded on *resemblance*, it is ordinarily *incidental* and *casual*, rather than *primary* or avowed.

Method relationale

Hence—as we have before seen—it is liable to become a prolific source of inferential error: because many images are founded on a resemblance true enough for beauty or even remote illustration, which will give a fallacious result, when pressed into the ends of argument; e. g.,

Danger of error.

"The highest intellects, like the tops of mountains, are the first to catch and reflect the dawn."

The image, here, is beautiful and striking, but the relation on which it is founded is so far *fanciful* as to raise a *question*, at least, whether it would be safe to *infer* from the *analogy*, that discoveries are always necessarily *first* made or *welcomed* by great men.

§13. The ready perception of analogies,—a function of the

Perception of Analogies a high gift.

imagination—is one chief endowment in the mental constitution, of a great inductive philosopher; but unless it is conjoined with a very patient and careful habit of *discriminating* between *true* and *fanciful* resemblance, it is a very *dangerous* gift.

Danger of Fallacy.

The facility with which the truth of such analogies may be *verified*, in the case of the *physical sciences*, by repeated experiments or observation, gives them the honourable appellation of the *exact sciences*: while the difficulty of nice discriminations, and accurate, and repeated observations,—and the consequent difficulty of verification,—gives scope for endless debate, in the theological and moral sciences.*

Exact Sciences.

Moral Science, why uncertain.

The ground of difference, in the two cases, does *not* lie in the fact that the one is guided by real analogies, and the other by imagination, or conjecture.

When Newton inferred—*truly*—the identity of the force which held the moon in its orbit, with that which caused the apple to fall to the ground, it was as really conjecture, or *hypothesis*,—due to the imagination,—as when the ancient astronomers *conjectured—erroneously*—the orbit of the stars to be *circles*; because the circle was a perfect figure,—or when the Pantheist conjectured the force of will, to be identical, in the case of God and men alike.

Hypothesis and Imagination.

Difference and Danger of Hypothesis.

In each and every case,—alike,—the conjecture was a function of the imagination;—hence, sometimes, called the philosophic imagination;—and the difference lies, in the facilities for ascertaining the difference between *real* and *fanciful* analogies; and the *care* with which the *conclusiveness* of the inference, is *tried*, in the exact sciences, before the conjecture, or "*hypothesis*," is received as an item of "exact science."

Real and Fanciful Analogies.

§ 14. Those *analogies* which are *not close* enough, to *sustain an argument*, while yet they are sufficient to *illustrate* or *beautify* a thought, are called *rhetorical analogies*; while, in order to give validity or force, to *argument*

Rhetorical Analogies.

* See Part III, Book II, chap. II.

Logical Analogies.

or *proof*, they must be, what are sometimes called *logical*, or *real analogies*.

Sometimes analogies, supplying the imagery of speech, answer all the *four* purposes now specified,—*beauty, illustration, force* and *argument*. This, of course is the *perfection* of the use of imagery: and the *more* of those purposes an *image serves*, the more it *approximates perfection*. On the other hand, an image which *subserves neither* of these purposes, *except* that of *beauty*, it would, in most instances, be better to dispense with; because *mere* beauty, however *beautiful*, is seldom—perhaps *never* legitimately—the chief end of style.

Complete Analogies.

Mere Beauty Seldom Allowable.

§ 15. From this exposition of the principles ruling in the use of imagery, we may now draw, the following *practical canons of style* in composition :—viz.

1. *Never use a figure* at all, unless it *expresses the idea better*—for *some* reason,—than the *simple, plain language*, which mere *propriety of diction* would suggest.

1. Use Imagery only for greater Force.

The temptation is very strong,—especially in the *training period* of composition—to foist in some image, *merely* for its *beauty*.

§ 16. For example :—a writer is speaking of an *illustrious man*, and to clothe him with becoming dignity, presents him to the imagination, under the image of "a *star*." This might be brilliant, and even forcible ; if—like other stars—it were set in the *firmament*. Instead, of this, however, we next find him, figuring "on the *page of history* :" where, it need not be said, no *star*,—*except an asterisk*—was ever seen : and not only so, but we immediately find our star "stemming the *torrent* of human *ignorance* and *crime* ;" an achievement,—however proper for a rock,—is utterly incompatible with the deportment, even of a *figurative* star.

Incongruous Imagery.

We have purposely employed a strong case—though a real one—taken from a very *immature stage*, in the culture of style ; just as we would use a magnifying glass, to show more clearly, the fault of style, likely to be generated by the *profuse* and *careless* use of *imagery* ; without constant reference to the *consistency* of the image.

2. The *second* canon applicable to the case, is, that when an image is introduced it should be *consistent* with the *main idea* sought to be expressed, and especially that whatever is said

The Image should be Self-consistent.

of it, *in* a *secondary sense*, should be *self-consistent*.

Take this case:—

"In the morning of life, the sensibilities and virtues of the heart, open most genially, like the flowers, under the sunshine of the social affections."

Faulty use of Imagery.

Here the image is *appropriate*, *striking* and *beautiful*. But,—paraphrased by an unskillful hand,—it becomes,—

"The morning of life is the period, when the most *numerous* and abiding *impressions*, are made on the mind."

Incongruity of Imagery.

The very same thought, here becomes utterly tame, and inexpressive. The image of *morning*,—as descriptive of youth — has no obvious relation, and gives neither light nor force, to the idea of making *impressions* on the mind. Instead of the brilliant image of "*morning*," the plain word "*youth*," is much better, in such a case. The fault forbidden by this canon, is technically known as "*mixed metaphor*."

Plain Language Better.

§ 17. It is important to bear in mind, that a large part of our language is founded, originally, on imagery: and while that feature of such words has been, in a great degree lost sight of, it is not *safe* to presume that men of cultivated taste, will not *feel* the *impropriety* of language, resulting from the *congruous mixture of imagery*.

Language Founded in Imagery.

Incongruous Imagery.

E. g., the words *foil*, and *baffle*, are *synonyms*, in the expression of the general idea of *embarrassment*, and failure in prosecution of a purpose; and yet they *cannot* be *interchanged*, without a violation of *good taste*. A *foil* is an instrument to prevent the *penetration* of a rapier,—as in fencing;—and to baffle is to *throw* a dog *off the track* of the game he is pursuing;—and to which the idea of prosecuting intellectual research, is strikingly analogous. It would, therefore, manifestly be a violation of *propriety*, and a *mixture of metaphor*, to speak of *foiling* one's *research*, or *baffling* his *penetration*. And yet no rhetorical *blunder* is so common, as this *mixture of metaphor;* or the incongruous use—for one reason or another—of the image, which underlies so large a proportion of our words. And yet, *liable* as the fault is to occur, in the *careless* use of words, by *common* writers, it always offends a highly *cultivated taste*, and may disturb the *clearness* or *force*, or *beauty* of a thought;

Synonyms, "foil" and "baffle."

Difference.

Liability to Blunder.

Always Offensive.

even when the ground of the offence is not distinctly perceived.

§ 18. The *third* rule for the use of imagery forbids the employment of analogies so remote or fanciful, as not to be readily seen, when stated. An image which requires to be *explained*, had better never be used. It is like a beautiful gauze *veil*, hung over a *beautiful painting*. It both distracts the attention and hinders the view. What we wish te see, is not the veil but the painting.

The Analogy must be Discernible.

§ 19. The *fourth principle*, applicable to the proper use of imagery, is, that the relation or *analogy*, on which the image is founded, while it must be, not only *discernible*, but *clear* and *forcible* when stated, yet must not be *too obvious* or *common place*. Such an analogy supplies neither *light*, nor *interest*, to the thought. It awakens little pleasure, and does still less real good.

But not too Obvious.

Hence, a figure cannot be founded on a resemblance so close and obvious as that of *one* man to *another*; or of a man to his picture. The only exception to this rule, is where one individual is so remarkable for some property, above all other men, as to render him a *proverb* for the quality in question.

Thus, e. g., we speak not only *properly*, but *with great force*, of "out Heroding Herod."

The Analogy not far fetched.

Nor Founded in mistake.

§ 20. The last rule,—analogous to the last but one,—forbids the use of an analogy, as the basis of an image that is *far fetched*, and, still more,—one that is *founded in mistake*. The style of Spencer, Sydney, Jeremy Taylor,—and still more the earlier authors, of our English Literature, are, not seldom, at fault, in this respect: and even Shakspeare,* —from the very exuberance of his imagery,—as we have seen before, is not free from fault, in this respect, though by far the most stimulating name in all our Literature.†

* See p.

† The natural *complement* of the *subject of style*,—and rendered almost *imperative* by the *usage of authors*,—would be a chapter on the

PART IV.

ELOCUTION.

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. The claim of ELOCUTION to a place in RHETORIC, has been disputed, *mainly* on *two* grounds :—1, because the proper object of *Rhetoric* is to supply the DISCOURSE ;—which, again, is the instrument employed in the attainment of the two-fold end of *eloquence*,—conviction and persuasion :—and 2, because the *result*, in successful eloquence, due to the *elocution*, is so complicated as (1,) to defy any attempt to reduce it,—by analysis, —to the laws, on which it depends,—and (2,) the very *attempt*, is held to produce a *mannerism* in delivery, which is always damaging and sometimes fatal, to the effect of the discourse.

Elocution a questionable art.

The elements of a successful elocution, are held to be, so essentially, *natural gifts*, as to supply their own *law* of *guidance and control ;* so that the method—if *method* it may be called—may be substantially summed up, in *one* single *precept* :—viz. to ignore all rules, and *speak naturally*.

Grounds of question.

§ 2. In reply to these questions touching the propriety of giving elocution a place, as an integral part of Rhetoric, it may be sufficient to reply, 1, that a *discourse* is not complete either in *form*, or in *effect*, until it is delivered. Many a *good* discourse, is ren-

These questions answered.

Effect depends on elocution.

Nature, the classification, and *the distinctions of figures of speech*, but as our aim is purely practical ; and as the complete and elaborate classifications and expositions of Day, on this subject, are supposed to have been previously mastered, we close the subject of style at this point, for the present.

dered *poor* in the form of its delivery: and both the ulterior ends of Rhetoric, are therefore *marred*, or even *defeated*, in conseqence; when set into relation with that which is the inclusive end of rhetoric, —viz: ELOQUENCE:—and 2, complex as the product is, in successful *elocution*, it may well be doubted, whether it is more so than that of other arts,—say music, e. g.

Admits of analysis.

Let any one recall the effect produced by a full and powerful band of music: and then remember that both the harmony and melody of that complicated performance can be analysed, reduced to law, and even written down; so as to admit of *exact reproduction*, and he will find that the objection resting on the ground of its complexity, will lie against the study of the *other arts*, equally with that of elocution.

Same difficulty in other arts.

3. And in reply to the second ground of question, it may be sufficient to reply;—1, That while the elements of a successful elocution, are primarily *natural gifts*, they are yet, like other human gifts *improveable;* by analytic study, and wisely conducted practical training:—just as in music. It is precisely this, which vindicates beyond all question, the analytic, and practical study, of the art of *Rhetoric* itself. And 2, the objection grounded, farther, on the tendency to produce a *mannerism* in delivery lies, with nearly,—if not quite —equal force against a *mannerism* in the composition of *discourse.* Everywhere and always, this property of style constitutes a *fault:* but it is no more a fault in the *character* of the *elocution;* than it is a *fault,* in the *properties* of the *style.*

Second objection answered.

Some objection to Rhetoric.

Mannerism always a fault.

4. The mannerism so strenuously objected to,—even by Whately, e. g.—is a fault belonging to the *training period* of an orator; and is due mainly to the *self consciousness* which accompanies training practice;—but which should cease to be so, when that *practice* has rendered its own characters, *habitual:*—as it is always supposed to have done, before the *elocutionist* has become an *orator,*—or *rhetoric* developed into *eloquence.*

Mannerism Overcome.

Becomes Habitual and so Natural.

There seems to be no apparent reason, why the natural gifts of the pupil should be left to supply their own law, unaided by *analysis*

Gifts not a Sufficient Law.

and *criticism*, that does not hold equally good, for leaving the natural gifts in argument or persuasion, to supply their own guiding law; without the analysis and criticism by which the rhetorician seeks to train himself to be an orator.*

Analysis and Criticism supplying the Law.

§ 3. Nor is this conclusion purely *theoretic*. The power of eloquence, has been always held to be largely due to the *elocutionary* art of the orator.

Value of Elocution Practically.

It is not of so much moment,—says Quinctilian,—what our compositions *are*, as how they are *delivered*: since it is the manner of their *delivery*, by which the audience is moved.

Quinctilian.

WHITFIELD'S sermons, in print, were not remarkable, above the productions of a thousand other men and yet, with Whitfield's *elocution*, they were able to electrify the thousands who thronged to hear his eloquence, on both sides of the Atlantic.

Whitfield.

Such was the power of SHERIDAN'S eloquence on an important occasion in the House of Commons, notwithstanding the social disadvantage under which he lay,—being the son of a play actor, and himself, once, the lessee and manager of a theatre,—that PITT, then Prime Minister of England, besought the House to adjourn, on the *avowed* ground, that an impartial vote was out of the question, while they were under the influence of such a speech. We call the total product in such cases ELOQUENCE; but as we have the discourse itself remaining, we are compelled,—eloquent and able as confessedly, it is,—to regard its *peculiar* power, as lying mainly,—or at least largely,—in the elocution.

Sheredin.

Elocution is to *discourse*, what *performance* is to *music*. The music must, of course, be good; but however skilful in composition, it is *powerless*, if unskilfully *performed*. So in eloquence;—however good the speech, it is powerless, if badly delivered.

Analogy to Music.

§ 4. But can the successful effect, be subjected to analysis, and the laws ruling in its production be detected, and classified; and the control of them be *acquired*, by analytic study, and by skillful practice, so as to reproduce the same, more or less perfectly, at will?

Are there Laws? i. e., Science.

And an Art.

* See further, Part III, Book I, Chap. I.

To this important question,—as we have already seen,—directly opposite answers have been given. And we have already assigned reasons, also, which seem to us,—directly or analogically,—to justify an *affirmative* response. Indeed it seems incredible, that one should have to argue against such a man as Whately, and in the light of his own rhetoric, a conclusion, so nearly in the form of *a truism*, as that if a man would read or speak *well*, he must first learn how.

Different Opinions.

§ 5. Before proceeding to any analysis, of the principles or laws of elocution, it may be worth while to premise three things:—1. That by the power of elocution, we do not mean the mere *outward mannerism* of the orator: but the *feeling*, the *soul*, the *fire*, which animates, and *informs that manner*. Without this, the *rules* of *elocution* are as valueless, as a machine without a power. But still we are to remember, that while a machine without a power is *valueless*, it is equally true, that the power *requires* the machine to give it *direction* and *effect*. So while mere empty *elocution*, is worse than *worthless*, without its proper content, of *thought* and *feeling*; yet thought and feeling require true *elocutionary expression*, to constitute ELOQUENCE.

Elocution not mere Mannerism.

Mere Rules Worthless.

But Elocution needed for Effect.

2. *Elocution*,—like every other art,—is founded on an analysis, and imitation, of what is found, in experience, to give effect to discourse, or reading. Not only is it possible to discover, by well directed analysis, what it is that makes one man's elocution so much better than another's; but it is possible to *describe this difference*; so that it may be recognized and *reduced to practice*, like musical notation, and so *acquired*;—like *skill* in any other art.

Founded on Analysis and Imitation.

3. The *practical training* designed to effect this end, should *begin in early life*, while the faculties are pliant and the functions imitative. Good elocutionary habits, are like good manners in society. High perfection, supposes high gifts, in the way of original endowments of nature,—especially in the line of refined, and sensitive, and true emotion;—and then long and uninterrupted contact with *good models*,—and finally intelligent, and patient *practice* under faithful, friendly, effective, and judicious *criticism*. These are the conditions of *elecutionary*, as they are of every other *form of*, *education*. No culture, of course, will *equalize* all men:—but it is in the na-

Skill early acquired.

Supposes high gifts.

Good models.

All men improvable.

ture of all human endowments, that judicious culture will *improve all.*

Rush on the voice.

§ 6. In the analysis, which supplies us with the elements of elocutionary training, and criticism, we find the work done to our hands, by Dr. Rush,* with a completeness, so nearly exhaustive that it leaves us little else, than to make a clear and condensed epitome, of the Philosophical principles elucidated by him, in their applications to vocal expression, in Rhetoric.

To reduce these principles to *moderate compass*, and to practical form, and render them, as far as possible, *intelligible and available* for the student of Rhetoric, is all that we propose in what remains.†

Analysis.

§ 7. Any complete analysis will show that the elements of successful elocution, are, 1, *Physical*, 2, *Intellectual*, 3, *Æsthetic, and* 4, *Moral.*

Conditions of success.

We have already seen, throughout, the necessary *connexion*, of clear, vigorous, and comprehensive *grasp of intellect*,—correct and delicate *taste*—and of sound and controling *moral qualities*, with *successful eloquence.*‡

All that we propose at present, is an *analysis* and *classification* of the *physical* elements of elocution.

§ 8. These may be subdivided, after Rush,—into

* See The Philosophy of the Human Voice; embracing its Physiological history, together with a system of Principles, by which *Criticism* may be rendered *intelligible*, and *Instruction definite* and *comprehensive.* To which is added a brief analysis of song, and recitative. By James Rush, M. D. Philadelphia.

† The Professional Elocutionists, have already done this work, in their way;—some of them with, and some without, express acknowledgment of their indebtedness to great work of Dr. Rush:—which has, to this day, neither *an equal*, nor *a second*, in this, nor in any other modern country;—so far, at least, as we are aware. For our purposes, however, we prefer both for fulness, and philosophic form, to revert to the original work.

‡ The ruling and profound apprehension of the Greek Rhetoricians, expressed itself in the well known maxim, "An orator can only *speak*, as he *lives*:' and the same radical maxim, underlies the fine conception and treatment of Rhetoric, by Theremin,—already referred to—entitled "Eloquence a Virtue," or "Outlines of a Systematic Rhetoric."

Sub-classes. 1, VOICE :—and 2, ACTION :—embracing under this latter term, (1,) the *expression* of the *posture* of the body,—(2,) the *play* and *management* of the *countenance* and the *eye*,—(3,) *gesture*, in the common acceptation of the word.

It ought to be understood, that the ancient Rhetoricians, among the Greeks and Romans, included under the term ACTION, everything pertaining to the *management of their voice*, as well as *expression* and gesture.

The answer of the great Greek orator to the question, what is the *first* requisite to the orator? Action: and what the second? *Action*: and what the third? ACTION :—is liable to a mischievous misapprehension, unless this be borne in mind.

CHAPTER II.

VOICE.

§ 1. The first and most important study in elocution, is the subject of VOICE. This we propose to treat under the following heads,—viz:

Important.

Analysis of the subject.

1. THE PROPERTIES OF VOICE, considered merely as sound.
2. ARTICULATION.
3. INFLECTION.
4. ACCENT.
5. EMPHASIS.
6. PAUSE.

§ 2. For a fuller account of the *mechanism* of the *human voice*, we must be content to refer to the work of Dr. Rush—before alluded to,—as we have neither time, nor space, to enter on any subject, that is not of indispensable necessity, to our purely practical end.* For the same reason,—even at the risk of some obscurity,—we must equally omit the curious structure of the organ of hearing; and proceed to say, that the *properties of voice*, considered simply as *sound*, depend—like other sounds—on the vibrations of the sounding body, and these again upon the struc-

Mechanism of voice.

Depend on the organs.

* There are more than thirty organs whose anatomy and physiology would require description, in any complete discussion of the subject.

ture of that body. In the case of the human voice the sound originates, in the vibrations of the semi-muscular cords, or "*vocal ligaments*;"—so called—stretched across the top of the *larynx*;—and which are thrown into vibration, by air expelled from the lungs;—like the cords stretched between the sash of a window—; and constituting what is well known as an *Æolian harp*.

Causes of voice.

§ 3. The character of the sound, due to this vocal apparatus, may be studied under *Five heads*, or classes of properties:—viz: 1, *Quality*:—2, *Force*:—3, *Time*:—4, *Abruptness*:—and 5, *Pitch*.

Analysis of Properties.

§ 4. Under these *five properties*, may be ranged the whole of the expressive powers of speech;—sometimes acting mainly *alone;* but more frequently, in the form of *mutual combination*. There is not an *excellency* nor *a defect*, in elocution, which does not admit of *intelligible exposition*, in view of one or more of these qualities of voice, in some of their applications in eloquence. We propose to consider them in their order;—and first,—

Expressive Power of Speech.

Section I.

Of Quality.

§ 1. It can scarcely have escaped the notice of the least reflecting, that the *voice* of every individual,—just as truly as his *face*,—has *some property*, distinctive of his *individuality*. Sufficient familiarity will enable one to recognize the voice of another, as certainly, as his face. One voice is *full* and *round*, another *thin* and *flat*, one *rough*, another *smooth*, one *harsh*, another *musical*. These epithets describe what is meant by the term QUALITY, as applied to *voice*.

Difference of Quality.

Individual properties.

Definition.

§ 2. The same thing may be illustrated, by the sound of different instruments of music; say a violin flute, or piano. The difference is not a thing of *force*, *time* or *pitch*. These may all agree. The instru-

Quality in Instruments.

ments may be all *in accord*; and yet there is a clear *difference* between them notwithstanding. This, again, is what is meant by *quality* of sound; and is due, as we have said, to *the structure* of the sounding body.

§ 3. In the case of the human organs the *different* Qualities in the Voice. *qualities* of voice, are due to *varying circumstances* in the organs;—some of them natural and unavoidable, and others accidental and curable. Excessive *secretions*, or *dryness* and Causes of Change. *puffiness* of the throat, whether accidental or constitutional, will affect the *quality* of voice;—producing, *the one* a *rattling* or *husky*,—the *other* a *hoarse* or *whispering* sound.

§ 4. The *nasal quality* of voice, popularly termed "speaking Nasal Quality. through the nose,"—is caused by the vibrating air,—constituting voice,—*failing* to pass through the *nasal cavities*, in consequence of some obstruction,—temporary or permanent,—in the back portion of the throat. The result Injurious Effects. will be, to *mar*, if not make impossible any clear impressive, and emphatic utterance, of serious, and especially of solemn truth. The thin or slender quality of Shrill Quality. voice,—especially in the form of a shrill or squeaking voice,—so unfriendly to the elocution,—especially of grave and weighty sentiments, is owing to the want Cause. of sufficient *volume* of the air, vocalized, by the vibrating vocal ligaments

§ 5. *Feebleness* of voice commonly results from de- Feebleness. fective muscular force, in propelling the requisite volume of air, through the *vocal* Cause. *apparatus*.

§ 6. The *defects* in the *quality* of voice are too nu- Defects Common. merous to describe in detail; and yet they are often very *damaging*; and sometimes almost *fatal*, to any great degree of power, Damaging. in elocution. On the other hand positive *excellencies* of the quality of voice are among the very desirable, natural gifts of an orator. At Quality Improvable. the same time it is encouraging to know that there is no property in efficient elocution, more readily, or highly *improveable* than this.

It is this, which makes the chief difference between a *good* voice and a *poor* one :—and although the *ground* of difference in quality is laid in nature, yet culture and practice will do wonders with the poorest. Every body knows how Demostbenes, is said to have laboured under the threefold defect, of *stammering*, *bad articulation* and *feebleness*, of voice ;—and how he is said to have been hissed down, on his first public appearance, before an Athenian audience, and how and by what means he yet conquered. Cicero's voice, it is also said, was thin and unmusical: and yet by culture, under the most skilful elocutionists, not only at Rome, but in foreign lands —whither he travelled, mainly for this very purpose —his voice became a proverb, both for its *music* and its *compass*.

Good and Bad Voice.

Demosthnes.

Cicero.

§ 7. Among the most efficient *methods* of vocal *culture*, may be mentioned, judicious, repeated and even *habitual, practice;* —in *reading* and *declamation*, and, as in an analogous line of culture, in *vocal music*.

Methods of culture.

But as defects of voice, like most personal defects, —unless they are *extreme* and almost *monstrous*,—become so familiar, to us, that we cease to be aware of their very existence, it is especially desirable, to have the advice and criticism of a master, or at least the counsels of a *judicious friend*, to point out those qualities which need correction, and to aid us in our attempts to improve our *quality*, of voice.

Need criticism.

Section II.

Of Force.

Force. § 1. The *second* of the Properties of Voice, is Force.

§ 2. *Force*, describes the property of sound, as *loud* and *strong*, or *soft* and *feeble*. It is not to be confounded with the *pitch*, which renders a note *high* or *low* as to *its key*, as it stands upon the scale;—nor yet with its *quality*, for this will be the same, whether the sound be *loud* or *low*,—as it proceeds from the same voice in both cases.

Definition. Distinguished from quality and pitch.

§ 3. If the key of a piano be first touched *lightly* and then with *more violence*, it will supply an example of the property designated by the term *force*. The *pitch*, the *quality*, the *time*, of the note, are all the *same*,—by the conditions,—it only varies in *loudness* or *force*.

Examples of Force.

§ 4. Force depends upon *the breadth* of the vibrations, of the sounding body;—*pitch* upon the *length of the wave of sound*. If a cord, like the string of a base-viol, be stretched to a certain degree of tension, and then vibrated—as, e. g. by drawing a bow over it,—it gives a certain quality of sound, on a certain pitch. If it be shortened, by putting the finger on it, or if its tension be *increased*, it gives a *higher* note, because the number of vibrations in a given time,—say a second—is *increased*, by a *diuminution of the length*. If the cord be vibrated *more violently*, so as to increase the space through which it vibrates,—without altering its tension at all—the number and length of the vibrations will remain the same, and consequently the *pitch*, of the sound will be the same; but as their *breadth* is *increased*, the sound will be *louder*:—i. e. the *force* will be *augmented*.

Difference of force and pitch. Mechanism of Pitch. Cause of changes of pitch. Cause of force.

§ 5. Now if the *vocal ligaments* be substituted in the place of the string of the base viol, and *the impulse* of the air,—blown from the lungs, and causing the

Mechanism of Force of Voice.

vocal ligaments to vibrate,—in place of the bow, performing the same office, we have an intelligible account, of the mechanism of *force* of *voice*.

§ 6. This, of course, is a very *important* property of voice in elocution. The emphasis and expression—i. e. both the *degree* and *kind* of emotion—depend upon it.

Importance in emphasis.

Impvroable.

§ 7. There is no property of voice more *improvable* than this

It depends mainly upon the *force*, with which the lungs are capable of driving the air past the vocal ligaments; —i. e. supposing the organs of speech to be sufficiently developed; and in a sound and healthy state. Now as this power depends almost entirely upon the *vigor* of the *muscles employed in respiration* we are able to avail ourselves, in cultivating force of voice, of the well known *property* of *muscles*, to *increase* in *volume* and *power*, by merely *exercising them*.

Conditions.

Rationale

§ 8. There appears to be no *assignable limit*, to this increase of power. It is stated that Garrick could make his ordinary voice heard without effort, by ten thousand persons:—and that Whitfield has spoken to twenty thousand.

Improvement illimitable.

§ 9. In the exercise of the voice, with a view to increasing its force, the following rules, should be observed.

Rules for culture of the voice.

1. It should be *continued daily*; and generally at *least twice a day*; in order to secure the greatest possible effect.

Daily.

2. It should *not* be *continued* so long as to *produce fatigue*.

Not excessive.

3. The voice should be exercised only in *clear, ringing tones*. *Roughness* or *hoarseness* indicate *wear* and *tear* of the organs, and endanger the production of *iritation* of the *lungs* or *throat*, as well as *bad quality* of *voice*.

Clear tones.

Danger.

4. The *greater the effort*, required to produce the desired effect, the *more rapid* the *increase of strength*, in the vocal organs. With that view Demosthenes, as is well remembered, declaimed on the sea shore, and pronounced long and difficult passages, while walking ra-

Exertion.

Demosthenes

Ancient elocutionists. pidly up hill. It was also a common practice with the ancient teachers of elocution, to compel their pupils to recite, while lying on the back,—and sometimes even with a heavy weight on the chest.

Application of Force. § 9. *The applications* of *force* of *voice* in elocution, are *very important.*

1. In the expression of the various emotions.

Secrecy. In the playful,–perhaps fanciful,–language of Dr. Rush,

"*Secrecy muffles the voice* against discovery.

Certainty in the full desire to be heard, distinctly assumes all the impressiveness of *strength.* *Anger*, in like manner, uses *force* of voice, because its charges and denials, are made with a wide appeal, and in the conscious *sincerity of passion.*

Certainty.

Anger.

All the the sentiments which are *unbecoming disgraceful* or *undelicate smother the voice* to its softer degrees, in the *instinctive desire* to *conceal* even the voluntary utterance of them.

Disgrace of Indelicy.

Joy. *Joy* is *loud* in call for *companionship*, through the overflowing *charity of satisfaction.*

Bodily pain, *fear* and *terror*, are also *strong* in their expression, with the double view of summoning relief, and repelling the offending cause."

Pain and Fear.

§ 10. The most *common faults* in the emphatic use of *force of voice*, are, 1, the *excessive* and *indiscriminate use of it*, without reference to the character of the subject, or the emotion proper and natural in the circumstances. This is the chief element of the style of elocution, called *ranting*:—which is the mere indiscriminate use of force.

Faults in Force.

Excessive Force.

§ 11. The second error is the opposite of that, viz :—*inadequate force*: which often sacrifices the *real interest* of discourse:

Inadequate Force.

while it either awakens the *painful sympathy* of the hearers, or *lulls* them to *sleep*,—while the cause of the speaker is allowed to take care of itself.

Peculiar emphasis of Force.

§ 12. But besides the general expression a rising from the *general drift of the voice, as to force*, the *peculiar character* of the force employed, has an important connexion with the *peculiar character* of the *expression*, in emphasis.

Three Forms of Stress.

§ 13. Elocutionists have divided the properties of voice,—i.e. the force—into three kinds, —according as it rests upon *the initial*, the *middle* or the *final sound*, of the syllable, or word, on which it falls. These three kinds of stress have been described as,

1. The *radical stress*,—in which the *force* of the voice, is thrown broadly and forcibly on the *opening sound*, and *dwindles*, gradually away.

Vanishing stress.

2. The *vanishing* or final *stress ;*—where the sound begins gently, gradually *increasing in force*, and breaks off *abruptly*, while in full voice.

Median stress.

3. The *median stress :*—in which the *force* of the voice falls on the *middle* of the sound ;—which therefore both *begins* and *ends gradually :*—like the *swell in music.*

Application in emphasis.

§ 14. Each of the forms of *stress* has its appropriate expression, in emphatic speaking. We shall have occasion to advert to this subject again, when we come to speak of *emphasis.*

Section III.

Of Time.

§ 1. The *third* property of voice in elocution is

Time defined. *Time.* By this is meant the varying duration of the voice upon the syllables;—giving rise to what is called *quantity*, and producing the *rapid*, or *slow* enunciation—as the case may be,—of the words, or phrases, or sentences.

§ 2. This too is an important element of *expression*, in speech, bearing both upon the *general character*, of the *sentiment* and the *emphasis*, of *particular emotion*. Sentiments of solemnity, dignity, deliberation, gravity, doubt, grief,—and others of this general character,—require *slow time*, to do them justice: while those of a light, gay, excited or eager kind assume a quicker movement. The *animation* in the expression of discourse on the one hand, and its *impressiveness*, on the other, depend upon the employment of the proper time in their expression, e. g.,—

Importance in emphasis.

Emotional expression.

Slow time:

Hail, holy light! Offspring of Heaven first born!
Or of the eternal, co-eternal beam,
May I express thee unblamed? since God is light;
And never but in an unapproached light
Dwelt from eternity; dwelt then in thee,
Bright effluence of bright essence, increate.

Quick time:

When over the hills like a gladsome bride,
Morning walks forth, in her beauty's pride,
And leading a band of laughing hours,
Brushes the dew from the nodding flowers:
Oh! cheerily then my voice is heard,
Mingling with that of the soaring bird,
Who flingeth abroad his matins loud,
As he freshens his wing in the cold, gray cloud.

In any effective elocution of such passages, the contrast in the use of time, is sufficiently apparent, without farther exposition of its grounds.

§ 3. A *drawling elocution*, which effectually kills the life of oratory, proceeds from the use of *slow* time, where the sentiment requires quicker:—and *too rapid* enunciation, where the sentiment demands prolonged time, is equally fatal to the power of eloquence.

§ 4. It deserves, however, to be remarked, that persons of *weak voice*, must speak fasterthan those of a *strong* and *heavy one*.

The quality of voice affects the time.

Robert Hall,—whose elocution was so powerful, that Chalmers declares, that one could scarcely get his breath, under some of the impassioned passages. Hall tells us that when he began his ministry, he unconsciously fell into the imitation of his great predecessor; until his pride was touched by hearing the remark, how much he resembled him. This remark induced him to *change* his whole manner entirely; and in narrating the incident he adds, that it was absurd, for one whose voice was so light and feeble to attempt to imitate the elocution of a speaker, of *strong deep tones*:—"because the *momentum* of delivery, as measured by its effect upon an audience, must be as the *mass*, *multiplied* into the *velocity*."

Case of Hall.

§ 4. In the production of emphasis, *time* is also of vital consequence. It serves as a *foundation* to support the *stress* of voice, which we have seen to be essential to *emphasis*. There is a *prolongation* of the time, of the accented syllable, of the emphatic word.

Time in Emphasis.

§ 5. To develope this function of the voice fully, would require a more minute discussion of the *quantity* of syllabic sounds, and the character of their Alphabetic elements, than we have time for, at present.

§ 6. It will be sufficient for our purposes to say, that syllables admit of division into two classes: — 1. Those, whose quantity cannot be prolonged, without deforming the pronunciation.

Two Classes of Syllables.

E. g., the first syllable of the word "record,"—used as a noun, —though an accented syllable, is incapable of increasing *its time*, under an emphasis, without producing a *drawling* sound.

1. Short.

2. Another class of syllables allow their time to be *prolonged indefinitely*, as the force of the emphasis may demand.

Convert, e. g., the same word "record," into a verb,—record, —and you may dwell upon the accented syllable, to an indefinite time, according, as the animation or emotion of

2. Long.

the discourse may demand,—i. e., according to the *strength* of the *emphasis*,—and that without marring the pronunciation.

3. Intermediate. There is also a class of syllables intermediate between these two; which admit of longer time than the first, and not so long as the last. But it is not important in practice, to cumber the memory with them.

Strongest Emphasis uses long time. § 7. The *fullest* force of emphasis, can be brought out, only upon those syllables, which admit of *long time*: as any one will see in pronouncing such sentences as the following:

"ROLL on, thou deep and dark blue ocean, roll."—*Byron*.

SECTION IV.

Of Abruptness.

Abruptness. §1 The *fourth* property of voice,—available in elocution,—is ABRUPTNESS. This term describes the *explosive* character, with which the voice admits of being thrown upon syllables or words. It is of great importance in expression: but is so closely connected with other functions, that we can despatch it, with little else than the definition.

Defined.

1. For Emphasis. § 2. *Abruptness* along with force, enters into the mechanism of the *stress* of voice,—of which we have already spoken:—and it is of great importance in *articulation*: and still more *in emphasis*, not yet reached in our analysis.

2. For Articulation and Emphasis.

SECTION V.

Of Pitch.

Pitch. **§ 1. The *fifth* and last of the properties of voice, is *pitch*. This is the *most important* of**

Most Important. all, from the variety, complication, and value, of its applications, in *elocution*.

Definition. PITCH indicates the relative position of sounds upon a scale,—marking its character, as *high* or *low*, *grave* or *acute*.

Analogies with Music. As some degree of acquaintance with the musical scale, is almost universal, we need not enter into any elementary exposition of the subject.

§ 2. It has been already stated, when treating of *force* that the pitch of sound,—its character as high or low,—depends upon *the number* of vibrations, in a given time, while *its force*—its character as loud or soft—depends upon the *extent* or *breadth* of these vibrations.

Mechanism of Pitch of voice. § 3. The *number of vibrations*—in a cord, e. g.,—is determined, 1, by its tension; 2, by *its length*. In the case of the *human voice*, this effect is produced by muscular action, *increasing the tension* of the *vocal ligaments* of the larynx.

Precision in the use of Pitch. § 4. The exactness with which experience enables, the practiced vocalist, to strike any note within the compass of three *octaves*,—consisting of twenty-two tones, or forty-four semitones;—while the extreme variation in the length of the vocal ligaments, can never exceed the *eighth* part of an inch, is one of the most *remarkable* examples of precision in the application of muscular power, which the study of the human frame exhibits.

Melody due to Pitch. § 5. The modulations of human speech, admit of precise exposition,—both as regards their efficiency, and their faults, in elocution,—just as *truly*, as the principles of *musical* expression.

No one, without very close attention and study, can have any conception of the important part played by *pitch*, in the *melody* and *expression* of speech.

Discrete change of Pitch. § 6. In sounding the successive notes of the ascending or descending scale, upon a flute, or piano, each note has a

distinct and separate sound of its own on the same level of pitch;—while the *intervals* between them, are also *fixed*, so that there is no running or sliding of one note into another. This is called a *discrete change of pitch.*

If now, a bow be drawn across the string of a violin, while, at the same time, a finger is passed along the string, it will give a whining sound, running upward through several continuous notes, *without any distinct interval,* at all. This is called a *concrete change of pitch:* —and the movement is called *a slide.*

Concrete Change of Pitch.

A Slide.

§ 7. A knowledge of these functions of the human voice, is essential, in order to understand the *philosophy of expression.* The precise difference between *song* and *speech*, is that in the *former*,—*song*,—the voice conforms essentially to the character of instruments, and adopts the *discrete* movement:—while *in speech*, it always takes the *concrete* slide, or movement.

Philosophy of Expression.

Difference between Speech and Song.

§ 8. The *sanctimonious tone*, of a certain class of speakers, is due to the fact, that, instead of the natural *slide of the voice* which should occur, upon every syllable, there is *an approach* to the continuous tone which characterizes, *song* or chanting.

Sanctimonious Tones.

The employment of this tone, is *popularly*,—and, commonly very *correctly*,—regarded, as a mark *of hypocrisy*, because it substitutes an *artificial*, i. e., *feigned*, for a *natural* tone.

What it Indicates.

Sometimes,—it is true,—*intense self consciousness*, or *diffidence* in a speaker, will produce the same form of interference with nature, as *hypocrisy* will. *Sometimes*, also, the *spirit of reverence*,—as in public prayer,—will approximate the solemn *emotional character of chanting.* But,—*except in prayer*,—where the free use of the slides gives an *undevout, conversational* air, to the intonations,—the thing is *always unnatural*, and unnatural for *that reason.* It,

Emotion, i. e., hypocrisy.

therefore, commonly indicates, *feigned*, emotion;—i. e., hypocrisy.

Slides Natural in Speech.

§ 9. Such is the perfection of the mechanism of the human organs, that the voice naturally, and with perfect ease, changes its pitch upon *almost every sound* it utters, reaching through a greater or less interval, from a semitone, to an octave; according to the strength of the emotion.

Change of Pitch in asking a Question.

§ 10. If, e.g., any one, not precisely aprehending the meaning of this statement, should put the question,—*how?*—with the simple intention of drawing out a re-statement of the principles, he will find the tone of the interrogative monosyllable, will instinctively slide up to the extent of a single note:—or, in other words, the interrogation will take the *rising inflection.*

Change due to Surprise.

§ 11. If, instead of asking a question *for information*, he exclaims *in surprise*,—HOW? the word will assume still more of the rising inflection, in proportion to the *strength of the emotion;*—until it reaches the interval of *an octave*, in the change of the pitch. The ordinary voice of common speakers, will not include the slides of wider intervals.

Change of Pitch limited to one Octave.

Difference between Male and Female voice.

The male and female voices do not differ, in the use of these principles—applicable to both reading and speaking,—except that the ordinary female voice, is pitched *by nature*, on a key, precisely one octave higher, than that of the ordinary male tenor voice; and the *bass* voice, moves on an average, still an octave lower.

Range of the Slides.

Reading or Recitation.

§ 12. The interval embraced in these changes of pitch,—slides so called,—varies from a *semitone*, or a *whole tone*, in simple unimpassioned reading or recitative, to *an octave* in the most impassioned tones of *speech*, in *eloquence.*

Governed by the Emotion.

The average range of the slides or tones will be determined, by the *strength of the emotion*. It ought to be said, moreover, that it requires a good degree of *vocal culture*, to acquire a command of the slide of the octave :—exclusively appropriate to the expression of the most excited state of the passions, real or feigned,—such, e g., as sneer, contempt, railery, or triumph.

Need of Culture.

To Reach Strong Emotions.

§ 13. When the passion of the speaker passes this limit, it is always liable to break, into what is known as the *falsetto*, or *head voice* :—which, again, has a peculiar, although hardly a proper *elocutionary*,—*effect*. Examples of this effect, are seen, in the *quarrels*, of not overnice *disputants*,—as where passion becomes so *towering*, as to get vent in a *shrill*, or *screaming quality of voice*.*

Effects of falsetto.

Mere excitement.

Real, *earnest*, *formidable* anger, on the contrary is *deep toned* and often guttural ;—or, sometimes, assumes the form of the *hissing of inarticulate breath*,—or the union of both these forms,—i.e. of hissing, conjoined with the deep guttural rolling of the "r ;" as in the raving oath of a Frenchman.

Real anger.

§ 14. The slide of the *fifth* for the expression of more earnest *interrogation*, and *emphasis*, —whether of sentiment or *emotion*,—and whether in *oratory* or *conversation* —and the slide of the *third*, for those of less impassioned reading, or oratory, are in constant use ; and should therefore be well *understood* and *mastered*.

Slides applied.

These distinctions may seem *vague*, and perhaps theoretic, and even *fanciful* at first ; the habit of *observing* them, however, and still more that of *practising* upon them, will soon render them not only *intelligible*, but clear, and obvious.

* The quarrels of huckster women in a market, will often take on the form and supply the illustration, of the principle in question. Such expressions of passion, for reasons mentioned in the text, are seldom dangerous.

§ 15. The slide of *the semi-tone* also produces a marked and *peculiar effect*. It gives that plaintive, or sometimes *whining* sound, which is exemplied in the cry of a spoiled child,—not in earnest,—in its grief. The expression of the semi-tone, does not rise to the dignity of *serious grief*. In elocution, its application is to the expression of the *tender*, or *subdued* emotions;—*love, pity, complaint, supplication, condolence*, and the like. Children cry in *semi-tones*, when their *grief is insincere*, and when in earnest they use the interval of a *whole tone;* as also do *adults*, when they cry at all.

Slide of the semi-tone peculiar.

Applications in elocution.

The whining cant of the hypocrite, formalist, or fanatic,—affecting emotions which they do not feel—all are likely to use the *semi-tone*.

Abuses.

§ 16. The absence of the semi-tone, in cases which demand its use, gives a *matter of fact tone* to the elocution, which is always *unnatural;* and even sometimes *offensive*. This is sometimes exemplied, in the intonations of public prayer. *Love, humility, penitence, supplication*, are among the applications most proper for the *semi-tone*, to give expression to. If the interval of a whole tone be substituted, the *effect* is to give a *conversational* air, which suggests the idea of *equality*,—not of *reverence*, and is therefore *undevotional* and *offensive*.

Effect of its absence.

§ 17. The interval of the *second*,—i. e. a change of pitch equal to a whole tone,—is by far the most common, and important, in all ordinary speech. "The ear," says Dr. Rush, "has its green, as well as the eye; and the interval of the *second*, like the verdure of the earth, is widely spread, to relieve sensation, from the fatiguing *stimulus*, of more vivid impressions."

Interval of the second.

The green of the ear.

And yet TAMENESS, will result from its continued

Tameness. or excessive use, especially where the varying sentiment requires, for its full expression, either of the *wider* intervals. These, therefore, How prevented. are the *lights* and *shades* of discourse; and are indispensable, to give *life*, and *reality*, and *power* of *impression* to the vocal picture.

§ 18. The difference between the tones of reading Difference between reading and oratory. and oratory, on the one hand, and that between *elocution*—whether in reading or speaking,—and *conversation*, on the other, is explicable, wholly in the light of these principles. Conversational tones. The natural tones of *conversation*, with the emotional *freedom* and *versatility*—natural especially in the case of *ladies*,— Difference between reading and conversation. will produce a much greater *freedom* and *variety* of *tones* or *inflections*, all using the *concrete slide* of the voice, than the more equable and uniform emotions of a mere reader would produce; and so put a clear and easily recognized difference, between the tones of a *reader*, and those of free *conversation* on the one hand, and between the varied and versatile tones of free *conversation*, and the grave, emphatic or impassioned tones, of *high oratory* on the other.

§ 19. It is clear in the light of these principles, Reading sermons and speeches. therefore, that there is a ground in nature for a reader—whether in the pulpit, or before a popular assembly—delivering his dis- Delivery, extempore and memoriter. course in a manner *characteristically different*, and therefore producing a characteristically *different effect* upon his audience, from that of its delivery, either *extempore* or *me-* Reading less emphatic and impressive. *moriter*, with the impressive emphasis, and impassioned power of an *orator*,—in the proper sense of the word. There may be,—as we have seen*—advantages peculiar to each method, but the attempt to unite them, so as to *com-*

* See Part III, Book I, Ch. II.

bine the peculiar *benefits* of each, is *contra-indicated* in nature; and will generally result in the one method getting the mastery, if not wholly supplanting the other, i. e. the pure ORATOR will come to speak *extempore;* and the READER will become the *slave* of his manuscript.

Melody of speech.

§ 20. The agreeable effect, which we call *melody of speech*, depends upon there being a sufficient *variety* and *pleasant succession*, of the various tones which compose speech, to fall agreeably on the tasteful or cultivated ear.

Its seven elements.

The *elements* of this melody of speech, are analysed by *Rush*, and elaborately represented by him: but as the exposition supposes the use of *diagrams*, in exemplification of the several "phrases of melody"—of which he finds *seven*, in *ordinary elocution*,—and as this mode of exemplification has proved, in our hands, *practically confusing*, especially to those not familiar with the *technicalities* of *music*, we pass over these details:—and simply refer our readers to them, in the work of Dr. Rush itself, as a question of *intelligent*, and *scientific*, but not of *practical*, importance.

Monotony, from Bad Habit.

§ 21. *Monotony*,—which is one of the most common faults of elocution,—is produced, by "keeping too much on the same line of radical pitch:"—or, in other words, not sufficiently varying the pitch, of the successive syllables. This is often the result of *mere habit*. Sometimes it arises from the speaker getting on so high a key, that he cannot give a melodious variety by raising the tone, without danger of his voice breaking into *the falsetto*, always unpleasant, and sometimes damaging.

Unpleasant and Damaging.

Monotony of Intonation.

§ 22. This form of monotony, is entirely distinct from other faults of elocution,—often called by the same name.

For example, the sing-song tone, ascribed to the old Puritans, and occasionally exemplified,—especially by Quaker preachers, produces *a monotonous effect;*—because the sounds are prolonged upon the level of the radical pitch,—as in song. In other words they resemble *chanting :*—which is a form of song.

§ 23. Another fault, producing a *monotonous impression*, is the constant recurrence of the *same changes of pitch;* or,—to use the language of music,—of *the same "phrases of melody."*

Another form of Monotony.

Some speakers commence *every* sentence, upon *the same pitch*, run through the *same routine of changes*, and close with precisely *the same form* of cadence. Although there may be, *the requisite variety* of pitch, in any one sentence, yet the incessant recurrence, of the same order of changes, in every successive sentence, soon becomes excessively wearisome to read. And besides it could only be justified by the supposition that *every* sentence expressed *precisely the same drift of sentiment*, and emotion; because the pitch of the voice should naturally conform to these conditions:—And, of course, such a uniformity of sentiment, throughout a whole discourse, is a violently improbable supposition.

Cause of Weariness.

Only justification of this Monotony.

Sameness of Emotion.

§ 24. There are some cases, where the general prevalence of "the *phrase of the monotone*," is not only *allowable*, but *essential*, to the full expression of the sentiment. This is true in all subjects of calm dignity, and elevation of sentiment, as in the extract—already quoted,—

Monotony Necessary.

Kind of Sentiment Expressed.

Hail holy light! *

Much of Milton can be read with full effect only

* See Part IV. Ch. II, Sec. III, § 2.

Milton to be read in Monotones. by keeping the monotone as the characteristic feature of the melody. In such cases, the *effect* of monotony, must be broken, by

Mononotony how Broken. an occasional slide and variation of pitch, in *strongly emphatic* words; returning again to the *prevalent* monotone; when the calm and elevated dignity of the sentiment requires it.

§ 25. Thus far we have spoken chiefly, of *the ex-*

The pitch of a whole discourse. *pression of pitch*, as applied to *single words*, or *short sentences*. The importance of the *general drift*, of the pitch, through a long paragraph, or a whole discourse, must not be

No fixed standard of pitch. overlooked. There is no fixed standard of pitch in elocution, as there is in music: but a well trained voice learns to assume in the commencement, and through the un-

Average or middle pitch. impassioned parts of the discourse, what is indefinitely called the *middle pitch*.

This is the pitch of our *habitual* and *easiest* utter-

Habitual or easy utterance. ance, when we are speaking under circumstances of common animation, *without excitement*. The pitch will *rise instinctively* in more *animated, eager*, or *earnest* strains, under *brisk, gay, joyous emotions*: and *sink* in *grave, subduing, solemn* themes, or under *grief, melancholy* or *despair*.

CHAPTER III.

Articulation.

§ 1. *Articulation*,—from articulus, a little joint—

Definition. expresses the combination or jointing together into syllables, of the elementary sounds, which compose speech.

Articulation, is the distinctive function of *human* speech as contradistinguished from the various forms of voice, or other sounds, by which *animals* express both their feelings, and their wants. It is also the distinctive character, of *oral* language, as contradistinguished, both from *human* language, in its written forms, and the more general sense of the word *language*, as descriptive of the medium employed in the *expression* of *thought*, in art; whether addressed to the ear, —as in music,—or to the eye, as in painting, sculpture, architecture, &c.

Distinctive character.

Written language.

Language in art.

§ 2. *A syllable*, consists of a sound, whether simple or complex, which is pronounced with a *single impulse* of the voice; or in other words, which takes a single concrete movement of voice. It is this last function which strictly characterises the syllable. No matter *how many letters*, or alphabetic elements it may be composed of, if they are all embraced in *one concrete movement* or *slide* of the *voice*, it is a single syllable,—as "strength;"—and, on the other hand, however *few* the letters, there *are* just as many syllables, as there are *distinct slides* of the voice,—as "Iowa;"—composed of three syllables; though only four letters.

Syllable defined.

If the syllable is made up of only a simple sound, as "a," or any other vowel, its utterance does not suppose *articulation*, in the proper, strict sense of the word. It is the joining on, of the *consonant* sounds, which gives rise to the function in question.

Due to consonant sounds.

§ 3. *Articulation* is of prime importance in elocution:—1. Because the *distinctions in words*, and consequently the whole important circumstance whether the speaker is *intelligible*, or not, depends upon his articulation.

Importance.

In order to be understood.

A view of the fault,—magnified so as to be *distinct*.—may be seen, in the case of foreigners, attempting to speak our language. They may use the right *words*; but their articulation renders them more or less difficult of comprehension.

Faults of articulation.

The *muttering* or *mumbling* or *mouthing elocution*, of some speakers, exemplifies the same thing. Where this fault exists, efficient *eloquence*, is out of the question.

Bad articulation fatal to eloquence.

On the other hand, there is a *beauty* and *elegance* about *distinct articulation*, which Austin,—in his Cheironomia,—compares to a coin, dropped fresh and bright from the mint.

2. *Good articulation* is the basis of all the qualities of *expression*, in elocution. *Quality*, *force*, *time*, *pitch*, *melody*, *emphasis*—*all* are the *mere finish*,—so to speak of the *articulate sounds* of the word.

Value of good articulation.

3. *Distinct articulation* is of the *utmost importance* to the orator, if he would speak *with ease* to himself, or if he would speak *at all*, to *large audiences*. If one will take pains to enunciate, and *articulate* all the elementary sounds, he may speak, on a *moderate key*, and with moderate *force*, in a hall of almost any dimensions. If his *articulation* is *careless* he must exert *double* the *force*, and expend *twice* the *strength*, and *exhaust* himself *in half* the time:—and, very probably, after he has done all, he is still heard with pain, if heard at all.

Good articulation essential to ease in speaking.

To large audiences.

Wear and tear of bad articulation

If bad elocution and especially bad articulation is not *the cause*, of the *bronchitis*,—lately so prevalent among public speakers, and especially among ministers,—it could scarcely fail to be, at least a *tributary* to that painful effect.

Morbid effects of bad articulation.

§ 4. Notwithstanding the importance of this function in elocution, a good articulation is far from being a *universal*, or even a *general* accomplishment.

Good Articulation rare.

How bad Articulation occurs.

As it consists of a distinct, limped and full *enunciation* of all the *alphabetic sounds* of every syllable uttered, so that *each letter* will strike the *ear*, it is obvious that *faults* of articulation may occur, in several diffreent ways.

Some words hard to pronounce.

§ 5. It is obvious, in the first place, that some of the *combinations of elementary sounds*, occurring in certain syllables, are *intrinsically difficult* of pronunciation.

How obviated by the Greeks.

This difficulty, the Greeks obviated, as every student knows, by making systematic *changes* of whole classes of letters, when such *unpronounceable* combinations of letters, would otherwise have occurred.

Such changes few in English.

Examples of the change.

In *English*, however, we have very few such arts of luxury. The change of the article "a" into "an," *before a vowel*, stands almost a *solitary example;* unless we except the formation of the *imperfect* and *participle* of some of the irregular verbs.

§ 6. The general rule, however,—in our language—is, that we must take the letters as they come—without regard to euphony—and hence one of the difficulties which foreigners,—especially Frenchmen and Italians,—complain of, in speaking English. Some of the coincidences of sound, are certainly difficult enough. It is well for those who have trouble on this score, to drill their organs, into *flexibility* and *precision* by practicing upon the more difficult combinations of sound, which actually occur in the language. E. g.

That morning, thou, that *slumber'dst* not before,
Nor *sleptst* great Ocean, *laidst* thy waves at rest.
And *hush'dst* thy mighty minstrelsy.

Or, The *finest streams, through tangled forests stray.*

Or, He *sawed six, sleek, slim saplings.*

It would be easy, to multiply examples, indefinitely.

The reasons of these difficulties in articulation, admit of precise philosophical explanation on physiological principles,—but it would require us to go into an analysis of the alphabetical elements of sound, which would not now fall in, with our purely practical ends.

§ 7. The *change* in the case of the article,—it may be said in passing,—arises from the fact, that the *radical stress*, with which every syllable commences, supposes, a *momentary cessation of the voice*, just *before* its *utterance* :—and in rapid elocution, it is very difficult to make these momentary stops of the sound, without the occurrence of one of those consonants, which produce, in their pronunciation, an occlusion, or stoppage of the voice. Thus if you say "a eel," you have to make a *labored* pause, which is *impossible in rapid utterance*. If you throw in the letter "*n*," it produces a *partial* occlusion of the voice, which enables it to open again upon the "radical stress," of the following syllable.

Reasons for changing "a" into "an."

Organic difficulty.

Exemplified.

§ 9. The *second* cause of difficulty, is the repeated recurrence of sounds, *differing so slightly*, that the organs of speech *instinctively* tend to *re-produce precisely the same sound ;* instead of making the necessary variation.

Another organic difficulty.

This is the cause of the difficulty, in the sentence, "he sawed six sleek, slim, saplings." Such combinations of unmanageable sounds, should be *avoided* in the original *composition* of discourse.

§ 10. The most prominent *causes* of *bad articulation*, are, 1, *Physical weakness*. The extreme form of this may be seen in the case of the inarticulate mutterings of *very sick* and *dying* persons.

Causes of bad articulation.

1. Weakness.

2. *Defective organs of speech.* Thickness of the *lips*, or *tongue*, deforms the pronunciation of the sounds, made by these

2. Defective organs.

organs respectively. *Defect* in the *palate*, affects the articulation of the *nasal sounds*. *Bad hearing*, also, leads to *bad articulation*; because the *ear* is our only *guide* in this function.

Bad hearing.

3. *Negligence* is the prolific cause of faults in articulation. Many persons *can* articulate with perfect distinctness but through *indolence*, and *neglect*, allow themselves often to mumble, wretchedly. This habit is *dangerous*, because it soon becomes *habitual*: and when noticed *in children*, or *youth*, should be *corrected at once*.

Negligence.

4. Undue *haste*, or the *hurry produced* by *nervous agitation*, mars the articulation of many speakers. This, like all bad habits, grows unnoticed, and leads to the *fusing together*, and *throwing out in the lump*, a *mouthful* of *confused consonants*;—instead of issuing them *singly*, in *pure tones*, like new coins from the mint. This fault is the more *unmanageable*, because it escapes the *consciousness of the speaker*, and is often really due to nervous diffidence or distrust of himself, on the part of the speaker.

Undue haste.

Effects of this fault.

Causes of this fault.

5. The last source of bad articulation, is *bad habits*. This—already more than once referred to—may be considered as the consummation of all the faults enumerated. But there are others still, which belong to this class.

5. Bad habits.

§ 11. *Mouthing*,—which is a *common fault*, especially in some *localities*,—is produced by the undue enlargement of the cavity of the mouth, and a faulty use of the lips, preventing the sounds from flowing out with freedom.

Mouthing.

Its cause.

§ 12. *Provincialisms* in pronunciation, are often merely *habitual faults of articulation*; and confined to certain localities. Thus, in some places, it is the ha-

Provincialism of pronunciation.

bit to omit the aspirate, *h*, when it occurs in connexion with the letter, *w* :—as "wen" for "when," "wite" for "white." An analogous, and quite common form of faulty articulation, in the form of a Provincialism, is the omission of the letter "h" in the word "shrink," making "srink." In other cases the sound of "*g*" is habitually omitted in all words ending with "*ing*,"—as "livin" for "living," "knowin" for "knowing," &c.

These *provincialisms* of *pronunciation*, are more common in England, than among ourselves. Others, again, instead of *omitting*, *add*, to the legitimate sounds of certain classes of words. Thus the letter "r," is very apt to be added to words ending with the short open sound of the letter "a"—"idear" for "idea," "Americar" for "America."

Provincialisms by addition.

§ 13. All these, like all *bad habits*, require the aid of a friend to detect and correct them. We should prize hints on the subject, and seek vigilantly to improve them, because, like isolated *vulgarisms* in polished society, they always *offend* highly *cultivated* persons; by showing an association,—more or less remote,—with the *vulgus commune*, in the kingdom of letters;—and that, sometimes, notwithstanding that their present respectability, is sanctioned,—as some of them are,—by so high usage, as that of the *British Parliament*, or *the U. S. Congress*.

Need criticism.

CHAPTER IV.

Inflection.

§ 1. The *next* topic, in the classification, is Inflection. We have retained a separate place for this

subject, out of deference to nearly universal usage. There are *three kinds of inflection*, described in all the books :—viz.

Three forms of Inflection.

1. *The rising inflection marked* /.
2. *The falling inflection marked* \.
3. *The circumflex inflection, marked* :—∧ or ∨.

It is obvious, however, that these are nothing else, than the concrete slides, or movements of voice,—described under the head of pitch: the *first*, being the rising slide,—the *second* the falling,—and the *third* the joining of the two, in the form of what is called the *wave*.

Or three slides of voice.

§ 2. The value of these slides, or inflections, or movements of voice, has been partially explained; and their application in *emphasis*,—which is their chief use,—will be shown more fully, when we treat of that function of speech.

Of their principal remaining applications, we shall now give some account.

§ 3. The *first*, and *most important* of these, is the use of inflection *in interrogation*.

Interrogation.

There is no topic in elocution, so *confused* and perplexed, as this. Some of the books lay down more than *fifty rules*, for the government of the *inflexions* of the voice; and as though this were not confusion enough, some of them admit a three-fold application, of this endless, and—for practical purposes,—*absurd*, multiplication of rules.

Principles confused and impractical.

Even Rush, whose analysis of the functions of voice is—as we have said—so masterly and complete, presents us, in his chapter on Interrogation, only a collection of observations, but partially classified, and not generalized at all.

§ 4. The *two first principles*, ruling the inflection in interrogation,—as laid down by the elocutionists,—depend upon a division of questions into 1, *direct*

Direct and Indirect Questions. interrogations,—viz :—those which require a simple *affirmative* or *negative*, answer—yes or no,—and 2, *indirect* interrogations,—viz : those which cannot be answered, by yes or no ; but require the answer to be in the form of an independent sentence.

Do you understand ? yes, is an example of the first.

Exempified. Why do you not understand ? is an example of the second—because you cannot reply yes or no ; but must answer by a seperate sentence.

First Rule. Hence, the 1st Rule is,—*direct* questions take the *rising* inflection ;—E. g., Must I leave thee, Paradise ?

Second Rule. 2d Rule. *Indirect* questions take the *falling* inflection.

E. g., Who's there ?

§ 5. These,—which are the most general rules in

Subject to changes. *unimpassioned discourse*, are sometimes *modified* or even *reversed*, by the introduction of new elements.

For instance, the 3rd Rule is, that where the in-

Third Rule. terrogation expresses the emotion of *doubt* or *surprise*, it takes the *rising inflection ;*—even though the question may be *indirect* in form.

Who did you say was there ?

4th Rule ;—If the question is very long, or if it

Fourth Rule. closes a Paragraph, although it may have the direct form, it takes the falling inflection at the close.

" Is it not your duty, in view of all these circumstances, to acquit the prisoner ? "

5th Rule.—Where the *form* of *interrogation* is used

Fifth Rule. *figuratively*, for the purpose of affirming a truth, with more *earnestness* and *certainty*, it generally takes *the falling inflection*,—whether the question be direct or indirect. I ask gentlemen, is

such a thing possible?—is it even conceivable?

§ 5. It is common to add to these rules two others, on the following ground:—Where a question is made up of *two members*, connected by the conjunction *or*, this particle may be used either *disjunctively*, or *conjunctively*. Hence, 1, If *or* is used *disjunctively*, the *first* member of the question takes the *rising;* the *second* member the *falling, inflection*. E.g., is it morning or afternoon? Was he a poet or an orator?

Two additional Rules.

Or disjunctive indirect.

2. But if *or* is taken conjunctively, then both members take the rising inflection. Was he a poet or an orator?

Or, conjunctive indirect

§ 6. It will be perceived, however, that these are only specifications, under the first two general Rules:—because the conjunctive particle, makes the question direct,—the disjunctive indirect.

§ 6. It will be seen, farther, that even this brief condensed abstract, of the multiplied rules of the old elocutionists, is merely empirical, and arbitrary; and brings no real ruling principle into view.

Rules Arbitrary.

No Principle.

Admitting these two rules to be universally applicable, what is there in the nature of the case—it may be asked,—to make this difference between direct and indirect questions? Why should one take the rising and the other the falling inflection? And then, they are not of universal application; showing, that after all, the right principle has not yet been seized.

Not universal.

§ 7. When we come to look carefully at those exceptions, they suggest, at once, what that principle is. If we look back at the *third*, and *fifth*, rules,—enumerated above—we shall find, that the *character* of the *emotion* or *sentiment* expressed in the interrogation, completely over-

The sentiment, not the form rules.

rules the circumstance of the question being *direct*, or *indirect*.

Inflection ruled by the cadence.

§ 8. In like manner, the 4th rule proves that the same thing occurs where the question forms the true close of a sentence. In other words interrogative sentences, like all other complete sentences *close with a cadence*. Now it seems to be a very simple induction from these facts, that the inflection is determined, not by its form as a question, of this, or of that sort at all; but either first, by the *character of the emotion* or *sentiment* expressed in the interrogation, —or else secondly, by the law of construction, which closes every sentence by a cadence;—in which the voice terminates upon the *key note* of the passage.

Two principles ruling in inflection.

The emotion governs the inflection.

§ 9. If an interrogation takes the *rising inflection*, it is not because it is an interrogation, either direct or indirect,—because then the law would be uniform, but because it expresses an emotion, which naturally assumes in its expression, the rising inflection. In other words interrogations follow precisely the same laws, with other modes of speech, as to their expression. The inquiry then, is, not to which of the two classes—both of them arbitrary—the question belongs;—but what sentiment, does it express?

Emotions which take the rising slide.

§ 10. This puts us upon inquiring into the natural language of the passions. And then we shall find, that in all discourse whatever, whether interrogatory or otherwise, in expressing doubt, uncertainty or surprise, we naturally assume the rising slide. Now as these emotions are very apt to prompt questions for their relief or satisfaction, it happens very naturally that most questions take this upward slide;—not, we repeat, because they have the interrogatory form,—not because they are ques-

Why the rising slide.

tions—but because they are the language of uncertainty, doubt, surprise, or some emotion, of which that slide is the natural expression. If farther proof of this point were needed, we have it in the fact, that when the interrogation expresses certainty, sadness, or any of those emotions which naturally take the downward inflection, or concrete slide,—as most of the stronger emotions actually do,—then the question closes with that inflection, despite its being a direct question in form.

Emotions which takes the falling inflection.

All strong emotions take the falling inflection

For example, let a person put the question with the emotion of doubt, or surprise, —"Is he dead?"—and it takes throughout the rising slide. Then let him repeat it, under a conviction of its truth, and a feeling of sadness, and he at once reverses the inflection,—"Is he dead?"

If the sentiment changes.

Can anything show more conclusively that it is not the form of the question but the sentiment, that determines the inflections. The form remains identically the same, and yet the inflections are exactly reversed. So true is it,—that the sentiment will control the inflection,—just as fully, where there is no question at all. Let one utter, e. g., the following sentence, with the bitterest sneer he can assume,—"Give Brutus a statue with his ancestors,"—and he will have the extremest form of interrogatory inflection, in the slide of the octave, where there is no question at all.

The slides will change.

Emotion settles the inflection without a question.

Then let him repeat it, in the tone of authoritative command, "Give Brutus a statue with his ancestors," and the slides are instinctively reversed again.

This, then, is one of the circumstances, on which the inflection depends;—viz: the character of the emotion, intended to be expressed.

§ 11. There is another, equally influential and important. It is the law of the cadence. By that is meant the instinctive tendency of the voice, at the close of every complete sentence, to sink down, and rest, upon the key note of the sentence. It is just as essential in elocution, as it is in music, to complete the melody.

The law of cadence.

Ground of the law.

§ 12. From that law it follows as a corollary, that where a question forms the true close of a sentence, or,—in other words,—where it expresses a complete idea, it must terminate—like other complete sentences,—with the falling inflection,—i. e., with the usual form of cadence. Thus, e. g.

Affirmative sentences close with a cadence.

"Who's here so base, that he would be a bondman?"

We have a complete affirmative sentence, put in the form of a question, and it therefore conforms to the common law of cadence,—especially wherever it expresses a strong affirmation.

But if, on the other hand, the sentence is incomplete, without the answer, then the question terminates with the rising inflection—which is the natural sign of expectation, and the cadence is found in the answer, which closes, therefore, with the falling inflection.

Incomplete sentences take rising inflection.

Why.

Thus suppose,—by way of confirmation—the question to be put by a bewildered child, "Where's my father?" Here we have an indirect question, and also the falling inflection, according to rule. But now if we suppose a bystander to answer the question, but so as not to be distinctly heard: the child immediately rejoins, "Where?"

Illustrative Example.

The question is again indirect, i. e. cannot be answered by yes or no: and yet it equally assumes

the rising inflection. Here the rule breaks down.

Principle violated. Now apply the principle just stated. The question may be considered, in the first instance, as forming a com-

A complete sentence. plete sentence. It may be repeated fifty times, without any answer at all. It does not ne-

No reply expected. cessarily imply the *expectation* of an answer. It is urged and repeated, under the bewilderment and uncertainty of the circumstances, not knowing whether any body *can* answer it, or not. It is therefore a complete sentence, expressive of earnest grief, and takes the falling inflection to make the usual cadence; like any other complete sentence.

But when an answer has been given, and not being heard the question is repeated,—"*Where?*" it is clear that the question is not complete. The full,

Answer expected eager expectation of an answer suspends the voice by the rising inflection, till the reply completes both the sense and the sentence, with the usual cadence.

§ 13. Our principle then supplies both *a rule* and

A rule and a reason. *a reason* for it. The rule is, that **when a question forms a complete sentence by itself, it takes the falling inflection, if incomplete, without the answer, it takes the rising inflection.** The reason is, that in the former case,

The reason. the voice seeks to rest in the cadence expressive of a full close: in the latter it

The cadence. expresses—by the rising inflection—its expectation of something farther to be added, before it sinks down to the *cadence*, which is its natural resting place.

§ 14. The *circumflex inflection*—or in other words *the wave*—which is formed by the

Circumflex inflection. union of the two slides,—the rising and falling,—is of compartively *rare use*, in elocution,

—especially in the delivery of elevated or argumentative composition. Its chief application is in the expression of sentiments of *drollery*, *irony*, *sarcasm*, or *sneer*. Its peculiar *curling* effect, adds character to the *point* and *force* of these emotions. E. g.,

Its applications.

"They tell *us* to be *moderate*, but *they* revel in profusion."

The circumflex, or *wave*, like the single slides can embrace all the intervals of the *semitone, the second, the third, the fifth, the octave;*—according as the strength of the emotion, —and the skill of the orator,—may demand. We have already said, that one of the characteristics which distinguish the intonations of conversation, from those of reading, and formal discourse, is the *free use* of the *slides* of the wider intervals. We have now to add, that *the freedom of conversation* is very apt to *prolong* these *slides*, into the *waves* of the same intervals. With some persons, especially ladies,—as more emotional than men—this becomes habitual, and produces an extreme, which even sometimes *deforms* their elocution.

Strength of emotions.

Limits of its use.

Uses in conversation.

CHAPTER IV.

ACCENT.

§ 1. ACCENT,—the next topic in order—is commonly defined to be a *peculiar stress* or *force* of *voice*, upon certain syllables of a word, to distinguish them from the other syllables; with exclusive reference to the pronunciation.

Accent defined.

This definition, is *too narrow* because the requisite *distinction of syllables*,—which is the true function of

accent—may be effected in *other ways*, besides, mere *stress of voice.*

§ 2. There are *three* of the *properties of voice*, which are available to produce *accent.* 1st. *The radical stress*, which is a combination of *force* of voice, with *abruptness*, on the *opening sound* of the accented syllable. This is the method resorted to in the case of all syllables, which are immutably short; as in the word *accent.*

Three properties of voice in Accent.

Radical stress.

Short syllables.

2. The *median* stress, i. e., the force of the voice, *without abruptness*, and in the form of a swell; and which is applicable only to syllables of longer time;—as in the word *contrast.*

Median stress in longer syllables.

3d. *The mere increase of the time* of a syllable, without any stress of voice at all, is a very common mode of accentuation.

Increased time.

Perhaps, indeed, as the accent in English, most commonly, falls on syllables of long quantity, this method of accent, is more frequent, than any other.

The most common method.

§ 3. It is only necessary however, to remember that *accent* consists in *giving prominence* to a *syllable, for the mere purpose of pronunciation*, without adding any kind or degree of *expression* to the stress. It is precisely the fact,—that *accent* is totally destitute of all *expressiveness*, either of *sentiment* or *emotion*,—which distinguishes it from *emphasis*; which we now proceed to define and discuss.

True functions of accent.

Differs from Emphasis.

CHAPTER VI.

Emphasis.

§ 1. Emphasis,—from the Greek *εμφαινω*,—to cause

Emphasis defined. to appear—consists in giving significance to certain *words* in a sentence, with a view of giving the *fullest expression to the thought, and emotion of the speaker*.

Like accent, the characteristic, or distinctive utterance, falls mainly upon a *syllable* of the emphatic word; and commonly, upon the *accented syllable*.

The difference, then, between accent and emphasis, Misapprehension is not,—as frequently stated, that the *one* is the *prominence* given to *syllables* in a *word*, the *other* to *words* in a *sentence*; but that the one is expressive of *sentiment* or *emotion*, the *other* is *not*.

§ 2. We have said, that the *emphasis* commonly Emphasis takes precedence of accent. falls upon the accented syllable. But in case the sentiment to be emphasized, resides in the *unaccented* syllable of a compound word,—as sometimes happens,—then the *accent* gives way to *the emphasis*. E. g. He must *in*crease, but I must *de*crease.

§ 3. We have already,—in discussing the elemen- Different elements of Emphasis. tary properties of voice,—pointed out their applications so often, that we can despatch them very rapidly. Our present *practical* object, is rather to give *a classification* of the *elements*, in their *uses* as *forms of emphasis*, than to exhaust the subject.

§ 4. One of the most common errors, in regard Not wholly force. to emphasis, lies in supposing that it consists *exclusively* in an increase of the *force* of the voice. This is *one* of the elements of Emphasis of meaning. emphasis, as we have seen; and in *unimpassioned discourse*,—where the object is merely to give the meaning,—it is very generally employed in a moderate degree, to designate the important words.

But in the emphasis of *expression*, or *emotion*, where

Emphasis of Emotion.

the object is to display the *emotional sentiment*, so far from being the *only* method, it is often wholly *unallowable*.

§ 5. The first, and most obvious element of emphasis,

Three forms of stress available.

is *Force*. The *three kinds* of *stress* of voice—the *radical*—the *median*, —and the *vanishing*,—have each, its peculiar application in emphasis.

1st. the *radical stress*, is used in the expression of

Radical stress, its applications.

all the *violent passions*,—especially of the *harsher* kind,—and is of course, the only form *practicable* in *short* syllables, e, g.,—*Back*, to thy *punishment*, *false fugitive*.

2d. The *median stress*,—which requires long quantity in the syllables on which it falls,—is appropriate to *calm*, and *lofty sentiments*, *or emotions*, as e. g. Hail, holy Light—offspring of Heaven, first-born.

Median stress applications.

3d. The vanishing stress, emphasizes the *petulant*, *contemptuous emotions*. Hamlet, at the grave of Ophelia, exclams at Laertes, "Dost thou come here to *whine?*" with the upward inflection on the last word. It is also the natural language of *surprise*, in *energetic interrogation*,—especially that implying doubt.

Vanishing stress applications.

Hamlet. *Saw who* ?

Horatio. My Lord, the King, your Father.

Hamlet. The *King*, my *Father ?*—again with the upward inflection of the voice, even to an extreme degree.

§ 6. The *second* element of emphasis, is *Time* ;

Second element—Time.

which enables us to give significance to a syllable by merely dwelling upon it,—or in other words, by *increasing* its *quantity*.

The peculiar significance of this kind of emphasis,

Varied Expression. depends upon the *character* of the sound thus prolonged. We have already stated the *peculiar relations* of the time, and slides, to the several forms of *passion* or *emotion*, which they severally express.*

The third element Pitch. § 7. The *third constituent*, of emphasis, is *Pitch*.

We have already stated that it is only *the wider* Applications. intervals of pitch,—the *third*, *fifth*, or *octave*,—that serve the purpose of emphasis, and that the *stronger*, the *emphasis* the *wider* the *interval* it employs. In the *emphasis* of *emotion*,—as distinguished from the emphasis of sentiment — the *change of the pitch*, is the most *common constituent*.

Combined with time and stress. Sometimes it is *combined* with some one of the *various forms of stress*: and, of course, the use of the *wider intervals*, requires the syllables to be of *long quantity* also.

Significance lies in the inflection. But the *significance* of the emphasis often resides *exclusively* in the *inflection*. Thus Shakspeare makes the old Jew, *Shylock*, *sneeringly* exult over Antonio,—

Monies is your suit,
* * * * * * *
Hath a *dog* money? Is it possible
A *cur* can lend three thousand ducats?

To emphasize such a passage by mere *force* of voice, would destroy the expression altogether.

The *sort* of *inflection*—or change of pitch, proper Sort of inflection proper for emphatic words, depends upon the nature of the passion or emotion, sought to be expressed, and the proper adaptation of the laws of expression, at the command of the orator. For the exposition of this subject, we refer to the previous chapters on voice,† and inflection.

* See page 246, 7, 8 ; also page 239.
† See Ch. III, Sec. V, and Chapter IV.

§ 8. The *fourth* element of emphasis, is the *quality of voice*, employed on the emphatic word.

Quality of voice in emphasis.

Three qualities available.

There are three kinds of voice available for the purpose.

1. The guttural quality, is expressive of great *energy* of *feeling*,—especially of *dislike* or *settled determination*. The deep, laboring, guttural enunciation, seems to suggest a smothered, pent up, but heaving emotion, just ready to burst out without restraint or control.

Guttural quality.

2. The *aspirated quality* of voice, is, also, sometimes the instrument of emphasis, in the class of violent passions,—and often in *conjunction* with the guttural tone.

Aspirated quality.

Its expressive power seems to arise from the violent expulsion of a *larger* and more *rapid* volume of air from the lungs, than can be *vocalized*. It expresses a violence of passion transcending the power of the vocal organs, to control and *vocalize*.

Guttural quality.

Rationale.

3rd, the *tremulous quality* of voice, expresses a *high degree of excitement*, which disturbs one's quiet *command* over his muscles. This is the emphasis of *fear, joy, grief*, and kindred emotions, in their *highest forms*.

Tremulous quality.

§ 9. These constituents of emphasis, though distinguishable, not only admit of being conjoined, but, in point of fact, very often are *conjoined*, in giving the full emphasis to passages, expressive of the most excited passion. Shakspeare's Othello, e. g. is full of illustrations.

Different elements conjoined.

§ 10. We have now sufficiently explained the *mechanism* of emphasis, but there is still a question of great complexity, and difficulty, to be disposed of—viz. the question, *on what words the emphasis is to fall.*

Place of the emphasis

If we reply on the *important* words of the sentence, the reply states little else than a useless truism:—for the question returns, what are the *important* words of the sentence?

What the important words are.

§ 11. It must be obvious to all, 1, that to give the true and precise meaning, and the full expression and force, of a passage, a *right disposition* of the *emphasis* is *indispensable*.

Right emphasis indispensable.

Suppose e. g., one should repeat the words without emphasis—"Arm warriors, arm for fight," it is evident that it would be simply ridiculous. No one would believe he meant what he said: and of course, therefore, no one would obey the order. The *emotion* of the passage is a substantive part of its *import*: and therefore the emphasis, is *a part of the sense*.

2. That *blunders*, in this respect, are exceedingly *common*;—even among *educated* men.

Errors very common.

3. To embody the principles which govern all the the cases, in a system of rules, is no easy matter. One may find more than fifty rules in the books: and it need not be said, that to attempt to *read*, or *speak*, correctly, by attending to such a number of rules, would be like an unpracticed person attempting to display the graces of attitude, upon a slack rope.

Difficult to obviate.

§ 12. There are, however, a few principles of so wide application, if we can seize upon them, that they will throw great light upon the question.

There are principles.

§ 13. We shall find, by analyzing speech carefully, that emphasis really subserves *three* distinct purposes.

Three forms of Emphasis

1. The first use of emphasis, is to make *apparent* the *true sense*, or the *grammatical structure*, of the sentences. This is, sometimes,

Logical Emphasis.

a very important office, especially where important accessory ideas, are *thrown in between* the *leading terms* of the thought. e. g.

Go PREACH TO THE COWARD, thou death-telling seer!
Or, if gory Culloden so dreadful appear,
DRAW, dotard, around thy old wavering sight,
THIS MANTLE, to cover the phantoms of fright.

The main ideas in the thought, which are expressed by the chief governing words of the sentence, are brought into close and obvious relation by the emphasis. This application of the emphasis, is analogous to the device of *italicising* words, in written discourse.

Emphasis of Sentiment.

The *second* use of emphasis, is to *give prominence* to those words in a sentence which express *the sentiment*, on which we wish to fix the attention.

How Expressed.

This may be called the *emphasis of sentiment*. We have said before, that this emphasis is commonly made either by an increase in the stress, of voice, or in the time of the syllable, or by both, together with a change of the pitch.

Emphasis of Emotion.

The *third* form of emphasis, is the *emphasis of emotion*.

§ 14. In regard to the emphasis of sentiment, we remark,—

Comparison, antithesis, or contrast.

1. That it is founded upon the relation of comparison, antithesis or contrast, in the emphatic ideas. Hence the emphasis must fall upon those words, which express the ideas thus related.

Comparison.

The following examples illustrate these several relations, which it is the object of emphasis, thus to signalize.

Comparison :—

Yet half I hear the parting spirit sigh,
It is a *dread* and *awful* thing, *to die*.

Antithesis :—

Leaves have their time *to fall*,
And *flowers* to *wither* at the north wind's breath,
And *stars* to *set*;—but *all*—
Thou hast *all seasons* for thine own, *O Death!*

Contrast:—

Still as the breeze, but *dreadful* as the storm.

Or:—

It is said *fools* talk *much* to themselves; but *wise* men will talk *still more*.

2. One member of the comparison or antithesis, is often not expressed;—but the member which is expressed, is emphatic, notwithstanding. e. g., "To err is human;—implying that it may not be superhuman.

3. The ideas compared or contrasted, may sometimes run through a clause, or a member of a sentence; and then the emphasis must, in that case, rest upon the whole clause.

Emphatic Clauses.

This often gives rise to difficulty and mistakes, in adjusting the emphasis. Boswell tells us, that GARRICK and JOHNSON, once disputed about the emphasis in the Ninth Commandment,—"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor." The one said it was upon *shalt*, the other upon *not*. Both were clearly wrong. The emphasis belongs to the whole clause, "bear false witness against thy neighbor;" because this is the idea, which stands in contrast with every other prohibition. It is this, and nothing else, which the commandment forbids; and therefore this is the emphatic idea, because it is the contrasted idea.

Hence difficulty in fixing the emphasis.

Sense depends on the emphasis.

"Man never IS, but always TO BE blest." Shift the emphasis to ALWAYS and the sense is not only obscured, but reversed.

§ 15. In order to give full effect to the emphasis, the unimportant words, such as articles, auxiliaries and connecting particles, should not be emphasized. Some-

Small words not Emphasized.

times, however, the idea hinges on these small words; and then, of course, they become emphatic. E. g., He made not only A speech, but THE speech, of the evening.

Exception.

I did not say Friday OR Saturday, but Friday AND Saturday.

A series of Antithectic terms.

§ 16. When a sentence is made up of a succession of terms, set in antithesis to each other, they all take the emphasis of the downward slide. E. g.

Emphasis of the downward Slide.

"Neither life, nor death, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God."

§ 17. When the members of a sentence are composed of two terms thus related to each other, the first takes the emphasis of the rising,—the second that of the falling slide. E. g.

Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance patience, &c.

§ 18. When the ideas compared or contrasted, have two terms each, the double emphasis becomes complicated. The rule may, however, be expressed thus: In the first member, the first term, takes the emphasis of the falling slide, the second that of the rising slide; while in the second member, the first term, takes the rising the second the falling slide.

Complicated emphasis.

This will be clearer by an example:

Young men are accustomed to think themselves wise enough, as drunken men think themselves sober.

The reason of this rule may be discovered by reference to what we have already said about the principles of cadence.

§ 19. When an emphatic word is immediately re-

Words not repeated twice emphatic.

peated, it is not to be emphasized in the second case. E. g.,

Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house; thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife, nor his man-servant nor his maid-servant, &c., &c. This rule is very apt to be violated.

Exception to this rule.

When the very object of the repetition is to give the word increased significance, then the emphasis falls upon it, with even increased force the second time.

O Jerusalem, Jerusalem! thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them, that are sent unto thee, &c.

Necessity of study to appreciate sentiment.

§ 20. All these precepts in detail, may be summed in one practical canon:—to make a study of the sentiment to be delivered, and strive not only to apprehend the precise sentiment of the oration, but to enter fully into it, and strive to give it forth simply and effectively, as if it were original with the speaker, and uttered for the first time.

Such great dramatic actors, as Garrick, or Mrs. Siddons never appeared on the boards, without long, profound and tentative practice, in apprehending and giving forth the precise sentiment of the original dramatist.

Emphasis of emotion.

Not founded on comparison or contrast.

§ 21. The third object, or use of emphasis, is to express emotion. In this case there is no necessary expression of the relation of comparison er contrast in the emphatic word.

Falls on impassioned words.

This emphasis falls upon interjections, exclamations, abrupt, excited interrogations, and all words expressive of the various emotions and passions. E. g.,

But see! the angry victor hath recalled,
His ministers of vengeance and pursuit,
Back to the gates of Heaven.

We! wo! to the riders that trample them down.

§ 22. The various forms of emphasis, and their various applications in the expression of the several classes of emotions, and passions, have been already sufficiently discussed, in the form of general principles. It would be useless, and fruitless, to attempt to form those principles, *into Rules*, applicable to all the cases that may rise.

CHAPTER VII.

PAUSE.

§ 1. The only remaining topic under the first general head of elocution,—viz:—*Voice*,—is that of PAUSE. This function of speech serves *three distinct* purposes. 1, to mark the *grammatical division*, of sentences, answering, in this respect, precisely to the system of *punctuation* in writing. 2, to produce the *rhythm of speech*; i. e., the division of the *melody* into *phrases* or short sections, containing a certain succession of accented and unaccented, or of long and short syllables.

Ends of Pause.

1 Grammatical.

2Rhythmical

§ 2. The quick and attentive ear will notice this in a suppressed, and irregular form, in prose: and it is of course known to all, that its regularity both in its measures, and the order of their succession, constitutes the characteristic of *verse*. The most marked of these prosodial pauses, are those occurring in the middle and at the close of every line in poetry.:

Prose Rythm

Poetic Rythm.

Example.

Lo, the poor Indian | whose untutored mind, |
Sees God in clouds, | or hears him in the wind; |
His soul proud science | never taught to stray |
Far as the solar walk | or milky way. |

A closer analysis will disclose to the more searching and practised ear, a vastly greater number of minor prosodial, or rythmical pauses, used by all good readers, or speakers.

Other Rhythmic Pauses

I come not | friends | to steal away your hearts, |
I am | no orator | as Brutus | is.

§ 3. The third use of Pause, in Elocution, is *for emphasis*. This may be termed the *emphatic pause*. It is in fact merely one form of emphasis, and might have been treated, except out of deference to universal usage, under that head.

Pauses for emphasis.

This is entirely distinct from those pauses which mark both the punctuation or *syntax*, and the *rhythm* or *prosody*, of sentences. The pause for *emphasis*, occurs, frequently where neither the syntax nor the prosody call for a pause at all. E. g.

District from grammatic and prosodial pauses.

Lightly | they'll talk | of the spirit | that's gone,
And o'er | his cold ashes | upbraid him.

§ 4. It so far sets at defiance all the connexions of syntax, that it often comes in between words the most closely related,—between the *nominative* and the *verb*, or the *adjective* and the *noun*.

Separated related words.

He, | raised a mortal to the skies,
She, | drew an angel down.

§ 5. A slight pause, superadded to the other elements of emphasis often increases the effect in a wonderful degree. Sometimes it is made just *before*, sometimes just *after*, the emphatic word.

Pauses increases the effect of emphasis.

§ 6. Another form of the *emphatic pause*, is that sometimes called the *major* or *rhetorical* pause;—where the speaker after getting the feelings of his hearers greatly excited, makes a sudden stop of considerable duration either before,

Rhetorical Pause

or at, the close of a period. The effect of this in skilful hands is prodigious. No device in oratory is more effective. It allows the excited *imagination* to *run*, in its conceptions, far *beyond* any thing which the most masterly *elocution*, or even *eloquence*, could express in *language*.

Power of such Pause.

It resembles the device in painting, which in order to give the highest possible impression of grief or despair, partially suggests the idea, and then averts the countenance, or draws a veil over it, that the imagination may *conceive*, what *no art* could so fully *depict*.

Imaginative effect.

§ 7. When joined with the unutterable expression of *attitude* and *countenance*, it is the highest form of *rhetorical art*. Whitfield was accustomed to produce the most overwhelming impressions, by his *rhetorical, emphatic* pauses. The awful silence, amid excited thousands, whose very breathing seemed to stop, produced effects the most electrifying and never to be effaced; even when the *sentiment* of his discourse, had long *faded from the memory*.

Conjoined with action.

Power of Whitfield.

§ 8. But this very circumstance, the *extreme character* of this device in oratory, makes it *difficult and dangerous* to manage. Unless the *excitement of the imagination* and the feelings, justify its use, it is the flattest of all failures. Children had better not venture to play with edged tools.

Risk in using.

CHAPTER VIII.

Vocal Culture.

§ 1. The chief objects of criticism, so far as it aims at practical improvement, are mainly two. 1. To analyze nature, in order to dis-

Critical Study.

Objects of Criticism. cover what are the true elements of *grace* and *power*; or in other words, what are the *real sources*, of the pleasure and effect of *good oratory*.

And 2d, Having seized upon these principles, to Practical benefits. show, in clear and intelligible terms, how the *presence* and *right combination* of those principles produce the *excellencies*;—and their *absence*, or *wrong use*, the *defects*, of elocution. And Tests of efficiency. as in every other science, the truth of these principles admits of two separate Philosophical. tests: 1. Their furnishing an adequate and full explanation both of the successes Criticism. and the failures, of elocution; or in other words, making intelligent critics.

§ 2. The *second*, and far severer test, is their en- Effective execution. abling us to *produce* at will the very results themselves; in other words, their making agreeable and effective speakers.

This last, however,—it need not be said—can be Long and early practice. the result *only of long and judicious practice*, in addition to a *thorough comprehension*, of the *right principles*, and *methods*, in the case.

Instead of expecting to acquire an *agreeable* and Conditions of Success. *effective elocution*, simply by hearing lectures, the *culture* should form a part of the training,—and from an early stage,—of our education; and failing in this, a man must expect to labor,—as Demosthenes and Cicero did—for years, in *correcting faults*, and *cultivating excellencies* of voice and expression.

§ 3. And then, we are not to suppose that elocu- Elocution not everything. tion is the whole of oratory. It will not *dispense* with *sense and feeling*. Manner supposes matter. Expression supposes both *sentiment and feeling*. Without these, *the*

mere elocution, would be, like the fugle-man in militia drill, who *loads* and *aims*, with *precision* and *grace*, but fires only *blank cartridges*.

Not an art but a Science.

§ 4. But while all this is true of the *art* of elocution, the *science* is a very different matter. If the *principles* explained are *true*, and if we have succeeded in this hurried outline, in making them intelligible, they ought to explain the grounds of success or failure, in every case. There cannot be a *fault* or a *merit* in elocution, which may not be referred with precision, to one or more of these properties of voice;—viz., *quality*, *time*, *force and pitch*. The mere analysis of these, will disclose the *complete mechanism*–not only,–of plain, *unimpassioned discourse*; but of every one of the *countless varieties*, and different *shades of expression*.

Analysis explains both excellence and defect.

Intelligible analysis a source of pleasure.

Now it must be obvious that the mere power of discerning the delicate and hidden springs of sentiment and emotion, by which the soul puts itself in living sympathy with others, must be a source of lively pleasure.

Also of Power.

But to be enabled to explain, in clear and definite terms, these mysteries of spirit revealing itself to spirit, is to challenge a superiority over the mere passive slaves of imitation, in the divine art of human speech; like that of the philosopher, who is perfectly at home amid the laws and orbits of the celestial bodies—over the unlettered peasant, who gazes upon their beautiful and brilliant pathways, in the heavens.

Advantages of Science.

Condition of right Culture.

§ 5. And it must be remembered, farther, that the mastery of the true elements of vocal expression, suggests the best methods of culture in elocution;—although as

A work of time. we have said, their reduction to an *art*, is the *work of time* and labor. But still Practicable. it is no small matter, to know precisely, what is to be done, and how to do it. That it *can* be done, is too plain to be argued.

Rests on each man. Whether it *shall* be done or not, is a question which every one must decide for himself.

CHAPTER IX.

ACTION.

§ 1. The only remaining topic in Elocution—in the plan of treatment we are now pursuing—is that of ACTION.

This will not detain us long. The ancients, at- Valued by the Ancient Elocutionists. tached to it the utmost importance, and gave the most minute directions, in regard to its use in elocution.

Definition and limits. Under action, is included all that pertains to delivery, *except the voice.* It is the *sermo corporis*, of Cicero.

Austin's Cheironomia. The chief work on this subject, is *Austin's Cheironomia*,—as Rush is the great authority, on the subject of voice.

§ 2. The foundation of this branch of elocution, Ground of expression in action. is laid in the well known fact, that in all strong sentiments and emotions, the *mind* acts upon the *body*, so as to Physical signs of Emotion. give *instinctive expresion* to them, by *physical signs.* This is done chiefly through the *agency* of the *muscular system*; as exhibited in the attitude of *the body*, the movements of the limbs, and the expression of the eye and Mechanism of Physical countenance, due—partly to the

Expression. action of the muscles of the face, and partly to the heart,—which is one of the muscles—acting upon the circulation of the blood, and thus altering the color and expression both of the face and eye.

So close and invariable is this connexion between
No emotion without its physical signs. the mind and the body, that where there is no physical sign of emotion, we instinctively conclude there is no emotion felt. And, if in this case, language should be used
Profession of Emotion powerless, without. expressive of emotion, it not only fails to awaken our sympathy, but *repels* us *with dislike*, under the impression of *hypocrisy* or *heartlessness*.

Powerful language. So clearly is this a law of nature, that—as every one knows—a child will
More than. invariably regard these *physical signs*, of expression as *predominant* over language. One may rail never so hard, *in words*, but if no *expression of displeasure* appear in the countenance, he will rail in vain. Indeed, it is said that the most ferocious
Even animals feel the power of the eye. wild animals, and equally ferocious madmen, are awed and unnerved by the steady, self-possessed expression of the human eye.

And how often, in the case of rational men,—so
Reasoning Fails. called,—when *reasoning*, *entreaty*, *expostulation*, or *warning*, have been *exhausted* in vain, how often has human des-
A tear prevails. tiny been determined by the shedding of a tear.

§ 3. Action, then, including the whole of physical
Action a power in eloquence. expression—except that pertaining to the voice,—is no unimportant element of power, in elocution.

ACTION, may be used for all the purposes of the hu-
An attempt to provide a man language. With deaf-mutes
human language. it is their *only* language, and is

capable of expressing the nicest shades, both of thought and feeling.

§4. In common eloquence, however, it is *subordinate*, and *auxiliary* to *speech*: and it is in this character alone, we speak of it.

Still subordinate.

§5. The *legitimate uses* of *action* in elocution, are *two:* 1, to *display* or *convey*, and to *emphasize* the sentiment or meaning of what we utter.

Uses of action, 1, to convey thought.

2, To express emotion. The *one* we can do, with more or less effect at our option, or according to our skill. The *other* we *must* do, under the penalty of conveying the impression, either that have no emotion of any sort, or else that what we have, is affected, or worthless.

Effects emotion.

Conviction of true passion depends on physical signs.

§6. Action may be subdivided into three kinds. 1, that of general *attitude* or *posture*. 2, the expression of the *countenance* and *eye*, and 3, the action of the *arm* and *hand*:—this latter being what is commonly meant by *gesture*. This term, however, it ought to be said, is, by some writers, taken in the same wide sense, in which we use the word *action*.

3 Kinds of action.

Gesture.

§7. There is not time, nor is it necessary, to discuss these several instruments of physical expression, separately and fully. Every one knows how simple earnestness, and still more how *passion* will energise and control the *attitude*, the *countenance and eye*, and the *motions of the hand and arm*. Whoever saw a man in deep earnest,—and still less in the heat of passion,—stand upon one leg, with the other wrapped around it? or lolling on a desk, or swaggering about, like one who had no pur-

Signs and power in each.

Attitude, countenance and eye.

Gesture.

Passion takes a firm posture on the floor.

Earnest purpose express.

ed by posture.

pose, or in a word, in any other than a *firm, dignified, upright posture*, admitting of free and earnest movement, without the hazard of losing his balance.

Attitude reveals passion.

The *mere attitude*, will reveal whether a speaker is *apathetic, calm, earnest*, or *excited*, as far as he can be seen.

Attitude depends on position of the feet.

§ 8. It may not however have been noticed that the attitude of the whole person depends very much upon the posture of his feet.

Often compromised by a desk

Those speaker's whose lower-half is shielded from observation, sometimes indulge in strange dispositions of their limbs; not thinking—perhaps not knowing—that the expression of their *visible part*, is implicated.

But, it is not necessary to turn posture maker, and teach the *details* of attitude. Our object is, merely, to put the speaker on his guard. A word to the wise, is sufficient.

Expression not spiritual.

§ 9. In regard to the expression of the human countenance and eye, there is a common impression, that it is something *ethereal* and *intangible*,—approximating to an attribute of *spirit*, rather than matter. It is needless to say, that this is groundless. *Thought and feeling*, are indeed the functions of *spirit*, but all their *manifestations* are made through *material* agencies. The expression of the countenance and eye *delicate, quick, impalpable*, and *variable* as it is, can be resolved with scientific precision into its physical elements: and its whole amazing *mechanism*, laid bare to the scrutiny of analysis and the *imitations* of art. In proof of this, see the able and striking work of Sir Charles Bell, the great anatomist of England, on "The Anatomy of Expression," or the still more

But material.

Expression mechanical

perfect work of FAU, on "THE ANATOMY OF ART."

§ 10. Gesture—i. e. *action* limited to the use of the hand and arm,—is by far the *most common* form of *action* employed in elocution. "Every one," says Sheridan, "knows that with the hands, we can *demand*, or *promise; call, dismiss; threaten, supplicate; ask, deny; show joy, sorrow, detestation, fear, confession, penitence, admiration, respect;* and many other things, now in common use. But how much farther their powers might be carried, through our neglect of using them, we little know."

Gesture. Its compass in expression.

§ 11. It remains, only to point out a few of the applications of the principles ruling in gesture: and both utility and brevity will be consulted by throwing our remarks, into the form of *strictures*, or *criticisms* on faults.

Principles applied.

§ 12. Gesture may be employed for *two distinct purposes*:—viz: 1, to express, or suggest—in the way of pantomime—*the idea* conveyed in the *words* of the passage *uttered:* and 2, to express *the emotion*, appropriate to the language so uttered.

Gesture serves two purposes

It may perhaps be doubted, as it is said in the days of Cicero, to have been disputed, whether thought, can be most *impressively* expressed by *pantomime* or by *words*. But discourse certainly employs the latter, and the other is especially and peculiarly the prerogative of the deaf and dumb. Our office is to employ gesture to accompany, not supersede articulate language. In this application of gesture, and in the classification of the most common faults we mention.

Pantomime and emotional emphasis

1. The use of gestures which are not appropriate, because they do not express what is intended.

Inexpressive gesture.

A common example of this, is the usual habit of extending both hands to express duration, or number, e. g. "The days of Methusaleh were, nine hundred, sixty and nine years."

Extension of the hands to express number.

It was but a more extreme, and ludicrous instance of the same fault, that led the juvenile elocutionist to hold up to the audience, the skirt of his coat, while repeating the couplet from Goldsmith :

"Soon as the evening shades prevail,
"The moon takes up the wondrous TALE."

1. A second, and also a *very common* fault, is the use of gestures, out of place ; as at the very beginning of a speech, or where the sentiment is not *sufficiently emphatic*, to need anything beyond the simple verbal statement ; —as e. g., casting the eyes *upward*, when we happen to speak of the sky, or putting the hand upon the heart, when we speak of *love*, or *conscience*. There is no more reason for this, than for pointing to the *feet*, whenever we happen to speak of walking.

Unnecessary gestures.

Where the gesture is expressive of *reverence* or *solemnity*, or *deep emotion* of any sort, it becomes of course, *appropriate* and expressive, for *that reason* ; but even then, it should be used in connexion with *other indications*, significant of *moral emotion*, rather than a *pain in the breast*.

Emotional Gesture.

§ 13. The *second*, of the two uses of gesture,—already specified,—contains the principle of action which rules in both these cases ;—viz., that *gesture* is *generally* the language of *emotion* or *passion*, and *very rarely* that of *mere intelligence*. For this latter purpose speech alone, is generally abundantly sufficient. It is the neglect of this principle, which leads to a common fault, with some speakers, of gesturing too much.

Gesture the language of Emotion.

Words, the language of intelligence.

Excessive gesture.

Gesture for intelligence

The principle which rules in the use of gestures of mere intelligence,—pantomime,—is, that they are not called for, except where the speaker designs to draw attention to what is thus signalized ;—and that, generally, with a view to emphasis, or oratorical impression ; as, e. g., where Paul exclaims, "Ye, yourselves know, that *these hands* have ministered to my necessities, and to them that are with me."

Faults of gesturing for Emotion.

14. In regard to gestures intended to express *emotion*, most of the common faults arise from violating the fundamental rule now stated. An orator should never force himself to

Should be spontaneous.

use the sign of emotion, except where the emotion is genuine, and deep enough, to move him spontaneously, The reasons for this, are too obvious to require to be

A heated speaker will be forcible.

stated. If the speaker is heated by passion, his action may not, indeed, be graceful, and may need criticism ; but it will be,—what is far better,—*forcible.*

Embarrasment breeds faults.

§ 15. A fourth class of faults, arises from the want of self-possession ; or — in the case of speakers in a course of training,—the perplexity of remembering what comes next.

The common type of the first division of this class, is *awkwardness* ; that of the second *confusion* of manner.

Its cure.

Practice is the specific cure for both.

Want of grace.

§ 16. A fifth class, comprises those faults which arise from want of grace,—constitutional with some.

Exemplified.

Awkward attitudes of body, angular, and rectilinear movements of the arm,—and putting the hands in forced and unnatural positions, —as when the fingers stick out like the repelling

leaves of an electrometer, or form a cup-like cavity of the palm; these, and innumerable others like them, exemplify this class of faults. Criticism, with practice, is the panacea for all these evils; as well as for the sixth, and last fault we shall mention, viz., uniformity or sameness of gesture.

Criticism necessary.

Uniformity a fault.

This is very apt to be a fault of each separate institution. If one should judge, from the students, he might well fancy, that each institution had a set of moulds for gestures, into which every student had been squeezed.

The sentiment must be studied.

Study the sentiment, and enter into the emotion, of what you wish to say; then be natural, earnest, simple, and as graceful as possible.